Datu Michael Abas Kida v.

Senate of the Philippines, et

al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011
DECISION
BRION, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that
established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for
the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No.
9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset
for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday of August 2005 and on
the same date every 3 years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been
held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.  But
on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular
elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

II.   THE ISSUES:

Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?  

III. THE RULING

  
Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the
interim is valid.

The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim

measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs
to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can
make.  This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant
constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in

nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this
power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must
be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is
embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the

consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
 public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the
President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments;

ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel
or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from

RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President
can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus,
the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis. 

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the

authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the
assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and
legislative officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent
political units.” This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose
non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs
constitutionally defective. 

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this

alleged  constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes
very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that
changes the elective and representative character of ARMM
positions.  RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the
organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance.  What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-
in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed
office.”  This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials
for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials
elected in the May 2013 elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No.
9054.  RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of
elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile
prevail.  And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it
was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its
order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure
responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.