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MODERATION MONITOR 1
Global Movement of Moderates

2 MODERATION MONITOR
EDITORIAL BOARD
Consulting Editor
Bunn Nagara
Editorial Team
Asrul Daniel Ahmad
Mahmud Rajaie
Syahrul Nizzam Nordin
BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Tan Sri Razali Ismail, Chairman

Ambassador (R) Dato’ M. Redzuan Kushairi
Professor Dr. Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud
Datuk Seri Wong Chun Wai
Dato’ Ho May Yong
Dato’ Saifuddin Abdullah, Chief Executive Officer
PUBLISHER
Global Movement of Moderates Foundation (GMMF)

15th Floor, Menara Manulife,
6 Jalan Gelenggang Damansara Heights,
50490 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Tel: +603 2095 1115

Fax: +603 2095 1215
Website: www.gmomf.org
Facebook: Global Movement of Moderates
Foundation (GMMF)
Twitter: GMM_Foundation

CONTENT
Asean, Moderation and Moderation Monitor
An Introduction
06
COMMENTARY
Political integrity is key to a stable region
Razali Ismail 08
Moderation, development’s essential ingredient
Bunn Nagara 12
ANALYSIS
An Asean Community by 2015?
Rodolfo C. Severino 18
Pursuing peace, prosperity and power:
What can Asean and The EU learn from each other? 28
Yeo Lay Hwee
Of Vision 2020, nation-of-intent and moderation
Shamsul A.B. 38
Big power rivalries and their impact on regional security
B.A. Hamzah 48
Indonesia’s 2014 Legislative and Presidential Elections:
An Overview 60
Farish A. Noor
Researching terrorism and militancy:
Skewed facts, twisted trends? 70
Asrul Daniel
Asean moderation as confidence-building measure
Bunn Nagara 80

About Moderation Monitor

JOURNAL
Moderation Monitor (“the journal”) is a publication of the Global Movement of
Moderates Foundation. It is a quarterly journal published in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
PURPOSE
The purpose of the journal is to encourage and stimulate serious thinking about
aspects of moderation in public policy and related issues of current public interest, as
well as to help researchers, teachers, policymakers and other practitioners to consider
some of these developments in the field.
METHOD
The journal offers itself as an international platform for the presentation of useful factual
information, the exposition of considered views, and the exchange of practicable ideas
for its purpose.
FOCUS
The focus of the journal is the exploration of ideas, policies and their implications for
society. It seeks to inform academicians and an informed public about issues and
developments through discourse, as well as to facilitate public communication on
these themes between specialists and non-specialists.
STYLE
The journal is an intelligent and intelligible publication, not an academic or refereed one.
To encourage a better understanding of the issues and more considered responses,
it seeks to avoid jargon, abstruse notions and abstract theoretical constructions in
favour of simpler vocabulary, grounded reasoning and practical experience for better
accessibility to a broader readership.
However, the simpler style adopted by the journal for better comprehension,
communication and application must not be deemed to compromise the quality of its
contents. The information by way of facts and ideas will remain of the highest standard
among professional journals.
CONTRIBUTIONS
Editorial contributions in the form of articles for our Commentary or Analysis section are
welcome. They must, however, conform to our requirements and house style (please
enquire for full updated details).

MANUSCRIPTS
Unsolicited manuscripts intended for publication will be considered for such at the sole
discretion of the publisher. No responsibility will be assumed by the publisher for any
loss or damage to material sent to us. Proof of dispatch will not be considered as proof
of receipt.
LETTERS
Readers’ responses in the form of letters will be assumed to be for publication unless
otherwise stated. Any decision to publish them in future issues of the journal will be at
the sole discretion of the publisher.
All letters to the journal must contain the sender’s full name, address, phone number
and email. A pseudonym may be included if required, in which case the name of the
writer will not be published.
COPYRIGHT
All rights reserved. No part of the contents of this journal may be reproduced without
the prior written approval of the publishers.
CITATIONS
All non-commercial citations of or from the journal are welcome, with due attribution to
the author(s) and/or publisher as may be appropriate, according to standard practice.

Asean, Moderation and

Moderation Monitor
Tan Sri Razali Ismail
W HAT does it mean to build a community? What makes a community what it

is? And what does it mean to be a part of a community?
These are some of the questions that should perhaps be asked as we approach
2015, when the Asean Community is anticipated to arrive. It will be the first in
a series of markers that we, as members of Asean, have set for ourselves in
becoming a complete, singular regional whole.
Understanding communities must begin with understanding stories – stories that

we share among ourselves and which provide us with the basis for relating with
one another in meaningful ways. The Asean story has always been about the
shaping of the Asean identity. It is about how individuals from among the region’s
600 million population had managed to overcome malignant mistrust, historical
rivalries and overwhelming diversity to come to believe that they share a common
destiny.
At the heart of the Asean story is the Asean Way, which underscores the belief
that the way forward lies not with denying differences but with respecting them,
that order and stability can just as much be a function of interpersonal relations
and strong leadership as they can be of the rigid, uncompromising rule of law. This
is not to say the two modalities are mutually exclusive, but there must be enough
latitude to consider one approach when the other might fail. In the most intense
and unforgiving of times, the method that truly matters is the one that works.
But as we move towards realising a regional community, we hear increasing calls

for a more “people-centred” Asean. A venture traditionally driven by the region’s
political and business elites, the integration of southeast Asia has time and again
come under fire – at times unjustly – for ignoring the needs of the dispossessed,
the cries of the discontented, and the plight of the common citizen. While a focus
on the economy has been vital in distributing the fruits of development throughout
the region, it will not by itself be able to instill a sense of belonging and ownership
that can sustain a regional community.
But what kind of community do we want for our region? Communities, just like
individuals, can be possessed by a range of different motivations, and we can
have communities that are driven just as much by hate and intolerance as those
characterised by compassion and forbearance. If, indeed, we want a more caring,

inclusive and equitable community as part of our shared regional destiny, we

can do far worse than articulate the moderate approach that has arguably been
Asean’s primary modality over the years.
Moderation has been a regular fixture of Asean, albeit narrowly in issues of

politics and security. Perhaps now is the time to develop more ways to apply it in
a wider and more comprehensive regional context. But Asean must be careful to
preserve the heterogeneous character of the region and not allow the vibrant and
dynamic diversity of its peoples to be engulfed in the banal folds of homogeneity.
While it is not a stretch to envision Asean as a community of moderation, its ideals,
institutions and mechanisms must work in tandem to shape the environment in
a regional tapestry imbued with the value and principle of moderation while
remaining true to the colours of its multicultural heritage.
In this our inaugural issue of Moderation Monitor, an international quarterly journal

for the area specialist and the informed general reader, we cover something about
the nature of Asean, moderation in public policy and some current issues in the
region. Although building an Asean Community and developing policy moderation
are both important and separate issues for southeast Asia, they are not unrelated.
Future issues of the journal will feature other themes of interest and consider
other contemporary concerns. As always, we welcome reader feedback that can
help us refine the content and affirm our purpose.

Political Integrity Is Key

To A Stable Region
Tan Sri Razali Ismail
A
little over three years ago, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon
talked about witnessing the birth of a “new age of accountability.” Of
course, what he mentioned was in reference to the development of the
International Criminal Court and the apparent end to the impunity by which some
leaders have been wantonly committing genocide, war crimes and crimes against
humanity. But the idea that it is no longer possible for individuals, groups and
governments to insulate themselves from being held accountable to any acts of
malfeasance can apply to other situations as well.
We find ourselves today in an environment in which institutions and policy

mechanisms have not only proliferated at an unprecedented rate and manner
to safeguard some measure of integrity within our political communities, but also
the ubiquity and mass adoption of information and communications technologies
have made it virtually impossible to avoid the watchful eyes and curious ears of
a vigilant and informed public. Transgressions and misconduct are often choice
fodder for the hungry denizens that populate the social media landscape, as
those who have found themselves at the centre of new media scandals and
controversies can readily attest. Honesty, it appears, is becoming less and less
of a choice and more and more of a necessity, one that is effectively prescribed,
monitored and enforced.
Or is it? It is perhaps both a blessing and a curse that humanity is by and large an
ingenious lot, and new obstacles to impede misbehaviour will inevitably be met
by new means and methods to overcome them. Crimes facilitated by electronic
means are now commonly featured on today’s headlines, and much of the internet
that we use on a daily basis is still largely unregulated and have so far effectively
resisted attempts at control. Even now, new methods of warfare are being waged
between nations in virtual landscapes where the loopholes and inadequacies of
the laws of armed conflict are being exploited to cause damage and disruptions
that, were they to come from real world sources, would have legitimately been
considered acts of war.
The increasingly transparent possibilities offered by advances in information and

communication technology are not immune from temptation and exploitation,
and have of late been employed for less than noble ends. It is only a matter
of time before those with a predilection for abusing their public office close the

TAN SRI RAZALI ISMAIL 9
technology gap and elevate their trespasses to a higher level. As such there is still
much room for integrity, especially integrity that is self-actualised, to play a role.
With today’s new realities, political integrity can only prove itself to be an
increasingly essential ingredient for maintaining the stability of any social,
economic or political environment. Holders of public office can leverage
tremendous resources of the state to serve their bidding, and consequently the
nature of the changes they bring about will be a reflection of how solemnly they
hold to their oath of office and how faithfully they remain true to those that put them
there. While we can see this notion affirmed at every level and in every system
of governance, from municipal councils to national administrations, the effects
are especially pronounced in complex, multilateral environments such as regional
arrangements. This is particularly so in a polity as ambitious as that envisioned by
the nations of south-east Asia, whose aspirations of coming together to realise the
Asean Community appears to be on track for 2015.
But even as they are bolstered by the watchful eyes of new media, are institutional
and systemic measures – which govern and regulate abuses of power within
a wholly material domain – sufficient to curb the many faces of corruption
that primarily operates through informal channels and shadowy networks of
connections? Perhaps, then, there is a case to be made for leadership of the
highest calibre that can heartily embrace uneasy truths and remain unmoved,
within reason, by the capricious persuasions of the polling booth and stay true to
its cause of public service. And perhaps we can also look to our own condition in
Malaysia as a microcosm of the heterogeneity and diversity embodied by Asean,
for some indication of the challenges faced in the struggle for a regional stability
that must be reinforced by the political integrity of our national leaders.
Politics, as Bismarck famously said, is the art of the possible. The skilful application
of politics can bring about results where other avenues have failed. Nations
rise and fall with the calculated games of political elites, and the stability and
prosperity of entire regions may rest upon how well the game is played. But to
what end is politics employed?
For Aristotle, politics is a practical science, a normative endeavour concerned with

the good life and the happiness of the citizens. It follows then that when one talks
of political integrity, it is with a desire for the holders of public office to continue
having their actions guided by the sole purpose of serving the interests of the
people, without being swayed by silver-tongued promises of private gain.
But to truly build a community, the people themselves must feel that they are
genuinely part of the process. That process must take a form in which their
needs, concerns and fears are heard and discussed, even if it is difficult or even
impossible for them to be fully resolved or attended to.

As small, albeit fully realised independent states, we now have to move beyond
the comfort zone of business as usual and begin developing policies that serve
our needs more substantially over the longer term and in a more inclusive
and participatory manner. A process for competing within the unforgiving and
uncompromising realm of interconnected interests in which merit, ability and
willingness to look past our differences to combine efforts will be the main,
perhaps the only, requisite for successfully carving out a niche for ourselves.
But how can we work well with others in the region when we don’t even have
our own house in order? We cannot do so if we bicker incessantly over issues
for positions that serve an ultimately narrow range of interests at the expense
of enfeebling the preconditions for solidarity that we know in our bones are
necessary to carry us through the long term.
This is not to say that the issues lying at the heart of the discontent running through
our society is in any way trivial or irrelevant - far from it, these are the issues that
have the capacity to make or break us, and must be approached carefully and
dealt with decisively. But these are also the issues that must be dealt with openly,
honestly and with integrity, and always with an eye on what lies over the horizon.
These are the issues that require self-reflection, public discourse and rigorous
debates over what can move us forward, rather than calculated scaremongering
and specious polemics that play to the crowd, insults our intelligence and
denigrate our dignity.
There is a palpable risk that comes with adopting immoderate positions for the
purpose of achieving some strategic advantage or winning some fleeting measure
of support to propel our own interests. Sometimes it is genuinely difficult to look
past the shadow plays that we partake in, our roles sometimes taking a life of
their own and creating the conditions that influence our actions just as much as
we believe we are in control of our environment. We can get lost in the moment
and find ourselves committing acts and adopting positions we would never have
done when we are given a moment to collect our thoughts. So powerful is the
mentality that our compromised sense of integrity might be tempted to exploit that
we ourselves might fall victim to the modalities and circumstances brought about
as consequences, and succumb to the uncaring tide of unintended consequences.
This is why political integrity serves as a most essential ingredient in building a

sense of belonging, clearing the pathways to participation and nurturing the bonds
of collective identity in any community. In an age when we are constantly forced
to adapt to new realities, recalibrate our perceptions and reconstitute our modes
of behaviour, recourse to political integrity, tempered perhaps by healthy doses of
humility and moderation, can serve as a beacon for the evolution our relationship
with others will take, whether at a personal, communal or even transnational
level. In maintaining the stability and sustaining the complexity and diversity that

TAN SRI RAZALI ISMAIL 11
constitute a Southeast Asia well on its way to becoming a fully realised and well-
integrated region, political integrity must play a central role in deciding the nature
and character of the community we will all be a part of.

Moderation, Development’s
Essential Ingredient
Bunn Nagara
T
HE world has needed a movement of moderates ever since extremists of
any stripe started organising on a mass scale. Unlike more localised or
personal efforts at organisation, a movement offers better reach and heft.
Consequently, a movement is also more likely than isolated organisations to

endure, assume greater visibility, grow and exert leverage for better impact. And
there are few better ways for a movement to assert an international standing or
universal appeal than to proclaim a global status.
At the very least, pockets of moderate-minded people who do not lack commitment
and determination exist everywhere. They may even constitute the mainstream,
among which those who do not share their inclinations form patchy, isolated
segments.
But out of all the regions of the world that suffer the pangs of racial, religious,
ideological, gender or some other form of chauvinistic extremism, which of them
should establish a movement of moderates that is global in intent and scope? It is
tempting to say anywhere which needs it most, but to originate such a movement
for the world is something else again.
The local need for moderate tendencies and policies need not equate with having
the best or most appropriate conditions for a global movement for that purpose.
The birthplace for such a movement should have some element of extremism to
know how to grapple with it, yet not be so overrun by extremists as to be obsessed
or overwhelmed by them. South-east Asia is such a place.
This is largely a developing region that has seen grand old civilisations, from the
Sri Vijaya empire to the Malacca Sultanate and the Lanna Kingdom, followed
by Western colonisation and then self-determination and independence. The
different levels of economic and political development among the countries of
Southeast Asia today remain vivid.
Extremist tendencies occasionally arise within and between countries in this

region. However, none has yet taken hold on a sufficiently major scale to damage
any nation or society irreparably. Over the medium and long terms, Asean as an
inclusive regional organisation has served to mitigate extremist tendencies and
blunt their sharp points and edges.

BUNN NAGARA 13
Since countries in this region generally subscribe to fundamental liberties for their
peoples, no state is embarking on an all-out effort to crush all elements deemed
extremist. So long as they do not violate existing laws, they are free to hold their
own views however noxious these may be. But where existing laws are deemed
inadequate, legislation needs to be reinforced accordingly.
The challenge remains for each nation state to keep a handle on extremist groups
and individuals, if only to make sure that they do not impinge on the rights and
security of others, violate laws, or breach socially accepted norms of conduct. As
ever, adequate laws are necessary and their diligent enforcement is vital.
Within Asean, Malaysia is as good a country as any to commence work on building

a global movement of moderation against extremism. There have been and there
remain elements of extremism at work in society. Like several countries in the
regional neighbourhood, patches of extremism in Malaysia exist at the fringes,
testing the limits of the mainstream that they hope to influence or displace.
For Malaysia as elsewhere, keeping a lid on extremism of all kinds is hard work.
The task needs to be more than just routine law enforcement. It needs to include
education, socialisation, enlightened policymaking and leadership by example. It
is a full-time initiative that must constantly be bold, vigilant, perceptive, creative
and innovative.
Desite occasional lurches to the contrary by certain individuals, avoiding

extremism of any kind is in the “DNA” of the Malaysian nation. Ever since the idea
of a Federation of Malaya emerging from previously disparate Malay sultanates
materialised, every major racial and religious group domiciled in the Malay
peninsula contributed actively to the work of state formation, the movement for
independence and the process of nation building. This was enhanced from 1963
when the Federation of Malaysia was formed with Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore,
adding more ethnic communities to the nation’s melting pot.
If Malaysia is unique, it is not only because it is multi-ethnic but because the

major ethnic communities are sizeable. Their presence is reflected daily in the
country’s wealth of local languages and dialects, mainstream and “new” media,
and the vernacular and national school systems. From the beginning, the nation’s
founding fathers were wise enough to embark on integrating the communities,
which implies acceptance and respect for their cultures, rather than assimilation
that compels them to conform to the norms of the dominant community.
Tunku Abdul Rahman, subsequently the first prime minister, led the movement
for independence from the British and formalised the founding of what was then
perhaps the world’s most celebrated multi-ethnic nation. But deadly rioting flared
in 1969, wounding the national polity and setting back the work of communal

integration. Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak then had to pacify the country and
renew international confidence in it, focusing on industrialisation. His immediate
successor Tun Hussein Onn did further work on communal relations to consolidate
national unity, while the next three prime ministers would temper economic growth
with communal welfare.
In 1991, Malaysia launched a comprehensive 30-year development programme

dubbed “Vision 2020.” Then Prime Minister Datuk Seri (now Tun) Dr Mahathir
Mohamad unveiled the ambitious plan to develop not just Malaysia but Malaysians.
But while it remains celebrated at home and abroad, inspiring Asean’s own Vision
2020 programme, the visionary master plan’s original planks remain poorly
understood.
The first time Malaysians or anyone else heard of the country’s Vision 2020
programme was Dr Mahathir’s speech at the Malaysian Business Council.
Remarkably for the occasion, only the last two of Vision 2020’s nine objectives
deal with economics. And of the two, only the last objective concerns economic
prosperity.
The “ninth challenge” itself does not just concern prosperity as in economic
growth, but contextualises it “with an economy that is fully competitive, dynamic,
robust and resilient.”
The eighth challenge is “of ensuring an economically just society… in which there
is a fair and equitable distribution of the wealth of the nation, in which there is full
partnership in economic progress.”
Clearly, growth for growth’s sake is too crude, vulgar and short-sighted for an
enlightened programme like Vision 2020. The first seven objectives are even
more fascinating: they remain just as seminal today more than two decades later,
and may even be more vital because of some distractions along the way.
The seventh objective is to build “a fully caring society” in which the people’s
welfare revolves around “a strong and resilient family,” not the state or the
individual.
Where the “First World” of the developed West emphasises the individual as the
basic societal unit and the “Second World” of the industrialised former socialist
bloc stressed a paternalistic state, Malaysia’s concept of a caring society based
on the family unit takes “Third World” development to creative and productive
ends, with a sociable character and social responsibilities.
The sixth objective of “establishing a scientific and progressive society” positions

Malaysia as both a consumer of, and a contributor to, global scientific and
technological advancement.

BUNN NAGARA 15
At one level, this is to ensure that Malaysia and Malaysians reap the greatest
possible benefit from the latest discoveries for their educational, employment,
industrial, technical and other needs. At another level and no less importantly,
becoming a scientific and progressive nation also means discarding the narrow,
outdated and harmful irrationalities of the past to embrace the light of an enabling
modernity.
The fifth objective of building “a mature, liberal and tolerant society” where
all Malaysians are free to practice their traditions and profess their beliefs is
something that many countries including Malaysia aspire to.
Will Malaysia succeed in becoming such a society, and do so by 2020? One way
to ensure progress is to guard against backsliding into the morass of disabling
extremism and bigotry. This challenge is formidable enough for any country, the
more so for multi-ethnic Malaysia.
The fourth challenge of building “a fully moral and ethical society” refers to the
basic character of the nation. This goal must surely be a universal ideal that is
neither far-fetched nor impracticable.
There can be no room for cynical defeatism that dismisses any prospect of
evolving towards a moral and ethical society. Just as these values are consistent
with every religious and philosophical tradition in Malaysia, the means for
realising them in education, legislation, enforcement and political leadership are
at the disposal of Malaysians.
The third objective of “developing a mature democratic society” sees the national
polity “practising a form of mature, consensual, community-oriented Malaysian
democracy” that can be a model for other developing nations.
There is no question that Malaysia has made headway in democratisation in

recent years. But in order to be credible such reforms have to be consistent,
besides progressing beyond election campaign promises and “sweeteners” to
actually embody good governance.
The second objective is to build “a psychologically liberated, secure and

developed Malaysian Society” that is confident, conscientious and resilient.
Once again this relates to the innate character of Malaysians. It is not beyond the scope
of the Malaysian character to reach such levels of sophistication in social development,
but it will take much effort, patience and social planning with the requisite political will.
The first objective of Vision 2020, which to its author Dr Mahathir is likely to be
“the most fundamental, the most basic,” is “establishing a united Malaysian nation
with a sense of common and shared destiny.”

Malaysians would then comprise one “Bangsa Malaysia” (Malaysian Race) loyal
and dedicated to their shared nation, a country “at peace with itself territorially,
and ethnically integrated, living in harmony and full and fair partnership.”
This remains an important work in progress. The challenge has been acknowledged
as a natural prerequisite of the other eight objectives of the Vision 2020 master
plan. A fully integrated and united Malaysia enables all other plans to be realised,
and without which little of value for the nation can be actualised.
The current expression of “Bangsa Malaysia” is “One Malaysia” (“1Malaysia”),

which lends a more comprehensible and agreeable meaning for many upon
translation. At its best, the brainchild of incumbent Prime Minister Datuk Seri
Najib Razak is about a deep-seated sense of nationhood within each citizen that
goes beyond slogans and cheerleading. It is an integral part of the soul of the
Malaysian nation, and a core need of Malaysia at this point in its history.
The nine objectives have been characterised as challenges: both as benchmarks

and as goals to be achieved in themselves. Together they form the distance
markers on a road map for the comprehensive development of Malaysia. They
also demonstrate certain abiding realities about the Malaysian condition.
Firstly, Malaysia’s larger development needs in the 21st century are no longer
material or economic. After posting several decades of relatively high growth,
national needs are now more values-laden and values-based. It is not that
economic growth is no longer important, rather that all priorities including
continued growth have become dependent on the social health of the nation and
its component communities.
Secondly, all the nine challenges of Vision 2020 are related. They are functionally
indivisible: the achievement of one facilitates the achievement of the others, while
the negation of any tends to negate the rest. Just as development means more
than material gain, comprehensive development for modern Malaysia includes
developing the various capacities of Malaysians to live more fulfilling lives and to
contribute better to society.
Thirdly, all of the nine challenges may be met only in a society with a moderate
mindset. From political maturity to inter-communal sensitivity to having an economy
that is internally just and externally competitive, the challenges of Vision 2020
drive the country to avoid extremist tendencies in all forms. Not insignificantly,
to achieve national development in its later stages Malaysia needs to nurture its
character of reason and moderation.
In centuries past, traders and other seafarers from abroad visited and settled in
the bustling Malay states of the time. Others had come to find work or seek a

BUNN NAGARA 17
better livelihood for their families. Together the denizens of these states built the
singular nation that is Malaysia today.
The character of the Malaysian nation is not determined at only key points of its
history. It is constantly defined and modified by the continual dialogue, negotiation
and other interaction of the country’s various institutions, agencies, communities
and individual citizens themselves. How things turn out cannot be predetermined,
since much depends on the people and their elected representatives.
Malaysia has not only discovered that its roots as a nation lie in moderation and
that its development trajectory had subsumed moderate policies and actions.
It has also found that its future as a cohesive and thriving nation depends on
avoiding all forms of extremism. And if such is true for Malaysia, that much may
also be true for other countries.
There may come a time when the Malaysian story will inspire other developing
countries to undertake a similar journey. Which aspects of Malaysia’s achievements
they choose to emulate, if any, is for them to decide. Malaysians need to focus
on building their nation with commitment, integrity and an essential sense of
proportion, propriety and what is deemed appropriate. This innate sense of the
considered is often regarded as moderation in the affairs of state and of society.
Bunn Nagara is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International

Studies (ISIS) Malaysia and Consultant Editor for Moderation Monitor.

An Asean Community
by 2015?
Rodolfo C. Severino
ABSTRACT
To understand better the concept of an Asean Community by 2015, we – in
particular the business people of south-east Asia – should seek clear answers to
certain basic questions. Those who need these answers include foreign traders
and investors who deal with their counterparts in the region. Firstly, what prompted
the decision-makers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or Asean, to
come up with the term “community”? Secondly, what changes in Asean can be
expected at the end of 2015? Thirdly, are companies – and people, generally – in
Southeast Asia affected significantly by developments in the region considerably
more than in their immediate neighbourhood or in their respective countries? If
they are, how exactly? Finally, can and should the European Union, which in its
early years was known as the European Economic Community and later as the
European Community – and to which Asean is increasingly being compared –
serve as a useful “model” for Asean to emulate?

RODOLFO C. SEVERINO 19
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Rodolfo C. Severino heads the Asean Studies Centre at the Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies (Singapore). A former Asean Secretary-General, he authored
Southeast Asia in Search of an Asean Community and two other books on the
Asean Regional Forum and Philippine national territory. He co-edited Whither
the Philippines in the 21st Century?, Southeast Asia in a New Era and The
Asean Economic Community: A Work in Progress. Severino was a Philippine
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, ambassador and Asean Senior Official. He
graduated from Ateneo de Manila University and the Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies.

A
T the Asean Summit in Phnom Penh in November 2002, then Prime
Minister of Singapore Goh Chok Tong proposed the word “community”
to describe the next stage of the Asean economic integration enterprise.
1
Without access to Singapore briefing notes and not having consulted Asean
records (assuming that either of these carry any reference to Goh Chok Tong’s
suggestion), it can only be surmised that the Singapore proposal arose from the
need to pin down member states of Asean to reaffirm their commitment to regional
economic integration, as well as to their openness to the global economy and
their rejection of protectionism in warding off competition to domestic industries
and other sectors. It might also be speculated that, by invoking the experience of
Europe, the reference to “community” was meant to show the world’s investors the
seriousness of Asean in such a reaffirmation.
It should be remembered that all this was taking place in a period when several
south-east Asian countries had been stricken and traumatised by the 1997-
98 “Asian” financial crisis, the worst catastrophe of its kind to devastate this
region. Meanwhile the world at large – including transnational investors – was
amazed, even attracted – by the economic surges of China and (albeit to a lesser
extent) India. Several of these investors were alarmed by the formation of new
regional economic associations around the world. The Doha Round of global
trade liberalisation did not seem to be going anywhere, while even more intense
competition was deemed to be looming.
In September 2002 Asean Economic Ministers, who were mostly trade ministers,
created a High-Level Task Force on Economic Integration (HLTF-EI). They had a
mandate to deepen regional economic integration beyond the Asean Free Trade
Area, thus advancing the idea of an economic community. 2 In carrying out its
mandate, the HLTF made four institutional recommendations.
First, strengthening the legal unit at the Asean Secretariat, whose counsel is “purely
advisory and non-binding in nature.” Second, establishing Asean Consultation to
Solve Trade and Investment Issues (ACT), a network of government agencies (with
one from each member country) “to allow the private sector to cut through red tape
and achieve speedy resolution of operational problems encountered.” This was
adapted from the EU’s Solvit mechanism. Third, installing an Asean Compliance
Monitoring Body (modelled on the Textile Monitoring Body of the WTO), using
“peer adjudication, which is less legalistic and offers a speedier channel, to help
countries resolve their disputes.” And fourth, erecting an “Enhanced Asean Dispute
Settlement Mechanism…. to ensure that binding decisions can be made based
solely on legal considerations.” Upon the ministers’ suggestion, Asean leaders
1
As then Asean Secretary-General, the writer was present at the Asean Summit when Prime Minister Goh
made his proposal.
2 “The Thirty-Fourth Asean Economic Ministers Meeting 12 September 2002, Bandar Seri Begawan Brunei
Darussalam,” The Asean Secretariat, Jakarta 12110, Indonesia.

endorsed all of the HLTF’s recommendations, including some practical, regionally

cooperative and domestic measures to advance regional economic integration.
Originally, in a bow to Malaysia’s Vision 2020 approach to setting a timeframe

for future goals, the Asean Economic Community (AEC) was set for the year
2020. Indeed, the aims of the AEC had been laid down in Asean Vision 2020,
which had been issued at the Asean Summit in Malaysia’s then capital, Kuala
Lumpur, in December 1997. This sought to establish “a stable, prosperous and
highly competitive Asean Economic Region in which there is a free flow of goods,
services and investments, a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development
and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities.” 3
At their Cebu Summit early in 2007, Asean leaders decided that establishment of
the Asean Community should be moved back by five years to 2015 4 , the year
when Malaysia assumes the Asean chairmanship. It was later made explicit that
the establishment of AEC 2015, which is one of the three “pillars” of the Asean
Community (the other two being the Asean Political-Security Community and the
Asean Socio-Cultural Community), would take place at the end of 2015.
As preparations proceeded for Indonesia to chair and host the Asean Summit
in 2011, it became clear that the Bali Summit would be dominated by economic
matters. Economics might even have come to overwhelm the occasion unless
something was done for the sake of “balance”. Indonesia’s Department of
Foreign Affairs, tasked with managing the summit proceedings, happened to
have an interest in political and security matters. It seemed that in this light, the
ministry managed to include “political-security” and “socio-cultural” matters in the
summit’s main “outcome document” on an equal footing with economic questions.
How much of a role the Indonesian president had in deciding on their inclusion is
not apparent.
To round things off, the Philippines insisted on including a “pillar” on Asean “socio-
cultural” cooperation. This was an area which was in its domestic political interest
to emphasise, although most of the issues covered here were either domestic
in nature or fragmented among different agencies and forums, or more likely
both. In any case, both the Asean Political-Security Community Blueprint and the
Asean Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, together with the Second Work Plan
of the Initiative for Asean Integration (which was of particular interest to the four
newer members of Asean), were adopted in early 2009. The Asean Economic
Community Blueprint had been agreed upon in late 2007. Thus the Roadmap for
an Asean Community 2009-2015 was complete. 5
3
“Asean Vision 2020,” Kuala Lumpur, 15 December 1997, The Asean Secretariat, Jakarta 12110, Indonesia.
4
“Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an Asean Community by 2015,” Cebu,
Philippines, 13 January 2007, The Asean Secretariat, Jakarta 12110, Indonesia.
5
Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015 , Cha-am, Thailand, 1 March 2009, The Asean
Secretariat, Jakarta 12110, Indonesia.

Will Asean Suddenly Change?

So, what is going to happen as the end of 2015 comes around? Basically, nothing
dramatic in the short run. Asean and its nature as an association of sovereign
states are not going to be transformed overnight. Asean’s way of going about
things is not going to change, just because 2015 is upon it and us.
Like every other regional group of sovereign states, Asean will continue to make
decisions by consensus. In this world of ours, which has no global authority
to enforce decisions, where the only enforcement authority and a monopoly
on legitimate violence lie with individual states, there is no other choice. Non-
interference in the internal affairs of nation states will continue to be the norm
and practice in Asean, as in other regional associations of sovereign states in the
world.
I have deep sympathy for members of the media who have to come up with a
story, or an old story with a new angle, every day. I also have much sympathy
for academics who occasionally (but less frequently than professional journalists)
are compelled to comment in the mass media. I am afraid that the advent of 2015
will sorely disappoint them; the expectation of a “big bang” in Asean community-
building that they have spent such a long time cultivating will be irritatingly
frustrated. As the authors of the chapter on Asean’s services trade in the joint study
by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and the Asian Development
Bank (ADB) published under the title The Asean Economic Community: A Work
in Progress says, “Perhaps the myths surrounding the AEC will help shake up
the dormant and well-protected service sector to face greater competition from
outside.” 6
Not so long ago, the Asean Secretariat had asked the ADB to help it assess AEC
2015. The ADB, in turn, supported and participated in a joint ADB-ISEAS project
to do just that. The ADB and ISEAS engaged experts to take a look at one or
another angle of regional economic integration – non-tariff barriers, services,
investments, competition policy and intellectual property rights, sub-regional
economic cooperation arrangements, free trade area agreements with external
partners, dispute settlement, and institutions. A survey of companies in nine out of
the ten Asean member countries (the exception was, for some reason, Malaysia)
was also conducted, competitively-run companies being supposed to be the main
actors in and the principal beneficiaries of regional economic integration.
Although it must be acknowledged that tariff barriers have largely been overcome
in terms of the trade in goods on the part of Asean’s leading trading nations, the
6
Deunden Nikomborirak and Supunnavadee Jitdumrong: “Asean Trade in Services“ in Sanchita Basu
Das, Jayant Menon, Rodolfo Severino and Omkar Lal Shrestha, eds.: The Asean Economic Community: A
Work in Progress, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, and Asian Development Bank, Manila,
2013, 137.

experts were unanimous in concluding that the Asean economy was far from
being truly integrated. Traders and investors continued to regard Asean not as
one big market, but as ten smaller ones. In addition, it might be observed that
several deadlines, set by the member states themselves in a “Strategic Schedule”
of four two-year tranches for concluding agreed measures to advance regional
economic integration, had already been missed.
For example, as previously observed and published in the Asean Community roadmap,
“the national ‘Single Windows’ in customs processing of the 10 Asean member states
are supposed to be ‘operationalised’ by 2008 and 2012 7 , years that have come and
gone without all national ‘Single Windows’ being ‘operationalised’. In accordance
with the AEC Blueprint’s ‘Strategic Schedule,’ non-tariff barriers applied by the first
six Asean members – Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand – should have been identified and dismantled by 2012,
8
a much more ambitious agenda than even the European Union has set for
itself. Restrictions on intra-Asean trade in logistics services should have been
‘substantially’ removed by 2013. 9 According to the same schedule, the Asean
states promised to apply by 2013 information and communications technology
to ‘all areas related to trade facilitation and customs management’. 10 The Asean
member states pledged to implement on an Asean-wide basis the single aviation
market agreement/arrangement by 2015. 11 Yet, Alan Tan Khee Jin, professor of aviation
law and policy in the National University of Singapore, wrote in 2013 that ‘the single
(aviation) market is unlikely to be realised in substance, certainly not by 2015.’” 12
The experts also make some specific recommendations, most of which are feasible
and practical. The most notable and promising of these include involving private
business in identifying barriers to trade in goods or services, technical assistance
in strengthening capacities for agreeing on and setting harmonised standards,
concentrating on groups of services rather than focusing on individual sectors,
and benchmarking sectors in Asean countries against those in countries where
goods and services are exposed to competition and have, as expected, attained
impressive development. Other practical recommendations include removal from
government or inter-governmental entities the delicate responsibility of identifying
those who benefit from current protection, replacing general flexibilities with
specific dates, substituting region-wide integration measures with “bite-sized” ones,
pushing for infrastructure necessary for greater Asean connectivity, continued
emphasis on the development of the newer (and less developed) Asean members,
improving the effectiveness of monitoring and feedback devices with the aim of
7
Roadmap for an Asean Community 2009-2015, Jakarta: Asean Secretariat, 2009, 45.
8
ibid., 42.
9
ibid., 48.
10
ibid., 46.
11
ibid., 60.
12
Alan Tan Khee Jin, “Asean’s single aviation market: many miles to go” in Airline Leader, Issue 16,
January-February 2013.

pressuring member states to fulfil their AEC commitments, compensating those

who stand to lose from regional liberalisation such as environmental groups,
local communities and labour, and effective improvements in Asean’s dispute-
settlement mechanisms and processes. 13
As the “Overview” chapter in the ISEAS-ADB publication stresses, another way of

looking at AEC 2015 is to regard its Blueprint as a strong re-affirmation of Asean
leaders’ aspirations for and commitment to promoting the efficiency of trade
and investment. It thus serves to attract foreign investments, market forces and
competition as the main economic drivers of development, besides signalling the
leaders’ openness to the international economy. Still another way to consider
it is to see it in the long term as a measure of how far Asean has gone since its
founding in August 1967. 14 In any case, Asean has long needed to agree on a
common definition of AEC 2015. Apparently, work is currently being done on this.
Most of this was presented to the HLTF-EI at its meeting in February 2014 in Yangon,
when Myanmar was in the Asean chair that year. A book launch and seminar were
held at ISEAS in Singapore with all four co-editors of the volume in attendance.
Similar events also took place in Jakarta, where the Asean Secretariat has its
seat, and at the ADB headquarters as well as the Asian Institute of Management
in MetroManila. Only three of the co-editors were on hand in Indonesia and the
Philippines, however (Basu Das was then recovering from surgery).
Effects on Companies and People

Business people increasingly ask, explicitly or in effect: will the advent of AEC
2015 affect my profits or my company’s bottom line, and if so how? And some
NGOs (non-governmental organisations) and individuals ask with increasing
frequency: what about “the people”? One finds the answer, first, if one looks at the
Asean Community as an integrated whole and its three “pillars” as intimately and
inseparably interrelated rather than as discrete “silos”.
Asean was founded in 1967 in order to prevent disputes among its founding
members from developing into armed conflict and, at the time of the Vietnam
War, to keep the region from getting directly involved in the quarrels of the strong,
while helping to foster constructive relations with and between all of them (the
strong powers). Despite minor skirmishes between the armed forces of Thailand
and Myanmar, between those of Thailand and Cambodia, and between those
of Cambodia and Vietnam, Asean has managed slowly to improve peace and
stability in Southeast Asia and its immediate neighbourhood.
13
Sanchita Basu Das, Jayant Menon, Rodolfo Severino and Omkar Lal Shrestha, eds.: The ASEAN
Economic Community: A Work in Progress, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, and Asian
Development Bank, Manila, 2013, 31-481.
14
ibid., 1-30.

This has, in turn, enabled countries in Southeast Asia to develop robustly and
many of their domestically based companies to thrive. Asean government officials
ought to do more to help business people see the connection between regional
peace and stability on the one hand and regional economic integration, economic
progress, national development and business profitability on the other, instead
of just deploring the low level of awareness of Asean and the AEC on the part of
business people and of “the people” at large.
The political cohesion and economic integration that are two of Asean’s core
purposes cannot be achieved unless the association advances the reality of
regional identity and awareness. Self-identity and self-awareness as a region
have already been assigned to the socio-cultural pillar of the Asean-agreed and
Secretariat-published Roadmap for an Asean Community 2009-2015.
Yet Asean member states, most of whose decisions are influenced by more
and more people, cannot be expected to agree with their neighbours on such
transcendental issues as national security and regional economic integration, or
carry out their part in implementing these agreements, unless more and more of
their people consider their national or personal interests as being served by the
pursuit of regional interests. For this, many more of the people have to be aware
at least of what the regional interests are, and to identify themselves with the
region to a degree closer to their identification with their family, clan, community
or nation.
In fact, despite the taunts and the politically self-serving and often high-sounding
statements, Asean has been making progress in this regard. An increasing number
of organisations are being formed and many more events are being held on an
Asean basis among professional or hobby groups, such as the Asean Congress
of Anaesthesiologists, the Asean Association of Radiologists, the Asean Chess
Confederation, the Asean Federation of Accountants, the Asean Kite Council,
the Asean Kite Flying Festival, and the Asean Orchid Congress. Asean foreign
ministers have decided to bid for Asean to be the site of the Fifa World Cup in
2030, a project that is under discussion with the Asean Football Federation.
An official in the Asean Secretariat once pointed out that the reason Europeans
feel more regional than Southeast Asians is that, thanks to the European Union,
Europeans are mostly free to live, study and work almost anywhere in the territory
encompassed by the union. This is a luxury not yet enjoyed by Southeast Asians
with respect to Asean, thus Asean has not yet directly touched their lives.
Asean and the EU

This is only one of the differences between south-east Asia and Europe, and
between Asean and the European Union. For one thing, Southeast Asia is much
more diverse than Europe, although people generally tend to exaggerate Europe’s
homogeneity. Southeast Asia is a place where the world’s three great religions –

Buddhism, Christianity and Islam – have taken root, whereas only Christianity, in
its various forms, has swept across much of Europe.
South-east Asia is also much more diverse than Europe in race, language, culture
and ethnicity, as well as religion. Most immediately to the point, Southeast Asia
is much more diverse than Europe in terms of governance and political systems,
from absolute monarchies and civilian autocracies to military juntas, and from
one-party states to emerging democracies.
This diversity is one of the reasons why Asean has never aspired to be like
the European Union (EU). However, as Asean itself has repeatedly stated and
demonstrated, various regional associations of states such as itself can learn much
from the EU in terms of regional cooperation for grappling with specific problems
that transcend national boundaries, such as protecting the regional environment,
combatting the spread of contagious diseases and fighting transnational crime.
Moreover, Europe has much to teach other regions in terms of common values,
such as respect for individual persons and the endeavour for the even-handed
application of justice and the rule of law. In turn, it also has much to learn from
Asean in terms of pragmatism and flexibility.
The fact that Asean is constantly being compared to the EU shows how far it
has gone in fulfilling its three broad objectives – peace and stability, economic
integration and regional cooperation in dealing with transnational problems –
and in surpassing other regional associations of sovereign states. Nevertheless,
people should stop comparing south-east Asia to Europe and cease imagining
that Asean aspires to be like the EU someday. The two regions and the interests
of their respective members are just too different.
Political Cohesion, Economic Integration and Regional Identity

In any case, political cohesion and regional economic integration require a more
highly developed sense of regional identity than currently exists in the Asean
countries. After all, profound peace among nations, regional stability and deeper
regional economic integration need a large majority of the peoples in the area to
feel a deeper sense of kinship with one another. This would help to convince them
that regionalisation can lead to better lives and livelihoods in terms of more jobs,
higher incomes, lower prices and more and better choices of goods and services
for them.
But as is typical in Asean and various other regional inter-state associations,

south-east Asian countries are extremely diverse in their levels of regional
awareness and identity. In all of them, education for the younger generation
deserves a second look as well as a renewed dedication. This, surely, is a long-
term endeavour for peoples everywhere.


Pursuing Peace, Prosperity

and Power:
What can Asean and the EU learn from each
other?
Yeo Lay Hwee
ABSTRACT
The EU and Asean are often compared and seen as relatively successful regional
organisations in their respective regions. Yet both have lately come under intense
scrutiny as they confront challenges posed by the financial crisis and rising
geopolitical tensions. Their inability to respond effectively to these challenges
has brought about a chorus of criticisms. Noting the current tensions faced by
both the EU and Asean, one cannot help but wonder how and if they can deal with
their increasingly complex security landscapes because of a weakened US and
the rise of the rest. This article compares and contrasts the approaches taken by
the EU and Asean thus far in trying to build peace and prosperity while managing
the demands of power politics. It explores what they can learn from each other in
navigating an increasingly paradoxical world of economic interdependence with
political fragmentation. (A separately edited version of this article appears in an
EU Centre Policy Brief (No. 7) following submission to Moderation Monitor.)

YEO LAY HWEE 29
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Yeo Lay Hwee is Director of the European Union Centre in Singapore. She is
also Council Secretary and Senior Research Fellow at the Singapore Institute
of International Affairs, and Adjunct Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies. An international relations expert, Dr Yeo’s research interests
revolve around comparative regionalism: Asia-Europe relations in general,
and in particular relations between the European Union and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, as well as the Asia-Europe Meeting (Asem) process.
She participates actively both in policy dialogues and academic workshops and
conferences, and contributes regularly to commentaries in media and journals.

E
ARLY 2014 saw a flurry of articles in the media comparing the rising tensions
in East Asia to the situation in Europe in 1914. The Prime Minister of Japan
himself likened the tensions between Japan and China to the relationship
between Germany as a rising power and Britain a century ago. This received an
immediate rebuke from China which preferred to frame its relations with Japan in
the context of World War II, in which China was the victim and Japan the aggressor.
In marking the 100 years since World War I erupted on the European continent,
several scholars have called for cooler heads in East Asia and to reflect on the
lessons from 1914. A series of events beginning in 2011 – the so-called US “pivot”
to Asia, China’s increasing assertiveness over its territorial claims in the South
China and East Asia Seas, leading to tensions with the Philippines, Vietnam and
Japan, and the return of right-wing Shinzo Abe as the Prime Minister of Japan –
led to increasingly shrill rhetoric in the region. Tensions ratcheted up a notch when
the Chinese unilaterally declared an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) over a
large part of the East China Sea including the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.
The US immediately challenged Chinese authority by flying a B52 bomber into
the zone unannounced.
The cascading events and increasing tensions in East Asia led a former prime
minister of Australia to warn that the East Asian region “resembles a 21st century
maritime redux of the Balkans a century ago – a tinderbox on water.” Pundits began
to cast their eyes on the Asia-Pacific as the next theatre of conflict between the
major powers. Who would have thought that just two months into 2014, attention
has now returned to Europe – the continent that sparked two world wars.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea has been labeled Europe’s biggest crisis in the
21st century. While most Western politicians and scholars were quick to put the
blame for what happened in Crimea on Putin’s revanchism, the fact that the
European Union was caught off-guard by the situation also led to criticisms of an
EU carried away by its own high-minded rhetoric and inability to face up to hard
power practised by Putin. Some analysts such as Roderic Lyne of Chatham House
talked of a gaping hole in Europe’s security architecture: that there is no forum in
which to negotiate quiet solutions to simmering issues before they boil over, while
others such as Asle Toje found the European diplomatic landscape to be over-
institutionalised.
In responding to heightened tensions in the Asia-Pacific in recent years, the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations has also been criticised for being
ineffectual and failing to bring about a grand bargain between the major powers
in the region. The lack of formal institutions for crisis management and an inability
to speak with one voice have often been regarded among the key weaknesses
of Asean. Yet despite these criticisms, Asean has a grasp of the geopolitics of
the region and actively seeks to manage the tensions with much talk and many
meetings.

YEO LAY HWEE 31
Given the current tensions faced by the EU and Asean in their respective regions,
how might they deal with the increasingly complex security landscapes that result
from a weakened US and the rise of emerging powers? How different and similar
are the approaches taken by the EU and Asean in building peace and prosperity?
How do they manage the demands of power politics, and what lessons can they
offer each other in navigating an increasingly paradoxical world of growing
economic interdependence amid increasing political fragmentation?
Peace, Prosperity and Power

The EU as a peace project is a narrative rooted in the historical context of Europe’s
20th century’s wars, which has widely been accepted by the founding members
of the European integration project. The raison d’etre of the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) was to reduce the risk of war among European states
by encouraging economic interdependence and having common oversight over
coal and steel, the two industries underpinning military power in the 20th century.
The success of the EU in delivering peace and reconciliation has also widely been
acknowledged. As laid out in Schuman’s declaration, war is now unthinkable
between member states of the EU. Yet while the EU has delivered on internal
reconciliation and peace among members, the broader peace and stability of
the entire European continent – particularly during the Cold War period – was
underpinned by Nato and the US security umbrella.
Seen in this light, the primary purpose of the EU in its “incarnation as the European
Economic Community was to help foster economic prosperity in Europe”. 1 And the
EU has succeeded in large measure to bring about higher economic growth and
better standards of living by first bringing down trade barriers, and then creating
a single market for goods, services, capital and people. Yet, again, economic
integration while by far the most successful aspiration of the EU also has its ups
and downs, and the objective of a single market is still a work in progress.
The EU’s role in high politics and power sees some ambivalence and perhaps
divergence amongst member states. The aim of acting as a political entity, a union
with a common foreign and security policy, was expressed more explicitly with
the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. While member states such as France and
Britain may be comfortable talking about power and see the EU as an additional
instrument for them to bolster or project their power, there are member states that
are not as comfortable in openly displaying power ambitions or dealing with hard
power. Hence the EU has toyed with various concepts of power, identifying itself
first as a civilian power and then as a normative power.
1
Asle Toje, The European Union as a Small Power: After the Post-Cold War (UK: Palgrave MacMillan,
2010)

However, normative power Europe has a very checkered record in foreign policy
and diplomacy. The EU has been able to export its norms of democracy and
respect for human rights to those countries that want to become members of the
EU, but it has not delivered on the intended outcomes in many countries of its
“near abroad” – from the southern Mediterranean to its eastern neighbourhood.
But what of Asean’s record in dealing with issues related to the three Ps – peace,
prosperity and power?
Asean’s founding document, the Bangkok Declaration (1967), lists economic growth,
social progress and cultural development in the spirit of equality and partnership
for a prosperous and peaceful community as among its core objectives. Another
key aim is to promote regional peace and stability through an abiding respect for
justice and the rule of law in relations among countries of the region, along with
adherence to the principles of the UN Charter.
Clearly, peace and prosperity were very much on the minds of Asean’s founding
members. Yet it was dealing with power politics and the realities of the security
situation in its region that Asean had recognised as the most important task for its
members. Only when they get the politics right can there be a stable environment
for growth and development.
Mindful of its own weaknesses and cognisant of the power politics in the region,
Asean emphasised a set of norms – non-interference, sovereign equality, respect
for diversity and the centrality of peace – in the relations among its members and
with external powers. For three decades, Asean cooperation was pursued through
a series of political meetings based on consultation and consensus, not by way of
formal institutions. Instead of relying on treaties and binding agreements, much of
the cooperation was based on political declarations and normative agreements.
Through careful navigation of the geopolitics of the region, and engaging in

balance of power politics, Asean made a not insignificant contribution to the
stability of the region. Hugh White argues that Asean was also lucky that after
Richard Nixon met Mao Zedong in 1972, a new strategic and political order was
established in which US primacy was not seriously contested in the region by
any Asian power. This provided the foundation for a remarkable era of peace and
stability, which in turn allowed Asean member states to focus their attention on
economic development.
The failure of import substitution as pursued by some of the bigger Asean

members in the earlier years led to more outward orientated, export-driven
strategies. Member states compete in attracting FDI and in their exports to the
developed world. Thus unlike the EU, Asean’s focus was not on regional economic
integration for prosperity. Instead it was plugged into the global economy, and it
was with an “open for business” ethos that Asean countries maintained decent

YEO LAY HWEE 33
economic growth. There was no customs union, and intra-Asean trade was low at
around 20% compared to the EU’s at over 60%.
It was only in the 1990s with the increasing pace of globalisation and competition
that Asean began to take regional economic integration more seriously. As
regionalism picked up pace in other regions and market-driven regionalisation
became an increasing reality in south-east Asia, Asean had to respond with some
semblance of economic collaboration and coordination.
Such was the ambiguous role of Asean in contributing to peace and prosperity
in the region. Due to the lack of trust between the major powers, Asean was
astute enough to carve out a role for itself in the geopolitics of the broader Asia-
Pacific region. This took the forms of a series of “dialogue partnerships” with all
major powers in the region, and the launch of the Asean Regional Forum (ARF).
Through its central role in the various emerging regional “architectures”, Asean is
positioned to shape their agenda.
Institutions and Interest

In comparing the EU and Asean, it is clear that the EU has gone much further
in terms of integration, particularly economic integration. This integration is
supported by a dense network of hard and soft institutions with “ever closer
union” as its overarching goal. This network of institutions binds member states
in an indissoluble economic interdependence that makes war between them
unthinkable. The interests of the member states are carefully weighed, calibrated
and balanced in this network of institutions.
In contrast, integration was never Asean’s original rationale. Asean was an

instrument for member states to manage the mistrust and tensions amongst them
and to navigate the geopolitics of its immediate environment. Asean cooperation
was more about achieving balance of power in an anarchical system. Traditional
diplomacy was initially the tool of choice for managing power politics, but at the
same time Asean also slowly went beyond traditional diplomacy to put in place
other soft institutions to reduce transaction costs.
The EU believed that institutions could be built to tame power politics. Pooling
sovereignty and establishing supranational institutions were the EU’s responses
to ever closer union in the economic sphere. For much of its first three decades, the
EU was “internally driven.” The purpose of acting fully as a Union when dealing
with the rest of the world came only at the end of the Cold War with the launch of
a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
In contrast, Asean had always been “externally focused.” In its first three
decades, Asean acted together occasionally in dealing with a changing security
environment – Nixon’s Guam doctrine, the triumph of communist North Vietnam
over the capitalist South, and Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. It was only at

the end of the Cold War, with an increasingly competitive external economic
environment, that Asean took the first real step towards economic cooperation
by agreeing to an Asean Free Trade Area. This was later upgraded to an Asean
Economic Community after the Asian financial crisis, which revealed further
vulnerabilities and Asean’s need for greater economic coordination to remain
attractive to foreign investors, particularly with emerging economic behemoths
like China and India.
As the EU enlarged and deepened its economic integration, it became a significant

global economic power. Translating this to political influence, however, has not been
easy – hence the common truism that the EU is an economic giant but a political
pygmy.
Why is this so? According to Toje, the EU is underpinned by a complex and

dynamic bargain among member states and common institutions, and bolstered
by a strong sense of common values. It has become wary of realpolitik, and its
successful enlargement to include several former Warsaw Pact (central and
Eastern European) countries had lulled it into believing that normative power
Europe could effect change through example and promoting norms for human
rights and democracy. It began to believe in its own propaganda for a norms- or
values-based foreign policy, failing to acknowledge fully that power and interests
lie at the heart of foreign policy.
For Asean, it was also only in the last decade that further institutionalisation to
build an Asean Community became a paramount objective. However, individual
national self-interests and realpolitik continue to thwart efforts in community-
building and economic integration. Political declarations and agreements have
been made and signed, but translating them into binding codes and standards has
not been of the utmost priority for some member states. Asean remains an inter-
governmental organisation firmly grounded in the primacy of national interests –
but when national and regional interests converge, concrete steps can be taken.
Comparing the EU and Asean brings us to an often overlooked fact. As Moeller

and Ewing-Chow note, “formalities cannot bend realities. Realities govern,
formalities follow. Formalities in the form of institutional structure cannot bring
along agreements that do not follow from member states’ interests.” 2
With the Lisbon Treaty, the EU tried to tweak its institutions to make itself a more
coherent actor on the world stage. But member states had chosen to retain the inter-
governmental nature of decision-making for the EU’s CFSP/CSDP (Common Foreign
and Security Policy / Common Security and Defence Policy). And when there is a clash
between national interests and (collective) European interests, the latter often lose out.
2
Michael Ewing Chow and Joergen Orstroem Moeller, “A Theory of Asean Integration” (unpublished paper,
2012).

YEO LAY HWEE 35
At the same time, although decision-making by consensus limits policy outputs, the
CFSP has also brought about a cumulative body of common foreign and security
policies characterised by common actions and joint actions, and a sea-change in
the practice and ambience of foreign policymaking. Bureaucratic politics rather
than diplomacy has begun to shape and set the EU foreign policy and security
agendas, for better or for worse.
Asean’s record in managing realpolitik may seem to be better than the EU’s, but
in recent years it has also begun to show strains as the security landscape and
geopolitics of the region become far more complex than during the Cold War. The
rise of China to become the world’s second-largest economy in 2011 came at a time
of declining US power and prestige, following the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and
the global financial crisis. We do not know how Sino-US relations will develop, and
whether increasing strategic rivalry would lead to a fragmentation of Asean. But for
Asean to continue playing an important role, member states will have to think not only
of national interests but also regional interests, and garner the political will to craft new
institutions that can harmonise national and regional interests.
Lessons learnt
Regional cooperation is fundamentally related to the pursuit of three main goals
– peace, prosperity and power. The varying degrees of intensity relating to these
three goals differ across regions and through time, being often informed by
history, tradition and geography.
The nature of European integration has changed over time – from being seen
essentially as a peace project bringing about the reconciliation of France and
Germany (the European Coal and Steel Community), to an instrument for economic
prosperity (European Economic Community), and now an entity designed not
only to manage economic interdependence and the challenges of globalisation,
but a regional actor trying to shape the external conditions through a web of
governance structures (the European Union).
Similarly, Asean has changed over time – from essentially being a mechanism by
member states to keep communism and external interference in domestic politics
at bay (the first decade), to collective diplomacy to deal with regional stability
and external threats to member states (mid-1970s to end of 1980s), to a more proactive
engagement to manage political and security dialogues and the pursuit of closer
economic cooperation in response to globalisation and greater interdependence (after
the Cold War).
Comparing and contrasting how the EU and Asean approach issues of peace,
prosperity and power, define interests and conceive of institutions in their
cooperative or integrative efforts lead us to the following lessons:

1. Always start with the why and what before considering the how:
Why pursue regional integration, and what are the objectives and goals? Only when
there is at least some consensus on these that we can begin to decide on how to go
about achieving the objectives – the type of institutions and processes that can help
us towards our goals.
Schuman and Monnet, in drawing up the plan for a coal and steel community, wanted
nation states to break away from old-style power politics and forge a complete
transformation in the relations among countries in Europe. Hence the Treaty of Paris
provided for a supranational institution, the High Authority to “take decisions in the
name of shared European interests,” and also a Court to “oversee compliance with the
Treaty.” Order and a firm footing were underpinned by the Treaty, and the Community
was made a legal entity represented inwardly and outwardly by the High Authority.
In contrast, Asean only had a political declaration (the Bangkok Declaration) of

a few pages mentioning broadly the desire for regional cooperation “to ensure
stability and security from external interference in any form of manifestation
in order to preserve their national identities….” 3 There were no Secretariat or High
Authority, only annual meetings of foreign ministers. The member states of Asean,
many of which were young nations emerging from colonialism and in the process of
building a national identity out of the disparate communities within their borders drawn
by their colonial masters, could not but proclaim the norms of sovereign equality and
non-interference as paramount. The Asean way is about consultation and consensus.
2. Institutions matter, but even more so leadership and political will:

While the High Authority (later to become the Commission) is an important
institution, Franco-German leadership was seen as the driving force behind
European integration. The first crisis of the EU happened when Charles de Gaulle,
unhappy with the Commission’s proposal to introduce more qualified majority
voting, decided to boycott all the meetings. The so-called empty chair crisis meant
that many decisions could not be taken, and the Community was “paralysed” until
a political solution was found and the Commission backed down on its proposal.
Asean relies on traditional-style diplomacy to address issues members face along

the way, and did not create any definitive institutions in its initial years. The Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation of 1976 was still more of a political declaration rather
than legal text, and the Asean Secretariat established in the same year functioned
merely as a postbox and logistical agency for managing meetings and other
events. Yet despite the lack of definitive institutions, Asean made modest progress
whenever political will was required in the face of common challenges.
3
The Bangkok Declaration (www.asean.org)

YEO LAY HWEE 37
Whether it is the EU with its complex web of legally definitive institutions or

“institutions-lite” Asean, ultimately leadership and political will are what really
matter. They are key to any progress in regional cooperation or integration.
3. Be mindful of power and interests:

Values, principles and law should matter and guide foreign and international
relations, but ultimately, power politics can never be ignored where sovereignty
and national interests continued to reign. Some people in the EU thought power
politics can be replaced by technical wrangling over policies guided by legal
norms and institutions. Yet the truth is that the dynamism of a union comes from
a complex mix arising from “each nation’s pursuit of self-interest, order through
membership, law and a balance of power” (van Middelaar, 2013).
In the case of Asean, too much power politics remains at play. Although there are
also norms and principles to govern this power play, there is a lack of the legal
dimension that can compel members to sit down and discuss their differences
until competing interests are reconciled and compromises made. Yet it is also
because Asean is painfully aware of the reality of power and national interests
in the geopolitics of the region that it can play the role of interlocutor and offer
a platform where all major powers meet. But this role is not assured, especially
as the security and political circumstances become more complex. Only an
Asean that can reconcile its own internal contradictory interests and be more
economically integrated can aspire to a central role in the broader region.
Conclusion
The crisis in Ukraine and the rising tensions in the South and East China Seas have
thrown the spotlight on the EU and Asean. Are they equipped with the political
acumen to deal with uncertainties and ambiguities, and be able to comprehend
the links between the past, present and future? As van Middelaar argues in his
book The Passage to Europe, “politics can transform raw reality into new facts….
Historical reality is fundamentally unpredictable. Unintended consequences of
human acts, unexpected chain reactions, hasty decisions – such things make the
future infinitely uncertain. No plan or treaty can predict the full creativity of history,
let alone lay down adequate answers in advance.” 4
How the EU and Asean manage geopolitical realities in their backyard will depend
on political will and dexterity. And when a crisis hits it is better to be agile and
flexible, relying on a general sense of direction rather than on hard and fast rules.
4
Luuk van Middelaar, The Passage to Europe: How a Continent Became a Union, Yale University Press, 2013

Of Vision 2020, Nation-of-Intent

and Moderation
Shamsul A.B.
ABSTRACT
The “moderation project” proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib
Razak in 2010 can be interpreted as an attempt to showcase, internationally,
Malaysia’s success in managing peace in an ethnically-divided society. “Social
equilibrium” and “social balance” are two concepts proposed as keys to Malaysia’s
ability to maintain moderation, as articulated through peace and stability that
have persisted for decades. This article suggests the “social equilibrium” and
“social balance” that we experience in Malaysia have been anchored in a broader
sociological process called social cohesion, a complex process tied to the style
of nation-building and approach to fostering national unity that Malaysia adopted
immediately after the tragic 13 May 1969 incident. In this context social cohesion
is not unity, but can be viewed as a path to or a precondition for unity. This article
argues that it is the backbone of Malaysia’s sense of moderation.

SHAMSUL A.B. 39
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Shamsul A.B. is Founding Director of the Institute of Ethnic Studies at the National
University of Malaysia and Deputy Chair of Malaysia’s National Council of
Professors. Educated at the Royal Military College, he trained as a social
anthropologist in Malaysia and Australia. He was a post-doctoral fellow at the
CNRS (Paris), received the Fukuoka Cultural Award Academic Prize (2008) and
is among three Distinguished Professors in Malaysia. He has been researching,
teaching and publishing extensively since 1973 on economic development, culture
and politics. He features as a current affairs and regional history commentator on
Aljazeera and the National Geographic Channel.

W
HEN Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad, the fourth Prime Minister of
Malaysia, announced that the first major challenge for Malaysia to
achieve the status of a developed country in 2020, in the framework
of Vision 2020, is to come up with a united Malaysian nation, it was a political
proclamation of tremendous significance in the modern political history of
Malaysia. 1 It was the first time that a top leader in Malaysia, and a prime minister
in the post-independence era, ever talked openly about the concept of a “nation-
of-intent” for Malaysia – that is, the nation that we desire to have which is yet to
be realised. 2
It immediately implied that at that time, what we have was only a “state”, defined
as a political entity that has the following features: a territory, rule of law, and
citizenship. The concept of a Malaysian “nation” was yet to evolve. The concept of
“nation” may be defined as different groups of people living in a particular state,
united by common culture and history, and sharing a common sense of belonging.
His original speech was in English, in which Mahathir expressed the “nation-of-
intent” precisely as a “united Malaysian nation” which was rendered into Malay
as “sebuah bangsa Malaysia yang bersepadu.” The translated version was then
shortened into two words, “Bangsa Malaysia.” However, the shortened Malay
version had caused many problems, not only in terms of semantics and politics,
but also in terms of epistemology and ontology.
Mahathir was not the first person to come up with the concept of “nation-of-
intent.” A variant of this, known as “Malaysian Malaysia,” was introduced by the
Malaysian Solidarity Council, a collaboration of several opposition parties which
used the phrase as their calling card and slogan. 3 The coalition was formed in
1964 under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew when Singapore was still part of the
Federation of Malaysia.
The objective of the Council was to oppose Article 153 of the Federal Constitution
of Malaysia which was considered a form of racial discrimination. The “Malaysian
Malaysia” concept proposed a nation of intent that would be based on equality for
all races, even though there was a very wide gap in terms of economic inequality
between ethnic groups, especially between Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera.
“A united Malaysian nation” as proposed by Mahathir in his original statement in

English is conceptually very different from Lee Kuan Yew’s “Malaysian Malaysia.”
While Mahathir clearly emphasised the element of “united” as the basis of a
nation-of-intent, Lee insisted on the element of “equality”. Malaysian opposition
1
Mahathir Mohamed, “Malaysia: The Way Forward,” text of a speech delivered at the Malaysian Business
Council meeting, 28 February 1991
2 For a detailed discussion on the concept of “nation-of-intent” see, Shamsul A.B. ‘Nations-of-Intent” in
Asian Forms of the Nation ed. Stein Tonnesson and Hans Antlove, Curzon, London 1996, 426-456
3 Ye, Lin-Sheng, The Chinese Dilemma, East West Publishing, London, 2003, 43.

SHAMSUL A.B. 41
leader Lim Kit Siang used to argue that “Malaysian Malaysia = Bangsa Malaysia,”
which is inaccurate and misleading.
Secondly, there are differences between Mahathir’s and Lee’s conceptions in

terms of epistemology and ontology (meaning and origins). “Unity in diversity”
underscores the concept of Mahathir’s nation-of-intent, contrasting with “equality
in diversity” that underscored Lee’s concept of nation-of-intent. (In 2011, Lee
contended that Singapore was still “a nation in the making.” 4 )
Two important political implications arise from this. First, since Malaysia’s formation
in 1963, two kinds of nation-of-intent have existed: one proposed by Lee and the
other by Mahathir. Secondly, it implies that whatever political entity that now exists
is only “a Malaysian state” and not “a Malaysian nation,” which is yet to emerge.
Therefore Malaysia is one of those countries still in the process of developing its
own nation-of-intent. The two processes may take place simultaneously, involving
many groups that have their own specific interests and visions of their own nations,
as it happened in Indonesian history. 5
Since 1991, the government has been promoting in a very big way the concept of
Bangsa Malaysia as nation of intent as proposed by Mahathir, namely a concept
based on “a united Malaysian nation.” A huge amount of money has been set
aside for a nationwide campaign using the mass media with various top-down
instructions, aimed at large target groups ranging from domestic households to
schools.
About 18 years later, in 2009, and 11 years before hitting the 2020 deadline, the
concept of “1Malaysia” was introduced by the sixth Malaysian prime minister,
Datuk Seri Najib Razak. It was proclaimed nationally as a slogan in a Malaysia
Day celebration on 16 September 2010.
When it was first introduced it was not meant as an ideology. Its aim was to
cultivate, instil and build “a nation-of-intent” similar to or complementing the one
proposed by Mahathir in 1991: “a united Malaysian nation.” Najib insisted that his
1Malaysia concept is a continuation of Mahathir’s Vision 2020. Slowly but surely
the concept of 1Malaysia was subsequently translated into practical and tangible
branding forms such as 1Malaysia Clinics, 1Malaysia Shops and 1Malaysia email.
The practical manifestation of Najib’s 1Malaysia can be seen in his usage of the
word “transformation”, which he believes would be the right means to achieve
“a united Malaysian nation” by 2020. The Government Transformation Plan
(GTP), with its whole range of programmes including the New Economic Model,
4
Elgin Toh, “Singapore still a work in progress: MM Lee,” The Straits Times, 12 January 2011.
5 Robert Cribb, “Nations-of-Intent in Colonial Indonesia,” paper for 18th IAHA Conference, Taipei 6-10 Dec.
2004.

constitutes various operational steps whose results are now being gradually
felt, monitored and measured. For this purpose Najib appointed a special body,
Pemandu, under the charge of a minister without portfolio to see it through.
The main question is, with all the efforts that are currently being undertaken,
can Najib’s wish to fulfill Mahathir’s aspiration for “a united Malaysian nation” be
achieved in the first place?
The answer can be found to be quite affirmative if we go back to 1971 when

the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) – popularly known as “the red book,”
incorporating the New Economic Policy (NEP) – was launched by then Prime
Minister Tun Razak. In the first paragraph of the Introduction of the “red book,”
Razak explicitly declared the NEP’s ultimate aim to be “national unity and
integration.”
From then until now, the aim of achieving national unity and integration has been
incorporated into practically every federal government statement: in speeches,
embedded in lyrics of patriotic songs at official functions, broadcast over radio
and television, and sung during school assemblies all over the country. 6
Thus the people and government of Malaysia have for a long time already been
in the quest for national unity. However, the assumption is that unity is something
yet to be realised fully in Malaysia. This also means that whatever understanding
Malaysians and their political leaders have of the nature of unity is not based
on existing reality, but on fragments of hope, intent or even dreams of what they
perceive to be “unity”.
More significant is that even though unity itself had yet to emerge in a real
sense substantively, Malaysians in general have co-existed with one another in
peace and stability particularly after the May 1969 ethnic conflict. This situation
has been described as “stable tension,” where stability itself is laced with deep-
seated tensions that occasionally erupt into open expressions of dispute by some
disgruntled Malaysians, but never amounting to violent arguments. 7
What often happens is the verbal expression of disputes, sometimes heated but
not violent, among Malaysians. In Malay it is referred to as bertikam lidah (tongue
stabbing). These arguments often occur openly between individuals or groups,
over casual teh tarik (pulled tea) drinking sessions at Indian Muslim restaurants,
during wedding parties, and even over the Internet and in blogs.
6
Most Malaysians would recollect the song Berjaya sung by Jamaluddin Alias in the 1960s, and Setia
by Roy in the 1980s, both being patriotic songs played numerous times a day over a number of years.
7
For a further discussion on “stable tension” see, Shamsul A.B. Many Ethnicities, Many Cultures, One
Nation: The Malaysian Experience, Ethnic Studies Paper Series, UKM No. 2 (Nov.) 2008, Institute of Ethnic
Studies, UKM, Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia.

SHAMSUL A.B. 43
The contents of these verbal arguments are more likely to be issues-based,

centring on different aspects of the quality of life in the country such as inadequate
income, high cost of goods, scarce educational opportunities, limited chances of
employment, or even arguments over the performance of the local football team.
Among the middle classes, the issue may be on the future of the Malays in the
wake of inter-party Umno-Pas-PKR-DAP political turmoil.
Most of these issues relate to social mobility, dissatisfaction over the present
education system and unfair distribution of economic opportunities and
employment that affect not only a particular ethnic group but all groups at all
levels or social classes. 8 Nevertheless, there are instances where these issues
are expressed in a very harsh tone, sometimes heavily loaded with stereotypes
and ethnic prejudices.
Issues often raised by certain groups go beyond social mobility, especially among
urbanised, young professional groups that enjoy a comfortable life in the cities
with ample social space, time and opportunities. This is the new generation of
Malaysians that often “takes issue” with environmental degradation, human rights
violations, problems of civil society, and voter registration lists alleged to contain
discrepancies. In reality these issues have an economic dimension of their own,
hence a “political commodity” that is traded as part of entrepreneurial activities in
advertising, specifically those that relate very closely to “branding.”
If all these debates happen in a peaceful and tranquil manner, how would we
describe the situation? To say that we have achieved some sort of unity among
all of us would be far from true. We are still in search of a unity that at this very
moment is still an elusive dream. If this is not unity, what category can we place
this situation typified by peace, stability and prosperity that has lasted for a good
many years – for 40 years or so?
Actually what we have been enjoying for more than four decades is not “unity”
per se, not just yet, but “social cohesion.” But what is meant by social cohesion?
Social cohesion in Malaysia can be described as how the plural, fragmented and
diverse components of society, overwhelmed by opposites and contradictions,
have been able – through a continuous process of bargaining and negotiation,
consensus and compromise at every level and section of society – to rise above
it all in a most mature manner to embrace peace and reject any form of violence
for long-term mutual survival. In this context social cohesion is not unity, but can
be regarded as a path to or a precondition for unity.
8
For a recent discussion on social mobility in Malaysia, see Shamsul A.B. & Athi Sivan, “Conceptualising
social mobility in Malaysia” in Human Development Report, Malaysia 2013, a report commissioned by the
UNDP, Kuala Lumpur, in collaboration with the Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s Department, 2014

For social cohesion to have evolved and sustained itself in Malaysia, the following
conditions had to exist: (i) a high quality of life in terms of material provisions,
measurable by a quality of life index; (ii) a peaceful, stable and safe social order;
(iii) active interaction based on positive networks and exchanges, with relations
between different groups; (iv) positive efforts to encourage the participation of all
sectors in mainstream activities; (v) accessibility to various resources to ensure the
quality of life and social mobility.
Even though there are differences, contradictions, contestations and conflicts

within society itself, social cohesion will continue and be sustained as long as
members of the community are willing to sit down and negotiate in the spirit of
give-and-take to reach some degree of consensus, tolerance, accommodation
and harmony, while collectively striving very hard to create various forms of social
alliances and alignments.
Close cooperation between Malaysia’s various ethnic groups has existed not only
in political, social and cultural aspects, but also in the economy and the market.
Malaysians depend on one another in their daily economic activities in terms of
supply and demand. As an example, the suppliers of goods may be Chinese,
Indian or Malay, while the workers may be Indian, Iban, Kadazan or Chinese. The
supply chain may be under the control of Chinese compradors but those who
make it function and sustainable come from different ethnic groups. 9
Social cohesion and social interests among various ethnic groups are therefore
interlaced in economic and political activities that cut across ethnic boundaries.
They have become an integral part of our daily life. Malaysians are not likely to
sacrifice the existing form of social cohesion, because all parties are interested in
maintaining the “win-win” situation which they enjoy and with which they are very
comfortable.
What is equally significant here is how social cohesion becomes the base of
the moderation concept promoted by Najib. However, this sociological notion of
social cohesion was not clearly expressed and understood by the architect of the
“moderation movement.” It was expressed in terms “social equilibrium” or “social
balance.” The moderation idea would have been clearer and better anchored if
it had been based on the notion of social cohesion. But this conceptual lacuna
persists in the articulation of moderation by Najib and his team of thinkers and
researchers. 10
9
The multi-ethnic nature of the supply chain and the economic power of the Chinese has been discussed
in detail by James Jesudason, Ethnicity and the Economy: The State, Chinese Business and the
Multinationals, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1989.
10 This conceptual lacuna is found in the text of Najib’s speech at the 65th Session of the United Nation
General Assembly on 27 September 2010, when he first introduced the idea regarding the “Global
Movement of the Moderates.”

SHAMSUL A.B. 45
Of course, from time to time we hear dissenting voices with racist overtones full of
ethnic stereotypes and prejudices. The effect is that they give the wrong signals
about ethnic relations in Malaysia. Foreign observers who pride themselves as
prophets of doom tend to consider the disquiet as an indication that Malaysia
is not that stable after all, with the potential for ethnic violence lurking in the
background.
The more extreme of these pundits are confident that ethnic riots are about
to break out any time. This widespread misunderstanding has generated
considerable concern and fear among foreign investors. These are actually
the people responsible for tarnishing Malaysia’s image by drumming up ethnic
issues merely to beef up their ailing political influence even though they may be
Malaysian citizens themselves.
The irony is that all the negative remarks about Malaysia had been uttered in a
situation of economic and social comfort that these pundits themselves have been
enjoying. Some have even hoped for a Malaysian version of the Arab Spring to
happen in Malaysia, which is really wishful thinking. 11
Corruption, human rights issues, the lack of religious and cultural freedom,
infringement of minority rights, inadequate rural infrastructure and discriminatory
aspects of the NEP towards non-Bumiputera are some of the issues raised by these
disgruntled groups. These issues are often blown out proportion to the extent that
they overshadow the most important and relevant factor of Malaysian society: the
fact that the country has survived with a social cohesion among its people, who
are committed to stability and peace while rejecting any form of violence.
A device called the Quality of Life Index (QOLI) summarises these issues and
challenges. It is a yardstick to measure the economic, political, social and cultural
development that Malaysia has achieved. The QOLI takes into account 11 criteria
to gauge development: income and income distribution, employment, transport
and communication, health, education, housing, the environment, family, social
participation, public safety and recreational activities.
Each criterion has challenges of its own. The job of managing and solving each
of these challenges seems never-ending; as some are being solved and done
with, new ones crop up. However, all these setbacks do not seem to shatter the
spirit of social cohesion among Malaysians. While it is true that Malaysians will
continue to engage in heated verbal arguments, they will stay within the limit of
sanity as to not engage in violent means. Although the kind of “unity” that they
11
An article in the Economist of 13 July 2013 entitled “The Arab Spring, has it failed?” explains why the
uprising would not succeed in Malaysia and Indonesia, even though the Malaysian political opposition
has been very hopeful that it would happen.

seek may still be up in the clouds, close ethnic relationships in the form of social
cohesion have already emerged. It is a painstaking and long-drawn process, but
the positive social environment will ensure that Malaysians will continue to stay
clear of violent conflict. 12
In the event that by the year 2020 Malaysians fail to achieve a condition of
national unity and integration and “a united Malaysian nation” as proposed by
Mahathir, this should never be considered a failure at all. Malaysians still have
social cohesion binding them, and which has bonded them in the last 40-plus
years, a solid base for us to move forward with towards the goal of “national
unity.”
At this juncture, perhaps it is appropriate to note that the theoretical implications in

the social sciences arising from the introduction of Vision 2020 are most important.
Previously the concept of the nation state had been used widely in political
science without questions of political behaviour. Now the concepts of nation and
state can be separated from each other. For instance there are countries that exist
without a nation, like Malaysia; there are those that exist without a state, like the
Bangsamoro; and there are countries that have both nation and state, like Japan.
Because there are such countries as a state without a nation like Malaysia, the
concept of “nation” itself may be construed in many abstract forms according to
what is meant by “a nation-of-intent” as desired and perceived by each of the
ethnic groups. For instance, a Malaysian Malaysia as proposed by Lee Kuan Yew,
and still staunchly supported by the DAP, and the concept of “a united Malaysian
nation” as advocated by Mahathir, are two different examples of “a nation-of-
intent.”
Vision 2020, regardless of whether it is achievable within its timeframe, is still

relevant for Malaysia as an objective and aspiration even beyond 2020 for all
who collectively love peace, harmony and prosperity. Bangsa Malaysia as a
nation-of-intent therefore remains important, and the key is the drive to achieve
this in a peaceful manner anchored in moderation.
12
How Malaysia manages peace and stability is described in Shamsul A.B. & Anis Y. Yusoff, Managing
peace in Malaysia: A case study, Ethnic Studies Paper Series, UKM No. 18, May 2011, Institute of Ethnic
Studies, UKM, Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia.

SHAMSUL A.B. 47

Big Power Rivalries and Their

Impact on Regional Security
B.A. Hamzah
ABSTRACT
The geopolitical situation in the South China Sea is very fluid, with three
interrelated trends likely to impact on maritime security. The first is competition for
influence by major maritime powers, either on the pretext of exercising freedom
of navigation or conscious efforts to contain China’s rise. The second trend
relates to rising nationalist sentiments and militarism in certain countries with an
interest in the South China Sea. The third concerns the policy of some countries of
seeking external support, especially from the US, to do their bidding: Philippine-
US military ties come to mind. Recent developments suggest that despite rhetoric
to the contrary, US efforts to reclaim its pre-eminence in the South China Sea are
not likely to be smooth sailing. Due to economic and financial constraints, the
US is unlikely to “put more boots on the ground,” and certainly will not confront
China head-on. One occasion likely to influence Philippine-China relations in the
South China Sea is arbitration over China’s contentious nine-dash-line maritime
boundary. Although China has refused to participate in the proceedings, the onus
is on it as a strong military power to demonstrate some magnanimity by defusing
the tension. Other stakeholders must also refrain from further provocations.

B.A. HAMZAH 49
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

B.A. Hamzah is a Professor at the Department of Strategic Studies in Malaysia’s
National Defence University and a Distinguished Fellow at the Malaysian Institute
of Defence and Security. He headed Strategic and International Studies at the
Malaysian Armed Forces Defence College, was Assistant Director-General of the
Institute of Strategic and International Studies, and founding head of the Maritime
Institute of Malaysia. Dr Hamzah was a Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies (Singapore) and a Special Senior Fellow at the UN Institute of Training
and Research (Hiroshima). He was a Visiting Scholar at Cambridge University’s
Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law and has served as a corporate
consultant.

T
HE return of big power rivalry to Southeast Asia is likely to have an adverse
impact on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ quest to establish
a Political-Security Community in the region. The political dynamics are
difficult to fathom as things change by the hour. Some of these dynamics have
confounded rational analysis. Nonetheless, some general but discernible trends
have been evident since the US left Vietnam in 1975.
Unfortunately for Washington, by the time it makes its return 1 , China would already
have consolidated its military position in the South China Sea. Since its 1974 seizure of
the Paracels and naval skirmish with Vietnam in 1988, China has occupied more territory
in the Spratlys, including Mischief Reef in 1995. In April 2010, China used the State
Oceanic Administration and Fisheries Administration’s vessels to occupy Scarborough
Shoal in response to the attempted arrest of its fishermen by the Philippine Navy.
By 2013, China had established a firm zone of strategic influence in the South
China Sea. 2 By 1992, China’s strategy of attrition had already begun a process of
Balkanisation and Tibetisation of the South China Sea. By 2009, China seemed
to want to convert the South China Sea into its “internal lake,” akin to what the US
did with the Caribbean in the 19th Century. According to Kaplan, 3 China is seeking
to establish an Asian version of the Monroe Doctrine.
Today, that assertion has become a reality.
This does not suggest that what China has done is acceptable, but that is the
reality on the ground. Since 1974, China has used diplomacy, history, economics
and law 4 to augment its military position in the SCS. Many are unhappy with
China’s policy (a combination of charm offensive, salami slicing, soft power and
hard power), but can do little beyond rhetoric to sanction China, the largest and
strongest neighbour which since the 1990s has underwritten the region’s economy.
Thus far, China has withstood external pressures. Its security policy in the South
China Sea and in the East China Sea remains the same for the last decade or so.
1
Hillary Clinton’s speech at the Asean Summit in Hanoi, 2010, and Robert Gates’s statement at the
Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in 2010. This was followed by Obama’s notable 2011 speech before
the Australian Parliament that the US would be pivoting to the Asia-Pacific. Obama promised to despatch
60% of US naval strength to the region, including sending some 3,500 marines on annual rotation to
Darwin, as well as stationing four LCS (Littoral Combat Ships) in Singapore by 2016. The purchase of the
LCSs has been scaled down to 32 from 52 due to budget cuts (the total price was estimated at US$40
billion).
2 B.A. Hamzah, “China’s strategy,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 August 1992. See also J.N. Mak and
B.A. Hamzah, “Navy blues,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 March 1994.
3 Robert Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End to a Stable Pacific, Random House,
New York, 2014.
4 Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sea (1958
Declaration); 1992 Law of the PRC on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1992TS/CZ Law); the
Law of the PRC on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf in 1998 (1998 EEZ/ CS Law)

B.A. HAMZAH 51
However, China would be wise to take stock of recent geopolitical developments

in the region to start de-escalating tensions in the South China Sea, to regain the
confidence and trust of the other claimants and stakeholders. This is because
China has been the primary source of the conflict. At the same time, however, as it
takes two to tango, other stakeholders – most notably some claimant states and
external powers – must also stop all provocations against China.
At the beginning of 2010, with the completion of the Asean-China Free Trade
Agreement (the world’s third-largest FTA after the EU and the North American
FTA), China further consolidated its economic position in the region. China today
has become the largest trading partner of countries in the region. It has also
become an important source of Foreign Direct Investment in the world. 5
Some6 believe China’s assertiveness has to do with access to fish and

hydrocarbon resources in the South China Sea. There is little disagreement over
China’s economic motivation. However, even if the South China Sea were bereft of
resources, China would still wish to dominate the area for its strategic location and
exert strong political and diplomatic influence for purposes of power projection.
According to one report 7 some US$5.3 trillion of trade passes through the South
China Sea, making it the primary conduit for international trade between East and
West. It is also the primary route for military navigation for major maritime powers
like the US, China, Japan and to a lesser extent India and Russia.
Witness what happened during the years preceding the Opium Wars (1839-1842),
especially how the major maritime powers exploited China’s weak defences at
sea to invade the mainland. In 1842, British forces invaded mainland China from
the South China Sea. Since the 1800s, China has viewed that sea as its softest
strategic underbelly, which superior external forces could exploit if it were not
effectively defended.
During the Cold War era, the Soviet Union protected this flank for China. However,
immediately after the Cold War, and following the US and Soviet withdrawals from
the region, this flank was again unprotected as China concentrated on economic
development. It was only in the early 1990s that defence of China’s eastern flank
returned, when it began to deploy both military and civilian assets 8 to the region
in a more sustainable manner.
Within the overall context of the three likely trends discussed above, one subsidiary
trajectory that we can discern with some clarity is China’s consolidation of its firm
5
Frank Ching, “China’s new transformation,” New Straits Times, 3 April 2014.
6 Michael Richardson, “Energy boom fuelling China’s anxiety,” Straits Times, 10 December 2012
7 Bonnie Glaser, Armed Clash in the South China Sea: Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14, Council
on Foreign Relations, April 2012.
8 See International Crisis Group Report, Stirring Up the South China Sea, Asia Report No 223, April 2012.

military and political grip in the South China Sea. China is determined to keep the
status quo in the South China Sea, as it is in its larger geostrategic interest to do
so. However, China is prepared to co-exist with friendly claimant states that have
occupied some overlapping features at sea. 9
A book 10 on China by Wu Shicun, one of the country’s leading scholars, makes

clear that China is visibly troubled by two issues that may undermine its security
at sea:
• First, the involvement of external powers in the South China Sea, under any
pretext;
• Second, provocations by smaller claimant states like the Philippines and
Vietnam.
The reasons why China does not tolerate interference from outside powers in its
geostrategic designs in the South China Sea are too obvious to miss.
• The South China Sea is its own lake, for which it now has the military might to
defend against any aggressor;
• China considers the South China Sea its softest strategic underbelly. It cannot
afford to let any outside power gain an upper hand in the region that could
undermine its security from its eastern (sea) flank;
• China sees itself as the victim of an international conspiracy to contain its rise.
Hence it will resist any state that might undermine its security. China considers
the South China Sea and the East China Sea as integral to its geostrategic
landscape or core interests.
• China is dead set against multilateralising or internationalising the South China
Sea. The bilateral approach makes sense to China although some stakeholders
object to it.
The United States enters the scene

In the current circumstances, the only maritime power that can pose a real military
threat to China is the United States. Buoyed by some recent developments (e.g.
uncertainties following the Arab Spring, Syria, Iran and now Ukraine), China
believes the US is under pressure to reduce military adventurism following the
events in Iraq and Afghanistan. Besides, the US is undergoing some of its worst
economic woes since the 1928 economic recession, making support for a more
adventurist foreign policy orientation away from its shores unlikely.
After retreating from Vietnam in 1975, the United States went reclusive for a while,
nursing its wounds while conducting some soul-searching. Apart from sending
marines to arrest some warlords in Mogadishu in 1993, the United States did
9
See Wu Shicun, Solving Disputes for Regional Cooperation and Development in the South China Sea: A
Chinese Perspective, Chandos Publishing, Oxford, 2013.
10 Wu Shicun, op. cit.

B.A. HAMZAH 53
not dispatch its war machine abroad until the war (against Afghanistan in 2001,
followed by the 2003 invasion of Iraq) to remove Saddam Hussein. This means
there was a lapse of almost 20 years before US forces returned to the battlefield
(1975-1993).
It may take the United States much longer this time after its withdrawal from
Afghanistan in 2014, due to the new geopolitical imperatives. The weak US
response to Russian “annexation” of the Crimean peninsula in March 2014 is
troubling to those who seek US military guarantees. However, the United States
may remain engaged and even more active in cyberspace-related security
matters which do not require troop deployments. Incidentally, China is reportedly
active in cyberspace security too.
With a budget deficit of more than US$16 trillion, the United States is in dire straits.
It should not surprise anyone if the US government were to shut down again.
Additionally, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has submitted a smaller budget
(US$496 billion) for 2014, which reportedly would shrink the US Army to the
smallest force since WWII. 11
China understands that when push comes to shove, the United States is unlikely
to come to the help of its treaty allies (the Philippines, Japan). US support for
Manila is likely to take commercial form like selling second-hand naval vessels,
aircraft and armaments. The United States is unlikely to deploy troops, not after
Afghanistan and Iraq. Besides, it is now too preoccupied with other strategic
priorities like managing a Russia with Crimea.
There is strong evidence that the United States is turning inwards, as it has done
in the 1920s and the 1930s. It needs to recuperate from war fatigue. It has to face
the situation in times of severe economic austerity.
Make no mistake: the United States is not about to go to war with China or anyone
else in Asia. The struggle to manage Chinese ambition will be left mostly to
countries in the region. And, according to James Traub, 12 the very complicated
relationship with China is much less a clash of worldviews than of interests.
Traub believes the United States can no longer afford its own ambitions because
of poor economics. He has quoted Michael Mandelbaum 13, author of The Frugal
Superpower, who argues that the contraction of the US economy means “the
defining fact of foreign policy in the second decade of the 21st century and
11
Thom Shanker and Helene Cooper, “Pentagon Plans to Shrink Army to Pre-WWII level,” New York Times,
23 February 2014.
12 James Traub, “The end of American intervention,” New York Times, 19 February 2012
13 Michael Mandelbaum, The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-strapped Era,
Public Affairs, New York, 2010.

beyond will be ‘less’. According to Mandelbaum, a realist, the chief victim of the
new austerity will be “intervention”.
Japan under Abe

That leaves Japan. 14 Japan has been pushing its gnat weight under Shinzo Abe,
considered the most conservative right-wing prime minister in recent times. Japan
is still grappling with economic problems following years of stagnation and slow
growth. It is still recovering from the adverse effects of the Fukushima nuclear
plant incident of 2011 to have any impact on China.
Clearly, Abe is worried about another world war presumably because he finds the
global community lacking any interest in rolling back China’s quest to become a
strong military power. Although he did not suggest it, his message at the Davos
2014 Economic Forum was quite clear: Japan would rearm to protect itself and
prevent a strong China from becoming belligerent.
Faced with similar strategic uncertainties in the 1930s, Japan abandoned the
Washington Treaty (1921-1922) and the London Naval Treaties (1930, 1936), which
imposed a limit on its growing Imperial Navy. Subsequently, a rearmed Japan
waged a long war, including the second invasion of China in 1937, prior to the
establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in south-east Asia.
Parallels drawn between current China-Japan relations and the build-up to World
War I are inaccurate. Tensions, mainly between Germany and England, led to the
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire,
in June 1914. These tensions were driven mainly by ideological differences, rising
nationalism in Germany and, most importantly, the desire on the part of Kaiser
Wilhelm II and his ministers to dominate Europe and to project power overseas.
Backed by a robust economy and a strong army, Germany mistakenly thought it
could defeat Britain’s naval supremacy.
The current rifts between China and Japan are nowhere near as wide as prior to
the outbreak of global war in 1914 and 1939.The quarrels are of a different nature.
Contrary to what some observers have suggested, the arms race between China
and Japan is not comparable with what Germany and England experienced prior
to World War I.
History might not repeat itself but, as Mark Twain put it, it does rhyme. Fear is
growing that the war that blasted Europe for more than four years (1914-1918) may
echo in East Asia if the international community fails to rein in China.
14
B.A. Hamzah, “Japan releases bottled-up ‘genie’ of war,” The Nation, Bangkok, 24 February 2014.

B.A. HAMZAH 55
As Japan’s most right-wing and conservative second-time prime minister in recent

years, Abe has to appear hawkish to his people just as Kaiser Wilhelm did in 1914.
There is a difference, though: unlike the Kaiser, Abe is not under the control of the
military – not yet. Nevertheless, Kaiser Wilhelm wanted a war and he got one. If
Abe aspires to the same, he will also get one. This is how history might rhyme.
Revising Article 9 of its 1947 Constitution would allow Japan to re-arm, maintain
a military and renounce peace as a national policy. Abe’s plan to raise defence
spending by almost 5% over the next five years marks a turning point in Tokyo’s
post-war policy. His decision to beef up the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) is
disturbing, coming as it does amid uncertainties in the region.
Currently, the JSDF has 250,000 soldiers in active service plus 60,000 reservists.
With more than 50,000 US troops in the country, the number of armed military
personnel in Japan is relatively large.
The budget for the JSDF (including the US forces) is sizeable. At US$60 billion in
2012, Japan spends more than India or Germany on defence. However, it spends
US$3 billion less on the military than Britain, a nuclear state. By comparison, the
total military budget for the 10 Asean countries in 2012 was only US$23 billion.
The JSDF is well equipped and ably led. The Maritime Self-Defence Forces of
Japan boasts more frigates, submarines and mine warfare craft than Britain’s
Royal Navy or the French Navy. Japan has 18 submarines in active service, more
than all the Asean navies combined. Apart from two helicopter carriers, Japan has
some 40 destroyers and six frigates. According to Robert Kaplan 15, an authority
on world navies, “the Japanese navy boasts roughly four times as many major
warships as the British Royal Navy.”
Japan also has more ships in its merchant marine fleet and a more advanced
shipbuilding industry than either Britain or France, with a slight edge over them
in naval capabilities. Tokyo may lack the capacity to project maritime power
compared to Britain or France, but its naval assets are impressive. These assets
include oceanography expertise, maritime technology and maritime enforcement
agencies like the Coast Guard. Like other countries, Japan needs these assets to
develop a coherent national sea-power policy.
Japan’s land forces have more towed artillery pieces than British or French forces.
Similarly, its air force boasts a bigger fleet than either European power.
Under Abe, the JSDF will be equipped with state-of-the-art offensive conventional
weapons systems including drones, missiles and robotics - and it could opt for
15
Robert Kaplan, “The return of toxic nationalism,” The Wall Street Journal (Opinion), 23 December 2012.

nuclear weapons. Some experts claim Japan has the capability to assemble a
nuclear bomb in 90 days.
Whether Japan can have “a comprehensive defensive posture that can completely
defend our nation” to hedge against an uncertain future influenced by China is a
question of both economics and political will. By revising the 1947 Constitution,
Abe has intentionally released the “military genie” from the bottle of a dark past.
Japan faces not only an unfriendly China but also an unruly North Korea and
South Korea. To a limited extent, Japan’s relations with Russia are also at a
crossroads partly because of the unsettled ownership of the Kuril islands, a relic
of WWII. There is no doubt that Japan faces an uncertain geostrategic future if the
US becomes more insular.
Although Japan has a defence treaty 16 with the US, its utility is a big question
especially in regard to China with whom the US has developed a more coherent
geo-economic relationship. As the US is most unlikely to risk putting boots on the
ground against a determined China, Japan needs an indigenous insurance policy.
Rearming the military is its choice.
Other maritime powers like Russia and India are not going to make any waves in
the South China Sea. Both are handicapped by their own domestic policies. Russia
is currently preoccupied with Crimea, a stagnant economy, and it has a special
relationship with China that may find the South China Sea too distant to bother
with. India is grappling with an economic slowdown and other internal problems
to have the luxury to venture outside its maritime comfort zone.
Provocations
Provocations by some claimant states, most notably the Philippines, against
China’s interest in the South China Sea may be a source of conflict. With the
Philippines, the situation deteriorated after the occupation of Mischief Reef,
of Scarborough Shoal and the standoff around the Second Thomas Shoal.
Compounding problems in Philippine-China relations is the absence of good
chemistry between their leaders, besides pressure from nationalist quarters.
An authority 17 on the South China Sea has described Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s

presidency as a golden era in Philippine-China relations. Relations began to sour
soon after she left office in June 2010. President Benigno Aquino III’s administration
later witnessed strong anti-China nationalist sentiments. These sentiments became
more pronounced after the US announced its “pivot” rebalancing policy in the
16
US and Japan Mutual Defense Agreement of 8 March 1954.
17 Ian Storey, “China and the Philippines: moving beyond the South China Sea dispute,” The Jamestown
Foundation, Washington, China Brief, 2006.

B.A. HAMZAH 57
region, and the manner in which China nudged the Philippines from Scarborough
Shoal in 2012.
Slighted by a lack of support from other Asean countries over Scarborough Shoal
at the 45th Asean Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Phnom Penh, Manila then took
a tougher line against China by referring it to the UN Tribunal at the Hague. As
the bilateral relations reached a new low, the US military presence in the South
China Sea continued as a source of anxiety for China. Manila-Beijing relations
are heading for a collision course if the situation is not defused. It reached critical
point after the Philippines took China to the United Nations Arbitral Tribunal in
January 2013. 18
Manila should have realised that its relationship with an assertive China that still
believes in the uniqueness of the Middle Kingdom is not a zero-sum game. China
and the Philippines established diplomatic relations in 1975. As close neighbours,
the peoples of both countries had been trading with each other since ancient
times. Professor Wang Gungwu describes the early trading relations between
mainland Chinese and the maritime states of Southeast Asia as in a sense centred
in the Philippines. 19 Traders from China sailing through the South China Sea would
first stop in the Philippines before moving to the other parts of the region.
The South China Sea remains the most critical sea lane of communication in the
Asia-Pacific region. Almost a third of global trade in crude oil and over half of the
LNG trade pass through it. President Xi Jin-Ping recently revived the idea of the
maritime silk route during his visit to Jakarta in 2013.
Besides flourishing trade, power politics drives China’s interest in the South China
Sea. Geopolitics, security and access to oil, gas and fisheries are mere pretexts for
power play. China is no longer happy to be a wealthy state. It wants to exercise
commensurate political power following its humiliation at the hands of Western
colonists.
Furious at Manila’s refusal to withdraw the case before the Tribunal, China
rescinded an invitation to President Aquino to the China-Asean Trade Exposition
in Nanning. That was more than a slap on Manila’s wrist; it was spiteful. After
that, relations between Manila and Beijing went into free fall. There is speculation
that China has stationed some frigates for the Spratly region that could be used
against the Philippine-occupied island of Pagasa/Thitu 20. It would be tragic if
China were to act harshly and hastily.
18
China sent a note verbale to the Tribunal that “it does not accept the arbitration initiated by the
Philippines” and stated that it was not participating in the Tribunal’s proceedings on 1 August 2013.
19 Wang Gung Wu, The Nanhai Trade: Early Chinese Trade in the South China Sea, University of Malaya,
Kuala Lumpur. Reprinted 1997, 2003.
20 About 300 nautical miles from Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, Philippines.

The outcome of the UN Arbitral Tribunal, which heard the Philippines Memorial in
March 2014, may have some influence on China’s future behaviour in the Spratlys.
But the Tribunal may lack the jurisdiction to hear the case because the reliefs
Manila sought from the Tribunal were too broad and vague. A leading scholar
21
in international law found that none of the 13 points of the relief sought either
gives the right to a dispute concerning the application of the convention (Unclos),
or may “be addressed without considering matters which are or have been validly
removed from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”
Conclusion
The political situation in the South China Sea is so fluid as to make rational analysis
very challenging. The dynamics keep changing ceaselessly, and it is difficult to
make any long term sense of the events on the ground or at sea. However, there
are some discernible scenarios or trends which point to further consolidation of
the area by China.
Recent developments suggest that despite rhetoric to the contrary, US efforts

to reclaim pre-eminence in the South China Sea and in the Asia-Pacific region
have been long on rhetoric but short on implementation. This vagueness has
emboldened China. Whatever the outcome of the Arbitral Tribunal, China must
demonstrate some magnanimity by de-escalating the tension in the South China
Sea. Other stakeholders must do likewise and refrain from further provocations. It
takes two to tango.
21
Stefan Talmon, “The South China Sea Arbitration,” Bonn Research Papers on Public International Law,
Paper No # 2, 9 February 2014

B.A. HAMZAH 59

Indonesia’s 2014 Legislative

and Presidential Elections:
An Overview
Farish A. Noor
ABSTRACT
Indonesia’s legislative and presidential elections this year will mark a turning
point in the nation’s complex history. Yet as the legislative election campaign
has shown, the Indonesian electorate seems to have grown jaded with political
parties, partisan rhetoric and the political process in general. This article is based
on fieldwork carried out during the election campaign, and notes that Indonesians
today seem more focused on local provincial issues than on concerns about the
future development and trajectory of the nation. Yet Indonesia’s place in Asean
remains pivotal, and the success or failure of Asean will also depend on how
Indonesia responds to the challenges facing it. In the absence of both clear
ideological lines and long-term vision, and with a populace that grows increasingly
disillusioned, questions arise as to how Indonesia will move into the future and
what shape the country will assume in the short-run.

FARISH A. NOOR 61
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Farish A. Noor is an Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, where he
teaches Southeast Asian politics and history. Dr Farish has researched and written
on Indonesia extensively, covering areas such as political history, religio-political
movements and parties, as well as political security. His latest writings include
The Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party PAS: Islamism in a Mottled Nation and Islam on
the Move: The Tablighi Jama’at Movement in Southeast Asia. He is also a Visiting
Fellow at ISIS Malaysia. He graduated from Sussex University, the University of
London and Essex University.

I
NDONESIA is currently in the midst of its general elections, for both legislative
seats (DPR) and the presidency. In the face of looming challenges to the country’s
future, the current campaign has delivered some startling results which prompt
serious questions about where the country is heading and what sort of Indonesia
is likely to emerge. A cursory overview of the political-economic-social landscape
of Indonesia reveals a lot about where the country is at the moment, and how it
has progressed since the days of reformasi in 1998.
A young, restless and cynical nation

For a start, Indonesia is a very young country with the median age at about 29
years. The youth vote bank is the biggest at this election, where around 67 million
people will be first-time voters out of a total voter pool of 187 million. First-time
voters will make up around 35% of all voters. Yet as we have seen in the case
of the legislative elections of 9 April 2014, the number of non-voters, dubbed the
Golput or “golongan putih” who chose not to vote or to spoil their votes has risen,
from 28% at the last elections in 2009 to above 32% this time.
This is a worrying indicator of the level of apathy and disillusionment among

Indonesian voters in general, and the youth in particular. 1 The fact that the number
of non-voters has risen to an estimated 32-34% has made the golput the biggest
constituency of all (when compared to the 19% of voters who gave the biggest
block vote to the PDI-P, or even the 32% won by the five Islamist parties combined.)
That the level of apathy and non-participation has risen so high in Indonesia also
reflects the extent to which the political process, as well as politicians and political
parties, have been discredited by now. In the lead-up to the legislative elections,
several polls indicated that most Indonesians no longer believe in politics or
the political process. The Edelman Trust survey, for instance, noted that 82% of
Indonesians place their trust in the private sector, 78% in the media and 73% in
NGOs, while only 53% trust politicians and political parties. The conclusion is that
levels of public trust in the political system have eroded to a critical level.
Compounding this deficit in public trust is the fact that most Indonesians have
become bored with political rhetoric and accustomed to systematic abuses of the
system. Surveys indicate that more than half of Indonesians believe that vote-
buying is normal and acceptable. In terms of fulfilling their obligations as citizens,
it ought to be noted that out of a population of 240-plus million where more than
120 million are working, only 20 million Indonesians pay taxes.
1
There were also campaigns by Indonesian activists to encourage the younger generation of first-time
voters to vote. One such effort was called the “Ayo Vote!” campaign organised by young activists at
places such as shopping malls and cinemas, and which was widely supported by the mainstream media.
Despite the media coverage given to such campaigns however, the voter turn-out proved disappointing
for many.

FARISH A. NOOR 63
With a general decline in public faith and participation in politics, the new domain
of public activity is the Internet and other forms of social media. Indonesia’s
media remains powerful and the country’s newspapers and TV channels enjoy
wide coverage across the archipelago, but the acquisition of TV companies and
newspapers by political parties and business tycoons from 1998 to the present
has also meant that the media is largely partisan and thus divisive. In the course
of the election campaign, many of the mass public campaigns were conducted
via social media instead, including the “Ayo vote!” campaign to encourage
young Indonesians to vote, as well as many golput campaigns encouraging
voters to spoil their votes. Though Internet coverage is not as wide in Indonesia
as compared to Malaysia and Singapore, it is growing and is becoming a major
channel for communication and mass mobilisation.
While younger Indonesians are increasingly apathetic and sceptical about politics,
the country’s ground-level socio-economic realities are evident to all: Indonesia’s
wealth gap is growing, as seen in the rise of the new urban elite, shopping malls,
clubs, etc. The recent release of government bonds led to a higher sell-out of
15 trillion rupiah (IR), more than the earlier estimate of 10 trillion – indicating the
power of the domestic market and demand among the emerging middle class.
However 60% of Indonesia’s liquid wealth (cash) remains in Jakarta, while 30%
of the country’s cash circulates in the larger commercial cities such as Surabaya,
Medan and Bandung. Only 10% of Indonesia’s cash is actually in the hands of the
general public in the rest of the country.
With these realities in the background, Indonesia is faced with several daunting
challenges that need to be addressed over the next few years:
• Indonesia’s youth boom and the expansion of the higher education sector has
basically created a glut of young students in their 20s with new middle-class
sensibilities and rising socio-economic expectations. The next government
of Indonesia will have to bring this mass-base of young Indonesians into the
economy in a meaningful way, and embed them in national development so
that they will have a stake in the economy and the nation.
• The autonomy experiment in Aceh is being watched closely by other provinces

envious of the local Acehnese government’s newly-granted right to administer its
own land, and to reap a majority share of profits from developing and exploiting
its resources. In other parts of Indonesia there are already growing calls for
federalism, and the demands for relative autonomy (as with the special province
of Jogjakarta). Should this become a trend, power will be diluted at the centre
and increasingly dispersed to local centres of power instead, with the potential
of creating local oligarchies and pockets of local resistance against Jakarta.

• There is an apparent absence of a vision for a united, centralised Indonesian

republic in the future. In the course of the legislative elections, there was no
discussion of the future of Indonesia as a united archipelago and no discussion
of foreign affairs or defence policy. This compounds the general sense of
apathy, alienation and anomie felt by many Indonesians today, particularly the
younger generation.
These factors were clearly evident in the course of the field research conducted
during the election campaign. They point to a curious development in contemporary
Indonesian politics, where national elections are inward-looking and border on
the parochial.
A national election without national issues

One of the most striking observations of the 2014 legislative elections was the
near-absence of serious discussion about matters of national interest, or issues
related to foreign policy. In the course of election-related research connected
with this article, fieldwork was carried out in a number of different localities: from
Banda Aceh and its environs in Northern Sumatra to Medan to the Minangkabau
highlands of Central Sumatra, from Jakarta to Jogjakarta, Surakarta and
Purwokorto, and from Bali to Makassar, Manado and Poso. In the course of the
interviews and research, it was clear that in all these localities the main issues
raised by the respective parties and their candidates were local ones.
Bali: One of the most widely discussed issues in Bali during the campaign was
the land reclamation project opposed by a range of local NGOs. The project will
extend land for commercial purposes and is intended to boost tourism facilities in
Aceh. The project was approved in 2013 by the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)
administration, but has met with local resistance from environmentalist groups
and student organisations on local campuses. The SBY administration is accused
of colluding with local land authorities besides accusations of corruption, kick-
backs and local authorities not paying heed to environmental warnings.
The group behind the reclamation project wants to raise the level of land in the
Teluk Benua area to five meters above sea level, but opposition groups like
Conservation International note that raising land over an area of 838 hectares
will affect not only Teluk Benua but also other parts of Bali such as Sewung,
Pemogan, Sesetan and Sanur, as the rest of the land mass is only two metres
above sea level. The primary concerns are two-fold: the economic impact on local
communities, and the environmental impact of creating a zone where floods will
be increasingly frequent. Local NGOs have noted that Jakarta’s flooding problem
is also a result of land reclamation at Indah Kapuk beach.
Surakarta (Java): The contest between the PDI-P and Partai Demokrat (PD) had
intensified with several members of the ruling Surakarta royal family running for
office at both parliamentary and local government levels. Princesses Gusti Mung,

FARISH A. NOOR 65
Gusti In and Gusti Timoer were all running for parliamentary and local government
seats under the PD banner. So was Kanjeng Edy Wirabumi, who contested against
Jokowi for the Governorship of Surakarta (and lost).
In all, five members of the royal family had openly joined SBY’s PD and hoped to
capitalise on local issues, chief of which is their demand that special provincial
status be given to Surakarta on par with the other royal city of Jogjakarta. The
PDI-P remained in pole position in Surakarta and was unlikely to be defeated,
but Megawati’s popularity was low then due to her reluctance to nominate
Jokowi (former governor of Surakarta, now governor of Jakarta, Joko Widodo)
as candidate for president. Though Surakarta remains the PDI-P’s main political
base, the PD has made inroads with the election of Gusti Mung to Parliament.
Jogjakarta (Java): The Jogjakarta royal family is also now involved in politics,
with the daughter of the Sultan of Jogjakarta joining the Gerindra party led by
Prabowo Subianto. Other members of the royal family have also joined other
parties including PD. The main local issue is perpetuating the special provincial
status of Jogjakarta, an issue debated in Parliament last year. This has aroused
much support from locally based students and activist groups, with wide support
for the Sultan and for Jogjakarta’s special status.
At present Jogjakarta seems to be witnessing a strong contest between Gerindra,

PD, PDI-P and Golkar. It is interesting that despite the fact of Jogjakarta being the
birthplace of the Muhamadiyyah movement, its party-political branch – the Pan
party led by Amien Rais – is not doing well. As late as February 2014 there were
no visible signs of Pan candidates or party banners, and Pan had not even begun
to campaign in the city.
Padang-Pekan Baru (Sumatra): In the Minangkabau area of Sumatra, currently the

most widely debated issue is the clash between local adat (customary) laws and
the laws embodied in the Indonesian republican Constitution. New revisions to the
Constitution, coupled with the drive to streamline all non-constitutional adat laws
across Indonesia, are seen by Minang conservative groups as a direct challenge
to their cultural identity and belief system. The Minangkabau lands have no local
parties, but local Minang activists are demanding that all mainstream national
party candidates take up the cause of Minang adat law and the defence of the
Minang adat legal system.
The Minangkabau community’s local politics is very inward-looking, dominated as

it is by these local adat-related concerns. Thus the national development plans
forwarded by the 12 mainstream national parties have low traction among local
political leaders. All the major national parties will be fielding local candidates in
the Minang region, but due to the heated debate over the future of Minang adat
law and customs, these local issues are expected to dominate local debates and
become the factor to affect voting patterns.

Aceh: Aceh’s political situation is more complex compared to other provinces,

because of the decentralisation process that began during Abdurrahman Wahid’s
presidency and accelerated during Megawati’s time. Apart from the 12 national
mainstream parties running, there were also three local parties including the
Partai Nasional Aceh (PNA), Partai Damai Aceh (PDA) and Partai Aceh (PA) that
emerged from the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) which accepted the 2004-05
peace accord following the devastating tsunami. Local political contestation was
intense, with low-level violence, extortion and intimidation between rival local
parties in areas outside major cities and towns.
Indonesian police note that during election campaigns Aceh and West Papua
have always been hotspots, with the highest number of violent clashes between
rival groups. Compounding matters further is the rivalry between PA which rules
the province and PNA in particular. The PA establishment has been accused of
corruption, abuse of power, environmental destruction and creeping Shariah
ordinances that have impacted on the lives of locals.
Several reports by the International Crisis Group note that the PA government
is using all means at its disposal to create what may become a one-party
government/state. This is also impacting on local political dynamics, leading to
more contention. The PA is also engaged in a protracted legal battle with Jakarta
and the Constitutional Court of Indonesia to use the Gam flag as the flag for Aceh
province.
Posturing by PA, PNA and PDA has made it increasingly difficult for national
mainstream parties to contest in Aceh province as a whole, for all four local
Acehnese parties are united on the common goal of keeping mainstream parties
out of Aceh. Compounding matters is the fact that the local leaders of PA, PNA and
PDA are former Gam rebels who have not really experienced the complexities
of governance and state management. Many of the former rebels have now
become politicians with no technocratic expertise, and have little knowledge of
management issues such as town planning and environmental protection.
No clear winners, only loose coalitions from legislative poll

In the wake of the legislative elections in April, Indonesia is now preparing for
the presidential election campaign that will take off in earnest in June. If the
legislative election campaign is anything to go by, we can expect a relatively
muted campaign with less pyrotechnics and fewer instances of violence (as
compared to the campaigns of 2004 and 2009 that were more eventful).
Among the observations that can be made thus far are:
There were no clear winners at the legislative elections of April, as none of

the parties had managed to exceed the 20% votes mark expected of them.

FARISH A. NOOR 67
2
The biggest disappointment for many was the obvious failure of the Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P) to get anywhere close to the 30% votes
mark it had set for itself. The international media were hasty to conclude that the
PDI-P had “won” the elections, for the fact remains that no party could get even
20% of the votes. This marks a downturn from the elections of 2009, when SBY’s
PD passed the 20% threshold.
The most glaring aspect of the PDI-P’s failure was the absence of the much-touted
“Jokowi effect” – attributed to the governor of Jakarta Joko Widodo, who was
expected to bring about a massive vote swing among younger voters eager for
change. It was expected that Jokowi would help the PDI-P raise its level of support
to the 30% mark, and ensure a smooth victory for the PDI-P and an easy coalition-
building process after that. The fact that no such vote swing took place indicates
the deep level of distrust and apathy among voters in general.
Despite reducing the number of national parties to 12 (and three local parties in
Aceh), no single party dominated the election results. Equally important to note
are the comeback of Golkar and the rise of fortunes of the Gerindra party led
by former general Prabowo Subianto, that managed to secure around 12% of
the votes. This, in effect, means that three parties lead the polls: PDI-P, Golkar
and Gerindra, while the rest are in a position to jockey for alliances and seats
in attempts to form a working coalition that will assume power in the legislature
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or DPR).
The other important development has been the swing back to the Islamist parties,
including the PKS, PKB, PPP and Pan. Collectively the Islamist parties account
for 32% of the vote, making them the second-biggest vote block after the 32-
34% golput (non-voter) block. The Islamist parties have not, however, been able to
unite under a single banner, and efforts by parties like Pan to bring them together
as the Islamist middle ground (poros tengah) have failed. At present, the Islamist
parties are divided in their loyalties and alliances, with the PKB – an offshoot of
the Nahdatul Ulama – openly aligned to the PDI-P, while PPP, PKS and Pan have
all been courted by Gerindra. 3
2
In terms of seats won by the respective parties, the present tally stands as follows: PDI-P 109; Golkar
91; Gerindra 73; Demokrat 61; Pan 49; PKB 47; PKS 40; PPP 39; Nasdem 35; Hanura 16. In such a situation
where no party commands half of the house of representatives, instrumental and pragmatic coalitions are
likely to be the only way that any coalition can come to power.
3 In the course of the legislative campaign and in the wake of the parliamentary (Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat, or DPR) elections, Islamist groups have already begun to wage a sustained campaign against
PDI-P presidential nominee Joko Widodo on the grounds that he harbours “pro-Christian leanings.” The
fact that Jakarta’s deputy governor (Ahok) who served with him is of ethnic Chinese origin has also
become an issue for far-right groups in the country. Local analysts have expressed their concern that the
presidential election campaign may witness the use of anti-Christian and anti-Chinese rhetoric by those
who wish to tarnish Jokowi’s image further.

Indonesia’s current political landscape is therefore fluid and ever-changing,

making it exceedingly difficult to anticipate the sort of coalitions to emerge as
the parties come together on a purely pragmatic basis. In the absence of a
clear distinction between left-leaning and right-leaning parties, ideology is of no
concern or relevance in the coalition-building process. Thus Islamist parties like
PAN and PKS are engaged in dialogue with Gerindra, despite concerns about
Islamist parties working with a nationalist party helmed by a former head of the
Indonesian security forces that, in the 1980s-90s, led the depoliticising of Islam in
the country. But a closer examination of the coalition-building process indicates
that ideology is of secondary importance when compared to brokering for seats,
cabinet posts and the position of vice-presidential candidate.
At the time of writing, there appear to be two candidates vying for the presidency:
Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Prabowo Subianto. While both will fall upon the party-
political machinery and manpower of their respective parties (PDI-P and Gerindra)
for the campaign that will follow, patterns of convergence in their respective
campaigns can already be seen:
In the context of present-day Indonesian society where political awareness and

education seem to be low, ideological differences are not likely to be raised
between the two candidates and/or any other third presidential candidate. Both
Prabowo and Jokowi have spelled out their vision for Indonesia’s future, but on
terms that remain fluid, vague and local, focusing on bread-and-butter issues that
impact on the livelihoods of ordinary Indonesians. Thus far there has been scant
debate on matters of national policy, foreign policy or defence policy, and these
issues are not expected to be the main issues in either candidate’s campaign
either.
One issue that has been raised by both candidates is the need for Indonesia
to break free from dependency on foreign capital, occasioning the rise of an
economic-nationalist agenda. This has been the campaign pledge of Prabowo and
his Gerindra party (and was restated during Gerindra’s negotiations with a potential
campaign ally, the Islamist PKS party). Similar sentiments have been expressed in
even more explicit terms by Jokowi, who addressed the Indonesian public at large
via a published appeal entitled “Revolusi Mental” (“Mental Revolution”), where
he spoke of Indonesia’s need to liberate itself from over-dependency on foreign
capital and called for Indonesia’s natural wealth and resources to be developed
by the nation’s industry and capital instead.
In both cases, the discourse of economic nationalism articulated by Prabowo/

Gerindra and Jokowi/PDI-P seems populist and nationalist, in keeping with the
tenor of the legislative campaign earlier. This may pave the way for the rise of
more nationalist discourse, leading to a sustained campaign against “foreign
predatory capital” as was the case in the recent past. Gerindra and PKS have
even talked about nationalising foreign capital assets in the country, a move that

FARISH A. NOOR 69
was populist in appeal but greeted with some degree of alarm by foreign investors
and the expatriate business community. 4
The short-to-medium-term prognosis for Indonesia is that after a largely

inconclusive election process, there will be no clear mandate for any party or
faction that wishes to govern the country and take Indonesia into the future.
Whichever coalition comes to dominate the assembly (DPR) will be a coalition put
together on a pragmatic basis, and will be loose and functional in character. The
same can be said of the future president of Indonesia, who will be backed by his
respective coalition in parliament.
The absence of a clear majority in the DPR means that policymaking, long-
term planning and governance may well be hindered by incessant debate
and resistance at the legislative level, complicating Indonesia’s legal-political
landscape further. At present, what Indonesia needs most is a unifying leader
figure and a united government coalition that can bring together the disparate
interest groups, provincial representatives and classes within a national narrative
that foregrounds the value and objectives of a centralised Indonesian republic.
But as public faith in politicians and political praxis wanes, there are concerns that
large sections of Indonesian society may remain disaffected and uninterested in
developing a common, unifying vision for the country over the longer term.
4
Economic nationalism has long and deep roots in Indonesia, going back to the 1950s and 1960s when
President Sukarno shocked the international business community by nationalising Dutch and other
Western capital assets to much popular support but at the expense of bilateral relations with Western
powers. Such moves have also been supported by leftist elements in the country, such as the Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI) that was active in the forceful appropriation of foreign property and capital during
that period, until its own violent demise in 1965. In recent times some Indonesian leaders – including
those from the PDI-P, among others – have called for nationalising foreign capital, and have articulated
an anti-FDI discourse that views foreign investment as exploitative and predatory. In 2009-2010 this
was accompanied by instances of low-level attacks and demonstrations against foreign companies and
banks operating in different parts of the country.

Researching Terrorism and

Militancy:
Skewed Facts, Twisted Trends?
Asrul Daniel
ABSTRACT
Research on terrorism and violent extremism has been galvanised so much in
the wake of the September 11 attacks that some analysts have likened the years
that followed to a golden age of terrorism studies. But as much as there has been
significant progress in the body of work on the subject since then, there also
appears to be some persistent challenges that continue to hamper the nascent
discipline from fully realising its potential. These challenges range from the dearth
of empirically-based studies that employ invaluable data from primary sources, to
the possibly flawed frameworks and assumptions of a field dominated by counter-
insurgency ideology. This article examines how research on terrorism and violent
extremism can possibly benefit from a diversity of approaches and frames of
reference that may provide safeguards and counterweights, as well as critical
perspectives, that can lead to a more nuanced and informed understanding of
one of the more complex challenges of our times.

ASRUL DANIEL 71
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Asrul Daniel Ahmed is Director of Research and Publications at the Global
Movement of Moderates Foundation. He was previously part of the Kuala Lumpur
delegation’s Communications Unit of the International Committee of the Red Cross.
He earned his M.A. in International Relations from the International University
of Japan in Niigata, after teaching at several higher educational institutions in
Malaysia. Mr Asrul has presented talks on international relations, including at
Mercy Malaysia’s International Humanitarian Conference in 2011, the Institute of
Advanced Islamic Studies’ Peace and Security Forum in 2013, and Oxford Club
Malaysia’s Malaysia In.Spires Forum in 2014.

R
ESEARCH on terrorism and violent extremism has received much attention
and support in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks of 2001. The spate
of terrorist attacks since then has roused interest further so as to capture
the attention of a global public: the Bali bombings of 2003 and 2005, the 11-M
Madrid bombings of 2004, the 7/7 London bombings of 2005, the Mumbai attacks
of 2008 and Kenya’s Westgate mall attack of 2013, to name a few. At one point
the research output was so abundant that it was estimated that a new book on
terrorism was being published every six hours, leading to the observation that we
were in the “golden age” of terrorism studies. 1
But how much of the research work done has been able to provide an accurate
and representative picture of the state of affairs of the subject? How successful
has the work been in addressing some of the most perplexing questions, such as
even when given the same backgrounds and facing similar circumstances, why do
some people turn to violent extremism while others do not? And how useful has
the accumulation of research been in informing policymakers about the strategies
and courses of action that can realistically and effectively address the obstacles
and other challenges posed by those ideologies given to extremism?
It is difficult to deny that the substantial body of work that has been done on
the study of terrorism and violent extremism has contributed significantly to our
understanding of what appears to be the defining mode of conflict in the early 21st
century. Therefore adopting a more critical approach towards the methodology,
trends and trajectory of the research studies should help us identify the gaps and
biases that can impede the discipline from reaching its full potential.
From wars to struggles to contingencies

In March 2009, a memo circulating among the staff at the US Department of
Defense appeared to indicate an interesting shift of direction that the Obama
administration had decided to take in regard to protracted conflicts in a post-Sept
11 world. It announced that the administration “prefers to avoid using the term
‘Long War’ or ‘Global War on Terror (GWOT)’,” and urged that the term “Overseas
Contingency Operation” be used instead. 2 Ostensibly putting the last nail in
the coffin of a term that has proven rather unpopular abroad, it is perhaps worth
remembering that GWOT had already been given its marching orders during the
George W. Bush administration. It was in the second term of the younger George
Bush that then Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, along with other senior US
officials, began promoting the use of the term “Global Struggle Against Violent
Extremism” (GSAVE) in an apparent nod towards the growing consensus that the
complex challenges posed by al-Qaeda and its network of affiliates could no
longer be addressed solely through military means.
1
Jessica Shepherd, “The rise and rise of terrorism studies,” The Guardian, 3 July 2007.
2 Scott Wilson and Al Kamen, “’Global War on Terror’ Is Given New Name,” Washington Post, 25 March
2009.

ASRUL DANIEL 73
The reasons behind the conceptual shift from GWOT to GSAVE, and eventually to
OCO, may not have been articulated clearly, but it is not unreasonable to venture
that the weight of semantics had exacted some measure of political cost both at
home and abroad. Since the core term “terrorism” is ultimately pejorative, any
direct invocation of it can arguably be understood as an appeal to metanarratives
with the effect – whether intended or otherwise – of discrediting and dehumanising
those to whom the cruel and violent acts have been attributed. Interestingly
enough, just as the act of terrorism has popularly been understood as a means
of applying symbolic violence to achieve political objectives, the use of the term
“terrorism” itself is increasingly perceived to be a means of manipulating symbols
of violence for, among others, political mileage.
The spectacle of belligerence against loosely networked non-state enemies

of the state was proving to be an increasingly counter-productive strategy. As
early as 2003, voices even from within the US defence community had expressed
concerns about the open-ended nature of GWOT in conflating the disparate,
diffused and dissimilar groups and individuals, and questionably reconstituting
them as a united, coherent and monolithic adversary. 3 The collective notion
that this elusive chimera might presumably be understood, confronted and
ultimately defeated may have set the unitary state on the path of a conflict that
is undesirable, unsustainable and ultimately unwinnable in the illusory quest for
absolute security.
Research on terrorism and violent extremism has no doubt been instrumental in

shaping policies and strategies against persons who pose violent threats to public
order and security, as well as against the ideologies that feed them and the forces
that drive them. A look at the current trends and trajectories of the work that has
been done in this field may lend some insights into what models have informed
certain policies, what assumptions have framed certain strategies, and why some
approaches have been favoured over others.
Trends and trajectories

In studies related to terrorism or violent extremism, it is rare to find any work that
fails to refer to the events of September 11th. The date has perhaps become a
marker of the fin de siècle that witnessed the dying throes of the uneasy order
that dominated interstate relations along bipolar lines, and the rise of a new
political landscape loosely tethered to a multipolar, or as some would say non-
polar, international security order. States are nowhere near losing their salience or
relevance in the 21st century. However, the apparent re-emergence of increasingly
visible, aggressive and vicious non-state actors determined to exploit the multiple
effects of their engagements with states have lent credence to the idea that in the
conduct of international affairs today, the rules of the game have changed.
3
See Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, Strategic Studies Institute monograph,
December 2003.

In the midst of this change, the violent extremes to which some of these non-
state actors are willing to go in serving their purported cause have galvanised
a significant number of states to place a high priority on the study of terrorism
and violent extremism. The assault by members of al-Qaeda on the World Trade
Centre in New York had sparked a considerable surge of interest in what was
previously a comparatively underdeveloped and severely underfunded area of
research of only limited and intermittent interest to the intellectual community
at large. Indeed, prior to 2001, such studies were regarded much less of a solid,
well-defined or rigorously supported academic discipline, no more significant than
an ephemeral topic that meandered between the margins of political science and
military studies. But contemporary trends would soon indicate that research on
terrorism increased dramatically after the attacks, by as much as 300% by some
accounts, with studies done after September 11 coming close to or exceeding
some 90% of the totality of academic work that had been done in the field. 4
But how much of this intensive and voluminous research has proven useful,
instructive or effective in the field? How much of this work has actually been
meaningful and worthwhile by way of collecting accurate data, providing insightful
models or informing practicable policies to address the threats posed by terrorism
or the challenges of violent extremism today? Some of the most exhaustive studies
on contemporary research trends in these areas have been cautiously optimistic.
The findings come with qualified concessions that significant progress has been
made, but that persistent issues continue to dog the discipline: among them, the
dearth of empirical studies, the lack of recourse to primary sources, the scarcity
of experienced and dedicated specialists in the field, the heavy bias towards
particular and specific forms of violent extremism such as “Islamist” terrorism,
and the relative rarity of situating the studies within historical frameworks. 5 Other
observations express concerns about the trajectory of some of the studies, due to
such issues as sources of funding and dominant institutional culture being bound
within state-centric frameworks, as well as narratives and ideologies that are from
the outset hostile towards their subjects – and thus have their results unhelpfully
coloured by cognitive biases. 6
This could be due to the paucity of critiques on research on terrorism and violent
extremism, which has brought with it the pitfalls of basing policies on research
that can be substantiated by hard evidence. In one of the leading collaborative
4
Jessica Shepherd, op. cit.
5 See Schmid, Alex P., “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion
and Literature Review.” International Centre for Counter-terrorism, The Hague, ICCT Research Paper;
Ranstorp, Magnus, ed. Mapping terrorism research: state of the art, gaps and future direction. Routledge,
2006; and Silke, Andrew, ed. Research on terrorism: Trends, achievements and failures, Routledge, 2004.
6 See the argument made for a more critical approach to terrorism studies by Jackson, Richard, “The core
commitments of critical terrorism studies,” European Political Science 6, no. 3 (2007): 244-251

ASRUL DANIEL 75
research works in the area, Schmid and Jongman famously commented that
“Much of the writing in the crucial areas of terrorism research… is impressionistic,
superficial, and at the same time often also pretentious, venturing far-reaching
generalisations on the basis of episodal (sic) evidence.” 7
Andrew Silke later commented that even after the surge of interest following the
events of September 11, much of the work is still of the literary review variety and
lamented that a significant portion of the research had not been based on hard
empirical evidence. 8 This is not to imply that non-empirical approaches do not
have a role in enhancing our understanding of the subject matter – indeed, theory
is still a powerful tool that can draw linkages and frame complexities in a manner
that enhances our understanding. However, the significant dearth of studies
based on solid first-hand data makes it difficult to determine which assumptions,
arguments and conclusions correspond to what can be observed on the ground.
Studies based on hard empirical evidence are necessary to provide safeguards
against the range of cognitive biases that may lead policy to counterproductive or
even dangerous ends. One can perhaps take the example of targeted killings by
drones as a core strategy in military operations against al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
The first recorded drone strike was reportedly carried out on 4 February 2002 by
the Central Intelligence Agency, with a Hellfire missile intended for Osama bin
Laden thought to be residing in the Paktia province of Afghanistan at the time. 9
Although not much of a success, the use of weaponised Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs) became increasingly popular, so much so that it became increasingly
referred to as one of the core components of the “Obama Doctrine.” More than
a decade later, the 2013 Pew Research Center survey revealed that support for
drone strikes among the general public in the US was still strong, with only 26%
having disapproved of their use. According to White House counterterrorism
official John Brennan, “…in order to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States
and to save American lives – the United States government conduct targeted
strikes against specific al-Qaeda terrorists, sometimes using remotely piloted
aircraft, often referred publicly as drones.” He also argued that the targeted
strikes “dramatically reduce danger to innocent civilians.” 10
While evidently successful in eliminating a significant number of high-value targets

within al-Qaeda and its affiliates, has the programme been successful in preventing
terrorist attacks on the United States? The answer will prove complicated, as a
range of studies paints conflicting pictures about the consequences of the use
7
Schmid, Alex, and Albert Jongman, Political terrorism: a research guide to concepts, theories, databases,
and literature, Transaction Books, 1988.
8 Silke, Andrew, ed. Research on terrorism: Trends, achievements and failures, Routledge, 2004.
9 John Sifton, “A brief history of drones,” The Nation, 27 February 2012.
10 Aamer Madhani, “Obama administration details rationale for covert drone war,” USA Today, 30 April
2012.

of drones for targeted killings. Johnston and Sarbahi found that the available
data indicated that although the reduction of incidences and lethality of terrorist
attacks have been associated with drone attacks, the effects do not appear to be
long-term. 11
Blank expressed concern that use of drones carries potential risks that the
interpretation of the Law of Armed Conflict could develop in ways that might
jeopardise its primary role of protecting civilians, by putting into question what
constitutes hostilities in a lawful manner. 12 Boyle points out that evidence of how
drones limit the means by which terrorist groups conduct their operations and
pressures their organisational structure to fracture from the inside is quite unclear.
And although there are indications that members of al-Qaeda in Pakistan had left
the organisation as a consequence of drone attacks, their resulting enlistment
in other groups imparts lethal skills to a broader range of extremist groups in
Syria, Mali, Somalia, Iraq or Yemen effectively multiplies the number of competent
terrorist organisations that must be dealt with. 13
Is the US made safer as a consequence? Empirical evidence is complicating what

may at first appear to be a cut-and-dried issue.
Another problem is that much of the literature on violent extremism has been
framed, for better or worse, in a “Western” perspective. 14 This is not to discount
or denigrate the value and utility of Western viewpoints for understanding the
problem, but it does highlight a particular weakness of the work done on violent
extremism thus far – the lack of alternative frameworks to provide a balanced
picture of extremism from a variety of cultural perspectives. As Ilardi puts it, “…the
vast majority of terrorism researchers hail from North America, Western Europe or
some other corner of the globe where terrorism is considered an abomination. 15
The lack of studies that deal with hard empirical facts and primary sources,
coupled with the fact that much of the research is framed in Western perspectives,
encourages the possibility of the research and the corresponding public opinion
influenced by it to be biased by way of cultural preconceptions and political
priorities. For example, despite the popular association of suicide bombings with
Islamic “fundamentalism”, the respected study on suicide terrorism by Robert
Pape finds the causal link between Islamist militancy and tactics involving suicide
11
Patrick Johnston and A. Sarbahi, “The impact of US drone strikes on terrorism in Pakistan and
Afghanistan,” New America Foundation, 2013.
12 Laurie R. Blank, “After Top Gun: how drone strikes impact the law of war.” U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 33, 2011, 675.
13 Michael J. Boyle, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs 89, no. 1, 2013,
1-29.
14 Magnus Ranstorp, ed. Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction,
Routledge, 2006.
15 Gaetano Ilardi, “Redefining the issues: the future of terrorism research and the search for empathy,” in
Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, London, Frank Cass, 2004.

ASRUL DANIEL 77
to be highly contested by the hard empirical evidence collected between 1980

and 2003. According to the study, out of 315 incidents 76 had been committed
by the Tamil Tigers, a Sri Lankan Marxist-Leninist group, exceeding the number
committed by the Islamist militant Hamas. 16
In lieu of a conclusion
Knowledge gaps and biases are not uncommon in any field of research, but
identifying and understanding them may help to provide clues on how to build
our stock of knowledge on any subject. This is particularly true for a subject as
contentious and challenging as terrorism and the sub-category of violent political
extremism. Based on what is currently known about research trends in this field of
study, the following are some recommendations:
1. Foster more empirically-based research that involves field investigations

and collection of data from primary sources. Much of the research already
done is based largely on literature review methods, relying heavily on
analysing materials from secondary sources. Also, much of the research done
so far is limited to deskwork by researchers without much experience in the
field, involving very little if any direct contact with subjects relating to terrorism
and violent extremism.
While it may be understandable that the opportunities for direct contact with
such subjects are few and far between, and that the potential risks involved may
deter more adventurous efforts, the result thus far is that a significant amount of
research remains largely speculative and mostly derivative. That could prove
unhelpful at best and counterproductive at worst in efforts to develop a better
policy understanding of the subject. Hard data from primary sources would help
in developing better frameworks and models that can serve to inform better
policies and more pragmatic solutions to address the real-world challenges.
2. Encourage a broader application of what constitutes “terrorism” and violent

extremism in the identities, agendas and locations of the perpetrators.
While it is not unreasonable that interest in the field has centred largely on the
threats, whether real or imagined, posed by militants from the Muslim world
owing to several recent events, it cannot help to narrow the scope of research
to exclude or downplay other perpetrators of terrorism and violent extremism.
Militant extremists in the real world are as varied as Aum Shinrikyo, Tamil Tigers
and the Shining Path.
As Silke has pointed out, the popularity of some topics such as the use of
chemical, biological or radiological weapons in acts of terrorism may result in a
disproportionate effort being allotted to issues with limited policy implications,
while other topics of equal or greater importance may not receive the attention
they deserve. Limiting the field in such ways may contribute to growing
knowledge gaps and a susceptibility to cognitive biases that can reduce the

utility of research for policy applications. Ensuring an adequate scope for

research would thus help to enhance and refine the stock of knowledge on the
subject.
3. Situate research within relevant contexts. Some of the research being done
runs the risk of being too abstract and theoretical. Such work typically studies
acts of terrorism and violent extremism as well as their agents as if they exist in
a vacuum, being behaviorally atomistic, with their actions given to explanation
once the appropriate positivistic model has been formulated. A cross-fertilisation
of relevant information and the experience of various practitioners, agencies,
academics, civil society groups, businesses, the media and other stakeholders
would help to provide a useful range of perspectives that can locate actors and
their actions within the rich historical, cultural and social landscapes they are
embedded in.
4. Provide platforms for intercultural and cross-civilisational exchanges of

ideas. The fact that scholars and academics are themselves embedded in their
historical, cultural and social environments that exert a measure of influence
over their own models and frameworks of understanding is sometimes
overlooked. Research on terrorism and violent extremism constitutes a field of
study where belief, culture and traditions purportedly play a significant role
in shaping and informing ideologies and behaviour. It is therefore important
that the epistemic resources of other cultures and traditions are tapped into
to provide alternative approaches, insights and other possibilities. It pays
to introduce greater diversity into research efforts as a means to safeguard
against one’s own cognitive biases.

ASRUL DANIEL 79

Asean Moderation As
Confidence-Building Measure
Bunn Nagara
ABSTRACT
After 47 chequered years, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has
retained its relevance and even grown impressively. Now with a full complement
of all 10 countries in south-east Asia, Asean has developed new institutions and
practices while refining its methods. Yet some challenges also remain, and there is
much that Asean must do to maintain standards of performance and achievement.
However, progress depends as much on appreciating Asean’s strengths as on
acknowledging its actual limitations. This should begin with an understanding
of its origins and development as well as knowledge of some of its undeserved
criticisms. In sum, Asean’s biggest regional contribution may be as a confidence-
building measure. However, this vital role is enabled only by its moderate nature,
ingrained in the organisation since its inception. This contribution is not necessarily
unique to Asean either, since any regional organisation sharing Asean’s attributes
and aspirations can also do as well.

BUNN NAGARA 81
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Bunn Nagara is a Senior Fellow at ISIS Malaysia and a media commentator on
strategic issues. He was Senior Analyst and Visiting Fellow at ISIS, Research
Fellow at ISEAS (Singapore) and Asean Fellow at the Japan Institute of
International Affairs (Tokyo). Mr Nagara has published in Race and Class, The
Indonesian Quarterly and Contemporary South-East Asia, besides the East Asian
press and appeared in regional current affairs broadcasting. He has contributed
to books on peace journalism, regional order in East Asia and the rise of China.
He graduated from Southampton University and completed a graduate course in
Uppsala University.

A
S Asean approaches its first half-century, it has proven to be as prevalent
and ubiquitous in regional affairs as it has been widely discussed and
misunderstood. 1 Policymakers and scholars vie with one another to dissect
and debate what the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is and represents.
Historical references have been cited, theoretical models proposed, established
perspectives challenged and counter-perspectives advanced. Not uncommonly,
abstract navel-gazing tends to generate an academic cottage industry of its own,
becoming that much more distant from Asean and its work.
The more Asean and its influence remain pervasive, the more important it is to
understand its nature and origins as well as its scope and terms of reference – and
thus also its strengths, promise, limits and weaknesses. One thing that Asean is
not, and was never meant to be, is an academic exercise in regional organisation.
Neither was it an attempt to mimic any other regional organisation like the
European Union, although Asean has never shied from absorbing useful lessons
from anywhere through selective adaptation. A pragmatic child of necessity of
its time and place, the Southeast Asia of the 1960s, Asean has essentially been
about a regional convergence of distinct national endeavours when that serves,
enhances or (at minimum) does not jeopardise the national interest of any of its
constituent member states.
To understand Asean is to appreciate its contribution to regional peace and security,

as well as to comprehend its value in the present and the future. Since Asean has
no intrinsic governing authority of its own, but rather whose future derives entirely
from the interest and resources that individual member governments invest in it,
Asean is also a regional indicator of inter-state cooperation, organisation and
security. Besides Asean’s several efforts at confidence building in southeast Asia,
one often neglected aspect of its work is its very being – that Asean itself is a
confidence-building measure (CBM), as it was meant to be from its beginning,
and the most significant CBM in the region. Its growth in transnational reach and
membership number testify to the ever-larger stakes involved.
To cut through the web of misperception and misinterpretation, it is best to begin

at the beginning. Asean was established jointly by Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand on 8 August 1967. It was an opportune time
to commence formal regional cooperation both historically for the region, and
nationally in the cross-border relations of the five co-founding member nations.
This confluence of opportunity meant the founding five, under their respective
national leaders at the time, had little reason to object to the establishment of
Asean.
1
See Bunn Nagara, “Misunderstanding the ‘Asean Way’,” Sunday Star, 1 December 2013.

BUNN NAGARA 83
Some background
On 8 September 1954 several countries led by the United States came together to
form a military alliance, the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty. A product
of the anti-communist Truman Doctrine, it was also known as the Manila Pact.
The US role as “defender” however was limited to confronting communist attacks.
Despite its name, most of the treaty signatories were not in southeast Asia and
most southeast Asian nations were not members.
This arrangement became the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (Seato) on

19 February 1955, assigned as a regional equivalent of Nato. Despite formal
sovereign equality among members, it remained Western-centric. The only
countries in the region that were members were the Philippines and Thailand,
both of them US allies. The others were Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand,
Pakistan and the United States.
The non-aligned impulse in the rest of south-east Asia seemed to have kept it away
from Seato. The clear ideological intent did not appear to have converted much of
the region to the Western anti-communist cause. Despite Seato’s multilateral and
bilateral (with the United States) defence provisions, non-aligned tendencies even
in Thailand and the Philippines had not been extinguished but – decades later –
tended to militate against alliance status. 2
Since Seato had been conceived as an ideological rather than a political, security
or administrative entity, it did little even to secure tangible regional security. It did
distinguish itself, however, in support of the US war in Vietnam, which split regional
sentiments. Soon Seato succumbed to its own internal regional contradictions and
withered away.
On 31 July 1961 the Association of Southeast Asia (Asa) was established between
then Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand. Before long it proved unviable. From
the start, it might be questioned whether any organisation limited to just three
countries in an increasingly complex region of sovereign nations in the second half
of the 20th century ever stood a chance. In comprising only the three countries,
Asa had also excluded Indonesia, the largest country in the region.
The next attempt at regional organisation in Southeast Asia was Maphilindo,

comprising Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia in July 1963. Known variously as
2
Personal communication with Bangkokians, and with a resident diplomat at the Malaysian Embassy
in Manila, February 1986. Also, in his welcoming address at the Fourth Asean Ministerial Meeting in
Manila in March 1971, then Philippine Foreign Minister Gen. Carlos Romulo lamented that countries in the
region had been “victims of world powers in their ideological power play,” prompting “an awakening to
their common identity and community of interests.” See Vinod K. Aggarwal and Jonathan T. Chow, “The
perils of consensus: How Asean’s meta-regime undermines economic and environmental cooperation,”
Berkeley Apec Study Center, University of California, Berkeley, July 2009.

Malaya Irredenta and the Greater Malayan Confederation, it purportedly sought

to advance Malay ethnicity regionally. Other interpretations saw it as effectively
diminishing the status of minority races such as the ethnic Chinese, and disrupting
moves to establish Malaysia (comprising the Federation of Malaya, Singapore,
Sabah and Sarawak). As it had been with Seato and Asa before, the narrowness
of Maphilindo’s agenda also hastened its demise.
By 1967 Southeast Asia had changed somewhat, some of that in disconcerting

ways for Malaysia. Singapore had left Malaysia in 1965 after helping to establish
it two years before, the Philippines continued to demand the Malaysian state
of Sabah for itself, and it was unclear if the Orde Baru (New Order) regime of
President Suharto in post-Sukarno Indonesia would endure or end the policy of
konfrontasi (confrontation) with Malaysia for good. Several leaders in the region
saw that time as a valuable window of opportunity to build constructive regional
relations through a new organisation that was workable and mutually reassuring
for member nations.
The new organisation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, thus had to
be a voluntary and inclusive coming together of equals that would also assure
members that their sovereignty would remain intact. This priority cannot be
underestimated, especially since all the member nations treasure their hard-won
sovereignty following independence (except for Thailand) from Western colonial
powers. The organisation would also be an association, as Thailand had preferred
with Asa, rather than a tighter union. Decision-making in Asean would therefore
proceed from consensus, with a cardinal principle being non-intervention in the
internal affairs of member states.
At this point it is important to lay some myths about Asean to rest. More than a
few analysts tend to presume that the organisation was established as a Western
affiliate during the Cold War to serve as an anti-communist front. That is not the
first nor the last Western-centric notion to be plausible but far from accurate.
Asean’s primary rationale was security rather than economic cooperation or
cultural exchange as initially declared, but the security sought was that between
mutually suspicious or feuding neighbours.
The lack of this intra-regional security had compromised individual national

efforts at economic development and nation building. For post-colonial nations
still finding their feet in both tasks, and for which domestic pressures could only
be offset by increasing the economic pie, the imperative of growth-with-stability
(“peace and prosperity”) was of singular national importance. The founding
members had enough of their own reasons to formalise their own fraternity. 3
3
Bunn Nagara, “Building the new East Asia,” in Regional Order in East Asia: Asean and Japan Perspectives,
NIDS Joint Research Series No. 1, National Institute for Defense Studies, 2007, Tokyo.

BUNN NAGARA 85
Although several states in Southeast Asia faced communist-inspired insurgencies,

but these were all home-grown rebellions. The insurgencies enjoyed little more
than moral support from China (and often no more than that), were uncoordinated
across the region, and were not part of some pan-regional, Cold War “great
game.” The occasional argument that China’s strategic role was still somehow
part of the Cold War scenario is more notional and presumptive than sensible or
substantiated. 4 The “China card” that Nixon and Kissinger played in fact had the
effect of mitigating Cold War implications in the region, and of enhancing China’s
independent position in the global bipolarity of the Cold War.
Asean’s formation had also predated some of its supposed motivations, like
Britain’s 1968 announcement of its decision to withdraw its forces “east of Suez”
by 1971 and the 1969 US Guam Doctrine. 5 At the same time, Asean’s capacity
to accommodate or even encourage a sense of non-alignment should not be
neglected. Not only has Indonesia sustained its non-aligned impulse through the
Sukarno and Suharto years, but Asean has also been seen as an outlet for a US-
allied Philippines. 6
Asean’s establishment also signalled a return to a pre-colonial south-east Asia

when the region was not riven by the strategic rivalry of external powers. It was
then a region when national leaders freely met one another to confer on issues
of trade and governance. 7 The notion of a Western-backed Asean had prompted
China to regard it in that light for several years, but that does not substantiate any
sense of Asean being anything other than unaligned.
Although Vietnam’s 1979 invasion of Cambodia is often said to have galvanised

Asean countries into a more anti-communist mode focused externally, this
concerned the security agencies more than policy analysts or government
strategists. There was still little advocacy for a regional security alliance, with the
focus of concern being more on helping Thailand cope with any spillover effects
across its border with Cambodia. 8 With Vietnam to Cambodia’s east and Thailand
to Cambodia’s west, such anxieties typically relate to mass refugee influxes
4
Joseph Chinyong Liow, “Malaysia’s post-Cold War China policy: A reassessment,” in The Rise of China:
Responses from Southeast Asia and Japan, NIDS Joint Research Series No. 4, National Institute for
Defense Studies, 2009, Tokyo.
5 Asean was formally established in August 1967, indicating that plans had been made, discussions held
and agreement found among the five original member states some time before. Britain’s announcement
of its forces withdrawal east of Suez came only in January 1968, following the Wilson government’s
decision to devalue the pound in 1967, although the announcement of the withdrawal is sometimes linked
to that of devaluation to the extent of being dated also as 1967. Lee Jones, “Asean and the norm of non-
interference in Southeast Asia: A quest for social order,” Nuffield College Politics Group Working Paper,
March 2009, Oxford. The Guam (or Nixon) Doctrine was announced by President Richard Nixon in Guam
on 25 July 1969. Vinod K. Aggarwal and Jonathan T. Chow, op. cit.
6 Vinod K. Aggarwal and Jonathan T. Chow, op. cit.
7 Personal communication with former Malaysian Foreign Minister Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, 1992.
8 Amitav Acharya, “A survey of military cooperation among the Asean states: Bilateralism or alliance?,”
Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 14, May 1990.

(into Thailand) rather than (Vietnam’s) extended military incursions. Asean’s

comfortable accommodation of non-democratic Brunei and communist Vietnam
subsequently only confirmed its non-ideological underpinnings.
Asean’s core principles

Further analysis of Asean tends to dwell on its core principles of consensus
and non-intervention. In times of crisis, critics typically bemoan the limitations
ostensibly imposed by these operative principles. A debate then ensues over the
problems or virtues of continuing with them.
Much of such debate ignores the reality that the principles serve as part-guide,
part-rhetoric, although still useful as operating norms, while Asean practices
selective observance without seeing that as violating any norms. The selective
observance of principles in practice, without open or formal acknowledgement
of it as such, then becomes an operative norm. Given the flexibility that Asean-in-
practice adopts in relation to consensual decision-making and non-intervention in
the internal affairs of member states, much of the haranguing tends to go off at a
futile tangent. 9
A corollary of such discussions then presumes that consensus and non-intervention

are peculiar Asean characteristics unique to the organisation, when they are
in fact cornerstones of the international system common to other international
organisations including the United Nations. 10 Any regional organisation that
has had Asean’s experience of colonialism, decolonisation and the imperative
of regional regime building is also likely to exhibit similar tendencies. Asean
itself would not have existed at all, let alone grow to accommodate 10 sovereign
nations, if it had not prescribed non-intervention and sovereign equality for all its
members. The latter in practice becomes decision-making by consensus.
The problem emerges when Asean decisions and actions, if any, are perceived
as slow, laborious and ineffectual. Where crises occur in the region, Asean tends
to appear aloof, out of touch or irrelevant. However, such criticism neglects the
distinction between “non-interference” and “non-involvement.” 11 Asean is seldom
if ever uninvolved in pressing regional issues, but whether the involvement
amounts to intervention or interference – and is openly acknowledged by Asean
as such – are quite another matter.
9
David Ginn, “The abused notion of non-interference,” Asean Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus,
undated. Although many of the issues Ginn raises are valid and important, the chief issue of Asean having
to modify its stand on absolute non-intervention is misplaced because observance of Asean principles
has never been absolute. Jones op. cit.
10 Non-intervention as a policy principle originated in Europe, specifically with the Treaty of Westphalia
that coined the concept of the nation state. John Funston, “Asean and the principle of non-intervention
– practice and prospects,” Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, No. 5, March 2000; based on a paper by
John Funston at the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, 7th Comprehensive Security
Working Group Meeting, 1-2 December 1999, Seoul
11 Funston, op. cit.

BUNN NAGARA 87
Political leaders in Asean can be adept at using English words to finesse issues,
thereby effecting desired diplomatic outcomes or avoiding undesirable ones. In a
region that is often rich in nuances, that means considerable political, diplomatic
and linguistic skills. Sometimes the result appears indeterminate, which may
suggest failure in influencing an outcome, or rather success in not having to
pursue the matter further. One example, which stretched for over a decade, may
serve to illustrate the point.
In the 1980s, US President Ronald Reagan was criticised internationally for doing
business with apartheid South Africa. He tried to excuse the US position away by
calling it “constructive engagement.” Reagan did not expect his critics to regard US
policy differently on account of that, but there was little he could say in defence of
promoting relations with a pariah state. The international community made a note
of that without excusing the Reagan administration’s conduct.
Later, when the US and EU criticised Asean countries for doing business with
Myanmar’s military junta, Asean’s response was to call the dealings “constructive
engagement.” Asean did not expect its relations with the junta to be excused
by its critics either, rather it was meant to show that working with pariah states
neither began with Asean nor was it unique to the organisation. Nonetheless,
international opprobrium over the junta’s dismal human rights record lingered.
Then Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim advanced
the concept of “constructive intervention” against errant states like Myanmar. 12
“Intervention” is typically seen as action directed against a regime, but in this case
labelled as “constructive” to soften the blow.
Beyond a measure of support in Thailand, “constructive intervention” met with

rejection from the other Asean countries. Indonesia and Singapore openly
repudiated it. 13 Then Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad
Badawi countered with the concept of “constructive interaction,” subtly shifting
the focus back to engaging (positively) with Myanmar rather than intervening
(negatively) against it. But that did not end the issue there.
On the eve of the Asean Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in July 1998, the concept
morphed into “flexible engagement.” Discussion on it followed at the meeting,
with inconclusive results. The concept changed again to “enhanced interaction,”
which could be taken to mean almost anything or nothing. Asean was already
interacting with Myanmar – whether it was called intervention or engagement,
and how far the “new” interaction was supposed to go were never specified.
12
Anwar Ibrahim, “Crisis prevention,” in Newsweek, 21 July 1997.
13 Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism, Cornell University
Press, 2009, 126, 127

The discussion and the debate “concluded” thus without a discernible conclusion.
However, that should not be assumed to mean that the issue went nowhere.
Nothing new or definitive had been adopted, and nothing was identifiably revised,
so that meant remaining with the status quo. In effect it was another Asean way
of saying let things be. The whole exercise was – apart from anything else –
an interesting diplomatic tour of the linguistic landscape, showcasing how words
were selected to impart certain preferences. 14
As experienced Asean hands have discerned, rejection of new concepts may

have originated from apprehension that long-held principles would be displaced
or modified, rather than the merits (or flaws) of the new concepts
themselves. 15 That the changes tend to come when Asean is under pressure
makes them even less appealing to Asean’s practitioners, particularly the more
conservative ones. Furthermore, eager reformists bristling with the rush of a new
idea tend not to consider the full implications of the proposed changes to Asean’s
core principles and practices. But since any change requires thoroughgoing
discussion and debate, the arguments that began with “constructive engagement”
but eventually seemed to grind to a halt may not have been in vain.
Asean’s burden, and promise

From the foregoing, it is evident that Asean has had to bear the burden of unfair
criticism. At its coarsest, criticism covers Asean’s supposed inability to avoid or
deal with such problems as the 1997-98 financial crisis and the 2003 Sars (severe
acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak. 16 It does not seem to matter to these critics
that Asean was never intended or designed to handle such problems. Equally
(or more so), Nato as a military alliance may be accused of failing to prevent the
Kosovo crisis and the EU the currency crisis in Europe.
At another level, criticism is also levelled at Asean for possessing only limited,
largely bilateral capacity for handling challenges posed by terrorism and piracy.
17
Although there is always room for more work and better coordination, Asean’s
traditional security challenges – including insurgency, terrorism and piracy –
has largely been domestic or at most bilateral (with a neighbouring country). As
these challenges grow, so has Asean’s response, as evidenced in the “Eyes in the
14
Unnecessary confusion is sometimes caused when the different terms or concepts are used
interchangeably to mean the same thing, even when former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and
others had stressed their distinct differentness. See Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Asean enlargement: political,
security and institutional perspectives,” in Asean Enlargement: Impacts and Implications, ed. Mya Than
and Carolyn L. Gates, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001, 39.
15 Funston op. cit.
16 Muhammad Fuad Othman and Zaheruddin Othman, “The principle of non-interference in Asean: Can
Malaysia spearhead the effort towards a more interventionist Asean?,” in Political Managements and
Policies in Malaysia Conference, 13-15 July 2010, Langkawi, Kedah, Malaysia.
17 Ralf Emmers, “Comprehensive security and resilience in south-east Asia: Asean’s approach to
terrorism and sea piracy,” RSIS Working Papers, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang
Technological University, 2007, Singapore

BUNN NAGARA 89
Sky” (EiS) joint operations in the Straits of Malacca involving Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand. Working as less than the full membership of 10 countries
need not be a liability either: Asean’s “10 - x” formula has proven useful, not the
least of which being to expedite processes and operations.
At the same time, Asean has also been criticised for unduly insisting on “its”
non-intervention principle even when that is said to be a handicap. Strangely,
some observers see observance of the principle as “Asian”, but still with Asean
in the middle of it. They are able to see it practised by countries other than those
in Asean, but not as a universal practice of a universal principle. More than a
dozen non-Asean Asian countries in South Asia and north-east Asia are said to be
burdened by this principle. 18
Yet through all these travails, Asean continues to work, to benefit its members
and to contribute to regional peace in its region. For a region that had in years
past seen serious threats and violent conflict between neighbouring countries,
this is no mean feat. It is often said that Asean membership has seen no fighting
between members. There have been occasional tensions and spats, but no open,
physical conflict. Why has this been so?
One reason is that since its founding, Asean has been an inclusive organisation
that does not compel its members to adopt a particular economic or political
system. This gives space to members to develop in their own way, often through
mutual assistance. Another reason is that Asean is a pragmatic organisation not
determined by ideology or obsessed with a particular worldview. That encourages
favourable working comfort levels among members, which also promote frankness
and sincerity in their relations.
Third, Asean is not and has never been a tool of the Cold War or any major
power. Its implicitly unaligned nature lends comfort to developing countries still
trying to establish their sovereign status. Fourth, Asean countries individually and
collectively have no predatory designs on any region, including their own. Asean
members’ security concerns are largely domestic, and they have more to gain by
working together than by contesting one another.
Fifth, Asean’s mode of interaction comprises hundreds of meetings a year amounting

to solid, regular engagement in a web of mutual exchanges. This leads to comforting
familiarity and confidence building. Sixth, that much in these exchanges tends to be
informal offers flexibility and forbearance. It avoids undue pressures while allowing
different member states with different capacities to proceed at their own pace.
18
Hitoshi Nasu, “Revisiting the principle of non-intervention: a structural principle of international law or
a political obstacle to regional security in Asia?,” Australian National University, paper presented at the
3rd NUS-AsianSIL (Asian Society of International Law) Young Scholars Workshop, NUS Law School, 23-24
February 2012.

Seventh, Asean has also developed institutions and practices that offer alternative
channels for members to express their differences without resorting to conflict.
Among members there are regular meetings of foreign ministers and defence
ministers, as well as other forms of networking at the level of officials. Eighth,
Asean has also developed relations with non-members through institutions like
Dialogue Partnership and specific bodies like the Asean Regional Forum. The latter
helps to keep Asean connected in broader regional (Asia-Pacific) engagements, a
development that now takes the form of Asean “centrality”.
Ninth, all members – old or new, large or small, rich or poor – have equal rights and
entitlements. That means no sense of inequality or unfairness, as well as decision-
making by consensus where each member enjoys palpable rights by simply being
equal with any other member. Tenth, Asean’s workaday purposiveness means it
is driven by the business of the policy at hand, focused on due implementation,
rather than by any partisan consideration or sectarian preference.
All of the above amount to an operative culture of moderation. Although

Asean may not articulate moderation as its purpose or mission, moderation is
nonetheless its modus operandi. That would help to explain Asean’s success as a
regional organisation in a very heterogeneous region, and its continuing promise
for the future. But this, too, need not be uniquely Asean; any regional organisation
that practices Asean’s work culture and aspires to its goals should prove just as
successful.

BUNN NAGARA 91


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MODERATION MONITOR 1

Global Movement of Moderates

Tan Sri Razali Ismail, Chairman

Global Movement of Moderates Foundation (GMMF)

Tel: +603 2095 1115

Global Movement of Moderates

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