63.) G.R. No.

83484 February 12, 1990

CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA,
respondents.

FACTS:

This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino
novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the
spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr. His father died barely ten (10) months after his
marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.

On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house
and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these
properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends
his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a
college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977 without having set up the
foundation.
Celedonia filed on March 8, 1977 Special Proceeding for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate
of Esteban Javellana, Jr. Later, she filed an amended petition praying that letters of administration be issued to
her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased..

She was declared sole heir of the estate.Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other
obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA
FOUNDATION".

On August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order
declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. Her motion was
denied by the court for tardiness .Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or one
year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, for partition,
recovery of possession, ownership and damages.

ISSUE:

Whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain for partition and recovery of Concordia
Villanueva's share of the estate even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in
Branch 23 of the same court.

RULING:

No. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for
partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl,
Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as
yet no orders for the submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the
residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings. In view of the pendency of the probate
proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside
the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and
recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in Special Proceeding. Her remedy
when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari.
64.) G.R. No. 162956             April 10, 2008

FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION REYES, JULIETA C. RIVERA, and EUTIQUIO DICO, JR.,
petitioners,
vs.
PETER B. ENRIQUEZ, for himself and Attorney-in-Fact of his daughter DEBORAH ANN C.
ENRIQUEZ, and SPS. DIONISIO FERNANDEZ and CATALINA FERNANDEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

According to petitioners Faustino Reyes, Esperidion Reyes, Julieta C. Rivera, and Eutiquio Dico, Jr., they are
the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject parcel of land with Anacleto Cabrera as evidenced
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-3551. On April 17, 1996, petitioners executed the Extra Judicial
Settlement of Dionisia Reyes involving a portion of the subject parcel of land.

On March 21, 1997, the petitioners and the known heirs of Anacleto Cabrera executed the Segregation and
Confirmation of Sale over the same property. By virtue of the aforestated documents, TCT No. RT-35551 was
cancelled and new TCTs were issued.

Respondents Peter for himself and on behalf of his minor daughter Deborah Ann, alleges that their predecessor-
in-interest collectively the Spouses Cabrera owned ½ pro-indiviso share in the subject parcel of land or 1051 sq.
m. They further allege that Spouses Cabrera were survived by two daughters – Graciana, who died single and
without issue, and Etta, the wife of respondent Peter and mother of respondent Deborah Ann. Etta died and the
property passed on to petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann by virtue of an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate. On
June 19, 1999, petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to
Spouses Dionisio and Catalina Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also their co-respondents.

The RTC, upon motion of the herein petitioners, dismissed the case on the ground that the respondents-plaintiffs
were actually seeking first and foremost to be declared heirs of Anacleto Cabrera since they cannot demand the
partition of the real property without first being declared as legal heirs and such may not be done in an ordinary
civil action, as in this case, but through a special proceeding specifically instituted for the purpose.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs of
Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto the Extra-
Judicial Settlement with the Sale of Estate and the Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale
as well as to cancel the new transfer certificates of title.

RULING:

Yes. The trial court correctly dismissed the case for there is a lack of cause of action when a case is instituted by
parties who are not real parties in interest. While a declaration of heirship was not prayed for in the complaint, it
is clear from the allegations therein that the right the respondents sought to protect or enforce is that of an heir
of one of the registered co-owners of the property prior to the issuance of the new transfer certificates of title
that they seek to cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as such heirs in the proper forum. a real
party in interest is allowed to prosecute and defend an action in court. A real party in interest is the one who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof.
65.) G.R. No. 42108 December 29, 1989

OSCAR D. RAMOS and LUZ AGUDO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ADELAIDA RAMOS and LAZARO E. MENESES, respodents.

FACTS:

In January 1959, private respondent Adelaida Ramos borrowed from her brother, petitioner Oscar D. Ramos,
the amounts of P 5,000.00 and P 9,000.00 in connection with her business transaction with one Flor Ramiro,
Fred Naboa and Atty. Ruperto Sarandi involving the recovery of a parcel of land in Tenejeros, Malabon. As
security for said loan, private respondent Adelaida Ramos executed in favor of petitioners two (2) deeds of
conditional sale of her rights, shares, interests and participation respectively over Lot No. 4033 registered in the
name of their parents, Valente Ramos and Margarita Denoga, now deceased; and Lot No. 4221.

Upon the failure of said private respondent as vendor a retro to exercise her right of repurchase within the
redemption period, petitioner filed a petition for consolidation and approval of the conditional sale of Lot No.
4033 in Special Proceedings and a petition for approval of the pacto de retro sale of Lot No. 4221 in the former
Court of First Instance of Tarlac acting as a cadastral court.

The probate court issued an order where the CONDITIONAL SALE executed on May 27, 1959, by Adelaida
Ramos in favor of spouses Oscar D. Ramos and Luz Agudo, conveying to the latter by way of pacto de retro
sale whatever rights and interests. At the same time, the cadastral Court also issued a similar order where the
granting the petition, orders the consolidation of ownership and dominion in petitioners-spouses Oscar D.
Ramos and Luz Agudo over the rights, shares and interests of Adelaida Ramos.

On February 28, 1968, private respondent filed Civil Case with the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac for
declaration of nullity of orders, reformation of instrument, recovery of possession with preliminary injunction
and damages. The complaint therein alleged that the deeds of conditional sale are mere mortgages and were
vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud and undue influence and that the orders, respectively issued by the probate
and cadastral courts, were null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the order issued by the probate court and by the
cadastral court respectively, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:

Yes. The approval of the probate court of the conditional sale is not a conclusive determination of the intrinsic
or extrinsic validity of the contract but a mere recognition of the right of private respondent Adelaida Ramos as
an heir, to dispose of her rights and interests over her inheritance even before partition. The approval by the
settlement court is not deemed final until the estate is closed and said order can still be vacated, hence the
assigning heir remains an interested person in the proceeding even after said approval. The probate jurisdiction
of the court of first instance relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of
wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and
trustees. The law does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate court to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceeding. Obviously, the approval by the probate court of the conditional sale
was without prejudice to the filing of the proper action for consolidation of ownership and/or reformation of
instrument in the proper court within the statutory period of prescription. The same jurisdictional flaw obtains in
the order of consolidation issued.
66.) 200 NW 94. 51 ND 543

GOODIN VS. CASSELMAN

FACTS:

Mary Cole and Joseph Goodin resided in Braddock, North Dakota. Mary Cole was an old aged woman of some
of some means, having a house and some personal property. Goodin lived with Mary and ministered to the
personal wants of Mary Cole. The complaint alleges the employment of plaintiff by deceased and an agreement
to transfer, by will, her property to him if he would continue in her employ and care for her and her property;
that in reliance upon this oral agreement he continued to live with the deceased and cared for her and her
property without compensation other than his board; that while not so engaged in caring for her he earned large
sums of money working for others which he used in caring for her excepting only such amount as was
necessary for his personal needs; that pursuant to such oral agreement the deceased made, on Sept. 16th, 1921, a
written agreement to convey to him her property and, also, her last will in conformity thereto; that by reason
thereof plaintiff acquired a contractual and vested interest in her property which could not be divested by a
subsequent will; that on Sept. 23rd, 1921, deceased made a subsequent will; that such last will was admitted to
probate in the county court and defendant W.S. Casselman appointed as executor thereof; that such county
court, unless restrained, would proceed to execute such will which is null and void. The prayer of this complaint
requests that adverse claims of defendants be set up; that the last will be adjudged null and void; that the county
court be restrained from interfering with plaintiff's right, title, use and occupation of the property.

The trial court ordered that when the last will was made, deceased was without capacity in any way to execute
the contract made with plaintiff and that the will executed on Sept. 23rd was null and void and without legal
effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiff entitled to the inheritance of Mary Cole.

RULING:

No. In view of her advanced age and serious ailment her life expectancy was not long. The Court can
reasonably conclude that the real object of the instruments in suit was to make provision for the maintenance
and care of Mary Cole. Their real purpose was to obtain Mary Cole's property for Joe Goodin. While much of
the evidence offered by the defendants was excluded it nevertheless appears that Goodin is a man wholly
without means, and in fact had no capacity to provide for Mary Cole unless he did so out of her property. While
a comparatively young man he apparently had for six or seven years been satisfied to live largely at the expense
of Mary Cole. He in no manner changed his course of conduct as a result of the contract. He proceeded to do
after the execution thereof, what he had been doing before, namely, make his home at Mary Cole's house and
receive his sustenance from her property. The Court concluded that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief in
this action.
67.) G.R. No. L-62431-33 August 31, 1984

PIO BARRETTO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) and HONOR MOSLARES, respondents.

FACTS: 

Nicolai Drepin died testate on August 23, 1972. He left behind three (3) parcels of titled land. Since the filing of
the petition for probate of the Drepin’s will offers had been made for the purchase of the Drepin lands, among
them, that of GM Management Phils through its President Honor P. Moslares. Moslares alleged that on October
9, 1970, Drepin executed a deed of sale with mortgage executed in his favor. He also alleged that on June 25,
1971, Drepin and Moslares entered into a "Joint Venture Agreement" where it was agreed that Drepin shall be
the registered "owner" of the lots and denominated Moslares as "developer" tasked with converting the lands
into a residential subdivision. But before the agreement could be implemented, Nicolai Drepin died.

Upon learning of the existence of Special Proceedings, Moslares informed the Judicial Administrator that he is
already the owner of the properties made subject matter of the Special Proceedings and proposed that he will be
permitted to pay the balance on the sale with mortgage in accordance with the terms of his written proposal. On
September 25,1979, with the court’s permission, a Deed of Undertaking was entered into by respondent
Moslares and the Administrator to implement the Contract of Sale with Mortgage.

Moslares failed to pay as agreed. Thus, the administrator reported the matter to the probate court which
approved the sale of the property to Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. The deed of sale was duly registered. Mosrales
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was not acted by the probate court. Under the theory of
Moslares, it is insisted that the probate court has no authority to cancel his unfulfilled offer to buy,
notwithstanding the fact that he failed miserably to comply with the terms of his own offer to buy. On May 18,
1981, Pio Barreto Realty filed Civil Case before the CFI of Rizal to determine title and ownership over the
Drepin lands.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the probate court can order the execution of the deed of sale with Pio Barreto.

RULINGS:

Yes. Actions of the probate court, in the case at bar, do not refer to the adjudication of rights under the contract
entered into by the deceased during his lifetime. It is to be noted that the dealings of the respondent with the
court arose out of the latter's bid to sell property under its authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber
property of the estate to pay or settle against the estate. Thus, by estoppel, respondent bound himself under an
agreement with the court separate and distinct from that which he had with the decedent. In rescinding such
contract, the court merely seeks to enforce its right to put an end to an agreement which had ceased to be a
working proposition. Surely, this is well within the power of the probate court. It is also to be emphasized that
it was not respondent's contract of sale with decedent that had been invalidated but rather the administrator's
authority to sell to respondent.
68.) G.R. No. L-43701  64 Phil 179           March 6, 1937

In re Instate of the deceased Marciana Escaño.

ANGELITA JONES., petitioner-appellant-appellee,
vs.
FELIX HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower and heir, oppositor-appellant-appellee.

FACTS:

Marciana Escano and Arthur Jones got married in December 1914. On January 10, 1918, Jones secured a
passport. She never heard from him again. In 1919, she filed for a proceeding to judicially declare Arthur
missing. On October 25, 1919, the court declared Arthur as an absentee with the proviso that said judicial
declaration of absence would not take effect until six months after its publication in the official newspapers
pursuant to Art. 186 of the Old Civil Code. In 23 April 1921, the court issued another order for the taking effect
of the declaration of absence, publication thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal." On
May 6, 1927, Marciana contracted a second marriage with Felix Hortiguela. When Marciana died intestate,
Felix was appointed as judicial administrator of the estate. Angelita Jones, Marciana’s daughter from her first
marriage, filed a case and alleged that she is the only heir of her mother and that her mother’s marriage to Felix
was null and void on the ground that from April 23, 1921 (when the court issued an order for the taking effect
of declaration of absence & publication thereof) to May 6, 1927 (her mother and Felix’s marriage) was below
the 7-year prescriptive period. On May 3, 1934, the heiress Angelita Jones, then married to Ernesto Lardizabal,
filed a motion alleging that she was the only heir of her mother, the deceased Marciana Escaño; that there never
was a valid marriage between her mother and Felix Hortiguela or that had such marriage been celebrated, it was
null and void; and even granting that it were valid, Felix Hortiguela was not entitled to a share of one-third of
the inheritance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Felix Hortiguela entitled to the estate of Marciana Escano.

RULING:

Yes.The absence of Marciana Escaño's former husband should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on
which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than
nine years elapsed. Then the marriage of Felix Hortiguela to Marciana Escaño is valid and lawful. Inasmuch as
Felix Hortiguela was lawfully married to Marciana Escaño and was divorced from her at the time of her death
there is no doubt that he is entitled to inherit in usufruct, not only in testate but also in intestate succession, as in
the present case.