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A Homeric Challenge: The Purpose and Meaning of the Poetry Critique in Book 10

of Plato’s Republic

Abstract

This article defends and develops a dialectical interpretation of the book 10 poetry
critique of Plato’s Republic. Socrates’ attack on Homer is argued to be ironic and
designed to test Glaucon in various ways, and generate interest in the concept of imitation
and Homeric poetry in the context of the psychology of the Republic. This article also
shows how Socrates subtly indicates how a successful defense of Homer might proceed.

By far the most controversial discussion on the topic of poetry in all of Plato’s

dialogues is Socrates’ critique of imitative poetry in book 10 of the Republic.1 Although

many scholars have interpreted this section as an unambiguous rejection of Homer’s

epics,2 this line of interpretation typically relies on the assumption that is reasonable to

1 Socrates’ attitude towards Homer and poetry throughout the dialogues is perhaps the most
perplexing and hotly disputed aspects of Plato’s writings. This article focuses only on the
discussion of imitative poetry in book 10 of the Republic—which includes by far Socrates’ most
critical comments about Homer and poetry in any of the dialogues. Hence, if Socrates’ criticism
of Homer in Republic 10 is most plausibly interpreted as ironic praise of the poet, the
implications for assessing Plato’s overall attitude towards Homer would be substantial. For an
excellent general discussion of Plato and poetry, see Ferrari, 1989, 92-148.

2 For example, Moss 2007, 443 concludes: “Plato’s argument against poetry in Republic 10 is far
more substantial than it first appears. He is not merely making the complaint that various
influential poets happen to write ethically harmful poetry. Rather he has presented an argument,
based on metaphysical and psychological theory, that only ethically harmful poetry – poetry that
reflects and reinforces the flaws in popular morality – can compel us and move us with its
portrayal of human affairs. Persuasive, pleasing, poikilon (multicolored) poetry has what
beneficial but austere haploun (simple) poetry lacks: the power over ordinary people that makes
poetry a matter of such concern to Plato in the first place, and the power over even a Plato or a
Socrates that make them wish it could be redeemed.” For similar “mouthpiece” interpretations of
the book 10 poetry critique see Janaway, 1995; Annas, 1981 335-344; Urmson, 1997; Nehemas,
1982; Popper 1962, 228n39.
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interpret the book 10 poetry critique as a “proto-essay” 3 in which Plato uses Socrates as a

“mouthpiece” to expresses his own sincere philosophical views on Homer’s poems.

Several details of the text, however, suggest that this assumption might be dubious, such

as Socrates’ indication at the outset of the poetry critique (599b) that there is an

“antidote” that would allow for one to hear poetry without ill effect; the irony that

Socrates seems to employ in a series of ad hominem criticisms against Homer (at 599d-

601a); and Socrates’ challenge (607c-d) for any lover of imitative poetry to come forward

and demonstrate how such poems can benefit the soul (rather than provide mere

entertainment).

In this article I argue that Socrates’ criticism of Homer and imitative poetry is best

understood as part of a dialectical strategy that he adopts in order to diagnose and correct

certain deficiencies that he recognizes in his interlocutor (Glaucon). 4 I will argue that

Socrates proceeds the way he does in this section in order to test Glaucon’s understanding

of imitation (μίμησις), tragic poetry (especially Homer’s epic poems), and the nature of a

good and successful life. Furthermore, I will argue that in response to Glaucon’s failure

in each of these tests, Socrates attempts to remedy Glaucon’s condition by sowing

rhetorical “seeds” designed to pique his interest in the concept of imitation and Homeric

poetry (especially in light of the psychology of the Republic), as part of a broader effort

to encourage him to reconsider his problematic beliefs about the nature of a good and

successful life.

3 Sayre, 1992, 227; See also Sayre, 1995, 4.

4 In doing so, I will be further developing a line of exegesis previously developed by Planinc
2003, and Moes, 2011 by unpacking further details of Socrates’ testing of Glaucon, and also
providing a detailed analysis of Socrates’ strategy to help remedy Glaucon’s condition.
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One of the major upshots of the forthcoming analysis is that it suggests that Plato

actually does not actually present Socrates in the Republic as hostile to Homer’s epic

poems after all. Rather, I will argue that Plato’s Socrates disapproves of the prevailing

interpretations of Homer that accompanied his status as “the poet who educated Greece”

(606e), and is ever weary of the dangers a shallow interpretation of Homer’s poems can

have on the souls of those brought up in the Hellenic culture of his day.5 However, rather

than attempt to directly explain the lessons of the Iliad and the Odyssey, I will contend

that Plato aims (through Socrates) to inspire his audience to meet a Homeric challenge—

and even provides a few ominous clues that show how this challenge can be met.6

I. The Context of the Book 10 Poetry Critique

In books 8 and 9 of the Republic, Socrates discusses with his interlocutors the

decline of the city/state he has developed, describing the various kinds of flawed

constitutions that exist amongst city/states (timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and

tyranny), along with the kinds of people who correspond to each of these city/states. By

the end of book 9, Glaucon has become convinced that the unjust tyrant is 729 times

more miserable than the just philosopher (587e); this suggests that the argument Socrates

developed based on the city/soul analogy was a resounding success insofar as it showed

Glaucon precisely what he expressed a desire to see in the beginning of book 2—that

5 All translations from Plato’s writings in this article are from Cooper ed. 1997, freely amended.

6 I suspect that Plato modeled this Homeric challenge on Agamemnon’s method of rousing the
Achaeans to battle by means of suggesting the opposite (Il. ii 110-140), which leads (by way of
Athena’s influence) to Odysseus taking the scepter and rousing the troops for battle. Plato seemed
to have hoped to have inspired a bold reader to react likewise, and provide a spirited defense of
Homer’s poems.
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justice is good to possess “for its own sake” (357c). This means that Glaucon now has a

way of understanding justice that would seems to provide the requisite motivation for

him to pursue justice at all costs without taking into consideration how a “reputation for

justice” might “bring him honor and rewards” (357d).

Having successfully reached this conclusion in book 9, Socrates returns to the

subject of poetry in book 10, where he provides what Roochnik 2003, 111 calls one of the

“great riddles” of the Republic, when he asks, “Why does Socrates abruptly and without

explanation return to the theme of poetry in book 10, and then proceed to change

drastically the terms of his earlier critique?” Earlier in the Republic, Socrates stated that

the city would permit a poet “who would imitate the speech of a decent person” (398b),

an assertion which seems to conflict with what he says at the beginning of book 10, when

he states that they were right in earlier not admitting “any [poetry] that is imitative”

(595a). Moreover, the context of the earlier critique was in the context of providing a

musical education for children, where Socrates’ guidelines for censorship seem

reasonable even by today’s standards.7

In the beginning of book 10, Socrates asserts that he sees the rightness of excluding

imitative poetry to be now “even clearer,” due to having “distinguished between the

separate parts of the soul” (595a). In response to Glaucon’s request for clarification,

Socrates says that “all such poetry is likely to distort the understanding (διανοίας) of

anyone who hears it, unless he has the knowledge of what it is really like, as antidote to

7 For example, the first tale that Socrates bans from the guardian’s education program (378e-
479a) is Hesiod’s tale of Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus in the Theogany. A movie which graphically
depicted such a castration would likely receive an R (or possibly X) rating by the Motion Picture
Association of America.
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counteract it” (595b). The word διανοίας was used earlier by Socrates to refer to the third

stage of the divided line (511d), where it occupies a place between belief (πίστιν) and

knowing (νόησιν). Socrates’ use of this term here seems to imply that he is suggesting

that imitative poetry will prevent one from advancing from the third to the fourth stage of

the divided line. In terms of the allegory of the cave and the upper world, someone with a

corrupted διανοία would presumably be unable to “see the things in the world above”

(516a), which could lead to a return to life in the cave and further resistance to being

dragged out of the cave in the future. This is particularly important for Socrates’ primary

interlocutors (Glaucon and Adeimantus), both of whom appear to have spent enough time

with Socrates to have developed a sincere respect for him as a thinker and someone worth

talking to about matters of the upmost importance. Glaucon, in fact, is portrayed in the

beginning of the Republic as being with Socrates when he descends into the Piraeus

(327a), which might be a subtle literary indication that Glaucon has recently spent some

time outside of the cave, presumably engaging in philosophical discussions with

Socrates.

II. The Metaphysical Argument: Beds, Tables, and Imitations

After Socrates expresses hesitation to say what is on his mind due to the “love and

respect” he has had for Homer since he was a child (595b), there is the following

exchange (595c-596a):

Socrates: Listen then, or, rather, answer.

Glaucon: Ask and I will.

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Socrates: Could you tell me what imitation in general is? I don’t entirely

understand what sort of thing imitations are trying to be?

Glaucon: Is it likely, then, that I’ll understand?

Socrates: That wouldn’t be so strange, for people with bad eyesight often

see things before those whose eyesight is keener.

Glaucon: That’s so, but even if something occurred to me, I wouldn’t be

eager to talk about it in front of you. So I’d rather that you did the looking.

Just moments after declaring that imitative poetry should be purged from the

‘beautiful city’, Socrates ironically admits that he does not adequately understand the

concept of imitation, and asks Glaucon for help. Glaucon’s first refusal is understandable

—Socrates obviously has a better grasp of philosophical concepts in general than does

Glaucon, a point Socrates himself grants by suggesting that he is better sighted than him.

However, the reason Glaucon gives in his second denial to share his thoughts on the

matter is troubling: by declining to share his thoughts on what imitation is “in general,”

he seems to indicate that he’s more concerned with how foolish Socrates might make his

suggestions look than he is with his own philosophical development. Thus, Glaucon

appears to be avoiding an opportunity to allow Socrates to purge false notions he might

have about the concept of imitation out of fear of experiencing embarrassment at having

Socrates show his notions to be problematic.

On the other hand, Glaucon was not afraid to be shown foolish by Socrates when he

expressed his doubts about the value of justice at the beginning of book 2; so should

Glaucon develop a personal interest in the concept of imitation that is comparable to the
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interest he shows in the concept of justice early in the Republic, he would likely be open

to having Socrates refute any notions that he might have on the subject. Given these

details, it seems reasonable to explain Socrates’ approach in this section (thus far) in

terms of an attempt to generate interest in Glaucon for the concept of imitation in the

context of Homer and tragic poetry. An advantage of this approach is that it is potentially

capable of explaining the several seemingly strange, conflicting, or absurd statements that

Socrates makes in this section in terms of his intent to indirectly influence Glaucon, so

that he might eventually develop sincere philosophical interest in the concept of imitation

and its relation to poetry.

Socrates next suggests that they conduct an inquiry into the concept of imitation by

making use of their “usual procedure” of hypothesizing “a single form in connection with

each of the many things to which we apply the same name” (596a). Socrates then tells

Glaucon “let’s now take of the many things that you like,” but rather than allowing

Glaucon to choose, Socrates then offers the examples of “beds”8 and tables” (596b),

stating that there “are only two forms of such furniture, one of the bed and one of the

table” (596b). Socrates then distinguishes between three kinds of beds and three

corresponding bed-makers: the carpenter, who makes “a bed” (597a); “god”, whom

makes the form of the bed (597b); and a painter, who makes an “appearance” of a bed

(596e). Socrates then explains that painter is an imitator insofar as “his product is third

removed” (597e) from the “truly real bed” that is “one in nature” (597d).

There are several curious details about this section, including Socrates’ choice of a

bed or table as something that has a single form which applies to many particulars. By

8 The Greek term here (κλίνης) can mean either couch or bed.
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beginning this inquiry into the concept of imitation by positing a form of a bed and a

table, Socrates makes a move that he makes nowhere else in the dialogues. Moreover, in

the Parmenides, a youthful Socrates says that he’s not sure about positing forms for

human beings, fire, or water (130c). So if a youthful—and philosophically promising—

Socrates found good reason to be hesitant about there being forms for these natural

existents, it seems he would be even more skeptical about the existence of forms of man-

made artifacts. Glaucon, however, expresses no concern about whether or not forms of

these artifacts exist or not (and thus seems to have failed a critical test).

Moes 2011, 14 suggests that Socrates mentions couches and tables in this context

“because they are objects that define life in the conventional city for the comfort-loving

Glaucon.” Support for this view can be found by considering that Glaucon himself

specifically mentions κλινῶν and tables (τραπεζῶν) in his objection to the simple

agrarian community Socrates proposes in book 2, when he says, “If they aren’t to suffer

hardship, they should recline on proper couches, dine at a table, and have the delicacies

and desserts that people have nowadays” (372d). Thus, Socrates’ choice of beds and

tables mirrors Glaucon’s previous indication that he considers these highly valuable

items.

Planinc, on the other hand, explains Socrates choice of a bed as an oblique reference

to the bed of Odysseus and Penelope in the Odyssey, which Odysseus built to be

unmovable by using a living tree as a bedpost (Od. xxiii 210-230). Penelope uses her and

Odysseus’ shared knowledge of the nature of this bed as a test to weed out potential

imitators of her true husband (Od. xxiii 123-230). Planinc 2003, 120-21 argues that Plato

borrows from Homer by having Socrates provide a similar test involving a bed, in order
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to test Glaucon’s “understanding of the nature of poetic imitation.” Planinc argues that

Socrates makes Glaucon “ponder different kinds of couches and their relation to a couch

made by a god” in order to test his “familiarity with Homer’s beds.” According to

Planinc, “Plato’s presentation of the test is based on the scene of Penelope’s testing of

Odysseus, but he refigures the episode in the Odyssey as a comedy, reserving its dramatic

intimacy for the trope of Socrates’ relation to his silent, and amused, auditor.” Planinc

concludes that Glaucon “fails the bed test” insofar as he is exposed as a “man who would

censor Homer as someone with an inadequate understanding of the nature of poetic

imitation.”9 Indeed, it seems likely that if Glaucon had made the connection between the

discussion of the metaphysics of beds and images of beds and Homer’s inspired use of a

bed10 in the Odyssey, he might not be inclined to so readily agree with Socrates

characterization of him as a mere painter of words with no knowledge (or even right

opinion) of the subjects he writes about.

A synthesis of Plancinc’s and Moes’ respective explanations for Socrates’ choice of a

bed might shed light on what Socrates is up to in this section: Perhaps by choosing

examples of items that are both highly valuable to Glaucon and central to a mature

understanding of the Odyssey, Socrates is attempting to subtly influence Glaucon to think

of Homer’s use of a bed in the climactic moment of the Odyssey, which would likely

9 Planinc 2003, 122. Planinc notes that this casts Socrates into the role of an unworthy suitor.

10 The term for bed in the Odyssey is εὐνήν (Od. xxiii 179). Although one might argue that
Socrates’ use of a different term counts against Planinc’s Homeric exegesis of this section, it is
worth pointing out that for Socrates to have used the Homeric term would have made the
connection between his example of the bed and Homer’s use of the concept painfully obvious,
which would in effect compromise the ironic nature of the book 10 poetry critique by giving
away too much. Cf. Vlastos, 1991, 22, “When Irony riddles it risks being misunderstood.”
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cause him to resist Socrates’ criticism of him as a mere imitator. If Glaucon were to have

such an insight, it seems reasonable that he might develop loftier notions about the ideal

use of beds and tables than the hedonistic use he appears to currently envision. If this is

right, then Socrates is not merely testing Glaucon in this section, but is also attempting to

administer him a potential remedy—a remedy that will only work if Glaucon (eventually)

makes the connection himself, and realizes that Homer does much more than “paint” a

mere image of a bed.

In the remainder of book 10, Socrates appears to be acting to correct at least three

dianoetic deficiencies he notices in Glaucon: (1) a shallow understanding and

disinterested attitude in both the concept of imitation and the content of Homer’s epics

(as evidenced by his ready agreement with Socrates’ metaphysical argument); (2) a

preoccupation with how he is perceived by others (as evidenced by his expressed fear of

being made to look foolish by Socrates); and (3) a shallow and hedonistic view of what

constitutes a good life (as evidenced by the value he places on luxurious items, such as

couches and tables).11

III. The Knowledge Argument: Socrates’ Ad Hominem Assault on Homer and Hesiod

After developing the painting analogy, Socrates next provides a series of five ad

hominem arguments designed to show that Homer is like a painter insofar he did not have

knowledge of “warfare, generalship, city government, and people’s education” (599c),

11 This suggests that the higher studies outlined by Socrates in book 7 (arithmetic, geometry,
solid geometry, astronomy, and harmony) might be unpacked by incorporating the study of
Homer’s epics, an in depth analysis of the concept of imitation, and the relation of pleasure and
pain to the good. If this is right, mastery of the studies of book 7 would seem equivalent to
mastery of the material Socrates discusses at length in books 8-10.
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but rather was “third removed from the truth about virtue” (599d). Beck shows that all

five of these criticisms can be applied to either Plato or Socrates. 12 In order to appreciate

the ironic nature of this line of criticism, it is only necessary to consider Socrates’ final

argument, where he compares Homer and Hesiod to the sophists Prodicus and Protagoras

(600c-e):

But, Glaucon, if Homer had really been able to educate people and make

them better, if he’d known about these things and not merely about how to

imitate them, wouldn’t he have had many companions and been loved and

honored by them? Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, and a great

many others are able to convince anyone who associates with them in

private that he wouldn’t be able to manage is household or city unless they

themselves supervise his education, and they are so intensely loved

because of this wisdom of theirs that their disciples do everything but

carry them around on their shoulders. So do you suppose that, if Homer

had been able to benefit people and make them more virtuous, his

companions would have allowed either him or Hesiod to wander around as

rhapsodes? Instead, wouldn’t they have clung tighter to them than to gold

and compelled them to live with them in their homes, or, if they failed to

12 Beck’s comments are printed in Moes, 2011, 13n34. All five of these ad hominem arguments
seem to depend on the assumption that the poems of Homer and Hesiod don’t count as “fine
deeds” left behind as “memorials of themselves” that render the authors worthy of “the subject of
a eulogy [rather] than the author of one (599b).” Socrates makes it abundantly clear in books 2,
3, and 10, these authors’ poems have been extraordinary influential on the culture of his day.
What needs to be determined is whether or not the details of the text indicate that Socrates and
Plato really believe Homer and Hesiod to be nothing more than mere superficial imitators that
reflect no valuable insight into the nature of mankind.
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persuade them to do so, wouldn’t they have followed them wherever they

went until they had received sufficient education?

Rather than even considering the content of the texts produced by these two great

poets, Socrates suggests that they are not worth studying because if these authors knew

anything about the subject matters on which they write, they would have had a lot of

followers who would persuade them to stop living as wandering rhapsodes, but to instead

open up a school to teach them virtue! Yet Socrates never opened up a school, and never

received payment for his services, so this criticism would seem to apply to him as well.

Beck argues that this criticism is actually a veiled compliment for Homer and Hesiod,

since “the sophists were popular precisely because they were skilled at studying,

magnifying, and manipulation public opinion,” while those “who do imitate ‘the divine

form and image’ are neglected and misunderstood.” Glaucon’s response, however,

appears to be whole-hearted agreement, which suggests that he considers fame and

popularity (and the willingness of people to pay someone money) to be accurate

measures of whether or not one has knowledge of human excellence. 13 Glaucon,

therefore, appears to have failed yet another of Socrates’ tests: he judged Homer and

Hesiod to be less likely than sophists such as Prodicus and Protagoras to possess

13 Moes 2011, 3n7 makes a similar point about Ion: “The real center of attraction for Ion is not a
god but the audience who can bring him money and fame.” I’m not convinced that Glaucon
believes in these principles as whole-heartedly as does Ion. Rather, I believe that Socrates’
rhetorical strategy in this section involves eliciting Glaucon’s agreement with various problematic
arguments, and then providing him with both motivation and requisite hints that might lead him
to reconsider these arguments in later reflections. Socrates gets little resistance from Glaucon to
any of these arguments largely due to his being tired near the end of a very long discussion, as
well as his having been shown by Socrates precisely what he wanted to see—that a just man
really is truly better off than an unjust man. Nevertheless, Glaucon’s ready agreement with the
notion that fame and money are reliable standards of success is problematic in that it suggests
that, at the very least, he does not find them to be especially troubling standards.
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knowledge of great importance on account of their reputation of being mere wandering

rhapsodes, rather than highly paid so-called teachers of virtue.

Socrates’ use of knowledge of a basis for literary criticism raises a key issue: what

kind of painting of a bed would a master bed-maker paint? A key distinction between the

carpenter and the painter is that the painter looks to a mere appearance of a bed in making

his painting of the bed, whereas the carpenter looks to the form of the bed. As Moss 2007,

419 notes, “the appearance of a bed – what the painter paints – is nearly as far ‘removed

from truth’ as the painting of a bed: both are mere images of the particular bed (and

therefore copies of copies of the Form).” Moss, however, does not consider the

possibility that Homer might be akin to a master carpenter who also paints a bed, or what

such a painting would look like if made by one with knowledge of the form of the bed.

Presumably the latter painting would depict the bed being used in a way that best

facilitates in viewers insight into the form of the bed (perhaps by creatively representing

its ideal use and function), rather than merely imitating the appearance of a bed. Thus, if

Homer’s poems do not seem to represent mere appearances of the activities of gods and

men, but rather depict them in a way that best facilitates in its readers or hearers insight

into the ideal activity of gods and men, then there is nothing in the painter/maker/form

illustration that suggests that Homer could not have had knowledge of the subject matters

that benefit humankind most. Socrates suggests such a possibility himself when he

indicates that if Homer was “even second” removed from the truth (and therefore

analogous to the carpenter) he would be “capable of knowing what ways of life make

people better in private or in public” (599d).

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Socrates next distinguishes between a user, maker, and painter, arguing that the

makers of the artifacts used by horsemen and flute-players (such as reigns and bits and

flutes) must have a right opinion about these things, having been informed by the users of

these items (601c-e). The painter, on the other hand, Socrates says “has neither

knowledge nor right opinion about whether the things he makes are fine or bad” (602a).

Again, there’s nothing preventing a maker or user from composing a painting that is not a

mere appearance of a flute-players’ flute or a horseman’s reigns and bit. Thus, Socrates’

conclusion that an “imitator has no worthwhile knowledge of anything he imitates”

(602b) applies only to painters or poets who merely imitate the appearances they see in

an unreflective manner, without having either right opinion or knowledge of the things

that they depict. Thus, unless one is convinced by Socrates’ series of seemingly ironic ad

hominem arguments, there is no reason at this point to conclude that Socrates (or Plato)

believes that these criticisms apply to Homer.

IV. Diagnosis and Remedy: The Psychological Critique 1

Socrates next continues with his testing of Glaucon (presumably in order to

formulate an accurate diagnosis of his condition as possible), but also attempts to remedy

for Glaucon’s condition by introducing a series of re-orientating insights14 that illuminate

the relationship between poetry and the psychology of the Republic. Socrates develops

14 Miller, 1986, 6-7, identifies three dialectical stages that repeat themselves in the dialogues:
First, Socrates elicits the view of his interlocutor, followed by a refutation of that view, and then a
“re-orientating insight” designed to “show the path through the aporia.” In book 10 of the
Republic, however, Socrates is operating much more covertly than in Miller’s first two stages.
After proceeding to elicit agreement from a disinterested (and likely mentally exhausted) Glaucon
to an absurd series of proposals regarding Homer and tragic poetry, Socrates doesn’t bother
refuting these proposals, but instead provides a several hints that suggest they are problematic,
followed by a series of re-orientating insights into the nature of poetry and psychology that
provide Glaucon with the conceptual resources to eventually refute this shallow view of Homer
himself.
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the analogy between painting and poetry into a psychological critique of imitative poetry,

arguing that imitations, such as images seen in water (602c) and images that painters

paint (602d), are capable of deceiving us by consorting “with a part of us that is far from

reason” (603b). Socrates then extends this critique from including “things we see” to the

imitations “we hear—the ones we call poetry” (603b). He then explains just what it is that

imitative poetry imitates (603c):

We say that imitative poetry imitates human beings acting voluntarily or

under compulsion, who believe that, as a result of these actions, they are

doing either well or badly and who experience either pleasure or pain in

all this. Does it imitate anything apart from this?

Having identified (at least partially) what it is that imitative poetry imitates, Socrates

gets to the heart of a psychological danger he seems to sincerely be concerned about in

respect to poetry, reminding Glaucon of how they had earlier discussed how if a “decent

man” happened to “lose his son or other prized-possession,” 15 he would “bear it more

easily than the other sorts of people” (603e). Socrates notes how such a man would no

doubt grieve, but would do so less in public than in private (604a), and how in resisting to

“venture to say and do lots of things that he’d be ashamed to be heard saying or seen

doing,” it would be “reason and law that tells him to resist his pain, while experience of it

tells him to give in” (604a-b). Thus, Socrates concludes that the presence of “two

opposite inclinations in a person in relation to the same thing at the same time” suggests

15 The reference to the loss of a son would likely bring to mind Priam’s excessive mourning of
Hector in the Iliad; the loss of a prized possession likely refers to Achilles’ reaction to
Agamemnon’s taking of Briseis, and also foreshadows Socrates’ later use (in the myth of Er) of
Homer’s portrayal of Ajax’s mental anguish in Hades (Od. xi 542-568) on account of losing the
Arms of Achilles to Odysseus.
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that “he must also have two parts,” and only one of these parts is “ready to obey the law

wherever it leads” (604b). Socrates lists four points that the law has to offer on this matter

(604c):

1. It isn’t clear whether or not such things will ultimately turn out to be good or bad

in the end.
2. It doesn’t make the future any better by taking such things too hard.
3. Human affairs don’t matter all that much.
4. Grief prevents deliberation, the very thing that we need to “accept what happened

[…] and then arrange our affairs in whatever way reason determines to be best.”16

Socrates stresses that one “mustn’t hug the hurt part and spend our time weeping and

wailing like children when they trip,” but instead “we should always accustom our souls

to turn as quickly as possible to healing the disease and putting the disaster right,

replacing lamentation with cure” (604c-d). He then explains how a “rational and quiet”

person who is effective at healing themselves in this way is not easy to imitate, in

comparison with “this excitable character” who admits of “many multicolored imitations”

16 Telemachus offers perhaps even better advice in this respect to his mother in the Odyssey. In
response to her asking the minstrel Phemios to stop singing about the disastrous “Homecoming of
the Achaean’s” (Od. i 378), calling it a “bitter tale that wears my heart away” (Od i 392),
Telemachus tells Penelope: “Mother, why do you grudge our own dear minstrel joy of song,
wherever his thought may lead? Poets are not to blame, but Zeus who gives what fate he pleases
to adventurous men. Here is no reason for reproof: to sing the news of the Danaans! Men like best
a song that rings like morning on the ear. But your must nerve yourself and try to listen. Odysseus
was not the only one at Troy never to know the day of his homecoming. Others, how many
others, lost their lives!” Penelope reacts to her son’s advice by withdrawing in wonder with “her
son’s clear wisdom echoing in her mind,” only to weep for Odysseus until Athena casts “sweet
sleep on her eyes (Od. i 408-414). I would find it surprising if Plato had not given Telemachus’
defense of Phemios’ song to his mother consideration in writing this section of the Republic,
especially considering that he has Socrates cite this passage earlier in the Republic, where he
argues against a potential misinterpretation of this passage as indicating support for a “new way
of singing” (424b) that defies the laws established for music in books 2 and 3. This suggests that
Socrates regards the passage, properly interpreted, to support the ‘old’ and presumably right way
of singing that is rooted in the law.
 Page 17 of 30

(604d-e). He then claims that the imitative poet must be related to the excitable and

multicolored character “if he’s to attain a good reputation with the majority of the people”

(605a). Socrates then concludes (1) that a popular poet must be like a (mere) painter,

since such poetry must appeal to the part of the soul that is “inferior rather than to the

best part” (605a); and (2) that the “imitative poet puts a bad constitution in the soul of

each individual by making images that are far removed from the truth and by gratifying

the irrational part” (605b-c).

Socrates does not suggest the possibility that a poem might “attain a good reputation

with the majority of the people” while also providing beneficial moral, political, or

spiritual content. Is it really reasonable to believe that an author such as Plato wasn’t

aware of this possibility? Or that he didn’t believe that a clever, inspired, and creative

painter might paint something that conveys much more than a mere appearance? If not,

these details seem best understood in terms of Socrates continuing to test Glaucon,

providing him an opportunity to resist the ridiculous claim that the content of Homer’s

epics can be explained by the poet merely telling the masses what they want to hear.

V. Administering the Antidote: The Psychological Critique 2 ‘

Having diagnosed Glaucon as having a shallow understanding of imitation, poetry,

and a successful life, Socrates continues to attempt to remedy his condition with his

account of “the most serious charge” against imitative poetry. Socrates claims that, save

for a few, imitative poetry is “able to corrupt even decent people” (605c) by bringing

satisfaction to the part of the soul “that hungers and for the satisfaction of weeping and

wailing (606a),” while also causing the part “that is best by nature” to relax its guard over

the “lamenting part,” since “it hasn’t been adequately educated by reason or habit (606a).
 Page 18 of 30

The significance of this qualifying remark should not be overlooked—the reason that

imitative poetry is problematic, according to Socrates, lies in the poor education of all but

a few of its hearers/readers. Socrates makes this clear, when he concludes (606b):

I suppose that only a few are able to figure out that the enjoyment of other

people’s sufferings is necessarily transferred to our own and that the

pitying part, if it is nourished and strengthened on the sufferings of others,

won’t be easily held in check when we ourselves suffer.

Socrates here suggests that in pitying someone such as Achilles or Oedipus when

their fortunes take a turn for the worse, we run the risk of sowing the seeds to overly

indulge in self-pity when similar personal tragedies happen to us. At the same time,

however, he again mentions an elite group of people who are well aware of the profound

effect that imitative poetry can have on the soul, and thus are presumably capable of

hearing or reading it without corrupting themselves. Furthermore, Socrates tells Glaucon

precisely what it is that these people “are able to figure out”—the pity that poetry inspires

its listeners/readers to feel for characters who excessively mourn can lead one to emulate

such behavior later on. Socrates, therefore, suggests that as long as Glaucon is able to

remember this ‘inside information’ when he hears any poem, he will experience no harm.

However, even if possession of this ‘inside information’ permits one to safely

indulge in all kinds of poetry, there remains the further question of whether or not certain

poems are beneficial for educational purposes. An affirmative answer to this question can

be grounded in the ability of good poets to cultivate in their readers or hearers the ability

to experience love and friendship with one another. Socrates indirectly states that

successful poets (such as Homer) have just this ability, although he only mentions a
 Page 19 of 30

potentially negative consequence of this phenomenon. That is, the argument behind

Socrates’ “most serious charge” relies on the premise that poetry has the ability to cause

people to feel pity for others; this implies that it is a potentially valuable resource for

cultivating in people the ability to feel pity, empathy and compassion towards those who

suffer. Imitative poetry, on Socrates’ argument, is only problematic insofar as one comes

to experience the psychologically unhealthy pleasure that accompanies excessive

lamentation and other problematic behavior.17

Socrates also applies the same argument to laughter, suggesting that there are jokes

that we “would be ashamed to tell” but that we “very much enjoy hearing and don’t

detest as something evil in comic plays or in private” (606c). Thus, Socrates concludes

that by indulging in comic poetry, one “will be led into becoming a figure of fun” where

one’s “own affairs are concerned” (607c). However, Socrates critique of comedy seems to

refer to plays in which humor is provided through characters who display outlandish

buffoonery (such as in Aristophanes’ plays); it is not clear that this critique would extend

to the highbrow ironic humor we see in the dialogues.18

Socrates adds that “sex, anger, and all the desires, pleasures, and pains” are all things

that poetry “nurtures and waters” and “establishes as rulers in us when they ought to

17 Socrates further develops the re-orientating insights of the psychological critique in the
remainder of book 10, in which he argues that the soul is immortal, and suggests that we are
living our current lives because of choices made before we were born. To the degree that a poem
reflects insights that coheres well with these themes, it would seem that the poem is useful;
Socrates’ view in the Republic seems to be that Homer’s psychological insights were highly
valuable, but that his cosmology and metaphysics needed to be enhanced with certain Orphic
principles, including the immortality and transmigration of the soul, both of which are explored in
the remainder of book 10.

18 Such as Socrates’ counter-offer to the sentence of death in the Apology (36e), when he argues
that he should instead receive “free meals in the Prytaneum.”
 Page 20 of 30

wither and be ruled” (607d). He then expresses agreement with the consensus view that

Homer is “the most poetic of the tragedians, and the first amongst them,” but then asserts

that “hymns to the gods and eulogies to good people are the only poetry we can admit

into our city” (606e-607a). This latter comment sets the stage for a defense of Homer’s

poems in terms of one (or both) of these two criteria, or perhaps in terms of a third

criterion.19 Socrates confirms that he would indeed be very pleased to see some such

defense, when he suggests that “such poetry should return from exile when it has

successfully defended itself” (607d). He suggests that poets might make such a defense in

“lyric”, but also extends the challenge to non-poet lovers of poetry “to speak in prose on

its behalf and to show that it not only gives pleasure but is beneficial both to constitutions

and to human life.” Thus, Socrates ends the book 10 poetry critique with an explicit offer

for someone to take up a Homeric challenge, and appears to have already provided

several hints (largely in the form of easily refutable arguments) as to how such a

challenge can be met.

VI. Training the Lion: Socrates’ Portrayal of Ajax in the Myth of Er

Shortly after banning Homer from the ‘beautiful city’, Socrates makes use of several

Homeric characters in the myth of Er, which seems to call into question the suggestion

that Socrates finds no potentially valuable philosophical material in Homer’s epics. At

one point, Socrates presents what seems to be the final take-home lesson of the Republic

19 A successful defense of Homer would then require either showing how the Iliad and the
Odyssey are either hymns to the gods and/or eulogies to good people, or arguing that these tales
are worth studying in spite of being neither. My analysis focuses on the latter approach, although
it is worth noting that Socrates also seems to have suggested that these works could be
understood as hymns to the gods when he earlier acknowledged that Homer’s stories about the
gods might have an allegorical meaning (378d). Furthermore, Socrates adaptation of Penelope’s
bed test seems to be a tacit acknowledgement the Odyssey does indeed provide a eulogy of at
least one good person—Penelope (and perhaps Odysseus too).
 Page 21 of 30

(618b-619b), in which he stresses the importance of learning as much as possible about

the soul and human nature. He then presents a number of characters from Homer’s epics

making somewhat comical choices in choosing their next lives, including three of the

heroes from the Iliad, Ajax, Agamemnon, and Odysseus, and also Thersites (the agitator).

Socrates provides two ominous clues in his account of the soul of Ajax choosing his

next life (619a-b) that suggest he approves of Homer’s portrayal of Ajax. The first clue is

Ajax choosing the life of a lion, which Socrates describes as driven by his unwillingness

to become a man once again, due to the deep psychological trauma he experienced in the

aftermath of losing the Armor of Achilles to Odysseus (619a-b).20 This choice connects

Ajax with Socrates’ earlier representation of the spirited part of the soul (θυμός) as a lion

in book 9 (588d). The second clue is Socrates’ naming of Ajax as the 20 th to choose—the

only distinct number he assigns to any of the returning souls. 21 By linking Ajax with the

number 20, Socrates suggests a connection between the level of development he reached

in his earthly life, and the level of development the 20 year-olds have reached in the

education program that Socrates develops in the Republic. The cumulative force of these

two hints suggests that Socrates “riffs” on Homer’s Ajax, further developing Homer’s

portrayal of him by connecting him with a man ruled by θυμός—a purely timocratic man
20 See Od. xi 640-70.

21 Socrates does describe an unnamed soul choosing first—and making the poorest choice of all
(619b-c). He also identifies the soul of Agamemnon as choosing directly after Ajax, allowing him
to be identified as the 21st to choose (which perhaps signifies Agamemnon is highly similar to
Ajax, but slightly more philosophically developed). Socrates also describes Odysseus as choosing
last (although we are not told what number this is), Thersites choosing near the end, and Atlanta
(and by implication Epeius) choosing somewhere near the middle. It seems highly unlikely that
Socrates’ assignment of a specific number to only Ajax was an arbitrary decision, and even more
unlikely that it is a mere coincidence that Ajax’s number is identical to the age that qualified
students begin advanced philosophical training in Socrates’ education program.
 Page 22 of 30

—and connecting him with a distinction stage of maturity in the philosopher king’s

education program.

Socrates’ emphasis on Ajax in this context can be well explained as part of a strategy

to draw Glaucon’s attention to the extreme madness he could eventually suffer if he

continues to overvalue fame.22 Glaucon was earlier described by Adeimantus as the kind

of man who is akin to Socrates’ description of the constitution of the timocratic city

insofar as his “love of victory” is concerned (548d). Socrates grants that Glaucon matches

this aspect of the description, but then asserts that the timocrat is “more obstinate, and

less well trained in music and poetry” (549e) than Glaucon. The mention of “a few rare

exceptions” to the rule that imitative poetry is able to corrupt even decent people would

seemingly motivate one who is both highly competitive and reasonably well trained in

music and poetry to become such a rare person, especially if they consider Homer’s epic

poems to be especially pleasurable. By mentioning the existence of people who are not

corrupted by such poetry at the beginning (595b) and end (605c) of the critique, Socrates

seems to be trying to funnel Glaucon’s competitive nature towards the desire to be one of

the few who possess the antidote that prevents poetry from corrupting one’s διάνοια.

Furthermore, just before offering the opportunity for poets and/or poetry lovers to

offer a defense of Homer’s poems, Socrates encourages Glaucon to reflect on the “charm

of the pleasure-giving Muse, especially when you [Glaucon] study her through the eyes

of Homer” (607c). Thus, Socrates not only warns Glaucon about the dangers of Homer’s
22 Perhaps the first sign that Glaucon overvalues fame is his desire to see that justice is beneficial
“for its own sake,” rather than how a “reputation for justice” might bring him “honor and
rewards” (357c-d). This suggests that Glaucon has (at the very least) considered covertly
practicing injustice himself. Socrates succeeds in showing Glaucon what injustice looks like
inside the soul of the unjust—extremely miserable.
 Page 23 of 30

poems, but also attempts to impassion him to want to study Homer by appealing to his

competitive nature and emphasizing how highly pleasurable it can be to enjoy Homer’s

poems. Socrates presumably proceeds this way in the hope that these rhetorical seeds will

eventually compel Glaucon to study the Iliad and the Odyssey on a more profound level

than his peers.23

Further evidence that this is what Socrates is up to can be found by considering that,

although he banishes Homer from the ‘beautiful city,’ Socrates does not advise Glaucon

to abstain from Homer’s poems, but rather to “repeat the argument we have just now put

forward like an incantation so as to preserve ourselves from slipping back into that

childish passion for poetry which the majority of people have” (608a). Thus, Socrates’

goal seems to be to have Glaucon remember this argument when he reads or listens to the

Iliad and Odyssey, or any other poetic work. Yet this argument also includes the mention

of a few rare people who possess a key piece of ‘inside information’ that allows them to

enjoy Homer without being corrupted by it; an oblique reference to the bed of Odysseus

(the knowledge of which Penelope uses as a test to protect herself from an impersonator

of her true husband); a series of suspicious ad hominem attacks on Homer (and Hesiod)

that seem to reflect a problematic approach to success on Glaucon’s part; and an

impassioned offer to lovers of Homer to come forward and defend the study of his poems

as “beneficial both to constitutions and to human life” (607d).

23 Of course, Socrates ultimate goal is not for Glaucon to merely become an astute reader of
Homer, but for him to incorporate the valuable lessons he learns in Homer into his own
understanding of what constitutes a truly good and successful life. Socrates’ indirect approach
with Glaucon, as well his description of him as well trained in music and poetry, suggests that he
believes Glaucon has the ability to become one of the rare people who understand Homer on a
profound level, should he become passionately interested in doing so.
 Page 24 of 30

Thus, by encouraging Glaucon to “chant” this argument while listening to the Iliad

or the Odyssey, Socrates appears to be steering him towards having the desire to become

one of the few who can hear these poems without corrupting his soul, which then might

encourage him to reconsider these arguments, and eventually come forward and provide

Homer with a proper defense.24 In doing so, Glaucon would presumably eventually learn

to read Homer for the benefit of his soul. If this analysis is correct, Socrates provides the

groundwork for such a defense by hinting in the myth of Er that Homer’s characters have

been “painted” by someone with keen insight into the nature of the soul, and who is well

aware of the distinction between real and apparent human excellence.

VII. A Socratic Defense of Homer’s Epics

The above exegesis implies that Socrates is rather impressed by Homer’s portrayal of

Ajax, insofar as he tacitly acknowledges that he exemplifies a type of madness that is

characteristic of a paradigmatic timocratic man.25 In doing so, Socrates implicitly

suggests that the contents of the Iliad and the Odyssey reflect some (significant) degree of

insight into human nature.26 If this is right, then Socrates’ treatment of Ajax suggests he
24 Socrates’ ominous omission of the spirited part of the soul (θυμός) in the psychological
critique could be due to a strategy to attempt to subtly influence Glaucon on the level of θυμός
without confusing the issue by directly contrasting it with the appetitive part ( ἐπιθυμία); it is also
likely yet another (failed) test to see if Glaucon remembers the tripartite account of books 3 and
4.

25 The synoptic studies, which begin at the age of 20 (537b-c), would then seem to be (amongst
other things) a remedy for an unhealthy obsession with fame.

26 Given these clues regarding Ajax, there is reason to think that Socrates’ treatment of other
Homeric characters in the myth of Er reflects a similar appreciation for Homer’s insight into
human nature. Odysseus seems to make the best choice in picking his next life, choosing a “the
life of a private individual who did his own work” (620c), having thrown off all ambition due to
his toils on earth. Interestingly, although Odysseus’ choice reflects Socrates’ description of the
small number of true philosophers who “lead a quiet life and do their own work” (496d), it’s not
 Page 25 of 30

sees Homer as a valuable resource for the “calculation, measurement, or weighing”

(602d) of different kinds of souls, and how they function in various circumstances; this

suggests that Socrates slyly indicates in book 10 that Homer’s epics are indeed a

potentially valuable resource for strengthening the rational part of the soul, and therefore

beneficial to mature readers who seek a better understanding of human nature. This

follows because by suggesting that Homer has provided a paradigmatic timocratic man in

his characterization of Ajax, Socrates seems to be suggesting that in portraying Ajax in

the afterlife as still unable to overcome his “indignation” and “pride” (Od. xi 670),

Homer has shown keen insight into the type of severe psychological breakdown a

timocratic man might suffer if he fails to achieve the honor and recognition from others

that he so fervently desires. Thus, Socrates seems to be suggesting that insofar as the

Iliad and the Odyssey reflect such keen insight into human nature, they are precious

resources for the study of the human psyche. At the same time, Socrates also seems to be

indicating that if read shallowly (which seems to largely have been the case in the time of

Socrates and Plato), these texts are indeed sources of danger for those who live their lives

according to them.

Due to the prevailing interpretation of the poetry critique as a proto-essay, several

ironic moments in book 10 have been widely overlooked, including Socrates’ oblique

reference to the bed of Odysseus and Penelope, a series of highly dubious ad hominem

critiques against Homer, and the fact that much of Plato’s dialogues (including the

clear that he in fact chose wisely, since his choice might not reflect the ability to “know how to
choose the mean in such lives and how to avoid either of the extremes” (619a). That is, by
choosing such a life of simplicity Odysseus’ choice might not provide him with an opportunity to
develop a robust understanding of human nature. Nevertheless, Socrates seems to be suggesting
that Odysseus learned something from his experiences in the Iliad and the Odyssey, which
suggests that Socrates finds Homer’s Odysseus to be a character well worth studying.
 Page 26 of 30

Republic) contain hot-headed irrational characters that Socrates appears to be ban from

the poems of the ideal city in book 10. The above exegesis has the advantage of providing

a plausible explanation for these details, as well as other curiosities (such as Socrates’

almost repetitive use of the word μίμησις throughout the book 10 poetry critique) in

terms of a dialectical strategy that Socrates pursues with Glaucon at the end of a very

long (and memorable) discussion.

An ultimately favorable assessment of Homer by Socrates in book 10 also explains

the heavy presence of Homeric quotations, allusions, and paraphrases in the Republic,27

as well as the dialogues as a whole, where (according to Clay 2011) the Homeric poems

are quoted a total of 225 times. Clay, moreover, notes that some of these quotations

“introduce a ‘submerged context’ into the Platonic dialogue where they are cited.” Clay

argues that in order to recognize these submerged contexts, “Plato's reader must know

Homer as well as did Plato.” This suggests that Plato did not intend to discourage his

audience from studying Homer; rather, it suggests that he expected his most astute

readers to thoroughly study Homer’s epics. Socrates’ treatment of several characters from

the Iliad in the myth of Er seems to provide a clear case of one such submerged context, 28

which alone seems sufficient to refute the notion that Plato wanted his readers to utterly

disregard Homer.

Planinc’s more controversial suggestion that Socrates obliquely refers to the bed of

Odysseus and Penelope in book 10, if plausible, suggests that Plato’s Socrates saw much

more value in Homer’s poetry than is commonly assumed. At the very least, it seems
27 According to Lake 2011, p. 4 Plato cites Homer 93 times in the Republic.

28 The life-pattern choices Socrates describes these characters making would little sense to a
reader unfamiliar with Homer’s treatment of these characters.
 Page 27 of 30

clear that Plato did not write the Republic with the goal of dissuading his most astute

readers from studying Homer altogether; rather, he seems to have wanted to encourage

his readers to study Homer’s epics on a more profound level than most of his

contemporaries did—similar to the way in which he likely hoped his more astute readers

might approach his own writings.

VIII. Plato’s Reaction to Bad Interpretations of the Republic

As Clay, 2011 also notes, while Plato has received a significant degree of criticism

for Socrates’ treatment of Homer in the Republic, it seemed to have little effect on (or

may have even increased) Homer’s popularity over the years. In the 20 th century, the

Republic was heavily criticized by many scholars (most notably Popper) for promoting

problematic ideas such as totalitarianism, eugenics, incest, and infanticide, all of which

Socrates appears to endorse in the second wave of book 5 (457c-471b). This line of

criticism seems reasonable if indeed the city/state outlined by Socrates in the Republic

reflects a sincere and direct exposition of Plato’s political philosophy. However, this line

of interpretation that has been challenged,29 and seems to depend upon interpreting the

Republic as a “proto-essay” on political philosophy.

Curiously, Plato has Socrates’ provide what seems to be a grossly inadequate

summary of the Republic in the Timaeus (17c-19a); Rossetti 2011, 359 notes that this

“bad summary” seems to encourage readers to ignore everything in the Republic that

29 Annas, 2000, Rosen, 2005, and Strauss, 1964 argue against interpreting the city/state as a
serious political proposal. Probably the strongest evidence in support of their view is Socrates’
assertion that it doesn’t matter if the city comes into existence (592b) and the fact that he only
develops the city/state after Glaucon rejects (372d) his first proposal of a “healthy” non-luxurious
simple city. The controversial material in book 5 has been well-explained by Fendt and Rozema,
1998, 63-71. Roochnik, 2003, and Moes, 1996 provide insightful explanations of various details
of the Republic as part of a dialectical strategy that Socrates takes with his interlocutors.
 Page 28 of 30

comes after book 5. But why would Plato want to invite shallow criticism of the Republic

based on an interpretation wholly centered on the controversial proposals in books 2-5?

Although Rossetti could be right when suggests that Plato avoided widespread criticism

because of “the great amount of ‘honey’ he lavished in every page of his dialogues, and

his prestige,” the presence of such a bad summary in the Timaeus strongly suggests that

Plato expected many readers—even a learned Pythagorean such as Timaeus30—might

interpret the Republic as a mere political treatise, and have little interest in the rest of the

dialogue.31

Plato’s willingness as an author to accept the possibility that the Republic might be

read shallowly and invite criticism upon the author reflects an approach to writing in

which the work’s educational benefits are prioritized over the author’s desire to be

universally loved by his audience—a move Plato perhaps made so that he too might

avoid eventually succumbing to the madness of Ajax. According to Schindler 2008, 165

the “final expression for the desire for goodness” in the Republic is the “dispossession of

the self for the sake of the good of the whole.” Plato’s willingness to write the Republic in

such a way as to invite robust criticism of the author is highly consistent with the actions

of a philosopher king who does not measure the success of his rule in terms of fame and

recognition. This suggests that the controversial features of the Republic—not the least of

30 Timaeus affirms that Socrates has omitted nothing from this summary (19b).

31 It is not clear whether Plato was aware of this possibility when he wrote the “bad summary” of
the Republic in the Timaeus, or whether he wrote it after witnessing such a reception (such as
perhaps Aristotle and other students at the academy). In either case, Plato could have easily
cleared things up if he wanted to do so—he was clearly not bothered by the possibility that the
Republic would be read shallowly and be widely misunderstood.
 Page 29 of 30

which is the book 10 poetry critique—are expressions of the author’s most profound and

sincere desire for the good.

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