VOL. 184, APRIL 3, 1990 corroborative and is not an indispensable element in the prosecution of this case (People v.

Alfonso,
supra).

105
APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Br. 2.

People vs. Orita

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

G.R. No. 88724. April 3, 1990.*

     The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CEILITO ORITA alias “Lito,” defendant-
appellant.      C. Manalo for defendant-appellant.

Criminal Law; Rape; Court; Findings of fact of the trial court on credibility of witnesses should be
accorded the highest respect.—We find no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the
findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect MEDIALDEA, J.:
because it has the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and can discern if a witness is
telling the truth (People v. Samson, G.R. No. 55520, August 25, 1989).
The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 83-031-B
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch II, Borongan, Eastern Samar. The information filed in the said
Same; Same; Perfect penetration is not essential for the consummation of rape.—Clearly, in the crime of case reads as follows (p. 47, Rollo):
rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose
and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing
more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the “The undersigned Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal upon prior complaint under oath by the offended
crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long line of cases (People v. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People v. party, accuses CEILITO ORITA alias LITO of the crime of Rape committed as follows:
Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People v. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666; People v.
Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have set the uniform rule that for the
consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the
“That on March 20, 1983, at about 1:30 o’clock in the morning inside a boarding house at Victoria St.,
male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
Poblacion, Borongan, Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no
above named accused with lewd designs and by the use of a Batangas knife he conveniently provided
penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559; People v. Rabadan, et al., 53 Phil. 694;
himself for the purpose and with threats and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
United States v. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender
feloniously lay with and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Cristina S. Abayan against her
merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature,
will and without her consent.
elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly
conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.”

Same; Same; The accused may be convicted of rape on the basis of the credible testimony of the victim.
—The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the
victim’s testimony if credible (People v. Tabago, G.R. No. 69778, November 8, 1988, 167 SCRA 65;
People v. Aragona, G.R. No. L-43752, September 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 569; People v. Taduyo, G.R. Nos. L-
37928-29, September 29, 1987, 154 SCRA 349). Moreover, Dr. Zamora’s testimony is merely
Upon being arraigned, the accused entered the plea of not guilty to the offense charged. After the
witnesses for the People testified and the exhibits were formally offered and admitted, the prosecution
rested its case. Thereafter, the defense opted not to present any exculpatory evidence and instead filed a
Motion to Dismiss. On August 5, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads (pp. 59-60, Rollo):
“WHEREFORE, the Court being morally certain of the guilt of accused CEILITO ORITA @ LITO, of the
crime of Frustrated Rape (Art. 335, RPC), beyond reasonable doubt, with the aggravating circumstances
of dwelling and nightime (sic) with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and considering the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, imposes on accused an imprisonment of TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, PRISION MAYOR, as minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS PRISION MAYOR,
maximum; to indemnify CRISTINA S. ABAYAN, the amount of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) pesos,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay costs.
“SO ORDERED.”
Not satisfied with the decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. On December 29, 1988,
the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 102, Rollo):
“WHEREFORE, the trial court’s judgment is hereby MODIFIED, and the appellant found guilty of the
crime of rape, and consequently, sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
“SO ORDERED.”
On January 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution setting aside its December 29, 1988
decision and forwarded the case to this Court, considering the provision of Section 9, paragraph 3 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in conjunction with Section 17, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948.
The antecedent facts as summarized in the People’s brief are as follows (pp. 71-75, Rollo):
“Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph’s College at
Borongan, Eastern Samar. Appellant was a Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldier.
“In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at her boarding house. Her classmates
had just brought her home from a party (p. 44, tsn, May 23, 1984). Shortly after her classmates had left,
she knocked at the door of her boarding house (p. 5, ibid). All of a sudden, somebody held her and
poked a knife to her neck. She then recognized appellant who was a frequent visitor of another boarder
(pp. 8-9, ibid).
“She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since the door which
led to the first floor was locked from the inside, appellant forced complainant to use the back door
leading to the second floor (p. 77, ibid). With his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand
poking a ‘balisong’ to her neck, appellant dragged complainant up the stairs (p. 14, ibid). When they
reached the second floor, he commanded her to look for a room. With the Batangas knife still poked to
her neck, they entered complainant’s room.
“Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant who hit her head on the wall. With one hand
holding the knife, appellant undressed himself. He then ordered complainant to take off her clothes.
Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then he pulled off her bra, pants and panty (p. 20, ibid).
“He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert
it in her vagina. She followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her. At said position,
however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered her as she kept on
moving (p. 23, ibid).
“Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position, only a small
part again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant had both his hands flat on
the floor. Complainant thought of escaping (p. 20, ibid).
“She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. Appellant pursued her and climbed the
partition. When she saw him inside the room, she ran to another room. Appellant again chased her. She
fled to another room and jumped out through a window (p. 27, ibid).
“Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, which was about eighteen meters in front of the
boarding house, and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the building and
knocked on the back door. When the policemen who were inside the building opened the door, they
found complainant naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, the first policeman to see her, took
off his jacket and wrapped it around her. When they discovered what happened, Pat. Donceras and two
other policemen rushed to the boarding house. They heard a sound at the second floor and saw
somebody running away. Due to darkness, they failed to apprehend appellant.

“Meanwhile, the policemen brought complainant to the Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she
was physically examined.
“Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude, the resident physician who examined complainant, issued a Medical Certificate
(Exhibit ‘A’) which states:
‘Physical Examination—Patient is fairly built, came in with loose clothing with no under-clothes;
appears in state of shock, per unambulatory.
‘PE Findings—Pertinent Findings only.
‘Neck—Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck.
‘Breast—Well developed, conical in shape with prominent nipples; linear abrasions below (L) breast.
‘Back—Multiple pinpoint marks.
‘Extremities—Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees.
‘Vulva—No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over the vulva, errythematous (sic) areas
noted surrounding vaginal orifice, tender; hymen intact; no laceration fresh and old noted; examining
finger can barely enter and with difficulty; vaginal canal tight; no discharges noted.’ ”
As aforementioned, the trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.
In this appeal, the accused assigns the following errors:
1)The trial court erred in disregarding the substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses;
and
2)The trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was committed by the accused.
The accused assails the testimonies of the victim and Pat. Donceras because they “show remarkable and
vital inconsistencies and its incredibility amounting to fabrication and therefore casted doubt to its
candor, truth and validity.” (p. 33, Rollo)
A close scrutiny of the alleged inconsistencies revealed that they refer to trivial inconsistencies which
are not sufficient to blur or cast doubt on the witnesses’ straightforward attestations. Far from being
badges of fabrication, the inconsistencies in their testimonies may in fact be justifiably considered as
manifestations of truthfulness on material points. These little deviations also confirm that the witnesses
had not been rehearsed. The most candid witnesses may make mistakes sometimes but such honest
lapses do not necessarily impair their intrinsic credibility (People v. Cabato, G.R. No. L-37400, April 15,
1988, 160 SCRA 98). Rather than discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, discrepancies on
minor details must be viewed as adding credence and veracity to such spontaneous testimonies
(Aportadera, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-41358, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 695). As a
matter of fact, complete uniformity in details would be a strong indication of untruthfulness and lack of
spontaneity (People v. Bazar, G.R. No. L-41829, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 609). However, one of the
alleged inconsistencies deserves a little discussion which is, the testimony of the victim that the accused
asked her to hold and guide his penis in order to have carnal knowledge of her. According to the
accused, this is strange because “this is the only case where an aggressor’s advances is being helped-out
by the victim in order that there will be a consumation of the act.” (p. 34, Rollo). The allegation would
have been meritorious had the testimony of the victim ended there. The victim testified further that the
accused was holding a Batangas knife during the aggression. This is a material part of the victim’s
testimony which the accused conveniently deleted.
We find no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect because it has the advantage of
observing the demeanor of witnesses and can discern if a witness is telling the truth (People v. Samson,
G.R. No. 55520, August 25, 1989). We quote with favor the trial court’s finding regarding the testimony
of the victim (p. 56, Rollo):
“As correctly pointed out in the memorandum for the People, there is not much to be desired as to the
sincerity of the offended party in her testimony before the court. Her answer to every question
profounded (sic), under all circumstances, are plain and straightforward. To the Court she was a picture
of supplication hungry and thirsty for the immediate vindication of the affront to her honor. It is
inculcated into the mind of the Court that the accused had wronged her; had traversed illegally her
honor.”
When a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
was committed provided her testimony is clear and free from contradiction and her sincerity and
candor, free from suspicion (People v Alfonso, G.R. No. 72573, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 487; People
v. Alcid, G.R. Nos. 66387-88, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 280; People v. Soterol, G.R. No. 53498,
December 16, 1985, 140 SCRA 400). The victim in this case did not only state that she was raped but she
testified convincingly on how the rape was committed. The victim’s testimony from the time she
knocked on the door of the municipal building up to the time she was brought to the hospital was
corroborated by Pat. Donceras. Interpreting the findings as indicated in the medical certificate, Dr.
Reinerio Zamora (who was presented in view of the unavailability of Dr. Abude) declared that the
abrasions in the left and right knees, linear abrasions below the left breast, multiple pinpoint marks,
circumscribed hematoma at the anterior neck, erythematous area surrounding the vaginal orifice and
tender vulva, are conclusive proof of struggle against force and violence exerted on the victim (pp. 52-
53, Rollo). The trial court even inspected the boarding house and was fully satisfied that the narration of
the scene of the incident and the conditions therein is true (p. 54, Rollo):
“x x x. The staircase leading to the first floor is in such a condition safe enough to carry the weight of
both accused and offended party without the slightest difficulty, even in the manner as narrated. The
partitions of every room were of strong materials, securedly nailed, and would not give way even by
hastily scaling the same.”
A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in judging rape complaints (People v. Torio, et al.,
G.R. No. L-48731, December 21, 1983, 126 SCRA 265). Thus, the trial court added (p. 55, Rollo):
“x x x And the jump executed by the offended party from that balcony (opening) to the ground which
was correctly estimated to be less than eight (8) meters, will perhaps occasion no injury to a frightened
individual being pursued. Common experience will tell us that in occasion of conflagration, especially
occuring (sic) in high buildings, many have been saved by jumping from some considerable heights
without being injured. How much more for a frightened barrio girl, like the offended party to whom
honor appears to be more valuable than her life or limbs? Besides, the exposure of her private parts
when she sought assistance from authorities, as corroborated, is enough indication that something not
ordinary happened to her unless she is mentally deranged. Sadly, nothing was adduced to show that
she was out of her mind.”
In a similar case (People v. Sambili, G.R. No. L-44408, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 312), We ruled
that:
“What particularly imprints the badge of truth on her story is her having been rendered entirely naked
by appellant and that even in her nudity, she had to run away from the latter and managed to gain
sanctuary in a house owned by spouses hardly known to her. All these acts she would not have done
nor would these facts have occurred unless she was sexually assaulted in the manner she narrated.”
The accused questions also the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses to corroborate the
allegations in the complaint and the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually
examined the victim. Suffice it to say that it is up to the prosecution to determine who should be
presented as witnesses on the basis of its own assessment of their necessity (Tugbang v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 56679, June 29, 1989; People v. Somera, G.R. No. 65589, May 31, 1989). As for
the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually examined the victim, the trial court stated
that it was by agreement of the parties that another physician testified inasmuch as the medico-legal
officer was no longer available. The accused did not bother to contradict this statement.
Summing up, the arguments raised by the accused as regards the first assignment of error fall flat on its
face. Some were not even substantiated and do not, therefore, merit consideration. We are convinced
that the accused is guilty of rape. However, We believe the subject matter that really calls for
discussion, is whether or not the accused’s conviction for frustrated rape is proper. The trial court was
of the belief that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim and
thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only.
The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape. The Solicitor General shares the same
view.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and enumerates the elements of the crime of rape:
“ART. 335. When and how rape is committed.—Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
“1.By using force or intimidation;
“2.When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
“3.When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned
in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
“x x x .”
Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a woman
(Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 193).
On the other hand, Article 6 of the same Code provides:

“ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.—Consummated felonies as well as those
which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
“A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent
of the will of the perpetrator.
“There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.”
Correlating these two provisions, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages apply
to the crime of rape. Our concern now is whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape.
The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of
the perpetrator’s will. In the leading case of United States v. Eduave, 36 Phil. 209, 212, Justice Moreland
set a distinction between attempted and frustrated felonies which is readily understood even by law
students:
“x x x A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission of
the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing all of the
acts which should produce the crime. In other words, to be an attempted crime the purpose of the
offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior
to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence,
which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the
consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt.
The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is
no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of
the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed which should result in the
consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at
the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point
by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.”
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he
actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have
been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last
act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long line of cases (People v.
Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People v. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People v. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29,
1974, 56 SCRA 666; People v. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have set
the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female
organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.
Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil.
559; People v. Rabadan, et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of
execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and
jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be
committed.
Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v. Eriñia, 50 Phil. 998 [1927]
where We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no conclusive evidence of
penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. However, it appears that this is a “stray”
decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions. Likewise, We are aware of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 2632 (dated September 12,
1960) and Republic Act No. 4111 (dated March 29, 1965) which provides, in its penultimate paragraph,
for the penalty of death when the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion thereof. We are of the opinion that this particular provision on frustrated rape
is a dead provision. The Eriñia case, supra, might have prompted the law-making body to include the
crime of frustrated rape in the amendments introduced by said laws.
In concluding that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim, the
trial court relied on the testimony of Dr. Zamora when he “categorically declared that the findings in
the vulva does not give a concrete disclosure of penetration. As a matter of fact, he tossed back to the
offended party the answer as to whether or not there actually was penetration.” (p. 53, Rollo)
Furthermore, the trial court stated (p. 57, Rollo):
“x x x It cannot be insensible to the findings in the medical certificate (Exhibit ‘A’) as interpreted by Dr.
Reinerio Zamora and the equivocal declaration of the latter of uncertainty whether there was
penetration or not. It is true, and the Court is not oblivious, that conviction for rape could proceed from
the uncorroborated testimony of the offended party and that a medical certificate is not necessary
(People v. Royeras, People v. Orteza, 6 SCRA 109, 113). But the citations the people relied upon cannot
be applicable to the instant case. The testimony of the offended party is at variance with the medical
certificate. As such, a very disturbing doubt has surfaced in the mind of the court. It should be stressed
that in cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all
respect, compliment each other, for otherwise to rely on the testimony alone in utter disregard of the
manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of mischievous results.”
“Q

The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim and the medical certificate does not exist. On
the contrary, it is stated in the medical certificate that the vulva was erythematous (which means And was it inserted?
marked by abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary congestion, as in inflammation) and tender. It
bears emphasis that Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the genital organ of the victim. He
merely testified that there was uncertainty whether or not there was penetration. Anent this testimony, “A
the victim positively testified that there was penetration, even if only partially (pp. 302, 304, t.s.n., May
23, 1984):
Yes only a little.”

“Q
The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the
victim’s testimony if credible (People v. Tabago, G.R. No. 69778, November 8, 1988, 167 SCRA 65;
Was the penis inserted on your vagina? People v. Aragona, G.R. No. L-43752, September 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 569; People v. Taduyo, G.R. Nos. L-
37928-29, September 29, 1987, 154 SCRA 349). Moreover, Dr. Zamora’s testimony is merely
corroborative and is not an indispensable element in the prosecution of this case (People v. Alfonso,
“A supra).

It entered but only a portion of it.” Although the second assignment of error is meritorious, it will not tilt the scale in favor of the accused
because after a thorough review of the records, We find the evidence sufficient to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape.

Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx

The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. Thus, the proper
“Q imposable penalty is death. In view, however, of Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution and
Our ruling in People v. Millora, et al., G.R. Nos. L-38968-70, February 9, 1989, that the cited
Constitutional provision did not declare the abolition of the death penalty but merely prohibits the
What do you mean when you said comply, or what act do you referred (sic) to, when you said comply? imposition of the death penalty, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty
whenever it was called for under the Revised Penal Code but instead reduced the same to reclusion
perpetua (People v. Solis, et al., G.R. Nos. 78732-33, February 14, 1990). Reclusion perpetua, being a
single indivisible penalty under Article 335, paragraph 3, is imposed regardless of any mitigating or
“A
aggravating circumstances (in relation to Article 63, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code; see People v.
Arizala, G.R. No. 59713, March 15, 1982, 112 SCRA 615; People v. Manzano, G.R. No. L-38449,
November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 705; People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 70744, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 702).
I inserted his penis into my vagina.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. The accused Ceilito
Orita is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Decision modified.
Note .—Fact that no spermatozoa was found in complainant’s private part does not disprove
consummation of rape. The slightest penetration even without emission is sufficient to constitute the
crime of rape. (People vs. Budol, 143 SCRA 241.)
People vs. Campuhan
G.R. No. 129433. March 30, 2000.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO, accused-
appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape; Words and Phrases; Touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean
mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the
external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis—there must be sufficient and convincing proof
that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the
external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.—In People v. De la Peña
we clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if the attacker’s penis merely touched the
external portions of the female genitalia were made in the context of the presence or existence of an
erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the accused failed to achieve an erection, had a limp or
flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into the victim’s vagina, the Court nonetheless
held that rape was consummated on the basis of the victim’s testimony that the accused repeatedly
tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her vagina and in all likelihood reached the labia of her
pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her vulva, or that the penis of the accused touched
the middle part of her vagina. Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere
epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external
layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing
proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the
external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are
required to be “touched” by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or
the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the
surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum
constitutes consummated rape.
Same; Same; Same; Attempted Rape; Acts of Lasciviousness; “Pudendum” or “Vulva,” “Mons Pubis,”
“Labia Majora,” “Labia Minora, “ Explained; Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the
female organ, i.e. touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated
rape—at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.—The pudendum or vulva is
the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis,
labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the
rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next
layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and
the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented,
while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands.
Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must
be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female
organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum
is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the
female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated
rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Same; Same; To the mind of the Supreme Court, the case at bar merely constitutes a “shelling of the
castle of orgasmic potency,” or a “strafing of the citadel of passion.”—Judicial depiction of
consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted “touching of the female organ,” but has also
progressed into being described as “the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the
pudendum,” or “the bombardment of the drawbridge.” But, to our mind, the case at bar merely
constitutes a “shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency,” or as earlier stated, a “strafing of the citadel of
passion.”
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Witnesses; It is the burden of the prosecution to establish how
the witness could have seen the sexual contact and to shove her account into the permissive sphere of
credibility—to hold otherwise would be to resolve the doubt in favor of the prosecution but to run
roughshod over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent.—It can reasonably be
drawn from the foregoing narration that Primo’s kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation
impossible. Not even a vantage point from the side of the accused and the victim would have provided
Corazon an unobstructed view of Primo’s penis supposedly reaching Crysthel’s external genitalia, i.e.,
labia majora, labia minora, hymen, clitoris, etc., since the legs and arms of Primo would have hidden his
movements from Corazon’s sight, not to discount the fact that Primo’s right hand was allegedly holding
his penis thereby blocking it from Corazon’s view. It is the burden of the prosecution to establish how
Corazon could have seen the sexual contact and to shove her account into the permissive sphere of
credibility. It is not enough that she claims that she saw what was done to her daughter. It is required
that her claim be properly demonstrated to inspire belief. The prosecution failed in this respect, thus we
cannot conclude without any taint of serious doubt that intergenital contact was at all achieved. To hold
otherwise would be to resolve the doubt in favor of the prosecution but to run roughshod over the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent. Same; Same; It is inconsistent with man’s
instinct of self-preservation to remain where he is and persist in satisfying his lust even when he knows
fully well that his dastardly acts have already been discovered or witnessed by no less than the mother
of his victim.—It is inconsistent with man’s instinct of self-preservation to remain where he is and
persist in satisfying his Just even when he knows fully well that his dastardly acts have already been
discovered or witnessed by no less than the mother of his victim. For, the normal behavior or reaction
of Primo upon learning of Corazon’s presence would have been to pull his pants up to avoid being
caught literally with his pants down. The interval, although relatively short, provided more than
enough opportunity for Primo not only to desist from but even to conceal his evil design.
Same; Same; Witnesses; Although a child’s testimony must be received with due consideration on
account of her tender age, the Supreme Court still endeavors to harness only what in her story appears
to be true, acutely aware of the equally guaranteed rights of the accused.—Antithetically, the possibility
of Primo’s penis having breached Crysthel’s vagina is belied by the child’s own assertion that she
resisted Primo’s advances by putting her legs close together; consequently, she did not feel any intense
pain but just felt “not happy” about what Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted “Ayo’ko, ayo’ko!
not “Aray ko, aray ko!” In cases where penetration was not fully established, the Court had anchored
its conclusion that rape nevertheless was consummated on the victim’s testimony that she felt pain, or
the medico-legal finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was already
gaping with redness, or the hymenal tags were no longer visible. None was shown in this case.
Although a child’s testimony must be received with due consideration on account of her tender age, the
Court endeavors at the same time to harness only what in her story appears to be true, acutely aware of
the equally guaranteed rights of the accused. Thus, we have to conclude that even on the basis of the
testimony of Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held liable for consummated rape; worse, be
sentenced to death.
Same; Same; Evidence; In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate,
both should in all respects complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone,
in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of
unwarranted or even mischievous results.—In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a
medical certificate, both should in all respects complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the
testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would
be productive of unwarranted or even mischievous results. It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether
the penis of the accused in reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately
conclude that rape was consummated. Failing in this, the thin line that separates attempted rape from
consummated rape will significantly disappear.
Same; Same; Attempted Rape; Rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of
rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance.—Under Art. 6, in
relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. All the elements of attempted rape—and only of attempted rape—are present in the instant
case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, Br. 170.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v. Orita1 finally did away with frustrated rape2 and allowed only
attempted rape and consummated rape to remain in our statute books. The instant case lurks at the
threshold of another emasculation of the stages of execution of rape by considering almost every
attempt at sexual violation of a woman as consummated rape, that is, if the contrary view were to be
adopted. The danger there is that that concept may send the wrong signal to every roaming lothario,
whenever the opportunity bares itself, to better intrude with climactic gusto, sans any restraint, since
after all any attempted fornication would be considered consummated rape and punished as such. A
mere strafing of the citadel of passion would then be considered a deadly fait accompli, which is
absurd.
In Orita we held that rape was consummated from the moment the offender had carnal knowledge of
the victim since by it he attained his objective. All the elements of the offense were already present and
nothing more was left for the offender to do, having performed all the acts necessary to produce the
crime and accomplish it. We ruled then that perfect penetration was not essential; any penetration of
the female organ by the male organ, however slight, was sufficient. The Court further held that entry of
the labia or lips of the female organ, even without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, was
sufficient to warrant conviction for consummated rape. We distinguished consummated rape from
attempted rape where there was no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution
were performed as the offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts.3
The inference that may be derived therefrom is that complete or full penetration of the vagina is not
required for rape to be consummated. Any penetration, in whatever degree, is enough to raise the crime
to its consummated stage.
But the Court in Orita clarified the concept of penetration in rape by requiring entry into the labia or
lips of the female organ, even if there be no rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, to warrant
a conviction for consummated rape. While the entry of the penis into the lips of the female organ was
considered synonymous with mere touching of the external genitalia, e.g., labia majora, labia minora,
etc.,4 the crucial doctrinal bottom line is that touching must be inextricably viewed in light of, in
relation to, or as an essential part of, the process of penile penetration, and not just mere touching in the
ordinary sense. In other words, the touching must be tacked to the penetration itself. The importance of
the requirement of penetration, however slight, cannot be gainsaid because where entry into the labia
or the lips of the female genitalia has not been established, the crime committed amounts merely to
attempted rape.
Verily, this should be the indicium of the Court in determining whether rape has been committed either
in its attempted or in its consummated stage; otherwise, no substantial distinction would exist between
the two, despite the fact that penalty-wise, this distinction, threadbare as it may seem, irrevocably spells
the difference between life and death for the accused—a reclusive life that is not even perpetua but only
temporal on one hand, and the ultimate extermination of life on the other. And, arguing on another
level, if the case at bar cannot be deemed attempted but consummated rape, what then would constitute
attempted rape? Must our field of choice be thus limited only to consummated rape and acts of
lasciviousness since attempted rape would no longer be possible in light of the view of those who
disagree with this ponencia?
On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the
court a quo to the extreme penalty of death,5 hence this case before us on automatic review under Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.6
As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25 April 1996, at around 4 o’clock in the afternoon,
Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the
second floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At the ground
floor she met Primo Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen
into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata, Jr., brother of
Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, “Ayo’ko,
ayo’ko!”7 prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her
children’s room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or “jogging pants” and panty were already
removed, while his short pants were down to his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel’s vagina. Horrified, she cursed the
accused, “P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!” and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and
pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out
and shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their
compound, to chase the accused.8 Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who answered
Corazon’s call for help. They held the accused at the back of their compound until they were advised by
their neighbors to call the barangay officials instead of detaining him for his misdeed. Physical
examination of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was
noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthel’s body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was only
0.5 cm. in diameter.
Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense. He maintained his innocence and
assailed the charge as a mere scheme of Crysthel’s mother who allegedly harbored ill will against him
for his refusal to run an errand for her.9 He asserted that in truth Crysthel was in a playing mood and
wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on
the floor. It was in this fallen position that Corazon chanced upon them and became hysterical. Corazon
slapped him and accused him of raping her child. He got mad but restrained himself from hitting back
when he realized she was a woman. Corazon called for help from her brothers to stop him as he ran
down from the second floor.
Vicente, Corazon’s brother, timely responded to her call for help and accosted Prime Vicente punched
him and threatened to kill him. Upon hearing the threat, Primo immediately ran towards the house of
Conrado Plata but Vicente followed him there. Primo pleaded for a chance to explain as he reasoned
out that the accusation was not true. But Vicente kicked him instead. When Primo saw Vicente holding
a piece of lead pipe, Primo raised his hands and turned his back to avoid the blow. At this moment, the
relatives and neighbors of Vicente prevailed upon him to take Primo to the barangay hall instead, and
not to maul or possibly kill him.
Although Primo Campuhan insisted on his innocence, the trial court on 27 May 1997 found him guilty
of statutory rape, sentenced him Sto the extreme penalty of death, and ordered him to pay his victim
P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, and the costs.
The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the credibility of Ma. Corazon Pamintuan. He argues
that her narration should not be given any weight or credence since it was punctured with implausible
statements and improbabilities so inconsistent with human nature and experience. He claims that it was
truly inconceivable for him to commit the rape considering that Crysthel’s younger sister was also in
the room playing while Corazon was just downstairs preparing Milo drinks for her daughters. Their
presence alone as possible eyewitnesses and the fact that the episode happened within the family
compound where a call for assistance could easily be heard and responded to, would have been enough
to deter him from committing the crime. Besides, the door of the room was wide open for anybody to
see what could be taking place inside. Primo insists that it was almost inconceivable that Corazon could
give such a vivid description of the alleged sexual contact when from where she stood she could not
have possibly seen the alleged touching of the sexual organs of the accused and his victim. He asserts
that the absence of any external signs of physical injuries or of penetration of Crysthel’s private parts
more than bolsters his innocence.
In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heav-ily on the testimony of Corazon that she saw
Primo with his short pants down to his knees kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were
supposedly “already removed” and that Primo was “forcing his penis into Crysthel’s vagina.” The
gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as
provided in Art. 335, par. (3), of the Revised Penal Code. Crysthel was only four (4) years old when
sexually molested, thus raising the penalty, from reclusion perpetua to death, to the single indivisible
penalty of death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended party being below seven (7) years old. We have
said often enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal
orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the
external genitalia by the penia capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal
knowledge.10 But the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the
penis into the labias of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the
pudendum.
In People v. De la Peña11 we clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if the attacker’s
penis merely touched the external portions of the female genitalia were made in the context of the
presence or existence of an erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the accused failed to achieve
an erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into the victim’s
vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated on the basis of the victim’s testimony
that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her vagina and in all likelihood
reached the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her vulva,12 or that the
penis of the accused touched the middle part of her vagina.13 Thus, touching when applied to rape
cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a
scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There
must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female
organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape.14 As the labias, which are required to be “touched” by the penis, are by their
natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is
to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia
majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the
perinea, area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice,
etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible
within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of
the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair
follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has
many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora.15 Jurisprudence dictates
that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated,16 and not merely for the penis to
stroke the surface of in a case, by the ‘mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of
sexual act’ x x x x.” the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the
mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of
the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis,
there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted “touching of the female
organ,”17 but has also progressed into being described as “the introduction of the male organ into the
labia of the pudendum,”18 or “the bombardment of the drawbridge.”19 But, to our mind, the case at
bar merely constitutes a “shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency,” or as earlier stated, a “strafing of
the citadel of passion.”
A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus of
proving that Primo’s penis was able to penetrate Crysthel’s vagina however slight. Even if we grant
arguendo that Corazon witnessed Primo in the act of sexually molesting her daughter, we seriously
doubt the veracity of her claim that she saw the inter-genital contact between Primo and Crysthel.
When asked what she saw upon entering her children’s room Corazon plunged into saying that she
saw Primo poking his penis on the vagina of Crysthel without explaining her relative position to them
as to enable her to see clearly and sufficiently, in automotive lingo, the contact point. It should be
recalled that when Corazon chanced upon Primo and Crysthel, the former was allegedly in a kneeling
position, which Corazon described thus:
Q
How was Primo holding your daughter?
A:
(The witness is demonstrating in such a way that the chest of the accused is pinning down the victim,
while his right hand is holding his penis and his left hand is spreading the legs of the victim).
It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration that Primo’s kneeling position rendered an
unbridled observation impossible. Not even a vantage point from the side of the accused and the victim
would have provided Corazon an unobstructed view of Primo’s penis supposedly reaching Crysthel’s
external genitalia, i.e., labia majora, labia minora, hymen, clitoris, etc., since the legs and arms of Primo
would have hidden his movements from Corazon’s sight, not to discount the fact that Primo’s right
hand was allegedly holding his penis thereby blocking it from Corazon’s view. It is the burden of the
prosecution to establish how Corazon could have seen the sexual contact and to shove her account into
the permissive sphere of credibility. It is not enough that she claims that she saw what was done to her
daughter. It is required that her claim be properly demonstrated to inspire belief. The prosecution failed
in this respect, thus we cannot conclude without any taint of serious doubt that inter-genital contact
was at all achieved. To hold otherwise would be to resolve the doubt in favor of the prosecution but to
run roughshod over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent.
Corazon insists that Primo did not restrain himself from pursuing his wicked intention despite her
timely appearance, thus giving her the opportunity to fully witness his beastly act.
We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent with man’s instinct of self-preservation to remain where he is
and persist in satisfying his lust even when he knows fully well that his dastardly acts have already
been discovered or witnessed by no less than the mother of his victim. For, the normal behavior or
reaction of Primo upon learning of Corazon’s presence would have been to pull his pants up to avoid
being caught literally with his pants down. The interval, although relatively short, provided more than
enough opportunity for Primo not only to desist from but even to conceal his evil design.
What appears to be the basis of the conviction of the accused was Crysthel’s answer to the question of
the court—
Q:
Did the penis of Primo touch your organ?
A:
Yes, sir.
But when asked further whether his penis penetrated her organ, she readily said, “No.” Thus—
Q:
But did his penis penetrate your organ?
A:
No, sir.20
This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that enshrouds the question of whether
rape in this case was consummated. It has foreclosed the possibility of Primo’s penis penetrating her
vagina, however slight. Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration,21 obviously
induced by a question propounded to her who could not have been aware of the finer distinctions
between touching and penetration. Consequently, it is improper and unfair to attach to this reply of a
four (4)-year old child, whose vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped as her sex and whose language is
bereft of worldly sophistication, an adult interpretation that because the penis of the accused touched
her organ there was sexual entry. Nor can it be deduced that in trying to penetrate the victim’s organ
the penis of the accused touched the middle portion of her vagina and entered the labia of her
pudendum as the prosecution failed to establish sufficiently that Primo made efforts to penetrate
Crysthel.22 Corazon did not say, nay, not even hint that Primo’s penis was erect or that he responded
with an erection.23 On the contrary, Corazon even narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his
right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim.
Antithetically, the possibility of Primo’s penis having breached Crysthel’s vagina is belied by the child’s
own assertion that she resisted Primo’s advances by putting her legs close together;24 consequently, she
did not feel any intense pain but just felt “not happy” about what Primo did to her.25 Thus, she only
shouted “Ayo’ko, ayo’ko!” not “Aray ko, aray ko!” In cases where penetration was not fully
established, the Court had anchored its conclusion that rape nevertheless was consummated on the
victim’s testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-legal finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the
vagina, or the labia minora was already gaping with redness, or the hymenal tags were no longer
visible.26 None was shown in this case. Although a child’s testimony must be received with due
consideration on account of her tender age, the Court endeavors at the same time to harness only what
in her story appears to be true, acutely aware of the equally guaranteed rights of the accused. Thus, we
have to conclude that even on the basis of the testimony of Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held
liable for consummated rape; worse, be sentenced to death.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused PRIMO “SONNY” CAMPUHAN Y
BELLO guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED. He is
instead found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8)
years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer’s finding in this case that there were no Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
external signs of physical injuries on complaining witness’ body to conclude from a medical perspective
that penetration had taken place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena explained, although the absence of complete
penetration of the hymen does not negate the possibility of contact, she clarified that there was no
medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and the victim.27      Panganiban, J., In the result.

In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all respects Judgment modified to attempted rape.
complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the
manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted or even mischievous
results. It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis of the accused in reality entered the labial Notes.—The mere touching by the male’s organ or instrument of sex of the labia of the pudendum of
threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that rape was consummated. Failing in this, the the woman’s private parts is sufficient to consummate rape. (People vs. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 [1999])
thin line that separates attempted rape from consummated rape will significantly disappear.

Well-settled is the rule that full penetration of the vaginal canal is not an essential element of rape—the
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender slightest introduction of the male organ into the labia of the victim already constitutes rape. (People vs.
commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution Monfero, 308 SCRA 396 [1999]) People vs. Campuhan, 329 SCRA 270, G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000
which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape—and only of attempted rape—are present
in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it.

The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the
offense charged, which is statutory rape of a minor below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees lower is
reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the accused shall be taken from the
medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1)
day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.

VOL. 302, FEBRUARY 1, 1999
455
People vs. Mahinay
G.R. No. 122485. February 1, 1999.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO, accused-
appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape; Those who lust and kill ought not to last.—A violation of the dignity, purity and
privacy of a child who is still innocent and unexposed to the ways of worldly pleasures is a harrowing
experience that destroys not only her future but of the youth population as well, who in the teachings of
our national hero, are considered the hope of the fatherland. Once again, the Court is confronted by
another tragic desecration of human dignity, committed no less upon a child, who at the salad age of a
few days past 12 years, has yet to knock on the portals of womanhood, and met her untimely death as a
result of the “intrinsically evil act” of non-consensual sex called rape. Burdened with the supreme
penalty of death, rape is an ignominious crime for which necessity is neither an excuse nor does there
exist any other rational justification other than lust. But those who lust ought not to last.
Same; Same; Rape with Homicide; Life, once taken is like virginity, which once defiled can never be
restored.—This being a death penalty case, the Court exercises the greatest circumspection in the
review thereof since “there can be no stake higher and no penalty more severe x x x than the
termination of a human life.” For life, once taken is like virginity, which once defiled can never be
restored. In order therefore, that appellant’s guilty mind be satisfied, the Court states the reasons why,
as the records are not shy, for him to verify.
Same; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites.—The proven circumstances of this case when
juxtaposed with appellant’s proffered excuse are sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable
doubt, notwithstanding the absence of any direct evidence relative to the commission of the crime for
which he was prosecuted. Absence of direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability
because under the Rules on evidence and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, conviction may be had on
circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites concur: 1. there is more than one
circumstance; 2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3. the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Same; Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence,
constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect
upon the court.—Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct
evidence in its effect upon the court.
Same; Same; Same; Rape; Evidence; Guiding Principles in Review of Rape Cases.—Guided by the three
principles in the review of rape cases, to wit: 1) An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; 2) In view of
the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of
the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and 3) The evidence of the prosecution stands or
falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The
foregoing circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the felony of rape with homicide defined and
penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659.
Same; Rape; Statutes; Republic Act No. 8353; Under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8353),
rape has since been reclassified as a crime against persons under Articles 266-A and 266-B, and thus,
may be prosecuted even without a complaint filed by the offended party.—At the time of the
commission of this heinous act, rape was still considered a crime against chastity, although under the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353), rape has since been reclassified as a crime against persons
under Articles 266-A and 266-B, and thus, may be prosecuted even without a complaint filed by the
offended party.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Republic Act No. 8353, rape may be committed even by a woman and
the victim may even be a man.—The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is sexual
congress with a woman by force and without consent. (Under the new law, rape may be committed
even by a woman and the victim may even be a man). If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of
force and consent becomes immaterial not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, but
the absence of a free consent is presumed when the woman is below such age. Conviction will therefore
lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she
was violated, as in this case, not only the first element of sexual intercourse must be proven but also the
other element that the perpetrator’s evil acts with the offended party was done through force, violence,
intimidation or threat needs to be established. Both elements are present in this case.
Same; Same; The mere touching by the male’s organ or instrument of sex of the labia of the pudendum
of the woman’s private parts is sufficient to consummate rape.—In proving sexual intercourse, it is not
full or deep penetration of the victim’s vagina; rather the slightest penetration of the male organ into the
female sex organ is enough to consummate the sexual intercourse. The mere touching by the male’s
organ or instrument of sex of the labia of the pudendum of the woman’s private parts is sufficient to
consummate rape.
Same; Same; Where the victim, at the time of her penile invasion, was unconscious, it could safely be
concluded that she had not given free and voluntary consent to her defilement, whether before or
during the sexual act.—From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the victim, force was
indeed employed upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from appellant’s own account, he pushed
the victim causing the latter to hit her head on the table and fell unconscious. It was at that instance that
he ravished her and satisfied his salacious and prurient desires. Considering that the victim, at the time
of her penile invasion, was unconscious, it could safely be concluded that she had not given free and
voluntary consent to her defilement, whether before or during the sexual act.
Same; Same; Witnesses; We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation and experience—whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous,
and is outside of judicial cognizance.—Appellant’s defense that two other persons brought to him the
dead body of the victim and forced him to rape the cadaver is too unbelievable. In the words of Vice-
Chancellor Van Fleet of New Jersey, “Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of
a credible witness, but must be credible in itself—such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human
testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant
to these belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of judicial cognizance.”
Same; Same; Same; The findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left
to the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the
appellate courts.—Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses.
Settled is the rule that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left
to the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the
appellate courts. In this case, the trial court’s findings, conclusions and evaluation of the testimony of
witnesses is received on appeal with the highest respect, the same being supported by substantial
evidence on record. There was no showing that the court a quo had overlooked or disregarded relevant
facts and circumstances which when considered would have affected the outcome of this case or justify
a departure from the assessments and findings of the court below. The absence of any improper or
illmotive on the part of the principal witnesses for the prosecution all the more strengthens the
conclusion that no such motive exists. Neither was any wrong motive attributed to the police officers
who testified against appellant.
Same; Rape with Homicide; Penalties; The special complex crime of rape with homicide is treated by
law in the same degree as qualified rape—that is, when any of the 7 (now 10) “attendant circumstances”
enumerated in the law is alleged and proven, the penalty is death, but in cases where any of those
circumstances is proven though not alleged, the penalty cannot be death except if the circumstance
proven can be properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15 of the
RPC which will affect the imposition of the proper penalty in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC.—
Coming now to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is correct. Under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659 “when by reason or on occasion of the rape, a
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.” This special complex crime is treated by law in the
same degree as qualified rape—that is, when any of the 7 (now 10) “attendant circumstances”
enumerated in the law is alleged and proven, in which instances, the penalty is death. In cases where
any of those circumstances is proven though not alleged, the penalty cannot be death except if the
circumstance proven can be properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and
15 of the RPC which will affect the imposition of the proper penalty in accordance with Article 63 of the
RPC. However, if any of those circumstances proven but not alleged cannot be considered as an
aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15, the same cannot affect the imposition of the penalty
because Article 63 of the RPC in mentioning aggravating circumstances refers to those defined in
Articles 14 and 15. Under R.A. No. 8353, if any of the 10 circumstances is alleged in the
information/complaint, it may be treated as a qualifying circumstance. But if it is not so alleged, it may
be considered as an aggravating circumstance, in which case the only penalty is death—subject to the
usual proof of such circumstance in either case.
Same; Same; Same; Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by law for
the crime of “rape with homicide,” the court has no option but to apply the same “regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime.”—Death
being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by law for the crime of “rape with
homicide,” the court has no option but to apply the same “regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime” in accordance with Article 63 of the
RPC, as amended. This case of rape with homicide carries with it penalty of death which is mandatorily
imposed by law within the import of Article 47 of the RPC as amended.
Same; Same; Damages; If the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by present amended law, the civil
indemnity for the victim shall be not less than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00).—Pursuant to
current case law, a victim of simple rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) but if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances
under which the death penalty is authorized by present amended law, the civil indemnity for the victim
shall be not less than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00). In addition to such indemnity, she can
also recover moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code in such amount as the court
deems just, without the necessity for pleading or proof of the basis thereof. Civil indemnity is different
from the award of moral and exemplary damages. The requirement of proof of mental and physical
suffering provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code is dispensed with because it is “recognized that the
victim’s injury is inherently concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to
warrant per se the award of moral damages.” Thus, it was held that a conviction for rape carries with it
the award of moral damages to the victim without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof.
priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be
visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall
be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished; 7. He must be informed that he
has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
and ensure that he understood the same; 8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a
lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise,
he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak; 9. That
the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the
process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the
police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must cease if it
has already begun; 10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to
remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time
during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some
statements; 11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained
in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 171.

Same; Constitutional Law; Custodial Investigations; Miranda Rights; Procedure, Guidelines and duties The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
to be done and observed by the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions
at the time of making an arrest, at and during custodial interrogation.—Considering the heavy penalty
of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful      The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
means, the Court, as guardian of the rights of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and
duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and
observe at the time of making an arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation
in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438: It is high-time to educate      Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda
rights which had become insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal
developments: 1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be PER CURIAM:
informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a
language known to and understood by said person; 2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain
A violation of the dignity, purity and privacy of a child who is still innocent and unexposed to the ways
silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him; 3. He must be informed
of worldly pleasures is a harrowing experience that destroys not only her future but of the youth
that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent
population as well, who in the teachings of our national hero, are considered the hope of the fatherland.
lawyer, preferably of his own choice; 4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford
Once again, the Court is confronted by another tragic desecration of human dignity, committed no less
the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any
upon a child, who at the salad age of a few days past 12 years, has yet to knock on the portals of
person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one
womanhood, and met her untimely death as a result of the “intrinsically evil act” of non-consensual sex
acting in his behalf; 5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that
called rape. Burdened with the supreme penalty of death, rape is an ignominious crime for which
no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a
necessity is neither an excuse nor does there exist any other rational justification other than lust. But
valid waiver has been made; 6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right
those who lust ought not to last.
to communicate or confer by the most expedient means—telephone, radio, letter or messenger—with
his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor,
The Court quotes with approval from the People’s Brief, the facts narrating the horrible experience and
the tragic demise of a young and innocent child in the bloody hands of appellant, as such facts are ably
supported by evidence on record:1**
“Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on November 20, 1993. His
task was to take care of Isip’s house which was under construction adjacent to her old residence
situated inside a compound at No. 4165 Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. But he
stayed and slept in an apartment also owned by Isip, located 10 meters away from the unfinished house
(TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 5-10).
“The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip’s neighbor in Dian Street. She used to pass by
Isip’s house on her way to school and play inside the compound yard, catching maya birds together
with other children. While they were playing, appellant was always around washing his clothes. Inside
the compound yard was a septic tank (TSN, August 22, 1995, pp. 29-31; September 6, 1995, pp. 17; 20-
22).
“On June 25, 1995, at 8 o’clock a.m., appellant joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking spree. Around 10
o’clock in the morning, appellant, who was already drunk, left Gregorio Rivera and asked permission
from Isip to go out with his friends (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 9-11).
“Meantime, Isip’s sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who also owned a store fronting the compound, saw
Ma. Victoria on that same day three to four times catching birds inside Isip’s unfinished house around 4
o’clock in the afternoon. The unfinished house was about 8 meters away from Rivera’s store (TSN,
September 18, 1995, pp. 9-11).
“On the other hand, Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a resident of Dian Street, went to his in-law’s house between
6 to 7 o’clock p.m. to call his office regarding changes on the trip of President Fidel V. Ramos. The house
of his in-laws was near the house of Isip. On his way to his in-law’s house, Sgt. Suni met appellant
along Dian Street. That same evening, between 8 to 9 o’clock p.m., he saw Ma. Victoria standing in front
of the gate of the unfinished house (TSN, September 27, 1995, pp. 3-7; 14-17).
“Later, at 9 o’clock in the evening, appellant showed up at Norgina Rivera’s store to buy lugaw.
Norgina Rivera informed appellant that there was none left of it. She notice that appellant appeared to
be uneasy and in deep thought. His hair was disarrayed; he was drunk and was walking in a dazed
manner. She asked why he looked so worried but he did not answer. Then he left and walked back to
the compound (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 4-8; 12-14).
“Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma. Victoria, was missing. She last saw her
daughter wearing a pair of white shorts, brown belt, a yellow hair ribbon, printed blue blouse, dirty
white panty, white lady sando and blue rubber slippers (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 22, 33).
“Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for supper that night. On the following day, June 26,
1995, at 2 o’clock in the morning, appellant boarded a passenger jeepney driven by Fernando Trinidad
at the talipapa. Appellant alighted at the top of the bridge of the North Expressway and had thereafter
disappeared (TSN, September 20, 1995, pp. 4-9; September 27, 1995; pp. 14-17).
“That same morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy found the dead body of Ma. Victoria inside the septic
tank. Boy immediately reported what he saw to the victim’s parents, Eduardo and Elvira Chan (TSN,
September 6, 1995, p. 13).
“With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was retrieved from the septic
tank. She was wearing a printed blouse without underwear. Her face bore bruises. Results of the
autopsy revealed the following findings:
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds,
Contusions, suprapubic area, 6.0 x 3.0 cm., thigh right,
Anterior aspect, middle third, 4.5 x 3.0 cm.
Contused-abrasions on the forehead, 5.0 x 5.0 cm. angle of the left eye, lateral aspect, 2.5 x 1.5 cm. left
jaw, 13.5 x 7.0 cm. neck, antero-lateral aspect, right, 2.0 x 1.0 cm. and left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm., left iliac area, 9.0
x 5.5 cm. intraclavicular area, left, posterior aspect, 4.0 x 2.0 cm. scapular area, right 4.0 x 4.0 cm.
subscapular area, left, 1.5 x 1.5 cm. lumbar area, left 7.0 x 8.0 cm. arm, left, posterior aspect, middle
third, 11.00 x 4.0 cm. elbows, right, 4.0 x 3.0 cm. and left 6.0 x 5.0 cm. forearms, left, posterior aspect,
lower rd, 5.2 x 4.0 cm. hand, left, dorsal aspect, 0.8 x 0.9 cm. thighs; right antero-lateral aspect, upper
33rd, 12.0 x 10.0 cm. right anterior aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 2.0 cm. and left antero-lower 3rd, 5.5 x 2.5 cm.
knee, right, lateral aspect, 1.5 x 1.0 cm. lateral mallcolum, left, 3.0 x 3.5 cm. foot, left, dorsal aspect 2.2 x
1.0 cm.
Hematoma, forehead, and scalp, left, 3.5 x 3.0 cm.
 to the police station (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 10-13; August 18, 1995, pp. 3-8; August 23, 1995, pp. 21-
25).
Hemorrhage, interstitial, underneath nailmarks, neck, subepicardial, subpleural petechial hemorrhages.

“A police report was subsequently prepared including a referral slip addressed to the office of the
Hemorrhage, subdural, left fronto-parietal area. Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1 Virgilio Villano retrieved the victim’s underwear from the
septic tank (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 3-8; 14-17).

Tracheo-bronchial tree, congested.

. “After a series of follow-up operations, appellant was finally arrested in Barangay Obario Matala,
Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to the Valenzuela Police Station. On July 7, 1995, with the assistance of
Other visceral organs, congested. Atty. Restituto Viernes, appellant executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated in detail
how he raped and killed the victim. Also, when appellant came face to face with the victim’s mother
and aunt, he confided to them that he was not alone in raping and killing the victim. He pointed to
Zaldy and Boyet as his co-conspirators (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 13-21).”
Stomach, contain 1/4 rice and other food particles.

Thus, on July 10, 1995, appellant was charged with rape with homicide in an Information which reads:2
CAUSE OF DEATH—Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation; Traumatic Head Injury, Contributory.

REMARKS: Hymen: tall, thick with complete lacerations at 4:00 and 8:00 o’clock position corresponding
to the face of a watch edges congested with blood clots. (TSN, August 18, 1995; p. 4, Record, p. 126)
“Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro were informed by Isip that
her houseboy, appellant Larry Mahinay, was missing. According to her, it was unlikely for appellant to
just disappear from the apartment since whenever he would go out, he would normally return on the
same day or early morning of the following day (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 6-11-27).
“That on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation employed upon
the person of MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO, age 12 years old, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y
CABALLERO against her will and without her consent; that on the occasion of said sexual assault, the
above-named accused, choke and strangle said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO as a result
of which, said victim died.

“Contrary to law.”3

“SPO1 Nacis and SPO1 Alabastro were also informed that a townmate of appellant was working in a
pancit factory at Barangay Reparo, Caloocan City. They proceeded to said place. The owner of the
to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision convicting appellant of
factory confirmed to them that appellant used to work at the factory but she did not know his present
the crime charged, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a total of P73,000.00 to the
whereabouts. Appellant’s townmate, on the other hand, informed them that appellant could possibly be
victim’s heirs. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision states:
found on 8th Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 8-9).

“WHEREFORE, finding accused Larry Mahinay y Amparado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
“The policemen returned to the scene of the crime. At the second floor of the house under construction,
crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to death by electricution (sic). He is likewise condemned to
they retrieved from one of the rooms a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair
indemnify the heirs of the victim, Ma. Victoria Chan the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the further
ribbon which was identified by Elvira Chan to belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They also found
sum of P23,000.00 for the funeral, burial and wake of the victim.
inside another room a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of appellant. Also found in the
yard, three armslength away from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty
long pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellant’s belongings. These items were brought
“Let the complete records of the case be immediately forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court for
the automatic review in accordance to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 7659.
“SO ORDERED.”4
Upon automatic review by the Court en banc pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended,5 appellant insists that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution against him
is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In his testimony summarized by the trial
court, appellant offered his version of what transpired as follows:
“(T)hat on June 25, 1995, around 9:30 a.m. on Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
he joined Gregorio Rivera and a certain Totoy in a drinking spree. Gregorio Rivera is the brother of
Maria Isip, appellant’s employer. After consuming three cases of red horse beer, he was summoned by
Isip to clean the jeepney. He finished cleaning the jeepney at 12 o’clock noon. Then he had lunch and
took a bath. Later, he asked permission from Isip to go out with his friends to see a movie. He also
asked for a cash advance of P300.00 (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-5).
“At 2 o’clock in the afternoon, appellant, instead of going out with his friend, opted to rejoin Gregorio
Rivera and Totoy for another drinking session. They consumed one case of red horse beer. Around 6
o’clock p.m., Zaldy, a co-worker, fetched him at Gregorio Rivera’s house. They went to Zaldy’s house
and bought a bottle of gin. They finished drinking gin around 8 o’clock p.m. After consuming the bottle
of gin, they went out and bought another bottle of gin from a nearby store. It was already 9 o’clock in
the evening. While they were at the store, appellant and Zaldy met Boyet. After giving the bottle of gin
to Zaldy and Boyet, appellant left (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 6-7).
“On his way home, appellant passed by Norgina Rivera’s store to buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera informed
him that there was none left of it. He left the store and proceeded to Isip’s apartment. But because it was
already closed, he decided to sleep at the second floor of Isip’s unfinished house. Around 10 o’clock
p.m., Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying a cadaver. The two placed the body inside the room where
appellant was sleeping. As appellant stood up, Zaldy pointed to him a knife. Zaldy and Boyet directed
him to rape the dead body of the child or they would kill him. He, however, refused to follow.
Then, he was asked by Zaldy and Boyet to assist them in bringing the dead body downstairs. He
obliged and helped dump the body into the septic tank. Thereupon, Zaldy and Boyet warned him that
should they ever see him again, they would kill him. At 4 o’clock the following morning, he left the
compound and proceeded first to Navotas and later to Batangas (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-13).
“Subsequently, appellant was apprehended by the police officers in Ibaan, Batangas. The police officers
allegedly brought him to a big house somewhere in Manila. There, appellant heard the police officer’s
plan to salvage him if he would not admit that he was the one who raped and killed the victim. Scared,
he executed an extra-judicial confession. He claimed that he was assisted by Atty. Restituto Viernes
only when he was forced to sign the extra-judicial confession (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 9-11).”6
This being a death penalty case, the Court exercises the greatest circumspection in the review thereof
since “there can be no stake higher and no penalty more severe x x x than the termination of a human
life.”7 For life, once taken is like virginity, which once defiled can never be restored. In order therefore,
that appellant’s guilty mind be satisfied, the Court states the reasons why, as the records are not shy, for
him to verify.
The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with appellant’s proffered excuse are sufficient
to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the absence of any direct evidence
relative to the commission of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence of direct proof does not
necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on evidence8 and pursuant to
settled jurisprudence,9 conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided that the following
requisites concur:
1.there is more than one circumstance;
2.the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3.the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must
be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis
except that of guilt.10 Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence,
constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect
upon the court.11
In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial evidence, which upon
thorough review of the Court is more than enough to prove appellant’s guilt beyond the shadow of
reasonable doubt. These circumstantial evidence are as follows:
“FIRST—Prosecution witness Norgina Rivera, sister-in-law of Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished big
house where the crime happened and the septic tank where the body of Maria Victoria Chan was found
in the morning of June 26, 1995 is located, categorically testified that at about 9:00 in the evening on
June 25, 1995, accused Larry Mahinay was in her store located in front portion of the compound of her
sister-in-law Maria Isip where the unfinished big house is situated buying rice noodle (lugaw). That she
noticed the accused’s hair was disarranged, drunk and walking in sigsaging manner. That the accused
appeared uneasy and seems to be thinking deeply. That the accused did not reply to her queries why he
looked worried but went inside the compound.
“SECOND—Prosecution witness Sgt. Roberto G. Suni, categorically testified that on June 25, 1995
between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening, on his way to his in-law’s house, he met accused Larry Mahinay
walking on the road leading to his in-law’s residence which is about 50 to 75 meters away to the
unfinished big house of Maria Isip. That he also saw victim Maria Victoria Chan standing at the gate of
the unfinished big house of Maria Isip between 8:00 and 9:00 in the same evening.
“THIRD—Prosecution witness Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished big house where victim’s body was
found inside the septic tank, testified that accused Larry Mahinay is her houseboy since November 20,
1993. That in the morning of June 25, 1995, a Sunday, Larry Mahinay asked permission from her to
leave. That after finishing some work she asked him to do accused Larry Mahinay left. That it is
customary on the part of Larry Mahinay to return in the afternoon of the same day or sometimes in the
next morning. That accused Larry Mahinay did not return until he was arrested in Batangas on July 7,
1995.
“FOURTH—Prosecution witness Fernando Trinidad, a passenger jeepney driver plying the route
Karuhatan-Ugong and vice versa which include Dian St., Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
pinpointed the accused Larry Mahinay as one of the passengers who boarded his passenger jeepney on
June 26, 1995 at 2:00 early morning and alighted on top of the overpass of the North Expressway.
“FIFTH—Personal belongings of the victim was found in the unfinished big house of Maria Isip where
accused Larry Mahinay slept on the night of the incident. This is a clear indication that the victim was
raped and killed in the said premises. “There is no showing that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses (sic) fabricated or there was any reason for them to testify falsely against the accused. The
absence of any evidence as to the existence of improper motive sustain the conclusion that no such
improper motive exists and that the testimonies of the witnesses, therefore, should be given full faith
and credit. (People vs. Retubado, L-58585, January 20, 1988, 162 SCRA 276, 284; People vs. Ali, L-18512,
October 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 756).
“SIXTH—Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having been informed of
his constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of the Public Attorney’s Office
voluntarily gave his statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said confession of accused Larry
Mahinay given with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been freely and
voluntarily given. That accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any maltreatment on his
person (People vs. delos Santos, L-3398, May 29, 1984; 150 SCRA 311). He did not even inform the
Inquest Prosecutor when he sworn to the truth of his statement on July 8, 1995 that he was forced,
coerced or was promised of reward or leniency. That his confession abound with details know only to
him. The Court noted that a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as
testified by said Atty. Viernes he informed and explained to the accused his constitutional rights and
was present all throughout the giving of the testimony. That he signed the statement given by the
accused. Lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is expected to be watchful and vigilant to notice any
irregularity in the manner of the investigation and the physical conditions of the accused. The post
mortem findings shows that the cause of death Asphyxia by manual strangulation; Traumatic Head
injury Contributory substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of the accused that he pushed the
victim and the latter’s head hit the table and the victim lost consciousness.
“Pagpasok niya sa kuwarto, hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak ko siya, tapos tumama iyong
ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakatulog na siya tapos ni-rape ko na siya.”
“There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or tortured in giving the statement. There were no
medical certificate submitted by the accused to sustain his claim that he was mauled by the police
officers.
There being no evidence presented to show that said confession were obtained as a result of violence,
torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency nor that the investigating
officer could have been motivated to concoct the facts narrated in said affidavit; the confession of the
accused is held to be true, correct and freely or voluntarily given. (People v. Tuazon, 6 SCRA 249;
People v. Tiongson, 6 SCRA 431, People v. Baluran, 52 SCRA 71, People v. Pingol, 35 SCRA 73).
“SEVENTH—Accused Larry Mahinay testified in open Court that he was not able to enter the
apartment where he is sleeping because it was already closed and he proceeded to the second floor of
the unfinished house and slept. He said while sleeping Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying the cadaver of
the victim and dumped it inside his room. That at the point of a knife, the two ordered him to have sex
with the dead body but he refused. That the two asked him to assist them in dumping the dead body of
the victim in the septic tank downstairs. (Tsn, pp. 8-9 October 16, 1995). This is unbelievable and
unnatural. Accused Larry Mahinay is staying in the apartment and not in the unfinished house. That he
slept in the said unfinished house only that night of June 25, 1995 because the apartment where he was
staying was already closed. The Court is at a loss how would Zaldy and Boyet knew he (Larry
Mahinay) was in the second floor of the unfinished house.
“Furthermore, if the child is already dead when brought by Zaldy and Boyet in the room at the second
floor of the unfinished house where accused Larry Mahinay was sleeping, why will Boyet and Zaldy
still brought the cadaver upstairs only to be dis-posed/dump later in the septic tank located in the
ground floor. Boyet and Zaldy can easily disposed and dumped the body in the septic tank by “When and how rape is committed—Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
themselves. under any of the following circumstances.

“It is likewise strange that the dead body of the child was taken to the room where accused Larry 1.)By using force or intimidation;
Mahinay was sleeping only to force the latter to have sex with the dead body of the child.
2.)When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3.)When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

“We have no test to the truth of human testimony except its conformity to aver knowledge observation
and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous. (People vs. Santos, L-385, The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Nov. 16, 1979).”

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
“EIGHT—If the accused did not commit the crime and was only forced to disposed/dumpted the body penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
of the victim in the septic tank, he could have apprise Col. Maganto, a high ranking police officer or the
lady reporter who interviewed him. His failure and omission to reveal the same is unnatural. An
innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime as a matter of When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
preservation and self-defense and as a precaution against prejudicing himself. A person’s silence
therefore, particularly when it is persistent will justify an inference that he is not innocent. (People vs.
Pilones, L-32754-5, July 21, 1978).
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

“NINTH—The circumstance of flight of the accused strongly indicate his consciousness of guilt. He left
the crime scene on the early morning after the incident and did not return until he was arrested in
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
Batangas on July 7, 1995.”12

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
Guided by the three principles in the review of rape cases, to wit:13
attendant circumstances:

1).An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
1.)When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
2).In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where only two persons are usually involved, the spouse of the parent of the victim.
testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and
2.)When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3).The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
3.)When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives
strength from the weakness of the defense.
within the third degree of consanguinity.
the foregoing circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the felony of rape with homicide defined and
4.)When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659, which
provides: 5.)When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
disease.
6.)When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or Philippine National And what did you find out after you examined the genitalia of the victim?
Police or any law enforcement agency.

7.)When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation.14 A:

At the time of the commission of this heinous act, rape was still considered a crime against chastity,15 The hymen was tall-thick with complete laceration at 4:00 o’clock and 8:00 o’clock position and that the
although under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353), rape has since been re-classified as a crime edges were congested.
against persons under Articles 266-A and 266-B, and thus, may be prosecuted even without a complaint
filed by the offended party.
Q:

The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is sexual congress with a woman by force and
without consent.16 (Under the new law, rape may be committed even by a woman and the victim may Now, what might have caused the laceration?
even be a man).17 If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes
immaterial18 not only because force is not an element of statutory rape,19 but the absence of a free
consent is presumed when the woman is below such age. Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual
A:
intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she was violated, as in this
case, not only the first element of sexual intercourse must be proven but also the other element that the
perpetrator’s evil acts with the offended party was done through force, violence, intimidation or threat
needs to be established. Both elements are present in this case. Under normal circumstances this might have (sic) caused by a penetration of an organ.

Based on the evidence on record, sexual intercourse with the victim was adequately proven. This is Q:
shown from the testimony of the medical doctor who conducted post mortem examination on the
child’s body:
So, the laceration was caused by the penetration of a male organ?

Q:
A:

And after that what other parts of the victim did you examine?
Adult male organ, sir.

A:
Q:

Then I examined the genitalia of the victim.

You are very sure of that, Mr. Witness?
Q:

A:
I am very sure of that.20 Itong short na ito, (pointing to a dirty white short placed atop this investigator’s table. Subject evidence
were part of evidences recovered at the crime scene).

Besides, as may be gleaned from his extrajudicial confession, appellant himself admitted that he had
sexual congress with the unconscious child. “17.

“15. T:

T: Bakit mo naman ni rape yung batang babae?

Ano ang nangyari ng mga sandali o oras na iyon?  

  S:

S: Eh nasobrahan ako ng lasing. Hindi ko na alam ang ginagawa ko.

Natutulog po ako sa itaas ng bahay ni ATE MARIA, yung malaking bahay na ginagawa, tapos “18.
dumating yung batang babae. Pag-pasok niya sa kuwarto hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak ko
siya. Tapos tumama yung ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakakatulog na siya tapos ni rape ko na siya.
T:

“16.
Ano ba ang inyong ininom bakit ka nasobrahan ng lasing?

T:
 

Ano ang suot nung batang babae na sinasabi mo?

S:

 
Red Horse po at saka GIN.

S:
 T:

“19.

Saan lugar ito nangyari?

T:

Saan lugar ng malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA mo ni rape yung batang babae?

S:

Sa Diam, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, M.M.

S:

“22.

Sa kuwarto ko po sa itaas.

T:

“20.

Alam mo ba ang pangalan ng batang babae na ni rape mo?

T:

Kailan ito at anong oras nangyari?

S:

Hindi ko po alam.

S:

“23.

Mga bandang alas 8:00 ng gabi, araw ng Linggo, hindi ko na matandaan kung anong petsa, basta araw
ng Linggo.
T:

“21.
Ngayon, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo na ang pangalan ng batang babae na iyong ni rape at pinatay ay si
MA. VICTORIA CHAN? Matatandaan mo ba ito?
 S:

Nilabasan po ako ng tamod.

S:

“26.

Oho.

T:

“24.

Nung nakaraos ka, nasaan parte ng katawan ng batang babae yung iyong ari?

T:

Nung ma-rape mo, nakaraos ka ba?

S:

Nakapasok po doon sa ari nung babae.

S:

“27.

Naka-isa po.

T:

“25.

Natapos mong ma-rape si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, ano pa ang sumunod mong ginawa?

T:

Nais kong liwanagin sa iyo kung ano ang ibig sabihin ng ‘NAKARAOS,’ maaari bang ipaliwanag mo
ito?
S:

 
Natulak ko siya sa terrace.
 T:

“28.

Bakit mo namang naisipang ilagay si MA. VICTORIA sa poso-negra?

T:

Ano ang nangyari kay MA. VICTORIA matapos mong itulak sa terrace?

S:

Doon ko lang po inilagay.

S:

“31.

Inilagay ko po sa poso-negra.

T:

“29.

Bakit nga doon mo inilagay siya?

T:

Saan makikita yung poso-negra na sinasabi mo?

S:

Natatakot po ako.

S:

Doon din sa malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA. “32.

“30. T:
Kanino ka natatakot?

S:

Nag-iisa lang po ako.

S:

“35.

Natatakot po ako sa ginawa kong masama, natatakot ako sa mga pulis.

T:

“33.

Noong mga oras or sandaling gahasain mo si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, buhay pa ba siya o patay na?

T:

Buhay pa ba si MA. VICTORIA nung ilagay mo siya sa poso-negra?

S:

Buhay pa po.

S:

“36.

Hindi ko po alam dahil nung pagbagsak niya inilagay ko na siya sa poso-negra.

T:

“34.

Papaano mo siya pinatay?

T:

Nung gawin mo ba itong krimen na ito, mayroon ka kasama?

S:

 
Tinulak ko nga po siya sa terrace.”21

“Q

In proving sexual intercourse, it is not full or deep penetration of the victim’s vagina; rather the
slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex organ is enough to consummate the sexual
intercourse.22 The mere touching by the male’s organ or instrument of sex of the labia of the —
pudendum of the woman’s private parts is sufficient to consummate rape.

And upon reaching the investigation room of Valenzuela PNP who were the other person present?
From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the victim, force was indeed employed upon
her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from appellant’s own account, he pushed the victim causing the
latter to hit her head on the table and fell unconscious. It was at that instance that he ravished her and “A
satisfied his salacious and prurient desires. Considering that the victim, at the time of her penile
invasion, was unconscious, it could safely be concluded that she had not given free and voluntary
consent to her defilement, whether before or during the sexual act.
—

Another thing that militates against appellant is his extra-judicial confession, which he, however, claims
Police Officer Alabastro, sir, Police Officer Nacis and other investigator inside the investigation room
was executed in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. But his contention is belied by the
and the parents of the child who was allegedly raped.
records as well as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained to him his
constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights. As testified to by the assisting
lawyer:
“Q

“Q
—

—
And when you reached the investigation room do you notice whether the accused already there?

Will you please inform the Court what was that call about?
“A

“A
—

—
The accused was already there.

We went to the station, police investigation together with Atty. Froilan Zapanta and we were told by
Police Officer Alabastro that one Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the crime of, I think, rape with “Q
homicide.
— By the way, who was that Atty. Zapanta?

Was he alone? “A

“A —

— Our immediate Superior of the Public Attorney’s Office.

He was alone, sir. “Q

“Q —

— Was he also present at the start of the question and answer period to the accused?

So, when you were already infront of SPO1 Arnold Alabastro and the other PNP Officers, what did “A
they tell you, if any?

—
“A

No more, sir, he already went to our office. I was left alone.

—

“Q
They told us together with Atty. Zapanta that this Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the crime
charged, sir.
—

“Q
But he saw the accused, Larry Mahinay?

—
“A
— First, I tried to explain to him his right, sir, under the constitution.

Yes, sir. “Q

“Q —

— What are those right?

Now, when Atty. Zapanta left at what time did the question and answer period start? “A

“A

That he has the right to remain silent. That he has the right of a counsel of his own choice and that if he
has no counsel a lawyer will be appointed to him and that he has the right to refuse to answer any
— question that would inc riminate him.

If I am not mistaken at around 4:05 of July 7, 1995 in the afternoon, sir. “Q

“Q —

— Now, after enumerating these constitutional rights of accused Larry Mahinay, do you recall whether
this constitutional right enumerated by you were reduced in writing?

And when this question and answer period started, what was the first thing that you did as assisting
lawyer to the accused? “A

“A —

— Yes, sir, and it was also explained to him one by one by Police Officer Alabastro.
  

“Q

May we request, Your Honor, that this document be marked as our Exhibit A proper.

I show to you this constitutional right which you said were reduced into writing, will you be able to
recognize the same?
“Q

“A
—

—
Do you recall after reducing into writing this constitutional right of the accused whether you asked him
to sign to acknowledge or to conform?

Yes, sir.

“A

“Q

I was the one who asked him, sir. It was Police Officer Alabastro.

Will you please go over this and tell the Court whether that is the same document you mentioned?

“Q

“A

But you were present?

Yes, sir, these were the said rights reduced into writing.

“A

ATTY. PRINCIPE:

—
I was then present when he signed. “ATTY. PRINCIPE:

“Q  

—  

There is a signature in this constitutional right after the enumeration, before and after there are two (2) May we request, Your Honor, that the two (2) signatures identified by my compañero be encircled and
signatures, will you please recognize the two (2) signatures? marked as Exhibits A-1 and A-2.

“Q

“A

After you said that you apprised the accused of his constitutional right explaining to him in Filipino, in
local dialect, what was the respond of the accused?
These were the same signatures signed in my presence, sir.

“A
“Q

—
—

Larry Mahinay said that we will proceed with his statement.

The signature of whom?

“Q
“A

—
—

What was the reply?

The signature of Larry Mahinay, sir.
 —

“A

In my presence, sir.

“Q

He said “Opo.”

“Q

And when he said or when he replied “Opo” so the question started?

“A

Did you ask him of his educational attainment?

“A

Yes, sir.

“Q

It was the Police Officer who asked him.

“Q

I noticed in this Exhibit A that there is also a waiver of rights, were you present also when he signed
this waiver?
—

“A
In your presence?

—
“A

Yes, sir, I was also present.

 —

“Q

And there is also a signature after the waiver in Filipino over the typewritten name Larry Mahinay,
“Nagsasalaysay,” whose signature is that?
—

“A
Did you explain to him the meaning of this waiver?

—
“A

This is also signed in my presence.

—

“Q
I had also explained to him, sir.

—
“Q

Why are you sure that this is his signature?

—

“A
In Filipino?

—
“A

He signed in my presence, sir.

—

483
In Tagalog, sir.

VOL. 302, FEBRUARY 1, 1999

“Q

483
People vs. Mahinay Appellant’s defense that two other persons brought to him the dead body of the victim and forced him
to rape the cadaver is too unbelievable. In the words of Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet of New Jersey,24

“Q
“Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth
— of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is
repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of judicial cognizance.”

And below immediately are the two (2) signatures. The first one is when Larry Mahinay subscribed and
sworn to, there is a signature here, do you recognize this signature? Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses. Settled is the rule that
the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court
because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate
“A courts.25 In this case, the trial court’s findings, conclusions and evaluation of the testimony of witnesses
is received on appeal with the highest respect,26 the same being supported by substantial evidence on
record. There was no showing that the court a quo had overlooked or disregarded relevant facts and
— circumstances which when considered would have affected the outcome of this case27 or justify a
departure from the assessments and findings of the court below. The absence of any improper or ill-
motive on the part of the principal witnesses for the prosecution all the more strengthens the conclusion
that no such motive exists.28 Neither was any wrong motive attributed to the police officers who
This is my signature, sir.
testified against appellant.

“Q
Coming now to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is correct. Under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659 “when by reason or on occasion of the rape, a
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.” This special complex crime is treated by law in the
— same degree as qualified rape—that is, when any of the 7 (now 10) “attendant circumstances”
enumerated in the law is alleged and proven, in which instances, the penalty is death. In cases where
any of those circumstances is proven though not alleged, the penalty cannot be death except if the
And immediately after your first signature is a Certification that you have personally examined the circumstance proven can be properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and
accused Larry Mahinay and testified that he voluntary executed the Extra Judicial Confession, do you 15 of the RPC which will affect the imposition of the proper penalty in accordance with Article 63 of the
recognize the signature? RPC. However, if any of those circumstances proven but not alleged cannot be considered as an
aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15, the same cannot affect the imposition of the penalty
because Article 63 of the RPC in mentioning aggravating circumstances refers to those defined in
Articles 14 and 15. Under R.A. No. 8353, if any of the 10 circumstances is alleged in the
“A
information/complaint, it may be treated as a qualifying circumstance. But if it is not so alleged, it may
be considered as an aggravating circumstance, in which case the only penalty is death—subject to the
usual proof of such circumstance in either case.
—

Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by law for the crime of “rape
This is also my signature, sir.”23 (emphasis supplied). with homicide,” the court has no option but to apply the same “regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime”29 in accordance with
Article 63 of the RPC, as amended.30 This case of rape with homicide carries with it the penalty of
death which is mandatorily imposed by law within the import of Article 47 of the RPC, as amended,
which provides:
“The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws,
except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime or is more than seventy years of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the
Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in
which cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.” (emphasis supplied).
In an apparent but futile attempt to escape the imposition of the death penalty, appellant tried to alter
his date of birth to show that he was only 17 years and a few months old at the time he committed the
rape and thus, covered by the proscription on the imposition of death if the guilty person is below
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the crime.31 Again, the record rebuffs appellant on
this point considering that he was proven to be already more than 20 years of age when he did the
heinous act.
Pursuant to current case law, a victim of simple rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) but if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by present amended law, the civil
indemnity for the victim shall be not less than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00).32 In addition
to such indemnity, she can also recover moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code33 in
such amount as the court deems just, without the necessity for pleading or proof of the basis thereof.34
Civil indemnity is different from the award of moral and exemplary damages.35 The requirement of
proof of mental and physical suffering provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code is dispensed with
because it is “recognized that the victim’s injury is inherently concomitant with and necessarily
resulting from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages.”36 Thus, it was
held that a conviction for rape carries with it the award of moral damages to the victim without need
for pleading or proof of the basis thereof.37
Exemplary damages can also be awarded if the commission of the crime was attended by one or more
aggravating circumstances pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code38 after proof that the offended
party is entitled to moral, temperate and compensatory damages.39 Under the circumstances of this
case, appellant is liable to the victim’s heirs for the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against an
accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian of the rights of the people lays
down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating
officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and again at and during
the time of the custodial interrogation40 in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and
Republic Act No. 7438.41 It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by
ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the
Court must update in the light of new legal developments:
1.The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a
language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any. Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a language
known to and understood by said person;
2.He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used
as evidence against him;
3.He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an
independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4.He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be
provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be
appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5.That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial
investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid
waiver has been made;
6.The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by
the most expedient means—telephone, radio, letter or messenger—with his lawyer (either retained or
appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by
him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly
accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the
officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7.He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8.In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be
done in writing and in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void
even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9.That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of
the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication,
the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must cease
if it has already begun;
10.The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to
counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless
of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements;
11.He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of
any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
Four members of the Court—although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions expressed
in People v. Echegaray42 that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is
unconstitutional—nevertheless submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is
constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED except for the award of civil indemnity
for the heinous rape which is INCREASED to P75,000.00, PLUS P50,000.00 moral damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code,
upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Martinez, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Conviction affirmed.
Notes.—Where there is no direct relation between the commission of rape with homicide and the
petitioner’s office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime
charged, the case does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. (Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227
SCRA 627 [1993])
The Supreme Court usually lends credence to the testimony of young girls, especially where the facts
point to their having been victims of sexual assault. (People vs. Sulte, 232 SCRA 421 [1994]) People vs.
Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455, G.R. No. 122485 February 1, 1999
G.R. No. 181202. December 5, 2012.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDGAR PADIGOS, accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Evidence; When the credibility of the victim is at issue, the Supreme Court gives great
weight to the trial court’s assessment; The wisdom behind this rule is that the trial court had the full
opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, thus, it is in a
better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence.—In the recent case of
People v. Bosi, 674 SCRA 411 (2012), we reiterated a long held principle that when the credibility of the
victim is at issue, the Court gives great weight to the trial court’s assessment. Expounding on the said
principle, we declared in that case that the trial court’s finding of facts is even conclusive and binding if
it is not shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence. The wisdom behind this rule is that the trial court had the full opportunity to observe directly
the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, thus, it is in a better position than the appellate
court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence.
Criminal Law; Rape; Statutory Rape; Sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old, which is the
subject of this case, is considered as statutory rape in this jurisdiction.—Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code which deals with the offense of rape provides: Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How
Committed.—Rape is committed—1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances: a. Through force, threat or intimidation; b. When the offended party
is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority; d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present; 2. By any person who, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person. As cemented in jurisprudence, the ele-
_______________
 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s
mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that
* FIRST DIVISION. it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of
proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him. 6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding
246 as to the age of the victim.

246 Same; Acts of Lasciviousness; Elements of.—Anent the charge of acts of lasciviousness, Article 336 of
the Revised Penal Code provides: Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness.—Any person who shall commit any
act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the
preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional. Therefore, the crime of acts of
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
lasciviousness is composed of the following elements: (1) That the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances: a. By using
force or intimidation; or b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
People vs. Padigos c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) That the offended party is another person
of either sex.

ments of rape under the said provision of law are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim;
and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of APPEAL from the decision of the Court of Appeals.
reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of age. Thus, sexual intercourse
with a girl below 12 years old, which is the subject of this case, is considered as statutory rape in this
jurisdiction.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Same; Same; Qualified Rape; In People v. Pruna, 390 SCRA 577 (2002), the Supreme Court formulated a
  The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
set of guidelines that will serve as a jurisprudential benchmark in appreciating age either as an element
of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance in order to address the seemingly conflicting court
decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the victim’s age in rape cases.—After a careful review
of the records of this case, we are persuaded that appellant is indeed guilty of qualified rape. In People   Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
v. Pruna, 390 SCRA 577 (2002), we formulated a set of guidelines that will serve as a jurisprudential
benchmark in appreciating age either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance in
order to address the seemingly conflicting court decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
victim’s age in rape cases. The Pruna guidelines are as follows: 1. The best evidence to prove the age of
the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. 2. In
the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. 3. If the certificate This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated July 20, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR.-
of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, H.C. No. 00344, entitled People of the Philippines v. Edgar Padigos, which affirmed with modification
the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity the Judgment2 dated September 26, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 14 in
or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date Criminal Case Nos. CBU-64584 & CBU-64585.
of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 The trial court found appellant Edgar Padigos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as
years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No.
alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. 7610 or the “Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.”

The Information in Criminal Case No. CBU-64584 charged appellant with the crime of rape in relation
to Republic Act No. 7610, while the Information in Criminal Case No. CBU-64585 charged him with the
crime of acts of lasciviousness also in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. The relevant portions of said
Informations read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. CBU-64584
That sometime in the evening of the 26th day of August, 2002, at x x x and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by lewd design, did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his own daughter, “AAA”3 who is a minor 6
years of age, that resulted to devirginizing her and causing her great dishonor.4
CRIMINAL CASE NO. CBU-64585
That sometime in the evening of the 27th day of August, 2002, at x x x and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and with lewd design, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously let his own daughter, “AAA” who is a minor 6 years of age,
masturbate his penis, which act is constitutive of physical abuse which debases, degrades or demeans
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the victim as a human being.5
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.6
The facts of this case, as narrated in the assailed July 20, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
The government presented as its witnesses, the minor victim and Dr. Naomi Poca. The defense, on the
other hand, only had accused-appellant for its witness.
THE PROSECUTION’S THEORY—
The evidence for the [S]tate discloses that “AAA” who was then only six-years old was sleeping inside
their house on August 26, 2002 when her father, herein accused-appellant raped her. He undressed her
and removed her panty. He also took off his pants. He inserted his penis into her vagina and made
push and pull movements. She felt pain in her private organ. Her mother was not around as it was only
her and her father who were home.
The next day or on August 27, 2002, accused-appellant made her hold his penis. He, on the other hand,
touched her genitals and inserted his fingers into her vagina causing her to feel pain.
She related the incidents to her mother who simply gave her father a fierce piercing stare but did
nothing. She also confided to her aunt, sister of her mother, who brought her to a doctor for medical
examination and to the police station to report the matter.
She was examined by Dr. Yu and Dr. Aznar of the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center. Since the
two physicians were no longer connected with the said hospital, it was one Dr. Naomi Poca who was
called to the witness stand who, testifying on the medical certificate (Exh. “B”) issued by the two
doctors, came-up with the following declarations, thus—
“Based on the medical certificate issued by Dr. Yu and Dr. Aznar, their written findings include, 1x1
cm. healed circular scar frontal lateral side left sec. to varicella, healed circular scar with the torso back
abdomen sec. to varicella, 3x3 cm. wound in left foot aspect sec. to varicella, height 110.5 cm., weight,
17.65 cm., well developed nourished cooperative if not explain, tunner crescent in shape with 2x1 11:00
o’clock position with minimal amount of vaginal bleeding. The first finding, 1x1 cm. healed circular
scar refers to head and nect, (sic) the second, healed 1x1 cm. circular torso back refers to torso and
abdomen, the third, 3x3 cm. open wounds refers to extremities, the well developed nourished
cooperative refers to general development and the next finding, Tanner 1 refers to the hymen and the
last.”
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S THEORY—
The present charges were merely fabricated by his wife as they have been estranged from each other
because she was cohabiting with another man prior to the incidents complained of. His wife prevented
their daughter/victim herein from returning to their house. On or before August 26, 2002, he met his
wife and requested her to allow their daughter to live with him because she did not want their child to
live under immoral circumstances. His wife strongly refused telling her he could get their child only
over their child’s dead body. A few days hence, to his surprise, he was arrested by police authorities
and was detained at the Talisay City Jail for having raped his own daughter. Their daughter never
returned to their house since he and his wife separated.7 (Citation omitted.)
After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted appellant of the crimes of rape and acts of
lasciviousness both in relation to Republic Act No. 7160. The dispositive portion of the September 26,
2005 Judgment of the trial court reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the court finds accused, EDGAR PADIGOS, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of RAPE in relation to R.A. 7[61]0 and, considering the aggravating qualifying
circumstance of relationship to and minority of the victim, imposes upon him the supreme penalty of
DEATH by lethal injection.
Accused is, likewise, sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to
TWELVE (12) YEARS of PRISION MAYOR for the ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS he committed and
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt.
In addition, Accused is ordered to pay the victim, [AAA], the following amounts:
1.) P50,000.00, as damages ex delito;
2.) P50,000.00, as moral damages;
3.) P25,000.00, as exemplary damages;
The Department of Social Welfare and Development, Region VII, Cebu City is ordered to take custody
of the minor, [AAA], for her to undergo rehabilitation.8
Hoping for a reversal of his conviction, appellant elevated his case to the Court of Appeals which
denied his appeal and affirmed with modification the trial court judgment in a Decision dated July 20,
2007, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with modification as to the
penalty.
Accused-appellant is found guilty of the crimes of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to
Republic Act 7610 and is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the first crime and to an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty (2[0]) days as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as maximum of reclusion temporal.
The award of civil damages is retained.9 (Italicization added.)
Hence, appellant now seeks redress with this Court through the present appeal wherein he merely
adopted the Appellant’s Brief he submitted to the Court of Appeals in lieu of submitting a
Supplemental Brief as permitted by this Court. In this appeal, appellant puts forward a single
assignment of error, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED AGAINST HIM DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.10
In his appeal, appellant asserts that the trial court should not have given full credence and weight to the
testimony of AAA because she allegedly failed to give a straightforward and consistent narration of the
events surrounding the incidents at issue. Appellant maintains that AAA’s testimony is not worthy of
belief because it allegedly lacked details as to how the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness were
actually committed.
We are not persuaded.
Appellant’s appeal is hinged principally on the credibility of the victim’s testimony. Appellant insists
that AAA’s testimony is not credible enough to warrant appellant’s conviction of the two felonies
attributed to him.
In the recent case of People v. Bosi,11 we reiterated a long held principle that when the credibility of the
victim is at issue, the Court gives great weight to the trial court’s assessment. Expounding on the said
principle, we declared in that case that the trial court’s finding of facts is even conclusive and binding if
it is not shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence. The wisdom behind this rule is that the trial court had the full opportunity to observe directly
the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, thus, it is in a better position than the appellate
court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence.
 A. Yes, Sir.

In the case at bar, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals categorically held that AAA is a credible
witness and that her testimony deserves full faith and belief. In spite of the brevity of her testimony, the
trial court considered the same as delivered in a clear and straightforward manner that is devoid of any Q. Can you please point him out?
pretense or equivocation.

A. That one.
An examination of the transcript of AAA’s testimony would indicate that the crime of rape was indeed
committed by appellant. The relevant portion of said testimony reads:
COURT INTERPRETER:

PROS. CALDERON:
  The witness is pointing to the accused who responded to his name as Edgar Padigos.

Q. Now, you were then in your house at that time. Can you remember now?
PROS. CALDERON:

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Do you understand the word rape?

Q. While you were sleeping, can you remember what happened to you?
A. Yes.

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. What do you understand by the word rape?

Q. Can you tell this court what happened to you?

A. [It is a] malicious word.

A. I was raped, Sir.

Q. What did your father do to you?

Q. Who raped you?

A. I was raped.

A. My father.
Q. How did he do it?

Q. Is your father around?

A. His penis was inserted in my vagina, Sir.
Q. How did he do it? Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code which deals with the offense of rape provides:

A. He made push and pull movements. Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed.—Rape is committed—

Q. What about your dress, were you still wearing it? 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

A. He undressed me, Sir. a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

Q. What about your panty? b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

A. Also without my panty. c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

Q. What about his pants? d.  When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present;

A. He also took off his pants.

2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit
an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
Q. When your father raped you, what did you do? instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

A. Very painful, Sir. As cemented in jurisprudence, the elements of rape under the said provision of law are: (1) the offender
had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation;
or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12
years of age.14 Thus, sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old, which is the subject of this case,
Q. Where did you feel the pain? is considered as statutory rape in this jurisdiction.

A. In my vagina.12 According to the sixth paragraph of Article 266-B, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of
rape is committed “when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
Pertinently, this Court has repeatedly stressed that no young girl would concoct a sordid tale of so the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.”
serious a crime as rape at the hands of her own father, undergo medical examination, then subject
herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent desire
to seek justice.13
It would appear from the death penalty imposed by the trial court that it found appellant guilty of
qualified rape. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, albeit reduced to reclusion perpetua
in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346. 5.  It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

After a careful review of the records of this case, we are persuaded that appellant is indeed guilty of
qualified rape. In People v. Pruna,15 we formulated a set of guidelines that will serve as a
jurisprudential benchmark in appreciating age either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance in order to address the seemingly conflicting court decisions regarding the sufficiency of
evidence of the victim’s age in rape cases. The Pruna guidelines are as follows:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate
and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.16 (Citation
omitted.)
In the case at bar, the prosecution may have been unable to present AAA’s birth certificate or other
authentic document such as a baptismal certificate during trial, however, that failure to present relevant
evidence will not deter this Court from upholding that qualified rape was indeed committed by
appellant because he himself admitted, in his counter-affidavit which formed part of the evidence for
the defense and the contents of which he later affirmed in his testimony in open court, that AAA was
below 7 years old around the time of the rape incident. In the Court’s view, this admission from
appellant, taken with the testimony of the victim, sufficiently proved the victim’s minority.

Parenthetically, we are not unmindful of the observation of the trial court, to wit:

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such
as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 7 years old;
Back to the instant case, by no stretch of even a fertile imagination can this Court, observing her frail
and diminutive mien, hold that AAA, at the age of 6 when she was raped, could be mistaken to be
above eleven (11) years old for the offense to fall under simple rape, much more could it be mistaken
that she was above 17 years old, for the accused to be saved from the supreme penalty: death. The
offense of rape could, thus, only fall under subparagraph d), par. 1), ART. 266-A of R.A. 7877—The
Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (statutory rape).17

Anent the charge of acts of lasciviousness, Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 12 years old;
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness.—Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other
persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be
punished by prision correccional.
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 18 years old.

Therefore, the crime of acts of lasciviousness is composed for the following elements:

4.  In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s
mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that
it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. (1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances: A. Yes, Sir.

a. By using force or intimidation; or Q. When he made you hold his penis, what happened?

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or A. My father also touched my vagina.

c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and Q. How did he touch your vagina?

(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.18 (Citation omitted.) A. He touched all the parts of my vagina.

Utilizing the foregoing definition as a guide, it is beyond cavil that appellant’s act of making AAA hold Q. Did he insert his fingers?
his penis and, subsequently, of touching her vagina with his fingers can be both characterized as
constituting acts of lasciviousness. As previously discussed, the moral influence or ascendancy
exercised by appellant over AAA takes the place of the element of force and intimidation. A. Yes, Sir.

AAA’s testimony in this regard provides adequate basis for appellant’s guilt: Q. What did you feel?

PROS. CALDERON: A. I felt pain, Sir.19

Q. What about the following day? In view of the foregoing, we therefore affirm the conviction of appellant for qualified rape and acts of
lasciviousness. Further, he is to suffer the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals which is reclusion
perpetua.
A. He told me to hold his penis.

The amount of actual damages and moral damages awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the
Q. That was the next day? Court of Appeals which is P50,000.00 each is correct. However, in line with jurisprudence, the award of
exemplary damages should be increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.20

A. Yes, Sir.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 20, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CEB-CR.-H.C. No. 00344, finding appellant Edgar Padigos guilty in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-64584
Q. That would be on August 27, 2002? and CBU-64585, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that:
(1) The award of exemplary damages is increased to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00); and
(2) Appellant Edgar Padigos is ordered to pay the private offended party interest on all damages
awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez** and Reyes, JJ., concur. 
Judgment affirmed with modifications.
Notes.—The accused cannot be held liable for qualified, much less statutory rape where the prosecution
failed to prove by independent evidence the age of the victim, much less the allegation that she was
under the age of 12 when she was raped. (People vs. Padua, 645 SCRA 744 [2011])
Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, rape is always committed when the accused has carnal
knowledge of a female under 12 years of age. The crime is commonly called statutory rape, because a
female of that age is deemed incapable of giving consent to the carnal knowledge. (People vs.
Villaflores, 669 SCRA 365 [2012])
——o0o——  People vs. Padigos, 687 SCRA 245, G.R. No. 181202 December 5, 2012
G.R. No. 199402. November 12, 2014.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ENRIQUE QUINTOS y BADILLA, accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Rape; The observance of the witnesses’ demeanor during an oral
direct examination, cross-examination, and during the entire period that he or she is present during
trial is indispensable especially in rape cases because it helps establish the moral conviction that an
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.—The observance of the witnesses’
demeanor during an oral direct examination, cross-examination, and during the entire period that he or
she is present during trial is indispensable especially in rape cases because it helps establish the moral
conviction that an accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Trial provides
judges with the opportunity to detect, consciously or unconsciously, observable cues and
microexpressions that could, more than the words said and taken as a whole, suggest sincerity or betray
lies and ill will. These important aspects can never be reflected or reproduced in documents and objects
used as evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The evaluation of the witnesses’ credibility is a matter best left to the trial court
because it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial.—“[T]he
evaluation of the witnesses’ credibility is a matter best left to the trial court because it has the
opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial. Thus, the Court accords great
respect to the trial court’s findings,” more so when the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings. The
exception is when the trial court and/or the Court of Appeals “overlooked or misconstrued substantial
facts that could have affected the outcome of the case.” No such facts were overlooked or misconstrued
in this case.
Criminal Law; Rape; To be convicted of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), it
only needs to be shown that a man had carnal knowledge with a woman, or a person sexually assaulted
another.—To be convicted of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, it only needs to be
shown that a man had carnal knowledge with a woman, or a person sexually assaulted another, under
any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat or intimidation; b) The victim is deprived
of reason; c) The victim is unconscious; d) By means of fraudulent machination; e) By means of grave
abuse of authority; f) When the victim is under 12 years of age; or g) When the victim is demented. In
this case, AAA made a spontaneous and unadorned testimony in court about the fact, the manner, and
the circumstances of the male accused’s sexual intercourse with her over a period of days. She was also
able to positively identify the accused, when asked.
Same; Same; The presence of lacerations is not an element of the crime of rape.—The presence of
lacerations is not an element of the crime of rape. This court previously characterized the presence or
absence of lacerations as a “trivial or inconsequential [matter] that does not alter the essential fact of the
commission of rape.” The presence of lacerations is, therefore, not necessary to sustain a conviction. An
accused may be found guilty of rape regardless of the existence or inexistence of lacerations. The
absence of lacerations is not a sufficient defense.
Same; Same; Regardless of the relationship between two individuals, forcing carnal knowledge upon
another is considered rape, more so when the victim is incapable of giving consent due to her mental
capacity.—Accused’s argument that he and AAA were sweethearts is irrelevant in rape cases wherein
the main element is “lack of consent.” Regardless of the relationship between two individuals, forcing
carnal knowledge upon another is considered rape, more so when the victim is incapable of giving
consent due to her mental capacity. Even married couples, upon whom the law imposes the duty to
cohabitate, are protected from forced sexual congress.
Same; Same; The prime purpose of a criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and
others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate
him or, in general, to maintain social order.—“The prime purpose of [a] criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him
from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.” Crimes are punished
as retribution so that society would understand that the act punished was wrong. Imposing different
penalties for different manners of committing rape creates a message that one experience of rape is
relatively trivial or less serious than another. It attaches different levels of wrongfulness to equally
degrading acts. Rape, in whatever manner, is a desecration of a person’s will and body. In terms of
penalties, treating one manner of committing rape as greater or less in heinousness than another may be
of doubtful constitutionality.

Same; Same; Violence Against Women and their Children Act; Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 recognizes
that wives, former wives, co-parents, and sweethearts may be raped by their husbands, former
husbands, co-parents, or sweethearts by stating that committing acts of rape against these persons are
considered violence against women.—Rape, as now defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
does not make a distinction with regard to an accused’s relationship with the victim. It only requires
that sexual congress be forced by a man upon another person. Moreover, Republic Act No. 9262
recognizes that wives, former wives, co-parents, and sweethearts may be raped by their husbands,
former husbands, co-parents, or sweethearts by stating that committing acts of rape against these
persons are considered violence against women.
Same; Same; Qualified Rape; To qualify the crime of rape and increase the penalty of accused from
reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B in relation to Article 266(A)(1) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), an allegation of the victim’s intellectual disability must be alleged in the information.—To
qualify the crime of rape and increase the penalty of accused from reclusion perpetua to death under
Article 266-B in relation to Article 266(A)(1) of the Revised Penal Code, an allegation of the victim’s
intellectual disability must be alleged in the information. If not alleged in the information, such mental
incapacity may prove lack of consent but it cannot increase the penalty to death. Neither can it be the
basis of conviction for statutory rape.

Same; Same; Sexual congress with a person who expressed her resistance by words or deeds constitutes APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
force either physically or psychologically through threat or intimidation.—When a person resists
another’s sexual advances, it would not be presumptuous to say that, that person does not consent to
any sexual activity with the other. That resistance may establish lack of consent. Sexual congress with a
person who expressed her resistance by words or deeds constitutes force either physically or The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
psychologically through threat or intimidation. It is rape. Lack of resistance may sometimes imply
consent. However, that is not always the case. While it may imply consent, there are circumstances that
may render a person unable to express her resistance to another’s sexual advances. Thus, when a   Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.
person has carnal knowledge with another person who does not show any resistance, it does not always
mean that that person consented to such act. Lack of resistance does not negate rape.
  Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.

Same; Same; Article 266-A recognizes that rape can happen even in circumstances when there is no
resistance from the victim.—Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code does not simply say that rape is
 
committed when a man has carnal knowledge with or sexually assaults another by means of force,
threat, or intimidation. It enumerates at least four other circumstances under which rape may be
committed: (1) by taking advantage of a person’s deprived reason or unconscious state; (2) through
fraudulent machination; (3) by taking advantage of a person’s age (12 years of age) or demented status; LEONEN, J.:
and (4) through grave abuse of authority. Article 266-A recognizes that rape can happen even in
circumstances when there is no resistance from the victim.

A person commits rape when he sexually assaults another who does not consent or is incapable of
giving consent to a sexual act. Children, either in chronological or mental age, are incapable of giving
consent to a sexual act.
This case involves accused Enrique Quintos y Badilla who was charged with rape allegedly committed
against AAA, a mental retardate1 (intellectually disabled).2
Two informations were filed against accused. Pertinent portions of which read:
A. Crim. Case No. 07-0873 (Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 266-B, 9th
paragraph, RPC)
That on or about the 25th day of October 2007, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with lewd design, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into the
mouth of one [AAA], through force, threat, or intimidation, and against her will and consent, thereby
debasing, demeaning and degrading her intrinsic worth and dignity.3
B. Crim. Case No. 07-0874 (Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code)
That on or about the 26th day of October, 2007, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge with
one [AAA], when she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or asleep, and against her will
and consent, thereby debasing, demeaning and degrading her intrinsic worth and dignity.
 
Accused pleaded not guilty in both cases.4
Upon motion, the Regional Trial Court consolidated the two cases on March 6, 2008.5
The prosecution established that at the time of the incident, AAA was intellectually disabled.6 She was
21 years old with a mental age of 6 years and 2 months.7 She had an IQ of 38.8 This was based on the
testimony of National Bureau of Investigation clinical psychologist Brenda Tablizo.
Brenda Tablizo testified that she had been with the National Bureau of Investigation for 33 years at the
time her testimony was taken. In handling rape cases, they have a procedure, which involves
“interviewing [the victim], giving [the victim a] psychological battery of tests and then . . . [an] in-depth
interview. . . .”9 With respect to this particular case, Brenda Tablizo “administered the standard
intelligence scale, and projective test.”10 She “conducted the standard intelligence scale to determine
the mental and emotional capacity of the individual.”11 She also gave AAA a draw-a-person test.12
According to Brenda Tablizo, the purpose of the tests was “to have a general assessment of the mental
and emotional capacity of an individual and . . . to determine mental illness. . . .”13 These were the
standard tests used to evaluate mental competence.14 She conducted the tests on the day AAA was
referred to her by the Philippine National Police on December 5, 2007.15
AAA testified that in October 2007, accused, who was her neighbor, went to her house to watch
television.16 Accused followed her when she went to the bathroom.17 In the bathroom, accused
removed his shorts and underwear, and inserted his penis into her vagina.18 AAA did not want to have
intercourse with the accused, but she did not tell the accused to stop.19 During the trial, AAA pointed
to a man in yellow shirt as the man who followed her in the bathroom.20 She identified his name as
“Enrique Quintos.”21
A similar incident happened the next day. While AAA was sleeping, accused removed her
undergarments, as well as his own undergarments.22 Accused then laid on top of her and, again,
inserted his penis into her vagina.23 AAA also recalled that on a different day, accused kissed her and
held her breasts.24 There was also one Thursday night when accused forced AAA to take his penis
inside her mouth despite her protests.25
Based on the medico-legal report dated November 5, 2007, there was evidence of lacerations in AAA’s
hymen that were not self-inflicted.26
Accused claimed that he did not rape AAA.27 He was in a romantic and sexual relationship with
AAA.28 However, he ended this relationship when he got his now common-law wife pregnant.29 He
insisted that AAA’s charges were fabricated because of AAA’s inability to accept that he ended their
relationship.30
On September 9, 2009, the trial court issued a judgment finding accused guilty of two counts of rape.31
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 07-0873, accused Enrique Quintos y Badilla @ Eric is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 in relation to Article 266-B,
9th paragraph and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 6 years of prisión correccional as
the minimum penalty to 10 years and 1 day of prisión mayor as the maximum penalty.
2. In Criminal Case No. 07-0874, this Court likewise finds the said accused GUILTY of the crime of rape
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
For each count or rape, accused is ordered to pay complainant [AAA] P50,000 as moral damages,
P50,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000 as exemplary damages, or a total of P250,000.00 for two (2)
counts of rape. Costs against the accused.
Accused appealed the trial court decision before the Court of Appeals.32
On March 23, 2011, the Court of Appeals issued a decision affirming with modification the trial court’s
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated, the appealed judgment finding accused appellant guilty of two
counts of Rape is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that in Criminal Case No. 07-0873,
accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prisión
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prisión mayor, as maximum. The award of exemplary
damages is increased from P25,000 to P30,000 for each count of rape.
All other aspects of the fallo of the assailed Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court Branch 202 of
Las Piñas City on September 9, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. 07-0873 and 07-0874, stand.33
The Court of Appeals found that AAA’s testimony was credible and sufficient to convict accused.34
“Her simple recollection of the acts done to her by accused-appellant evinces sincerity and truthfulness.
. . . A woman with a mental age of that of a six-year-old child [as testified to by a National Bureau of
Investigation psychologist] could not possibly concoct an accusation as serious as rape against . . .
accused or at any one for that matter.”35 The Court of Appeals also considered the medical evaluation
finding evidence of five-day-old (or less) lacerations.36
The Court of Appeals ruled that accused’s denial and alibi could not prosper because he was not able to
demonstrate the impossibility that he was present at the crime scene when the incident happened.37
On the alleged lack of resistance from AAA during the alleged assault, the Court of Appeals ruled that
since an intellectually disabled person cannot give consent, carnal knowledge with her is rape under the
law.38 Moreover, accused did not show proof that would substantiate his claim that he was in a
relationship with AAA.39 In any case, the existence of a romantic relationship does not justify such
force upon a party.40
The Court of Appeals modified the maximum penalty in Criminal Case No. 07-0873 to 10 years of
prisión mayor. The Court of Appeals removed the additional one day imposed by the trial court. 
On April 11, 2012, accused, through the Public Attorney’s Office, filed a notice of appeal of the Court of
Appeals’ decision dated March 23, 2011.41
Both the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and accused, through the Public Attorney’s
Office, manifested their intent to dispense with the filing of supplemental briefs.42
The issue in this case is whether accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.
In the accused’s brief filed before the Court of Appeals, accused argued that the trial court overlooked
“material loopholes”43 in AAA’s direct testimony that could discredit her.44 These include AAA’s
failure to disclose that accused employed force or intimidation against her. She never mentioned that
accused was in any occasion carrying a deadly weapon, uttering threats, or subjecting AAA to physical
violence.45 Force and intimidation are elements of the crime of rape under Article 355, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7659.46
Accused also emphasized that AAA did not offer resistance or attempted to flee despite accused’s lack
of weapon to intimidate her.47 She did not tell accused to stop when accused allegedly removed her
undergarments.48
Accused pointed out the closeness of the houses in the locality.49 The incident also happened in broad
daylight inside
AAA’s house where she lived with six other family members.50 These circumstances made it
improbable for AAA not to make an outcry.51
Moreover, the prosecution’s act of having to recall AAA to the witness stand so that she could testify to
1) the alleged threats that accused made to her and 2) the alleged fact that she wept after the incident
reflects the weakness of AAA’s initial testimony.52 It was clearly an “attempt to make out a stronger
rape case.”53 She could have alleged those if it were true in her sinumpaang salaysay and during her
direct testimony.54
Lastly, accused argued that he and AAA were sweethearts who were engaged in sexual intimacies, and
the charges against him were mere responses to their break-up.55
We affirm accused’s conviction.
I
Trial courts are in the best position
to evaluate witnesses’ credibility
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found AAA’s testimony to be credible and convincing.56
There is no reason to disturb this finding.
The observance of the witnesses’ demeanor during an oral direct examination, cross-examination, and
during the entire period that he or she is present during trial is indispensable especially in rape cases
because it helps establish the moral conviction that an accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. Trial provides judges with the opportunity to detect, consciously or unconsciously,
observable cues and microexpressions that could, more than the words said and taken as a whole,
suggest sincerity or betray lies and ill will. These important aspects can never be reflected or
reproduced in documents and objects used as evidence.
Hence, “[t]he evaluation of the witnesses’ credibility is a matter best left to the trial court because it has
the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial. Thus, the Court accords
great respect to the trial court’s findings,”57 more so when the Court of Appeals affirmed such
findings.58
The exception is when the trial court and/or the Court of Appeals “overlooked or misconstrued
substantial facts that could have affected the outcome of the case.”59 No such facts were overlooked or
misconstrued in this case.
II
The intellectual disability of the witness does not make her testimony incredible, especially when
corroborated by other evidence
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

When a victim’s testimony is credible and sufficiently establishes the elements of the crime, it may be
enough basis to convict an accused of rape.60 b) The victim is deprived of reason;

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides: c) The victim is unconscious;

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed.—Rape is committed. d) By means of fraudulent machination;

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: e) By means of grave abuse of authority;

a. Through force, threat or intimidation; f) When the victim is under 12 years of age; or

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; g) When the victim is demented.

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; In this case, AAA made a spontaneous and unadorned testimony in court about the fact, the manner,
and the circumstances of the male accused’s sexual intercourse with her over a period of days. She was
also able to positively identify the accused, when asked. Thus:

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present;
Q: When accused followed you to the bathroom what happened?

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit
an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any A: He removed his short and underwear, Ma’am.
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Republic Act No. 8353 which
took effect on October 22, 1997)
Q: And, what did he do after he removed his short and underwear?

 
A: He inserted, Ma’am.

Thus, to be convicted of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, it only needs to be shown
that a man had carnal knowledge with a woman, or a person sexually assaulted another, under any of Q: What did he insert?
the following circumstances:
 A: It is him, Ma’am.

A: His penis, Ma’am.

....

Q: And, where did he insert his penis?

Q: Who let you swallow that “something?”

A: In my vagina, Ma’am.

A: Eric, Ma’am.

....

Q: Please point to Eric if he is in this Courtroom.

Q: And, what happened on that another incident?

A: On a Tuesday he kissed me on the lips and held my breast, Ma’am.

RECORD: (Witness is pointing to a man wearing a yellow shirt and when asked his name answered,
Enrique Quintos.)
Q: And, after that incident on a Tuesday, what else happened?

Q: And, you said that the accused made you swallowed. What is that thing that he made you swallow?
A: On a Thursday he waited on me downstairs when it was already dark, Ma’am.

A: His penis, Ma’am.

Q: What did you do on that Thursday incident?

Q: What did you do when he made you swallowed his penis?

A: He let me swallowed, Ma’am.

A: He forced me, Ma’am.

Q: Who in particular let you swallowed something?

Q: And by forcing you, what action did you make with regard to his act of making you swallow his
A: Eric, Ma’am. penis?

Q: Are you referring to Eric the same accused who repeatedly inserted his penis into your vagina? A: I told him, “I do not like it,” Ma’am.
Q: And, did you in fact, able to swallow his penis? A: I also gave her the draw-a-person test and battery of tests, ma’am.

A: “Opo, sinubo po sa akin,” Ma’am.61 (Emphasis supplied) Q: What were the purposes or the goals of these kinds of tests conducted upon the said victim?

  A: The purpose of all these tests is to have a general assessment of the mental and emotional capacity of
an individual and also these tests determine mental illness, ma’am.

It was established by clinical psychologist Brenda Tablizo, however, through examinations and
interviews, that AAA was intellectually disabled with a mental age of 6 years and 2 months. Pertinent Q: These kinds of tests that you resulted to which you employed upon the victim, are these tests the
portions of Brenda Tablizo’s testimony are reproduced as follows: standard method being used all over to be able to specifically evaluate the mental competence and
incompetence of a certain person?

Q: In handling rape victim cases, what do you usually do with regard to them? 
A: Yes, ma’am.

A: We usually do a certain procedure like interviewing them, giving them psychological battery of tests
and then we still do the in-depth interview, ma’am. Q: For how long did you conduct this psychiatric examination upon the said victim?

Q: In this particular case . . . what kind of examination did you conduct upon her? A: I conducted the tests on the same day when the victim was referred to me, ma’am. I started it in the
morning until late in the afternoon. And we also asked for the victim to come back.

A: I administered the standard intelligence scale and projective test, ma’am.

Q: So, for how much time was required for you to completely terminate and fully satisfied that you
have completed this neuro-psychiatric examination upon the said victim?
....

A: For exactly one week, ma’am.

Pros. Sion: Madam Witness, will you please be more precise in informing this Honorable Court on the
various tests which you conducted upon the person of the victim. . .?
Q: As a result of the examination that you conducted upon the victim, what was the findings which
yielded from said examination?
Witness: I conducted the standard intelligence scale to determine the mental and emotional capacity of
the individual, ma’am.
A: In the conclusion which I made, it was found out that the victim is suffering from mental retardation,
her IQ is 38 and her mental age is 6 years and two months, ma’am.
Q: Other than that kind of test, what other tests were conducted upon the victim?

Q: How old was the victim at that time that you conducted this psychiatric examination?
A: She was 21 years old, ma’am.62 (Emphasis supplied)  

  III

AAA’s mental condition does not make her testimony incredible as long as she can recount her  
experience in a straightforward, spontaneous, and believable manner. In People v. Monticalvo, this
court said the following:
The existence of a relationship between accused and the victim does not negate rape

Competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld by this
Court where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capable and consistently. Rather than  
undermine the gravity of the complainant’s accusations, it even lends greater credence to her testimony,
that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of
the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the accused.63
Accused’s argument that he and AAA were sweethearts is irrelevant in rape cases wherein the main
element is “lack of consent.” Regardless of the relationship between two individuals, forcing carnal
knowledge upon another is considered rape, more so when the victim is incapable of giving consent
  due to her mental capacity. Even married couples, upon whom the law imposes the duty to cohabitate,
are protected from forced sexual congress.

AAA’s testimony was corroborated by the medical findings, which showed that there were lacerations
in her hymen that were produced by a blunt object. The testimonial evidence is bolstered by the
presence of these lacerations. Together, they produce a moral conviction that accused committed the
crimes charged.
The presence of lacerations is not an element of the crime of rape. This court previously characterized
the presence or absence of lacerations as a “trivial or inconsequential [matter] that does not alter the
essential fact of the commission of rape.”64 The presence of lacerations is, therefore, not necessary to
sustain a conviction. An accused may be found guilty of rape regardless of the existence or inexistence
of lacerations. The absence of lacerations is not a sufficient defense.
Rape, as now defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, does not make a distinction with
regard to an accused’s relationship with the victim. It only requires that sexual congress be forced by a
man upon another person. Moreover, Republic Act No. 9262 recognizes that wives, former wives, co-
parents, and sweethearts may be raped by their husbands, former husbands, co-parents, or sweethearts
by stating that committing acts of rape against these persons are considered violence against women.
Republic Act No. 9262 provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act:

(a) “Violence against women and their children” refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
However, the presence of lacerations may be used to sustain conviction of an accused by corroborating person against a woman who is his wife former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or
testimonies of abuse and documents showing trauma upon the victim’s genitals. had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child . . . which result in or is likely
to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse. . . .

In this case, the medical evidence of lacerations supported AAA’s testimony that she was sexually
abused. It was not necessary to convict accused, but it strengthened AAA’s testimony and the moral ....
certainty that accused was guilty of the crimes charged.
B. “Sexual violence” refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child.
It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harrassment, acts of lasciviousness . . . (Emphasis supplied)
 
Further, we discussed marital rape in People v. Jumawan.65 We said:
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the
realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.
 
....
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man
who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and
the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and
penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual
intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a
fellow human being with dignity equal to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate
this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent.66
 
IV
Absence of resistance does not, by itself, establish consent
Accused’s allegation that AAA did not resist his advances was belied by AAA’s testimony that accused
threatened the lives of her mother and siblings.67 This is intimidation that could explain AAA’s alleged
lack of resistance.
In any case, resistance is not an element of the crime of rape. It need not be shown by the prosecution.
Neither is it necessary to convict an accused. The main element of rape is “lack of consent.”
“Consent,” “resistance,” and “absence of resistance” are different things. Consent implies agreement
and voluntariness. It implies willfulness. Similarly, resistance is an act of will. However, it implies the
opposite of consent. It implies disagreement.
Meanwhile, absence of resistance only implies passivity. It may be a product of one’s will. It may imply
consent. However, it may also be the product of force, intimidation, manipulation, and other external
forces.
Thus, when a person resists another’s sexual advances, it would not be presumptuous to say that, that
person does not consent to any sexual activity with the other. That resistance may establish lack of
consent. Sexual congress with a person who expressed her resistance by words or deeds constitutes
force either physically or psychologically through threat or intimidation. It is rape.
Lack of resistance may sometimes imply consent. However, that is not always the case. While it may
imply consent, there are circumstances that may render a person unable to express her resistance to
another’s sexual advances. Thus, when a person has carnal knowledge with another person who does
not show any resistance, it does not always mean that that person consented to such act. Lack of
resistance does not negate rape.
Hence, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code does not simply say that rape is committed when a man
has carnal knowledge with or sexually assaults another by means of force, threat, or intimidation. It
enumerates at least four other circumstances under which rape may be committed: (1) by taking
advantage of a person’s deprived reason or unconscious state; (2) through fraudulent machination; (3)
by taking advantage of a person’s age (12 years of age) or demented status; and (4) through grave abuse
of authority. Article 266-A recognizes that rape can happen even in circumstances when there is no
resistance from the victim.
Resistance, therefore, is not necessary to establish rape, especially when the victim is unconscious,
deprived of reason, manipulated, demented, or young either in chronological age or mental age.
The circumstances when rape may be committed under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code should
be defined in terms of the capacity of an individual to give consent. An unconscious person cannot
rationally respond to stimuli or perform acts such as giving consent or offering resistance because he or
she is either unaware, asleep, or in a coma.
Meanwhile, when a person is a victim of fraudulent machination or manipulation, such as when she is
induced to have carnal knowledge to treat a person’s disease that he or she does not really have, she is
not in full control of his or her decisions. He or she acts without full or with false knowledge of the
circumstances from which he or she bases his or her actions. Therefore, any consent he or she gives is
either false or not his or her own. Any lack of resistance may not be interpreted as voluntariness.
The term, “deprived of reason,” is associated with insanity or madness. A person deprived of reason
has mental abnormalities that affect his or her reasoning and perception of reality and, therefore, his or
her capacity to resist, make decisions, and give consent.
The term, “demented,” refers to a person who suffers from a mental condition called dementia.
Dementia refers to the deterioration or loss of mental functions such as memory, learning, speaking,
and social condition, which impairs one’s independence in everyday activities.68
We are aware that the terms, “mental retardation” or “intellectual disability,” had been classified under
“deprived of reason.”69 The terms, “deprived of reason” and “demented,” however, should be
differentiated from the term, “mentally retarded” or “intellectually disabled.” An intellectually disabled
person is not necessarily deprived of reason or demented. This court had even ruled that they may be
credible witnesses.70 However, his or her maturity is not there despite the physical age. He or she is
deficient in general mental abilities and has an impaired conceptual, social, and practical functioning
relative to his or her age, gender, and peers.71 Because of such impairment, he or she does not meet the
“socio-cultural standards of personal independence and social responsibility.”72
Thus, a person with a chronological age of 7 years and a normal mental age is as capable of making
decisions and giving consent as a person with a chronological age of 35 and a mental age of 7. Both are
considered incapable of giving rational consent because both are not yet considered to have reached the
level of maturity that gives them the capability to make rational decisions, especially on matters
involving sexuality. Decision-making is a function of the mind. Hence, a person’s capacity to decide
whether to give consent or to express resistance to an adult activity is determined not by his or her
chronological age but by his or her mental age. Therefore, in determining whether a person is “twelve
(12) years of age” under Article 266(A)(1)(d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the
chronological age of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age
if intellectual disability is established.
In all the above circumstances, rape is ensured because the victim lacks the awareness or presence of
mind to resist a sexual abuse. The unconscious, the manipulated, the reason-deprived, the demented,
and the young cannot be expected to offer resistance to sexual abuse for the simple reason that their
mental statuses render them incapable of doing so. They are incapable of rational consent. Thus, sexual
intercourse with them is rape. No evidence of force, intimidation, or resistance is necessary.
In this case, the victim, AAA, is intellectually disabled, with a mental age of 6 years and 2 months at 21
years of chronological age and an IQ of 38 at the time of the incident. Her capacity to give consent is
only that of a 6-year and 2-month-old child. She is incapable of giving rational consent to a sexual act.
Any sexual intercourse with her, regardless of her relationship with accused and the presence or
absence of resistance, is considered rape. In People v. Butiong,73 this court said:
Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 because a mental retardate is not capable of giving her
consent to a sexual act. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to
establish, one, the sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and two, the mental retardation
of the victim.74
Similarly, in People v. Monticalvo,75 this court said:
The gravamen of the crime of rape under Art. 266(A)(1) is sexual intercourse with a woman against her
will or without her consent. . . .
. . . [F]or the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that the offender had carnal V
knowledge of a woman through any of the four enumerated circumstances. Without doubt, carnal
knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under the aforesaid provisions of law. Proof of
force or intimidation is not necessary as a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual  
act. What needs to be proved are the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and
the mental retardation of the latter.76

The victim’s mental incapacity need not be alleged in the information in order to convict an accused of
the crime of rape as long as evidence established such incapacity
For the same reason that AAA was incapable of giving her consent, forcing her to take one’s genitals
inside her mouth is rape under Article 266(A)(2) regardless of the existence of or lack of consent.

The classifications of rape in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are relevant only insofar as these
define the manners of commission of rape. However, it does not mean that one manner is less heinous
or wrong than the other. Whether rape is committed by nonconsensual carnal knowledge of a woman
or by insertion of the penis into the mouth of another person, the damage to the victim’s dignity is
incalculable. Child sexual abuse in general has been associated with negative psychological impacts
such as trauma, sustained fearfulness, anxiety, self-destructive behavior, emotional pain, impaired
sense of self, and interpersonal difficulties.77 Hence, one experience of sexual abuse should not be
trivialized just because it was committed in a relatively unusual manner.
“The prime purpose of [a] criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others
from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him
or, in general, to maintain social order.”78 Crimes are punished as retribution so that society would
understand that the act punished was wrong.
Imposing different penalties for different manners of committing rape creates a message that one
experience of rape is relatively trivial or less serious than another. It attaches different levels of
wrongfulness to equally degrading acts. Rape, in whatever manner, is a desecration of a person’s will
and body. In terms of penalties, treating one manner of committing rape as greater or less in
heinousness than another may be of doubtful constitutionality.
However, the discriminatory treatment of these two acts with the same result was not raised in this
case. Acknowledging that every presumption must be accorded in favor of accused in criminal cases,
we have no choice but to impose a lesser penalty for rape committed by inserting the penis into the
mouth of the victim.
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A is
punishable by reclusion perpetua.
The information charging accused of this crime lacked the allegation of any mental disability on the
part of AAA. This is not necessary to convict accused of the crime of rape provided that sexual congress
and mental incapacity and, therefore, the incapacity to give consent, are proved by clear and convincing
evidence.
However, to qualify the crime of rape and increase the penalty of accused from reclusion perpetua to
death under Article 266-B in relation to Article 266(A)(1) of the Revised Penal Code, an allegation of the
victim’s intellectual disability must be alleged in the information. If not alleged in the information, such
mental incapacity may prove lack of consent but it cannot increase the penalty to death. Neither can it
be the basis of conviction for statutory rape.
In this case, the elements of sexual congress and lack of consent were sufficiently alleged in the
information. They were also clearly and conveniently determined during trial. The fact of being
mentally incapacitated was only shown to prove AAA’s incapacity to give consent, not to qualify the
crime of rape.
Thus, the Court of Appeals is correct in affirming the trial court’s decision to impose the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and not death in Criminal Case No. 07-0874.

  Article 266-B also provides that rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A is punishable by prisión
mayor. Applying Act No. 4103 or the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and considering that there were no
attending circumstances that should be considered, accused’s penalty in Criminal Case No. 07-0873
should be “within the range of penalty next lower to [prisión mayor]” or prisión correccional in its
maximum period as minimum, and prisión mayor in its medium period as maximum. Prisión
correccional in its maximum period has a range of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years. Prisión mayor
in its medium period has a range of 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Since the penalty imposed by the trial
court exceeds by one day the allowable penalty for the offenses committed, the Court of Appeals was
correct in removing that excess.
This court had not hesitated to increase the awards of damages in crimes of utter heinousness and
depravity.79 Thus, we increase the awards for moral damages, civil indemnity, and exemplary
damages to P100,000.00 each, and for each count of rape.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding accused Enrique Quintos y Badilla guilty of
two counts of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for Criminal Case No. 07-0874, without possibility for parole in accordance with
Republic Act No. 9346.80 For Criminal Case No. 07-0873, accused is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prisión correccional as minimum to 10 years of prisión mayor
as maximum. The awards for moral damages, civil indemnity, and exemplary damages are increased to
P100,000.00 each for each count of rape or a total of P600,000.00, with an interest of 6% per annum from
the finality of this decision until satisfaction of the award.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Notes.—The failure to allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship in the information in Criminal
Case No. 98-2304-MK precluded a finding of qualified rape against the accused; Section 8 Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court has expressly required that qualifying and aggravating circumstances be specifically
alleged in the information. (People vs. Dadulla, 642 SCRA 432 [2011])
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices
against women. (Garcia vs. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352 [2013]) People vs. Quintos, 740 SCRA 179, G.R. No.
199402 November 12, 2014
G.R. No. 203041. June 5, 2013.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MOISES CAOILE, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape; Mental Retardate; Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides for two circumstances when having carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental
disability is considered rape: 1. Paragraph 1(b): when the offended party is deprived of reason; and 2.
Paragraph 1(d): when the offended party is demented.—Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, provides for two circumstances when having carnal knowledge of a woman
with a mental disability is considered rape: 1. Paragraph 1(b): when the offended party is deprived of
reason x x x; and 2. Paragraph 1(d): when the offended party is x x x demented. Caoile was charged in
the Amended Informations with rape of a demented person under paragraph 1(d). The term demented
refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by
marked decline from the individual’s former intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness,
or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1(b) has been
interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA,
who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is
“deprived of reason,” and not one who is “demented.”
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; The capacity of a mental retardate to stand as a witness in court has
already been settled by the Supreme Court.—The fact that AAA was able to answer in a
straightforward manner during her testimony cannot be used against her. The capacity of a mental
retardate to stand as a witness in court has already been settled by this Court. In People v. Castillo, 627
SCRA 452 (2010), we said: It bears emphasis that the competence and credibility of mentally deficient
rape victims as witnesses have been upheld by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate
their ordeal capably and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainant’s
accusations, it even lends greater credence to her testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded and
guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact
suffered such crime at the hands of the accused. Moreover, it is settled that when a woman says she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony victim’s mental disability, at the time he committed the rape, qualifies the crime and makes it
alone is sufficient if it satisfies the exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused. punishable by death under Article 266-B, paragraph 10, to wit: The death penalty shall also be imposed
if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
x x x x 10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
Same; Same; Same; Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under Article 266- handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.
A, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. This is because a mentally deficient person is
automatically considered incapable of giving consent to a sexual act.—Carnal knowledge of a woman
who is a mental retardate is rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
amended. This is because a mentally deficient person is automatically considered incapable of giving
consent to a sexual act. Thus, what needs to be proven are the facts of sexual intercourse between the
accused and the victim, and the victim’s mental retardation. Verily, the prosecution was able to    The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
sufficiently establish that AAA is a mental retardate. Anent the fact of sexual congress, it is worthy to
note that aside from the prosecution’s own testimonial and documentary evidence, Caoile never denied
being physically intimate with AAA. In fact, he has confirmed such fact, and even claimed that he and
AAA often had sex, they being sweethearts.   The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

  Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.

Same; Same; Sweetheart Theory; Carnal knowledge of a female, even when done without force or
intimidation, is rape nonetheless, if it was done without her consent.—Unfortunately, such defense will
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
not exculpate him from liability. Carnal knowledge of a female, even when done without force or
intimidation, is rape nonetheless, if it was done without her consent. To expound on such concept, this
Court, in People v. Butiong, 659 SCRA 557 (2011), said: In rape committed by means of duress, the
victim’s will is nullified or destroyed. Hence, the necessity of proving real and constant resistance on The accused-appellant challenges in this appeal the March 21, 2012 Decision1 promulgated by the Court
the part of the woman to establish that the act was committed against her will. On the other hand, in the of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03957, which affirmed with modification the judgment2 of
rape of a woman deprived of reason or unconscious, the victim has no will. The absence of will conviction for two counts of Rape rendered against him by Branch 32 of the Agoo, La Union Regional
determines the existence of the rape. Such lack of will may exist not only when the victim is Trial Court (RTC) in Family Court Case Nos. A-496 and A-497.
unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also when she is suffering some mental deficiency
impairing her reason or free will. In that case, it is not necessary that she should offer real opposition or
constant resistance to the sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge of a woman so weak in intellect as to be Accused-appellant Moises Caoile (Caoile), in two separate Amended Informations filed before the RTC
incapable of legal consent constitutes rape. Where the offended woman was feeble-minded, sickly and on January 5, 2006, was charged with two separate counts of Rape of a Demented Person under Article
almost an idiot, sexual intercourse with her is rape. Her failure to offer resistance to the act did not 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
mean consent for she was incapable of giving any rational consent. The deprivation of reason need not
be complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is enough. Cohabitation with a feebleminded, idiotic
woman is rape. Sexual intercourse with an insane woman was considered rape. But a deaf-mute is not
FAMILY COURT CASE No. A-496
necessarily deprived of reason. This circumstances must be proven. Intercourse with a deaf-mute is not
rape of a woman deprived of reason, in the absence of proof that she is an imbecile. Viada says that the
rape under par. 2 may be committed when the offended woman is deprived of reason due to any cause
such as when she is asleep, or due to lethargy produced by sickness or narcotics administered to her by That on or about April 6, 2005, in the Municipality of Rosario, La Union, Philippines and within the
the accused. jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing the mental disability of the
victim, did the[n] and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one
[AAA],3 a demented person with a mental age of seven (7) years old against her will and, to her
damage and prejudice.4
Same; Same; Mental Retardate; The Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the rape of a mentally
disabled person regardless of the perpetrator’s awareness of his victim’s mental condition.—The
Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the rape of a mentally disabled person regardless of the
perpetrator’s awareness of his victim’s mental condition. However, the perpetrator’s knowledge of the
FAMILY COURT CASE No. A-497
That on or about May 12, 2005, in the Municipality of Rosario, La Union, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing the mental disability of the
victim, did the[n] and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one
[AAA], a demented person with a mental age of seven (7) years old against her will and, to her damage
and prejudice.5
Caoile pleaded not guilty to both charges upon his arraignment6 for both cases on March 1, 2006. After
the completion of the pre-trial conference on March 8, 2006,7 joint trial on the merits ensued.
The antecedents of this case, which were succinctly summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
Evidence for the Prosecution
[AAA], the herein victim, was left in the care of her grandmother and auntie in Alipang, Rosario, La
Union when her mother left to work abroad when she was still young. One of their neighbors was the
accused whose daughter, Marivic, was the playmate of [AAA].
One day, the accused invited [AAA] to go to the bamboo trees in their place. Upon reaching thereat, the
accused directed [AAA] to lie down on the ground. [AAA] followed the instruction of the accused
whom she called uncle Moises. Thereafter, the accused removed [AAA]’s short pant[s] and panty and
inserted his penis into her vagina. [AAA] felt pain but she did not do anything. After two minutes or so,
the accused removed his penis inside [AAA]’s vagina. [AAA] stood up and wore again her short
pant[s] and panty. Before the accused allowed [AAA] to go home, the former gave the latter a medicine,
which she described as a red capsule with white casing, with the instruction of taking the same
immediately upon reaching home. As instructed by her uncle Moises, [AAA] took the medicine as soon
as she got home.
Four (4) days thereafter, and while [AAA] was at the pumping well near their house, the accused
invited her to gather guavas at the mountain.
[AAA] accepted her uncle Moises’s invitation. At the mountain, the accused led [AAA] to lie down, and
then he removed her short pant[s] and panty. Thereafter, the accused inserted his penis inside the
vagina of [AAA]. After the sexual intercourse, the accused and [AAA] gathered guavas, and went
home.
One day, while [AAA] was sleeping in their house, Marivic woke her up and invited her to play at their
house. At the accused’s house, and while [AAA] and Marivic were playing, the accused invited [AAA]
to gather santol fruits. [AAA] went with the accused, and once again the accused had carnal knowledge
[of] her.
Sometime in April 2005, [AAA] heard her friend, [BBB], complaining to Lucio Bafalar, a Barangay
Tanod, that the accused mashed her breast. Upon hearing the story of [BBB], [AAA] blurted out that
she, too, was abused by the accused.
[CCC], [AAA]’s aunt, immediately went home [to] Rosario when she learned that her niece was raped
by the accused, and together with [AAA] and Barangay Captain Roming Bartolome they went to the
Rosario Police Station to report the incident. After executing their respective affidavits, [AAA] was
examined by [Dr.] Claire Maramat at San Fernando, La Union.
After examining [AAA] on June 21, 2005, Dr. Claire Maramat found out that [AAA]’s genitalia suffered
a multiple hymenal laceration which, at the time of the examination, was already healed, thus, possibly,
it was inflicted a week or months prior to the examination. According to Dr. Maramat, a multiple
hymenal laceration may be caused by several factors, such as trauma to the perineal area or penetration
of a penis.
Dr. Maramat also took seminal fluid from the vagina, the cervix and the cervical canal of [AAA], and
forwarded the same to Dr. Brenda Rosuman, a pathologist at the Ilocos Training and Regional Medical
Center (ITRMC), for examination.
 Dr. Rosuman testified that after examining the seminal fluids taken from [AAA], she found the
presence of spermatozoa, which means that [AAA] had sexual intercourse, and the predominance of
coccobacilli, meaning that [AAA] could be suffering from infection caused by hygiene or acquired
through sexual intercourse. She further testified that, according to some books, spermatozoa can live in
the vaginal tract within 17 days from sexual intercourse. She clarified, however, that in her medical
experience, she rarely finds spermatozoa in a specimen beyond three (3) days.
Claire Baliaga, a psychologist of the Philippine Mental Health Association, Baguio-Benguet Chapter,
testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation on [AAA] on August 10, 2007; that [AAA]
obtained an overall score performance of 55, which is classified within the mental retardation range;
and that [AAA] has the mental age of a seven-year, nine-month old child who is inadequate of
sustaining mental processes and in solving novel problems employing adoptive strategies.
The accused did not force himself [on] [AAA]. [AAA] knew that he is a married man, but she,
nonetheless, loved him without reservation.

Dr. Roderico V. Ramos, a psychiatrist of the ITRMC, testified that he evaluated the mental condition of
[AAA], that after psychiatric evaluation, [AAA] was given a diagnosis of moderate mental retardation;
that a person who is mentally retardate do not function the way his age required him to be; that [AAA]
was eighteen (18) years old at the time he examined her, but the mental functioning of her brain is
around five (5) to six (6) years old; and that [AAA] can only do what a five or six-year old child could
do.
The defense moved that it be allowed to have [AAA] be evaluated by a psychiatrist of its own choice.
As prayed for the defense, [AAA] was evaluated by Dr. Lowell A. Rebucal of the Department of
Psychiatry, Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. In his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr.
Rebucal concluded that [AAA] is suffering from Mild Mental Retardation.9

Dr. Ramos further testified that generally a mentally retardate cannot finish primary education. He, Ruling of the RTC
however, explained that parents of mentally retardates begged the teachers to give passing marks to
their sons/daughters, and out of pity, they would be able to finish primary education.8
On May 6, 2009, after weighing the respective evidence of the parties, the RTC rendered its Joint
Decision finding Caoile guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape:
Evidence for the Defense

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:

Accused Moises Caoile knew [AAA] because they were neighbors. [AAA] was, in fact, a playmate of his
children and a frequent visitor in their house. When accused and [AAA] became familiar with one
another, the latter would go to the former’s house even when the children were not there, and they
would [talk] and [tease] each other.
1. In FC Case No. A-496, accused Moises Caoile is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) and Article 266-B of Republic
Act No. 8353, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In the year 2005, the wife of the accused worked at the town proper of Rosario, La Union. The wife
would leave early in the morning, and returned home late at night. More often than not, the accused 2. In FC Case No. A-497, accused Moises Caoile is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
was left alone in the house since all his children were attending school. It was during his so called alone crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) and Article 266-B of Republic
moments that the accused courted [AAA]. He gave her money, chocolates or candies. Time came when Act No. 8353, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
[AAA] would stay at the accused’[s] house, from Monday to Sunday, with or without the children.
Soon thereafter, accused and [AAA] found themselves falling in love with one other. As lovers, they
had their intimate moments, and their first sexual intercourse happened on April 6, 2005 on the
3. The accused is further ordered to indemnify the private complainant the amounts of P50,000.00 for
mountain. From then on, the accused and [AAA] repeatedly had sexual intercourse, and most of which
each count of rape as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 for each count of rape as moral
were initiated by [AAA], especially their sexual intimacies in Agri Motel, Pangasinan.
damages.10

Caoile elevated the RTC ruling to the Court of Appeals, claiming that his guilt was not proven beyond
During their relationship, [AAA] suggested that they [live] together as husband and wife. The accused reasonable doubt by attacking the credibility of AAA and the methods used to determine her mental
refused because he cannot leave his family. state.

The accused did not know that [AAA] was a demented person since she acted like a normal individual. Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In fact, she went to a regular school and she finished her elementary education.
In its Decision dated March 21, 2012, in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03957, the Court of Appeals affirmed 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
with modification the RTC decision. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:

x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Joint Decision dated May 6, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court
(“RTC”), First Judicial Region, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, in Family Court Case Nos. A-496 and A-497,
entitled “People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Moises Caoile, Accused,” finding appellant Moises b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
Caoile guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape is AFFIRMED with modification in that
aside from civil indemnity and moral damages, appellant Moises Caoile is ORDERED to indemnify
[AAA] exemplary damages amounting to P30,000.00 for each count of rape.11 (Citation omitted.)
x x x x

Issue
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied.)

Caoile is now before this Court, on appeal,12 with the same lone assignment of error he posited before
the Court of Appeals,13 to wit:
Article 266-B. Penalties.—Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF TWO COUNTS OF RAPE.14
Validity of the Amended Informations

In essence, Caoile is attacking the credibility of AAA, and claims that she might not be a mental
retardate at all, having been able to give categorical and straightforward answers during her testimony. Taking a cue from the Court of Appeals, this Court would like, at the outset, to address the validity of
Moreover, Caoile avers that it has not been shown that AAA underwent the proper clinical, laboratory, the Amended Informations vis-à-vis the crime Caoile was actually convicted of.
and psychometric tests to arrive at the conclusion that she fell within the range of mental retardation.
Caoile argues that while it is true that his denial and sweetheart defenses are generally deemed weak
and unavailing, his conviction should nevertheless be founded on the strength of the prosecution’s Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides for two circumstances
evidence and not on the flaws of his defenses.15 when having carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is considered rape:

This Court’s Ruling 1. Paragraph 1(b): when the offended party is deprived of reason x x x; and

Caoile was tried and convicted of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) in relation to Article 266-B, 2. Paragraph 1(d): when the offended party is x x x demented.16
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Said provisions read:

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed.—Rape is committed:
Caoile was charged in the Amended Informations with rape of a demented person under paragraph
1(d). The term demented17 refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated
mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual’s former intellectual level and often by
emotional apathy, madness, or insanity.18 On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under
paragraph 1(b) has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or
retardation.19 Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly
classified as a person who is “deprived of reason,” and not one who is “demented.”
The mistake, however, will not exonerate Caoile. In the first place, he did not even raise this as an
objection. More importantly, none of his rights, particularly that of to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him,20 was violated. Although the Amended Informations stated that he
was being charged with the crime of rape of a demented person under paragraph 1(d), it also stated
that his victim was “a person with a mental age of seven (7) years old.” Elucidating on the foregoing,
this Court, in People v. Valdez,21 held:
For [a] complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being
mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged,
and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it
does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense
must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein
must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature
of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is
that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
Thus, the erroneous reference to paragraph 1(d) in the Amended Informations, did not cause material
and substantial harm to Caoile. Firstly, he simply ignored the error. Secondly, particular facts stated in
the Amended Informations were averments sufficient to inform Caoile of the nature of the charges
against him.
Mental Condition of AAA
Caoile’s insistence, to escape liability, that AAA is not a mental retardate, cannot be accepted by this
Court.
The fact that AAA was able to answer in a straightforward manner during her testimony cannot be
used against her. The capacity of a mental retardate to stand as a witness in court has already been
settled by this Court. In People v. Castillo,22 we said:
It bears emphasis that the competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses
have been upheld by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capably and
consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainant’s accusations, it even lends greater
credence to her testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and
explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the accused.
Moreover, it is settled that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the
exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused. (Citations omitted.)
More importantly, AAA’s medical condition was verified not only by one expert, but three witnesses —
a psychologist and two psychiatrists, one of whom was even chosen by the defense and testified for the
defense. All three experts confirmed that AAA suffered from mental retardation. Caoile cannot, at this
point, properly impeach his own witness without violating established rules of evidence.
This Court further disagrees with Caoile’s claim that the experts “merely impressed that they
conducted a psychological evaluation on [AAA] in which she obtained a performance classified within
the mental retardation range.”23 The experts’ findings on AAA’s mental condition were based on
several tests and examinations, including the Stanford-Binet Test,24 which Caoile, relying on this
Court’s ruling in People v. Cartuano, Jr.,25 considered as one of the more reliable standardized tests.26
Besides, this Court has already qualified the applicability of Cartuano in cases involving mentally
deficient rape victims, to wit:
People v. Cartuano applies only to cases where there is a dearth of medical records to sustain a finding
of mental retardation. Indeed, the Court has clarified so in People v. Delos Santos, declaring that the
records in People v. Cartuano were wanting in clinical, laboratory, and psychometric support to sustain
a finding that the victim had been suffering from mental retardation. It is noted that in People v. Delos
Santos, the Court upheld the finding that the victim had been mentally retarded by an examining
psychiatrist who had been able to identify the tests administered to the victim and to sufficiently
explain the results of the tests to the trial court.27 (Citations omitted.)
Borrowing our words in People v. Butiong,28 “[i]n direct contrast to People v. Cartuano, this case did
not lack clinical findings on the mentality of the victim.” Here, the psychiatric evaluation report of
Caoile’s own expert witness is the final nail on the coffin of Caoile’s argument.
In addition, this Court will not contradict the RTC’s findings, which were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, absent any valid reason. The trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility is given great
weight and is even conclusive and binding upon this Court.29 In People v. Sapigao, Jr.,30 we explained
in detail the rationale for this practice:
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and
to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in
determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of
conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in
ascertaining the witness’ credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity and can take advantage of
these aids. These cannot be incorporated in the record so that all that the appellate court can see are the
cold words of the witness contained in transcript of testimonies with the risk that some of what the
witness actually said may have been lost in the process of transcribing. As correctly stated by an
American court, “There is an inherent impossibility of determining with any degree of accuracy what
credit is justly due to a witness from merely reading the words spoken by him, even if there were no
doubt as to the identity of the words. However artful a corrupt witness may be, there is generally,
under the pressure of a skillful cross-examination, something in his manner or bearing on the stand that
betrays him, and thereby destroys the force of his testimony. Many of the real tests of truth by which
the artful witness is exposed in the very nature of things cannot be transcribed upon the record, and
hence they can never be considered by the appellate court.”
Carnal Knowledge of a
Mental retardate amounts to Rape
Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. This is because a mentally deficient person is automatically
considered incapable of giving consent to a sexual act. Thus, what needs to be proven are the facts of
sexual intercourse between the accused and the victim, and the victim’s mental retardation.31
Verily, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish that AAA is a mental retardate. Anent the fact
of sexual congress, it is worthy to note that aside from the prosecution’s own testimonial and
documentary evidence, Caoile never denied being physically intimate with AAA. In fact, he has
confirmed such fact, and even claimed that he and AAA often had sex, they being sweethearts.
Sweetheart Defense
Unfortunately, such defense will not exculpate him from liability. Carnal knowledge of a female, even
when done without force or intimidation, is rape nonetheless, if it was done without her consent. To
expound on such concept, this Court, in People v. Butiong,32 said:
In rape committed by means of duress, the victim’s will is nullified or destroyed. Hence, the necessity
of proving real and constant resistance on the part of the woman to establish that the act was committed
against her will. On the other hand, in the rape of a woman deprived of reason or unconscious, the
victim has no will. The absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Such lack of will may exist
not only when the victim is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also when she is suffering
some mental deficiency impairing her reason or free will. In that case, it is not necessary that she should
offer real opposition or constant resistance to the sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge of a woman so
weak in intellect as to be incapable of legal consent constitutes rape. Where the offended woman was
feeble-minded, sickly and almost an idiot, sexual intercourse with her is rape. Her failure to offer
resistance to the act did not mean consent for she was incapable of giving any rational consent.
The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is enough.
Cohabitation with a feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape. Sexual intercourse with an insane woman
was considered rape. But a deaf-mute is not necessarily deprived of reason. This circumstances must be
proven. Intercourse with a deaf-mute is not rape of a woman deprived of reason, in the absence of proof
that she is an imbecile. Viada says that the rape under par. 2 may be committed when the offended
woman is deprived of reason due to any cause such as when she is asleep, or due to lethargy produced
by sickness or narcotics administered to her by the accused. x x x.
Consequently, the mere fact that Caoile had sexual intercourse with AAA, a mental retardate, makes
him liable for rape under the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Defense of Lack of knowledge of
AAA’s mental condition
Similarly, Caoile’s allegation that he did not know that AAA was mentally retarded will not suffice to
overturn his conviction.
The Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the rape of a mentally disabled person regardless of the
perpetrator’s awareness of his victim’s mental condition. However, the perpetrator’s knowledge of the
victim’s mental disability, at the time he committed the rape, qualifies the crime and makes it
punishable by death33 under Article 266-B, paragraph 10, to wit:
 Notes.—Mental retardation can be proved by evidence other than medical or clinical evidence, such as
the testimony of witnesses and even the observation of the trial court. (People vs. Bayrante, 672 SCRA
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following 446 [2012])
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

The Supreme Court has likewise repeatedly held that the sweetheart theory, as a defense, necessarily
x x x x admits carnal knowledge, the first element of rape. (People vs. Deligero, 696 SCRA 822 [2013])

10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of ——o0o—— People vs. Caoile, 697 SCRA 638, G.R. No. 203041 June 5, 2013
the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

There is no sufficient evidence to establish the qualifying circumstance of knowledge by Caoile of

AAA’s mental disability. The trial court and the Court of Appeals which did not make any finding on
the said qualifying circumstance correctly convicted said accused of simple rape only.

This Court finds the award of damages as modified by the Court of Appeals in order. Pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence,34 however, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be
imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
03957 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant MOISES CAOILE is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape in Family Court Case Nos. A-496 and A-
497 under subparagraph (b) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua for each count of rape. The award of civil indemnity and moral damages, both in
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), and exemplary damages in the amount of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), all for each count of rape, are maintained, subject to interest at the rate of
6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed with modification.

G.R. No. 196435. January 29, 2014.*


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOEL CRISOSTOMO y MALLIAR,[1] accused-
appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape; Statutory Rape; When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime
committed is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape.—When the
offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is “termed statutory rape as it departs
from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a woman
below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal
knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on
account of her tender years.” In this case, the prosecution satisfactorily established all the elements of
statutory rape. “AAA” testified that on April 8, 1999, appellant took off her clothes and made her lie
down. Appellant also removed his clothes, placed himself on top of “AAA,” inserted his penis into her
vagina, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. At the time of the rape, “AAA” was only six
years of age. Her birth certificate showed that she was born on April 4, 1993. “AAA’s” testimony was
corroborated by Dr. Emmanuel Reyes who found “AAA” to have fresh and bleeding hymenal
lacerations.
Same; Same; Rape by Sexual Assault; The gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault is the
insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
another person’s genital or anal orifice.—We agree with the CA that “AAA’s” “uncertainty” on whether
it was a match, rod or a cigarette stick that was inserted into her private parts, did not lessen her
credibility. Such “uncertainty” is so inconsequential and does not diminish the fact that an instrument
or object was inserted into her private parts. This is the essence of rape by sexual assault. “[T]he
gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault x x x is the insertion of the penis into another person’s
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice.” In any
event, “inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the
inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape.” We
also held in People v. Piosang, 697 SCRA 587 (2013), that — “[t]estimonies of child-victims are normally
given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the
offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be
exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of
truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a horrible story. x x x”
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; There is no standard behavioral response when one is confronted
with a traumatic experience. Some may show signs of stress; but others may act nonchalantly.—
Appellant’s argument that “AAA” did not manifest any stress or anxiety considering her traumatic
experience is purely speculative and bereft of any legal basis. Besides, it is settled that people react
differently when confronted with a startling experience. There is no standard behavioral response when
one is confronted with a traumatic experience. Some may show signs of stress; but others may act
nonchalantly. Nevertheless, “AAA’s” reaction does not in any way prove the innocence of appellant. As
correctly pointed out by the OSG, regardless of “AAA’s” reactions, it did not diminish the fact that she
was raped by appellant or that a crime was committed.
Criminal Law; Alibi; Denials; Appellant’s alibi and denial are weak defenses especially when weighed
against “AAA’s” positive identification of him as the malefactor.—Appellant’s alibi and denial are
weak defenses especially when weighed against “AAA’s” positive identification of him as the
malefactor. Appellant did not even attempt to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the crime scene at the time of its commission. In fact, he admitted that he lived just four houses away
from the house of “AAA.” His denial is also unsubstantiated hence the same is self-serving and
deserves no consideration or weight. The RTC properly disregarded the testimony of Rogelio Oletin
(Oletin), appellant’s brother-in-law, who claimed that appellant was at his house at the time of the
incident. As appellant already admitted, his house is near the house of “AAA” hence there was no
physical impossibility for him to be present at the crime scene. Also, the RTC observed that Oletin’s
testimony did not “prove beneficial to the defense. Suffice it to state that the private prosecutor
correctly noted that the said witness was always smiling and laughing when answering questions
propounded to him as if making a mockery of the proceedings which his own brother-in-law was
facing.”
Same; Rape; Statutory Rape; Penalties; Reclusion Perpetua; Pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), the penalty for statutory rape is death when the victim is a child below seven years
old; However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
on the appellant but without eligibility for parole.—Pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty
for statutory rape (Criminal Case No. 99-16237) is death when the victim is a child below seven years
old. There is no dispute that at the time the rape was committed on April 8, 1999, “AAA” was only six
years old, having been born on April 4, 1993. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on the appellant but without eligibility for parole. The CA thus
correctly imposed the said penalty on appellant.
Same; Same; Same; Rape by Sexual Assault; Rape by sexual assault committed against a child below
seven years old is punishable by reclusion temporal.—Rape by sexual assault committed against a child
below seven years old is punishable by reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
and there being no other aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty shall be
prision mayor as minimum, to reclusion temporal, as maximum. The CA thus correctly imposed the
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count of sexual assault.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
  Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
“[T]he trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to the highest respect absent
a showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case.”[2]
On appeal is the October 22, 2010 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03832 which affirmed with modification the July 3, 2008 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Antipolo City, Branch 73 finding appellant Joel Crisostomo y Malliar guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one count of statutory rape.
In three separate Informations,[5] appellant was charged with rape committed as follows: 
Criminal Case No. 99-16235 (Rape by Sexual Assault)
That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there
commit an act of sexual assault by using a lighted cigarette as an instrument or object and [inserting]
the same into the genital orifice of “AAA,”[6] a minor who is six (6) years of age, thereby causing the
labia majora of the vagina of said minor to suffer a third degree burn, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (Rape by Sexual Assault)
That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there
commit an act of sexual assault by using a lighted cigarette as an instrument or object and [inserting]
the same into the anal orifice of “AAA,” a minor who is six (6) years of age, thereby causing the
perianal region of the said anal orifice of said minor to suffer a third degree burn, against her will and
consent.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (Statutory Rape)
That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge [of] “AAA,” a minor who is six (6) years of age; that on the same occasion that the Accused
raped said minor, the accused did, then and there burn her buttocks by the use of a lighted cigarette,
against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned on January 9, 2001, appellant pleaded not guilty.[7] Pre-trial conference was
terminated upon agreement of the parties. Trial on the merits ensued.
Factual Antecedents
The facts as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
The victim in these cases[,] “AAA[,]” testified that at noon time of April 8, 1999, she was x x x playing
x x x with her playmates whereupon she wandered by the house of accused which x x x was just below
their house. “AAA” clarified during her cross-examination that there was a vulcanizing shop owned by
her father located in their house x x x and where accused was employed. While “AAA” was at the Joel [“]Liit[”] supposedly lighted a straw which inadvertently burned the anal portion of “AAA’s”
house of accused, she claimed that her genitals and buttocks were burned with a lighted cigarette by the body. Mary’s exact words were to the effect that “napatakan ang puwit ni “AAA”.”[8] 
said accused. “AAA” testified further that her clothes were taken off by the same accused who also took
his clothes off after which he allegedly placed himself on top of her, inserted his penis and proceeded to
have illicit carnal knowledge [of] the then six (6) year old girl. (TSN May 29, 2001, pp. 5-9; TSN Aug. 7, Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
2001, pp. 10-12.)

On July 3, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of three counts of rape, viz.:
“BBB,” father of “AAA,” presented in court his daughter’s birth certificate (Exhibit “B”) which stated
that she was born on April 4, 1993 (TSN Sept. 25, 2001, p. 4). On the other hand, Dr. Emmanuel Reyes
the Medico-Legal Officer who examined “AAA” identified his Medico-Legal Report (Exhibit “M”) and
testified that the victim indeed had two (2) third degree burns in the perianal region. Dr. Reyes testified WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Joel Crisostomo y Malliar is found GUILTY of all offenses
that it was possible that the said burns were caused by a lighted cigarette stick being forced on the stated in the three (3) Criminal Informations and is hereby sentenced to the following:
victim’s skin. Moreover, Dr. Reyes confirmed that there was a loss of virginity on the part of the victim
and that the same could have been done 24 hours from the time of his examination which was also on
April 8, 1999. (TSN Nov. 7, 2001 pp. 11-17) a) In Criminal Information # 99-16235 and Criminal Information # 99-16236, accused is to suffer the
Indeterminate Penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum
to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and is
“CCC” [aunt of “AAA”] testified that x x x she x x x assisted the mother of “AAA” in bringing the ordered to pay the victim “AAA” civil indemnity of P30,000.00, moral damages of P30,000.00 and
victim to the Pasig General Hospital and thereafter to Camp Crame where a doctor also examined exemplary damages of P15,000.00 for each of the two Criminal Informations.
“AAA” and confirmed that the latter was indeed a victim of rape. “CCC” testified that they then
proceeded to the Women’s [D]esk to file the instant complaint against the accused. (TSN August 5, 2003
pp. 4-8) b) In Criminal Information # 99-16237, accused is to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and is
ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity of P75,000.00, moral damages of P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages of P30,000.00 with cost [of] suit for all Criminal Informations.
On the other hand, [a]ccused denied the allegation of rape against him. Accused presented his brother-
in-law Rogelio Oletin who testified that he was tending the store located at the house of accused when
the latter supposedly arrived from work at 10:00 [a.m.] of April 8, 1999 and slept until 5:00 [p.m.] of the SO ORDERED.[9]
same day. According to Rogelio that is the usual routine of accused as the latter worked in the night
shift schedule as vulcanizer in the vulcanizing shop owned by the victim’s father. (TSN February 3,
2006 pp. 6-8)
 

When accused testified on November 17, 2006, he essentially confirmed the testimony of his brother-in-
Aggrieved, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[10] which was given due course by the trial court in its
law that it was impossible for him to have raped “AAA” on the date and time stated in the information
Order[11] dated February 2, 2009.
as his night shift work schedule just would not permit such an incident to occur. Accused added that he
knew of no reason why the family of the private complainant would pin the crime against him. (TSN
Nov. 17, 2006 pp. 9-11 & 14)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In an effort to explain the burn marks on the delicate parts of “AAA’s” body, the defense presented a
supposed playmate of “AAA” in the person of Mary Pabuayan. According to Mary, she was then 7
years old when she and two other playmates together with “AAA” and Joel [“]Liit[”] the son of accused
In his Brief filed before the CA, appellant raised the following assignment of error:
were burning worms near a santol tree in their neighborhood on a Good Friday in the year 1999. This
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY FOR
THE CRIME OF RAPE (ARTICLE 266-A PAR. 1 AND ART. 267-B, PAR. 7 IN RELATION TO R.A. NO.
7610) DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[12]
Appellant claimed that the trial court gravely erred when it lent full credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. In particular, appellant insisted that the trial court erred in finding “AAA’s”
testimony credible considering that she was unsure whether a match, rod or a cigarette stick,
was used in burning her private parts.[13] Appellant argued that “AAA” never showed signs of shock,
distress, or anxiety despite her alleged traumatic experience.[14] Appellant also alleged that “CCC’s”
testimony should be disregarded as she was not even present when the rape incidents happened.[15]
He opined that “CCC” influenced her niece, “AAA,” to file the suit against him which bespoke of ill-
motive on her part. Appellant concluded that these “inconsistencies and contradictions” are enough to
set aside the verdict of conviction imposed upon by the RTC.[16]
However, the CA gave short shrift to appellant’s arguments. The CA rendered its Decision disposing as
follows:
Hence, this appeal[19] which the CA gave due course in its Resolution[20] of January 6, 2011. In a
Resolution[21] dated June 15, 2011, this Court required the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs. In its Manifestation and Motion,[22] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) informed this Court
that it will no longer file a Supplemental Brief because it had already exhaustively discussed and
refuted all the arguments of the appellant in its brief filed before the CA. Appellant likewise filed a
Manifestation In Lieu of Supplemental Brief[23] praying that the case be deemed submitted for decision
based on the pleadings submitted.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly found appellant guilty of two counts of rape by sexual
assault and one count of rape by sexual intercourse. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
provides: 

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed.—Rape is committed—

ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed July 3, 2008 Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalties imposed, and to be read thus:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

“1. For Criminal Case Nos. 99-16235 and 99-16236, Joel Crisostomo is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten[17] (8) years and one (1) day of Prision a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
Mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum,
and ordered to pay AAA Thirty Thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as civil indemnity, Thirty Thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifteen Thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as exemplary damages, all for
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
each count of rape by sexual assault; and

c. By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority;

(2) For Criminal Case No. 99-16237, Joel Crisostomo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility of parole, and ordered to pay AAA Seventy-Five Thousand pesos
(P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Thirty
Thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and all the costs of suit.” d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above should be present;

SO ORDERED.[18]
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit
an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphases supplied)
When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is “termed statutory rape as it
departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a
woman below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether
carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her
own on account of her tender years.”[24] In this case, the prosecution satisfactorily established all the
elements of statutory rape. “AAA” testified that on April 8, 1999, appellant took off her clothes and
made her lie down. Appellant also removed his clothes, placed himself on top of “AAA,” inserted his
penis into her vagina, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. At the time of the rape, “AAA”
was only six years of age. Her birth certificate showed that she was born on April 4, 1993. “AAA’s”
testimony was corroborated by Dr. Emmanuel Reyes who found “AAA” to have fresh and bleeding
hymenal lacerations.
Likewise, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt appellant’s guilt for two counts of rape by
sexual assault. Records show that appellant inserted a lit cigarette stick into “AAA’s” genital orifice
causing her labia majora to suffer a 3rd degree burn. Appellant likewise inserted a lit cigarette stick into
“AAA’s” anal orifice causing 3rd degree burns in her perianal region.
We agree with the CA that “AAA’s” “uncertainty” on whether it was a match, rod or a cigarette stick
that was inserted into her private parts, did not lessen her credibility. Such “uncertainty” is so
inconsequential and does not diminish the fact that an instrument or object was inserted into her
private parts. This is the essence of rape by sexual assault. “[T]he gravamen of the crime of rape by
sexual assault x x x is the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice.”[25] In any event, “inconsistencies in
a rape victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial
matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape.”[26] We also held in People v.
Piosang[27] that —
“[t]estimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly
if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined
to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also
the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not
have invented a horrible story. x x x”
Moreover, appellant’s argument that “AAA” did not manifest any stress or anxiety considering her
traumatic experience is purely speculative and bereft of any legal basis. Besides, it is settled that people
react differently when confronted with a startling experience. There is no standard behavioral response
when one is confronted with a traumatic experience. Some may show signs of stress; but others may act
nonchalantly. Nevertheless, “AAA’s” reaction does not in any way prove the innocence of appellant. As
correctly pointed out by the OSG, regardless of “AAA’s” reactions, it did not diminish the fact that she
was raped by appellant or that a crime was committed.[28]
We also agree with the CA that “CCC’s” efforts to hale appellant to the court should not be equated
with ill-motive on her part. On the contrary, we find “CCC’s” efforts to seek justice for her niece who
was raped more in accord with the norms of society. At any rate, even if we disregard “CCC’s”
testimony, appellant’s conviction would still stand. We agree with the observation of the OSG that
“CCC’s” “testimony actually had no great impact on the case. In truth, her testimony [was] composed
mainly of the fact that she was the one who accompanied the mother of “AAA” in bringing “AAA” to
the Pasig General Hospital and thereafter to Camp Crame and later on to the Women’s desk.”[29]
On the other hand, appellant’s alibi and denial are weak defenses especially when weighed against
“AAA’s” positive identification of him as the malefactor. Appellant did not even attempt to show that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission. In fact, he
admitted that he lived just four houses away from the house of “AAA.” His denial is also
unsubstantiated hence the same is self-serving and deserves no consideration or weight. The RTC
properly disregarded the testimony of Rogelio Oletin (Oletin), appellant’s brother-in-law, who claimed
that appellant was at his house at the time of the incident. As appellant already admitted, his house is
near the house of “AAA” hence there was no physical impossibility for him to be present at the crime
scene. Also, the RTC observed that Oletin’s testimony did not “prove beneficial to the defense. Suffice it
to state that the private prosecutor correctly noted that the said witness was always smiling and
laughing when answering questions propounded to him as if making a mockery of the proceedings
which his own brother-in-law was facing.”[30]
Pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for statutory rape (Criminal Case No. 99-16237) is
death when the victim is a child below seven years old. There is no dispute that at the time the rape was
committed on April 8, 1999, “AAA” was only six years old, having been born on April 4, 1993.
However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346,[31] the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on
the appellant but without eligibility for parole.[32] The CA thus correctly imposed the said penalty on
appellant.
On the other hand, rape by sexual assault committed against a child below seven years old is
punishable by reclusion temporal.[33] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no
other aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty shall be prision mayor[34]
as minimum, to reclusion temporal,[35] as maximum. The CA thus correctly imposed the penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count of sexual assault.

As regards damages, the CA correctly awarded the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (statutory rape). However, the award
of moral damages must be increased to P75,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[36] As regards
Criminal Case No. 99-16235 and Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (rape by sexual assault), the CA likewise
properly awarded the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral damages, for
each count. However, the award of exemplary damages for each count of rape by sexual assault must
be increased to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[37] In addition, all damages awarded
shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The October 22, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03832 which affirmed with modification the July 3, 2008 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73 finding appellant Joel Crisostomo y Malliar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one count of statutory rape is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS that the award of moral damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (statutory
rape) is increased to P75,000.00 and the award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16235
and Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (rape by sexual assault) is increased to P30,000.00 for each count. In
addition, interest is imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality
of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 187495. April 21, 2014.*

Appeal dismissed, judgment affirmed with modifications. 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDGAR JUMAWAN, accused-appellant.

Notes.―Sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape. (People
vs. Alipio, 603 SCRA 40 [2009])
Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code explicitly provides that the gravamen of the crime of rape by
sexual assault which is the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice. (Pielago vs. People, 693 SCRA 476
[2013]) People vs. Crisostomo, 715 SCRA 99, G.R. No. 196435 January 29, 2014
Criminal Law; Rape; The law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit
of crimes against chastity.—In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article
335 of the RPC. The law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit of
crimes against chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps the law’s most progressive
proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and
criminalizing its perpetration, viz.: Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon.—The subsequent valid marriage
between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. In case it is the
legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the
penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio. Read together with Section 1 of the law,
which unqualifiedly uses the term “man” in defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353
penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal relationship with his victim.
Same; Same; Marital Rape; In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as ‘marital rape’ due to conservative
Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize
marital rape under the general definition of ‘rape.’—The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is
deducible from the records of the deliberations of the 10th Congress on the law’s progenitor’s, House
Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as ‘marital rape’ due to
conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include
and penalize marital rape under the general definition of ‘rape.’
Same; Same; Same; The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed
by R.A. No. 9262, which regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be
committed by a man against his wife within or outside the family abode.—The paradigm shift on
marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262, which regards rape
within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by a man against his wife within or
outside the family abode, viz.: Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in
or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes,
but is not limited to, the following acts: A. “Physical Violence” refers to acts that include bodily or
physical harm; B. “Sexual violence” refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a
woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to: a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness,
treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks,
physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim’s body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make
films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the
same room with the abuser; b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual
activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child. Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and
other forms of nonpersonal violence are the most common type of spousal violence accounting for 23%
incidence among ever-married women. One in seven ever-married women experienced physical
violence by their husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced sexual violence.
Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a
husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife’s body and thus her consent to every act of sexual
intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.—The Philippines, as State Party to the
CEDAW, recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society
and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to
take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women,
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based
on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women. One of such measures is R.A. No. 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital
rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife’s body and thus her
consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed. Another
important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women, which was promulgated by the UN General Assembly subsequent to the
CEDAW. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-based violence that constitute acts of
discrimination against women, identified ‘marital rape’ as a species of sexual violence.
Same; Same; Same; A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits
sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and its accompanying Declaration, defines and
penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.—Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of
sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against
her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its
accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353. A woman is no
longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse with his
wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being
with dignity equal to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing
her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on
its international commitments and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital
activities that have lost their relevance in a progressive society. It is true that the Family Code, obligates
the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of
love, that are both spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or
coercion.
Same; Same; Same; The delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife
excludes cruelty and coercion.—The delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband
and wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a
gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is
an expressive interest in each other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way
in deepening marital relationship. When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to
advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to protect
its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels
aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wife’s absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may
legally seek the court’s intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential
marital obligation.  But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or
violently.
Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; To treat marital rape cases differently from nonmarital
rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on
the equal protection clause.—To treat marital rape cases differently from nonmarital rape cases in terms
of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal
protection clause.  The Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws ordains that similar subjects
should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against
others; no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by
other persons or other classes in like circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as
traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator’s
own spouse.—As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1  of  R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a)
rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the
perpetrator’s own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the law does
not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage. Hence,
the law affords protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other man alike.
Same; Same; Same; A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape
his wife with impunity.—The Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in  rejecting  must be proved is the absence of the victim’s consent to the sexual congress.—Entrenched is the rule
the  argument akin  to  those  raised  by  herein accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be
viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the
same right to control her own body, as does an unmarried woman.  She can give or withhold her
consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from
her in case she refuses.
Same; Same; Same; The human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide
freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health,
free of coercion, discrimination and violence.—The human rights of women include their right to have
control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual
and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. Women do not divest
themselves of such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that human rights are
inalienable. In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and nonmarital rape nor
provide for different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what the
law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what
the law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape
cases as it would inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify them
differently from the victims of nonmarital rape. Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the
Court to apply the law and the evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the aggressor is the woman’s
own legal husband. The elements and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape
cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship between the accused and his accuser.
Same; Same; Evidence; In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the
victim.—In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. Hence,
the strict mandate that all courts must examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended party. While
the accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining witness, courts
are, nonetheless, duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the victim’s testimony is justified. Courts
must ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature. If
the testimony of the complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility
of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect.—It is settled that the evaluation by
the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect.
This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and their deportment,
conduct and attitude, especially during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its evaluation
was tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on appeal.
Criminal Law; Rape; Prosecution of Offenses; In the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that
that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must be proved is the absence of the
victim’s consent to the sexual congress. Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from
the victim by force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b)
the victim is incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.
Same; Same; As an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just enough
to bring about the desired result.—As an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible;
it may be just enough to bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind or is of such a
degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission.
Same; Same; Medical Certificates; It is not the presence or absence of blood on the victim’s underwear
that determines the fact of rape inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable evidence that is not
necessary to prove rape.—Contrary to the accused-appellant’s allusions, the absence of blood traces in
KKK’s panties or the lack of a medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of
blood on the victim’s underwear that determines the fact of rape inasmuch as a medical certificate is
dispensable evidence that is not necessary to prove rape. These details do not pertain to the elements
that produce the gravamen of the offense that is — sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or
without her consent.
Same; Same; It must be stressed that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually
only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse.—The accused-
appellant’s assertion that MMM and OOO’s testimonies lacked probative value as they did not witness
the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is essentially committed in relative
isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual
intercourse. Hence, the probative value of MMM and OOO’s testimonies rest not on whether they
actually witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations were in harmony with KKK’s narration of
the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape incidents.
Same; Same; Marital Rape; Fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common factor that
deter rape victims from reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape cases.
—Fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape victims from
reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape cases. This is in view of the
popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife’s absolute obligation to submit to her husband’s carnal
desires. A husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or trivialized as
simple domestic trouble.  Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape,
the stigma and public scrutiny that could have befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of
police authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are acceptable explanations for the failure or delay
in reporting the subject rape incidents.
Same; Alibi; Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable,
but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut.—Alibi is one of the weakest
defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by
eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify falsely. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the
accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime,
but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate
vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the place where the
accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but more
importantly, the facility of access between the two places.
Same; Same; Denials; Between the accused-appellant’s alibi and denial, and the positive identification
and credible testimony of the victim, and her two daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter.—
Between the accused-appellant’s alibi and denial, and the positive identification and credible testimony
of the victim, and her two daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter, especially in the absence
of ill motive on their part to falsely testify against the accused-appellant.
Same; Rape; Penalties; Parole; Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of R.A. No. 9346, shall not be eligible
for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.—The
Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the accused-
appellant for being in accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further, he shall not be
eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which states that “persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua,
by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.”
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an
abhorrence to a woman’s value and dignity as a human being.—Rape is a crime that evokes global
condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman’s value and dignity as a human being. It respects
no time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to
anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored fortress, the family
home, committed against her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein
pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they seek from
their sexually coercive husbands.
Same; Same; Marital Rape; Husbands are reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their
wives.—Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A
husband does not own his wife’s body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself
of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give
or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife’s unremitting refusal to
engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek
succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological
incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage. Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage
because it is the spiritual and biological communion that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It
entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and
never sexual coercion or imposition.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
  Dacalos Law Office for accused-appellant. 
REYES, J.:
“Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and protect his wife, to give
her a home, to provide her with the comforts and the necessities of life within his means, to treat her
kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to honor her x x x; it is his duty not only to maintain
and support her, but also to protect her from oppression and wrong.”[1]
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the
realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly legislated in Section
266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997.
The Case
This is an automatic review[2] of the Decision[3] dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00353, which affirmed the Judgment[4] dated April 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and 99-669 convicting
Edgar Jumawan (accused-appellant) of two (2) counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Facts
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,[5] were married on October 18, 1975. They lived together since
then and raised their four (4) children[6] as they put up several businesses over the years.  plea of not guilty to both charges.[14]
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit,[7] alleging that her husband, the accused-
appellant, raped her at 3:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for
refusing to have sex with him.
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint Resolution,[8]
finding probable cause for grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape and recommending that
the appropriate criminal information be filed against the accused-appellant.
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively docketed as Criminal
Case No. 99-668[9] and Criminal Case No. 99-669.[10] The Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668
charged the accused-appellant as follows:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of
force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[’]s will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads: 
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of
force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter’s will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. 
The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999.[11] On August 18, 1999, the
accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation,[12] which was denied by the trial court in an
Order[13] dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the accused-appellant was arraigned and he entered a
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information[15] averring that
the name of the private complainant was omitted in the original informations for rape. The motion also
stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit dated November 15, 1999,[16] attested that the true
dates of commission of the crime are October 16, 1998 and October 17, 1998 thereby modifying the dates
stated in her previous complaint-affidavit. The motion was granted on January 18, 2000.[17]
Accordingly, the criminal informations were amended as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-668:

That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable  Court,  the above-named accused by means of force upon person did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter’s will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.[18]
Criminal Case No. 99-669:
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable  Court,  the above-named accused by means of force upon person did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter’s will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.[19]
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea to both
indictments and a joint trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution’s theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters MMM and OOO,
which, together with pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the laborers.
They got married after a year of courtship.[20] When their first child, MMM, was born, KKK and the
accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store.[21] Later on, they engaged in several other businesses —
trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for the rice mill, which, ideally,
was under the accused-appellant’s supervision with the help of a trusted employee. In reality, however,
he merely assisted in the rice mill business by occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul goods.[22]
Accused-appellant’s keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK’s dedication.
Even the daughters observed the disproportionate labors of their parents.[23] He would drive the
trucks sometimes but KKK was the one who actively managed the businesses.[24] She wanted to
provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand, did not acquiesce with that
objective.[25]
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City.[26] Three of the children transferred residence therein while KKK, the accused-appellant
and one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She shuttled between the two places regularly
and sometimes he accompanied her.[27] In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City most of the
days of the week.[28]  On Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure supplies for the
family store and then returned to Cagayan de Oro City on the same day.[29]
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the accused-appellant. It
was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal
degree of enthusiasm.[30] However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately
remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of
lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten
her into submission.[31]
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she failed
to attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He
wanted KKK to stay at home because “a woman must stay in the house and only good in bed (sic)
x x x.” She disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of providing a good future for the children.
[32]
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant slept
together in Cebu City where the graduation rites of their eldest daughter were held. By October 14,
1998, the three of them were already back in Cagayan de Oro City.[33]
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about their nightly
routine. The family store in their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was taken.
Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls’ bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to pray the
rosary while the accused-appellant watched television in the living room.[34] OOO and MMM then
prepared their beds. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to
their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house.  KKK complied.[35]
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie
thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive
behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “[W]hy are you lying on the c[o]t[?],” and to instantaneously
order: “You transfer here [to] our bed.”[36]
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her
forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed,
lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up
from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.[37]
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with
her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that
she was not feeling well.[38]
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on
to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides.[39] KKK stayed defiant by
refusing to bend her legs.[40]
The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,[41] stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on
them.  She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he
was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: “[D]on’t do that
to me because I’m not feeling well.”[42]
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the spouses’
bedroom,[43] KKK’s pleas were audible in the children’s bedroom where MMM lay awake.  tear apart.[57] At this point, MMM interfered, “Pa, don’t do that to Mama because we are in front of
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: “Eddie, don’t do that to me, have pity on
me,”[44] MMM woke up OOO who prodded her to go to their parents’ room.[45] MMM hurriedly
climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her parents’ bedroom and inquired: “Pa, why is it
that Mama is crying?”[46] The accused-appellant then quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened
the door and said: “[D]on’t interfere because this is a family trouble,” before closing it again.[47]  Since
she heard her mother continue to cry, MMM ignored his father’s admonition, knocked at the bedroom
door again, and then kicked it.[48] A furious accused-appellant opened the door wider and rebuked
MMM once more: “Don’t interfere us. Go downstairs because this is family trouble!” Upon seeing KKK
crouching and crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her mother and
asked: “Ma, why are you crying?” before asking her father: “Pa, what happened to Mama why is it that
her underwear is torn[?]”[49]
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get up in order to
bring her to the girls’ bedroom. KKK then picked up her torn underwear and covered herself with a
blanket.[50] However, their breakout from the room was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the
accused-appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards the knob. He commanded KKK
to “[S]tay here, you sleep in our room,” when the trembling KKK pleaded: “Eddie, allow me to go out.”
He then held KKK’s hands but she pulled them back. Determined to get away, MMM leaned against
door and embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way out.[51]
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what happened.[52]
KKK relayed: “[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I’m not
feeling well.” The girls then locked the door and let her rest.”[53]
The accused-appellant’s aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family store on
October 17, 1998, KKK and the children took their supper. The accused-appellant did not join them
since, according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere. After resting for a short while, KKK and the
children proceeded to the girls’ bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to spend the night in the
room’s small bed and the girls were already fixing the beddings when the accused-appellant entered.
“Why are you sleeping in the room of our children,” he asked KKK, who responded that she preferred
to sleep with the children.[54] He then scoffed: “It’s alright if you will not go with me, anyway, there
are women that could be paid [P]1,000.00.” She dismissed his comment by turning her head away after
retorting: “So be it.” After that, he left the room.[55]
He returned 15 minutes later[56] and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became infuriated.  He
lifted her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: “Why will you sleep
here[?]  Let’s go to our bedroom.” When she defied him, he grabbed her short pants causing them to
you.”[58]
The  presence  of his  children  apparently  did  not  pacify the accused-appellant who yelled, “[E]ven in
front of you, I can have sex of your mother [sic] because I’m the head of the family.” He then ordered
his daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and went to the staircase where they
subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless mother resonate with the creaking bed.[59]
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled KKK’s
short pants and panties. He paid no heed as she begged, “[D]on’t do that to me, my body is still aching
and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex.”[60]
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted her and
forced himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants and briefs, stood
up, and went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly uttered: “[I]t’s nice, that is what you deserve
because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex.” He then retreated to the masters’ bedroom.[61]
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried upstairs but found
the door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for the doorknob inside
and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room, MMM and OOO found their mother crouched on the
bed with her hair disheveled. The girls asked: “Ma, what happened to you, why are you crying?” KKK
replied: “[Y]our father is a beast and animal, he again forced me to have sex with him even if I don’t feel
well.”[62]
Version of the Defense
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant’s father owned a land adjacent to that of
KKK’s father. He came to know KKK because she brought food for her father’s laborers. When they got
married on October 18, 1975, he was a high school graduate while she was an elementary graduate.  
Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable life. Through
their joint hard work and efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal properties and established
their own businesses that included a rice mill managed by the accused-appellant. He also drove their
trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or corn.[63]
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that on those
dates he was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling corn. On October 7, his truck met an accident
somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He left the truck by the roadside
because he had to attend MMM’s graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK. When they returned to
Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to proceed to Cagayan de Oro City and just leave
him behind so he can take care of the truck and buy some corn.[64]
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses’ driver from January 1996 until June 1999 corroborated the above
claims. According to him, on October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within the vicinity of the rice
mill’s loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998, he and the
accused-appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks of corn into the truck. They finished
loading at 3:00 p.m. The accused-appellant then instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon while the former attended a fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around
4:00 p.m., Equia, together with a helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order to tow the stalled truck
left there by the accused-appellant in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro City together
with the separate truck loaded with corn. 
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck around and hoist it
to the towing bar of the other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant arrived in Maluko. The
four of them then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City where they arrived at 3:00 a.m. of October 18,
1998. The accused-appellant went to Gusa while the other three men brought the damaged truck to
Cugman.[65]
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he
took over the control and management of their businesses as well as the possession of their pick-up
truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant was provoked to do so when she failed to account for
their bank deposits and business earnings. The entries in their bank account showed the balance of
P3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after only a month or on November 30, 1996, the amount
dwindled to a measly P9,894.88.[66] Her failure to immediately report to the police also belies her rape
allegations.[67]
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually detected from
her odd behavior. While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM’s graduation rites, the accused-
appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse. He was surprised when his wife asked him to get a napkin
to wipe her after having sex. He tagged her request as “high-tech,” because they did not do the same
when they had sex in the past. KKK had also become increasingly indifferent to him. When he arrives
home, it was an employee, not her, who opened the door and welcomed him. She prettied herself and
would no longer ask for his permission whenever she went out.[68]
Bebs,[69] KKK’s cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant several love
letters purportedly addressed to Bebs but were actually intended for KKK.[70]
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know as: Arsenio,
Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey, somebody from the military or the Philippine National Police, another one is a
government employee, a certain Fernandez and three other priests.[71] Several persons told him about
the paramours of his wife but he never confronted her or them about it because he trusted her.[72]
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2, 1998. At that
time, OOO was listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch a television program, he
asked OOO to turn down the volume of the cassette player. She got annoyed, unplugged the player,
spinned around and hit the accused-appellant’s head with the socket. His head bled. An altercation
between the accused-appellant and KKK thereafter followed because the latter took OOO’s side. During
the argument, OOO blurted out that KKK was better off without the accused-appellant because she had
somebody young, handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-appellant who smelled bad, and
was old, and ugly.[73]
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going to her and one-
fourth to the accused-appellant. However, the separation did not push through because the accused-
appellant’s parents intervened.[74] Thereafter, KKK pursued legal separation from the accused-
appellant by initiating Barangay Case No. 00588-99 before the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a Certificate to File Action dated February 18, 1999.
[75]
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment[76] dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by
giving greater weight and credence to the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the
prosecution’s witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and genuine the two daughters’
testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to testify against their own father for a crime
such as rape if the same was not truly committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accused-appellant’s
accusations of extra-marital affairs and money squandering against KKK. The trial court shelved the
accused-appellant’s alibi for being premised on inconsistent testimonies and the contradicting
declarations of the other defense witness, Equia, as to the accused-appellant’s actual whereabouts on
October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan “GUILTY” beyond reasonable doubt of
the two (2) separate charges of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each, to pay complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as moral damages, indemnify
complainant the sum of [P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.[77] 
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision[78] dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA held that Section
14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of the original
informations. Further, the accused-appellant was not prejudiced by the amendment because he was re-
arraigned with respect to the amended informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim herself and the
corroborative declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the
elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using
force and intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK’s failure to submit herself to medical examination did not negate the
commission of the crime because a medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant’s argument that since he and KKK are husband and wife with
mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing physical evidence or
manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained
that physical showing of external injuries is not indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for
rape; what is necessary is that the victim was forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses only reinforces
the truthfulness of KKK’s accusations because no wife in her right mind would accuse her husband of
having raped her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she stated that
she only found out that a wife may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal investigating her
separate complaint for grave threats and physical injuries told her about it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant’s alibi for lack of convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the
commission of the crimes, considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place where he allegedly was, is
only about four or five hours away. Accordingly, the decretal portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[79]
Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution[80] dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified the parties
that, if they so desire, they may file their respective supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation and
Motion[81] dated September 4, 2009, the appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, expressed This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept. Upon marrying,
that it intends to adopt its Brief before the CA. On April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant, through the woman becomes one with her husband. She had no right to make a contract, sue another, own
counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was not in Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged personal property or write a will.[91]
rape incidents took place, and the presence of force, threat or intimidation is negated by: (a) KKK’s
voluntary act of going with him to the conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK’s failure to put
up resistance or seek help from police authorities; and (c) the absence of a medical certificate and of II. The marital exemption rule
blood traces in KKK’s panties.[82]

In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the irrevocable
Our Ruling implied consent theory that would later on emerge as the marital exemption rule in rape. He stated that:

I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of ‘bride capture’ whereby
a man conquered a woman through rape and ‘stealing an heiress’ whereby a man abducted a woman
and married her.[83]
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman’s chastity but rather to
punish the act of obtaining the heiress’ property by forcible marriage[84] or to protect a man’s valuable
interest in his wife’s chastity or her daughter’s virginity.[85] If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he
was guilty of stealing her father’s property and if a man raped his wife, he was merely using his
property.[86]
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was justified under
three ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of her father until
she marries to become the property of her husband.[87] If a man abducted an unmarried woman, he
had to pay the owner, and later buy her from the owner; buying and marrying a wife were
synonymous.[88]
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and the law denied
her political power and status under the feudal doctrine of coverture.[89] A husband had the right to
chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing him to bring order within the family.[90]
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their
mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband,
which she cannot retract.[92] 
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America (USA) and
England. It gives legal immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act which would
be rape if committed against a woman not his wife.[93] In those jurisdictions, rape is traditionally
defined as “the forcible penetration of the body of a woman who is not the wife of the perpetrator.”[94]
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth v. Fogerty[95]
promulgated in 1857. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it would always
be a defense in rape to show marriage to the victim. Several other courts adhered to a similar rationale
with all of them citing Hale’s theory as basis.[96]
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was endowed with
absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife.[97] The privilege was personal and
pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or
abets another person in raping her.[98]
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women’s movements in the USA demanding for its abolition
for being violative of married women’s right to be equally protected under rape laws.[99]
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the application of the rule
in cases where the husband and wife are living apart pursuant to a court order “which by its terms or in
its effects requires such living apart,” or a decree, judgment or written agreement of separation.[100]
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of Appeals of New
York declared the same unconstitutional in People v. Liberta[101] for lack of rational basis in
distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The decision, which also renounced Hale’s
irrevocable implied consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape. The
various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic
notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand
even the slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute
to be unconstitutional.
Lord Hale’s notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual intercourse has
been cited most frequently in support of the marital exemption. x x x Any argument based on a
supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one party does not
consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the victim and
frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such
an act is irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never been
viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a
marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with
impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman
x x x. If a husband feels “aggrieved” by his wife’s refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he should
seek relief in the courts governing domestic relations, not in “violent or forceful self-help x x x.”
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law doctrines that a
woman was the property of her husband and that the legal existence of the woman was “incorporated
and consolidated into that of the husband x x x.” Both these doctrines, of course, have long been
rejected in this State. Indeed, “[nowhere] in the common-law world — [or] in any modern society — is a
woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity
associated with recognition as a whole human being x x x.”[102] (Citations omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District of Columbia,
outlawing the act without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted some exemptions to a
husband from prosecution such as when the wife is mentally or physically impaired, unconscious,
asleep, or legally unable to consent.[103]
III. Marital Rape in the Philippines
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It appears,
however, that the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hale’s irrevocable
implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,[104] a 
husband may  not  be  guilty  of rape  under  Article  335  of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal
separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse.[105]
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW).[106]
Hailed as the first international women’s bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first major instrument that
contains a ban on all forms of discrimination against women. The Philippines assumed the role of
promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment as a vital element in addressing global
concerns.[107] The country also committed, among others, to condemn discrimination against women
in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a policy of
eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other
appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate
means, the practical realization of this principle;  
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate,
prohibiting all discrimination against women;
x x x x
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws,
regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women.[108]
 
In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines enshrined the principle of
gender equality in the 1987 Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of Article II thereof, thus:
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.
x x x x
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.
The Philippines also acceded to adopt and implement the generally accepted principles of international
law such as the CEDAW and its allied issuances, viz.:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No.
8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC.[109] The law reclassified rape
as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular to
the present case, and perhaps the law’s most progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2
thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration, viz.:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon.—The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be
extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term “man” in defining rape, it is
unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal relationship
with his victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed.—Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present. 
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of the 10th
Congress on the law’s progenitor’s, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on
tagging the crime as ‘marital rape’ due to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus
of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the general definition of
‘rape,’ viz.:
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point of clarification in the House version
on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never agreed to marital rape. But under Article 266-C, it says
here: “In case it is the legal husband who is the offender…” Does this presuppose that there is now
marital rape? x x x.
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17 years of private
practice in the legal profession, Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can put at stake my license as a
lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a husband from being sued by the wife for rape.
Even jurisprudence, we don’t have any jurisprudence that prohibits a wife from suing a husband. That
is why even if we don’t provide in this bill expanding the definition of crime that is now being
presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if we don’t provide here for marital rape, even if we
don’t provide for sexual rape, there is the right of the wife to go against the husband. The wife can sue
the husband for marital rape and she cannot be prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction
there is no law that prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put second paragraph of 266-C
because it is the belief of many of us. x x x, that if it is true that in this jurisdiction there is marital rape
even if we don’t provide it here, then we must provide for something that will unify and keep the
cohesion of the family together that is why we have the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically House Bill No.
6265 our provision on a husband forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is marital sexual assault.
MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual assault. So, Your
Honor, direct to the point, under Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in the second paragraph,
quote: “In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, this refers to marital rape filed against the
husband? Is that correct?
MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call it?
MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already stated that.
Because under 1 and 2 it is all denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual assault. That is why I am
sorry that our House version which provided for sexual assault was not carried by the Senate version
because all sexual crimes under this bicameral conference committee report are all now denominated as
rape whether the penalty is from reclusion perpetua to death or whether the penalty is only prision
mayor. So there is marital rape, Your Honor, is that correct?
x x x x
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in favor of punishing the
husband who forces the wife even to 30 years imprisonment. But please do not call it marital rape, call it
marital sexual assault because of the sanctity of marriage. x x x.[110] (Emphasis ours)
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is not excluded.
HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang ‘yung marital rape. x x x x
HON. ROCO: x x x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can be implicitly
contained in the second paragraph. x x x So marital rape actually was in the House version x x x. But it
was not another definition of rape. You will notice, it only says, that because you are the lawful
husband does not mean that you cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your wife
until she’s blue. And if the wife complains she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just cannot raise the
defense x x x[:] I am the husband. But where in the marriage contract does it say that I can beat you up?
That’s all it means. That is why if we stop referring to it as marital rape, acceptance is easy. Because
parang ang marital rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying is you’re [the]
husband but you cannot beat me up. x x x. That’s why to me it’s not alarming. It was just a way of
saying you’re [the] husband, you cannot say when I am charged with rape x x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHANI: All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does not mean you can
have carnal knowledge by force[,] threat or intimidation or by depriving your wife reason, a grave
abuse of authority, I don’t know how that cannot apply. Di ba yung, or putting an instrument into the,
yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to have another classification of rape. It is all the same
definition x x x.
x x x x
HON. ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x, we can say that this rule is implicit
already in the first proviso. It implies na there is an instance when a husband can be charged [with]
rape x x x.

HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.
HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it is understood that this rule
of evidence is now transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove marital rape.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain the one on page 8,
the effect of pardon. x x x [I]t is inferred but we leave it because after all it is just a rule of evidence. But I
think we should understand that a husband cannot beat at his wife to have sex. Di ba? I think that
should be made clear. x x x.
x x x x
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is that if you’re [the]
legal husband, Jesus Christ, don’t beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are my wife, why do you
have to beat me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I mean, we can face up,
I hope, to the women and they would understand that it is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or creating a new
crime but instead, we are just defining a rule of evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence the fact that he is
husband is not, does not negate.[111]
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion. The only
disagreement now is where to place it. Let us clear this matter. There are two suggestions now on
marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is done with force or intimidation or any of the circumstances that
would define rape x x x immaterial. The fact that the husband and wife are separated does not come
into the picture. So even if they are living under one roof x x x for as long as the attendant
circumstances of the traditional rape is present, then that is rape.[112]
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x [t]his provision on marital rape, it
does not actually change the meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in anybody’s mind, whether or
not rape can indeed be committed by the husband against the wife. So the bill really says, you having
been married to one another is not a legal impediment. So I don’t really think there is any need to
change the concept of rape as defined presently under the revised penal code. This do[es] not actually
add anything to the definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely clarificatory. That if indeed the wife
has evidence to show that she was really brow beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated into having
sexual intercourse against her will, then the crime of rape has been committed against her by the
husband, notwithstanding the fact that they have been legally married. It does not change anything at
all, Mr. Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x x x.[113]
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262,
[114] which regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by a man
against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz.:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited
to, the following acts:
A. “Physical Violence” refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. “Sexual violence” refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child.
It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim’s body,
forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child
to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the
conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of nonpersonal
violence are the most common type of spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence among ever-
married women. One in seven ever-married women experienced physical violence by their husbands
while eight percent (8%) experienced sexual violence.[115]
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant’s arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant’s plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied consent theory. In
his appeal brief before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse, which gave rise to
the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim,
KKK, were a legally married and cohabiting couple. He argues that consent to copulation is presumed
between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently from
ordinary rape cases and that the standards for determining the presence of consent or lack thereof must
be adjusted on the ground that sexual community is a mutual right and obligation between husband
and wife.[116]
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory evolved have
already been superseded by modern global principles on the equality of rights between men and
women and respect for human dignity established in various international conventions, such as the
CEDAW. The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in the traditional role
of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality
between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social
and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.[117] One of such
measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist
because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife’s body and thus her consent to every
act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women, which was promulgated[118] by the UN General Assembly
subsequent to the CEDAW. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-based violence that
constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified ‘marital rape’ as a species of sexual violence,
viz.:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term “violence against women” means any act of gender-based
violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to
women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in
public or in private life.
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual
abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital
mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related
to exploitation.[119] (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man
who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and
the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and
penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual
intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a
fellow human being with dignity equal[120] to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to
violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely,
the Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments and accommodate conservative yet
irrational notions on marital activities[121] that have lost their relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code,[122] obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions
affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual[123] and
not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes
cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive
interest in each other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening
marital relationship.[124] When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance a
felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its lofty
purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels
aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wife’s absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may
legally seek the court’s intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential
marital obligation.[125] But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or
violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from nonmarital rape cases in terms of the elements
that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The
Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws[126] ordains that similar subjects should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no
person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other
persons or other classes in like circumstances.[127]
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as
traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator’s
own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the law does not
distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage. Hence, the
law affords protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against married rape victims
over unmarried rape victims because it withholds from married women raped by their husbands the
penal redress equally granted by law to all rape victims.
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting the argument akin
to those raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a
husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her
own body, as does an unmarried woman.[128] She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual
intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she
refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and
responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of
coercion, discrimination and violence.[129] Women do not divest themselves of such right by
contracting marriage for the simple reason that human rights are inalienable.[130]
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and nonmarital rape nor provide for
different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what the law
dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what the
law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as
it would inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently from
the victims of nonmarital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the evidentiary rules
on rape any differently if the aggressor is the woman’s own legal husband. The elements and quantum
of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the
legal relationship between the accused and his accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the established legal
principles and evidentiary policies in the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and found that no
reversible error can be imputed to the conviction meted the accused-appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies

In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. Hence, the
strict mandate that all courts must examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended party. While the
accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining witness, courts are,
nonetheless, duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the victim’s testimony is justified. Courts
must ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature. If
the testimony of the complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof.[131]
_______________
[131] People v. Publico, G.R. No. 183569, April 13, 2011, 648 SCRA 734, 74
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to the highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to directly observe the
witnesses and their deportment, conduct and attitude, especially during cross-examination. Thus,
unless it is shown that its evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and
value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on
appeal.[132]
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the entire records of
the trial proceedings and the transcript of each witnesses’ testimony, the Court found no justification to
disturb its findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and spontaneous. Hailed to
the witness stand on six separate occasions, KKK never wavered neither did her statements vacillate
between uncertainty and certitude. She remained consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid
during the rigorous cross-examination and on rebuttal examination, she was able to convincingly
explain and debunk the allegations of the defense.
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite her refusal on
October 16, 1998. He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by violently
throwing the cot where she was resting. In order not to aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed,
he insinuated for them to have sex. When she rejected his advances due to abdominal pain and
headache, his request for intimacy transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her
panties but the accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down. The tug caused the small clothing to tear
apart. She reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged him to stop. But no amount of resistance
or begging subdued him. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped her hands, mounted her, rested his own
legs on hers and inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued pleading but he never desisted.[133]
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 17, 1998 is likewise unmistakable.
After the appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK decided to sleep in the
children’s bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the beddings, the accused-appellant barged into
the room and berated her for refusing to go with him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to
stay in the children’s bedroom, the accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM’s attempt to
pacify the accused-appellant further enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of the family he
could do whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as patriarch, he ordered the children
to go out of the room and thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled
down her short pants and panties as KKK begged “Don’t do that to me, my body is still aching and also
my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex.”[134] But her pleas
fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed his shorts and briefs, spread KKK’s legs apart, held
her hands, mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. After gratifying himself, he got dressed,
left the room as he chuckled: “It’s nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of
sex.”[135]
Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must be proved is
the absence of the victim’s consent to the sexual congress.[136] Under the law, consent is absent when:
(a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent machinations or grave
abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is
demented.
Contrary to the accused-appellant’s asseverations, KKK’s consent was wrestled from her through force
and intimidation both of which were established beyond moral certainty by the prosecution through
the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz.:
On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO:
Q    So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you remember what
happened?
A   He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.
Q   How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you? Q      So after that what else did he do?

A    He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off his hand. A     He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter how I wrestled but I
failed because he is stronger than me.

Q   Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?
COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her testimony.

A    Yes. “witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or knocking her lap
which means that he wanted to have sex.” ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont’ng.)

Q      So, what did you do after that? Q   So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode on you and held
your two hands?

A    I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture the witness is
sobbing) A     I told him, “don’t do that because I’m not feeling well and my whole body is aching.”

Q     So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you? Q       How did you say that to your husband?

A     He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic] was torn. A      I told him, “don’t do that to me because I’m not feeling well.”

Q    Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]? Q      Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?

A     I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so strong. x x x x

xxxx A     I shouted when I uttered that words.

Q    So, when your pantie [sic] was torn by your husband, what else did he do? x x x x

A    He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs. Q     Was your husband able to consummate his desire?
 Q     Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?

x x x x

A     I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.

A    Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.[137]

x x x x

(Cross-Examination) Q    At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove your nightgown?

ATTY. AMARGA: A     No, Sir.

Q      Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove your panty? Q     And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?

A     Yes, Sir. A     He raised my duster [sic] up.

Q    It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because according to you he Q   In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?
normally do that if he have sex with you?

A    No, only on the breast level.[138]

A      Yes, Sir.

Q    And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?
On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:

A     Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don’t want to have sex
with him at that time. (Direct Examination)

Q   You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty? ATTY. LARGO

A      Yes, Sir. Q  So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
A   He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie forcible.
Q    So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?
A    I told him, “don’t do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what
you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex.”
Q     So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?
A     It was torn.
Q   And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he do?
A     He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me and succeeded in
having sex with me.[139]
 
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping her hands,
flexing her legs and then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the consummation of his
much-desired nonconsensual sexual intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK. His
actuations prior to the actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed his distorted
sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously demanded for her to lay with him on the bed and
thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their bed, when she
insisted to sleep in the children’s bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance over her as
husband all cowed KKK into submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom on October
16, 1998 cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to the forced sexual intercourse that ensued.
The accused-appellant was KKK’s husband and hence it was customary for her to sleep in the conjugal
bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such act of KKK because at that juncture there were no
indications that sexual intercourse was about to take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant
since the act for which the same is legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the person
from whom the consent was desired. The significant point when consent must be given is at that time
when it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that point is
when the accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK comprehended to be an
invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she refused.
Resistance, medical certificate
and blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant’s argument that KKK should have hit him to convey
that she was resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rape and the law does not
impose upon the victim the burden to prove resistance[140] much more requires her to raise a specific
kind thereof.
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-appellant to
recognize that she seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on to her panties to prevent
him from undressing her, she refused to bend her legs and she repeatedly shouted and begged for him
to stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just enough to
bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to
consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind[141] or is of such a degree as to impel the
defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission.[142]
Contrary to the accused-appellant’s allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK’s panties or the lack of
a medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on the victim’s
underwear that determines the fact of rape[143] inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable
evidence that is not necessary to prove rape.[144] These details do not pertain to the elements that
produce the gravamen of the offense that is — sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or
without her consent.[145]
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy,[146] the evidentiary
circumstances of which are, however, disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy, the testimony
of the complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent, and was controverted by the prosecution’s
medico-legal expert witness who stated that force was not applied based on the position of her hymenal
laceration. This led the Court to conclude that the absence of any sign of physical violence on the
victim’s body is an indication of consent.[147] Here, however, KKK’s testimony is, as discussed earlier,
credible, spontaneous and forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of
credence.
The accused-appellant’s assertion that MMM and OOO’s testimonies lacked probative value as they did
not witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is essentially committed in
relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced
sexual intercourse.[148] Hence, the probative value of MMM and OOO’s testimonies rest not on
whether they actually witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations were in harmony with
KKK’s narration of the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape
incidents.
MMM and OOO’s testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK’s narration. MMM heard KKK
shouting and crying: “Eddie, don’t do that to me, have pity on me”[149] on the night of October 16,
1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant went to their conjugal bedroom. When MMM went
upstairs to check on her mother, the accused-appellant admonished her for meddling. Frustrated to aid
her mother who persistently cried, MMM kicked the door so hard the accused-appellant was prompted
to open it and rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion from the room downstairs.
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled while her torn panty
lay on the floor. After a brief struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were finally able to
escape and retreat to the children’s bedroom where KKK narrated to her daughters: “[Y]our father is an
animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I’m not feeling well.”
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accused-appellant barged
inside the children’s bedroom. The couple had an argument and when MMM tried to interfere, the
accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get out after bragging that he can have sex with his wife
even in front of the children because he is the head of the family. The girls then stayed by the staircase
where they afterwards heard their mother helplessly crying and shouting for the accused-appellant to
stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accused-appellant,
through the use of force and intimidation, had nonconsensual and forced carnal knowledge of his wife,
KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
KKK’s helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and physical
resistance were clear manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw her on the bed after
the accused appellant opened the door on October 16, 1998, her conduct towards the accused-appellant
on her way out of the room, and her categorical outcry to her children after the two bedroom episodes
— all generate the conclusion that the sexual acts that occurred were against her will.
Failure to immediately report to
the police authorities, if satisfac-
torily explained, is not fatal to
the credibility of a witness.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they failed to report
the rape incidents to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape charges. Delay or
vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults does not necessarily impair their credibility if
such delay is satisfactorily explained.[150]
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to submit to
sexual intercourse is considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could sue his husband for
rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed the
separate charges for grave threats and physical injuries against the accused-appellant.[151] It must be
noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing marital
exemption in rape cases hence it is understandable that it was not yet known to a layman as opposed to
legal professionals like Prosecutor Tabique.
In addition, fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape victims
from reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape cases. This is in view of
the popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife’s absolute obligation to submit to her husband’s carnal
desires. A husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or trivialized as
simple domestic trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and public
scrutiny that could have befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of police authorities or even
the neighbors been sought, are acceptable explanations for the failure or delay in reporting the subject
rape incidents.
The victim’s testimony on the wit-
ness stand rendered unnecessary
the presentation of her complaint-
affidavit as evidence.
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK’s complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal in view of the
credible, candid and positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial evidence carries more
weight than the affidavit since it underwent the rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross
examinations. Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and
inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court.[152]
Ill motive imputed to the victim
The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as it is riddled with
loopholes generated by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was able to establish that the
P3 Million deposit in the spouses’ bank account was the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of
Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the
amount of P3,149,840.63 is the same amount the accused-appellant claimed to have entrusted to her
wife. Although the accused-appellant denied being aware of such loan, he admitted that approximately
P3 Million was spent for the construction of their house. These pieces of evidence effectively belie the
accused-appellant’s allegation that KKK could not account for the money deposited in the bank.[153]
Anent, KKK’s alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how Bebs could be
his wife KKK when the letter-sender greeted Bebs a “happy birthday” on October 28 while KKK’s
birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant also did not present Bebs herself, being a more competent
witness to the existence of the alleged love letters for KKK. He likewise failed, despite promise to do so,
to present the original copies of such love letters neither did he substantiate KKK’s supposed extra-
marital affairs by presenting witnesses who could corroborate his claims. Further, the Court finds it
unbelievable that an able man would not have the temerity to confront his wife who has fooled around
with 10 men — some of whom he has even met. The accused-appellant’s erratic statements on the
witness stand are inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it reasonable to infer
that he merely made up those malicious stories as a desperate ploy to extricate himself out of this legal
quandary.
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant’s unfounded suspicions
that hold no evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to destroy KKK’s credibility and that of
her testimony. In sum, the defense failed to present sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK is a mere
vindictive wife who is harassing the accused-appellant with fabricated rape charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense, the accused-
appellant has essentially admitted the facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the two criminal
informations for rape. This admission is inconsistent with the defense of alibi and any discussion
thereon will thus be irrelevant.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also
because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify falsely.[154]
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at
the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical
distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed when
the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the two places.[155]
 Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta in Dangcagan,
Bukidnon or was hauling corn with Equia on the dates of commission of the crime, the same will not
easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the
commission of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be traversed by about four or five hours from
Cagayan de Oro City, and even less by private vehicle which was available to the accused-appellant at
any time.[156] Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the situs criminis at the dates and
times when the two rape incidents were committed.
Between the accused-appellant’s alibi and denial, and the positive identification and credible testimony
of the victim, and her two daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter, especially in the absence
of ill motive on their part to falsely testify against the accused-appellant
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently overcome by
KKK’s clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two separate occasions, he
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, without her consent and against her will. Evidence of
overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is extant from KKK’s narration as believably
corroborated by the testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of KKK’s torn panties
and short pants. Based thereon, the reason and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the
accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the accused-
appellant for being in accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further, he shall not be
eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which states that “persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua,
by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.”[157]
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00. Moral damages are
granted to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape under the assumption that the
victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent.[158]
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took place.
Considering that the crime committed is simple rape, there being no qualifying circumstances attendant
in its commission, the appropriate amount is P50,000.00[159] and not P75,000.00 as awarded by the
RTC.
To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic violence, an
award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is imperative.[160]
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.[161]
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman’s value and
dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It can
happen anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside her
time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against her by her husband who vowed to be her
refuge from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide
the atonement they seek from their sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A
husband does not own his wife’s body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself
of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give
or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife’s unremitting refusal to
engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek
succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological
incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological communion that
achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it
contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing
personalities may use this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that
safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital
rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue and malicious charges will be made answerable
under the pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar
Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole. He is further
ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape. The award of damages shall
earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed with modifications.

Notes.―The crime of rape is no longer to be found under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code, or
crimes against chastity; As per Republic Act No. 8353, or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the crime of rape
has been reclassified as a crime against persons. (People vs. Lindo, 627 SCRA 519 [2010]) G.R. No. 166441. October 8, 2014.*

The commission of rape is not hindered by time or place as in fact it can be committed even in the most NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
public of places. (Id.) People vs. Jumawan, 722 SCRA 108, G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Judicial experience has shown, indeed, that the trial courts are in
the best position to decide issues of credibility of witnesses, having themselves heard and seen the
witnesses and observed firsthand their demeanor and deportment and the manner of testifying under
exacting examination.—In an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court reviews only
questions of law. No review of the findings of fact by the CA is involved. As a consequence of this rule,
the Court accords the highest respect for the factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions drawn from
its factual findings, particularly when they are affirmed by the CA. Judicial experience has shown,
indeed, that the trial courts are in the best position to decide issues of credibility of witnesses, having
themselves heard and seen the witnesses and observed firsthand their demeanor and deportment and
the manner of testifying under exacting examination. As such, the contentions of the petitioner on the
credibility of AAA as a witness for the State cannot be entertained. He thereby raises questions of fact
that are outside the scope of this appeal. Moreover, he thereby proposes to have the Court, which is not
a trier of facts, review the entire evidence adduced by the Prosecution and the Defense.

Criminal Law; Rape; Rape is consummated once the penis capable of consummating the sexual act
touches the external genitalia of the female.—The basic element of rape then and now is carnal
knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge is defined simply as “the act of a man having sexual bodily
connections with a woman,” which explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia
consummates the rape. In other words, rape is consummated once the penis capable of consummating
the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female.

Same; Same; Frustrated Rape; As the evolving case law on rape stands, rape in its frustrated stage is a
physical impossibility, considering that the requisites of a frustrated felony under Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) are that: (1) the offender has performed all the acts of execution which
would produce the felony; and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the
perpetrator’s will. Obviously, the offender attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal
knowledge of his victim.—It is noteworthy that in People v. Orita, 184 SCRA 105 (1990), the Court
clarified that the ruling in People v. Eriñia, 50 Phil. 998 (1927), whereby the offender was declared guilty
of frustrated rape because of lack of conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the
offended party, was a stray decision for not having been reiterated in subsequent cases. As the evolving
case law on rape stands, therefore, rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility, considering
that the requisites of a frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code are that: (1) the
offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; and (2) that the
felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will. Obviously, the offender
attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his victim, because from that moment
all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished, leaving nothing more to be done by
him.
Same; Same; Attempted Rape; In attempted rape, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not
perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge.—In attempted rape, therefore, the
concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal
knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its
attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt acts
without the offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only
means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape
as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that
intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal law, that showing must be through his overt
acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted rape without such overt acts
demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short, the State, to establish attempted rape, must
show that his overt acts, should his criminal intent be carried to its complete termination without being
thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape, for, as succinctly put in People v. Dominguez,
Jr., 636 SCRA 134 (2010): “The gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had been
committed is the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the
vagina, before the interruption.”
Same; Same; As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for as
long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no one could
determine with certainty what the perpetrator’s intent really was.—We clarify that the direct overt acts
of the petitioner that would have produced attempted rape did not include equivocal preparatory acts.
The former would have related to his acts directly connected to rape as the intended crime, but the
latter, whether external or internal, had no connection with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his
perpetration of the preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony.
His preparatory acts could include his putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the use of
AAA and BBB, and the other for himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for Manila
earlier that evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct connection to rape. As
a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Code for as long as they remained
equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no one could determine with
certainty what the perpetrator’s intent really was.
Same; Acts of Lasciviousness; Attempted Rape; It is obvious that the fundamental difference between
attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the offender’s intent to lie with the female.—It is obvious
that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the offender’s
intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is
not required in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the “touching” of
the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only
through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external
genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.
Same; Same; Elements of.—Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of
lasciviousness is consummated when the following essential elements concur, namely: (a) the offender
commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of either sex; and (b) the act of
lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is
under 12 years of age. In that regard, lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies
that form of immorality that has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton
manner.
Same; Rape; The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from
his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape.—The intent to
commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if
any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. A good illustration of this can be seen in
People v. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 (1997), where the accused was charged with attempted rape through
an information alleging that he, by means of force and intimidation, “did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by
then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of the undersigned [complainant], a minor, and about
to lay on top of her, all against her will, however, [he] did not perform all the acts of execution which
would have produced the crime of Rape by reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is, undersigned complainant push[ed] him away.” The accused was held liable only for
acts of lasciviousness because the intent to commit rape “is not apparent from the act described,” and
the intent to have sexual intercourse with her was not inferable from the act of licking her genitalia. The
Court also pointed out that the “act imputed to him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual
intercourse.”
Same; Acts of Lasciviousness; Penalties; Pursuant to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the
petitioner, being guilty of acts of lasciviousness, is punished with prisión correccional.—Pursuant to
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner, being guilty of acts of lasciviousness, is punished Antecedents
with prisión correccional. In the absence of modifying circumstances, prisión correccional is imposed in
its medium period, which ranges from two (2) years, four (4) months and one day to four (4) years and
two (2) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty should come The petitioner was charged in the RTC with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness involving
from arresto mayor, the penalty next lower than prisión correccional which ranges from one (1) month different victims. At arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the respective informations, to wit:
to six (6) months. Accordingly, the Court fixes the indeterminate sentence of three (3) months of arresto
mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prisión correccional, as the
maximum.
 

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Criminal Case No. 2388

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Attempted Rape

Tumangan, Payumo & Partners for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape and acts
of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness
does not. Only the direct overt acts of the offender establish the intent to lie with the female. However,
merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape without proof of his
erectile penis being in a position to penetrate the female’s vagina.
That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 2:00 o’clock in the morning, along the Bangar-
Luna Road, Barangay Central West No. 2, Municipality of Bangar, Province of La Union, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation commenced the commission of rape
directly by overt acts, to wit: While private complainant AAA, an unmarried woman, fifteen (15) years
old, was sleeping inside the tent along Bangar-Luna Road, the said accused remove her panty and
underwear and lay on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast with intent of
having carnal knowledge of her by means of force, and if the accused did not accomplish his purpose
that is to have carnal knowledge of the said AAA it was not because of his voluntary desistance but
because the said offended party succeeded in resisting the criminal attempt of said accused to the
damage and prejudice of said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The Case Criminal Case No. 2389

This appeal examines the decision promulgated on July 26, 2004,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the conviction for attempted rape of the petitioner by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, in
Balaoan, La Union (RTC), and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prisión mayor, as
maximum, and ordering him to pay moral damages of P20,000.00 to AAA,2 the victim.
Acts of Lasciviousness
That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 3:00 o’clock in the morning, along the Bangar-
Luna Road, Barangay Central West No. 2, Municipality of Bangar, Province of La Union, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused with lewd design, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touch the vagina of [BBB]4 against the latter’s will
and with no other purpose but to satisfy his lascivious desire to the damage and prejudice of said
offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
 
Version of the Prosecution
The CA summarized the version of the Prosecution as follows:6
x x x [Petitioner] Norberto Bartolome and [his wife] Belinda Cruz were engaged in the selling of plastic
wares and glass wares in different municipalities around the country. On December 20, 1993, Norberto
and Belinda employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their wares in Bangar, La Union which
was then celebrating its fiesta. From Libsong East, Lingayen, Pangasinan to Bangar, La Union, AAA
and BBB boarded a passenger jeepney owned by Norberto. The young girls were accompanied by
Norberto, Belinda, Ruben Rodriguez (driver) and a sales boy by the name of “Jess.”
Upon reaching Bangar, La Union, at around 8:00 in the evening of December 20, 1993, they parked in
front of Maroon enterprises. They brought out all the goods and wares for display. Two tents were
fixed in order that they will have a place to sleep. Belinda and the driver proceeded to Manila in order
to get more goods to be sold.
On December 21, 1993, at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning, AAA and BBB went to sleep. Less than an
hour later, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her. Norberto was mashing
her breast and touching her private part. AAA realized that she was divested of her clothing and that
she was totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she’ll be killed. AAA tried to push
Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas fell on deaf ears. She fought back and
kicked Norberto twice.
Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered her money and told her not to tell
the incident to her mother otherwise, she will be killed. AAA went out of the tent to seek help from Jess
(the house boy) but she failed to wake him up.
Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of
BBB. AAA saw her companion awake but her hands were shaking. When she finally entered the tent,
Norberto left and went outside.
Later that day, AAA and BBB narrated to Jess the incident that took place that early morning. Later still,
while they were on their way to fetch water, AAA and BBB asked the people around where they can
find the municipal building. An old woman pointed to them the place.
In the evening of December 21, 1993, AAA and BBB went straight to the municipal hall where they met
a policeman by the name of “Sabas.” They told Sabas the sexual advances made to them by Norberto.
Norberto was summoned to the police station where he personally confronted his accusers. When
Norberto’s wife, Belinda, arrived at the police station, an argument ensued between them.
On December 22, 1993, at around 2:20 o’clock in the morning, the police investigator ordered the
complainants to return at 6:00 o’clock in the morning. Norberto and Belinda were still able to bring
AAA and BBB home with them and worked for them until December 30, 1994, after which they were
sent back to Lingayen, Pangasinan.
On January 10, 1994, AAA and BBB went back to La Union and executed their respective sworn
statements against Norberto.
Version of the Defense
The petitioner denied the criminal acts imputed to him. His version was presented in the assailed
decision of the CA,7 as follows:
In a bid to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presents a totally different version of the story. The
accused maintains that it was not possible for him to commit the crimes hurled against him. On the date
of the alleged incident, there were many people around who were preparing for the “simbang gabi.”
Considering the location of the tents, which were near the road and the municipal hall, he could not
possibly do the dastardly acts out in the open, not to mention the fact that once AAA and BBB would
scream, the policemen in the municipal hall could hear them. He believes that the reason why the
complainants filed these cases against him was solely for the purpose of extorting money from him.

Judgment of the RTC
After the joint trial of the two criminal cases, the RTC rendered its judgment on April 6, 2000 finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388 and acts of
lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 2389,8 to wit:
 
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring the accused
NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of ATTEMPTED
RAPE and ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS as defined and penalized in Article 335 in relation with (sic)
Article 6, par. 3 and Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code respectively.
With respect to the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISIÓN
CORRECCIONAL as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS PRISIÓN MAYOR as Maximum and the accessory
penalties provided for by law and to pay the victim AAA the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages.
With regard to the crime of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, the Court hereby sentences the accused to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4) MONTHS ARRESTO MAYOR as
Minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISIÓN CORRECCIONAL as Maximum and
the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the victim BBB the amount of P10,000.00 as
moral damages.
The preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused by reason of the two cases is counted in his favor.
 SO ORDERED.9
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner contended that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him of attempted rape
despite the dubious credibility of AAA, and of acts of lasciviousness despite the fact that BBB did not
testify.
On July 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner for
attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388, but acquitting him of the acts of lasciviousness charged in
Criminal Case No. 2389 due to the insufficiency of the evidence,10 holding thusly:
In sum, the arguments of the accused-appellant are too puerile and inconsequential as to dent, even
slightly, the overall integrity and probative value of the prosecution’s evidence insofar as AAA is
concerned.
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony is the “penalty lower
by two (2) degrees” prescribed by law for the consummated felony. In this case, the penalty for rape if it
had been consummated would have been reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised
Penalty Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The penalty two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua is prisión mayor.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be the medium
period of prisión mayor in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance and the minimum
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense which in this case is
prisión correccional in any of its periods.
We also find that the trial court correctly assessed the amount of P20,000.00 by way of moral damages
against the accused-appellant. In a rape case, moral damages may be awarded without the need of
proof or pleading since it is assumed that the private complainant suffered moral injuries, more so,
when the victim is aged 13 to 19.
Insofar as the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed against BBB, the accused argues that there is not
enough evidence to support such accusation. BBB did not testify and neither her sworn statement was
formally offered in evidence to support the charge for acts of lasciviousness.
In this case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution is insufficient to substantiate the charge of acts of
lasciviousness against the accused-appellant. The basis of the complaint for acts of lasciviousness is the
sworn statement of BBB to the effect that the accused-appellant likewise molested her by mashing her
breast and touching her private part. However, she was not presented to testify. While AAA claims that
she personally saw the accused touching the private parts of BBB, there was no testimony to the effect
that such lascivious acts were without the consent or against the will of BBB.11
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner posits that the CA’s decision was not in accord with law or with
jurisprudence, particularly:
I.
In giving credence to the incredulous and unbelievable testimony of the alleged victim; and
II.
In convicting the accused notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails the behavior and credibility of AAA. He argues that AAA
still continued working for him and his wife until December 30, 1994 despite the alleged attempted rape
in the early morning of December 21, 1994, thereby belying his commission of the crime against her;
that he could not have undressed her without rousing her if she had gone to sleep only an hour before,
because her bra was locked at her back; that her testimony about his having been on top of her for
nearly an hour while they struggled was also inconceivable unless she either consented to his act and
yielded to his lust, or the incident did not happen at all, being the product only of her fertile
imagination; that the record does not indicate if he himself was also naked, or that his penis was poised
to penetrate her; and that she and her mother demanded from him P80,000.00 as settlement, under
threat that she would file a case against him.12
On the second issue, the petitioner assails the glaring inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA that cast
doubt on her veracity.
 
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious.
In an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,13 the Court reviews only questions of law. No review
of the findings of fact by the CA is involved. As a consequence of this rule, the Court accords the
highest respect for the factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses
and the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions drawn from its factual findings,
particularly when they are affirmed by the CA. Judicial experience has shown, indeed, that the trial
courts are in the best position to decide issues of credibility of witnesses, having themselves heard and
seen the witnesses and observed firsthand their demeanor and deportment and the manner of testifying
under exacting examination. As such, the contentions of the petitioner on the credibility of AAA as a
witness for the State cannot be entertained. He thereby raises questions of fact that are outside the scope
of this appeal. Moreover, he thereby proposes to have the Court, which is not a trier of facts, review the
entire evidence adduced by the Prosecution and the Defense.
Conformably with this limitation, our review focuses only on determining the question of law of
whether or not the petitioner’s climbing on top of the undressed AAA such that they faced each other,
with him mashing her breasts and touching her genitalia with his hands, constituted attempted rape,
the crime for which the RTC and the CA convicted and punished him. Based on the information, supra,
he committed such acts “with intent of having carnal knowledge of her by means of force, and if the
accused did not accomplish his purpose that is to have carnal knowledge of the said AAA it was not
because of his voluntary desistance but because the said offended party succeeded in resisting the
criminal attempt of said accused to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.”
There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender commences
the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous
desistance. In People v. Lamahang,14 the Court, speaking through the eminent Justice Claro M. Recto,
eruditely expounded on what overt acts would constitute an attempted felony, to wit:
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has
a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the
offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The
attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is
ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. x x x x But it is not sufficient,
for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere
beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and
natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop
into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning
of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated
by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily
ripen into a concrete offense. x x x x.
“It must be borne in mind (Groizard I, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage
is wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same
must be inferred from the nature of the acts of execution (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these
acts be such that by their very nature, by the facts to which they are related, by the circumstances of the
persons performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, they must show without any
doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double interpretation,
that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act,
must not and cannot furnish grounds by themselves for attempted or frustrated crimes. The relation
existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense of which said facts are supposed
to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary,
in order to avoid regrettable instance of injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from them the
intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury. This must have been the intention of the
legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt to exist, the offender must commence the commission
of the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say, that the acts performed must be such that, without the
intent to commit an offense, they would be meaningless.”15
To ascertain whether the acts performed by the petitioner constituted attempted rape, we have to
determine the law on rape in effect on December 21, 1993, when the petitioner committed the crime he
was convicted of. That law was Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently provided as
follows:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed.—Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned
in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
xxxx
The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge is defined
simply as “the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman,”16 which explains why
the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape. In other words, rape is
consummated once the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of
the female.17 In People v. Campuhan,18 the Court has defined the extent of “touching” by the penis in
rape in the following terms:
[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or
grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or
the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed
touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for
an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be “touched” by
the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch
them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion
that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the
perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice,
etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible
within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of
the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair
follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has
many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates
that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to
stroke the surface of the female organ. x x x x Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or
touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any
showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum
by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness. [Bold emphasis supplied]
 
It is noteworthy that in People v. Orita,19 the Court clarified that the ruling in People v. Eriñia20
whereby the offender was declared guilty of frustrated rape because of lack of conclusive evidence of
penetration of the genital organ of the offended party, was a stray decision for not having been
reiterated in subsequent cases. As the evolving case law on rape stands, therefore, rape in its frustrated
stage is a physical impossibility, considering that the requisites of a frustrated felony under Article 6 of
the Revised Penal Code are that: (1) the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony; and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the
perpetrator’s will. Obviously, the offender attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal
knowledge of his victim, because from that moment all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished, leaving nothing more to be done by him.21
Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage. In this connection, the character of the overt acts for
purposes of the attempted stage has been explained in People v. Lizada:22
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit
a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
The raison d’etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the
accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily
so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the
act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt
act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so
long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It
is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the
design. It is sufficient if it was the “first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the
commission of the offense after the preparations are made.” The act done need not constitute the last
proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to
the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary
relation to the offense. (Bold emphasis supplied)
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts
of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia
consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of
the felony directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that should
produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to
have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with
the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal law,23 that
showing must be through his overt acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for
attempted rape without such overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short, the
State, to establish attempted rape, must show that his overt acts, should his criminal intent be carried to
its complete termination without being thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape,24 for,
as succinctly put in People v. Dominguez, Jr.:25 “The gauge in determining whether the crime of
attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e.,
penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the interruption.”
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his
hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his
designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended felony
would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs towards her being
fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or “susceptible of double interpretation,” as
Justice Recto put in People v. Lamahang, supra, such that it was not permissible to directly infer from
them the intention to cause rape as the particular injury. Verily, his felony would not exclusively be
rape had he been allowed by her to continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some other
felony like simple seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her yield to him)26 could also be
ultimate felony.
We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted rape did not
include equivocal preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts directly connected to rape
as the intended crime, but the latter, whether external or internal, had no connection with rape as the
intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an
attempt to commit such felony.27 His preparatory acts could include his putting up of the separate
tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other for himself and his assistant, and his
allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal,
had no direct connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised
Penal Code for as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their
equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the perpetrator’s intent really was.28
If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute acts of lasciviousness?
It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the
offender’s intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this
element is not required in acts of lasciviousness.29 Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the
“touching” of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is
manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the
external genitalia of the female.30 Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is
committed.31
Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of lasciviousness is consummated
when the following essential elements concur, namely: (a) the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness or
lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party is
deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under 12 years of
age.32 In that regard, lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of
immorality that has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.33
The information charged that the petitioner “remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id] on top of Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, the courts are vested with the discretion to impose interest as a
said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast.” With such allegation of the information part of the damages in crimes and quasi-delicts. In that regard, the moral damages of P20,000.00 shall
being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment.40
lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not
directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the
position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES petitioner NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME
her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her. guilty of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, and, ACCORDINGLY, PENALIZES him with the indeterminate
sentence of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and
one day of prisión correccional, as the maximum; ORDERS him to pay moral damages of P30,000.00
The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own and civil indemnity of P20,000.00 to the complainant, with interest of 6% per annum on such awards
declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. A good illustration of reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS him to pay the costs of suit.
this can be seen in People v. Bugarin,34 where the accused was charged with attempted rape through
an information alleging that he, by means of force and intimidation, “did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by SO ORDERED.
then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of the undersigned [complainant], a minor, and about
to lay on top of her, all against her will, however, [he] did not perform all the acts of execution which
would have produced the crime of Rape by reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is, undersigned complainant push[ed] him away.” The accused was held liable only for Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
acts of lasciviousness because the intent to commit rape “is not apparent from the act described,” and
the intent to have sexual intercourse with her was not inferable from the act of licking her genitalia. The
Court also pointed out that the “act imputed to him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual Petitioner Norberto Cruz y Bartolome guilty of acts of lasciviousness.
intercourse.”35

Notes.—The Supreme Court ruled that when the “touching” of the vagina by the penis is coupled with
Pursuant to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner, being guilty of acts of lasciviousness, the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely acts of
is punished with prisión correccional. In the absence of modifying circumstances, prisión correccional is lasciviousness. (People vs. Pareja, 680 SCRA 198 [2012])
imposed in its medium period, which ranges from two (2) years, four (4) months and one day to four (4)
years and two (2) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty
should come from arresto mayor, the penalty next lower than prisión correccional which ranges from
Failure of the offended party to make a struggle or outcry is immaterial in the rape of a child below
one (1) month to six (6) months. Accordingly, the Court fixes the indeterminate sentence of three (3)
twelve years of age because the law presumes that the victim on account of her age does not and cannot
months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prisión
have a will of her own. (People vs. Banzuela, 712 SCRA 735 [2013])
correccional, as the maximum.

——o0o—— Cruz vs. People, 737 SCRA 567, G.R. No. 166441 October 8, 2014
In acts of lasciviousness, the victim suffers moral injuries because the offender violates her chastity by
his lewdness. “Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result
of the defendant’s wrongful act for omission.”36 Indeed, Article 2219(3), of the Civil Code expressly
VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 12, 2001
recognizes the right of the victim in acts of lasciviousness to recover moral damages.37 Towards that
end, the Court, upon its appreciation of the record, decrees that P30,000.00 is a reasonable award of
moral damages.38 In addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil indemnity of P20,000.00.39
485
People vs. Optana
G.R. No. 133922. February 12, 2001.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DEOLITO OPTANA, accused-appellant.
Witnesses; A witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and
remains consistent is a credible witness.—A witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent is a credible witness. Since the trial court found
Maria Rizalina’s testimony to be credible and trustworthy, it was more than sufficient to sustain the
accused-appellant’s conviction. The fact that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge with the
young victim is corroborated by the findings of Dr. Laila Patricio, who upon examination on
November, 1995 found Maria Rizalina to be 6-7 months pregnant already. Maria Rizalina confided to
her that her stepfather raped her. This accusation was repeated when she was investigated by SPO3
Cesar Antolin at the Subic Police Station, Subic, Zambales, and when she was interviewed by Social
Welfare Officer II, Ana Ecle of the DSWD, Iba, Zambales.
Criminal Law; Rape; Incestuous Rape; In a rape committed by a father against the daughter, the
former’s moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation.—In a
rape committed by a father against the daughter, the former’s moral ascendancy and influence over the
latter substitutes for violence and intimidation. The experience has certainly caused great trauma on
Maria Rizalina that she had to be committed to the National Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong
City to undergo psychological and medical treatment for severe depression.
Same; Same; Many cases attest to the unfortunate fact that rape can be committed even in places where
people congregate: in parks, along the roadside, within school premises and even inside a house where
there are occupants.—Accused-appellant denies having raped his stepdaughter alleging that it was
quite impossible for him to have committed the crime “in broad daylight, in a small house, abundant
with open windows and doors, peopled by six or seven mischievous and open-eyed curious souls keen
with every unusual scenarios of members involving kins and idols like their fathers.” The Court sees no
impossibility for the commission of this abominable act on the victim under the alleged circumstances.
Many cases attest to the unfortunate fact that rape can be committed even in places where people
congregate: in parks, along the roadside, within school premises and even inside a house where there
are occupants. Lust is no respecter of time or place.
Same; Same; Motive; Ill motive is never an essential element of a crime.—Ill motive is never an essential
element of a crime. It becomes inconsequential in a case where there are affirmative, nay, categorical
declarations towards the accused-appellant’s accountability for the felony. Maria Rizalina’s
straightforward and consistent testimony belies any claim of being pressured by her aunt to concoct a
story of defloration against the stepfather. Upon cross examination, she was quick to deny that her Tita
Evelyn prompted her to report to the authorities about her physical condition and the person
responsible thereof.
Same; Same; It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for sometime the assaults on their virtue
because of the rapist’s threat on their lives.—Delay in reporting the crime is understandable. It is not
uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the assaults on their virtue because of the rapist’s
threat on their lives. The case at bar is no exception to this well-founded rule. Maria Rizalina never said
anything to her mother of the many times the accused-appellant had sexually abused her for fear of her
life. She was definitely afraid of her stepfather who threatened to kill her once she reports the matter to
her mother.
Same; Child Abuse Law; Elements of the Violation of Sec. 5(b) of R.A. 7610; Sec. 5(b) of R.A. 7610
penalizes not only child prostitution, the essence of which is profit, but also other forms of sexual abuse
of children.— In the case of People v. Larin, the Court has explained that the elements of the offense
penalized under this provision are as follows: 1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct. 2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse. 3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. A child is deemed
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Under RA 7610, children are “persons below
eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental disability or condition.” It
must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also one
in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. Hence, the
foregoing provision penalizes not only child prostitution, the essence of which is profit, but also other
forms of sexual abuse of children. This is clear from the deliberations of the Senate.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Br. 75.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Romeo Alinea for accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Upon a sworn complaint filed by Maria Rizalina Onsiano on November 28, 1995, four (4) Informations
for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610, or known as the Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse and four (4) Informations for Rape were filed against herein accused-appellant
Deolito Optana committed as follows:
1.Criminal Case No. 482-95 for rape:
That on or about the 28th day of October, 1995 at Sitio Daan Naugsul, Brgy. Mangan Vaca, in the
Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, actuated by lust and by means of force, intimidation and threats, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with his stepdaughter one Rizalina
Onsiano, a girl of 13 years old and ten (10) months, against her will and consent, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.
2.Criminal Case No. 483-95 for rape:
That on or about and during the month of October 1993, at Sitio Daan Naugsol, Brgy. Mangan Vaca, in
the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, actuated by lust and by means of force, intimidation and threats,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with his stepdaughter
one Rizalina Onsiano, a girl of 11 years old and ten (10) months, against her will and consent, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter.
3.Criminal Case No. 484-95 for rape:
That on or about the month of September, 1995 at Sitio Daan Naugsul, Brgy. Mangan Vaca, in the
Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, actuated by lust and by means of force, intimidation and threats, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with his stepdaughter one Rizalina
Onsiano, a girl of 13 years old and nine (9) months, against her will and consent, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.
4.Criminal Case No. 485-95 for rape:
That on or about and during the month of September 1993, at Sitio Daan Naugsol, Brgy. Mangan Vaca,
in the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, actuated by lust and by means of force, intimidation and threats,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his stepdaughter
one Rizalina Onsiano, a girl of 11 years old and nine (9) months, against her will and consent, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter.
5.Criminal Case No. 486-95 for Viol. Of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act 7610 (Child Abuse):
That on or about and during the month of September, 1993, at Sitio Daan Naugsol, Brgy. Mangan Vaca,
in the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused with lewd design, and by means of intimidation, coercion, influence
and other considetation (sic), did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with his step-daughter one Rizalina Onsiano, a minor of 11 years old and nine (9) months,
to the damage and prejudice of said Rizalina Onsiano.
6.Criminal Case No. 487-95 for Viol. Of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act 7610 (Child Abuse):
That on or about the 28th day of October, 1995 at Sitio Daan Naugsol, Brgy. Mangan Vaca, in the
Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused with lewd design, and by means of intimidation, coercion, influence and other
consideration, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his
stepdaughter one Rizalina Onsiano, a minor of 13 years old and ten (10) months, to the damage and
prejudice of said Rizalina Onsiano.
7.Criminal Case No. 488-95 for Viol. Of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act 7610 (Child Abuse):
That on or about the month of September, 1995 at Sitio Daan Naugsol, Brgy. Mangan Vaca, in the
Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused with lewd design, and by means of intimidation, coercion, influence and other
consideration, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his
stepdaughter one Rizalina Onsiano.
8.Criminal Case No. 489-95 for Viol. Of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act 7610 (Child Abuse):
That on or about and during the month of October, 1993 at Sitio Daan Naugsol, Brgy. Mangan Vaca, in
the Municipality of Subic, Pronvice (sic) of Zambales, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused with lewd design, and by means of intimidation, coercion, influence
and other consideration, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with his stepdaughter one Rizalina Onsiano, a minor of 11 years old and ten (10) months, to
the damage and prejudice of said Rizalina Onsiano.1
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to each of the above informations.
 times she was raped but she particularly recalled that on October 28, 1995, the accused-appellant raped
her inside the room where she and her brothers and sisters were sleeping. This was the last time that
The facts are as follows: accused-appellant touched her.6

Maria Rizalina Onsiano is the daughter of Nida A. Onsiano who was born on December 13, 1981 at
Tondo General Hospital. The father, Raul Gomez left Nida Onciano even before Maria Rizalina was
born.2
Nida Onsiano met the accused-appellant, Deolito Optana in 1985 at Doris Restaurant in Olongapo City
where they were both working.3 They decided to live together in 1986 without the benefit of marriage
even if accused-appellant knew that Nida Onsiano already had a daughter. Out of this common-law
relationship, the couple had seven children, the eldest being born in 1988 and the youngest, less than a
month when the accused-appellant testified in court in June, 1997.4
It was on November 24, 1995 when Nida Onsiano noticed that Maria Rizalina’s tummy was quite
protruding while the latter was sleeping on the floor. Maria Rizalina at first refused to answer her
mother’s inquisitions but finally revealed that the accused-appellant raped her. The next day, Nida
Onsiano asked her sister, Evelyn Nallos to accompany Maria Rizalina to the doctor to have her
examined. At the Olongapo City General Hospital, Dr. Laila Patricio of the Obstetrics and Gynecology
Department found Maria Rizalina to be 6-7 months pregnant. Maria Rizalina told her that her stepfather
repeatedly raped her. The Medical Report revealed the following:
Medical Certification

In 1990, the couple moved to Subic and established residence at Sitio Daan Naugsol, Manganvaca, November 27, 1995
Subic, Zambales with Maria Rizalina and three born children in tow. Maria Rizalina started to go to
school at Manggahan Elementary School, Subic, Zambales.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Sometime in September, 1993, Maria Rizalina was playing in the yard with her brothers and sisters
when her stepfather called for her to come up to the room. Her mother was out of the house at that
time. Upon entering the room, Maria Rizalina was ordered to undress but she refused. The accused- This is to certify that RIZALINA ONSIANO 14 y/o, of Daangbakal, Daan Naugsol Subic, Zambales was
appellant slapped her face twice on her cheeks and threatened to box her.5 He finally succeeded in examined and treated/confined in this hospital on/from November 25, 1995 x x x with the following
removing her clothes. The accused-appellant kissed Maria Rizalina on the mouth, on her breast, and on findings and/or diagnosis:
her private parts. Thereafter, accused-appellant removed his shorts, held both hands of Maria Rizalina
and went on top of her while she was lying on the wooden bed.
BREAST—Enlarged, areola 3.5 x 3.5 cm, no fissures nor hematoma.

Accused-appellant inserted his penis into the vagina of Maria Rizalina. The latter felt pain in her private
part and shouted “masakit po.” Accused-appellant stayed on top of Maria Rizalina for about ten (10) ABDOMEN—FH 21 cm, FHT 736/min. RLQ
minutes making “downward and upward movement” or “pumping.” Accused-appellant stood up,
took a piece of cloth from the bed (pamunas) and wiped the blood in his sex organ. After which, he
gave the rag to Maria Rizalina and told her to wipe her private part because there was blood on it. He
• Hymen not intact, vagina admits 2 fingers with ease, Cervix closed, uneffaced, floating cephalic.
told her to dress up quickly since Maria Rizalina’s mother would arrive shortly. Maria Rizalina did not
tell her mother what happened to her because she was afraid of the accused-appellant. She was • Pregnancy uterine 6-7 months by size, not in labor.
threatened to be killed once she reports the incident. Maria Rizalina was twelve (12) years old at that
time of this fateful day. (SGD.) LAILA S. PATRICIO, M.D.

Attending Physician7     

On several occasions, whenever Nida Onsiano was out of the house since she was busy selling wares in
the market, accused-appellant raped Maria Rizalina. The victim could no longer remember how many
After Maria Rizalina’s statement was taken at the police station, a formal complaint was filed against
the accused-appellant on November 27, 1995. Considering Maria Rizalina’s minor age, she was referred
to the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office for assistance. Initial interviews revealed that
Maria Rizalina was so confused considering that her mother was pressuring her to withdraw the
complaint against the stepfather. It was then recommended that Maria Rizalina be committed to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development for protective custody and placed under the care of the
Substitute Home for Women in Especially Difficult Circumstances—Saup Lugud Center, San Ignacio
Subdivision, Pandan, Angeles City.8
On February 23, 1996, Maria Rizalina delivered a baby boy at the “Hospital Ning Angeles” in Angeles
City whom she named Richard Onsiano. The name of the father was not indicated.
At the Saup Lugud Center, Maria Rizalina manifested signs of depression and violence to the extent of
killing herself. She was committed to the National Center for Mental Health for treatment and
rehabilitation.
The accused, on the other hand, denied having raped his step-daughter. He testified that his
stepdaughter was always out of the house with her barkadas. In fact, her mother, Nida was always
complaining that she spent so much time looking for her. He testified further that Maria Rizalina was
always absent from school. He only learned about the complaint for rape filed against him when he was
apprehended by the police.
Deolito Optana testified that he met Nida Onsiano in 1985 in a restaurant in Olongapo City. He knew
that Nida had a daughter but he still courted her and promised to take care of both of them and help
support in the education of Maria Rizalina.
Nida Onsiano corroborated the accused-appellant’s testimony. She did not believe that her common-
law husband would rape her daughter because she considered her sexual relationship with him as very
satisfactory. She averred that it was her sister, Evelyn Nallos who insisted on pursuing the case against
Optana because of an old grudge against them. Evelyn Nallos took care of two of the children of Nida
Onsiano and Deolito Optana but who died of pneumonia and drowning during a flood. Since the death
of the children, her relationship with her sister had been estranged. Evelyn Nallos still wanted to take
her other children including Maria Rizalina but she refused.
On March 5, 1998, the RTC rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Deolito Optana guilty beyond reasonable doubt by direct
participation of the crime of rape as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
and for violation of Section 5(b) of Republic Act 7610, judgment is rendered in the following manner:
1.In Criminal Case No. 485-95 for rape, the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessory penalties attached thereto and to indemnify the minor Ma. Rizalina
Onciano the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, and exemplary
damages of P100,000.00.
2.In Criminal Case No. 487-95, for violation of Section 5 (b), R.A. 7610, the said accused is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum with all the accessory
penalties attached thereto and to indemnify Ma. Rizalina Onciano the amount of P50,000.00, plus moral
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00.
3.The accused shall support Ma. Rizalina Onciano’s child Richard Onciano.
4.The accused is acquitted of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. 482-95, 483-95, 484-95, 486-95,
488-95, 489-95, for insufficiency of evidence.
5.The accused shall be entitled in full of his preventive imprisonment if he agreed in writing to abide by
all the disciplinary rules imposed on convicted prisoners, otherwise to only 4/5 thereof.
6.Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.9
Accused-appellant now comes to this Court with the following assignment of errors:
THE APPELLANT’S CONVICTION BY THE TRIAL COURT IS GROUNDED ON FACTS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ARE INCONSISTENT AND IMPROBABLE TO
HAPPEN, AND THE ACTS CHARGED ARE NOT CLEAR, POSITIVE AND CONVINCING, AND
NOT CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND TITE (SIC) NATURAL COURSE OF THINGS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER AND APPRECIATE THE ILL-MOTIVE AND
CONSUMING HATRED OF APPELLANT’S IN-LAWS WHO ORCHESTRATED THE FILING OF THIS
CASE, AND WHO WITH UNCUNNY MEASURES PREVENTED THE DEFENSE THE MUCH Yes, sir.
NEEDED CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE.

 
III

xxx
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER AND APPRECIATE THAT THE ACTUATIONS AND
CONDUCT OF THE COMPLAINT AFTER THE INCIDENTS AND DURING THE TRIAL WHEN
INTERTWINED WITH OTHER FACTS DOES NOT CONFORM TO THE NORM OF CONDUCT OF q
PEOPLE WHO ARE INJURED AND RAVAGED.

What school were you enrolled in 1993?

IV

a
THE COURT A QUO OVERLOOKED, MISUNDERSTOOD, MISAPPRECIATED AND
MISINTERPRETED MATERIAL FACTS OF IMPORTANCE AND SUBSTANCE WHICH IF
CONSIDERED AND GIVEN WEIGHT AND PROBATIVE VALUE WILL TILT THE SCALE OF “LADY
Manggahan Elementary School, sir.
JUSTICE“ IN FAVOR OF ACQUITTAL.10

q
We agree with the trial court’s decision.

School in 1993?
The victim, Maria Rizalina, first took the witness stand on August 7, 1996. She was, however, observed
to be psychologically and emotionally unprepared to testify at that time so the trial court decided to
postpone her testimony to a later date after her complete rehabilitation at the National Center for
Mental Health.11 On January 22, 1997, Maria Rizalina was called back to the witness stand. Now very a
much calm and composed, she gave a recount of her ordeal under her stepfather. She testified as
follows:
Grade IV, sir.

q
q

Now, Ms. Onsiano, did you go to school sometime in September 1993?

And who was supporting your education?

a
a

xxx

My mother, sir.

That’s him, sir.

And aside from your mother, who else, if any, was helping your mother in providing your educational
expenses?
 

a
xxx

Deolito Optana, sir, my stepfather.

q

q
Now, how long have you been living with your mother together with your stepfather Deolito Optana at
Barangay Mangavaca, Subic, Zambales, prior to September 1993?

If Deolito Optana is inside the courtroom, will you be able to point him out to the court?

Since I was in Grade 1, sir.

Yes, sir.

COURT

Now, in September 1993, do you recall if Deolito Optana was still living with your mother in your
house at Mangavaca, Subic, Zambales?
 

a
Point him out.

Yes, sir.
 
q a

Now, do you recall sometime in the afternoon or noontime of September 1993 while you were in your By my stepfather, sir.
house at Manganvaca, Subic, Zambales, if any unusual incident that happened to you?

COURT
 

q
xxx

And who is your stepfather?

a

a
Yes, sir.

Deolito Optana, sir.

PROS. FLORESTA

q
q

Is Deolito Optana married to your mother?

Could you please tell this Honorable Court what is that unusual incident that happened in your house
at Subic sometime in September 1993?
a

a
No, sir.

I was raped, sir.

q

q
So, he is a live-in partner of your mother?

By whom?
a

But you have clothes on your body?

Yes, sir.

Yes, sir.

xxx

PROS. FLORESTA

And do you know what did the accused Deolito Optana do with your clothes?

And how did Deolito Optana raped (sic) you?

He was forcing me to undress or to remove my clothes, sir.

He was forcing me, sir.

And was he able to make you undress?

Do you still recall what dress were you wearing at that time?

No, sir.

No, sir.

And when Deolito Optana failed to force you to undress, what did he do, if any?

q
a

COURT

He was hurting me, sir.

COURT

How many times were you slapped on the face?

How was he hurting you?

Twice, sir.

He was slapping me on my face, and sometimes he would threaten me that he would box me, sir.

And what happened to you when you were slapped on the face?

xxx

My cheeks were painful, sir.

PROS. FLORESTA

xxx

And what did you do when Deolito Optana was hurting you by slapping you on your face?

PROS. FLORESTA

I was scared, sir.

And after you were slapped by the accused, what else happened, if any?

Yes, sir.

He was forcing me to undress and then, he repeatedly kissed me, sir.

Could you please tell us what was he wearing at that time?

What part of your body was kissed by the accused?

Yes, sir, shorts.

My mouth, my breast and my private part, sir.

And what did he do with his shorts?

And after the accused kissed your private part, what did the accused do, if any?

He removed his shorts, sir.

And afterwards, he was forcing to insert his penis into my vagina, sir.

And then after removing his shorts, what did the accused do, if any?

And do you still recall what the accused was wearing at that time?

After removing his shorts and underwear, he held both of my hands and went on top of me, sir.

a
498

What did you feel?

498

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

It was painful, sir.

People vs. Optana

COURT

And after he was able to move on top of you, what else did he do?

Continue.

PROS. FLORESTA

He repeatedly kissed me and then, he was forcing to insert his penis into my vagina, sir.

COURT

And what did you do when (sic) felt pain in your body after the accused had inserted his penis?

Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina?

I shouted, sir.

COURT

Yes, sir.

q
What did you shout?

My brother and sister were there, sir.

I said MASAKIT PO, sir.

And how many brothers do you have?

To whom did you address that?

Two, sir.

To the accused, sir.

Where were they?

You are referring to the accused Deolito Optana?

Downstairs, sir.

Yes, sir.

How many sisters do you have?

Were you alone at that time?

One, sir.

a
q

How long did the accused stayed on top of you?

Where was she at that time?

More or less, ten minutes, sir.

Downstairs, also, sir.

What did you do during that period when he was on top of you?

How about your mother?

He was making a downward and upward movement, sir. He was pumping.

She was not around, sir.

xxx

PROS. FLORESTA

Where was she?

Now, after making those downward and forward movement, what happened?

She left the house at that time, and I do not know where she went, sir.

q
At first, he was trembling, sir.

What else did you found (sic) out in your private part?

And then after that, what did the accused do?

It was painful, sir.

He stood up and he got a PAMUNAS, sir.

COURT

Why was it painful?

Why would he have to take a wipe?

Because of his private part, I sustained a wound in my private part, sir.

It was because there was blood on his sex, sir.

xxx

PROS. FLORESTA

How about in your private part?

Now, after the accused stood up, and got a piece of doth and . . .

Yes, sir, I was having blood in my private part.

COURT

What else did he do?

Was he able to get this piece of cloth?

After wiping his face, and gave the piece of cloth to me in order to wipe my vagina, and he told me to
do it faster, sir.
a

 
Yes, sir.

xxx
q

PROS. FLORESTA
Where?

q
a

And why did the accused in this case told (sic) you to act faster?
On the HIGAAN, sir.

a
q

Because my mother was about to arrive, sir.

What did he do with this?

q
a

So what did you do when the accused told you to wipe your private part fast?
He used it in wiping his face, sir.

a
q
I followed him because I was afraid of him, sir.

And when your mother arrived home, what did you do?

And what else did the accused do after you wiped your private part with the cloth he gave to you?

I did not do anything because I was instructed not to tell my mother. So I did not do anything because I
was afraid, sir.
a

COURT
He instructed me to dress up quickly because my mother would arrive, sir.

q
q

Why were you afriad (sic) of your stepfather?

And did you follow him?

a
a

Because he would kill me if I report the incident, sir.

Yes, sir.

q
q

How did you know?

And did your mother arrive home?

a
a

Because he told me, sir.

Yes, sir.

q
q
When was it when he told you that?

In what room?

After he raped me, sir.

In their room, sir.

xxx

When you said THEY, to whom do you refer?

PROS. FLORESTA

My mother, sir.

Now, after the accused raped you sometime in September 1993, do you know if this incident was
repeated by the accused?
q

COURT
You were lying down?

q
a

Before you go to that. This incident that you have described, where in the house did this happen?
Yes, sir.

a
q

Upstairs, sir.
On what?

q
a

On the bed, sir.

xxx

PROS. FLORESTA

What kind of bed?

After this incident, was there any other incident that happened to you?

Wooden bed, sir.

Yes, sir.

How many rooms were there upstairs?

When was that?

Two, sir.

I could no longer recall when but everytime my mother was out, he would do the same thing to me, sir.

The other room is for whom?

Could you still recall how many weeks or days have passed from the first incident in September 1993
when the last incident happened?
For us, sir, my brothers and sisters.
a

I could no longer count because it happened several times, sir.

Do you know the occupation of your stepfather Deolito Optana in 1993?

And how many times, more (or) less does this incident happened to your?

He was a waiter, sir.

Several times, sir.

xxx

Now, in the month of September 1993, do you recall how many times?

And in what grade were you at the time this first incident happened?

I cannot, sir.

Grade IV, sir.

Now, you said that everytime that your mother is out, out of the house, your stepfather used to rape
you, could you please tell us what is the reason why your mother is always out of your house?
How old were you then?

a
a

Sometimes she would go to the market and sometimes she would sell some things, sir.
12 years old, sir.

No more, sir.

What is your birth day?

Now, do you know the reason why he was no longer residing in the house of your mother in 1995?

13 December 1981, sir.

He was already detained at that time, sir.

How did you know that your birth is 13 December 1981?

xxx

From my mother, sir.

PROS. FLORESTA

xxx

When was the last incident?

PROS. FLORESTA

WITNESS

Now, in 1995, do you still recall if the accused is still living in your house in Manganvaca, Subic,
Zambales with you and your mother?
28 October 1995, sir.

Yes, sir.

PROS. FLORESTA

x x x12

And where did this 28 October 1995 rape happened?

During the last hearing, you testified that after you were first raped by the accused in September, 1993,
the accused repeated the act of having raped you. Now could you please tell this honorable court how
In our house, sir. did the accused raped (sic) you after September, 1993?

q a

In the same room upstairs? He was forcing me, sir.

a q

In our room, sir. And how did the accused forced (sic) you . . . to have raped you?

COURT COURT

q q

You mean in the room where your brothers and sisters were sleeping? He was forcing you to what?

a a
 Is that the room, the same room, where the first incident took place?

He was forcing me to undress, sir.

It happens sometime in our room and sometimes in their room, sir.

Where?

Could you still recall the month after the first incident that happened to you when the accused forced
you to undress inside his room?
In our house, sir.

a
q

The incident started in September 1993, but he would always rape me when my mother was out, sir.
Where in your house? (GINAGALAW NIYA AKO TUWING WALA ANG MAMA KO.)

a q

In the room, sir. So, when you say that since September 1993 up to October 28, 1995, the accused had been
GINAGALAW you, is that correct, Ms. Onsiano?

 
a

xxx
Yes, sir.

PROS. FLORESTA
q

q
What do you mean by GINAGALAW?
a  

He was using me, sir. I report the matter to anyone, sir.

COURT

But do you remember having reported this incident to your mother?

How did he use you?

Yes, sir, on 24 November 1995. That was the time when I told my mother about the incident.

He was forcing his penis into my vagina, sir.

And what did your mother do when you reported the matter to her?

xxx

She summoned my Aunt in order to accompany me to the municipal hall to report the matter, sir.

Why did you not report this or why did you report your stepfather, the accused in this case, to anyone
of what he did to you?
After that, I was investigated by the policeman and then, my stepfather was apprehended, sir.

a
xxx

I was afraid because he threatened me that he would kill me if

q
 a

What happened to you when you were raped by your stepfather?

23 February 1996. Sir.

I was hurt and I got pregnant, sir.

Where?

When did you get pregnant?

At a hospital in Angeles, sir.

I cannot say what month, sir. xxx

q q

But what happened to your pregnancy? And what name did you give your child?

a a

I gave birth to a child, sir. Richard Onsiano, sir.

q COURT

When?  
Who is the father as appearing in the document? For what purpose?

PROS. FLORESTA

In order to accompany me to the Municipal Hall, sir.

Unknown because this is out of wedlock, your Honor.

And were you and your Aunt Evelyn Nallos able to go to the Municipal Hall?

You made the registration of the child with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Angeles City?

Yes, sir.

COURT

The Social Worker, sir.

What is the name of the aunt? Evelyn Nallos?

Now, you mentioned awhile ago that when you reported this incident to your mother sometime in
November 1995, your mother called for your Aunt Evelyn Nallos?
a

a
Yes, your Honor.

Yes, sir.
q

q
And what did you do at the Municipal Hall?
 q

Could you still recall what month in 1995, prior to 28 October 1995 when you were raped by the
accused in this case?
A complaint was filed against my stepfather, sir.

a
q

I could no longer recall the exact date because he has been using me several times, sir.
And to whom did you complain?

q
a

Could you still recall how many times in a month the accused has been using you since September 1993
Police officer, sir. up to 28 October 1995?

q a

And what did the police officer do when you complained to him? Several times, sir. I could no longer count because he would always use me each time my mother was
out, sir.

a
 

Deolito Optana, my stepfather, was apprehended.

xxx

 
q

xxx
Did you have any sexual intercourse with any other men before you gave birth to your child?

PROS. FLORESTA
a
Yes, sir, my stepfather.

xxx

You are referring to the accused?

Do you have any boyfriend?

Yes, sir.

None, sir.

Aside from the accused, was there any other men who had sexual intercourse with you prior to October
1995?
x x x13

a
Mindful of the well-settled rule that findings of facts of the trial court are accorded great respect
considering that the trial judge has observed the demeanor of the witnesses, the Court does not find any
cogent reason to depart from such rule. The trial judge had these observations about the witness:
None, sir, he was the only one.

Rizalina was already 14 years old when she testified in Court. At the time she testified she was succinct
q in her declaration and appeared to the Court to be truthful. She had no reason to fabricate a story
against the accused who supported her in her daily needs and spent for her education until she finished
Grade 6. Ingratitude is not a trait common to a provincial child still innocent of the vicissitudes of life.14
Prior to the birth of your child, it was only your stepfather who had sexual intercourse with you?

A witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains
a consistent is a credible witness.15 Since the trial court found Maria Rizalina’s testimony to be credible
and trustworthy, it was more than sufficient to sustain the accused-appellant’s conviction.16 The fact
that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge with the young victim is corroborated by the findings
of Dr. Laila Patricio, who upon examination on November, 1995 found Maria Rizalina to be 6-7 months
Yes, sir.
pregnant already. Maria Rizalina confided to her that her stepfather raped her.17 This accusation was
repeated when she was investigated by SPO3 Cesar Antolin at the Subic Police Station, Subic,
Zambales,18 and when she was interviewed by Social Welfare Officer II, Ana Ecle of the DSWD, Iba,
  Zambales.19
When the accused-appellant was courting Nida Onsiano, he was very aware that she had a daughter. Q
Before they agreed to live together, he was made to understand that he had to accept and treat Maria
Rizalina as his own daughter too, caring for her and providing for her education.20 Since Maria
Rizalina did not have a father, she regarded the accused-appellant as such. Even at her young age, she By the way, was she able to disclose to you on your initial interview with the patient Rizalina Onciano
recognized the parental authority the accused-appellant had over her and in return, she gave the regarding the sexual abuse committed in her person?
reverence and respect due him as a father. Undeniably, there was moral ascendancy on the part of the
accused-appellant over the victim.21

In a rape committed by a father against the daughter, the former’s moral ascendancy and influence over
the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation. The experience has certainly caused great trauma on
Maria Rizalina that she had to be committed to the National Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong Initially, sir, she had difficulty, she would cry, she would request that we change the topic, however,
City to undergo psychological and medical treatment for severe depression.22 The testimony of Dr. she was consistent in identifying the perpetrator of the crime, sir, or the accused.
Dijamco, a psychiatrist at the National Center for Mental Health is quite revealing:

Q
A

Now, in your honest opinion as a psychiatrist, is it normal for a child not to tell or recall the sexual
After having gathered all the informations we have conceded and collated the data and we have agreed abuse committed on her person?
to come up with an impression as stated in the protocol or major depression, sir, and that it was advised
that the patient be given medication and to undergo regular psycho therapy, sir. 
A

x x x23
An abuse is a trauma in itself. So, for a child not to remember is quite impossible. So, abuse especially if
these abuses have taken quite a number of times or it happened several times, sir.
Q

Q
Now, in your honest opinion, what could have been the cause of your findings that the patient Rizalina
Onsiano suffered from major deppressive (sic) disorder?
But is it normal for a child not to tell the details of the abuse committed in her person?

A
A

After having a thorough study of the patient’s case. We could only conclude that it was the abuser and
the trauma that she underwent which led to her deppression (sic), her major and severe deppression There is a possibility, sir, especially when a threat comes along or for several reasons, sir, but it is
(sic), sir. possible does not disclose immediately that she has been sexually abused by some other people, sir.
Q A

Would you be able to give an example of what other factors that would prevent the child from Basically, prior to the commission of the crime, Rizalina was an up-grown child. Having undergone
disclosing or tell the abuse committed on her person? abuse for quite somet ime, it is not easy for one to fully disclose what she underwent. There are times
when the patient will be able to identify him just about that. Now, in Rizalina’s case, I don’t think it was
normal. Basically, it is a normal part wherein she would not automatically disclosed what happened. It
A would take time prior to full disclosure of such trauma, sir.

Sir, based on my observations and the cases I have handled for one it would be shame and the guilt
since the patient underwent such trauma they feel that they are to be blamed that’s why they don’t tell,
they feel that they have a part in the crime that’s why they don’t tell. For another reason, an important
reason for not disclosing is the threat the perpetrator imposes on the victim. The threat to life, the threat
to property, the threat to steal. Basically, those are the major reasons why a child or adolescent would
not disclose immediately that she has been sexually molested.
Q
Now, later on, after she was discharged from the National Center for Mental Health specifally (sic) on
January 23, 1997, when Rizalina Onsiano was presented again to testify on the abuse committed against
her by the accused, her own stepfather, she was able to narrate the details of what happened to her, is
that also normal?

Q
A

Would you say the influence of the mother for being uncooperative with her in her fighting for her
right, is one of the factor that would prevent the child from disclosing? That proved, sir, that the therapy, the medication she took or that she underwent at the Center helped
her in gradually dealing with the situation as such, sir, whenever she has to testify against her
stepfather. The course she is undergoing right now is the effect of the treatment she has undergone at
A our Center.

There is a possibility, sir, since whenever a child is abused, it is not the child or the victim which is just Accused-appellant denies having raped his stepdaughter alleging that it was quite impossible for him
affected. It is the entire family, the brothers, the sisters, the mother, the father, the entire family. Since to have committed the crime “in broad daylight, in a small house, abundant with open windows and
their child is affected, so, the mother and the other relatives may have stayed in the child not disc losing doors, peopled by six or seven mischievous and open-eyed curious souls keen with every unusual
about the attempts or the abuse, sir. scenarios of members involving kins and idols like their fathers.”25

Q The Court sees no impossibility for the commission of this abominable act on the victim under the
alleged circumstances. Many cases attest to the unfortunate fact that rape can be committed even in
places where people congregate: in parks, along the roadside, within school premises and even inside a
house where there are occupants. Lust is no respecter of time or place.26
Now, in the case of Rizalina Onsiano, while she was presented by this representation, when this
representation was about to ask her of the actual abuse committed on her person, she broke down and
refused to talk. Is it normal, is that a normal behavior of Rizalina Onsiano?
Furthermore, accused-appellant points to his sister-in-law, Evelyn Nallos as the person who allegedly
pressured his step-daughter to file the charges of rape against him considering an old grudge existing
between the two of them. It can be recalled that Evelyn Nallos took care of two of their children who,
unfortunately, died under her care, one died of meningitis and pneumonia and the other by drowning
in a flood. To the defense, the deaths were plainly due to Evelyn’s negligence.27 Since then, their
relationship was estranged.
This contention deserves scant consideration. Ill motive is never an essential element of a crime. It
becomes inconsequential in a case where there are affirmative, nay, categorical declarations towards the
accused-appellant’s accountability for the felony.28 Maria Rizalina’s straightforward and consistent
testimony belies any claim of being pressured by her aunt to concoct a story of defloration against the
stepfather. Upon cross-examination, she was quick to deny that her Tita Evelyn prompted her to report
to the authorities about her physical condition and the person responsible thereof.29
To the accused-appellant, it strains credulity why the victim never said anything about the incidents
until the discovery by the mother on November 24, 1994 when she revealed that it was her stepfather
who was responsible for her pregnancy.
Delay in reporting the crime is understandable. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some
time the assaults on their virtue because of the rapist’s threat on their lives.30 The case at bar is no
exception to this well-founded rule. Maria Rizalina never said anything to her mother of the many
times the accused-appellant had sexually abused her for fear of her life. She.was definitely afraid of her
stepfather who threatened to kill her once she reports the matter to her mother.31
Neither was there any medical’ impossibility to the commission of the crime as accused-appellant
argues:
Granting “en gratia arguendo” that accused-appellant did the act complained of in September 1993, or
the last act on October 28, 1995, it is medically impossible and contrary to the natural laws and religious
belief. And, the medical books and hospital records is in dearth or paucity of four (4) months premature
births.
xxx
x x x the turning point when the pregnancy became apparent and noticeable was a clear span or
intereggnum (sic) of one (1) year and five (5) months from the month and year subject matter of this
review (November 24, 1995) which logically coincides with the months that complainant gallivanted
with the “barkada,” but is off-tangent and is irreconcilable and medically and naturally impossible with
the alleged commission of rape of September 1993.32
This defense is unavailing.
Maria Rizalina gave birth on February 23, 1996. She testified that she was raped several times by her
stepfather. While she could hardly remember the exact dates of these instances, she only remembered
the first time she was raped which was in September, 1993 when she was only 12 years old and was in
Grade IV33 and the last time was on October 28, 1995. Obviously, she could not have conceived in
September, 1993 because as she testified, she was not yet menstruating at that time. She started to have
her menstruation when she was in Grade V34 or in 1994. She denies going home late after school and is
not fond of being out with friends.35 Since she maintained that her stepfather raped her several times,
the child was definitely conceived as a result of the rape between September, 1993 and October 28, 1995.
Given all these facts and circumstances, we rule with moral certainty that the accused-appellant is
indeed guilty of the crimes.
Accused-appellant was charged for violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 and Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code for rape which read as follows:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.—Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:
“x x x
“(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse:
Provided, that when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period”;36
xxx
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed.—Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
“1.By using force or intimidation;
“2.When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
“3.When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned
in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
“The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.”
xxx
Anent the numerous informations filed, the trial court corrected the erroneous filing of these
informations as it explained:
It will be noted, however, that for the same act committed on the same date by the accused on the same
offended party, the accused stands charged with two offenses: for violation of Section 5, paragraph (b)
of Republic Act 7610 and for rape committed through force and intimidation. Thus: (1) in Criminal Case
Nos. 482-95 and 487-95, the accused was charged with rape and violation of Section 5, paragraph (b) of
Republic Act 7610, respectively, committed on the same date, October 1995, when the victim was 13
years old and 9 months; (2) in Criminal Case Nos. 484-95 and 488-95, the Informations charged rape and
violation of the same special law, respectively, committed on the same date, “September 1995, when the
victim was 13 years and 9 months old; (3) in Criminal Case Nos. 483-95 and 489-95, the accused was
charged with rape and violation of the same special law, respectively, committed in October 1995 when
the child was 11 years and 10 months old; and (4) in Criminal Case Nos. 485-95 and 486-95, the accused
was charged with rape and violation of the same special law, respectively, committed in September
1993 when the victim was 11 years and 9 months old.
Charging the accused with two different offenses for the same act committed on the same date against
the said victim is erroneous as it is illegal, except where the law itself so allows. Section 5 (b), Republic
Act 7610, however, does not so allow. The said law in fact provides that if the child is below 12 years
old, the accused must be prosecuted under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Conversely, if the
child is above 12 years old but below 18 years old, then the accused must be prosecuted under Republic
Act 7610 for the so called “child abuse.”37
The trial court correctly convicted the accused for Rape under Article 335 of the RPC in Criminal Case
No. 485-95 for it was clearly proven that the accused had carnal knowledge with the victim through
force and intimidation on that fateful day in September, 1993. This was the first time the accused raped
Maria Rizalina who was able to give a detailed account of this traumatic experience. She was below 12
years old at that time. While Maria Rizalina also testified that she was raped several times after
September, 1993, the prosecution, however, failed to establish the material details as to the time, place,
and manner by which these offenses were committed. There is still a need for proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the offenses alleged in the informations were indeed committed.38 Thus, the trial court
acquitted the accused under Criminal Case Nos. 482-95, 483-95, 484-95, 486-95, 488-95, 489-95 for want
of sufficient evidence.
Aside from the first incident of rape, all what Maria Rizalina could say was that she was molested by
the accused for the last time on October 28, 1995. Whether there was force and intimidation to qualify
this incident as rape was, unfortunately, not proven. Nonetheless, there is no dispute that Maria
Rizalina was sexually abused by the accused on this occasion. Hence, the trial court convicted the
accused under Criminal Case No. 487-95 for violation of Sec. 5(b) of R.A. 7610 or the Child Abuse Law.
In the case of People v. Larin,39 the Court has explained that the elements of the offense penalized
under this provision are as follows:
1.The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2.The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
3.The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b)
under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Under RA 7610, children are “persons
below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental disability or
condition.”
It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also
one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. Hence, the
foregoing provision penalizes not only child prostitution, the essence of which is profit, but also other Notes.—The penetration of accused’s penis into the vagina of the victim was satisfactorily and
forms of sexual abuse of children. This is clear from the deliberations of the Senate. conclusively proven by the pregnancy of the latter. (People vs. Ferrer, 295 SCRA 191 [1998])

From the above disquisition, the accused is certainly guilty for sexual abuse committed on his In rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former’s moral ascendancy and influence
stepdaughter, using his moral ascendancy in intimidating the victim to engage in sexual intercourse over the latter take the place of violence or intimidation. (People vs. Acala, 307 SCRA 330 [1999]) People
with him. vs. Optana, 351 SCRA 485, G.R. No. 133922 February 12, 2001

The amount of damages must, however, be modified. In each of the cases, the trial court awarded the
amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P100,000 for moral damages and another P100,000 as exemplary
damages. In line with recent jurisprudence, the award of P50,000 as civil indemnity is in order
regardless of proof. In addition to civil indemnity, moral damages may, likewise, be awarded without
the need for proving the same in the amount not exceeding P50,000.40 The award of exemplary
damages must be deleted for lack of legal basis.41

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 5, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, Olongapo City
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.000) as civil indemnity, FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as moral damages in Crim. Case No. 485-95 and Crim.

International Corporate Bank vs. Gueco

Case No. 487-95, the award of exemplary damages is deleted in the above criminal cases.

SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

     Puno, J., No part. On official leave.

Judgment affirmed with modification.

VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 21, 2007

643

Malto vs. People
G.R. No. 164733. September 21, 2007.*
MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Sufficiency of Complaint or Information; A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense by the statute,
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the
approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was committed.—In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
Pursuant thereto, the complaint or information against him should be sufficient in form and substance.
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense
was committed.
Same; Same; Same; The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances.—The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it. The acts or omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in
the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the
court to pronounce judgment.
Same; Same; Same; The failure however to designate the offense by statute, or to mention the specific
provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated does not vitiate the
information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged.—The designation
in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to
afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. However, the failure to designate the
offense by statute, or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification
of the law violated does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged. What controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the
offense but the actual facts recited in the information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the
commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged
in the information.
Criminal Law; Republic Act 7610; Elements of Paragraph (a) and (b) of RA 7610.—The elements of
paragraph (a) are: 1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution; 2. the act
is done through, but not limited to, the following means: a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute; b.
inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other
similar means; c. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute; d.
threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute or, e. giving monetary
consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in
prostitution; 3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and, 4. the child,
whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. On the other hand, the elements of paragraph (b) are:
1. the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; 2. the act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse and, 3. the child, whether male or
female, is below 18 years of age.
Same; Same; Under paragraph (a), the child is abused primarily for profit.—Paragraph (a) essentially
punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It contemplates sexual abuse of a child
exploited in prostitution. In other words, under paragraph (a), the child is abused primarily for profit.
Same; Same; Paragraph (b) covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in
which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct.—Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child
exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a
situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation
or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
Same; Same; Petitioner can be held liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 despite a
finding that he did not commit rape.—Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610, not rape. The offense for which he was convicted is punished by a special
law while rape is a felony under the Revised Penal Code. They have different elements. The two are
separate and distinct crimes. Thus, petitioner can be held liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of
RA 7610 despite a finding that he did not commit rape.
Same; Same; Sweetheart Theory; For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child
abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable.—The sweetheart theory applies in
acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies committed against or without the consent of the victim. It
operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It requires proof that the accused and the
victim were lovers and that she consented to the sexual relations. For purposes of sexual intercourse
and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual
intercourse with another person.
Same; Same; Same; Unlike rape, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article
III of RA 7610.—Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with
a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a
malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.
Same; Same; Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law; Notwithstanding that RA 7610 is a special law,
petitioner may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.—The penalty prescribed for
violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the proper
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, the medium of the penalty prescribed
by the law. Notwithstanding that RA 7610 is a special law, petitioner may enjoy the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Since the penalty provided in RA 7610 is taken from the range of penalties
in the Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the first clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. Thus, he is entitled to a maximum term which should be within the range of the proper imposable
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (ranging from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20
years) and a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the law: prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period (ranging
from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months).
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Ruby Ruiz-Bruno for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for respondent.
CORONA, J.:
Whereas, mankind owes to the child the best it has to give. (Final preambular clause of the Declaration
of the Rights of the Child)
This is a petition for review1 of the decision2 dated July 30, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 25925 affirming with modification the decision3 of Branch 109 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 000691 which found petitioner Michael John Z. Malto guilty for
violation of paragraph 3, Section 5(a), Article III of RA 7610,4 as amended.
Petitioner was originally charged in an information which read:
“The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of VIOLATION OF
SECTION 5(b), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED, committed as follows: That on or
about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Michael
John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induce and/or
seduce his student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in
sexual intercourse for several times with him as in fact said accused had carnal knowledge.
Contrary to law.”5
This was subsequently amended as follows:
“The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of VIOLATION OF
SECTION 5(a), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED, committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Michael John Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
advantage and exert influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce his
student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual
intercourse and lascivious conduct for several times with him as in fact said accused has carnal
knowledge.
Contrary to law.”6

Petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned; hence, the trial court entered for him a plea of “not
guilty.” After the mandatory pre-trial, trial on the merits proceeded.
The prosecution established the following:
At the time of the incident, private complainant AAA was 17 years old.7 She was a college student at
the Assumption College in San Lorenzo Village, Makati City. Petitioner, then 28, was her professor in
her Philosophy II class in the first semester of the school year 1997 to 1998.
On July 18, 1997, AAA was having lunch with her friends when petitioner joined their group. He told
them to address him simply as “Mike.” He handed them his organizer and asked them to list down
their names and contact numbers.
On October 3, 1997, while AAA and her friends were discussing the movie Kama Sutra, petitioner
butted in and bragged that it was nothing compared to his collection of xxxrated films. To the shock of
AAA’s group, he lectured on and demonstrated sexual acts he had already experienced. He then
invited the group to view his collection.
On October 10, 1997, petitioner reiterated his invitation to AAA and her friends to watch his collection
of pornographic films. Afraid of offending petitioner, AAA and two of her friends went with him. They
rode in his car and he brought them to the Anito Lodge on Harrison St. in Pasay City. They checked in
at a “calesa room.” Petitioner was disappointed when he found out there was neither a video cassette
player (on which he could play his video tapes) nor an x-rated show on the closed-circuit television. He
suggested that they just cuddle up together. AAA and her friends ignored him but he pulled each of
them towards him to lie with him in bed. They resisted until he relented.
AAA and her friends regretted having accepted petitioner’s invitation. For fear of embarrassment in
case their classmates got wind of what happened, they agreed to keep things a secret. Meanwhile,
petitioner apologized for his actuations.
Thereafter, petitioner started to show AAA amorous attention. He called her on the phone and paged8
her romantic messages at least thrice a day. When semestral break came, his calls and messages became
more frequent. Their conversation always started innocently but he had a way of veering the subject to
sex. Young, naive and coming from a broken family, AAA was soon overwhelmed by petitioner’s
persistence and slowly got attracted to him. He was the first person to court her. Soon, they had a
“mutual understanding” and became sweethearts.
When AAA secured her class card in Philosophy II at the start of the second semester, petitioner told
her that he gave her a final grade of “3.” She protested, stating that her midterm grade was “1.2.” He
gave her a grade of “1.5” when she promised not to disclose his intimate messages to her to anyone. He
also cautioned her not to tell anyone about their affair as it could jeopardize his job.
On November 19, 1997, at around 11:00 a.m., AAA agreed to have lunch with petitioner outside the
premises of the college. Since she was not feeling well at that time, he asked her to lie down in the
backseat of his car. She was surprised when he brought her to Queensland Lodge9 on Harrison St. in
Pasay City. Once inside the motel room, he kissed her at the back and neck, touched her breasts and
placed his hand inside her blouse. She resisted his advances but he was too strong for her. He stopped
only when she got angry at him.
On November 26, 1997, petitioner asked AAA to come with him so that they could talk in private. He
again brought her to Queensland Lodge. As soon as they were inside the room, he took off his shirt, lay
down in bed and told her, “halika na, dito na tayo mag-usap.” She refused but he dragged her towards
the bed, kissed her lips, neck and breasts and unsnapped her brassiere. She struggled to stop him but he
overpowered her. He went on top of her, lowered her pants and touched her private part. He tried to
penetrate her but she pushed him away forcefully and she sat up in bed. He hugged her tightly saying,
“Sige na, AAA, pumayag ka na, I won’t hurt you.” She refused and said, “Mike, ayoko.” He angrily
stood up saying, “Fine, hindi na tayo mag-uusap. Don’t come to the faculty room anymore. You know I
need this and if you will not give in or give it to me, let us end this.” She replied, “Mike, hindi pa ako
ready and it was you who said it will be after my debut” on December 3, 1997. He insisted that there
was no difference between having sex then and after her debut. He told her, “kung hindi ko makukuha
ngayon, tapusin na natin ngayon.” Pressured and afraid of his threat to end their relationship, she
hesitantly replied “Fine.” On hearing this, he quickly undressed while commenting “ibibigay mo rin
pala, pinahirapan mo pa ako” and laughed. They had sexual intercourse.
In July 1999, AAA ended her relationship with petitioner. She learned that he was either intimately
involved with or was sexually harassing his students in Assumption College and in other colleges
where he taught. In particular, he was dismissed from the De La Salle University-Aguinaldo for having
sexual relations with a student and sexually harassing three other students. His employment was also
terminated by Assumption College for sexually harassing two of his students. It was then that AAA
realized that she was actually abused by petitioner. Depressed and distressed, she confided all that
happened between her and petitioner to her mother, BBB.
On learning what her daughter underwent in the hands of petitioner, BBB filed an administrative
complaint in Assumption College against him. She also lodged a complaint in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasay City which led to the filing of Criminal Case No. 00-0691.
In his defense, petitioner proffered denial and alibi. He claimed that the alleged incidents on October 3,
1997 and October 10, 1997 did not happen. He spent October 3, 1997 with his colleagues Joseph Hipolito
and AJ Lagaso while he was busy checking papers and computing grades on October 10, 1997. The last
time he saw AAA during the first semester was when she submitted her final paper on October 18,
1997.
On November 19, 1997, between 10:30 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., he sorted out conflicts of class schedules for
the second semester at the Assumption College. On November 26, 1997, he was at St. Scholastica’s
College (where he was also teaching) preparing a faculty concert slated on December 12, 1997. At lunch
time, he attended the birthday treat of a colleague, Evelyn Bancoro.
On November 29, 1997, he attended AAA’s 18th birthday party. That was the last time he saw her.
According to petitioner, AAA became his sweetheart when she was already 19 years old and after he
was dismissed from Assumption College. On December 27 and 28, 1998, they spent time together,
shared their worries, problems and dreams and kissed each other. On January 3, 1999, he brought her to
Queensland Lodge where they had sexual intercourse for the first time. It was repeated for at least 20
times from January 1999 until they broke up in July 1999, some of which were done at either his or her
house when no one was around.
The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction. On
March 7, 2001, it rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty.10 The dispositive portion read:
“In view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Michael John Malto y Zarsadias guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Article III, Section 5(a)[,] paragraph 3 of RA 7610[,] as amended and
hereby sentences him to reclusion temporal in its medium period or an imprisonment of seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay civil indemnity in the amount of
Php 75,000.00 and moral and exemplary damages of Php 50,000.00 to minor complainant with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.”11
Petitioner questioned the trial court’s decision in the CA. In a decision dated July 30, 2004,12 the
appellate court affirmed his conviction even if it found that his acts were not covered by paragraph (a)
but by paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. It further observed that the trial court failed to
fix the minimum term of indeterminate sentence imposed on him. It also ruled that the trial court erred
in awarding P75,000 civil indemnity in favor of AAA as it was proper only in a conviction for rape
committed under the circumstances under which the death penalty was authorized by law.13 Hence,
the CA modified the decision of the trial court as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of conviction is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that (1)
appellant MICHAEL JOHN MALTO y ZARSADIAS is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months
and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal as maximum; and (2) the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is
DELETED.”14
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in sustaining his conviction although it found that he did not rape
AAA. For him, he should have been acquitted since there was no rape. He also claims that he and AAA
were sweethearts and their sexual intercourse was consensual.
Petitioner is wrong.
THE OFFENSE STATED IN THE INFORMATION WAS WRONGLY DESIGNATED
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.15 Pursuant thereto, the complaint or information against him should be
sufficient in form and substance. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense and the place where the offense was committed.16
The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts
or omissions constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.17 If
there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it.18 The acts or omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.19
The designation of the offense in the information against petitioner was changed from “violation of
Section 5(b), Article III” of RA 7610 to “violation of Section 5(a), Article III” thereof. Paragraphs (a) and
(b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provide:
“Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.—Children, whether male or female, who, for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not
limited to, the following:
1.Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
2.Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or
other similar means;
3.Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
4.Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
5.Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such
child in prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be: Provided, that the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and
x x x      x x x      x x x (emphasis supplied)
The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1.the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;
2.the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:
a.acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
b.inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or
other similar means;
c.taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
d.threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute or
e.giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such
child in prostitution;
3.the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and
4.the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
On the other hand, the elements of paragraph (b) are:
1.the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2.the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse and
3.the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It
contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under paragraph (a), the
child is abused primarily for profit.
On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a
child exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a
situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation
or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.20
The information against petitioner did not allege anything pertaining to or connected with child
prostitution. It did not aver that AAA was abused for profit. What it charged was that petitioner had
carnal knowledge or committed sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct with AAA; AAA was
induced and/or seduced by petitioner who was her professor to indulge in sexual intercourse and
lascivious conduct and AAA was a 17-year old minor. These allegations support a charge for violation
of paragraph (b), not paragraph (a), of Section 5, Article III, RA 7610.
THE REAL NATURE OF THE OFFENSE IS DETERMINED BY FACTS ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION,NOT BY THE DESIGNATION
The designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the
accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. However, the failure to
designate the offense by statute,21 or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act,22 or an
erroneous specification of the law violated23 does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly
recite the facts constituting the crime charged.24 What controls is not the title of the information or the
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information.25 In other words, it is the
recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the
crime being charged in the information.26
The facts stated in the amended information against petitioner correctly made out a charge for violation
of Section 5(b), Article III, RA 7610. Thus, even if the trial and appellate courts followed the wrong
designation of the offense, petitioner could be convicted of the offense on the basis of the facts recited in
the information and duly proven during trial.
PETITIONER VIOLATED SECTION 5(B), ARTICLE III OF RA 7610, AS AMENDED
The first element of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or acts committed by the
accused. The second element refers to the state or condition of the offended party. The third element
corresponds to the minority or age of the offended party.
The first element was present in this case. Petitioner committed lascivious conduct against and had
sexual intercourse with AAA in the following instances: (1) on November 19, 1997, when he kissed her
at the back and neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand inside her blouse to gratify his lust; (2) on
November 26, 1997, when, with lewd designs, he dragged her towards the bed of the motel room and
forcibly kissed her on the lips, neck and breasts and (3) when he exerted moral influence on her and
pressured her until she surrendered herself to him on November 26, 1997. His acts were covered by the
definitions of sexual abuse and lascivious conduct under Section 2(g) and (h) of the Rules and
Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases promulgated to implement the
provisions of RA 7610, particularly on child abuse:
(g) “Sexual abuse” includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a
child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with children;
(h) “Lascivious conduct” means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or public area of a person. (emphasis supplied)
The second element was likewise present here. The following pronouncement in People v. Larin 27 is
significant:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b)
under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. (emphasis supplied)
On November 19, 1997, due to the influence of petitioner, AAA indulged in lascivious acts with or
allowed him to commit lascivious acts on her. This was repeated on November 26, 1997 on which date
AAA also indulged in sexual intercourse with petitioner as a result of the latter’s influence and moral
ascendancy. Thus, she was deemed to be a “child subjected to other sexual abuse” as the concept is
defined in the opening paragraph of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 and in Larin.
The third element of the offense was also satisfied. Section 3 (a), Article I of RA 7610 provides:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.—
(a) “Children” refers [to] persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully
take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition; (emphasis supplied)
On November 19, 2007 and November 26, 2007, AAA was a child as she was below 18 years of age. She
was therefore within the protective mantle of the law.
Since all three elements of the crime were present, the conviction of petitioner was proper.
VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(B), ARTICLE III OF RA 7610 AND RAPE ARE SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT CRIMES
Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, not rape. The
offense for which he was convicted is punished by a special law while rape is a felony under the
Revised Penal Code.28 They have different elements.29 The two are separate and distinct crimes. Thus,
petitioner can be held liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 despite a finding that he
did not commit rape.
CONSENT OF THE CHILD IS IMMATERIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES INVOLVING VIOLATION OF
SECTION 5, ARTICLE III OF RA 7610
Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches and consented to have sexual intercourse
with him. They engaged in these acts out of mutual love and affection. But may the “sweetheart theory”
be invoked in cases of child prostitution and other sexual abuse prosecuted under Section 5, Article III
of RA 7610? No.
The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies committed against or without
the consent of the victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It requires proof
that the accused and the victim were lovers and that she consented to the sexual relations.30
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the
sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse
cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish
[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA
7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is
exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum,
an evil that is proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws.31 This is on the rationale that she can
easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or
import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm
to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully.32 Those of
tender years deserve its protection.33
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more
damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful
consequences34 of her attempts at adult sexual behavior.35 For this reason, a child should not be
deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate
physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation
and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly
tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is presumed
by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.36
This must be so if we are to be true to the constitutionally enshrined State policy to promote the
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of the youth.37 This is consistent with the
declared policy of the State
“[T]o provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development; provide sanctions for their
commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in
situations of child abuse, exploitation, and discrimination.”38 (emphasis supplied)
as well as to
“intervene on behalf of the child when the parents, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody
of the child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation, and discrimination or when
such acts against the child are committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care
and custody of the same.”39 (emphasis supplied)
This is also in harmony with the foremost consideration of the child’s best interests in all actions
concerning him or her.
“The best interest of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning them,
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the principles of First Call for Children as enunciated
in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote
the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life.”40 (emphasis
supplied)
PETITIONER MAY ENJOY THE BENEFITS OF THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
The penalty prescribed for violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion
temporal in its
41 People v. Delantar, supra note 36.

_______________
42 People v. Bon, G.R. No. 149199, 28 January 2003, 396 SCRA 506.

tance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.”(Section 3, Article XV) 43 Cadua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123123, 19 August 1999, 312 SCRA 703 citing People v. Simon,
234 SCRA 555 (1994). Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides:

38 Section 2, Article I, RA 7610.

SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
39 Id. imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
40 Id. which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same. (emphasis supplied) Simon ruled:

665
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an offense under the
Revised Penal Code, states that ‘if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 21, 2007
by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.’ We
hold that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an

665

666

Malto vs. People

666

medium period to reclusion perpetua. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
proper imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, the medium of the penalty
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
prescribed by the law.41 Notwithstanding that RA 7610 is a special law, petitioner may enjoy the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.42 Since the penalty provided in RA 7610 is taken from the
range of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the first clause of Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.43 Thus, he is Malto vs. People

_______________ entitled to a maximum term which should be within the range of the proper imposable penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period (ranging from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years) and
a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the law:
prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period (ranging from 8 years
and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months).      Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.

THE AWARD OF DAMAGES SHOULD BE MODIFIED Appeal denied.

The trial court awarded AAA P75,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral and exemplary damages. The
CA deleted the award for civil indemnity. It correctly reasoned that the award was proper only in a Note.—Consistent with the accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
conviction for rape committed under the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by against him, this circumstance must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information
law. Consistent, however, with the objective of RA 7610 to afford children special protection against and proven during the trial. (People vs. Ilao, 418 SCRA 391 [2003])
abuse, exploitation and discrimination and with the principle that every person who contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same,44 civil
indemnity to the child is proper in a case involving violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
Every person criminally liable is civilly liable.45 The rule is that, in crimes and quasi-delicts, the
defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of.46 Thus, P50,000 civil indemnity ex delicto shall be awarded in cases of
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.47

Moreover, the CA erred in affirming the grant of P50,000 as “moral and exemplary damages.” The rule
is that, in every case, trial courts must specify the award of each item of damages and make a finding
thereon in the body of the decision.48 Thus, moral damages and exemplary damages should be
separate items of award.

AAA testified that she was “emotionally devastated” and “lost touch of her inner self” as a result of
what petitioner did to her. Because of the mental anxiety and wounded feelings caused by petitioner to
her, she had several sessions with the dean for student affairs49 and the guidance counselor of
Assumption College as well as with a psychiatrist. This was corroborated by her mother and the dean
of student affairs of Assumption College. Thus, she is entitled to moral damages of P50,000. However,
in the absence of an aggravating circumstance, the grant of exemplary damages is unwarranted.50

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioner Michael John Z. Malto is hereby found guilty of
violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended, for which he is sentenced to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is further
ordered to pay AAA P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 for moral damages.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.