21

INTRAPERSONAL COMMUNICATION
AND IMAGINED INTERACTIONS

James M. Honeycutt, Christopher M. Mapp, Khaled A. Nasser,

and Joyceia M. Banner

Before an interview for an internship position, a student imagines the conversation she is to have
with the interviewer. She considers questions he may pose and prepares appropriate answers
accordingly. In a different setting, a teenager may repeat a conversation he held with a classmate
he admires, hoping to decode a love hint or find a concealed message. Such examples, which
occur across cultures on a daily basis, testify to the pervasiveness of a communication phenom-
enon we refer to as intrapersonal communication.
In this chapter, we examine the following fundamental questions: “How can intrapersonal
communication be operationalized into discrete variables that are manipulated and measured?”
“How is intrapersonal communication linked with interpersonal communication and out-
comes?” We briefly review some conceptualizations of intrapersonal communication followed by
a discussion of the construct of imagined interactions. Imagined interactions have been used to
operationalize the study of intrapersonal communication in terms of cognition and message pro-
cessing. The importance of physiological correlates of intrapersonal communication variables is
discussed as a method for reflecting process. Finally, a study is proposed exploring the association
between physiological variables and imagined interaction variables among intimate couples.

Conceptualization of Intrapersonal Communication

Intrapersonal communication occurs inside each communicator (Stacks & Sellers, 1989). It
takes different forms such as self-talk, inner speech, imagined interaction, daydreaming, listen-
ing, and emotional awareness, to name a few. Intrapersonal communication is considered as the
foundation for all communication and a key source for understanding ourselves and our envi-
ronment (Barker & Edwards, 1980). In differentiating levels of communication, intrapersonal
communication is the most individualistic while mass communication is the most collectivistic.
Depending on the number of communicators, interpersonal communication may have a number
of intermediary positions on the individual–collectivistic continuum. Indeed, the distinction is
between the Latin prefix “intra,” which means “within,” while the Latin prefix “inter” means
“between.” Hence, intrapersonal communication requires only one individual while interper-
sonal communication involves two or more people.
Many conversations, speech, decision making, planning, or conflict are mentally processed
before they are communicated outwardly. Indeed, communication competence is often attrib-
uted to communicators who can articulate their own positions well. Hence, people often spend
more time thinking about how they are going to communicate their positions as opposed to
thinking about the viewpoints of others. Indeed, socioegocentrism argues that individuals pay

323

Stacks_C021.indd 323 7/18/2008 5:25:58 PM

 JAMES M. HONEYCUTT ET AL.

more attention to their own monologues (Piaget, 1955) in order to state their own messages well
while spending less time actively listening to others. Hewes (1986) provides eloquent examples
of egocentric speech at cocktail parties. Persons tend to follow the basic conventions of dia-
logue including turn-taking and the use of trite acknowledgments of another person’s statements
(“Ya’ll, you’re right”). Yet, the meaningful dialogue of a normal conversation is missing because
collective monologues are used. Diminished cognitive capacity prevents people from integrating
both halves of a conversation and they rely on their own half in order to demonstrate at a mini-
mum, that they can articulate their own point of view well. Hence, intrapersonal communica-
tion is clearly operating as individuals attend to their own thoughts and messages.
The processing of messages happens either deliberately with the individual actively reflecting
on an issue (Smith, 1982), or unintentionally with thoughts popping up for no intended rea-
son. Many scholars agree that intrapersonal communication is an inner, private communication
process—in other words that the communicator is internally exchanging messages both as the
sender and the receiver (Cunningham, 1989; Vocate, 1994). Yet, research in intrapersonal com-
munication processes is vast. For example, researchers study the mind, functions of the brain,
introspection, self-concept, cognition, and voicing (Heisel & Beatty, 2006; Honeycutt, 2003;
LeDoux, 2003; Hamilton, 1996). Indeed, the study of intrapersonal communication has blos-
somed and given rise to specialized areas of research.
Cunningham (1989) distinguishes, however, between intrapersonal communication, where
message exchange occurs inside a person’s mind, and cognitive processing, which is basically the
act of processing information. Stacks and Sellers (1989), on the other hand, include cognitive
processing in the definition of intrapersonal communication when they break down the process
into three areas: (1) the mental process (interpretation of self, others and environment); (2) the
physical state (physiological aspects such as the impact of hormones); and (3) the biological–
psychological system (relationship between the two areas).
To investigate the processes taking place in the three different areas, Stacks and Sellers (1994)
propose two strategies for research. The first is observational and includes diaries, interviews, and
paper and pencil measures (surveys). The second strategy is psychophysiological and involves
physiological analyses (such as measuring heart rates, galvanic skin response, and respiration),
measures of brain activity using the electroencephalogram (EEG) and dichotic listening. We
have used both strategies in measuring intrapersonal communication. In terms of the mental
process of interpreting the self and others, we briefly discuss the role of listening as part of intrap-
ersonal communication.

Listening
Listening and hearing are two entirely separate functions of human communication. Although
the two are sometimes confused, hearing strictly involves the physiological mechanisms and pro-
cesses by which the ears receive and transmit sound as information to the brain. While hearing
and listening often work in tandem, they are not necessarily dependent on each other, primarily
because listening is an active process of comprehension that demands the listener to be cogni-
tively alert (Witkin, 1993). Simply hearing sounds does not require one to screen or use a process
of message selection. According to Barker (1971), listening requires actively focusing on specific
sounds with a purpose, whereas hearing requires only passive reception of sounds. In a study by
Werner (1975), people were found to spend about 55 percent of their time listening.
Listening can be divided into two main stages: signal processing and literal processing. The
first, signal processing, is a mostly automatic process in which listeners analyze sounds for under-
standing (Anderson, 1990). The second stage, literal processing, determines the meaning or mes-
sage behind the sounds. Listeners do this through two main strategies, forecasting and focusing.

324

Stacks_C021.indd 324 7/18/2008 5:26:06 PM

 INTRAPERSONAL COMMUNICATION AND IMAGINED INTERACTION

Listeners do not just listen patiently for speakers to complete their meanings verbally (Marslen-
Wilson & Tyler, 1980). Instead, listeners predict or forecast, sometimes erroneously, what the
speaker will say next. According to Ellis and Beattie (1986), how well a listener can interpret a
speaker’s message depends largely on the speaker’s ability to link together related concepts upon
which the listener can focus. If hearing is the physiological part of the auditory process, then
attending is the psychological aspect that describes the process of message selection whereby
we screen sounds and filter for those needs and desires we most want met (Smeltzer & Watson,
1984).
Schemata are cognitive structures, rather like mental templates or “frames,” that represent
a person’s knowledge about objects, people, or situations. They are derived from memory and
prior experience. They simplify reality, setting up expectations about what is probable in relation
to particular conversations. People use schemata to organize current knowledge and provide
a framework for future understanding. Examples of schemata include rubrics, social roles, ste-
reotypes, scripts, worldviews, archetypes, and prototypes. Through the use of schemata, many
everyday situations do not require effortful thought; instead mindless or automatic thought is
all that is required (Langer, 1997; Lee, 2005). People can quickly organize new perceptions into
schemata and act effectively without effort. For example, many people have a schema for accel-
erating onto a highway through an entrance ramp and can apply it to new highways that they
have never driven on.
New or novel situations may require the creation of scripts. Yet, we tend to assimilate infor-
mation into preexisting categories because it requires less cognitive effort (Honeycutt, 1993;
Mandler, 1984). Additionally, when hearing new information (e.g., listening to a lecture on
physiological measures of arousal), people who hear information that activates a personal schema
will listen to and recall more accurately and vividly that information as opposed to information
that does not fit an existing schema (Edwards & McDonald, 1993).
After literal processing takes place, listeners usually reflect on what has been said, and if
manifested as conflict in the form of imagined interactions, it can lead to a concept called
“mulling.” Mulling, the mental reliving of an argument, occurs when individuals replay conver-
sations in their mind. Individuals often have retroactive imagined interactions in which they
replay conversations. This use of retroactive imagined interactions allows individuals to revisit
past episodes over and over and can also allow listeners to revisit the conflict online (during
the course of a conversation) with the added benefit of reformulated points and counterpoints
(Honeycutt, 1991, 1995).
It is important to note that when listeners, busy decoding messages from the speaker, wait
to take their turn to talk, many do not simply sit in rapt attention at every word. Instead, their
minds may wander, either formulating points of their own, engaging in self-talk, or day-dreaming
and fantasizing. Indeed, this is a listening skill mentioned by Nichols (1987) in his classic article
on skills for listening.
Listeners are advised to capitalize on thought speed. Most people encode messages more slowly
than they decode them. Nichols states that we have about 400 words of thinking time to spare
during every minute of speech. He wonders what people with excess thinking time do while
someone is speaking. Many people become distracted because we are impatient with the slow
progress of speaker encoding. Hence, thoughts may be diverted off the topic to other thoughts
while periodically darting back to the speaker. Nichols advises listeners to speculate about what
may be said next as well as to mentally summarize what the speaker has been saying. Hence, he
is advising listeners to have imagined interactions with the speaker. Indeed, this advice reflects a
proactive imagined interaction in which the listener is imagining what could be said (Honeycutt,
2003). Yet, some persons start to prepare counterarguments in advance of what is said while get-
ting “lost” in the conversation. The speaker may have moved on to other points even though the

325

Stacks_C021.indd 325 7/18/2008 5:26:06 PM

 JAMES M. HONEYCUTT ET AL.

listener may be mentally constructing arguments in response to earlier claims. When capitaliz-
ing on thought speed while listening, we can rehearse what we want to say. Indeed, research has
revealed that this can help people reduce communication anxiety and increase speech fluency
(Allen & Honeycutt, 1997). Imagined interactions and their functions are discussed next.

Imagined Interactions: A Construct for Operationalizing

Intrapersonal Communication
Imagined interactions (IIs) are a type of social cognition and mental imagery grounded in sym-
bolic interactionism and script theory in which individuals imagine conversations with significant
others for a variety of purposes (Honeycutt, 2003; Honeycutt & Ford, 2003). The II construct has
provided a beneficial mechanism for operationalizing the study of intrapersonal communication
because the communication is internal and involves dialogues as well as emotional affect (indi-
viduals may feel a variety of emotions depending on what they are imagining). Often, individuals
experience positive, negative, or mixed emotions (Zagacki, Honeycutt, & Edwards, 1992).
IIs are a type of daydreaming that have definitive characteristics and serve a number of func-
tions including rehearsal, self-understanding, relational maintenance, managing conflict, cathar-
sis, and compensation. For example, the conflict management functions explain how conflict is
difficult to manage in everyday life such that it is hard to “forgive and forget.” IIs are different
from internal monologues and private speech. Internal monologues are self-talk in which an
individual talks to him- or herself in both speaking and listening roles (Honeycutt & Ford, 2001).
It is speech directed toward the self from the self. Private speech is where an individual speaks
aloud to him- or herself. Roloff and Ifert (1998) discuss how private speech may occur in isolation
as well as in the presence of others.
There are six functions of IIs. IIs serve to maintain relationships as intrusive thinking, which
occurs when the partner is thought about outside of his or her physical presence. A second func-
tion of IIs is rehearsing and planning messages. Individuals report how they prepare for impor-
tant encounters and even think of various messages depending on the response of the interaction
partner. The third function is self-understanding. IIs allow people to clarify their own thoughts
and promote understanding of their own views. The catharsis function allows people to release
feelings and vent feelings of frustration or joy. The fifth function is compensation as IIs may be
used to compensate for the lack of actual conversations. These functions are not independent of
each other. Some of them may occur simultaneously. For example, compensating for the lack of
real interaction in a long-distance relationship may be used to keep the relationship alive as well
as rehearsing what will be said at the next telephone conversation.
The final function is conflict management. Individuals relive old arguments while simultane-
ously imagining statements for ensuing encounters. Conflict is kept alive within our minds as
people relive old arguments in our minds. For example, we interviewed a famous actor from the
Star Trek show who still recalls old arguments from her ex-husband that occurred over 30 years
ago because the arguments were memorable and affected her self-concept. Individuals may be
more likely to recall arguments rather than positive encounters because of the negativity bias.
According to the negativity bias, negative impressions are remembered more than positive ones
(Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998). For example, if we give you three compliments and a
criticism, the criticism is more likely to be recalled because it may provide more information that
challenges your self-concept.
People ruminate about arguments and in some cases, become obsessed with them. Research
has revealed that vengeful people ruminate on the perceived injustice that they have received
and seek revenge (McCullough, Bellah, Kilpatrick, & Johnson, 2001). Rumination is associated

326

Stacks_C021.indd 326 7/18/2008 5:26:06 PM

 INTRAPERSONAL COMMUNICATION AND IMAGINED INTERACTION

with having retro and proactive IIs as interaction scenes are replayed, rehearsed, or both (Hon-
eycutt, in press). Furthermore, self-focused rumination occurs when people repetitively focus
on themselves and on the cause and implications of negative feelings (Lyubomirsky, Tucker,
Caldwell, & Berg, 1999).
Rumination is an example of the negative consequences of IIs. Conflict is kept alive in terms
of conversational memory as individuals reflect on prior arguments. In fact, conflict is associ-
ated with negative valence as well as self-dominant IIs in which individuals report more verbal
imagery compared to visual imagery such as imagining the scene of the II or nonverbal elements
(Zagacki, Edwards, & Honeycutt, 1992). When verbal imagery is used, more emphasis is con-
centrated on the content of the message itself, while visual imagery is associated with pictorial
images. Hence, imagined conflict tends to be associated with more emphasis on the message
(Zagacki et al., 1992).
The conflict management function has resulted in an axiomatic theory explaining why con-
flict is enduring, may be constructive or destructive, and can erupt anytime in interpersonal
relationships (Honeycutt 2003, 2004, in press; Honeycutt & Cantrill, 2001). The theory contains
3 axioms and 9 theorems. In terms of its axioms, the theory assumes that an interpersonal rela-
tionship is maintained and developed through thinking and dwelling on a relationship partner
outside of actual conversations and that managing conflict begins at the intrapersonal level of
communication in terms of IIs. Communication is a critical foundation of interpersonal relation-
ships such that the communication is the relationship and that a major theme of interpersonal
relationships is conflict management (e.g., cooperation-competition). One of the theorems is
concerned with physiology, which is discussed next.

Physiology
Theorem 6 of II conflict-management theory states that recurring conflict is a function of brain,
neurotransmitter activity in which neurons are stimulated (Honeycutt, 2004). Communication
theorists indicate the importance of neurobiological factors in determining traits such as com-
munication apprehension and verbal aggression (Beatty, Heisel, Hall, Levine, & LaFrance, 2002).
Hence, there is some support that there is a biological link to conflict, particularly verbal aggres-
sion. If certain communicative characteristics can be linked to biological determinants, then it
seems logical that likelihood to engage in conflict could be linked to such factors as well (cf.,
Beatty & McCroskey, 1998). Hence, the physiology of intrapersonal communication is addressed
in terms of managing ongoing conflict with intimates, rivals, work associates, or family members.
This is based on the premise that emotions are experienced (negative, positive, mixed). Indeed,
numerous studies reveal that people have a wide range of emotions when imagining conversa-
tions (Honeycutt, 2003).
Communication is filled with emotion and arousing (Guerrero & Andersen, 1988). Endor-
phins and adrenalin may be released depending on the situation. For example, thinking about
conversations that are likely to be filled with arguments affects the autonomic nervous system
(Honeycutt, in press). Interpersonal conflict often makes people vigilant and alert in order to be
alert to surroundings. Physiological arousal accompanies changes in emotions (Andersen, Guer-
rero, & Trost, 1998; Schacter & Singer, 1962).
The autonomic nervous system regulates involuntary body functions, including those of the
heart and intestine. It controls blood flow, digestion, and temperature regulation. The autonomic
nervous system has two divisions: the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) accelerates heart rate,
constricts blood vessels, and raises blood pressure; the parasympathetic nervous system slows
heart rate, increases intestinal and gland activity, and relaxes sphincter muscles. The sympathetic

327

Stacks_C021.indd 327 7/18/2008 5:26:06 PM

 JAMES M. HONEYCUTT ET AL.

nervous system is a fight/flight system that expends energy while the parasympathetic system
conserves energy. Both systems influence blood pressure. The sympathetic reduces motility of
the stomach and intestines while the parasympathetic increases motility. Most of the organs and
glands are controlled by the autonomic nervous system and have the dual regulation of excite-
ment or arousal and calm.
Our ancestors’ physiology evolved to deal rapidly with physical threats such as fighting a rival
for food or fleeing from predators (Sapolsky, 2005). In contemporary society, the SNS becomes
activated when faced with a psychological or social threat. For example, you may be faced with a
dilemma when your partner asks you what you think about his or her new wardrobe (which you
dislike) and you want to be polite.
Lying and deception are also associated with arousal; hence, the use of galvanic skin response.
Once activated, the SNS releases epinephrine, norepinephrine, and cortisol into the blood-
stream. Correspondingly, there is increased respiration, blood pressure, heartbeat, and mus-
cle tension. Research reveals that deceivers demonstrate greater sympathetic activation than
unaroused truth tellers (deTurck & Miller, 1985).
The second part of the autonomic nervous system is the parasympathetic nervous system
(PNS). The parasympathetic division functions with actions that do not require immediate reac-
tion. The PNS does essentially the opposite of the SNS: it decreases heart rate, increases diges-
tion, and so on. Hence the relaxation response turns SNS arousal off by turning on the PNS. So,
in essence, you don’t really control the relaxation response; instead, you do the things that result
in the PNS taking control.
Aside from temperature and perspiration changes, skin plays a role in communication because
humans are highly social animals. Various emotions such as anger or embarrassment may be
reflected in changes of skin color. To say that communication involves one organ system or one
nervous system would be in error; messaging involves every cell of the human being.
Physiological arousal involves the autonomic nervous system in a state of adrenalin release and
includes pulse (heartbeats per minute), interbeat intervals (IBI), and somatic activity measured in
terms of a wrist monitor (Honeycutt, in press). Somatic activity tracks wrist and hand movements
used while gesturing. It reflects kinetic energy release and tension release through motion. IBI is
a measure of the time in milliseconds between adjacent heartbeats. High IBI rates are related to
increased levels of adrenalin, anxiety, and arousal (Porges, 1985). The lower the IBI value, the
shorter the cardiac beat which reflects a faster heart rate. Under normal conditions, the heart’s
rate is under control of the parasympathetic nervous system. Generally, resting heart rates for
men are 70 and 80 for women according to the American Heart Association. Heart rates above
105 are high, and above the effects of exercise (Rowell, 1986). We always take a baseline measure
of heart rate before engaging in experimental stimuli. We use the baseline measure and age as a
covariate in analyzing subsequent mean differences.
The measurement of heart rate variables is important in physiological research. The electro-
magnetic signal that the heart sends to the brain and every other cell as well is the most powerful
signal in the body (Hughes, Patterson, & Terrell, 2005). Moreover, Childre and Martin (1999)
demonstrate how the heart helps people respond to environmental and contextual cues through
the production of mood-enhancing hormones. Damasio (2003) shows that people cannot make
decisions without processing emotional information that incorporates beliefs about how positive
and negative the situation is. These judgments reflect the synthesis of both heart and brain func-
tions weaving together cognition and emotion in a joint, intertwined fabric.
Yet, the measurement of heart rate must be cautious. Behnke (1989) cautions researchers to
be cautious about definitional issues. For example, should heart rate be averaged over the entire
experiment or should averages be computed for various meaningful events? How these averages

328

Stacks_C021.indd 328 7/18/2008 5:26:06 PM

 INTRAPERSONAL COMMUNICATION AND IMAGINED INTERACTION

are computed and should the operational definition of physiological arousal correct for effects of
other physiological responses such as respiration, sweating, or brain cortical activity? As noted
earlier, we factor our baseline heart rates and instead use a running average of arithmetic means
utilizing one-minute time windows.
There is a classic critique of physiological arousal by Lacey (1967) in which he demonstrated
that laboratory experiments often invoke anxiety-producing stimuli resulting in higher inter-
correlations. He notes that there is evidence for both association and no association across
physiological measures. Yet, these intercorrelations are lower when positive stimuli are involved.
Disassociation occurs under mild, neutral, or positive conditions while associations are stronger
under negative conditions. Therefore, we have participants report on both positive and nega-
tive topics of interaction and report independent correlations between each of the physiological
measures and outcome variables including various functions of IIs. For example, blood pressure
and heart rate do not always rise together. If blood pressure increases sharply, then there are
stretch receptors in the arch of the heart’s aorta that join the carotid sinus which are connected
to cranial nerves in the lower brain stem. These nerves act to inhibit cortical activity in the
brain and lower heart rate.

Sample Study
A criticism of communication research is that components of communication are often studied
in isolation from another. Yet, any theory or explanation of communication ultimately, must deal
with three components: input-throughput-output. Many communication studies deal with two
components; input-output, because the actual process of communication is ignored (Honeycutt,
in press).
Input reflects preexisting attitudes, beliefs, experiences, or personality that is brought into
a conversation. This is often measured through self-report surveys or inventories. Throughput
has commonly been referred to as “process” and represents the actual behaviors and messages
(verbal and nonverbal) that are transmitted. Interactions may be monitored and coded in order
to determine a variety of communication strategies (statements or messages) that are used. Yet,
it is common for hypothetical scenarios to be used in surveys rather than observing behavior.
The fact of the matter is that behavioral observation is costly because of the time required to
observe communicators as well as code the behaviors. Coders have to be trained and intercoder
reliability established in order to establish that the coding scheme is valid. The time cost to
observe 100 subjects may be very expensive, while 100 surveys can be administered in minutes
as well as electronically coded very quickly if online HTML protocol programs are used. The
data can be automatically downloaded to a spreadsheet program for statistical analyses. Finally,
output, also referred to as outcome, reflects any arbitrary variable that the researcher may be
interested in such as attraction, satisfaction, postinteraction attitudes, desires, emotional ratings,
impressions, and so forth. Outcomes tend to be measured through simple survey instruments. As
noted above, numerous studies are simple input-output studies in which surveys and hypothetical
scenarios are used in lieu of actual coding of verbal and nonverbal behaviors, which are costly
and time-consuming.
IIs are primarily input and output. Indeed, a proactive II represents expectations about what
may happen during a conversation. They reside within the individual while ignoring actual
communication processes. However, it is possible to link IIs with throughput which is done in
our sample study. IIs can be induced in people and then the actual conversation can be moni-
tored. Furthermore, we can obtain continuous physiological data while the subjects are doing
the experiment.

329

Stacks_C021.indd 329 7/18/2008 5:26:07 PM

 JAMES M. HONEYCUTT ET AL.

Rationale
People easily engage in conversations with others on a daily basis across a variety of topics; how-
ever, when there is conflict, it is difficult to initiate the conversation. A confrontation episode is
initiated when one participant signals the other participant that his or her behavior has violated
(or is violating) a rule or expectation for appropriate conduct within the relationship or situa-
tion. Unfortunately, conflict is often associated with negative affect in interpersonal relation-
ships; therefore the response to negative affect in a relationship may prompt an individual to
avoid the conflict instead of communicating about the problem. These conclusions are similar
to Gottman’s (1994) studies of negative affect and reciprocity. The negative affect reciprocity
model states that if one partner is negative (for example, angry), the spouse is much more likely
to be negative than he or she would be. The negative affect is met with a negative response
which produces a cycle of negative affect which can then escalate. Negative affect reciprocity
becomes like an absorbing state that once it is entered into, it is difficult to exit. Indeed, some
studies show gender differences in which men are poorer at self-soothing themselves compared to
women. Once aroused, women take less time to return to a basal resting state in terms of blood
pressure and heart rate variability (Gottman, 1994). Indeed, some studies reveal that brooding
and ruminating about grievances may be worse for men than women. The rumination clearly
reflects intrapersonal communication as individuals replay prior arguments (Honeycutt, 2003;
McCullough, Bono, & Root, 2007).
A study by Sapolsky, Stocking, and Zillman (1977) describes how men and women partici-
pants were provoked to anger by their partners using hypothetical scenarios. They were given
the opportunity to immediately respond after provocation or after a 6-minute wait. Waiting
reduced arousal in women, but not in men. Gottman (1994) surmises that males may be worse at
self-soothing than females and be more socialized to ruminate for the purpose of revenge. Thus,
it is been hypothesized that men withdraw from sensitive discussions in personal relationships
in order to prevent possible arousal (e.g., Gottman, 1994; Gottman & Levenson, 1988; Tannen,
2002). Still, other studies have reached conflicting conclusions. For example, Kiecolt-Glaser et
al. (1996) suggest that in regards to marriage, wives are more reactive and that this explains the
finding that wives exhibit poorer health than husbands in distressed marriages. Because their
studies differ in methods and samples, a direct comparison of Gottman and Kiecolt-Glaser’s gen-
der findings is beyond the scope of our study.
In laboratory settings, women typically will start up a conversation about negative topics
(Gottman, Coan, Carrerre, & Swanson, 1998). We also believe this is true in imagined interac-
tion as prior research reveals sex differences with women reporting more imagined interactions
than men as well as more specificity and details (Edwards, Honeycutt, & Zagacki, 1989; Honey-
cutt, 2003). Start-up is defined as the escalation of conflict from one partner’s neutral affect to
the other partner’s negative affect. Gottman and Levenson (1988) proposed that the woman’s
likelihood to start up negative conversations is based on a biological difference between the
sexes. Their hypothesis was that men are in some ways more reactive to stress than women.
Gottman (1994) proposed that emotionally, males are flooded by lower levels of negative affect
than are females. Because of the aversive nature of physiological arousal, men may attempt to
avoid negative affect in close relationships because it is more physiologically punishing for them
than for women. Since it is harder for men to physiologically soothe their own responses to nega-
tive affect, men avoid negative start-ups by avoiding conflict altogether. In addition, research by
Gottman and Levenson (1988), proposed that negative affect pervades unhappy marriages in
which men withdraw emotionally, and women do not. Therefore, the happiness of the marriage
may depend on the wife’s ability to bring up a conflict with as little negative affect as possible
(soft start-up).

330

Stacks_C021.indd 330 7/18/2008 5:26:07 PM

 INTRAPERSONAL COMMUNICATION AND IMAGINED INTERACTION

Hypotheses
Borrowing from Gottman’s (1994) work, we hypothesize the following in linking intrapersonal
and interpersonal communication processes:
H1: In intimate, heterosexual relationships, women soften their start-up by not escalating
from neutral to negative affect.
H2: When given a choice, men will choose to talk about a topic with positive affect rather
than negative affect.
H3: There will be physiological correlates of imagined interaction and actual
conversation.

Participants
Students are recruited from various undergraduate courses at the Louisiana State University
using snowball sampling in which they can receive extra credit points. Students are encouraged
to bring a close, intimate partner to our physiological lab popularly known as the “Relation Sta-
tion Matchbox” or to recruit someone from their social network who would like to see a picture
of their heart-rate graph after they have done the experiment. They are required to have been in
a committed romantic relationship for a period of time no less than six months.

Procedure and Instrumentation

The couples come to our interaction laboratory. Upon entering the lab, they are connected
to portable, unobtrusive physiological monitors that measure heartbeats per minute, interbeat
interval, and wrist activity. They wear a comfortable, elastic, chest belt underneath the sternum
and a wrist cuff. We let them decide which wrist to place the cuff on. Research on gesturing
indicates little difference in gesturing between hands when participants were asked to describe
how to illustrate how a mechanical device works with the aid of a predrawn diagram, regardless
of whether the individual is left or right handed (Eisenstein & Davis, 2007). After three minutes,
the meter signals the end of the baseline measurement time period. These readings are used as
covariates in subsequent analyses controlling for baseline measures.
Next, the partners are separated: one partner imagines discussing a pleasing topic while the
other imagines discussing a displeasing topic. We alternately assign men and women the pleas-
ing/displeasing topic role. This allows us to measure agenda initiation when they are reunited to
see whose topic is discussed first and if the males defer discussing the displeasing topic when they
are in that condition.
Both partners complete the Survey of Imagined Interaction (SSI) (Honeycutt, 2003; in press)
as well as demographic information about age, relational duration, and happiness. The follow-
ing dimensions of IIs are measured: rehearsal, discrepancy, catharsis, conflict management, rela-
tional management. After completing the SII, they complete a form that lists 27 topics and they
are asked to rate how satisfied they are with the topic (Honeycutt, 1989). Sample topics include
social life, job satisfaction, how they argue, how they communicate, chemical dependency, and
how decisions are made. After indicating the degree of satisfaction for each topic, they are asked
to circle the topic(s) that they are most displeased with or the ones that they are most pleased
with. Then, they are asked to take up to five minutes and role play by speaking out loud and hav-
ing a conversation with their partner about the topic that is most displeasing or pleasing. The
individual is to imagine what he or she would say in terms of counterarguments or reactions to
what the partner is saying. After doing this, the physiological meter is signaled to indicate the
end of the time period for the induced II.

331

Stacks_C021.indd 331 7/18/2008 5:26:07 PM

 JAMES M. HONEYCUTT ET AL.

The partners are reunited in our lab. Then they are instructed to discuss their respective top-
ics for up to five minutes. An important instruction is for them to decide which topic is initially
discussed. These instructions allow for the measurement of agenda initiation. After five minutes,
a third signaling to the physiological meter is done after the actual conversation in order to test
heart-rate differences between the induced II and actual conversation time periods. Following
this signaling, the experimental session ends with each partner completing some postinteraction
surveys using 7-point Likert-type items in which they rate their own and their partner’s start-up
as well as how satisfied they were with the preceding communication (Hecht, 1978).

Partner Evaluations of Soft versus Harsh Start-Up

Each partner is asked to give a series of 20 ratings on how harsh start-up was a problem in the
actual conversation. Sample items include: My partner was very critical of me discussing his or
her topic. My partner raised issues in an insulting manner. I felt picked on by my partner. My
partner was unnerving and unsettling when bringing up the issue. These items are modified from
Gottman and Silver’s (1999) harsh start-up questionnaire and will be factor analyzed to deter-
mine the underlying dimensions. Reliable factors will be used in subsequent data analyses.

Data Analysis
The analysis uses a 2 (male/female) × 2 (pleasing/displeasing topic) factorial design with the
initial heartbeats per minute and interbeat intervals specified as baseline covariates. A multivari-
ate analysis of covariance can be used with the following dependent variables: heartbeats per
minute, interbeat intervals, wrist activity, and ratings of start-up. Additional analyses can use the
II indices and ratings of relationship happiness. It is possible to treat the physiological variables
as repeated measures contrasting physiological changes in the induced II condition and in the
actual conversation.

Summary
Interest in intrapersonal communication has grown rapidly over the years. In this regard, the
National Communication Association has a special division called “Communication and Social
Cognition” that began as a commission in 1986. Despite a variety of definitions, there appears
to be agreement that intrapersonal communication is the study of information and cognitive
processing. Hence, studies involve both psychological and physiological perspectives. The brain,
along with the rest of the nervous system, serves as the processing conduit for messages. Indeed,
the electromagnetic signals of the heart that are sent to the brain are the strongest in the human
body. Hence, heart-rate variability has proven to be a robust measure of physiological arousal
given its conduit to the brain.
The study of imagined interaction has a long history and has proven to be a good construct
for the measurement of intrapersonal communication. IIs serve a variety of functions and can
be measured as a personality trait as well as in specific contexts in which individuals imagine
conversations with others and then the actual conversation can be measured as well as assessing
a variety of postinteraction outcomes including communication satisfaction.
The sample study is offered as a way to continue the exciting study of intrapersonal communi-
cation that links the major components of communication: input (preexisting beliefs, attitudes,
personality traits brought into the encounter), throughput (the actual communication encoun-
ter), and output (postinteraction assessment of ratings of the communication).

332

Stacks_C021.indd 332 7/18/2008 5:26:07 PM

 INTRAPERSONAL COMMUNICATION AND IMAGINED INTERACTION

References
Allen, T. H., & Honeycutt, J. M. (1997). Planning, imagined interaction, and the nonverbal display of
anxiety. Communication Research, 24, 64–82.
Andersen, P. A., Guerrero, L. K., & Trost, M. R. (1998). Communication and emotion: Basic concepts and
approaches. In P. A. Andersen & L. K. Guerrero (Eds.), Handbook of communication and emotions (pp.
5–29).San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Anderson, J. (1990). Cognitive psychology and its implications. New York: Freeman.
Barker, L. (1971). Listening behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Barker, L. L., & Edwards, R. (1980). Intrapersonal communication. Dubuque, IA: Gorsuch Scarisbrick.
Beatty, M. J., Heisel, D. A., Hall, A. E., Levine, T. R., & LaFrance, B. H. (2002). What can we learn from
the study of twins about genetic and environmental influences on interpersonal affiliation, aggressive-
ness, and social anxiety? A meta-analytic study. Communication Monographs, 69, 1–18.
Beatty, M. J., & McCroskey, J. C. (1998). Interpersonal communication as temperamental expression: A
communibiological paradigm. In J. C. McCroskey, J. A. Daly, M. M. Martin, & M. J. Beatty (Eds.), Com-
munication and personality: Trait perspectives (pp. 41–68). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton.
Behnke, R. W. (1989). Issues of measurement, instrumentation, and analysis of physiological variables. In
C. V. Roberts & K. W. Watson (Eds.), Intrapersonal communication: Original essays (pp. 203–216). New
Orleans, LA: SPECTRA/ Gorsuch-Scarisbrick.
Childre, D. L., & Martin, H. (1999). The heartmath solution. San Francisco, CA: Harper.
Cunningham, S. B. (1989). Defining intrapersonal communication. In C. V. Roberts, K. W. Watson, &
L. L. Barker (Eds.), Intrapersonal communication processes (pp. 82–94). New Orleans, LA: SPECTRA/
Gorsuch-Scarisbrick.
Damasio, A. (2003). Looking for Spinoza. Orlando, FL: Harcourt.
deTurck, M. A., & Miller, G. R. (1985). Deception and arousal: Isolating the behavioral correlates of decep-
tion. Human Communication Research, 12, 181–201.
Edwards, R., Honeycutt, J. M., & Zagacki, K. S. (1989). Gender differences in imagined interactions. Sex
Roles, 21, 259–268.
Edwards, R., & McDonald, J. (1993). Schema theory and listening: In A. Wolvin & C. Coakley (Eds.),
Perspectives on listening (pp. 60–77). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Eisenstein, J., & Davis, R. (2007, February 8). Natural gesture in descriptive monologues. Retrieved Febru-
ary 8, 2007, from http://rationale.csail.mit.edu/publications/Eisenstein2003 Natural.pdf.
Ellis, A., & Beattie, G. (1986). The psychology of language & communication. London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson.
Gottman, J. M. (1994). What predicts divorce? Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Gottman, J. M., Coan, J., Carrere, S., & Swanson, C. (1998). Predicting marital happiness and stability
from newlywed interactions. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 60, 5–22.
Gottman, J. M., & Levenson, R. W. (1988). The social psychophysiology of marriage. In P. Noller &
M. A. Fitzpatrick (Eds.), Perspectives on marital interaction (pp. 182–200). Clevedon, UK: Multilingual
Matters.
Gottman, J. M., & Silver, N. (1999). The seven principles for making marriage work. New York: Crown.
Hamilton, M. A. (1996). Verbal auditory hallucination and the invention of alter-ego mental constructs.
In J. Aitken & L. J. Shedletsky (Eds.), Intrapersonal communication processes (pp. 151–158). Annandale,
VA: Speech Communication Association.
Hecht, M. (1978). The conceptualization and measurement of interpersonal communication satisfaction.
Human Communication Research, 4, 253–264.
Heisel, A. D., & Beatty, M. J. (2006). Are cognitive representations of friends’ request refusals implemented
in the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices? A cognitive neuroscience approach to “theory
of mind” in relationships. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 23, 249–265.
Hewes, D. E. (1986). A socio-egocentric model of group decision-making. In R.Y. Hirokawa & M. S. Poole
(Eds.), Communication and group decision-making (pp. 265–292). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Honeycutt, J. M. (1989a). Satisfaction with marital issues and topics scale. In J. Touliatos, B. F. Perlmutter,
& M.A. Straus (Eds.), Handbook of family measurement techniques. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

333

Stacks_C021.indd 333 7/18/2008 5:26:07 PM

 JAMES M. HONEYCUTT ET AL.

Honeycutt, J. M. (1989b). Satisfaction with marital issues and topics scale. In J. Touliatos, B. F. Perlmutter,
& M. A. Straus (Eds.) Handbook of Family Measurement Technique (p. 92). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Honeycutt, J. M. (1991). Imagined interactions, imagery and mindfulness/mindfulness. In R. Kunzendorf
(Ed.), Mental imagery (pp.121–128). New York: Plenum.
Honeycutt, J. M. (1993). Components and functions of communication during initial interaction with
extrapolations to beyond. In S. Deetz (Ed.), Communication yearbook (Vol. 16, pp. 461–491). Newbury
Park, CA: Sage.
Honeycutt, J. M. (1995). Imagined interactions, recurrent conflict and thoughts about personal relation-
ships: A memory structure approach. In J. E. Aitken & L. J. Shedletsky (Eds.), Intrapersonal communi-
cation processes (pp.138–150). Plymouth, MI: Speech Communication Association and Midnight Oil
Multimedia.
Honeycutt, J. M. (2003). Imagined interaction: Daydreaming about communication. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton.
Honeycutt, J. M. (2004). Imagined interaction conflict-linkage theory: Explaining the persistence and reso-
lution of interpersonal conflict in everyday life. Imagination, Cognition, and Personality, 23, 3–25.
Honeycutt, J. M. (in press). Physiology and imagined interactions. In J. M. Honeycutt (Ed.), Imagine that:
Studies in imagined interaction. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton.
Honeycutt, J. M., & Cantrill, J. G. (2001). Cognition, communication, and romantic relationships. Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Honeycutt, J. M., & Ford, S. G. (2001). Mental imagery and intrapersonal communication: A review of
research on Imagined Interactions (IIs) and current developments. In W. B. Gudykunst (Ed.), Commu-
nication yearbook (Vol. 25, pp. 315–345). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Hughes, M., Patterson, B., & Terrell, J. B. (2005). Emotional intelligence in action. San Francisco: Pfeiffer.
Ito, T. A., Larsen, J. T., Smith, N. K., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1998). Negative information weighs more heavily
on the brain: The negativity bias in evaluative categorizations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 75, 887–900.
Kiecolt-Glaser, J. K., Newton, T., Cacioppo, J. T., MacCallum, R. C., Glaser, R., & Malarkey, W. B. (1996).
Marital conflict and endocrine function: Are men really more physiologically affected than women.
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 64, 324–332.
Lacey, J. L. (1967). Somatic response patterning and stress: Some revisions of activation theory. In M. H.
Appley & R. Trumbull (Eds.), Psychological stress: Issues in research (pp. 14–37). New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts.
Langer, E. (1997). The power of mindful learning. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
LeDoux, J. E. (2003). Synaptic self: How our brains became who we are. New York: Penguin Putnam.
Lee, E. J. (2005). When placebic information differs from real information. Communication Research, 32,
615–645.
Lyubomirsky, S., Tucker, K. L., Caldwell, N. D., & Berg, K. (1999). Why ruminators are poor problem solv-
ers: Clues from the phenomenology of dysphoric rumination. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
77, 1041–1060.
Mandler, J. M. (1984). Stories, scripts, and scenes: Aspects of schema theory. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Marslen-Wilson, W., & Tyler, L. K. (1980). The temporal structure of spoken language understanding.
Cognition, 8, 1–71.
McCullough, M. E., Bellah, C. G., Kilpatrick, S. D., Johnson, J. L. (2001). Vengefulness: Relationships
with forgiveness, rumination, well-being, and the Big Five. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27,
601–610.
McCullough, M. E., Bono, G., & Root, L. M. (2007). Rumination, emotion, and forgiveness: Three longi-
tudinal studies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 490–505.
Nichols, R. O. (1987). Listening is a 10-part skill. Nation’s Business, 75, 40.
Piaget, J. (1955). The language and thought of the child. New York: Meridian Books.
Porges, S. W. (1985). Spontaneous oscillations in heart rate: Potential index of stress. In P. G. Moberg (Ed.),
Animal stress (pp. 97–111). Bethesda, MD: The American Physiological Society.
Roloff, M. E., & Ifert, D. E. (1998). Exploring the role of private speech, imagined interaction, and serial
interaction in mutual influence. In M. T. Palmer & G. A. Barnett (Eds.), Progress in communication sciences
(Vol. 14, pp. 113–133). Stanford, CT: Ablex.

334

Stacks_C021.indd 334 7/18/2008 5:26:07 PM

 INTRAPERSONAL COMMUNICATION AND IMAGINED INTERACTION

Rowell, L. (1986). Human circulation: Regulation during physical stress. New York: Oxford.
Sapolsky, B. S., Stocking, S. H., & Zillman, D. (1977). Immediate vs. delayed retaliation in male and female
adults. Psychological Reports, 40, 197–198.
Sapolsky, R. M. (2005). The influence of social hierarchy on primate health. Science, 308, 648–652.
Schacter, S., & Singer. J. L. (1962). Cognitive, social and physiological determinants of emotional state.
Psychological Review, 69, 379–399.
Smeltzer, L. R., & Watson, K.W. (1984). Listening: An empirical comparison of discussion length and level
of incentive. Central States Speech Journal, 35, 166–170.
Smith, M. J. (1982). Persuasion and human action: A review and critique of social influence theories. Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth.
Stacks, D. W., & Sellers, D. E. (1989). Understanding intrapersonal communication: Neurological pro-
cessing implications. In C. V. Roberts, K. W. Watson, L. L. Barker (Eds.), Intrapersonal communication
processes: Original essays (pp. 243–267). New Orleans, LA: SPECTRA/Gorsuch-Scarisbrick.
Stacks, D. W., & Sellers, D. E. (1994). Research: Expanding our knowledge of intrapersonal communi-
cation processes. In D. Vocate (Ed.), Intrapersonal communication: Different voices, different minds (pp.
101–120). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Tannen, D. (2002). I only say this because I love you. New York: Ballantine.
Vocate, D. R. (1994). Self-talk and inner speech: Understanding the uniquely human aspect of intraper-
sonal communication. In D. Vocate (Ed.), Intrapersonal communication: Different voices, different minds
(pp. 3–32). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Werner, E. K. (1975). A study of communication time. Unpublished master’s thesis, University of Maryland,
College Park.
Witkin, B. R. (1993). Human information processing. In A. D. Wolvin & C. G. Coakley (Eds.), Perspectives
on listening (pp. 23–59). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Zagacki, K. S., Edwards, R., & Honeycutt, J. M. (1992). The role of mental imagery and emotion in imag-
ined interaction. Communication Quarterly, 40, 56–68.

Suggested Readings
Barth, F. D. (1997). Daydreaming: Unlocking the creative power of your mind. New York: Penguin.
Honeycutt, J. M. (2001). Imagined interactions: Daydreaming about communication. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton.
Honeycutt, J. M. (in press). Physiology and imagined interactions. In J. M. Honeycutt (Ed.), Imagine that:
Studies in imagined interaction. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton.

335

Stacks_C021.indd 335 7/18/2008 5:26:07 PM