PUBLIC OFFICERS

PUBLIC OFFICE AND OFFICERS

Public Office

Definition

A public office is the right, authority and duty created and conferred by law,
by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of
the appointing power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit
of the public. (Mechem)

Purpose and Nature

A public office is created to effect the end for which government has been
instituted which is the common good; not profit, honor, or private interest of any
person, family or class of persons (63 A Am Jur 2d 667)

Nature: (1) A public office is a public trust. (Art. XI, Sec. 1, 1987 Consti)
(2) It is a responsibility and not a right. (Morfe v. Mutuc)

Elements

(1) Must be created either by (a) the Constitution, (b) the Legislature, or (c)
a municipality or other body through authority conferred by the
Legislature;

(2) Must possess a delegation of a portion of the sovereign power of

government, to be exercised for the benefit of the public;

(3) The powers conferred and the duties discharged must be defined,
directly or impliedly by the Legislature or through legislative authority;

(4) The duties must be performed independently and without control of a

superior power other than the law;

Exception: If the duties are those of an inferior or subordinate office,

created or authorized by the Legislature and by it placed under the
general control of a superior office or body;

(5) Must have some permanency and continuity

Note: This is not to be applied literally. The Board of Canvassers is

a public office, yet its duties are only for a limited period of time.

(cf. Barney v. Hawkins)

Public Officer v Public Employment

Public employment is broader than public office. All public office is

public employment, but not all public employment is a public office.

Generally, a position is a public office when it is created by law, with

duties cast upon the incumbent which involve the exercise of some portion
of the sovereign power, and in the performance of which the public is
 concerned. Public employment is a position which lacks one or more of the
foregoing elements.

Public Office v Public Contract

Public Office Public Contract

Creation Incident of sovereignty Originates from will

of contracting parties

Object Carrying out of Obligations imposed

sovereign as well as only upon the
governmental persons who entered
functions affecting into the contract
even persons not
bound by the contract

Subject Tenure, duration, Limited duration

Matter continuity

Scope Duties that are Duties are very

generally continuing specific to the
and permanent contract

Where The law Contract

duties are
defined

No vested right to public office

GENERAL RULE: A public office, being a mere privilege given by the

state, does not vest any rights in the holder of the
office. This rule applies when the law is clear.

EXCEPTION: When the law is vague, the person’s holding of

the office is protected and he should not be deprived of
his office.

Segovia v. Noel

It is a fundamental principle that a public office cannot be regarded

as the property of the incumbent and that a public office is not a public
contract. Nonetheless, Act. No. 3107 should be given a prospective effect
in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary. Although there is a
vested right to an office, which may not be disturbed by legislation, yet the
incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office. If that right is to be taken
away by statute, the terms should be clear.

Agcaoili v. Suguitan

The Supreme Court held that Agcaoili had not ceased to be a justice
of the peace by operation of Act No. 3107. The Segovia ruling was
reiterated, i.e. Act No. 3107 should be given prospective effect only, as
there was no express statement making the law applicable retroactively.
 Public Office not property

A public office is not the property of the public officer within the
provision of the Constitution against deprivation of property without due
process of law or within an agreement in a treaty not to impair the property
or rights of private individuals.

Exceptions:

(1) In quo warranto proceedings relating to the question

as to which of 2 persons is entitled to a public office

(2) In an action for recovery of compensation accruing by

virtue of
the public office

Cornejo v. Gabriel

Due process is violated only if an office is considered

property. However, a public office is not property within the constitutional
guaranties of due process. It is a public trust or agency. As public officers
are mere agents and not rulers of the people, no man has a proprietary or
contractual right to an office. Every officer accepts office pursuant to law
and holds office as a trust for the people whom he represents.

Abeja v. Tanada

Public office being personal, the death of a public officer terminates

his right to occupy the contested office and extinguishes his counterclaim
for damages. His widow and/or heirs cannot be substituted in the
counterclaim suit.

Modes of Creation of Public Office

(1) by the Constitution

(2) by statute / law
(3) by a tribunal or body to which the power to create the office has been
delegated

Scope and Extent of Power of legislature

GENERAL RULE: The creation of a public office is primarily a

legislative function.

Exceptions: (1) where the offices are created by the

Constitution;
(2) where the Legislature delegates such
power.

Delegation of power to create public office

Q: What is the effect where an office is created pursuant to illegally

delegated powers?
 A: The office would have no existence.

U.S.T. v. Board of Tax Appeals

The authority given to the President to "reorganize within one year

the different executive departments, bureaus and other instrumentalities of
the Government" in order to promote efficiency in the public service is
limited in scope and cannot be extended to other matters not embraced
therein. Therefore, an executive order depriving the Courts of First Instance
of jurisdiction over cases involving recovery of taxes illegally collected is null
and void, as Congress alone has the "power to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts."

Methods of Organizing offices

(1) Single-head: one head assisted by subordinates. Swifter decision and

actions but may sometimes be hastily made.

(2) Board System: collegial body in formulating polices and implementing

programs. Mature studies and deliberations but may be slow in
responding to issues and problems.

Modification and Abolition

GENERAL RULE: The power to create an office includes the power to

modify or abolish it. (i.e., this is generally a legislative
function)

EXCEPTIONS:

(1) Where the Constitution prohibits such modification /

abolition;
(2) Where the Constitution gives the people the power to
modify or abolish the office;

Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice

The legislative power to create a court carries with it the power to

abolish it. When the court is abolished, any unexpired term is abolished
also.

Zandueta v. De la Costa

RULE: When a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to

an office newly created by law -- which new office is incompatible
with the former -- he will be considered to have abandoned his former
office.

Exception: When the non-acceptance of the new appointment would

affect public interest, and the public official is thereby constrained to
accept.

Estoppel to deny existence of office

Q: When is a public officer estopped from denying that he has occupied a

public office?
 A: When he has acted as a public officer, esp. where he has
received
public monies by virtue of his office.

Public Officer
Volunteer Service under RA 6713

Definition

A public officer is one who performs public functions / duties of government

by virtue of direct provision of law, popular election, or appointment by
competent authority. His duties involve the exercise of discretion in the
performance of the functions of the government, and are not of a merely clerical
or manual nature. (See Sec. 2 (14), E.O. 292)

Note: For the purpose of applying the provisions of the Revised

Penal
Code, employees, agents, or subordinate officials, of any
rank or class, who perform public duties in the government or
in any of its branches shall be deemed as public officers.

Illustrations:

 In the case of Maniego v. People, a laborer who was

in charge of issuing summons and subpoenas for traffic
violations in a judge's sala was convicted for bribery under
RPC 203. The court held that even temporary
performance of public functions is sufficient to constitute a
person as a public official.

 In the case of People v. Paloma, a sorter and filer of

money orders in the Auditor's Office of the Bureau of Posts
was convicted for infidelity in the custody of
documents. The court pointed out that the sorting and
filing of money orders in the Bureau of Posts is obviously
a public function or duty.

Who are not considered public officers?

 Special policemen salaried by a private entity and patrolling only the

premises of such private entity (Manila Terminal Co. v. CIR);
 Concession forest guards (Martha Lumber Mill v. Lagradante);

 Company cashier of a private corporation owned by the government

(Tanchoco v. GSIS)

May a person be compelled to accept a public office?

GENERAL RULE: NO.

EXCEPTIONS:

(1) When citizens are required, under conditions provided by

law, to render personal military or civil service (Sec. 4, Art.
II, 1987 Const.);
 (2) When a person who, having been elected by popular
election to a public office, refuses without legal motive to be
sworn in or to discharge the duties of said office (Art. 234,
RPC; Note: the penalty shall be either arresto mayor, or a
fine not exceeding P 1,000.00, or both)

No presumption of power

Villegas v. Subido

Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises
power, not rights. The government itself is merely an agency through which
the will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are
likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its
functions. As such, there is no presumption that they are empowered to
act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or
implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power.

Classification of Public Offices and Public Officers

Creation

(1) Constitutional
(2) Statutory

Public Body Served

(1) National
(2) Local

Department of government to which their functions pertain

(1) Legislative
(2) Executive
(3) Judicial

Nature of functions

(1) Civil
(2) Military
Exercise of Judgment or discretion

(1) Quasi-judicial
(2) Ministerial

Legality of Title to office

(1) De Jure
(2) De Facto

Compensation

(1) Lucrative
(2) Honorary

DE FACTO OFFICERS
 De Facto Doctrine

Q: What is the de facto doctrine?

A: It is the principle which holds that a person, who, by the proper authority,
is admitted and sworn into office is deemed to be rightfully in such office
until:

(a) by judicial declaration in a proper proceeding he is ousted

therefrom; or
(b) his admission thereto is declared void.

Q: What is the purpose for the doctrine?

A: It is to ensure the orderly functioning of government. The public cannot

afford to check the validity of the officer's title each time they transact with
him.

De Facto Officer defined

Q: When is a person a de facto officer?

A: Where the duties of the office are exercised under any of the following
circumstances:

(1) Without a known appointment or election, but under such

circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated
to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action,
supposing him to the be the officer he assumed to be; or

(2) Under color of a known and valid appointment or election, but

where the officer has failed to conform to some precedent
requirement or condition (e.g., taking an oath or giving a bond);

(3) Under color of a known election or appointment, void because:

(a) the officer was not eligible;

(b) there was a want of power in the electing or appointing
body;
(c) there was a defect or irregularity in its exercise;

such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to the

public.

(4) Under color of an election or an appointment by or pursuant to

a public, unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be
such.

Note: Here, what is unconstitutional is not the act creating the

office, but the act by which the officer is appointed to an office
legally existing. (Norton v. County of Shelby)

Officer De Jure v. Officer De Facto

De Jure De Facto

Requisites (1) De jure office;

 (1) Existence of a de
jure office;
(2) Color of right or
(2) must possess the general
legal qualifications acquiescence by
for the office in the public;
question;
(3) Actual physical
(3) must be lawfully possession of the
chosen to such office in good faith
office;

(4) must have

qualified himself to
perform the duties
of such office
according to the
mode prescribed by
law.

Basis of Right: he has the Reputation: Has the

Authority lawful right / title to the possession and
office performs the duties
under color of right,
without being
technically qualified in
all points of law to act

How ousted Cannot be ousted. Only by a direct

proceeding (quo
warranto); not
collaterally

Validity of Valid, subject to Valid as to the public

official acts exceptions (e.g., they until such time as his
were done beyond the title to the office is
scope of his authority, adjudged insufficient.
etc.)

Rule on Entitled to Entitled to receive

Compensation compensation as
a compensation only
matter of right; during the time when
no de jure officer is
The principle of "no declared;
work, no pay" is not
applicable to him. He is paid only for
actual services
rendered by him.

Officer De Facto v. Intruder

De Facto Intruder

Nature Officer under any of the One who takes

4 circumstances possession of an office
 discussed under Part II and undertakes to act
(above). officially without any
authority, either actual
or apparent

Basis of Color of right or title to None. He has neither

authority office lawful title nor color of
right or title to office.

Validity of Valid as to the public Absolutely void; they

"official" acts until such time as his can be impeached at
title to the office is any time in any
adjudged insufficient proceeding (unless and
until he continues to act
for so long a time as to
afford a presumption of
his right to act)

Rule on Entitled to receive Not entitled to

compensation compensation only compensation at all.
during the time when
no de jure officer is
declared;

He is paid only for

actual services
rendered by him.

Q: Can an intruder / usurper ripen into a de facto officer?

A: Yes. With the passage of time, a presumption may be created in the

minds of the public that the intruder has a right to act as a public officer.

Q: Is good faith a factor in the ripening of intruder status into de facto

status?

A: Yes. HOWEVER, it must be noted that the good faith must be on the
part of
the public; not on the part of the intruder.

Elements of a De Facto Officership

(1) De jure office

(2) Color of right or general acquiescence by the public;
(3) Actual physical possession of the office in good faith
Note: This is not absolutely true. An intruder / usurper may ripen
into a de facto officer.

Examples of De Facto Officers

 A judge who continued to exercise his duties after his appointment was
disapproved by the CA according to a newspaper report, but before receiving
the official notification regarding the rejection of his appointment (Regala v.
Judge of CFI);
 A lawyer instructed by the Acting Provincial Governor to file an information
for homicide, where the latter had no authority to designate him as assistant
fiscal, and where the DOJ had not authorized him to act as such (People v.
Penesa);

 A third-ranking councilor who is designated to act as mayor by an officer

other than the proper appointing authority prescribed by law, and lacking the
consent of the Provincial Board (Codilla v. Martinez)

Examples of those not considered as De Facto Officers

 A judge who has accepted an appointment as finance secretary and

yet renders a decision after having accepted such appointment (Luna v.
Rodriguez);

 A judge whose position has already been abolished by law, and yet
promulgates a decision in a criminal case after the abolition and over the
objection of the fiscal (People v. So)

Legal Effect of Acts of De Facto Officers

As regards the officers themselves

GENERAL RULE: A party suing or defending in his own right as a

public officer must show that he is an officer de jure. It
is not sufficient that he be merely a de facto officer.

As regards the public and third persons

GENERAL RULE: The acts of a de facto officer are valid as to third

persons and the public until his title to office is
adjudged insufficient.
Official Acts of De Facto Officers not subject to collateral attack

RULE: The title of a de facto officer and the validity of his

acts cannot be collaterally questioned in proceedings to which he
is not a party, or which were not instituted to determine the very
question.

REMEDY: Quo warranto proceedings

Who may file:

(1) The person who claims to be entitled to the office;

(2) The Republic of the Philippines, represented by

(a) the Solicitor-General; or

(b) a public prosecutor

Nueno v. Angeles

In this case, there were four (4) petitioners seeking to oust six (6) Board
Members. The Court held that this could not be done unless all 4 of them
were entitled to the offices of the 6.

Liabilities of De Facto Officers

  The liability of a de facto officer is generally held to be the same
degree of accountability for official acts as that of a de jure officer.

 The de facto officer may be liable for all penalties imposed by law
for any of the following acts:

(a) usurping or unlawfully holding office;

(b) exercising the functions of public office without lawful right;
(c) not being qualified for the public office as required by law.

 The de facto officer cannot excuse his responsibility for crimes

committed in his official capacity by asserting his de facto status.

ELIGIBILITY AND QUALIFICATIONS

Definition

 Eligibility, which is the term usually used in reference to the Civil Service Law,
refers
to the endowment / requirement / accomplishment that fits one for a public office.

 Qualification generally refers to the endowment / act which a person must do

before
he can occupy a public office.

Power to Prescribe Qualifications

GENERAL RULE: Congress is empowered to prescribe the

qualifications for holding public office, subject to the
following restrictions:
 Congress cannot exceed its constitutional powers;

 Congress cannot impose conditions of eligibility inconsistent with

constitutional provisions;

 The qualification must be germane to the position ("reasonable

relation" rule);

 Congress cannot prescribe qualifications so detailed as to

practically amount to making an appointment. (Legislative
appointments are unconstitutional and therefore void for being a
usurpation of executive power.);

 Where the Constitution establishes specific eligibility

requirements for a particular constitutional office, the constitutional
criteria are exclusive, and Congress cannot add to them except if the
Constitution expressly or impliedly gives the power to set
qualifications.

Q: What legislative enactments are tantamount to legislative appointments?

A:
 Extensions of the terms of office of the incumbents;

 The People's Court Act, which provided that the President could
designate Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance or
Cadastral Judges to sit as substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in
 treason cases without them necessarily having to possess the required
constitutional qualifications of a regular Supreme Court Justice. (Vargas
v. Rilloraza);

 A proviso which limits the choices of the appointing authority to only

one eligible, e.g. the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City (Flores v.
Drilon);

 A legislative enactment abolishing a particular office and providing

for the automatic transfer of the incumbent officer to a new office
created (contemplated in Manalang v. Quitoriano);

 A provision that impliedly prescribes inclusion in a list submitted by

the Executive Council of the Phil. Medical Association as one of the
qualifications for appointment; and which confines the selection of the
members of the Board of Medical Examiners to the 12 persons included
in the list (Cuyegkeng v. Cruz) ;

Manalang v. Quitoriano

Congress cannot either appoint a public officer or impose upon the President
the duty to appoint any particular person to an office. The appointing power is the
exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may be imposed
by Congress, except those resulting from:

(1) the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission on

Appointments; and

(2) the exercise of the limited legislative power to prescribe the

qualifications to a given appointive office.

Cuyegkeng v. Cruz

The power of appointment vested in the President by the Constitution connotes

necessarily a reasonable measure of freedom, latitude, or discretion in the
exercise of the power to choose appointees.

Flores v. Drilon

Where only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded
from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power
of appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes
against the very nature itself of appointment.

Time of Possession of Qualifications

Q: When must the qualifications be possessed?

A: Where the time is specified by

the Constitution or law: At the time specified

Where the Constitution or law is silent:

There are 2 views:

 (1) qualification must be at the time of commencement of term
or induction into office;

(2) qualification / eligibility must exist at the time of the election

or appointment

* Eligibility is a continuing nature, and must exist throughout the holding of

the public office. Once the qualifications are lost, then the public officer
forfeits the office.

Castaneda v. Yap

Knowledge of ineligibility of a candidate and failure to question such

ineligibility before or during the election is not a bar to questioning such
eligibility after such ineligible candidate has won and been proclaimed. Estoppel
will not apply in such a case.

Frivaldo v. COMELEC

The citizenship requirement must be met only on election day. While the
Local Government Code requires one year residency immediately preceding
election day and the prescribed age on election day, no date is specified for
citizenship. The purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure leaders owing
allegiance to no other country. Such purpose is not thwarted, but instead achieved
by construing the requirement to apply at time of proclamation and at the start of
the term.

Qualifications usually prescribed

a. President (Sec. 2, Art. VI, Constitution)

Vice President (Sec. 3, Art. VII, Constitution)

 Natural-born citizen
 40 years old on day of election
 resident of the Philippines for at least 10 yrs immediately preceding election
day

b. Senator (Sec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution)

 Natural-born citizen
 35 years old on day of election
 able to read and write
 registered voter
 resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding election day

c. Congressmen (Sec. 6, Art. VI, Constitution)

 Natural-born citizen
 25 years old on day of election
 able to read and write
 registered voter in district in which he shall be elected
 resident thereof for not less than one year immediately preceding election
day

d. Supreme Court Justice

  Natural born citizen
 at least 40 years old
 15 years or more a judge or engaged in law practice
 of proven CIPI (competence, integrity, probity and independence)

e. Civil Service Commissioners (Sec. 1 [1], Art. IXB. Constitution)

 Natural-born citizen
 35 years old at time of appointment
 proven capacity for public administration
 not a candidate for any elective position in elections immediately preceding
appointment

f. COMELEC Comm. (Sec. 1[1], Art. IXC)

 Natural-born citizen
 35 years old at time of appointment
 college degree holder
 not a candidate for elective position in election immediately preceding
appointment
 chairman and majority should be members of the bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years (See Cayetano v. Monsod)

g. COA Commissioners

 Natural-born citizen
 35 years old at time of appointment
 CPA with >10 year of auditing experience or
 Bar member engaged in practice of law for at least 10 years
 Not have been candidates for elective position in elections immediately
preceding appointment

Cayetano v. Monsod Practice of law means any activity, in or out of

court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. Generally, to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service which
requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.

Aquino v. COMELEC: Residency of not less than 1 year prior to the

elections for the position of Congressman. In
election law, residence refers to domicile, i.e.
the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where
he intends to return. To successfully effect a
change of domicile, the candidate must prove
an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile. Here, it was held that leasing a
condominium unit in the district was not to
acquire a new residence or domicile but only to
qualify as a candidate.

Marcos v. COMELEC: Domicile, which includes the twin elements of

actual habitual residence, and animus manendi,
the intention of remaining there permanently. It
was held that domicile of origin is not easily lost,
 and that in the absence of clear and positive
proof of a successful change of domicile, the
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

Religious Test or Qualification

No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
(Art. III, Sec. 5, 1987 Constitution)

FORMATION OF OFFICIAL RELATION

Modes of Commencing Official Relation

(a) Election

(b) Appointment

(c) Others:
(i) Succession by operation of law;

(ii) Direct provision of law, e.g. ex-oficio officers

Election: Selection or designation by a popular vote

Appointment

Definition

Q: Distinguish between designation and appointment.

Designation Appointment

Definition Imposition of Selection of an

additional duties upon individual to occupy a
an existing office certain public office
by one authorized by
law to make such
selection

Extent of Limited Comprehensive

Powers

Security of No. Yes.

tenure?

When Assumption of a Assumption of a

deemed designated position is 2ndappointive position
abandonment not deemed is usually deemed
of prior office abandonment of the abandonment of the
1st position first office.

Nature of Appointing Power

 The power to appoint is intrinsically an executive act involving the
exercise of discretion. (Concepcion v. Paredes)

The power and prerogative to a vacant position in the civil service is

lodged with the appointing authority.

Constitutional Provisions

Q: Who can the President nominate and appoint with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments?

A:
 Heads of the executive departments (Art. VII, Sec. 16,
1987 Const.);

 Ambassadors (ibid);

 Other public ministers and consuls (ibid);

 Officers of the armed forces from the rank or colonel or naval

captain (ibid);
 Other officers whose appointments are vested in him by the
Constitution (ibid), including Constitutional Commissioners (Art.
IX-B, Sec. 1 (2) for CSC; Art. IX-C, Sec. 1 (2) for COMELEC; Art.
IX-D, Sec. 1 (2) for COA).

Q: Who can the President appoint without the need for CA approval?

A: All other officers of the government whose appointments are not

otherwise provided for by law;

 Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint;

 Members of the Supreme Court;

Note: To be appointed from a list of at least 3 nominees

prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council (Art. VIII, Sec. 9, 1987
Const.)

 Judges of lower courts;

Note: To be appointed from a list of at least 3 nominees

prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council (Art. VIII, Sec. 9, 1987
Const.)

 Ombudsman and his deputies

Note: To be appointed from a list of at least 6 nominees

prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of 3
nominees for every vacancy thereafter (Art. XI, Sec. 9, 1987
Const.)

Q: Does the President have the power to make appointments when

Congress is in recess?

A: Yes. However, such appointments shall be effective only until:

 (1) disapproval by the Commission on Appointments; or

(2) the next adjournment of the Congress (Sec. 16, Art. VII,
1987 Const.)

Q: What is the effectivity of appointments extended by an Acting

President?

A: Such appointments shall remain effective unless revoked

by the elected President within 90 days from his assumption
or reassumption of office. (Sec. 14, Art. VII, 1987 Const.)

Qualification Standards and Requirements under the Civil Service Law

Qualification Standards:

 Express the minimum requirements for a class of positions in

terms of education , training and experience, civil service
eligibility, physical fitness, and other qualities required for
successful performance. (Sec. 22, Book V, EO 292)

 A statement of the minimum qualifications of a

position which shall include education, experience,
training, civil service eligibility, and physical
characteristics and personality traitsrequired by the
job. (Sec. 2, Rule IV, Omnibus Rules)

 With respect to a particular position, such qualification

standards shall serve as the basis for the determination by the
appointing authority of the degree of qualifications of an officer or
employee (ibid);

 Shall be used as basis for civil service examinations for

positions in the career service, as guides in appointment and
other personnel actions, in the adjudication of protested
appointments, in determining training needs, and as aid in the
inspection and audit of the agencies' personnel work programs
(ibid);

 Shall be administered in such manner as to continually

provide incentives to officers and employees towards
professional growth and foster the career system in the
government service (ibid);

 It shall be the responsibility of the departments

and agencies to establish, administer and maintain
the qualification standards on a continuing basis as
an incentive to career advancement. (Sec. 7, Rule
IV, Omnibus Rules)

 Their establishment, administration, and maintenance shall

be the responsibility of the department / agency, with the
assistance and approval of the CSC and in consultation with the
Wage and Position Classification Office (ibid);
  Whenever necessary, the CSC shall
provide technical assistance to departments and
agencies in the development of their qualification
standards. (Sec. 5, Rule IV, Omnibus Rules)

 Shall be established for all positions in the 1st and

2nd levels (Sec. 1, Rule IV, Omnibus Rules);

Political Qualifications for an Office

GENERAL RULE: Political qualifications are not required for public

office.

Exceptions: (1) Membership in the electoral tribunals of

either the House of Representatives or Senate
(Art. VI, Sec. 17, 1987 Const.);

(2) Party-list representation;

(3) Commission on Appointments;

(4) Vacancies in the Sanggunian (Sec. 45,

Local Government Code)

Property Qualifications

In the cases of Maquera v. Borra and Aurea v. COMELEC, the Supreme

Court struck down R.A. 4421 which required candidates for national, provincial,
city and municipal offices to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary
or emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate, which shall be forfeited
in favor of the govt. concerned if the candidate fails to obtain at least 10% of the
votes cast.

The Supreme Court held that property qualifications are inconsistent with
the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and
the principle of social justice underlying the same. The Court reasoned out that:

"Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority

emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the
right to vote and to be voted shall not be dependent upon the wealth
of the individual concerned. Social justice presupposes equal
opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no
person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be
elected to public office."

Aliens not eligible to public office

This is self-explanatory.

Effect of removal of qualifications during the term

Q: What happens if the qualification is lost which the officer is holding

office?

A: The officer must be terminated.

Effect of pardon upon the disqualification to hold public office

 GENERAL RULE: A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right
to
hold public office. (Art. 36, Revised Penal Code)

Exceptions: (1) Where such right to hold public office is expressly

restored by the terms of the pardon (Art. 36, RPC);

(2) When a person is granted pardon because he did

not commit the offense imputed to him (Garcia v.
Chairman, COA)

Rules governing effects of pardon:

(1) A public official who has been convicted of a crime but has been
pardoned must secure a reappointment before he / she can
reassume his / her former position. (Monsanto v. Factoran)

Note: Acquittal is the only ground for automatic reinstatement

of a public officer to his / her former position.

(2) Pardon does not exempt the culprit from payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him / her by the sentence. (Art. 36, par. 2,
RPC)

(3) A convicted public official who has been pardoned is not entitled
to backpay and other emoluments due to him during the period of his
suspension pendente lite. (Monsanto v. Factoran)

Discretion of appointing official

� Discretion, if not plenary, at least sufficient, should thus be granted to

those entrusted with the responsibility of administering the officers
concerned, primarily the department heads. They are in the most favorable
position to determine who can best fulfill the functions of the office thus
vacated. Unless, therefore, the law speaks in the most mandatory and
peremptory tone, considering all the circumstances, there should be, as
there has been, full recognition of the wide scope of such discretionary
authority. (Reyes v. Abeleda)

� Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed

by the officer in which it is vested according to this best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. (Lapinid v. CSC)

� The only function of the CSC is to review the appointment in the light of
the requirements of the Civil Service Law, and when it finds the appointee
to be qualified and all other legal requirements have been otherwise
satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the appointment. It cannot order
the replacement of the appointee simply because it considers another
employee to be better qualified. (Lapinid v. CSC)

� To hold that the Civil Service Law requires that any vacancy be filled by
promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, or certification in that
order would be tantamount to legislative appointment which is repugnant to
the Constitution. The requirement under the Civil Service Law that the
appointing power set forth the reason for failing to appoint the officer next
 in rank applies only in cases of promotion and not in cases where the
appointing power chooses to fill the vacancy by transfer, reinstatement,
reemployment or certification, not necessarily in that order. (Pineda v.
Claudio)

� The CSC is not empowered to change the nature of the appointment

extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving
or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil
Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the legal requirements
are satisfied, the CSC has no choice but to attest to the
appointment. (Luego v. CSC)

� Appointment is a political question.

� Where the palpable excess of authority or abuse of discretion in refusing

to issue promotional appointment would lead to manifest injustice,
mandamus will lie to compel the appointing authority to issue said
appointments. (Gesolgon v. Lacson)

Effectivity of Appointment

Q: When does an appointment take effect?

A: Immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority. (Rule V, Sec.

10, Omnibus Rules).

When appointment becomes complete, final and irrevocable

GENERAL RULE: An appointment, once made, is irrevocable

and not subject to reconsideration.

Qualification: Where the assent, confirmation, or approval of some

other
officer or body is needed before the appointment may
be issue and be deemed complete.

Exceptions: (1) When the appointment is an absolute nullity (Mitra

v. Subido);

(2) When there is fraud on the part of the appointee

(Mitra v. Subido);

(3) Midnight appointments

A completed appointment vests a legal right. It cannot be taken away

EXCEPT for cause, and with previous notice and hearing (due process).

Midnight appointments

A President or Acting President is prohibited from making appointments 2

months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term. (Art. VII, Sec. 15, 1987 Const.)

Exception: Temporary appointments to executive positions when

continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
ASSUMPTION AND TERM OR TENURE OF OFFICE

Qualification to Office
Appointment and Qualification to Office Distinguished

Appointment and qualification to office are separate and distinct

things. Appointment is the act of being designated to a public office by the
appointing authority. Qualification is the act of signifying one's acceptance of the
appointive position. This generally consists of the taking / subscribing / filing of an
official oath, and in certain cases, of the giving of an official bond, as required by
law. (Mechem)

No one can be compelled to accept an appointment.

Lacson v. Romero

The appointment to a government post involves several steps: (1) the

President nominates; (b) the Commission on Appointments confirms the
appointment; and (c) the appointee accepts the appointment by his assumption
of office. The first 2 steps are mere offers to the post but the last step rests
solely with the appointee who may or may not accept the appointment.

Borromeo v. Mariano

A judge may not be made a judge of another district without his

consent. Appointment and qualification to office are separate and distinct
things. Appointment is the sole act of the appointee. There is no power which
can compel a man to accept the office.

Effect of Failure to Qualify

 Failure to qualify is deemed evidence of refusal of the office.

 It is a ground for removal:

If qualification is a condition precedent: Failure to qualify ipso

facto deemed rejection of the office

If not condition precedent: Failure is not ipso facto rejection

 Justifiable reasons for delay in qualifying include sickness, accident,

and other fortuitous events that excuse delay.

 The Omnibus Election Code provides that the officer must qualify
(i.e., take his oath of office and assume office) within 6 months from
proclamation. Otherwise, the position will be deemed vacant.

Exception: If the non-assumption of office is due to a cause

beyond his control.

 Qualification is significant because it designates when security of

tenure begins.

Oath of Office
  An oath is an outward pledge whereby one formally calls upon God to witness
to the truth of what he says or to the fact that he sincerely intends to do what he
says.

 Although the law usually requires the taking of an oath, it is not

indispensable. It is a mere incident to the office and constitutes no part of the
office itself. However, the President, Vice-President and Acting President are
required by the Constitution (Art. VII, Sec. 5) to take an oath or affirmation before
entering into the execution of their office. Such oath-taking is mandatory.

Q: Who are authorized to administer oaths?

A: (1) Notaries public;

(2) Judges;
(3) Clerks of court;
(4) Secretary of House / Senate;
(5) Secretary of Exec. Departments;
(6) Bureau Directors;
(7) Register of Deeds;
(8) Provincial governors;
(9) City mayors;
(10) Municipal mayors;
(11) Any other officer in the service of the government of the
Philippines
whose appointment is vested in the President;
(12) Any other officer whose duties, as defined by law or regulation,
require presentation to him of any statement under oath

Q: Who are obliged to administer oaths in all instances, and not just in
matters of official business?

A: (1) Notaries public;

(2) Municipal judges;
(3) Clerks of court

Time of Taking the Oath of Office

A public officer must take his oath of office before entering upon the
discharge of his duties.

Requalification

If a public officer is re-elected or re-appointed, he must take another oath

and fulfill the other condition precedents before assuming office. The oath and
other qualifications made prior to assumption of his previous office will not be valid
for subsequent terms of office.

Giving of Bonds

Persons required to give bond

Q: Who are the public officers generally required to give a bond?

A: (1) Accountable public officers or those to whom are entrusted the

collection and custody of public money;
 (2) Public ministerial officers whose actions may affect the rights and
interests of individuals.

The bond is in the nature of an indemnity bond rather than a penal or

forfeiture bond.

The bond is also an obligation binding the sureties to make good the
officer’s default. It is required not for the benefit of the office holder, but for
the protection of the public interest and is designed to indemnify those
suffering loss or injury by reason of misconduct or neglect in office.

Effect of Failure to Give Bond within the Prescribed Period

If not condition precedent: Failure to give bond merely constitutes a

ground for forfeiture of the office; it
is not forfeiture of the office ipso facto.

IF condition precedent: Failure to give bond within the prescribed

period renders the office vacant.

Term and Tenure of Office

Term of Office and Tenure of Office Distinguished

Term of Office Tenure of Office

De jure De facto

Fixed and definite period of time Period during which the incumbent
during which the officer may actually holds the office. It may be
claim to hold the office as of right shorter than the term.

Alba v. Evangelista

It is only in those cases in which the office is held at the pleasure of the
appointing power and where the power of removal is exercisable at its mere
discretion that the officer may be removed without notice or hearing.

Power of the Legislature to Fix and Change the Term of Office

RULES:

 Where the term is fixed

by the Constitution: Congress has no power to alter the term.

However, such term of office can be shortened or extended

by the vote of the people ratifying a constitutional amendment.

 Where the term is not fixed: Congress may fix the terms of officers
other than those provided for in the
Const.

Congress has the power to change the tenure of officers holding

offices created by it. However, if the term is lengthened and made to apply
to the incumbents, this could be tantamount to a legislative appointment
which is null and void.
 When Term of Office Dependent upon "Pleasure of the President"

Congress can legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials
dependent upon the pleasure of the President. (Alba v. Evangelista)

Where the office is held at the pleasure of the appointing power and such
appointing power can exercise the power of removal at his mere discretion, the
public officer may be removed without notice or hearing. (Alba v. Evangelista)

No Vested Interest in Term of Office

Public office is a privilege revocable by the sovereignty at will. An

incumbent cannot validly object to the alteration of his term since he has no vested
right in his office. (Greenshow v. U.S.)

Term of Office Not Extended by Reason of War

There is no principle, law or doctrine by which the term may be extended by

reason of war. (Nueno, et al. v. Angeles)

Doctrine of Holdover

Q: What is the doctrine of hold-over?

A: A public officer whose term has expired or services have been terminated is
allowed to continue holding his office until his successor is appointed or chosen
and had qualified. (Mechem)

Purpose of the Hold-Over Rule

Public interest. It is to prevent a hiatus in the government pending the time

when a successor may be chosen and inducted into office.

Holding-Over Rules

(1) Where the law provides for it: The office does not become vacant
upon the expiration of the term if there is
no successor elected and qualified to
assume it. Incumbent will hold-over even
if beyond the term fixed by law.

(2) Where the law is silent: Unless hold-over is expressly or

impliedly prohibited, incumbent may
hold-over.

(3) Where the Constitution limits

the term of a public officer and
does not provide for hold-over: Hold-over is not permitted.
Commencement of Term of Office

RULES:

(1) Where the time is fixed: The term will begin on the specified
date.

(2) Where no time is fixed: The term will generally begin on the
date
 of the election or the appointment.

POWERS AND DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Source of Government Authority: The people, the sovereignty.

Scope of Powers of a Public Officer

Lo Cham v. Ocampo

The duties of a public office includes all those which truly are within its
scope:

(1) those which are essential to the accomplishment of the main

purpose for which the office was created; or

(2) those which, although incidental or collateral, are germane to and

serve to promote the accomplishment of the principal purpose.

Territorial Extent of Powers of Public Officer

GENERAL RULE: Where a public officer is authorized by law to perform the

duties of his office at a particular place, action at a place not
authorized by law is ordinarily invalid. (Note: This rule is
applicable to all public officers whose duties are essentially
local in nature, e.g. judges.)

EXCEPTIONS: (1) Consuls;

(2) Police officers, who may arrest persons for crimes

committed outside Philippine territory;

(3) Doctrine of hot pursuit

Duration of Authority of Public Officers

The duration of the authority of public officers is limited to that term during which
he is, by law, invested with the rights and duties of the office.

Construction of Grant of Powers

Strict construction. Will be construed as conferring only those powers which

are expressly imposed or necessarily implied.

Classification of Powers

Discretionary Ministerial

Definition Acts which require the Acts which are performed

exercise of reason in in a given state of facts, in
determining when, where, a prescribed manner, in
and how to exercise the obedience to the mandate
power of legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise
of his own judgment upon
the propriety or
 impropriety of the act
done (Lamb v. Phipps)

Can be Generally, NO. Generally, YES.

delegated?
Exception: When the Exception: When the
power to substitute / law expressly requires the
delegate has been given act to be performed by the
officer in person and / or
prohibits such delegation

When is Only if the duty to do In all cases.

mandamus something has been
proper? delayed for an
unreasonable period of
time.

Is public officer Generally not liable Liable if duty exercised

liable? Exceptions: if there is contrary to the manner
fraud or malice prescribed by law.

Discretion; Discretionary Power

Ministerial Duty

Q: What is discretion?

A: Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right

conferred upon them by law of acting officially in certain circumstances,
according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled
by the judgment or conscience of others. (Lamb v. Phipps)

Q: What is a ministerial act?

A: A purely ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal performs

in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. A
ministerial act is one to which nothing is left to the discretion of the
person who must perform. It is a simple, definite duty arising under
conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law. It is a
precise act, accurately marked out, enjoined upon particular officers
for a particular purpose. (Lamb v. Phipps)

Lamb v. Phipps

Auditors and comptrollers, as accounting officers, are generally regarded

as quasi-judicial officers. They perform mere ministerial duties only in
cases where the sum due is conclusively fixed by law or pursuant to
law. Except in such cases, the action of the accounting officers upon claims
coming before them for settlement and certification of balances found by
them to be due, is not merely ministerial but judicial and
discretionary. Mandamus will therefore not issue.

Torres v. Ribo
 The powers of the Board of Canvassers are quasi-judicial and therefore
discretionary.

Aprueba v. Ganzon

Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion

of a public officer where the law imposes on him the right or duty to exercise
judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act.

The privilege of operating a market stall under license is not absolute but
revocable under an implied lease contract subject to the general welfare
clause.

Mandamus never lies to enforce the performance of contractual

obligations.

Miguel v. Zulueta

Public officers may properly be compelled by mandamus to remove or

rectify an unlawful act if to do so is within their official competence.

Q: When will the writ of mandamus issue?

A:
 To correct a gross abuse of discretion, a palpable excess of
authority resulting in manifest injustice (Gesolgon v. Lacson);

 Where the question of constitutionality is raised by the petitioner

(Cu Unjieng v. Patstone);

Q: When will the writ of mandamus never issue?

A: (1) To control discretion;

(2) When another adequate remedy exists;

(3) To enforce the performance of contractual obligations, as
in the issuance of a license / permit (Aprueba v. Ganzon);

Q: In filing a mandamus suit, when does a taxpayer not have to show that
he has any legal or special interest in the results of such suit?

A: When the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus
is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, such as the observance
of the law. (Miguel v. Zulueta)

Time of Execution of Powers

 Where not indicated: Within a reasonable time

 Where indicated: Merely directory

Exceptions:
 (1) When there is something in the statute which shows a
different intent (Araphoe City v. Union Pac);

(2) Where a disregard of the provisions of the statute would

injuriously affect a public interest or public right;

(3) When the provision is accompanied by negative words

importing that the acts shall not be done in any other
manner or time than that designated.

Ratification of Unauthorized Acts

 If act was absolutely void

at the time it was done: Cannot be ratified

 If merely voidable: Can be ratified and rendered valid

� Where superior officers have authority to ratify the acts of their inferiors, they
are restricted to the ratification of acts and contracts which they themselves are
empowered to make.

� It is not enough that the public officer acted beyond his powers in order that
he may be held liable for damages. If the act committed is reasonably related
to his duties and the officer was in good faith, he will not be held liable.

Government not estopped by the unauthorized or Illegal acts of officers

� As between an individual and his government, the individual cannot plead the
void act of an official to shield him from the demand of the government that he
(the individual) fulfill an obligation which he has contracted with the
government, after the benefits accruing to him as a result of that obligation have
been received. The government can neither be estopped nor prejudiced by the
illegal acts of its servants. (Government v. Galarosa)

Hilado v. Collector

A tax circular issued on a wrong construction of the law cannot give rise to
a vested right that can be invoked by a taxpayer.

Accountability and Responsibility of Public Officers and Employees

Norm of Performance of Duties

Q: What are the standards of personal conduct provided for in Sec. 4, RA 6713?

A: (1) Commitment to public interest;

(2) Professionalism;
(3) Justness and sincerity;
(4) Political neutrality;
(5) Responsiveness to the public;
(6) Nationalism and patriotism;
(7) Commitment to democracy;
(8) Simple living

RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Right to Office
 The right to office is the right to exercise the powers of the office to the exclusion
of others.

Right to Salary or Compensation

GENERAL RULES:

� A public officer is not entitled to compensation for services rendered

under an unconstitutional statute or provision thereof.

Exception: If some other statute provides otherwise.

� If no compensation is fixed by law, the public officer is assumed to

have accepted the office to serve gratuitously.

� After services have been rendered by a public officer, the

compensation thus earned cannot be taken away by a subsequent
law. However, he cannot recover salary for a period during which he
performed no services.

� One without legal title to office either by lawful appointment or election

and qualification is not entitled to recover salary or compensation
attached to the office.

� One who intrudes into or usurps a public office has no right to the
salary or emoluments attached to the office.

Compensation not an element of public office

Compensation is not indispensable to public office. It is not part of the office

but merely incident thereto. It is sometimes expressly provided that certain officers
shall receive no compensation, and a law creating an office without any provision
for compensation may carry with it the implication that the services are to be
rendered gratuitously.

Salary, Wages, and Per Diems Defined and Distinguished

Salary: time-bound
Wages: service-bound
Per Diem: allowance for days actually spent for special duties

Salary of Public Officer Not Subject to Attachment

 The salary of a public officer or employee may not, by garnishment,

attachment, or order of execution, be seized before being paid by him,
and appropriated for the payment of his debts.

 Money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due

government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees
in the process of garnishment because the sovereign State cannot be
sued in its own courts except by express authorization by statute. Until
paid over by the agent of the government to the person entitled to
receive it, public funds cannot in any legal sense be part of his effects
subject to attachment by legal process. (Director of Commerce and
Industry v. Concepcion)
Future or Unearned Salaries Cannot be Assigned

The salary or emoluments in public office are not considered the proper
subject of barter and sale. (22 R.C.L. 541)

Agreements Affecting Compensation Held Void

An agreement by a public officer respecting his compensation may rightfully

be considered invalid as against public policy where it tends to pervert such
compensation to a purpose other than that for which it was intended, and to
interfere with the officer's free and unbiased judgment in relation to the duties of
his office. (This is usually with reference to unperformed services and the salary
or fees attached thereto.)

Right to Recover Salary: De Jure Officer and De Facto Officer

Monroy v. CA and del Rosario

Where a mayor filed a certificate of candidacy for congressman then

withdrew such certificate and reassumed the position of mayor, thus
preventing the vice-mayor from discharging the duties of the position of
mayor, the mayor should reimburse to the vice-mayor, as the right rightful
occupant of the position of mayor, the salaried which he had received.

Rodriguez v. Tan

Where a duly proclaimed elective official who assumes office is

subsequently ousted in an election protest, the prevailing party can no
longer recover the salary paid to the ousted officer. The ousted officer, who
acted as de facto officer during his incumbency, is entitled to the
compensation, emoluments and allowances which are provided for the
position.

Exception: If there was fraud on the part of the de facto officer

which would vitiate his election.

Q: When can the de jure officer recover from:

(a) the government?

When the government continues to pay the de facto officer even after
the notice of adjudication of the protest in favor of the de jure officer.

(b) A de facto officer?

When notice of adjudication of the title to the de jure officer has been
given, and the de facto officer still continues to exercise duties and receive
salaries and emoluments.

(c) An intruder / usurper?

At all instances.

Additional or Double Compensation Prohibited

Q: Differentiate additional compensation from double compensation.

 Additional Double

There is only 1 position, but There are 2 positions, and with

additional functions and the public officer is getting
additional compensation. emoluments for
both positions.

Q: Differentiate the 2 kinds of allowances.

Commutable Reimbursable

Given by virtue of the position The public officer must present

whether or not he incurred a receipt or certification under
expenses for which the allowance oath that such amount was
spent
is given. Received as a matter in order that the public officer
of right. may recover the money
spent.

There is a conclusive presumption

that it was spent.

RULES:

� Pensions / gratuities are not considered as additional, double, or

indirect compensation. (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution)
� By its very nature, a bonus partakes of an additional remuneration or
compensation. (Peralta v. Auditor General)

� An allowance for expenses incident to the discharge of the duties of

office is not an increase of salary, a perquisite, nor an emolument of
office. (Peralta v. Auditor-General)

Can Public Officer Recover Salary for Period of Suspension?

RULES:

� If preventively suspended: NO, he cannot recover salary.

BUT: If he is subsequently exonerated, he can recover salary for the period of his
preventive suspension.

� If he was given penalty of removal from office, but was completely exonerated upon
appeal: YES, he can recover because he was completely exonerated.

� If he was given penalty of removal from office, but his penalty was commuted from
removal to mere suspension, or demotion: NO, because he was still found guilty
although the penalty was reduced.

� If the suspension / removal from office is unjustified: YES.

Q: In summary, when can payment of salaries corresponding to the period

when an employee was suspended be allowed?
 A: (1) When he is found innocent of the charges
which caused his suspension;

(2) When the suspension is unjustified (Abellera v. City

of Baguio)

ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE

Over Presidential Appointees

Olonan v. CSC

Administrative charges were filed against the PUP President and other officers for
violations of RA 3019 with the CSC. Olonan et.al. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
contending principally that the CSC has no jurisdiction to try and decide the case against
her, she being a presidential appointee. The CA upheld Olonan’s contention. There is
nothing in the provisions of the Constitution or the Administrative Code of 1987 which
gives the CSC the power to discipline presidential appointees like petitioner herein. Sec.
47(1), Book V of EO 292 which provides that “a complaint may be filed directly with the
CSC by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may
hear and decide the case” must be read together with Sec. 48 which is entitled “Procedure
in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees.” The very subject of Sec.
48 implicitly limits the scope of the CSC’s jurisdiction in administrative cases to non-
presidential appointees and makes patent the conclusion that the disciplinary authority
over presidential appointees lies elsewhere – the President as appointing power himself.

Power to Appoint Implies the Power to Remove; Exceptions

a) Justices of the Supreme Court (by impeachment)

b) Members of Constitutional Commissions (by impeachment)
c) Ombudsman (by impeachment)
d) Judges of inferior courts (disciplinary or removal power vested
in the Supreme Court)

Bonifacio Sans Maceda v. Vasquez

A judge who falsifies his Certificate of Service is administratively liable to the SC

for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and
criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. Where
a criminal complaint against a judge or other employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the
SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of
their administrative duties. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter to the SC
for determination of whether the certificates reflected the true status of his pending case
load, as the SC had the necessary records to make such a determination. Art. VIII, Sec.
6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts
and court personnel.

Dolalas v. Ombudsman-Mindanao

Citing the Maceda case, the SC power of administrative supervision over judges
and court personnel is exclusive. Investigation by the Ombudsman violates the specific
constitutional mandate of the SC and undermines the independence of the judiciary.

Over Non-Presidential Appointees

Grounds
Sec. 46(a), Book V of EO 292 provides that “No officer or employee
in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided
by law and after due process.” The grounds constituting just cause are enumerated
in Sec. 46(b).

Jurisdiction

Original complaints may be filed: (a) directly with the CSC or (b) with the
Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities for officers and employees under their jurisdiction.

Decisions of Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities,

provinces, cities and municipalities shall be final in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty
days’ salary.

In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the
Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the
Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the
penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation
by the Secretary concerned.

 Decisions imposing the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days or fine in
an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from office shall be appealable to the CSC.

Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees

Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or

employee by the Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or head of local
government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn written complaint
of any other person.

For complaints filed by any other person

Complainant shall submit sworn statements covering his testimony and those
of his witnesses together with his documentary evidence.

If based on such papers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the disciplining
authority shall dismiss the case. Otherwise, he shall notify the respondent in writing of
the charges against the latter.

Respondent shall be allowed not less than seventy-two hours after receipt of
the complaint to answer the charges in writing under oath, together with supporting
sworn statements and documents. He shall also indicate whether or not he elects a
formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory.

If the answer is found satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the
case.

Although a respondent does not request a formal investigation, one shall

nevertheless be conducted when from the allegations of the complaint and the answer
of the respondent, including the supporting documents, the merits of the case cannot
be decided judiciously without conducting such an investigation.
The decision shall be rendered by the disciplining authority within thirty days
from the termination of the investigation or submission of the report of the investigator,
which report shall be submitted within fifteen days from the conclusion of the
investigation.

Either party may avail himself of the services of counsel and may require the
attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in his favor
through the compulsory process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.

Appeals and Petition for Reconsideration

Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the
decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for
reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within fifteen days.

A petition for reconsideration shall be based only on any of the following
grounds:

(a) new evidence has been discovered which materially affects the decision
rendered;
(b) the decision is not supported by the evidence on record; or
(c) error of law or irregularities have been committee which are prejudicial to the
interests of the respondent.

Only one petition for reconsideration shall be allowed.

Mendez v. Civil Service Commission

The remedy of appeal in civil service cases may be availed of only in a

case where respondent is found guilty of the charges against him. But when the
respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion for
appeal. PD 807 shows that it does not contemplate a review of decisions
exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges. “Party adversely
affected by the decision” in Section 39 of the Civil Service Law refers to the
government employee against whom case was filed.

Summary Proceedings

No formal investigation is necessary and the respondent may be

immediately removed or dismissed if any of the following circumstances is present:

(1) When the charge is serious and the evidence if guilt is strong;
(2) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and
there is reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty or the present
charge; and

(3) When the respondent is notoriously undesirable.

Preventive Suspension

The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate

officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against
such officer or employee involves:

(a) dishonesty; or
(b) oppression or grave misconduct; or
(c) neglect in the performance of duty; or
 (d) if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which
would warrant his removal from the service.

Maximum period for preventive suspension is ninety (90) days for national
officials. Under the Local Government Code, local appointive and elective officials may
be preventively suspended for only sixty (60) days. If the case is filed in the
Ombudsman, the latter may impose a preventive suspension for a period of six (6)
months.

When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive
suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety
(90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential
appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service.

Penalty
In meting out punishment, the same penalties shall be imposed for similar
offenses and only one penalty shall be imposed in each case.

The disciplining authority may impose the penalty of removal from the service,
demotion in rank, suspension for not more than one year without pay, fine in an
amount not exceeding six months’ salary, or reprimand. (Sec. 46(d), Book V, EO 292)

If the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty
imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or count and the
test may be considered as aggravating circumstances. (Sec. 17 of the Implementing
Civil Service Rules and Regulations)

A reprimand whether given by the Civil Service Commission or the head of
department or agency shall be considered a penalty. However, a warning or an
admonition shall not be considered a penalty. (Sec. 15 of the Implementing Civil
Service Rules and Regulations)



Tobias v. Veloso

Reprimand is a penalty. In this case, police chief is not entitled to back

wages as Sec. 16 of the Police Act of 1966 expressly provides that a suspended
member of the police force shall be entitled to his salary for the period of his
suspension upon exoneration. A reprimand is not equivalent to an exoneration. It
is more severe than an admonition, which is considered a mild rebuke. A
reprimand is administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or a body to
which he belongs. It is an administrative penalty, although it may be slight form of
punishment.

NOTE: A warning is an act or fact of putting one on his

guard; an admonition is a gentle or friendly reproof or a mild rebuke; while a
reprimand is a formal and public censure or a severe reproof.

Removal of Administrative Penalties or Disabilities

In meritorious cases and upon recommendation of the CSC, the President may
commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities imposed upon officers or
employees in disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he may
impose in the interest of the service.

Over Elective Officials

Impeachment

A verified complaint may be filed by any member of the House of

Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member
thereof.

Complaint shall be included in the Order of Business within ten sessions days
and referred to the proper Committee within three sessions days thereafter.

The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together
with the corresponding resolutions. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration of the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

A vote of at least one-third of all the members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution.

In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least

one-third of all the members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without
the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.

Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from
office and disqualification to hold office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the
party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and
punishment according to law.

No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.

Local Elective Officials (Sec. 60-68, Local Government Code)

Grounds for Disciplinary Actions

(1) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines

(2) Culpable violation of the Constitution

(3) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or

dereliction of duty

(4) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense

punishable by
at least prision mayor

(5) Abuse of authority

(6) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive days, except in the case
of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay
 (7) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the
status of
an immigrant of another country

(8) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.

Procedure

(1) Verified Complaint

A verified complaint may be filed against any erring local elective official and submitted
to the following disciplinary authorities:

Office of the President - elective official of a province, a highly

urbanized
city, an independent component city or
component city;

Sangguniang panlalawigan - elective official of a municipality

Sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan - elective barangay official

(2) Answer

Within seven (7) days after the administrative complaint is filed, the Office of the
President or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent
to submit his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof

(3) Investigation

The investigation of the case shall be commenced within ten (10) days after
receipt of such answer of the respondent.

However, no investigation shall be held within ninety (90) days

immediately prior to any local election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed
within the said period.

Preventive Suspension

Preventive suspension may be imposed:

a) By the President: if the respondent is an elective official of a

province,
a highly urbanized or an independent
component city;

b) By the governor: if the respondent is an elective official of a

component city or municipality; or

c) By the mayor: if the respondent is an elective official of the

barangay.

Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined,
when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great
probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
 witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence.

However, any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not
extend beyond sixty (60) days.

Furthermore, in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an
elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days
within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of
the first suspension.

Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elective official

shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings against him, which shall be terminated within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the time he was formally notified of the case against him.

Note: The respondent official preventively suspended from office

shall receive no salary or compensation during such suspension; but upon
subsequent exoneration and reinstatement, he shall be paid full salary or
compensation including such emoluments accruing during such suspension.

Note: No preventive suspension shall be imposed within

ninety (90) days immediately prior to any local election. If preventive suspension
has been imposed prior to the 90-day period immediately preceding local election,
it shall be deemed automatically lifted upon the start of the aforesaid period.

Rights of Respondent

The respondent shall be accorded full opportunity to appear and defend himself in
person or by counsel, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to
require the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary process of
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.

Form and Notice of Decision

The investigation of the case shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from
the start thereof.

Within thirty (30) days after the end of the investigation, the Office of the
President or the sanggunian concerned shall render a decision in writing stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision.

The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the
respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor shall
said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he
meets the qualifications required for the office.

The penalty of removal from office as a result of an administrative investigation

shall be considered a bar to the candidacy of the respondent for any elective position.

Administrative Appeals

Decisions in administrative cases may, within thirty (3) days from receipt
thereof, be appealed to the following:

a) The sanggunian panlalawigan: in the case of decisions of:

 (1) sangguniang panlungsod of component cities; and

(2) sangguniang bayan;

b) The Office of the President: in the case of decisions of:

(1) the sangguniang panlalawigan;

(2) the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities;
(3) the sangguniang panglungsod of independent
component cities.

Decisions of the Office of the President shall final and executory.

Execution Pending Appeal

An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. The
respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension
during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such appeal. In the event the
appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments
during the pendency of the appeal.

TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS

Modes of Termination

1) Expiration of Term or Tenure of Office

a) End of a fixed term

b) End of Pleasure where one holds office at pleasure of appointing
authority
c) Loss of confidence in primarily confidential employment

2) Reaching the age limit; Retirement

3) Bona fide abolition of office
4) Abandonment of office
5) Acceptance of an incompatible office
6) Resignation
7) Resignation
8) Removal for cause
9) Temporary appointments’ termination
10) Recall
11) Impeachment
12) Prescription of right to office
13) Death
14) Conviction of crime where disqualification is an accessory penalty
15) Filing of certificate of candidacy
16) Performance of act or accomplishment of purpose for which the office was created

Expiration of Term or Tenure of Office

End of Fixed Term

Upon the expiration of the officer’s term, unless he is authorized by
law to hold over, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must be ipso
facto terminated.

End of pleasure where one holds office at the pleasure of the appointing authority

Alba v. Evangelista

President can validly terminate tenure of Vice Mayor of Roxas City as the office
was created at the pleasure of the President. What is involved here is not the
question of removal, or whether legal cause should precede or not that of removal.
What is involved here is the creation of an office and the tenure of such office,
which has been made expressly dependent upon the pleasure of the President.

Fernandez v Ledesma

The Charter of Basilan City provides that the President shall appoint and may
remove at his discretion any of the city’s officers, including its Chief of Police, with
the exception of the municipal judge, who may be removed only according to law.
The legislative intent is to make continuance in office dependent upon the pleasure
of the President. Congress has the power to vest such power of appointment.
Further, “A public office is the right for a given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power.” Alba v. Evangelista states that the
replacement is not removal, but an expiration of tenure, which is an ordinary mode
of terminating official relations. What is involved is not removal, or whether legal
cause should precede such removal, but the creation of an office and the tenure
of such office, which has been made expressly dependent upon the pleasure of
the President.

Loss of Confidence in Primarily Confidential Employment

Hernandez v. Villegas

Even officers and employees of the civil service occupying primarily confidential
positions are subject to the constitutional safeguard against removal or suspension
except for cause.

Official and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue only for
so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation
can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case, their
cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of
office.

Ingles v. Mutuc

The statement that an officer holding a position which is primarily confidential

in nature is “subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power” is
inaccurate. Such statement (a mere obiterin the case of De los Santos v. Mallare),
if detached from the context of the decision in said case, would be inconsistent
with the constitutional command to the effect that “no officer or employee in the
Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law,”
and it is conceded that one holding in the government a primarily confidential
positions is “in the Civil Service.”
 This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily
confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. It
should be noted however, that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the
incumbent is not “removed” or “dismissed” from office - his “term” merely “expires”
in much the same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration
of the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected is not and cannot be
deemed “removed” or “dismissed” therefrom, upon the expiration of said term. The
main difference between the former - the primarily confidential officer - and the
latter is that the latter’s term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is not
pre-fixed but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes
fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an
end to the services of the incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not
“removed” or “dismissed” from officer - his term has merely expired.

Gray v. De Vera

President appointed Gray as Board secretary of the
People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation but was later terminated through a
board resolution due to loss of confidence. SC reversed ruling that Gray’s
appointment was a permanent one. Although the President, EO 99, declared the
position of secretary to the board of a government corporation “primarily
confidential in nature,” it does not follow that a board secretary whose appointment
was permanent may be removed from office without a formal charge specifying the
ground for removal and without giving him an opportunity to be head. Such removal
was illegal since there was no lawful cause for removal.

By declaring that the position is primarily confidential in nature, the President

intended that the position be filled by an appointee of unquestioned honesty and
integrity. The act of Gray in reporting the board’s act of mismanagement and
misconduct was in consonance with the honesty and integrity required for the
position.

Cariño v. ACCFA

SC reversed termination of lawyers who were appointed as permanent

employees of ACCFA. That petitioners’ positions are primarily confidential is
immaterial. The Constitution merely excepts primarily confidential positions from
the coverage of “the rule requiring appointments in the civil service to be made on
the basis of merit and fitness as determined from the competitive exams,” but does
not exempt such positions from the operation of the principle that no officer or
employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law, which recognizes no exception.

Reaching the Age Limit; Retirement

Conditions for entitlement to retirement benefits (R.A. No. 8291)

a) he has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service;

b) he is at least sixty (60) years of age at the time of retirement; and
c) he is not receiving a monthly pension benefit from permanent total disability.

Compulsory Retirement

Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be

compulsory for an employee at least sixty-five (65) years of age with at least fifteen (15)
years of service; Provided that if he has less than fifteen (15) years of service, he may be
allowed to continue in the service in accordance with existing civil service rules and
regulations.

Retirement benefits

(1) the lump sum payment defined in RA No. 8291 payable at the time of retirement
plus an
old-age pension benefit equal to the basis monthly pension payable monthly for
life, starting upon expiration of the give-year (5) guaranteed period covered by the
lump sum; or

(2) cash payment equivalent to eighteen (18) months of his basic monthly pension
plus monthly pension for life payable immediately with no five-year (5) guarantee.

Beronilla v GSIS

The compulsory retirement of government officials and employees upon

reaching the age of 65 years is founded on public policy which aims by it to
maintain efficiency in the government service and, at the same time, give to the
retiring public servants the opportunity to enjoy during the remainder of their lives
the recompenses for their long service and devotion to the government, in the form
of a comparatively easier life, freed from the rigors, discipline and the exacting
demands that the nature of their work and their relations with their superiors as
well as the public would impose on them.

UP Board of Regents v. Auditor General

A BOR resolution extended the services of a UP professor for another year. In

the same year, he reached the age of 65. The Auditor General questioned the
legality of the resolution arguing that the services rendered after the compulsory
retirement age were illegal and that he was not entitled to compensation. SC
upheld Auditor General ruling that as government employees, UP professors are
compulsorily covered by the Retirement Law which creates a uniform retirement
system for all members of the GSIS.

Rabor v. CSC

At the age of 55, Rabor was hired as a government employee at the Davao
City Mayor’s Office in 1978. In 1991, he was advised to apply for retirement. He
was already 68 years old with 13 years of service. He requested that his services
be extended in order that he may complete the 15-year service requirement. This
was denied and Rabor claimed that the doctrine enunciated in Cena v. CSC should
be applied in his case.

SC ruled that the Cena doctrine is not applicable. CSC Memo Circular No. 27,
s. of 1990 cited in the decision in Cena v. CSC, provides that “any request for the
extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the 15-year service
requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the
career service who are regular GSIS members, and shall be granted for a period
not exceeding one (1) year.” Cena further stated that the authority to grant the
extension was a discretionary one vested in the head of the agency concerned. To
reiterate, the head of the government agency concerned is vested with
discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of service of an employee
who has reached 65 years old without completing 15 years of government service;
this discretion to be exercised conformably with CSC Memo Circular No. 27, s. of
1990.
Bona Fide Abolition of Office

As a general rule, absent some Constitutional prohibition, Congress may

abolish any office it creates without infringing upon the rights of the officer or employee
affected.

To consider an office abolished, there must have been an intention to do away
with it wholly and permanently.

Termination by virtue of the abolition of the office is to be distinguished from

removal. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is
in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would
thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure when there is an abolition of office
does not arise. The right itself disappeared with the abolished office as an accessory
following the principal.

Busacay v. Buenaventura

Busacay was laid off as toll collector when the bridge was destroyed. However,
the bridge was later reconstructed and opened to the public with a new collector
being appointed. Busacay was ordered reinstated by the SC. To consider an office
abolished, there must have been an intention to do away with it wholly and
permanently. In the case at bar, there was never any thought of not rebuilding the
bridge. The collapse of the bridge did not work to destroy but only to suspend the
position of toll collector thereon, and upon its reconstruction and re-opening, the
collector’s right to the position was similarly and automatically restored.


Manalang v. Quitoriano

The National Employment Service was established by R.A. No. 761 in lieu of
the Placement Bureau. Quitoriano was appointed as NES Commissioner in spite
of the recommendation of the Labor secretary to appoint Manalang who was the
incumbent Director of the Placement Bureau. SC held that appoint of Quitoriano
was valid. A removal implies that the office still exists. R.A. No. 761, creating NES,
expressly abolished the Placement Bureau and, by implication, the office of the
Director of the Placement Bureau. Had Congress intended the NES to be a mere
enlargement of the Placement Bureau, it would have directed the retention, not the
transfer, of qualified personnel to the NES. Manalang has never been NES
Commissioner and thus could not have been removed therefrom.

Abolition Must Be in Good Faith

As well settled to the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal or separation of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the
abolition must be made in good faith, not for personal or political reasons, and not
implemented in violation of law.

Briones v. Osmeña

Briones and Rosagaran were employees in the Office of the City Mayor since
1937 and 1940, respectively, In 1956, the City created 35 new positions and
abolished 32, of which the positions of Briones and Rosagaran were included.
Consequently, the two were terminated. SC held that the termination was not valid.
While abolition does not imply removal of the incumbent, this rule is true only where
 the abolition is made in good faith. In other words, the right to abolish cannot be
used to discharge employees in violation of the Civil Service law nor can it be
exercised for personal or political reasons.

Facundo v. Pabalan

There is no law which expressly authorizes a municipal council to abolish the

positions it has created. However, the rule is well-settled that the power to create
an office includes the power to abolish it, unless there are constitutional or statutory
rules providing otherwise. But the office must be abolished in good faith.

Cruz v. Primicias

As well settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an
illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition
must be made in good faith. Where the abolition is made in bad faith, for political
or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure
of civil service employees, it is null and void. In the case at bar, while 22 positions
were abolished, 28 new positions with higher salaries were simultaneously
created. No charge of inefficiency is lodged against petitioners. In truth and in fact,
what respondents sought to achieve was to supplant civil service eligibles with
men of their choice, whose tenure would be totally dependent upon their pleasure
and discretion.

Reorganization

Reorganization occurs where there is an alteration of the existing structure of

government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them to promote greater efficiency, to remove redundancy of
functions, or to effect economy and make it more responsive to the needs of their public
clientele. It may result in the loss of one’s position through removal or abolition of office.
Reorganization of the government may be required by law independently of specific
constitutional authorization. But in order to be valid, it must also be done in good faith.

Board of Directors of PCSO v. Alandy

Alandy was the incumbent Assistant General Manager of the PCSO. In 1954,
Resolution No. 314 was passed to reorganize the PCSO. The position of Assistant
General Manager was converted to General Field Supervisor to which Alandy was
appointed. However, in 1955, the position of Assistant General Manager was again
created through Resolution No. 422 and a different person was appointed to the
position. SC invalidated the new appointment and reinstated Alandy to his position
as PCSO Assistant General Manager. What occurred here is that the position of
Assistant General Manager was not abolished but was merely converted to
another position. As such, the conversion merely caused the giving of additional
functions to Alandy, who still held the position of Assistant General Manager.

Dario v. Mison

In pursuance of its reorganization policy, Pres. Aquino issued EO 127 in 1987

which provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs. Pursuant to EO
127, Commissioner Mison terminated a total of 310 employees. Upon appeal, the
CSC ordered the reinstatement of 283 employees which was upheld by the SC.
The dismissal are not valid. There is no dispute that pursuant to the Freedom
Constitution and the various executive orders issued by Pres. Aquino, the different
departments of government were authorized to carry on reorganization programs.
But the nature and extent of the power to reorganize were circumscribed by the
 source of the power itself. The Reorganization process is made up of two stages.
The first stage, which was effected pursuant to Proclamation 3, allowed removals
“not for cause,” and it ended on 02 February 1987. On the other hand, the second
stage is a continuing one from 02 February 1987 pursuant to the 1987 Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution requires that removal “not for cause” must be a result of
reorganization. Such removals must also pass the test of good faith, a test
obviously not required under the first stage which was envisioned as a purgation.

A reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy

or to make the bureaucracy more efficient. Good faith, as a component of
reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of each case.
In the case at bar, there was lack of good faith. Mison’s argument that the
reorganization is progressive would be valid only if it was pursuant to Proclamation
3. However, in spite of her immense revolutionary power, Pres. Aquino still
promulgated EO 17 which established

safeguards against the propensity that accompany reorganizations and

established the rule that dismissals should be based on findings of inefficiency,
graft and unfitness to render public service. Assuming then that the reorganization
in the first stage was progressive and still valid, such dismissals as ordered by
Mison would still have to comply with the terms set down in EO 17.

Rubenecia v. CSC

SC upheld power of the CSC to transfer jurisdiction over administrative appeals

from the Merit Systems Protection Board to the CSC en banc itself. The 1987
Administrative Code made clear that the MPSB was intended to be an office of the
CSC like any other of the other 13 offices in the CSC. In other words, the MPSB
was a part of the internal structure and organization of the CSC. It was not an
autonomous entity created by law and merely attached for administrative purposes
to the CSC. Thus, it was a proper subject of organizational change which the CSC
is authorized to undertake under the present Civil Service law. The resolution
merely re-allocated to the CSC itself the functions of the MPSB relating to the
determination of administrative disciplinary cases to “streamline the operation of
the CSC.” It did not purport to abolish the MPSB nor to effect the termination of the
relationship of public employment between CSC and any of its officers or
employees.

Abandonment of Office

A public office may become vacant ipso facto by abandonment and non-user.
When an office is once abandoned, the former incumbent cannot legally repossess it
even by forcible re-occupancy.

Abandonment must be total and absolute, and must be under such

circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment thereof. Moreover, the
officer should manifest a clear intention to abandon the office and its duties.
Abandonment by reason of acceptance of another office, in order to be effective and
binding, must spring from and be accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice,
either to keep the old office or renounce it for another. Temporary absence is not
sufficient.

Summers v. Ozaeta

Summers, a cadastral judge, assumed office as CFI judge due to an ad interim

appointment. However, the ad interim appointment was disapproved and
 Summers now seeks to be reappointed as cadastral judge. SC held that Summers’
voluntary acceptance of the position of CFI judge amounted to a waiver of his right
to hold the position of cadastral judge during the term fixed and guaranteed by the
Constitution. He accepted and qualified for the position of judge-at-large by taking
the oath of office of judge-at-large, and not merely of an “acting” judge-at-large.
The situation is one wherein he cannot legally hold two offices of similar category
at the same time.



Zandueta v. Dela Costa

When a public official accepts an appointment to an office newly created or

reorganized by law which new office is incompatible with his former office, qualifies
for the position, takes the necessary oath, and executes acts inherent in the newly
created office, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was
occupying by virtue of his former appointment and he cannot question the
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was appointed.

Floresca v. Quetulio

Floresca’s refusal to assume his pre-war post as Justice of the Peace and his
subsequent acceptance of other employments without any pretense on his part
that he simultaneously continued to perform the functions of the Justice of the
Peace, clearly show deliberate abandonment of the latter office.

Ortiz v. De Guzman

Ortiz allowed three years to elapse since he was ousted from office without
having taken any steps to reclaim his former office. SC held that he cannot ask for
reinstatement. A public employee who voluntarily abandons his office for a long
time is estopped from asking for reinstatement. In order to constitute an
abandonment of office, it must be total, and under such circumstances as to clearly
indicate an absolute relinquishment. Temporary absence is not sufficient where no
statute fixes the period beyond which the absence must continue. In all cases, the
officer should manifest a clear intention to abandon the office and its duties. Yet,
this intention may be inferred from his conduct. If his acts and statements are such
as to clearly indicate absolute relinquishment, a vacancy will be thereby created
and no judicial determination is necessary. When once abandoned, the former
incumbent cannot legally repossess the office.

Madrid v. Auditor General

One claiming the right to a position in the civil service must institute the proper
proceeding within one year from the date of separation, otherwise he is deemed
to have abandoned his office or even acquiesced or consented to his removal, and
thus is not entitled to seek reinstatement. The rationale is to inform the
Government of the rightful holder of the office and to prevent payment of salary to
both claimants.

Magana v. Auditor General

Having accepted the benefits accruing from the abolition of his office, he is
estopped from questioning its validity or deemed to have waived the right to
contest the same.


 Villegas v. Subido

Villegas did not abandon his office as mayor of the City of Manila when he
assumed the position of Director of NAWASA because he had been merely
designated in an acting capacity and was not appointed to the said position.

Tan v. Gimenez

The fact that, during the time his appeal was pending and was thus deprived
of his office and salary, an employee sought employment in another branch of the
government does not constitute abandonment of his former position.

Acceptance of an Incompatible Office

He who, while occupying one office, accepts another office incompatible with
the first, ipso facto absolutely vacates the first office. That the second office is inferior
to the first does not affect the rule. And even though the title to the second office fails
as where election is void, the rule is still the same, nor can the officer then regain the
possession of his former office to which another has been appointed or elected.

If the law or Constitution as an expression of public policy forbids the

acceptance by a public officer of any other office other than that which he holds, it is
not a case of incompatibility but of legal prohibition.

Incompatibility of offices exists where:

(a) There is conflict in such duties and functions so that the performance of
the duties of one interferes with the performance of the duties of another,
as to render it improper for considerations of public policy for one person to
retain both.

(b) One is subordinate to the other and is subject in some degree to its
supervisory powers for in such situation where both are held by the same
person, the design that one acts as a check on the other would be frustrated.

(c) The Constitution or the law itself, for reasons of public policy, declares
the incompatibility even though there is no inconsistency in the nature and
functions of the offices.

Exceptions to the Rule on Holding of Incompatible Offices

(a) Where the officer cannot vacate the first office by his own act, upon the
principle that he will not be permitted to thus do indirectly what he could not
do directly, as where the law requires the approval of the provincial board
before a municipal official can resign.

(b) First office is held under a different government from that which
conferred the second.

(c) Officer is expressly authorized by law to accept another office.

(d) Second office is temporary.

Resignation

A resignation of a public officer need not be in any particular form, unless some
form is prescribed by statute. Ordinarily, it may either be in writing or by parol. The
conduct of an employee may properly be regarded as constituting a resignation from
the position held by him. However, to constitute a complete and operative resignation
of public office, there must be an intention to relinquish a part of the term,
accompanied by the act of relinquishment.

The right of a public officer to resign is well recognized, even where it is

provided than an officer may hold over until election and qualification of a successor.
The right is sometimes recognized or secured by constitution or statute.

The views in the various jurisdictions are conflicting in regard to what

constitutes acceptance of a resignation and whether an acceptance is required.
According to some authorities, no acceptance is necessary to render a resignation
effective, especially when the resignation is unconditional and purports to take effect
immediately. Indeed, it may be provided by statute that the resignation of a public
officer is to take effect at the time of filing it.

However, many other cases take the view that to be effective, the resignation
must be accepted by competent authority. Without acceptance, the resignation is
nothing and the officer remains in office. (63 Am Jur 2d., sec. 163)

Prof. Barlongay: Two (2) elements are necessary to constitute an effective

acceptance:

(1) intention to relinquish office coupled with actual relinquishment; and

(2) acceptance of resignation.

Gonzales v. Hernandez

Gonzales filed a letter of resignation the pertinent portion of which reads: “ x x

x subject to the result of my appeal with the Civil Service Board of Appeals, and to
the provisions of the Resolution of the Cabinet on July 17, 1939.” SC held that
Gonzales, although his conditional resignation was unconditionally accepted,
cannot be considered as having resigned from office. There was no resignation to
speak of. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or
employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position. In the
case at bar, there was no such intention as Gonzales’ resignation was subject to
the result of his appeal.



Ortiz v. COMELEC

Petitioner’s separation from the government as a result of the reorganization

ordained by former Pres. Aquino may not be considered a resignation within the
law’s contemplation. Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an
officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. To
constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee
must show a clear intention to relinquish his position accompanied by the act of
relinquishment and its acceptance by competent and lawful authority. Based on
the facts, petitioner’s resignation lacks the element of clear intention to surrender
his position. We cannot presume such intention from the letter he sent placing
 himself at the disposal of the President. He did not categorically state that he was
unconditionally giving up his position. It should be good to note that said letter was
actually a response to Proclamation No. 1 of Pres. Aquino calling all appointive
public officials to offer their “courtesy resignation.”

A “courtesy resignation” cannot properly be interpreted as resignation in a legal

sense. It just manifests the submission of a person to the will of the political authority.

Prof. Barlongay: Courtesy resignation is not allowed in (1) career positions and
(2) non-career positions with security of tenure (i.e. local elective officials).

Removal for Cause

No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except

for cause provided by law (Sec. 2(3), Art. IX, 1987 Constitution).

Grounds for Removal from Office

For Presidential appointees, Prof. Barlongay states that there is no specific law
providing for the grounds for their removal. Determination of grounds is just a matter
of practice and by analogy, the grounds used for non-presidential appointees are
made applicable.

For civil service officials and employees, see Sec. 46, Book V, E.O. No. 292
which provides for at least 30 grounds for disciplinary action.

For local elective officials, Sec. 60 of the Local Government Code provides for
the grounds where an elective local official may be disciplined, suspended or removed
from office.

Misconduct need not be “in office” in case of appointive officers.

Misconduct must be “in office” in case of elective officers.

Nera v. Garcia

Under the Revised Administrative Code, the rule in preventive suspension

provides that a Bureau Chief may suspend, with the approval of the head of the
department, any subordinate officer or employee if he is charged with dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty. The same
words are expressed in the civil service law. From these provisions, suspension
was proper even if the dishonest act was not in the performance of his duty since
under the Revised Administrative Code and the Civil Service Law, dishonesty was
not qualified by the phrase “in the performance of duty.”

Ochate v. Ty Deling

The SC held that the facts alleged in the administrative charge, as

substantiated by the affidavits of the complainants, do not justify the administrative
proceedings instituted against the petitioner and his suspension by the governor.
The alleged libel imputed to the mayor was not such misconduct even if the term
“misconduct in office” be taken in its broadest sense. The radio broadcast in which
 the objectionable utterances were made had nothing to do with his official functions
and duties as a mayor.

Misconduct committed during a prior term, not a ground for dismissal

Pascual v. Provincial Board

The SC held that the weight of authority follows the rule which denies the right
to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term. Offenses
committed or acts done during a previous term are generally held not to furnish
cause for removal and this is especially true where the Constitution provides that
the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from
office and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was
elected and appointed. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from
other terms and that re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefore.

Aguinaldo v. Santos

SC held that Aquinaldo should not be removed from office. His re-election to
the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending
before it moot and academic.

Offenses committed or acts done, during a previous term are generally not held
to furnish cause for removal. The Court should never remove a public officer for
acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive
the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man
to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they

disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if guilty of any. It is not for the court,
by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overruled the will of the people.

The rule then is that a public officer cannot be removed for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, since his reelection to office operates
as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove him therefore. This rule, however, is not applicable to criminal
cases pending against the petitioner for acts he may have committed during the
failed coup.

Transfer from One Position to Another May or May Not Constitute

Violation of Security of Tenure

A transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent

rank, level, or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment.

It shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public
service, in which case, the employee concerned shall be informed of the reasons
therefore. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the transfer, he may
appeal to the SC.

The transfer may be from one department or agency to another or from one
organizational unit to another in the same department or agency; Provided, however
 that any movement from the non-career service to the career service shall not be
considered a transfer.

Lacson v. Romero

Lacson was appointed provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental by the President.

However, three years after, another person was appointed to the same position
while Lacson was nominated to the position of provincial fiscal of Tarlac. Lacson
never accepted the appointment and did not assume the duties of said office. The
SC held that Lacson has the right to occupy the office of provincial fiscal of Negros
Oriental as he neither accepted nor assumed the office of provincial fiscal of Tarlac
and no one can compel his to do so.

The intended transfer of Lacson to Tarlac, if carried out without the approval of
Lacson, would be equivalent to a removal from his office in Negros Oriental. The
reason is that a fiscal is appointed for each province and Lacson could not legally
hold and occupy the two posts of fiscal of Tarlac and Negros Oriental
simultaneously. Therefore, to be a fiscal of Tarlac must mean his removal from
office in Negros.

Since the transfer in the case at bar is considered a removal, such should be
for cause in order for the other person to legally occupy the office in Negros. There
was no cause for Lacson’s removal. He therefore remains as fiscal of Negro.

Termination of Temporary Appointment

Quitiquit v. Villacorta

The appointment being temporary in character, the same can be terminated at

pleasure by the appointing power.

Ferrer v. de Leon

One holding an office in a temporary capacity may be ousted at anytime with

or without cause.

What determines character of appointment

Hojilla v. Marino

The controlling factor in determining the character of the appointment is the

appointment itself. Even if a position is permanent, if the appointment is made
temporary, the appointment is determinative. What is determinative is not the
nature of the office (permanent or temporary), but the nature of the appointment.

One appointed to a position of another who was illegally suspended or

dismissed, holds it in temporary capacity and must yield to the latter. The reason for
this is that there was no valid termination.

Recall

The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
 system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and
referendum …(Sec. 3, Art. X, 1987 Constitution)

Procedure for recall is provided in Sections 69-75 of the Local Government

Code.

Garcia v. COMELEC

SC upheld initiation of recall through the Preparatory Recall Assembly. Recall

is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of
office. The people’s prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident to their
sovereign power, and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is
implied in all government operations. There are two reasons why a Preparatory
Recall Assembly is allowed: (1) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall through
direct action of the people; (2) to cut down on expenses. Moreover, the Constitution
does not provide for any particularly mode of initiating recall elections. Initiation by
the Preparatory Recall Assembly may be considered as initiation of recall by the
people, although done indirectly through representatives. In any event, the
composition of the Preparatory Recall Assembly is politically neutral, so loss of
confidence cannot be said to be inspired by difference in political party affiliation.

Prescription of Right to Office

Unabia v. City Mayor

No reinstatement is possible in the case at bar. Even if the removal was void
for lack of cause, Unabia filed his petition for reinstatement with the CFI after a
delay of one year and fifteen days. Any person claiming a right to a position in the
civil service is required to file his petition for reinstatement within one year,
otherwise he is deemed to have abandoned his office. Reason is public policy and
convenience, stability in the public service.

Prof. Barlongay: The one-year period is the prescriptive period to claim public
office (whether through quo warranto or otherwise). The one-year period presupposes
judicial action, not administrative action.

Filing of Certificate of Candidacy

Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code states that any person

holding appointive public offices or positions, including active AFP members, is
considered ipso facto resigned from office by the mere filing of certificate of candidacy.

Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed,
the seat is forever forfeited and nothing, save a new election or appointment, can
restore the ousted official.

 Note: The following provisions have been repealed by Sec. 14 of R.A. 9006 (Fair
Election Act of 2001):

 Sec. 67 of B.P. 881 which states that any elective official, whether
national or local, running for any office OTHER than one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice
President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from office by the
mere filing of a certificate of candidacy.
  The first proviso of Sec. 11 of R.A. 8436 which states that "Any
elective official, running for any officer other than one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned upon the start of
the campaign period."

Performance of Act or Accomplishment of Purpose for which the Office was

Created

Performance of act or accomplishment of purpose renders

office functus officio.