JERRY VALEROSO VS.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

September 3, 2009
G.R. No. 164815

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under
P.D. 1866 and was found liable as charged before the RTC of Quezon City.

On July 10, 1996, the Central District Command served a duly issued warrant of
arrest to Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso in a case of kidnapping for ransom. Valeroso was
found and arrested in INP Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City where he was about to
board a tricycle. He was bodily searched and after which a firearm with live
ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was later verified by the
Firearms and Explosive Division at Camp Crame and was confirmed and revealed to
have not been issued to the petitioner but to another person.

The defense on the other hand contended that Valeroso was arrested and
searched in the boarding house of his children in New Era Quezon City. He was
aroused from his slumber when four heavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted the
room. The pointed their guns on him and pulled him out of the room as the raiding
team went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Moments later an operative
came out of the room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside.

Adrian Yuson, an occupant to the adjacent room testified for the defense. SPO3
Timbol, Jr. testified that the firearm with live ammunition was issued to Jerry Valeroso
by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt. The petitioner was found guilty as charged by the
RTC. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the same. Hence this petition. Petitioner
raised the issue of legality of the search and the admissibility and validity of the evidence
obtained as the same was the “fruit of the poisonous tree”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and

ammunition valid.
RULING:

NO. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section
2, Article III of the Constitution which states:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a general

rule, the procurement of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search
or seize the person, house, papers, or effects of any individual.
FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. NO. 160261
November 10, 2003
 
 
Facts:

On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives

adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings,
superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner
of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
(first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by
House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5
August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The
House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003
for being insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed
with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated
by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of
all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the
Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.”

Issues:
 Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint
constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution.
 
 
Rulings:

This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the
judicial power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question
which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent
is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is
the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of
the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover,
Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to
make rules.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental
law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without
need of referendum.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken
thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices
of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August
5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003
violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
 
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28,
2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of
the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3
of Article XI of the Constitution.

Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)

Facts:

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members
Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to
be applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to
regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also
asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for
being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose
P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class
motels;  there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying
their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to
be violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room
or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this
for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the
hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Issue:

Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process
clause?

Held: No.
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not
lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police
power. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation
of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of
some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual
foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the
pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the
judgment against the ordinance set aside.”
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and
prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the
same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due
process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the
power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which
the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or
property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process
which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged
ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided.
 Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process
are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an alleged
failure to meet the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police
power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and
regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed
a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from
applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to
interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s police power.
In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the
amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed
purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24
hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the
good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and
the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his
mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in
the sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way
to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual
relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the
mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more
rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of
property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of
establishments, and the “full rate of payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no
canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean."

1-UTAK, Petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 206020,       April 14, 2015

FACTS:

On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which
provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013
national and local elections and subsequent elections.  Section 7 thereof, which
enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda, pertinently provides:

SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the campaign period, it is

unlawful:

xxx

(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of
authorized common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without the
consent of the owner thereof.

(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following:

xxx

5.  Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and
tricycles, whether motorized or not;

6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports,

seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation
of the public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the
transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.

Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the application of

Resolution No. 9615 particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f),
vis-à-vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The
petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the
assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post
election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals.

The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which denied the
petitioner’s request to reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in
relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 are constitutional.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are null and
void for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are prior
restraints on speech

                Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615
unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech.  Central
to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private
transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election
campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them.

Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election

campaign material during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries
with it the penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall make the owner
thereof liable for an election offense.

The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the
owners of PUVs and transport terminals.  As a result of the prohibition, owners of
PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing
their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation
of their franchise or permit to operate. 

JUSTA G. GUIDO
v.
Rural Progress Administration
G.R. No. L-2089
31 October 1949

FACTS:

Justa Guido, owner of the land being expropriated by the Rural Progress
Administration (RPA), filed a petition for prohibition to prevent RPA and Judge Oscar
Castelo from proceeding with the expropriation. Guido alleged, among others, that the
land sought to be expropriated is commercial and therefore excluded within the
purview of the provisions of Act 539.Commonwealth Act No. 539 authorized the
President of the Philippines to acquire private lands orany interest therein through
purchaser or farms for resale at a reasonable price. The National Assembly approved
this enactment on the authority of section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution which
provides that the Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
individuals.

Issue:

Whether the expropriation of Guido’s land is in conformity to the principle of Social

Justice.

RULING:
The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply
paramount basis for untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress
Administration or any other government instrumentality. Social justice does not
champion division of property or equality of economic status; what it and the
Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of political rights,
equality before the law, equality between values given and received, and equitable
sharing of the social and material goods on the basis of efforts exerted in their
production.