IPC CASE COMMENTARY

Machhi Singh and Others v. State of Punjab1

Machhi Singh and Others v. State of Punjab, commonly called the Machhi Singh case, is a
case with enormous relevance and judicial and social importance. As famous as this case is it
is much more controversial and subjected to much criticism. One of the most important
developments in Indian judicial system through this case is the general principle laid down as
to under what all circumstances can a case fall under the doctrine of ‘rarest of the rare’. In
this case, the appellants and his companions out of a personal family feud killed seventeen
people in a pre-planned and cold-blooded manner in five different but interconnected
incidents. The Sessions court after assessing the arguments and evidence presented passed
death sentence on the accused Machhi Singh, Kashmir Singh and Jagir Singh. Later on
appeal, the High Court sentenced Mohinder Singh too to death which was later reversed by
the Supreme Court. The controversies surrounding this case rest on the guidelines laid down
to discern what could constitute a rarest of the rare case and also the general criticism on the
retention of the death penalty and Constitutionality of it. This case has been considered a
great precedent and the principles laid down, in this case, are debated every time the subject
of capital punishment comes into question. Starting from being too vague and broad to being
arbitrary and inconsistent in its application by the judgements following it, these guidelines
have been criticised and also supplemented by other opinions by the following judges. While
in no doubt that sentiments of the community are considered to be a very significant factor in
judicial proceedings, the question also arises as to how much weightage should be given to
these outrages by the society. There is also the question of the correctness regarding the
mitigating and aggravating factors of the crime and criminal on the basis of which the
judgement is passed. Although no one question the culpability of the accused in this question
some, however, question the reasoning deployed to justify the death sentence passed. As a
case of such magnitude and importance, it is no surprise that this has been sifted through
thoroughly and scrupulously by jurists giving rise to a plethora of interpretations and
opinions.

This case is a collection of five different appeals originating from the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana. These five appeals although dealt with separately based on their merits, their
judgements, however, were clubbed together into one for convenience and to reduce
redundancy. The facts of the case run thus.

Machhi Singh is the main and common accused in all of these appeals. He along with his
eleven companions in the intervening night of 12th and 13th August 1977 committed a series
of murders and attempted murders that resulted in the death of seventeen people and injury of
three. The death toll included men, women and even children. These crimes were committed
in five different villages close to each other in the state of Punjab. The main targets were one
Amar Singh and his sister Piaro Bai. The other victims were relatives, near and far, or
acquaintances of them. The victims were assaulted by rifles or kirpans, a dagger carried by

1
1983 SCR (3) 413.
the Sikhs. The motive seems to be retaliation and it is known that there was a family feud
between the assailants and their targets.

In the first incident, Amar Singh and his family were targeted when around 8:30 pm on 12 th
August Machhi Singh with four of his companions entered the house of Amar Singh in Alahi
Baksh Badla village and killed his wife and three sons who were all sleeping when they were
shot by Machhi Singh and Mohinder Singh. The evidence that was most relied upon was the
eye-witness reports given by Amar Singh and his daughter Mohindo both of whom managed
to hide from the assailants and thus lived to tell the story. Other than the eye-witnesses the
recovered rifle connected Machhi Singh to the crime scene with the ballistics report
corroborating this fact. Mohinder Singh was given the benefit of the doubt and his death
sentence was reversed as the rifle he was accused of using to commit the crimes could not be
satisfactorily tied to him as by the records it was issued to Kashmir Singh, another appellant
in this series of appeals. The second incident takes place in the neighbouring village Sowaya
Rai around 9:00 or 10:00 pm. Nine people intrude into the house of Kehar Singh and kill two
and injure the third. After the said commission of the act, the same set of people went Kho
Kunjuka where they intruded into the house of Bishan Singh and killed him and a woman and
her child. Hakam Singh who was lying on a cot outside the house ran for his life when
Machhi Singh and Jagir Singh gave chase and fired which hit Hakam Singh who lived to be
an eye-witness in the case. Another person who survived a gunshot was a Nankobai, whose
narration had great importance as she herself was shot by Kashmir Singh. This piece of
evidence was vital in the conviction of the accused in the incident that took place in Sowaya
Rai while that of Hakan Singh was used to convict the accused present in the Kho Kunjuka.
The third incident took place about 11:00 pm at a certain Wajnar Singh’s house in Mamujoa
village where he and his grandson were killed by rifle shots. The incident was narrated by
Sabban, the wife of Wajnar. She awoke to find five men standing over her sleeping grandson
whereupon he was shot by Machhi Singh. Simultaneously Wajnar Singh was shot by
Mohinder Singh and both of them succumbed to their wounds instantly. When she cried for
help she was shot at by Machhi Singh only to be missed and to hit a bullock near her. The
next incident takes place at Kamrewala village around 1:00 am of 13th August 1977. Here
Piaro Bai was awakened by shouts outside her home woke her husband Mohinder Singh up.
Even as he was getting up five men entered the courtyard and Machhi Singh shot him and left
the scene. He died instantly. The eye-witness reports of Piaro Bai and Jaggar Singh, a guest
in her house that night, convicted the accused. The last of this series of brutal incidents took
place at 3:30 am the same night at Dandi Khur village. Five men entered the house of one
Ujagar Singh. They killed his sister Palibai and attacked four of her relatives. Out of the five
attacked three died on the spot while two, Mukhtiar Singh and Sahib Singh died at later point
of time. Mukhtiar Singh’s police statements were later accepted as dying declaration and
along with Ujagar Singh and Munibai Singh’s statements were also used to convict the
perpetrators.

The counsels appearing for the appellants put forward the lack of lighting as their main
argument. They argued that since there was no electricity and that all the witnesses had to
rely on the weak light of lanterns their statements cannot be relied upon to implicate the
accused. But all the three courts refused to consider this. The reasoning the Supreme Court
gave was that villagers living in villages where electricity has not reached as yet, get
accustomed to seeing things in the light shed by the lantern. Their eyesight gets conditioned
and becomes accustomed to the situation. Their powers of seeing are therefore not diminished
by the circumstance that the incident is witnessed in the light shed in the light shed by the
lantern and not electric light.2 Another argument put forth was that the police statement of
Mukhtiar Singh should not be accepted as dying declaration as magistrate did not record
them. The court refused to accept this argument as it was evidenced that Mukhtiar Singh was
making a good recovery hence saw no need for a magistrate. Also since the court believed the
statement to be genuine and hence admitted it to be treated as a dying declaration.

After considering all these evidence the court adjudged capital punishment on Machhi Singh,
Kashmir Singh and Jagir Singh and reversed the death sentence given by the High Court on
Mohinder Singh. The rest of the appellants were imprisoned in accordance with the
judgement of the lower courts.

The impact of this case is very immense in two distinct ways. The first implication is that of
the death sentencing. This has always been a controversial matter both in legal and social
spheres. The reason is the very nature of its irreversibility and for the fact judgements passed
by the courts can and have been proven to be wrong at a later point of time. Another reason
for the controversy may be in the humanistic values that it violates. When countries all over
the world are abolishing the death penalty for all the cases, India and few other countries still
retain it and it is even applicable to political cases.3 Added to this social impact is the legal
impact it will have in the form of being a precedent. This has been the case too. This case has
been cited as an authority in important cases such as Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh 4 and
Mukesh & Anr vs State For Nct Of Delhi & Ors5.

The main legal issue in this case is regarding the conditions posed to test whether a case can
be considered a ‘rarest of the rare’ case. This doctrine itself was proposed in the Bachan
Singh case6 and so naturally this also draws heavily on this precedent. In this case, it was
established that life imprisonment was the rule and death penalty should be awarded in the
rarest cases. Along with this, it set out some principles as to when to impose a death sentence
which was further elaborated in the Machhi Singh case. Another issue lies in its reasoning as
to why impose the death penalty. In this case, the court argues that acts which are done in a
cold-blooded manner which shocks and angers the community at large can come under the
consideration to be treated as a rarest of the rare case and goes on to set out certain
circumstances or guidelines as to when the people are shocked and demand death for the
accused. Some analysis of the principles expressed in the Bachan Singh is also warranted as
the Machhi Singh judgement is passed by relying on it.

2
1983 SCR (3) 413 [5].
3
Monica Sakhrani, Maharukh Adenwalla, ‘Death Penalty: Case for Its Abolition’ (2005) 40 Economic and
Political Weekly 1023.
4
(2012) 4 SCC 257.
5
(2017) 6 SCC 1.
6
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684.
In this case, the test to determine whether a case can be classified under the doctrine of rarest
of the rare is to answer the following questions:

1. Is there something uncommon about the crime which renders sentence of

imprisonment for life inadequate and calls for a death sentence?
2. Are the circumstances of the crime such that there is no alternative but to impose
death sentence even after according maximum weightage to the mitigating
circumstances which speak in favour of the offender?7

The problem that has been repeatedly pointed is the vagueness when considering the factor of
uncommonness. Does it refer to the method and mode in which the crime took place or an
altogether new set of crimes or crime which can be considered as heinous in nature? There
has been confusion regarding the frequency in the occurrence of the crime also. In the case of
Ravindra Trimbach Chouthmal v. State of Maharashtra8 the judgement given by the court,
although heavily criticised, underwent this same confusion. In this case, the judge considered
the frequency rather than the mode and motive for which it was committed. He reasoned that
since dowry deaths were being more frequent it cannot come under rarest of the rare doctrine.
Although this was not categorically the correct interpretation of this question posed this
confusion can be attributed to the vagueness in the definition of the term uncommon. Another
question that could be raised is what to do under the circumstance where violent crimes
which are heinous in nature go up? The doctrine of rarest of rare was adopted as a common
ground between advocates of retributive justice and humanists who aim to abolish capital
punishment. The term uncommon was made a requirement to supplement this doctrine
making death sentence imposable only to extraordinary circumstances. When violent crimes
go up accused are more likely to be meted out. This shifts the balance between retributive and
humanist principles. So what is to be done then? Will the courts continue to sentence death
upon these convicts following the precedents thus far, hence resulting in more number of
convicts in death row or take another approach, the difference caused solely by the increasing
frequency of the crimes being committed, a view which is heavily criticised presently?

In addition to the test, this judgement has also placed enormous importance on the sentiments
of the community at large. There are several criticisms that can be raised in this view of the
judges both in the way of the overall premise and the guidelines set out. The problem with the
view that communal outrage or shock can be used as an indicator to award the death sentence
lies in its relevance. Is it right to take into account public outrage when sentencing a person to
death? It seems to run too close to the overall sentiment of mob lynching itself. In mob
lynching, a group of people injure or kill a person or a set of people on the grounds that they
believed the said person has committed a crime or a wrong which they find abhorrent. One
criticism that could be raised to the said argument could be that mob lynching involves only a
small set of people and not the entire community at large. But this can be rebutted by saying
that it does not need to be the entire community at large but a large enough section is enough
to achieve this result. So the main critique of this principle is that current rules of imposing
the death penalty in India can take a form of judicially sanctioned mob lynching. Secondly,
7
Machhi Singh (n1) [39].
8
(1996) 4 SCC 148
the court expressed that the people may not feel safe enough even such convicts are jailed and
would demand death sentence on them fearing for their own safety. It is, of course, a
possibility that these convicts may escape the prison but that is a remote possibility.
Demanding death sentence on this ground seems frivolous and exaggerated. Also, could we
extend this opinion of the court regarding the community to other crimes too? Currently, the
death sentence is applied to murder cases of heinous nature. But it is no secret that the public
feels strongly on issues such as women safety and communal hatred. So can death penalty be
considered in cases where gang rape of women and crimes such as honour killing and
murders where the motive is religiously or communally charged? It is a precedent wherein a
case of gang rape, the perpetrators were awarded death sentence but it came in the aftermath
of the death of the victim9, but should the death of the victim be the only standard for death
sentencing is a question that can also be asked. The main reason the court mentioned
communal shock as a justification for death sentence is that the public demands retribution
when their conscience is shaken in such a heinous manner. If a similar effect can be made on
the people without the death of a person should that be also considered? The purpose of
retributive justice is to direct the retributive sentiments that people may harbour. This is
argued to prevent lynching and vigilantism.10But the question here is whether the court itself
is, knowingly or unknowingly, promoting sentiment of lynching by taking into consideration
the sentiment of the community.

The Supreme Court also set out certain indicators as to when the community may feel
shocked and demand the death penalty for the convicted which is classified under the
following broad headings:

1. Manner of commission of murder.

2. Motive of commission of murder.
3. Anti-social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime.
4. Magnitude of crime.
5. Personality of the victim of murder.

In addition to the question asked of the inclusion of shock of the community as an indicator
to award the death penalty there are concerns over the individual guidelines set out here.
Under the heading of the anti-social nature of the crime, it is mentioned that murder of a
person belonging to a minority community or Scheduled Caste when done not in pursuance
of a personal motive but done to terrorise such people the crime may cause social wrath. So
in practical application, this again sounds close to mob lynching which in India takes mostly
a communal form. But members of such mobs are not punished with death. It does not matter
whether the crime was committed by a single person or a group of people as long as it was
committed with a common intention to cause harm. Another guideline set out under the
heading of motives is a murder which is committed in betrayal of the motherland. This is one
of the political aspects of this case. This guideline has the chance of being politicised. This,
of course, is applicable to the entire matter of capital punishment when the public endorses

9
Nirbhaya Case (n7).
10
Albert Alschuler, "The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Last Century and
Some Thoughts about the Next," 70 University of Chicago Law Review 1 (2003).
the death of a person but this principle, in particular, is controversial due to the vague nature
of the term betrayal. It is not mentioned what all can be constituted as a betrayal and hence
this can be misused.11 The principle of considering the personality of the victim is also under
some criticism. The chief question being, why should it matter? The inherent equality of the
citizens of India and the basic humanistic value that all life is intrinsically equal comes into
question. Under this category, the following are mentioned:

1. An innocent child who could not have or has not provided even an excuse, much less
a provocation, for murder.
2. A helpless woman or a person rendered helpless by old age or infirmity.
3. When the victim is a person Vis-a Vis whom the murderer is in a position of
domination or trust.
4. When the victim is a public figure generally loved and respected by the community
for the services rendered by him and the murder is committed for political or similar
reasons other than personal reasons.

The first two conditions implicitly sate that murder of a young or an old is considered to be
more heinous than that of others. The last condition again goes against the ethos of equality
of everyone. Is the murder of a person however respected and loved by all really a valid
consideration for death penalty? It is understood that these principles are in relation to the
sentiment of the community and not a general rule laid down to award capital punishment but
the judgements down the line use these guidelines as precedents and adjudicate based on
them, which leads to the next major criticism the lack of uniformity in applying the principles
laid down in the Bachan Singh case and this one.

The following were laid down in Bachan Singh v State of Punjab:

1. The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme
culpability;
2. Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances of the 'offender' also require to
be taken into consideration along with the circumstances of the 'crime'.
3. Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. In other words death
sentence must be imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether
inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime, and
provided, and only provided the option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life
cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of
the crime and all the relevant circumstances.
4. A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up and
in doing so the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full weightage and a just
balance has to be struck between the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances
before the option is exercised.12

In the case of Bachhan Singh, another important issue raised was the power given to the
judges in awarding death sentences. This was quashed by the court’s saying that:
11
Sakhrani (n3).
12
Bachan Singh (n6).
 1. This discretion in the matter of sentence is to be exercised by the Judge judicially,
after balancing all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime.
2. The discretion is liable to be corrected by superior courts. The exercise of judicial
discretion on well-recognised principles is, in the final analysis, the safest possible
safeguard for the accused.

This is in one way true as a standardised formula for awarding death sentence might make the
assessment of the aggravating and mitigating factors a bit farcical. One of the most essential
requirements to be fulfilled before awarding death sentence is that the court should balance
the aggravating factors with the mitigating factors and if the aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating factors only then should the court proceed with the sentencing. A standardised
formula may take out certain mitigating factors as an exhaustive list cannot be developed as
these vary on a case to case basis. So the accused stands a better chance in this way. But
problems arise in the balancing factors as it totally is dependent on the views of the judges.
What one may consider to be a mitigating factor another one may not and there may be some
variation to the weightage given to each of these factors, again depending on the judge
presiding. The cases of State of U.P v. Satish 13 and Surendra Pal Shivbalakal v. State of
Gujarat14 illustrate this conundrum. Both these cases involve the rape and death of victims
who were minors. The facts of the case are also similar but the conclusions reached were very
different with the accused in the former case sentenced to the death and the latter was not.
Also, the factors that judges may consider aggravating may differ among one another. This is
illustrated in the cases of Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal15 and State of Punjab
v. Harchet Singh16. The accused in the former was given a death sentence while the one in the
latter case was not. The reason given was that in the latter case commission occurred out of
lust and not enmity as was the case in the Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal. This
distinction drawn between enmity and lust-based crimes seems frivolous, devoid of any legal
or moral justification.

The main problem arising out of such examples is stated by Justice Bhagwati in his
dissenting opinion in the Bacchi Singh case-‘The views of Judges as to what may be regarded
as 'special reasons' are bound to differ from Judge to Judge depending upon his value system
and social philosophy with the result that whether a person shall live or die depends very
much upon the composition of the bench. Which tries his case and this renders the imposition
of death penalty the arbitrary and capricious.’

S. Hasthisha Desikan

13
(2005) 3 S.C.C. 114.
14
(2005) 3 S.C.C. 127.
15
(1994) 2 S.C.C. 220.
16
(1994) 3 Crim.LJ (S.C.) 1529.