 Digest last two cases, READ ALL CASES, fill out the syllabus.

1. Familiarize with the hierarchy of courts

2. Understand Precedent and the doctrines of Stare Decisis, Res Judicata, and Law of the Case

 Res Judicata – “bar by prior judgment” a final judgment order on the merits, rendered by a Court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case between the same parties
and their successor-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.

The requisites essential for the application of the principle are:

(1) there must be a final judgment or order;
(b) said judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) the Court rendering the same must have jurisdiction on the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be
between the two cases identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action.

 Stare Decisis - The doctrine of stare decisis, embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code, is enunciated, thus: The
doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the
rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.

 Law of the Case - A decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that
decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party being to seek a rehearing. The SC, being the court of last
resort, is the final arbiter of all legal question properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case
constitutes the law of that particular case. Once its judgment becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts,
and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify.

3. Know what are dissents and separate opinions

Concurring – Agrees with the decision

Separate – Has a different/ separate opinion of how the law was decided.
Dissenting – disagrees with the decision

4. Distinguish between Ratio Decidendi and Obiter Dictum

Ratio decidendi (Latin plural rationes decidendi) is a Latin phrase meaning "the reason" or "the rationale for the
decision". The ratio decidendi is "the point in a case that determines the judgement" or "the principle that the case
establishes".

Obiter dictum (usually used in the plural, obiter dicta) is the Latin phrase meaning "by the way",[1] that is, a remark in a
judgment that is "said in passing". It is a concept derived from English common law, whereby a judgment comprises
only two elements: ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. For the purposes of judicial precedent, ratio decidendi is binding,
whereas obiter dicta are persuasive only.

5. Learn how to handle inconsistencies in case law

 Judicial doctrines have only prospective operation and do not apply to cases previously decided. Posterior changes in
the doctrine of the Supreme Court can not retroactively be applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same proceeding,
where the prior adjudication was had, whether the case should be civil or criminal in nature.

Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC

FACTS:

             It was in 2013 when the petitioners published an posted two tarpaulins in a private compound of the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. The said tarpaulin contains the message ““IBASURA RH Law” referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354, they were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view.

The issue in this case is the second tarpaulin which contains a heading “Conscience Vote” and  lists candidates as either
“(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a checkmark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark.
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team
Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

                Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate and that the
tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH
Law but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within
the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was
not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental
right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech. 

HELD: 

FIRST ISSUE: No.

                The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no
political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..

                The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ
infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the
discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental
right to expression.
                Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and
non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers
or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch
or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

                A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers
or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting
the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.

                In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that this
right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

                The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.

                Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of  administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe
for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either
branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may come into the picture.”

                Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable
relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against
petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to
curtail petitioners’ speech.

                In the context of this case, exhaustion of their  administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their
pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

                Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to
regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties.
Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to
regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

                The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.

                Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of
endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.

                The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named  candidates and
political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in
return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

                By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are
covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,”
“fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech
that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin
is, however, definitely political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

                Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the utterance or
speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time,
place, or manner of the speech.

                The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily
divorced from the size of its medium.

                Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present
danger rule as measure.

                Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule
will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.”

                Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right
of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the
tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

                The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private
property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.

                Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an
arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties
of due process and equal protection of the laws.

                The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is
“so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

                The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The
position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one
of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the
tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

                With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of
religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into
account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a
person’s or institution’s religion.

                As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible,
from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise
thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish.”

Firestone Ceramics v. CA

FACTS:

In the case of firestone ceramics v ca, a land which was originally classified as a forest land were now declared as type
A & D lands which spouses Gana & Caros were able to obtain a certificate of title. Through the investigation of the
Lands Management Bureau, at the time that the certificate was issued, the land they claim still belongs to the forest zone
making in incapable to be registered as private property.

Spouses then in return filed a motion to dismiss alleging the petition filed against their claim of the land has no validity,
invoking the decisions of the Supreme Court in cases of Margolles vs CA and Golden Rod v CA, where the petition
questions the validity of the OCT no. 4216 were denied.

Petitioner argues that the Margolles case could not be applied to it since the elements of the doctrine of res judicata is
not present.

ISSUE: W/O the decision in the Margolles case is applicable in the case at bar, applying the doctrine of res judicata.

RULLING:

Yes it is applicable and so the petition was denied for lack of merit.

The Margolles case had long become final, thus the validity of OCT No. 4216 should no longer be disturbed and should
be applied in the instant case based on the principle of res judicata or, otherwise, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment
where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined therein or
which were necessarily included therein.

Under the rule of res judicata, also known as “bar by prior judgment” a final judgment or order on the merits, rendered
by a Court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case between the
same parties and their successor-in- interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. When a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate

DOCTRINE:

Res Judicata

Fermin v. People
FACTS

Petitioner Fermin and Tugas were accused of libel by spouses Annabel Rama Gutierrez and Eddie Gutierrez for
publishing false information about the Annabel and Eddie in a tabloid causing humiliation and disgrace on the latter.
petitioner and Tugas appealed to the CA which affirmed the conviction of petitioner, but acquitted Tugas on account of
non-participation in the publication of the libelous article.

ISSUE

Whether or not both the publisher and the Editor-in-chief are guilty of libel based on the libelous article written by
Fermin.

HELD – Res Judicata

Yes.

In U.S. v. Taylor, which provides that: “Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication
is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or
serial as fully as if he were the author of the same.” In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was made to the
Spanish text of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which includes the verb “publicar.” Thus, it was held that  Article
360 includes not only the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be published, but also the person who
prints or publishes it.

Based on these cases, therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of the offending article is
not required, if the accused has been specifically identified as “author, editor, or proprietor” or “printer/publisher” of the
publication, as petitioner and Tugas are in this case. It is worthy to note that petitioner was not only the “publisher,” as
shown by the editorial box of Gossip Tabloid but also its “president” and “chairperson” as she herself admitted on the
witness stand and petitioner had full control over the publication of articles in the said tabloid.

So her excuse of lack of knowledge, consent, or participation in the release of the libelous article fails to persuade. 
Following SC’s ruling in Ocampo, petitioner’s criminal guilt should be affirmed, whether or not she had actual
knowledge and participation, having furnished the means of carrying on the publication of the article purportedly
prepared by the members of the Gossip Reportorial Team, who were employees under her control and supervision.

In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the conviction of Fermin for libel should be upheld.  CA erred in acquitting
Tugas, he being the editor-in-chief. But the SC cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial court convicting Tugas because
with his acquittal by the CA, SC would run afoul of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS

DOCTRINE
Stare Decisis

Pepsi Cola Products Philippines v. Pagdangan

Facts: 

Pepsi-Cola announced a promotional campaign entitled “number fever” where they will give out cash for persons who
got the three number combinations on the lids of the resealable cap. So when Pepsi announced the three number
combination, a lot of participants redeemed the prize, however, their security codes were incorrect and do not
correspond to that assigned to the winning number “349”. As “goodwill” Pepsi-Cola offered to give the respondents a
small sum of money. Respondents demanded the payment of the corresponding cash prizes, but Pepsi-Cola refused.
This prompted the respondents to file a collective complaint for sum of money and damages before the RTC.

RTC dismissed the case for lack of action, holding that the three-digit number must tally with the corresponding security
code, and that it was made clear in the advertisements.

Arguments:
Pepsi-Cola: In the previous Pepsi/”349″ cases, i.e., Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan, and De Mesa, SC held that both the three-
digit number and the security code must be acquired in order for the person to be entitled to such cash prize. Pepsi-Cola
raised this, alleging that the principle of stare decisis should have been determinative of the outcome of the case at bar.

Respondents: They justified the non-application of stare decises by stating that it is required that the legal rights and
relations of the parties, and the facts, and the applicable laws, the issue, and evidence are exactly the same. They
contended that they are not similar nor identical with the previous cases, and that their basis of their action is Breach of
Contract whereas the Mendoza case involved complains for Specific Performance.

 
Issue:
Whether or not Pepsi-Cola is estopped from raising stare decisis as a defense.
 

Held:

SC held that the cases of Mendoza (and the other previous Pepsi/”349″ cases), including the case at bar, arose from the
same set of facts concerning the “Number Fever” promo debacle of Pepsi-Cola. Like the respondents, Mendoza (and the
other previous Pepsi/”349″ cases) were also the holders of supposedly-winning crowns, but were not honored for failing
to contain the correct security code assigned to such winning combination. In those old cases, SC held that the
announced mechanics clearly indicated the need for the authenticated security number in order to prevent tampering or
faking crowns; that in those cases, the legal rights and relations of the parties, the facts, the applicable laws, the causes
of action, the issues, and the evidence are exactly the same as those preceding cases. The doctrine of stare decisis
embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of
controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a similar situation.

The case ruled in favor of Pepsi invoking The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule
of law which has been established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases
involving a similar situation.

People v. Olarte

FACTS:

This is the second time that the present case is brought on appeal, Defendant Ascencion Olarte is charged with libel after
allegedly writing letters address to Mss. Visitacion Meris with the purpose of insulting and humiliating her. The latter
then filed with the provincial fiscal the corresponding charge of libel. However, said filing was beyond the
commencement of the prescription of filing for the crime of libel which is 2 years since she already filed a complaint
with the justice of peace prior.

OLARTE presented anew a motion to quash the information on the ground of prescription of the offense, invoking  the
subsequent ruling of the SC in the case of People vs. Coquia. The CFI sustained OLARTE's new motion to quash upon
the ground of prescription. The set of facts in this case is practically identical with those of the  Coquia case. Inasmuch
as the latter is inconsistent with or contradicts the previous decision, the 1963 ruling in the  Coquia case indicates that
the SC intended to abandon the one made in 1960 in the first appeal of this case. The prosecution interposed the present
appeal to the SC on a pure question of law.

ISSUE/S:

W/O the ruling on the first appeal: the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace (or municipal judge) does
interrupt the course of the prescriptive term or the decision in the later case of People vs. Coquia: to produce
interruption the complaint or information must have been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the case on
its merits

RULING:

DOCTRINE: The filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. 

Art. 91, RPC, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or
investigation merely, or for action on the merits even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only
proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender,
and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted.

It is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control.

The SC's ruling in the previous case, rendered on the first appeal, constitutes the law of the case, and, even if erroneous,
it may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final long ago. A subsequent reinterpretation of the law
may be applied to new cases but certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively determined

Law of the case

the opinion delivered on a former appeal Whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of
decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before
the court. 

GENERAL RULE: A decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that decision
is right or wrong, the remedy of the party being to seek a rehearing.
The SC, being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal question properly brought before it and that its
decision in any given case constitutes the law of that particular case. Once its judgment becomes final it is binding on
all inferior courts, and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify.
Judicial doctrines have only prospective operation and do not apply to cases previously decided.  Our recent
interpretation of the law may be applied to new cases, but certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively
determined.
Posterior changes in the doctrine of this Court can not retroactively be applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same
proceeding where the prior adjudication was had, whether the case should be civil or criminal in nature.
SANTOS CASE

Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to
be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court
Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with
the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and
he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred,
because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple
would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living
independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with
his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When
Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch
with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

Leo

Issue:
Whether or not Leouel’s marriage with Julia can be declared invalid.

Ruling:
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with
less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme.
Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in
Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:The Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law.

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be
given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision. So the progress
was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be,
however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some
psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here
described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the
contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he
cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal
act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which
could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true
psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb.
5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the
person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving
consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by
these duties.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society,
then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code. The above provisions
express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets
we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a
nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

The petition is denied.

OCHOSA V. ALANO 

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.

FACTS: 

Jose, a young lieutenant in the AFP, married Bonain Basilan in 1973. In 1976, they adopted as their daughter Ramona.
During the marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippines as a member of the AFP. Bona did not
cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in Basilan. Bona had illicit relations with other men whenever Jose was
assigned in various parts of the country. She was even caught by a security aide having sex with Jose’s driver. Word
circulated of such infidelity and when Jose confronted Bona about it, the latter admitted her relationship with said
driver. Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of Bona’s psychological incapacity to
fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. Jose and his two military aides testified on Bona’s infidelity. A psychiatrist
testified that after conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion that Bona was suffering from histrionic
personality disorder and that her personality was that she had an excessive emotion and attention seeking behavior and
therefore could not develop sympathy in feelings and had difficulty in maintaining emotional intimacy. She further
testified that whenever Jose was gone, her extramarital affairs was her way of seeking attention and emotions from other
persons and that said disorder was traceable to her family history, having for a father a gambler and womanizer and a
mother who was a battered wife. Finally, the psychiatrist said that there was no possibility of a cure since Bona did not
have an insight of what was happening to her and refused to acknowledge the reality. The Solicitor-General opposed the
petition.

ISSUE: 

Whether Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. NO

RATIO: 

Article 36 of the Family Code provides: “a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.” In Santos v. CA, it was held that  psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved. In Republic v. CA and Molina, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code were laid down: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2)
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable, whether absolute or relative only in regard to the other spouse; (5) Such
illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage;
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code; (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts; and (8) The trial court must
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. In Marcos v. Marcos,
it was held that the foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated and that what is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately  establish the
party’s psychological condition. In the case at bar, the evidence presented were the testimonies of Jose, his military
aides and the psychiatrist. But this is inadequate in proving that her “defects” were already present at the inception of, or
prior to, the marriage. Only the uncorroborated testimony of Jose supported the allegation that Bona’s sexual
promiscuity already existed prior to the marriage. The psychiatrist’s testimony on Bona’s histrionic personality disorder
did not meet the standard of evidence required in determining psychological incapacity as her findings did not emanate
from a personal interview with Bona herself and merely relied on her interview with Jose and his other witnesses. This
factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Jose’s
cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration. In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological
incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her
marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with
a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.

Carpio-Morales v. CA

FACTS:
– The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition, and her
corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act, which
reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted
by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is
outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the
Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

– The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from extending
provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase
“[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court,” the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not
cover the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?

RULING: The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued; The second paragraph is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND INVALID.

The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from
the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it
encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Through this provision, Congress interfered with a
provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both
integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may
be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued
therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the
first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also
practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by
supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same.

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or findings” of the Ombudsman
to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770- attempts to effectively increase
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former
provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should squarely
apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they “cover the same specific or
particular subject matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of the CA’s
subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent proceedings relative
thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its
own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the
jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on
the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case
where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any
proceeding.

Meralco v. Castro, G.R. No. L-49623(June 29,1982) (including dissent of J. Teehankee)

FACTS:

This case involves the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution that no private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area,
that prohibition is not found in the 1935 Constitution. The Manila Electric Company, prayed for the confirmation of
their application of two lots with a total area of 655 sq, this is a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws.

The lower court dismissed the application of Meralco on the grounds that Meralco is distinguished a private corporation
therefore is disqualified to hold alienable public lands.

ISSUE:

w/o not Meralco had acquired upon the completion of the 30th year of continuous and unchallenged occupation

RULING:

The ruling of the Court that Meralco as a juridical person is disqualified to apply for its registration under Section 48 (b)
of the Public Land Act for applicant’s immediate predecessors-in-interest are or constitute a grant or concession by the
State; and before they could acquire any right under such benefits, the applicant’s immediate predecessors- in-interest
should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits.

Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr.,

Tehankee -

He invoked the established doctrine in the Case of Susi vs. Razon wherein an open, continuous, adverse and public
possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time
by a private confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and
becomes private property therefore, the application of Meralco should be granted.
Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 73002 (Dec 12 1986)

FACTS:

Land acquired in 1962 – corporations allowed to acquire lands not beyond 1024 hectares

1973 Constitution – Does not allow

1982 – 30th Year

Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

The director of lands appealed by certiorari over the decisions of the Appellate court affirming the decision which
ordered the registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. The land measures 481, 390 more or less acquired
from the Dumagat Tribe. It is also related with the case of Meralco vs Castro, where Acme is a corporation a private
corporation. Which according to sec 11 of art. 14 of the 1987 constitution, prohibits private corporations or associations
for holding alienable rights.

ISSUES:

RULING:

The Meralco v Castro doctrine was abandoned and the correct rule, Susi vs. Razon was followed.

Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter."

The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful possessor of
the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of
the Government

DOCTRINE: