Working Paper: 1.

Deliberations on Arms Trade Treaty -

1. DPRK - As per earlier discussions, the Arms Trade Treaty has been identified as a
recommendation rather than obligation and thus cannot be put forward as a guiding legal
document towards reduction and eventual disarmament of Small Arms and Light
Weapons under these conditions:
a. States cannot be held accountable for any and all illicit transfer
b. Sales of conventional weapons affect national security, economy and foreign
policies of various member states
c. Unreliability of the ATT due to the existence of Article 20 makes the document
biased due to western influence
2. Mexico:
a. Widen the scope of the Arms trade treaty, where surveillance equipment, military
technology, grenades, land mines and other arms are included.
b. enhancement to the article 6, broadening the circumstances required before an
outright ban is imposed. Where a transfer that has reasonable potential for
undermining international peace and security, or of being used to commit or
facilitate serious human rights violations should be included.
c. reformulation of the article 7.1, fixing the technical legal gap that allows exporters
to pick and choose among potential recipients on the ground of economic self
interest or political advantage.
d. strengthening the application of the arms trade treaty to the authorised
signatories. With special regard to the article 12 and 14.
e. Deliberation of the arms trade treaty article 20 that allows changes to be made to
the act through and forth.
f. Capacity Building and Technical Support for National Points of Contact on the
ATT.
3. Lebanon:
a. to make a clear inclusion of "prohibition of transfer of SALW to non-state actors
without the authorization of both the exporting and importing states," in article 6.
*Non-state actors being entities not falling under state actors which are any
government authorized groups or individuals.
4. Iran:
a. Definitions must be elaborated upon to prevent member states from 
misinterpreting them
b. The ATT must widen its scope to include but not limited to improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), cluster munition and ai controlled armaments
 c. Clear definitions and elaboration on article 6 to make the inclusion on prohibition
of transfers to non-state actors.
5. New Zealand:
a. The ATT should be signed and ratified by the remaining member-states of the
United Nations, in order to achieve global eradication of illicit proliferation of
SALW, after due deliberation and debate.

6. Zimbabwe: The ATT was designed to control the illegal arms trade but it is a weak
document as it lacks clear definitions and some countries are finding loopholes in it and
have interpreted the definitions in it in such a way that it makes the treaty almost
insignificant.
a. The definitions given in the treaty must be more clearer
b. The loopholes in the treaty must be closed and strict actions must be taken
against countries violating it.
c. The treaty must widen its scope and add more strong points that give it more
control.
d. The interface of the treaty should be more attractive as it will make more
countries sign it.
7. Syria: Calls for the strengthening the Arms Trade Treaty by:
a. ​Including clauses to prohibit any and all transfers of SALW to Non-State Actors,
wherein non-state actors are clearly defined.
b. Ensure greater transparency during reporting by states.
c. Modifying the treaty to be obligatory rather than recommendatory in nature.
8. Brazil:
a. Urges every member state to sign and ratify the Arms Trade Treaty to tackle the
issue of Small Arms and Light Weapons.
b. Widening the scope of the Arms Trade Treaty regarding ammunition and parts
and components of Small Arms and Light Weapons.
c. Inclusion and strengthening of laws regarding transfer of any and all types of
SALW to specifically defined Non-State Actors.
9. Russia:
a. Including a direct ban on unlicensed arms production and transfers to Non-State
Actors
b. Including provisions regulating the re-export of items intended for military use.
10. Philippines:
a. Creation of a sponsorship program under the ATT, which would allow for greater
representation during the Arms Trade Treaty Meetings to bring about the
structural reforms in the treaty which would in turn encourage its universal
application and adherence​.
b. Include ATT initiatives like active assistance to enhance cooperation and
coordination in the areas of information exchange, tracing, investigation and
prosecution on the illicit trade of SALW.
11. Turkey:
 a. Proliferation and unauthorized use of Man-portable Air defence systems [MANPADs]
is also a matter of serious concern in relation to the small arms and light weapons
[SALWs]. Turkey strongly believes that the international community should act
decisively to improve stockpile security and strengthen export controls in countries
that manufacturer and import Man-portable Air defence systems [MANPADs]

12. ​United Kingdom​: United Kingdom believes that the Arms Trade treaty is a self-sufficient
document and was developed as a normative framework aimed to develop the highest possible
common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international
trade in conventional arms. This was done keeping in mind the various forms of government
and market structures they follow.

● Also, from the concerns raised by member nations, we believe that the lacunas
mentioned can be eradicated by proper and comprehensive implementation of the other
treaties and instruments addressing transfer of arms.
● Further, the UK recommends the proper implementation of Resolution 71/450, operative
clause 15, which called for cooperations between INTERPOL and World Customs
Organization for monitoring flow of arms from one's country and proper reporting to the
organisations.
● The UK will only entertain proposals of amendment to the Arms trade Treaty with respect
to the International Cooperation Mechanisms.

Proper Implementation of UN PoA

1. DPRK - Western and European member states have been called out on their reports to
the UN PoA for focusing on past actions while providing no clarity to the future steps,
something that the UN PoA is geared towards. Furthermore, UN PoA requires
continuous commitment from all member states but the same relies heavily on the
cooperation and transparency of said member states.

2. Mexico:
a. Capacity Building and Technical Support for National Points of Contact on the
ATT and UNPOA, should be made one our main points of focus
b. Provision of a comprehensive training programme on international, for the
instruments including the ATT and UNPoA on weapon trafficking.
c. improving the national points of contacts capacity to coordinate national activities
in addressing international obligations.
d. enhancement of the POA.
e. Provision of comprehensive multilateral and regional arms control instruments,
monitoring tools.
 f. Increasing financial aid to facilitate the roles and functions of national points of
contact.
g. Training workshops for national points of contact on arms control advance
designs for tackling the national, regional and global problems faced by the
national points of contacts should be provided.
h. monitoring and evaluating frameworks on the impact of conventional arms.
i. Analysis of the real time situations, and policy formulation based on country
specific issues.

3. New Zealand:
a. Tracing/identification of gun parts, by international , regional, and national laws
and/or treaties. This is necessary to prevent smuggling of parts across borders
and construction of illicit SALW by using the aforementioned parts.
b. Strict background checks for civilians and NSA to purchase and use SALW.
c. International information exchange regarding information helping to determine
whether a non-state actor may or may not be allowed to bear arms as well as
illicit supply lines and other relevant information pertaining to SALW.

d. Strong customs screening at all borders and of all shipments, in order to cut off
supply lines of illicit SALW. This will prevent the guns from leaking through
porous borders.
e. Validation and inspection mechanisms using technologies such as blockchain
and artificial intelligence must be used to check source and destination of
shipments of SALW. These technologies can help check the database and create
a trail for the shipment, which would allow governments to intercept illicit SALW
while they are being transported, or prevent diversion of Legal shipments for
illegal purposes.
4. Iran:
a. The delegate calls for all member states to have an inclusive, transparent 
and robust process to achieve results in the combat of SALWs illicit spread. 
b. To achieve that objective, weapon transfers must be controlled and 
discussions must address reducing arms inventories while tackling their 
diversion to illicit markets 
c. The international community must also mobilize to cope with the devastating 
threat of the improvised explosive devices. 
d. National Governments must implement policies for the tracing of guns and 
gun parts 
e. Stricter Laws for Private arms dealers 
5. France 
a. to make a new initiative to examine the security risks that arise from 
stockpiles of ammunition and explosives should be destroyed by the OSCE . 
As if there is no ammunition and explosives there will be no use of guns as 
 you cannot use them. This initiative can cover ammunition and explosives 
for use in all conventional armaments. 
b. We should have been moving forward the process of creating international 
tracing standards by arranging seminars. 
6. Syria: Calls for greater implementation of the following with respect to the UNPoA
a. Measures at the national levels including but not limited to improving legislation
and having stringent checks before providing licenses
b. At the regional levels, negotiations for legally binding instruments aimed to curb
illicit SALWs, and regional capacity building and regional cooperation and
assistance.
7. Russia: The steps to implement the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects should be
followed properly.
8. Pakistan
a. Effective and legislative framework as well as administrative regulations and
procedures both at the federal and provincial levels should remain under
constant review.
b. Production and manufacturing of small arms and light weapons is undertaken
entirely by the public sector. Stricter penal provisions should be applied by the
law.
c. All small arms and light weapons produced, manufactured and sold in Pakistan
are uniquely marked to maintain distinction for civilian, law enforcement and
armed forces use. Records for all the weapons are also kept on a permanent
basis. Pakistan urges other countries to adopt this.
d. Record of all types of arms manufactured by the public sector ordance factories
or imported in Pakistan is kept. Private arms dealers can only sell a few specified
categories of arms under a license issued by the government. A strict licensing
regime to regulate and monitor the lawful private possession of small arms has
been further improved. Pakistan urges other countries to adopt this too.
e. Strict export control regime should be there for all small arms and light weapons.
f. Export of all weapons should be regulated by the ministry of their respective
country with the concurrence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
9. Zimbabwe:
a. Concentrating more on preventing manufacturing than trade of SALWs
b. Ensuring that there are non-corrupt officials in power.
c. Ensuring security at the site of storage of weapons.
d. The nation's should try to reach out to their neighbours and jointly work on their
issues
10. Philippines:
a. States should consider reporting on their national regulations on ammunition and
explosives which are often an integral part of their national SALW control
programmes.
 b. States should consider harmonizing PoA reporting with other appropriate regional
reporting mechanisms. If the above harmonization of reporting is unfeasible, states
should consider attaching other information reported on small arms initiatives and
themes submitted to other bodies during the same year in order to scrutinize and
maintain a systematic record of SALWs.
11. United Arab Emirates
a. Recommends to the Security Council to stress upon the need for stricter
enforcement in states of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent,
Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in each
and every aspect, whereby slowly leading to the prevention of illicit trafficking,
illicit trade, etc,
b. States should implement the UNPoA in a much more stringent manner than
before as it will lead to less distribution of SALW to non state actors, stricter
management of stockpile of SALW, rigid control and checking of export and
import of SALW
12. South Sudan: Conducting programs which would spread awareness among people to
voluntarily follow the PoA.
13. PRC: China deems it imperative for the international community to uphold the following
four principles:
a. Governments should assume primary responsibilities.
b. The UN should continue to play a leading role.
c. International coordination and cooperation should be enhanced.
d. a comprehensive approach should be adopted to address both the symptoms
and underlying causes.

Transfer of SALW to Non-state actors

1. DPRK: Use of certain methods such as tracing mechanism and deep web scraping to
predict SALWs in conflict struck zones.
2. Russia: -
a. Improvised cross-border controls to ensure that there is no cross-border
trafficking of SALW.
b. Proper stockpile management of SALWs and it’s ammunition

c. Cross border control measures – These efforts should include, but not be limited
to, training; the exchange of information to support common action to contain and
reduce illicit SALW trafficking across borders, and the conclusion of necessary
agreements in this regard. They address operational capacity and law
enforcement and involve strengthening regional and continental cooperation
among police, customs, and border control services to address the illicit
proliferation, circulation, and trafficking of SALW.
 d. Legislative and regulatory measures – These address some of the legal
considerations that underpin the implementation of an effective system of
stockpile management, defined as the control and management, in all its
aspects, of SALW in state and non-state possession.
3. Iran
a. The problems of terrorist or armed groups possessing conventional arms is 
due to the lack of proper export controls or inadequate stockpile therefore 
states must implement policies to regulate and monitor export and import of 
SALWs 
b. Encourages relevant United Nations offices to Co-operate with Sovereign 
Nations to help fully implement the POA 
c. Introduce a widespread restriction on the exchange of a small arms or light 
weapons to substances that are not approved by the States to which they are 
sent;  
d. States ought to be needed to enact severe guidelines and exercise direct 
authority over arms-export facilitating exercises in regions under their 
purview and limit the quantities of the brokers to the lowest minimum; 
4. Mexico:
a. Coordination and synergies
i. Implementation at the national level
1. To establish or strengthen national laws, regulations and
administrative procedures, as well as relevant national strategies
and programmes, in support of the full and effective
implementation of the Programme of Action.
2. To develop, adopt and implement national action plans or other
national policy instruments in support of the implementation of the
Programme of Action and to coordinate the development and
implementation of such plans or instruments, as appropriate, in
collaboration with relevant stakeholders, including those from civil
society and industry, with those relating to the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development, in particular Goal 16 and target 16.4,
and to relevant General Assembly and Se curity Council
resolutions on women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms
control.
3. To improve the measurement of progress made in the national
implementation of the Programme of Action, in particular by
making better use of existing information, including that collected
within the framework of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, in particular Goal 16 and target 16.4.
ii. implementation on global level:
1. To encourage States, relevant United Nations offices, the
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the
 World Customs Organization to enhance coordination, and share
best practices and lessons learned for the full and effective
implementation of the Programme of Action.
2. To encourage joint operations and other forms of operational
cooperation with relevant international organizations, including
INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization, in combating
the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.
3. To encourage States, relevant United Nations offices and
international, regional and subregional organizations to enhance
their cooperation with international governmental and
non-governmental transport organizations, including the
International Civil Aviation Organization and the International
Maritime Organization, in order to prevent and combat the illicit
trade in small arms and light weapons.
b. Preventing and combating the diversion of small arms and light weapons
i. Stockpile management and security
1. In accordance with the provisions of the Programme of Action, to
redouble national efforts to ensure the safety, security and
effective management of stockpiles of small arms and light
weapons held by government armed and security forces, including
man-portable air defence systems, in particular in conflict and
post-conflict situations, at all stages of the small arm/light weapon
life cycle, drawing on existing standards and guidelines for this
purpose.
2. To apply the provisions of the Programme of Action to ammunition
to redouble their efforts to ensure the safety, security, and
effective management of stockpiles of small arms and light
weapons ammunition held by government armed and security
forces, including in conflict and post-conflict situations, at all
stages of their life cycles, drawing on existing standards and
guidelines for this purpose.
3. To take all necessary measures, in full cooperation with relevant
bodies, organs and missions of the United Nations, regional and
subregional arrangements and organizations, to promptly ensure
the security of stockpiles of small arms and light weapons in
conflict and post-conflict situations in order to prevent diversion to
illicit markets and the uncontrolled proliferation of these weapons.
ii. Transnational transportation
1. To take all necessary measures to ensure the secure
transnational transportation, transit, trans-shipment and delivery of
small arms and light weapons, including by air and sea, in
accordance with relevant international law, with a view to
preventing their diversion.
 2. To provide law enforcement authorities, in particular customs
authorities, with the mandates, legal frameworks and resources
that would enable them to identify and intercept illicit shipments of
small arms and light weapons within their territories.
5. New Zealand:
a. Database for NSA, that will help countries decide whether a specific NSA should
be permitted to purchase arms, depending on various factors. A few examples
include any incriminating or violence-inciting acts in the past, as well as potential
to harm possessed by them.
b. Cross examination of source of funds for operations of NSA and funds to
purchase weapons. This is to be done by trustworthy officials.
c. States may allow said permissions for purchase and usage of weapons only
within the limits of their own jurisdiction. Other member-states reserve the right to
restrict or prevent usage, possession or purchase Of SALW by NSA in their own
country. This is for NSA’s that function across the territory of many countries.
6. Brazil:
a. Encourages member states to adopt effective measures regarding illicit arms
brokering and transit of Small Arms and Light Weapons.
b. Improving the systematic collection and record keeping of information about the
Small Arms and Light Weapons, including the ammunition owned by an individual
and/or an organisation. Maintaining records of SALW at each stage of the
distribution chain.

7. Syria: Recognises the serious threat posed by SALW in the hands of non-state Actors, and
recommends that:
a. Non state actors provide SALW to any and all non-state actors.
b. Ensure that only governments are involved in the sale, purchase, storage and transport
of SALWs to reduce the risk of acquisition by non-state actors.
c. Ensure greater regional cooperation to prevent SALW transfers to non-state actors.

8. Philippines:

a. Robust stockpile management and security should therefore be priorities for preventing
illicit flows of arms to NSA.
b. States could be encouraged to exchange the lists of non state actors with other states
at meetings of States Parties or via an Implementation Support Unit (ISU). By the same
token, they could also be encouraged to share the lists that they maintain of NSA that
are registered to produce, receive or deal in conventional arms. The exchange of such
information should also assist States Parties in verifying information contained in
applications for authorizations and end-user documentation. Where deemed appropriate,
such information could also help to facilitate post-shipment controls.
9. Zimbabwe:

a. Focussing more on implementation of old laws rather than making new ones.
b. Generating more employment as it will prevent the youth from getting into the illicit
manufacturing and trading of SALWs
10. France
a. First, with respect to real threats to international peace and security, we advise to reform
arms embargoes applicable to non-state actors, individuals and all associated entities,
which are the main cause of threats to international peace and security. These actors
include but are not limited to transnational organized crime groups like drug cartels,
pirates or human traffickers, all of them users of small arms and light weapons.
11. Afghanistan
a. Strategic Approach to Countering Terrorism
i. In order to organize themselves, and to plan and carry out attacks, terrorists need
recruits and supporters, funds, weapons, the ability to travel unimpeded, other
forms of material support (e.g., means of communicating, places and access to
vulnerable targets. Therefore, effectively countering acts of terrorism requires a
comprehensive and strategic approach, relying on a broad range of policies and
measures.
b. Multilateral notification system for arms control
i. The mitigation measures discussed here are primarily intended to be undertaken
by states that are aid donors or arms suppliers or by states in which commercial
suppliers providing arms and ammunition are based.
ii. Multilateral notification systems for arms transfers are instruments that have been
put in place by supplier or recipient states to limit the negative impact of transfers
of arms and military equipment. In particular, supplier states and recipients could
exchange information on the intended recipient’s current holdings and the
licences issued and used by the exporting state.
iii. These existing reporting mechanisms could provide the foundations for more
detailed reporting systems that could increase transparency in transfers of arms
and ammunition to fragile states.
c. Controlling the illicit trade
i. Controlling Southeast Asia's illicit trade in light arms will not be easy. Not only is
there already a vast number of weapons in circulation, the fact that the munitions
are, by definition, small, allows traffickers to easily evade weak customs controls
as well as more traditional detection mechanisms, such as satellite surveillance.
Nonetheless, there are certain steps that can and should be taken to stem some
of the proliferation:
1. promoting supplier 'traceability' by tagging weapons and ammunition;
2. concluding and enforcing multilateral agreements calling for the
destruction of surplus armament stocks;
 3. strengthening regional customs, law-enforcement and intelligence
structures, and increasing co-operation among them through such forums
as the ASEAN Police .
4. creating a specific Southeast Asian small arms register; and

12. United Arab Emirates

1) Recommends, t​ hat states should eliminate and end the supply of SALW to non state
actors by:
a) Stringent checking of exports and imports of small arms, ammunition, light weapons, etc
by respective states,
b) Rigid border checks for SALW, ammunition, etc, between countries with geographically
intercrossed borders,
2) ​Recommends, t​ o states with assistance from the UNODA and OPCW destroy all
stockpile which may be acquired by non state actors acting in other armed conflicts
3) ​Recommends, t​ o states with assistance from the UNODA and OPCW destroy all
stockpile which may be acquired by non state actors acting in other armed conflicts
13) Germany
a) The making of an online and offline registry to mark and the weapons being
exported which will help in ensuring that the weapons don't fall in hands of
Violent Non State Actors.
b) Authorities should be able to request access to the premises of any registered
gun owner at any time.
c) New regulations, requiring owners to undergo a security check every five years
as well as justifying their need for a weapon.

14. ​United Kingdom​: The United Kingdom believes the principle impedance to tackle this issue
is the understanding and definition of Non-State Actors that the member states have. There is a
fundamental difference within the member nations - regarding who they consider as non-state
actors. Hence, we suggest that each member nation try coming up with a proper and
comprehensive list of actors in the international scene.
Then we recommend that:
- Maintenance of proper records of trade made by states to other states or actors and
maintaining transparency regarding that
- Maintenance of Arms registries nationally and updating the internationally maintained
registries like the UN Registry of Conventional Arms, Firearms Reference Table, Illicit
Arms Records and Tracing Management System maintained by agencies like UNODA,
INTERPOL, etc.
- Maintaining a proper national marking and licensing regimes in form of National
Legislations. With proper markings, the arms and ammunition become easier to trace
and attributed back to specific countries.
 - International cooperation through development of Standard Operating Procedures and
Best practices compendiums on Licensing laws and procedures of marking of weapons
and Database management as a reference for developing nations.
15. PRC :

a. Encourages States to reinforce cross-border cooperation at the national, subregional

and regional levels in addressing the problem of the illicit trade in SALWs in all its
aspects, with full respect for each State’s sovereignty over its own borders;
b. Also encourages States to utilize the resources of, and cooperate with, the United
Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament and the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime;

Collection and Destruction of SALW

1. Russia: -
a. Suggests that a committee should be formed to ensure the proper collection and
destruction of small arms and light weapons;
b. Destruction of the weapons and ammunition should be public and symbolic;
c. Where the weapons are to be destroyed by burning, the actual burning can be
observed by independent and local NGOs, politicians, and the media;
d. Explosive items such as grenades, ammunition, anti-tank rockets, and landmines
may also be destroyed in symbolic explosions;
e. Destruction certificates shall be made available to show what weapons have
been destroyed;
f. The result of the destruction pro​cess will be large amounts of scrap metal and
possibly wood if burning is not used which can be used.
g. For the destruction of large quantities of SALW, particularly if they are
concentrated in only a few locations, on site destruction may be desirable.
h. Small quantities of SALW at numerous locations might best be destroyed by use
of cutting torches and carbide saws.
i. Some light weapons, as well as heavy conventional weaponry, will probably
require initial disabling and preparation for destruction disposal through the use
of cutting devices such as oxy-acetylene torches.
j. Small arms, such as handguns, could be easily destroyed using light presses or
even sledgehammers and anvils.
2. Pakistan:
a. Despite economic constraints, the Government of Pakistan initiated a buy back
programme of SALW. Approximately 20, 000 small arms were bought back and
destroyed.
b. Financial allocation for economic uplift n troubled areas. More development
activities directed towards poverty alleviation and improvement in civic facilities
especially the education sector.
 c. Targeted subsidy programs should be developed to rescue the locals from their
traditional grinding poverty.
d. After revision of License issue procedures at a federal level, only minister for
interior can now issue arms licenses and that too for non - prohibited weapons.
All automatic weapons fall in the category of prohibited weapons except for
military use.
e. Computerized arms licenses should be issued to legitimate users. Data base for
such licenses should be maintained
f. Only government controlled manufacturing units are allowed to sell weapons.
g. More establishments of counter terrorism should be there.
h. Mobilization of ngo for awareness and advocacy campaigns.
i. A lot of technical surveillance for controlling arms traffic.
3. France:
a. To destroy the small arms and light weapons that is not in the hand of
governmental and private agencies is to use a method called Oxyacetylene
cutting
b. Oxyacetylene cutting is a proven method of destroying all types of weapons. The
equipment is relatively simple to use; the personnel can be trained to use it in
one day. The equipment needed is available for sale worldwide, and can be
transported by helicopter, light aircraft or light truck. Additionally, the torch is
almost maintenance-free and spare parts are easily available in almost every
country .
4. Sudan
a. A Sect of the government can be formed in Sudan which will only look into
collection of arms from a crime scene or from ​surplus stocks from armed forces 
or law enforcement. 
b. Areas that were severely affected by the protests in the country can be scanned
for any light weapons or for the grenades in regions like Darfur.
c. A number of weapons are brought to Sudan for further export, out of which some
are smuggled into the country.Tracing the tracks of this journey of the weapons,
a lot of ways through which these weapons are smuggled can be discovered as
well as eradicated.
d. At any point of conflict, civilians with or without license to hold weapons, should
be constantly scanned for weapons, and collected for until the situation is under
control.
e. Abolish any member of the government or police, that is found to be engaging in
such matters.
f. In Sudan, annual homicides by any means total are estimated to be 2,596 which
means we lose a lot of our citizens at this annual rate and therefore utmost
security is to be provided to the civilians
g. Destruction ensures that small arms and light weapons will not find their way
(back) into illicit circuits.
 h. Open-pit burning;Melting in foundries;Open-pit detonation;Oxyacetylene
cutting;Shredding are some of the methods that if properly used can prevent
almost any re-entry of these weapons into the black market. And for effective
use, the waste metal scrap can be recycled for further use.
5. South Sudan: Tracing illegal weapons and ammunitions:
a. Tracing is to develop a system of keeping records of weapons and ammunition
made and traded to prevent future accumulation of illegal arms and ammunition.
b. Member states should record the purpose of importing and exporting with the
record of the no. of weapons used in different sectors from a particular import.
c. These records should be cross-checked annually. This process should be under
the supervision of the UN.
d. Clear and detailed instructions should be given while conducting any
disarmament programme.
e. Protection of the innocent civilians should be the main aim.

6. Afghanistan: The UN may employ or support a variety of Disarmament, Demobilization

and Reintegration(DDR) programming elements adapted to suit each context. These
may include:
a. The disbanding of armed groups: Governments may request assistance to
disband armed groups. The establishment of a Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) programme is agreed to and defined within a ceasefire, the
ending of hostilities or a comprehensive peace agreement. Trust and
commitment by the parties to the implementation of an agreement and minimum
conditions of security are essential for the success of a DDR programme.
b. The rightsizing of armed forces or police: Governments may request assistance
to downsize or restructure their armies or police and supporting institutional
infrastructure (salaries, benefits, basic services, etc.). Such processes contribute
to security sector reform (SSR). DDR practitioners should work in close
collaboration with SSR experts while planning reintegration support to former
members of armed forces.
c. The repatriation of foreign combatants and associated groups:Considering the
regional dimensions of conflict, Governments may agree to assistance to
repatriation. DDR programmes may need to become involved in repatriating
national combatants and their civilian family members, as well as children
associated with armed forces and groups who may have crossed an international
border.
d. Designing a demobilization program to confront a problem of this magnitude is an
imposing challenge for the Afghan government officials, dono government
representatives, and UN experts given this task. However, a major factor in their
favor is that the majority of the Afghan people are ardently in favor of this
enterprise. It must be remembered that Taliban efforts to disarm militia groups
and assert a monopoly over the use of force was their most popular policy.
 7. DPRK - Engage in positive buyback in cases on conflict wherein the nations which have
provided weapons shall either take back their weapon stockpiles and compensate the
host monetarily or allow the host to dispose off the stockpiles by melting down and
reusing the materials or selling parts of the SALW in a controlled format.
8. United Arab Emirates
1) Advises s​ tates to ensure all ongoing productions of small arms, light weapons,
minor explosives, ammunition, etc have been authorised by the state itself and
non-licensed actor plays a role in the same
2) Urges ​states to coordinate with the UNODC and UNODA with regards to the
destruction of stockpile in states
3) Recommends t​ he stricter and more stringent enforcement of the Firearms
Protocol in states whereby :
a) establishing as criminal offence the illicit manufacturing of and 
trafficking in firearms in line with the Protocol's requirements and 
definitions 
b) adopting effective control and security measures, including the 
disposal of firearms, in order to prevent their theft and diversion into 
the illicit circuit  
c) establishing a system of government authorizations or licensing 
intending to ensure legitimate manufacturing of, and trafficking in, 
firearms;  
d) ensuring adequate marking, recording and tracing of firearms and 
effective international cooperation for this purpose.

9. Republic of Turkey:
a) Whatever method is chosen, a number of common preparatory tasks need to be
undertaken. These include collecting the weapons, ensuring that they have been
rendered safe (e.g., contain no ammunition), implementing and maintaining a chain of
custody and accountability, sorting and segregating the weapons, inventorying and
transferring them to temporary storage or directly to the destruction site. At the same
time it is necessary to ensure that environmental concerns have been taken into
account and that a verification system is in place to certify destruction. Within the
organization tasked with carrying out the destruction operation unauthorized production.

1. Russia
A) Control by the recipient
In the event of transportation of the finished product by the recipient, the serial numbers and
completeness of all SALW should be verified, recorded and maintained in accordance with
national law.
Where applicable, the manufacturer should provide decommissioning (destruction) certificates
for the components manufactured at other enterprises.

B) Control by the manufacturer

At the stage of SALW manufacture, controls could cover:
i) Use of technical (design and technological) weapons documentation;
ii) Use of special equipment required to manufacture the weapons;
iii) Parts, assemblies and finished weapons;
iv) Substandard weapons and their parts, registered by serial number during manufacture or
destruction;
v) Marking and stamping of the weapons.

11.Philippines: -

a)Small arms collection, destruction, and stockpile protection programs are important because: -

: • Collection programs prevent weapons from being used in crimes, banditry, and violence

• Destruction programs increase security and serve as confidence building measures

• Stockpile security prevents weapons from being stolen or misused.

b)The primary principle of aftermath of the requirement of SALWS is that safe destruction
should be the overriding objective in operations designed to reduce or eliminate weapons,
ammunition and explosives collected or rendered surplus for whatever reason.

c)The overall objective of the process should be to ensure that weapons can never be fired
again and the ammunition and explosives are rendered completely inoperable and present no
hazard to personnel as well as the environment.

United Kingdom​: We attribute the problem of collection and destruction of SALWs to effective
stockpile management by countries.
- Here, we suggest the member nations to try and follow the International Ammunition
Technical Guidelines which is a best practices guidelines developed and compiled by
the UN Cordinationating Action against Small Arms in stockpile maintenance, and
management.
- Recommends the countries engaging in positive buyback policies to maintain a record
on the purchases they made and details of the seller and conduct background checks so
as to ensure that these buybacks do not become a method of funding extremists or
violent non-state actors.

12. New Zealand

a) Introduction of gun buyback and surrender schemes in countries where they have not
already been introduced.
 b) Destruction of said guns by the government of countries and not storing.
c) Thorough checking of owners of guns and their background through strong laws. This
shall both-
i) Prevent legal firearms from being leaked into illegal channels.l
ii) Reduce misuse of firearms by civilians.
13. PRC:
a. Welcomes the role of United Nations-mandated peacekeeping missions in combating
issue of SALWs
b. Recommends the United Nations-mandated peacekeeping missions, as appropriate and
with the consent of the host State, to include practical disarmament measures
addressing the illicit trafficking of SALWs, including through disarmament,
demobilization, reintegration, weapons collection and weapons disposal programmes
and enhancing physical security and stockpile management practices, as well as training
programmes with a view to promoting and implementing a comprehensive and effective
weapons management strategy that would contribute to a sustainable peacebuilding
process.

14. Mexico:
(a) the following step by step procedure is encouraged to be followed by the members:
Step1: Determining what types of weapons to collect
Step2: Understanding SALW demand
Step3: Familiarisation with legal and political considerations
Step 4: selecting incentives
Step 5: The ‘where’ and ‘when’
Step 6: Raising Public Awareness
Step 7: Registering collected weapons

(b) For the countries where it is applicable alternative voluntary methods such as:
•door to door collection
•weapons for development
•tools for arms
•goods for guns
•guns for cash
Should be fostered.

15.) Syria: Recognising the role of efficient collection and destruction of SALW, recommends
the following measures:
1.) Enabling efficient buyback schemes wherein civilians might voluntarily relinquish their
arms and receive adequate compensation.
2.) Ensuring that state actors are the only ones involved in all aspects of SALW trade,
including its destruction to ensure that SALW do not fall into wrong hands.
Improvements in National Legislation
1. PRC -
a. Urges the States to identify, where applicable, groups and individuals engaged in
the illegal manufacture, trade, stockpiling, transfer, possession, as well as
financing for acquisition, of illicit SALWs, and take action under relevant national
law against such groups and individuals;
b. Encourages civil society organizations and associations to work together, along
with the national commissions, in their efforts to combat the illicit traffic in small
arms and light weapons and in the implementation of the UNPoA

Global Cooperation
1. PRC:
a. ​Encourages multilateralism among State organs, international
organizations and civil society in support of programmes and projects
aimed at combating the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and
collecting them;
b. Encourages the international community to provide financial and technical
support to build up the capacity of civil society organizations to take action
to help to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons;
c. Invites the States and organizations, that are in a position to do so, to
provide assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and
light weapons and collecting them;
d. Recognizes the necessity for interested States to develop effective
coordination mechanisms, where they do not exist, in order to match the
needs of States with existing resources to enhance the implementation of
the Programme of Action and to make international assistance more
efficient, and in this regard encourages States to make use of the
Programme of Action Implementation Support System;

2.​. Syria:

a.) Suggests that states be the only one to engage in import, export, storage and transport of
SALW so as to reduce the risk of them falling into the wrong hands.
b.) Recommends the states to improve national legislation with respect to licensing,
manufacturing, and other aspects of SALW.
Unauthorized production of small arms and light
weapons.

1. Mexico

(a) establish as a criminal offence the illicit manufacture of small arms and light
weapons.

(b) establish as a criminal offence the manufacturing and selling of unmarked

small arms and light weapons where this is not already the case.

(c)Subjecting to any legal constraints associated with the preparation of criminal

prosecutions, to destroy confiscated, seized or collected small arms and light
weapons that have been illegally manufactured, unless another form of
disposition or use has been officially authorized and provided that such weapons
have been duly marked and registered.

2. United Kingdom:

- Recommends the member nations to actively cooperate with INTERPOL and

provide information to keep updating the Integrated Ballistic Identification System
(IBIS), so as to effectively trace unauthorised arms that have been produced
using the INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network.
-
3) Germany

a)​States that manufactured and exported conventional arms must work with
other nations to ensure adequate control systems

b)Major producing States should ensure that the supply of small arms and light
weapons was limited only to Governments or entities duly authorized by them
c)Scientific and technological advances should ensure that the application of new
military technologies was consistent with legal, ethical and political imperatives.