G.R. No.

170409 January 28, 2008

GREGORIA MARTINEZ,1, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF MELANIO MEDINA, SR., MELANIO MEDINA, JR.,
NORBERTO MEDINA, ERMITANO MEDINA, ALBERTO MEDINA, SENEN MEDINA, ANTONIO
MEDINA, MANOLO MEDINA, and ARTURO MEDINA, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The present petition originally stemmed from a Complaint2 filed by private respondents against
petitioner,3 seeking the cancellation of titles over the parcels of land involved.4 Subject of the complaint
are three (3) parcels of land with areas of approximately 10,064; 48,000; and 5,784 sq m, all situated
in Bangkal, Carmona, Cavite and covered respectively by Original Certificates of Title (OCT Nos.) No.
P-5518, No. P-5519, and No. P-5482.5

Respondents are the heirs of the late Melanio Medina, Sr. who during his lifetime inherited the
properties from his mother, Rosa Martinez Emitaño, who in turn inherited them from her own mother,
Celedonia Martinez (Celedonia). The complaint alleged that sometime in 1992, petitioner, whose real
name as appearing in her birth certificate is Gregoria Merquines, represented herself as Gregoria
Martinez and as thus one of the descendants of Celedonia, and under that name applied for free
patents over the properties with the Community Environmental and Natural Resources Office of
Bacoor, Cavite. Unbeknownst to private respondents, the corresponding OCTs were thus issued in
the name of Gregoria Martinez. When private respondents later filed an application for land registration
over the same properties, petitioner opposed the same. This impelled private respondents to file the
instant complaint.6

The complaint was heard by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20.7 The only
issue raised at the trial was whether the free patents and land titles should be annulled due to fraud
and misrepresentation in their procurement.8

After weighing the evidence of both sides, the trial court rendered a Decision9 ordering the cancellation
of petitioner’s titles. It found that the true surname of petitioner Gregoria is Merquines and not Martinez,
a surname which petitioner used for the first time when she applied for the free patents. The RTC
observed that no other document was presented to show that petitioner used the surname Martinez
in any of her previous transactions; that the surname indicated in her birth certificate is Merquines;
that she was born on 17 November 1924 to spouses Pablo Merquines and Bartola Cardona; and that
the records of marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite recorded the marriage of
Gregoria Merquines, daughter of Pablo Merquines and Bartola Cardona, to Jose Restrivera on 13 July
1941.

The trial court further endeavored to trace the lineage of petitioner. The baptismal certificate of her
father, Pablo Merquines, showed that he was born on 26 June 1897 to the spouses Faustino
Merquines and Juana Sarmiento, while the baptismal certificate of her mother, Bartola Cardona,
showed that she was born on 28 August 1898 to spouses Gaspar Cardona and Antonia Realon. Even
the birth certificates of petitioner’s siblings, Crispina, born on 20 January 1920 and Dominador, born
on 4 October 1931, showed that they bore the surname Merquines. Moreover, the birth certificates of
the children of petitioner and her husband Jose Restrivera namely, Norberto and Jaime Restrivera,
showed that the surname of their mother is Merquines and not Martinez.10

The trial court observed that notwithstanding the misrepresentations of petitioner in her free patent
applications, private respondents were not necessarily entitled to the automatic reconveyance of the
subject lots.11 It simply disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the cancellation

of OCT Nos. P-5518, P-5519 and P-5482 issued in the name of defendant.

SO ORDERED.12

Only petitioner interposed an appeal from the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals.
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner challenged the findings of fact of the trial court concerning the
fraud and misrepresentations which she committed. The appellate court made short shrift of the
challenge as follows:13

From the evidence extant on record, it is at once apparent that appellant committed fraud and
misrepresentation in her application for free patent which later became the basis for the
issuance of the certificates of title in her name. More than the issue of the use of the surname
"Martinez," her fraudulent act consists essentially in misrepresenting before the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of Bacoor, Cavite that she is the heir of Celedonia
Martinez whom she admitted in her Answer as the original absolute owner of the subject
parcels of land. She testified in open court that Celedonia Martinez is her grandmother, being
the mother of her father Pablo Merquines.

The documentary evidence adduced by appellles, however, particularly her father’s baptismal
certificate plainly shows that he is the son of spouses Faustino Merquines and Juana
Sarmiento. Her mother Bartola Cadona was also shown in her baptismal certificate to be the
child of spouses Gaspar Cardona and Antonia Realon. These documents indubitably show
that neither of appellant’s parents is the child of Celodonia Martinez and she is not in [anyway]
related by blood to the latter. Thus, not only was her application for patents tainted with fraud,
she also committed perjury in this case when she lied bold-faced about her lineage which was
disproved by the documentary evidence relative to her ancestors.14

Petitioner also assigned two other errors which, however, were neither raised in her answer as
defenses nor otherwise litigated during the trial. She argued in the main that the trial court erred in
adjudicating the case although an indispensable party in the person of the State through the director
of lands was not impleaded,15 and that the titles secured were already indefeasible in view of the lapse
of one year from the issuance of the titles.16

Sustaining the jurisdiction of the lower court, the Court of Appeals remarked that the jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In their complaint, private respondents asserted
private ownership over the subject lands as they had been in possession of and had been cultivating
the same for more than 60 years.17

The appellate court also noted that the issues were not raised in the petitioner’s answer and in the
subsequent proceedings.18

Concerning the alleged indefeasibility of the titles issued to petitioner, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the argument is untenable since petitioner employed fraud in the proceedings which led to the
issuance of the free patents and the titles.19

Before this Court, petitioner reiterates the same two issues previously raised for the first time before
the appellate court.

We sustain the Court of Appeals.

It is a well-settled principle that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought
to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court
as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal20 because this would be offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice and due process.21 On this point alone, the petition could be denied outright.
Nonetheless, like the Court of Appeals, we deign to decide the case on the merits.

Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only by homestead patent, sale,
lease, judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and administrative legalization or free
patent.22 One claiming private rights as basis of ownership must prove compliance with the Public
Land Act which prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of
public lands.23 Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by a separate chapter of the Public
Land Act. There are specific requirements and application procedures for every mode.24

The confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain may be done in two ways: judicial legalization or judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles under Chapter VIII, and administrative legalization or free patent under Chapter VII
of the Public Land Act.
Any citizen of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands
or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply with the RTC
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of his/her claim and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor under the Property Registration Decree.25 Such applicants must by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain,26 under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since 12 June 1945,27 except when
prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant.28 At present, such applications for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles must be filed prior to 31 December 2020; and must cover an area of up
to 12 hectares only.29

When the conditions specified in Section 48(b)30 of the Public Land Act are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, without the necessity of
a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceased to be of the public domain, and beyond
the authority of the director of lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality,
the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent
and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.31 For all legal intents and purposes,
the land is segregated from the public domain, because the beneficiary is "conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter."

Section 44, Chapter VII of the Public Land Act provides that the applicant for administrative
confirmation of imperfect title must be a natural born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of
more than 12 hectares and who, for at least 30 years prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6940
amending the Public Land Act,32 has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through
his predecessor-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public land subject to disposition, who shall
have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be
entitled to a free patent over such land/s not to exceed 12 hectares.

Turning again to the first issue raised by petitioner, it is apparent that her insistence that the State
through the director of lands is an indispensable party flows from her failure to recognize that private
respondents’ action is one for declaration of nullity of title which is different from an action for reversion
of title to the State. In the latter case the director of lands needs to be impleaded, unlike in the first.
Thus, we reiterated in Evangelista v. Santiago:33

An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is not the
same as an action for reversion. The difference between them lies in the allegations as to the
character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for
reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the
disputed land. Hence, in Gabila v. Barriga [41 SCRA 131], where the plaintiff in his complaint
admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment of the defendant’s title
because even if the title were canceled or amended the ownership of the land embraced
therein or of the portion affected by the amendment would revert to the public domain, we
ruled that the action was for reversion and that the only person or entity entitled to relief would
be the Director of Lands.

On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of
title would require allegations of the plaintiff’s ownership of the contested lot prior to the
issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendant’s fraud or mistake,
as the case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land
claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but
from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and
whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefore is consequently void ab initio. The real
party-in-interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership
over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the defendant.34

In an earlier case,35 in reversing the dismissal of the complaint by the trial court, this Court stressed
that the allegations of the complaint present an action for nullification of free patent and title, not an
action for reversion of title which has to be instituted by the Solicitor General.

It is true that the trial court opined that the next step following the cancellation of petitioner’s titles is
an action for the reversion of the disputed lands back to the public domain.36 Said observation, found
in the body only and not in the dispositive portion of the decision, does not detract from, but in fact
even bolsters, the real nature of the complaint as an action for nullification of title.

Now, the second issue. Petitioner claims that her titles are already indefeasible and incontrovertible
following the lapse of one year following their issuance.

In Apuyan v. Haldeman,37 also cited by petitioner, it was held that a certificate of title issued on the
basis of a free patent procured through fraud or in violation of the law may be cancelled, as such title
is not cloaked with indefeasibility.

It was likewise held in Meneses v. Court of Appeals38 that the principle of indefeasibility of title is
unavailing where fraud attended the issuance of the free patents and titles.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No.
70458 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail
the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals
(CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their
right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

Antecedents

The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig,
Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square
meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than
30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), which reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as
surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of
249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-
A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for
land registration, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name
of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog,
Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.3

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan
had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner
and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA
declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior
to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification
stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982,
Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing
Malabanan’s period of possession.

Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s
decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit)
remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard,
Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable
could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land
Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling
in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as
alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum
considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio
for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument
that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public
domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been
"converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the application without regard to
whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public
domain.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish
by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his
predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as
alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State.
Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it
to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the
real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently,
the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for
registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years
reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.

The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the
application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.

Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the
interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It
reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications
of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b)
belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or
although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the
patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from
the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public
domain belong to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown
to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the
public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the
reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the
classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added
national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively
by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may
be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the
State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without
limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but
with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or
timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are
reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested
in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from
the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized
by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or
reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land
to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is
applicable.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not
otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;
 (3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the
land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e.,
mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside
the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the
descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the
agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following
requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree,28 to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession

and occupation of the property subject of the application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands
of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have
been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the
Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable
as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement
that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or
reclassification of a public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession
of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the
fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or
by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession
and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left
to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and
occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12,
1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written
by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed
no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only
from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the
property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain
determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.

Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations
may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private
ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed
by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan
need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire
duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute
the presumption that the land is inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which
prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical,
open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but
a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that
such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to
unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation
thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear
in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when
Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements
and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly
residential lands, subject to area limitations.34

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such
land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and
registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the
State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the
public domain, namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are
also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
 (a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable
through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land
Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be
classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the
owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land
has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private property.37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer

intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the
sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands
of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription,
whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to
private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition
sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the
State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying
the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to
be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless
Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national wealth. 1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's
Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail
the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals
(CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their
right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

Antecedents

The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig,
Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square
meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than
30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), which reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as
surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of
249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-
A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for
land registration, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name
of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog,
Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.3

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan
had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner
and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA
declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior
to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification
stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982,
Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing
Malabanan’s period of possession.

Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s
decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit)
remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard,
Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable
could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land
Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling
in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as
alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum
considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio
for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument
that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public
domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been
"converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the application without regard to
whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public
domain.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish
by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his
predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as
alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State.
Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it
to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the
real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently,
the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for
registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years
reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.

The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the
application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.

Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the
interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It
reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications
of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b)
belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or
although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the
patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from
the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public
domain belong to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown
to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the
public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the
reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the
classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added
national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively
by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may
be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the
State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without
limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but
with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or
timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are
reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested
in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from
the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized
by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or
reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land
to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is
applicable.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not
otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;
 (3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the
land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e.,
mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside
the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the
descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the
agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following
requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree,28 to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession

and occupation of the property subject of the application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands
of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have
been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the
Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable
as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement
that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or
reclassification of a public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession
of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the
fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or
by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession
and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left
to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and
occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12,
1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written
by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed
no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only
from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the
property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain
determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.

Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations
may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private
ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed
by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan
need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire
duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute
the presumption that the land is inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which
prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical,
open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but
a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that
such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to
unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation
thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear
in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when
Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements
and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly
residential lands, subject to area limitations.34

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such
land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and
registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the
State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the
public domain, namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are
also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
 (a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable
through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land
Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be
classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the
owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land
has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private property.37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer

intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the
sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands
of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription,
whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to
private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition
sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the
State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying
the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to
be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless
Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national wealth. 1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's
Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137887 February 28, 2000

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
DAMIAN ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, DEOGRACIAS ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA
ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, ALICIA ERMITAÑO DE GUZMAN, SALVADOR ERMITAÑO DE
GUZMAN, DOMINGA ERMITAÑO, NATIVIDAD ENCARNACION, MELBA E. TORRES, FLORA
MANALO, SOCORRO DELA ROSA, JOSE ERMITAÑO, ESMERANDO ERMITAÑO, TRICOM
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and FILOMENO ERMITAÑO, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay, Branch 18, in LRC Cases No. TG-362 and TG-396.2

The facts are simple:

Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by Norma Almanzor and private
respondent Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land located in Silang, Cavite. After trial on the
merits, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent De Guzman, to wit —

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court as follows:

(1) In LRC Case No. TG-362, this Court hereby denies the application for registration of the
parcels of land mentioned therein by applicant Norma R. Almanzor for lack of factual and legal
bases;

(2) In LRC Case No. 396, this Court hereby approves the petition for registration and thus
places under the operation of Act 141, Act 946 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Psu-67537-Amd-2 and containing an
area of 308,638 square meters, as supported by its technical descriptions now forming parts
of the records of these cases, in addition to other proofs adduced in the names of petitioners
Damian Ermitaño De Guzman, Deogracias Ermitaño De Guzman, Zenaida Ermitaño De
Guzman, Alicia Ermitaño De Guzman and Salvador De Guzman, all married, of legal age and
with residence and postal addresses at Magallanes Street, Carmona, Cavite, subject to the
claims of oppositors Dominga Ermitaño, Natividad Encarnacion, Melba E. Torres, Flora
Manalo, Socorro de la Rosa, Jose Ermitaño and Esmeranso Ermitaño under an instrument
entitled "Waiver of Rights with Conformity" the terms and conditions of which are hereby
ordered by this Court to be annotated at the back of the certificates of title to be issued to the
petitioners pursuant to the judgment of this Court.

SO ORDERED.3

As earlier mentioned, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, said judgment was affirmed and the petition
for registration of private respondents over the subject parcels of land was approved.

Hence, the instant Petition, anchored upon the following assignments of error —

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT
SUBMITTED PROOF OF THEIR FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR POSSESSION IN THE MANNER
AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF
AN IMPERFECT TITLE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT
OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LANDS ARE PORTIONS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.4

We find merit in the instant Petition.

It is not disputed that the subject parcels of land were released as agricultural land only in 19655 while
the petition for confirmation of imperfect title was filed by private respondents only in 1991.6 Thus the
period of occupancy of the subject parcels of land from 1965 until the time the application was filed in
1991 was only twenty six (26) years, four (4) years short of the required thirty (30) year period
possession requirement under Sec. 14, P.D. 29 and R.A. No. 6940.

In finding that private respondents' possession of the subject property complied with law, the Court of
Appeals reasoned out that —

(W)hile it is true that the land became alienable and disposable only in December, 1965,
however, records indicate that as early as 1928, Pedro Ermitaño, appellees' predecessor-in-
interest, was already in possession of the property, cultivating it and planting various crops
thereon. It follows that appellees' possession as of the time of the filing of the petition in 1991
when tacked to Pedro Ermitaño's possession is 63 years or more than the required 30 years
period of possession. The land, which is agricultural, has been converted to private property.7

We disagree.

The Court of Appeals' consideration of the period of possession prior to the time the subject land was
released as agricultural is in direct contravention of the pronouncement in Almeda vs. Court of
Appeals,8 to wit —

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified for a grant
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act because their possession of the land while it was
still inalienable forest land, or before it was declared alienable and disposable land of the public
domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen into private ownership, and should be excluded
from the computation of the 30-year open and continuous possession in concept of
owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. It accords with our ruling in Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, Ibarra Bishar, et al., 178 SCRA 708, that:

Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of
Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689;
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).

Thus possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership
(Vamo vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 17 Phil.
410 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under
the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera,
120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).
(emphasis ours)

So, too, is the Court of Appeals' reliance on the case of Director of Land Management vs. Court of
Appeals9 misplaced. There, while the period of possession of the applicant's predecessor-in-interest
was tacked to his own possession to comply with the required thirty year period possession
requirement, the land involved therein was not forest land but alienable public land. On the other hand,
in the case before us, the property subject of private respondents' application was only declared
alienable in 1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest land incapable of private appropriation. It
was not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert it into private
property, (unless) and until such lands were reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. 10

In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or possession
thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty year possession requirement. This is in
accord with the ruling in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, (supra), and because the rules on the
confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain. 11

While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that private respondents and their predecessors-
in-interest have been in possession of the subject land for sixty three (63) years at the time of the
application of their petition, our hands are tied by the applicable laws and jurisprudence in giving
practical relief to them. The fact remains that from the time the subject land was declared alienable
until the time of their application, private respondents' occupation thereof was only twenty six (26)
years. We cannot consider their thirty seven (37) years of possession prior to the release of the land
as alienable because absent the fact of declassification prior to the possession and cultivation in good
faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained classified as forest or timberland, which he
could not have acquired by prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases which reiterate
that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert them into private property. Possession of the land by private
respondents, whether spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen into ownership. This Court is
constrained to abide by the latin maxim "(d)ura lex, sed lex". 12

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and the February 26, 1998 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48785 as well as that of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 38, in
LRC Case No. TG-396 are both REVERSED. Judgment is rendered dismissing LRC Case No. 396
for failure of the applicants therein to comply with the thirty year occupancy and possessory
requirements of law for confirmation of imperfect title. No pronouncement as to costs. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G. R. NO. 158449 October 22, 2004

LUNINGNING P. DEL ROSARIO-IGTIBEN, JOSE REYES IGTIBEN, JOSE DEL ROSARIO

IGTIBEN, JR. and THERESA TOPACIO MEDINA, petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68546,1 which set aside the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Silang-Amadeo Cavite in LRC Case No. 98-133 (LRA Record No. N-69787)2 and dismissed
petitioners’ application for registration of a parcel of land.

On 08 January 1998, petitioners filed with the trial court an application for registration of land under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The
application covered a parcel of land with an area of 2,988 square meters, situated in Barangay
Malabag, Silang, Cavite, and more particularly described as Lot 5442, Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre,
Ap-04-007007 (hereinafter referred to as the Subject Property). Petitioners alleged that they acquired
the Subject Property by purchase, and that they, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse possession of the
Subject Property in the concept of owner for more that 30 years.3

No opposition was filed against the application and so petitioners proceeded with the presentation of
their evidence. The State was represented in the proceedings by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose
M. Velasco, Jr.4

Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, the trial court traced the history of
possession of the Subject Property back to 1958, when the Subject Property was first declared for tax
purposes by Justina Hintog.5

Teodoro Calanog came into possession of the Subject Property in 1968. In the same year, the Subject
Property was transferred to spouses Alfredo Tonido and Agatona Calanog. Agatona Calanog allegedly
inherited the Subject Property from Teodoro Calanog, her father; on the other hand, Alfredo Tonido
supposedly purchased the same property also from Teodoro Calanog, his father-in-law. Alfredo Tonido
planted the Subject Property with palay, sayote, coffee, guyabano and other fruit bearing trees. After
the demise of Agatona Calanog, the rest of the Tonido family, consisting of Alfredo and his children,
Samuel, Elizabeth, Benjamin, Imelda and Esther, shared possession of the Subject Property.6

On 21 November 1995, the Tonido family sold the Subject Property to petitioners, as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale.7

The history of possession of the Subject Property, as related above, was supported by tax declarations
in the name of petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest from 1958 to 1998.8

On 15 August 2000, the trial court rendered a decision approving petitioners’ application for registration
of the Subject Property. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.

In its appeal, the Republic alleged that the trial court erred in approving the application for registration
despite petitioners’ failure to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the Subject Property since 12 June 1945, or earlier, as required by Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073.
Moreover, petitioners also failed to produce muniments of title to tack their possession to those of their
predecessors-in-interest in compliance with the prescriptive period required by law.9

On 20 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision finding the appeal meritorious,
setting aside the decision of the trial court, and dismissing the application for registration of
petitioners.10 The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration in its resolution
dated 22 May 2003.11
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that
the decision of the Court of Appeals be set aside and that the decision of the trial court, approving
petitioners’ application for registration of the Subject Property, be reinstated.12

In the original application filed by petitioners before the trial court, they claim that they are entitled to
confirmation and registration of their title to the Subject Property in accordance with Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree, although they had not identified under which specific paragraph of the
said Section.13

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree reads –

SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by
right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by
law.

By the allegation of petitioners in their application of actual, continuous, uninterrupted, open,

public, and adverse possession of the Subject Property in the concept of owner, by themselves
and through their predecessors-in-interest, for a given period of time, it can be logically
presumed that their claim to the right to register the Subject Property was based on Section
14, paragraph (1) of the Property Registration Decree.

However, subsequent pleadings filed by both petitioners and respondent Republic before the
Court of Appeals and this Court, discuss mainly the Public Land Act, thus, establishing that
the application for registration filed by petitioners before the trial court is essentially an
application for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject
Property, governed by Sections 47 to 57 of the Public Land Act.

Proceedings under the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act are the same in
that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and the
decree of registration issued for both is conclusive and final. They differ mainly in that under
the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which the court only needs to
confirm. On the other hand, under the Public Land Act, there exists a presumption that the
land applied for still pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors can only
claim an interest in the land by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious
possession thereof. Nonetheless, in the end, the two laws arrive at the same goal, namely, a
Torrens title, which aims at complete extinguishment, once and for all, of rights adverse to the
record title.14

In general, an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title under the Public
Land Act must be able to prove that: (1) the land is alienable public land; and (2) his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial
or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.15

The finding of fact of the trial court that the Subject Property is alienable public land is undisputed.
What is to be determined herein is whether petitioners have complied with the period of possession
and occupation required by the Public Land Act.
The provision of the Public Land Act that is particularly relevant to petitioners’ application is Section
48(b). Through the years, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has been amended several times. The
case of Republic v. Doldol16 provides a summary of these amendments, as follows–

x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which
provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, presently requires, for
judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title, the possession and occupation of the
piece of land by the applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, since
12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree heretofore cited.

In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioners have failed to comply with the
period of possession and occupation of the Subject Property, as required by both the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held that –

Indeed, the earliest period that the applicants could claim ownership over the property is in
1958, which is the earliest date Justina Hintog, the previous owner/occupant, declared the
property for taxation purposes. This is far later than June 12, 1945, the date prescribed by law
that the applicants’ possession under claim of ownership should have begun at the latest.17

Petitioners maintain, however, that RA No. 6940, enacted on 28 March 1990, has repealed by
implication Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, and has effectively
reduced the required period of possession and occupation of the land to thirty years prior to the filing
of the application for confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.

Petitioners’ arguments are without merit. This Court has already laid down the standard for repeals by
implication, as follows –

It has been the constant holding of this Court that repeals by implication are not favored and
will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended. Such a doctrine
goes as far back as United States v. Reyes, a 1908 decision. It is necessary then before such
a repeal is deemed to exist, that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with
the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be a
showing of repugnancy clear and convincing in character. The language used in the latter
statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An
inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. What is needed is a manifest
indication of the legislative purpose to repeal.18

In herein case, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the provisions of RA No. 6940 do not even
address the same subject matter.

In the Public Land Act, the ways by which the State may dispose of agricultural lands is enumerated,
to wit –

SEC. 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows –

1. For homestead settlement;

2. By sale;
 3. By lease; and

4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:

(a) By judicial legalization;

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act since
the specific requirements and application procedure differ for every mode. More particularly, the
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles may be done two ways, either by: (a) administrative
legalization or free patents under Chapter VII of the Public Land Act; or (b) judicial legalization or
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles under Chapter VIII of the same Act. Having filed
their application before the courts, petitioners have pursued a judicial legalization or judicial
confirmation of their title to the Subject Property.

Petitioners primarily base their arguments on the amendment by RA No. 6940 of Section 44 of the
Public Land Act, to read as follows –

SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twelve
(12) hectares and who, for at least thirty (30) years prior to the effectivity of this amendatory
Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-
in-interest a tract or tracts of agricultural public land subject to disposition, who shall have paid
the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be
entitled, under the provisions of this Chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract
or tracts of such land not to exceed twelve (12) hectares.

While the above-quoted provision does provide for a 30-year period of occupation and cultivation of
the land, Section 44 of the Public Land Act applies to free patents, and not to judicial confirmation of
an imperfect or incomplete title to which Section 48(b) applies.

The distinction between Sections 44 and 48(b) of the Public Land Act was recognized by Mr. Justice
Puno, in his separate opinion in the case of Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources,19 in which he discussed the development of the Regalian doctrine in the Philippine legal
system –

Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of
ownership under the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified
period, and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free
patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and Section 48(b) and (c) of the same Act on the
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

The remaining provisions of RA No. 6940 amend Sections 44 and 47 of the Public Land Act by
extending the periods for filing of applications for free patents and for judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles, respectively, to 31 December 2000. Except for extending the period for filing of
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, RA No. 6940 does not touch on
the other provisions under Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act, such as Section 48(b) and the
prescriptive period provided therein.

Consequently, applying the standard provided by this Court on repeal by implication, there can be no
conflict or inconsistency between Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the provisions of RA No.
6940 that would give rise to a repeal of the former by the latter.

The subsequent effectivity of RA No. 9176 on 01 January 2001 does not affect the position of this
Court on the issues discussed herein. Once again, Section 47 is the only provision under Chapter VIII
of the Public Land Act amended by RA No. 9176 by further extending the period for filing of applications
for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to 31 December 2020. The other provisions of
the Public Land Act amended by RA No. 9176, such as Sections 44 and 45, already refer to free
patents under Chapter VII. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, and
the prescriptive period provided therein still remain unchanged.

IN ALL:
 (1) Section 44 of the Public Land Act, as amended by RA No. 6940, which provides for a
prescriptive period of thirty (30) years possession, applies only to applications for free patents;

(2) The case at bar is a judicial application for confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title
over the Subject Property covered by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act; and

(3) Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act requires for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title the continuous possession of the land since 12 June 1945, or earlier, which
petitioners herein failed to comply with.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Court AFFIRMS the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68546, which reversed the decision of the lower
court in LRC Case No. 98-133 (LRA Record No. N-69787) and dismissed the application for land title
of petitioners. No cost.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179181 November 18, 2013

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, Petitioner,

vs.
CRESENCIASTA.TERESA RAMOS, assisted by her husband PONCIANO
FRANCISCO, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this petition for review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the challenge
to the April 10 2007 decision2 and the August 9, 2007 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 84646. This CA decision affirmed, with modification, the January 17, 2005 decision4 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156 of Pasig City (RTC), in LRC Case No. N-5811 that denied the
application for confirmation and registration of title filed by the petitioner, Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila (RCAM).

The Factual Antecedents

At the core of the controversy in the present petition are two parcels of land – Lot 1 with an area of 34
square meters and Lot 2 with an area of 760 square meters- covered by amended Plan PSU-
2239195 property), both located in what used to be Barrio Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal. On September
15, 1966, the RCAM filed before the R TC, (then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 11, acting as
a land registration court, an application for registration of title6 (application) of property, pursuant to
Commonwealth Act C.A.) No. 141 (the Public Land Act).7 On October 4, 1974, the RCAM amended
its application8 by reducing Lot 2 to 760 square meters (from 1,832 square meters).

In its amended application, the RCAM claimed that it owned the property; that it acquired the property
during the Spanish time; and that since then, it has been in open, public, continuous and peaceful
possession of it in the concept of an owner. It added that to the best of its knowledge and belief, no
mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affects the property, and that no person has any claim, legal or
equitable, on the property.

The RCAM attached the following documents to support its application: amended plan Psu-223919;
technical description of Lots 1 and 2;9 surveyor s certificate;10 and Tax Declaration No. 9551 issued on
September 6, 1966.11

On May 22, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Director of Lands, filed an
opposition12 to the application. The Republic claimed that the property is part of the public domain and
cannot be subject to private appropriation.

On August 18, 1992, respondent Cresencia Sta. Teresa Ramos, through her husband Ponciano
Francisco, filed her opposition13 to the RCAM's application. She alleged that the property formed part
of the entire property that her family owns and has continuously possessed and occupied from the
time of her grandparents, during the Spanish time, up to the present. Cresencia submitted the following
documents,14 among others, to support her requested confirmation of imperfect title:

1.) the death certificates of Cipriano Sta. Teresa and Eulogia Sta. Teresa Vda. de Ramos
(Cresencia's parents);

2.) her marriage certificate;

3.) their children's birth certificates;

4.) certificates of ownership covering two bancas;

5.) photographs of these two bane as with her youngest child while standing on the property
and showing the location of the RCAM' s church relative to the location of the property;

6.) photographs of a pile of gravel and sand (allegedly for their gravel and sand business) on
the property;
 7.) photographs of the RCAM's bahay ni Maria standing on the property;

8.) a photograph of the plaque awarded to Ponciano by ESSO Standard Philippines as sole
dealer of its gasoline products in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal;

9.) a photograph of their La Compania Refreshment Store standing on their titled lot adjacent
to the property;

10.) a photograph of the certificate of dealership given to Ponciano by a Tobacco company for
his dealership in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal; and

11.) the registration certificate for their family's sheet manufacturing business situated m
Bagumbayan, Taguig,15 Rizal.

The RCAM presented in evidence the following documents, in addition to those already on record:16 tax
declarations issued in its name in 1948, 1973, 1981, 1990, 1993, and 1999;17 the certified true copy of
Original Certificate of Title No. 0082 covering the lot in the name of Garcia, which adjoins the property
on the south; and the affidavit of Garcia confirming the RCAM's ownership of the property.18 It likewise
submitted several testimonial evidence to corroborate its ownership and claim of possession of the
property.

The ruling of the RTC

In its decision of January 17, 2005, 19 the RTC denied the RCAM's application for registration of title.
The RTC held that the RCAM failed to prove actual possession and ownership of the property applied
for. The RTC pointed out that the RCAM's only overt act on the property that could be regarded as
evidence of actual possession was its construction of the bahay ni Maria in 1991. Even this act,
according to the RTC, did not sufficiently satisfy the actual possession requirement of the law as the
RCAM did not show how and in what manner it possessed the property prior to 1991. The RCAM's
tax declarations were also inconclusive since they failed to prove actual possession.

In contrast, the numerous businesses allegedly conducted by Cresencia and her family on the
property, the various pieces of documentary evidence that she presented, and the testimony of the
RCAM' s own witnesses convinced the RTC that she and her family actually possessed the property
in the manner and for the period required by law.

This notwithstanding, the RTC refused to order the issuance of the title in Cresencia's name. The RTC
held that Cresencia failed to include in her opposition a prayer for issuance of title.

The RCAM assailed the R TC' s decision before the CA.

The CA ruling

In its April 10, 2007 decision,20 the CA affirmed with modification the RTC's January 17, 2005 ruling.
The CA confirmed Cresencia's incomplete and imperfect title to the property, subject to her compliance
with the requisites for registration of title.

The CA agreed with the RTC that the totality of the evidence on record unquestionably showed that
Cresencia was the actual possessor and occupant, in the concept of an owner, of the disputed
property. The CA held that Cresencia s use of the property since the Spanish time (through her
predecessors-in-interest), as confirmed by the RCAM s witnesses, clearly demonstrated her dominion
over the property. Thus, while she failed to register the property in her name or declare it for taxation
purposes as pointed out by the RCAM, the CA did not consider this non-declaration significant to
defeat her claim. To the CA, Cresencia merely tolerated the RCAM s temporary use of the property
for lack of any urgent need for it and only acted to protect her right when the RCAM applied for
registration in its name. Thus, the CA declared that Cresencia correctly waited until her possession
was disturbed before she took action to vindicate her right.

The CA similarly disregarded the additional tax declarations that the RCAM presented in support of its
application. The CA pointed out that these documents hardly proved the RCAM s alleged ownership
of or right to possess the property as it failed to prove actual possession. Lastly, the CA held that it
was bound by the findings of facts and the conclusions arrived at by the RTC as they were amply
supported by the evidence.
The RCAM filed the present petition after the CA denied its motion for reconsideration.21

Assignment of Errors

The RCAM argues before us that the CA erred and gravely abused its discretion in:22

1. confirming the incomplete and imperfect title of the oppositor when the magnitude of the
parties evidence shows that the oppositors merely had pretended possession that could not
ripen into ownership;

2. failing to consider that the RCAM had continuous, open and notorious possession of the
property in the concept of an owner for a period of thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the
application; and

3. confirming the oppositor’s incomplete and imperfect title despite her failure to comply with
the substantial and procedural requirements of the Public Land Act.

The Issue

In sum, the core issue for our resolution is who -between the RCAM and Cresencia -is entitled to the
benefits of C.A. No. 141 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 for confirmation and registration of
imperfect title.

The Court s Ruling

Preliminary considerations: nature of he issues; factual-issue-bar rule

In her comment,23 Cresencia primarily points out that the present petition essentially questions the
CA’s appreciation of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses who attested to her actual, public
and notorious possession of the property. She argues that these are questions of fact that are not
proper for a Rule 45 petition. In addition, the findings of the RTC were well supported by the evidence,
had been affirmed by the CA, and are thus binding on this Court.

We are not entirely convinced of the merits of what Cresencia pointed out.

The settled rule is that the jurisdiction of this Court over petitions for review on certiorari is limited to
the review of questions of law and not of fact. "A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy
concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue
does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood
of the facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth
or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence x x x as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation."24

An examination of the RCAM's issues shows that the claimed errors indeed primarily question the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the lower courts' conclusion that Cresencia, and not the RCAM,
had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the period required by law. When the
presented question centers on the sufficiency of the evidence, it is a question of fact25 and is barred in
a Rule 45 petition.

Nevertheless, jurisprudence recognizes certain exceptions to the settled rule. When the lower courts
grossly misunderstood the facts and circumstances that, when correctly appreciated, would warrant a
different conclusion, a review of the lower courts' findings may be made.26 This, in our view, is the exact
situation in the case as our discussions below will show.

Moreover, the RCAM also questions the propriety of the CA s confirmation of Cresencia's title over the
property although she was not the applicant and was merely the oppositor in the present confirmation
and registration proceedings. Stated in question form -was the CA justified under the law and
jurisprudence in its confirmation of the oppositor's title over the property? This, in part, is a question of
law as it concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to recognized facts.

Hence, we find it imperative to resolve the petition on the merits.

Requirements for confirmation and registration of imperfect and incomplete title under C.A. No. 141
and P.D. No. 1529

C.A. No. 141 governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. Section 11 of
C.A. No. 141 provides, as one of the modes of disposing public lands that are suitable for agriculture,
the "confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles." Section 48, on the other hand, enumerates those
who are considered to have acquired an imperfect or incomplete title over public lands and, therefore,
entitled to confirmation and registration under the Land Registration Act.

The RCAM did not specify the particular provision of C.A. No. 141 under which it anchored its
application for confirmation and registration of title. Nevertheless, the allegations in its application and
amended application readily show that it based its claim of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of C.A.
No. 141. As amended by P.D. No. 1073 on January 25, 1977, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 currently
provides:

Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. [emphases and
italics ours]

Prior to the amendment introduced by P.D. No. 1073, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, then operated
under the Republic Act R.A.) No. 1942 (June 22, 1957) amendment which reads:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years, immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. [emphases and italics ours]

Since the RCAM filed its application on September 15, 1966 and its amended application on October
4, 1974, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 1942 (which then required possession
of thirty years), governs.

In relation to C.A. No. 141, Section 14 of Presidential Decree P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree specifies those who are qualified to register their incomplete title over an alienable
and disposable public land under the Torrens system. P.D. No. 1529, which was approved on June
11, 1978, superseded and codified all laws relative to the registration of property.

The pertinent portion of Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 reads:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now
Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. [italics ours]

Under these legal parameters, applicants in a judicial confirmation of imperfect title may register their
titles upon a showing that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, 27 since June 12, 1945, or earlier (or for
at least 30 years in the case of the RCAM) immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title. The burden of proof in these cases rests on the applicants who must demonstrate
clear, positive and convincing evidence that: (1) the property subject of their application is alienable
and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) their alleged possession and occupation of the
property were of the length and of the character required by law.28

On the issue of whether the RC M is entitled to the benefits of C A No. 141 and P.D. No. 1529

Reiterating its position before the RTC and the CA, the RCAM now argues that it actually, continuously,
openly and notoriously possessed the property since time immemorial. It points out that its tax
declarations covering the property, while not conclusive evidence of ownership, are proof of its claim
of title and constitute as sufficient basis for inferring possession.

For her part, Cresencia counters that the RCAM failed to discharge its burden of proving possession
in the concept of an owner. She argues that the testimonies of the RCAM s witnesses were replete
with inconsistencies and betray the weakness of its claimed possession. Cresencia adds that at most,
the RCAM s possession was by her mere tolerance which, no matter how long, can never ripen into
ownership. She also points out that the RCAM s tax declarations are insufficient proof of possession
as they are not, by themselves, conclusive evidence of ownership.

We do not see any merit in the RCAM s contentions.

The RTC and the CA as it affirmed the RTC, dismissed the RCAM s application for its failure to comply
with the second requirement – possession of the property in the manner and for the period required
by law.

We find no reason to disturb the RTC and the CA findings on this point. They had carefully analyzed
and weighed each piece of the RCAM s evidence to support its application and had extensively
explained in their respective decisions why they could not give weight to these pieces of evidence.
Hence, we affirm their denial of the RCAM' s application. For greater certainty, we expound on the
reasons below.

a. The RC M failed to prove possession of the property in the manner and for the period required by
law

The possession contemplated by Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 is actual, not fictional or constructive.
In Carlos v Republic of the Philippines,29 the Court explained the character of the required possession,
as follows:

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction
and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader
than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together
with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the
fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a
land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.

Accordingly, to prove its compliance with Section 48(b)' s possession requirement, the RCAM had to
show that it performed specific overt acts in the character an owner would naturally exercise over his
own property. Proof of actual possession of the property at the time of the filing of the application is
required because the phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner," the RCAM
used to describe its alleged possession, is a conclusion of law,30 not an allegation of fact. Possession
is open when it is patent, visible, apparent [and] notorious x x x continuous when uninterrupted,
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when [the possession is characterized by acts
manifesting] exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to [the applicant's] own use
and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the
public or the people in the neighborhood."31

Very noticeably, the RCAM failed to show or point to any specific act characterizing its claimed
possession in the manner described above. The various documents that it submitted, as well as the
bare assertions it made and those of its witnesses, that it had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the property, hardly constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence
required in cases of this nature.32 We elaborate below on these points.

First, the tax declarations issued in the RCAM's name in 1948, 1966, 1977, 1984, 1990, 1993 and
1999 did not in any way prove the character of its possession over the property. Note that the settled
rule is that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land
when not supported by any other evidence showing actual, public and adverse possession.33 The
declaration for taxation purposes of property in the names of applicants for registration or of their
predecessors-in-interest may constitute collaborating evidence only when coupled with other acts of
possession and ownership;34 standing alone, it is inconclusive.

This rule applies even more strongly in this case since the RCAM's payments of taxes due on the
property were inconsistent and random. Interestingly, while the RCAM asserts that it had been in
possession of the property since the Spanish time, the earliest tax declaration that it could present
was that issued in 1948. Also, when it filed its application in 1966 and its amended application in 197
4, the RCAM presented only two tax declarations (issued in 1948 and 1966) covering the property.
And since then, up to the issuance of the January 1 7, 2005 decision of the R TC, the RCAM presented
only five other tax declarations -those issued in 1977, 1984, 1990, 1993 and 1999. The case of Tan v.
Republic35 teaches us that this type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does
not prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation.

Second, even if we were to consider the RCAM' s tax declarations as basis for inferring possession,
36 the RCAM still failed to prove actual possession of the property for the required duration. As already
noted, the earliest tax declaration that it presented was for 1948. We are in fact inclined to believe that
the RCAM first declared the property in its name only in 1948 as this tax declaration does not appear
to have cancelled any previously-issued tax declaration. Thus, when it filed its application in 1966, it
was in possession of the property for only eighteen years, counted from 1948. Even if we were to
count the possession period from the filing of its amended application in 1974, its alleged possession
(which was only for twenty-six years counted from 1948) would still be short of the thirty-year period
required by Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by RA No. 1942. The situation would be worse
if we were to consider the amendment introduced by P.D. No. 1073 to Section 48(b) where, for the
RCAM's claimed possession of the property to give rise to an imperfect title, this possession should
have commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Third, the amended plan Psu-223919, technical description for Lots 1 and 2, and surveyor s certificate
only prove the identity of the property that the RCAM sought to register in its name.37 While these
documents plot the location, the area and the boundaries of the property, they hardly prove that the
RCAM actually possessed the property in the concept of an owner for the required duration. In fact,
the RCAM seemed to be uncertain of the exact area it allegedly possesses and over which it claims
ownership. The total area that the RCAM applied for, as stated in its amended application and the
amended survey plan, was 794 square meters (34 square meters for Lot 1 and 760 square meters for
Lot 2). Yet, in its various tax declarations issued even after it filed its amended application, the total
area declared under its name was still 1,832 square meters. Notably, the area stated in its 1948 tax
declaration was only 132.30 square meters, while the area stated in the subsequently issued tax
declaration (1966) was 1,832 square meters. Significantly, the RCAM did not account for or provide
sufficient explanation for this increase in the area; thus, it appeared uncertain on the specific area
claimed.

Fourth, the RCAM did not build any permanent structure or any other improvement that clearly
announces its claim of ownership over the property. Neither did it account for any act of occupation,
development, maintenance or cultivation for the duration of time it was allegedly in possession of it.
The "bahay ni Maria" where the RCAM conducts its fiesta-related and Lenten activities could hardly
satisfy the possession requirement of C.A. No. 141. As found out by the CA, this structure was
constructed only in 1991 and not at the time of, or prior to, the filing of its application in 1966.

Last, the RCAM s testimonial evidence hardly supplemented the inherent inadequacy of its
documentary evidence. While apparently confirming the RCAM s claim, the testimonies were
undoubtedly hearsay and were not based on personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding
the RCAM’s claimed actual, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession.

b. The RC M failed to prove that the property is alienable and disposable land of he public domain

Most importantly, we find the RCAM s evidence to be insufficient since it failed to comply with the first
and most basic requirement – proof of the alienable and disposable character of the property.
Surprisingly, no finding or pronouncement referring to this requirement was ever made in the decisions
of the R TC and the CA.

To prove that the property is alienable and disposable, the RCAM was bound to establish "the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute."38 It could have also secured a certification from the government that the property
applied for was alienable and disposable.39 Our review of the records shows that this evidence is fatally
absent and we are in fact disappointed to note that both the RTC and the CA appeared to have simply
assumed that the property was alienable and disposable.

We cannot tolerate this kind of approach for two basic reasons. One, in this jurisdiction, all lands
belong to the State regardless of their classification.40 This rule, more commonly known as the
Regalian doctrine, applies with equal force even to private unregistered lands, unless the contrary is
satisfactorily shown. Second, unless the date when the property became alienable and disposable is
specifically identified, any determination on the RCAM' s compliance with the second requirement is
rendered useless as any alleged period of possession prior to the date the property became alienable
and disposable can never be counted in its favor as any period of possession and occupation of public
lands in the concept of owner, no matter how long, can never ripen into ownership.41

On this ground alone, the R TC could have outrightly denied the RCAM' s application.

On the CA’s authority to confirm the title of the oppositor in land registration proceedings

The RCAM next argues that the CA’s act of confirming Cresencia's title over the property is contrary
to law and jurisprudence. The RCAM points out that it filed the application for registration of title under
the provisions of C.A. No. 141 or alternatively under P.D. No. 1529; both statutes dictate several
substantive and procedural requirements that must first be complied with before title to the property is
confirmed and registered. In affirming Cresencia's title without any evidence showing her compliance
with these requirements, it claims that the CA, in effect, made Cresencia the applicant entitled to the
benefits of the land registration proceedings that it initiated before the lower court.

We differ with this view.

Section 29 of P.D. No. 1529 gives the court the authority to confirm the title of either the applicant or
the oppositor in a land registration proceeding depending on the conclusion that the evidence calls
for. Specifically, Section 29 provides that the court "x x x after considering the evidence x x x finds that
the applicant or the oppositor has sufficient title proper for registration, judgment shall be rendered
confirming the title of the applicant, or the oppositor, to the land x x x x." (emphases and italics ours)

Thus, contrary to the RCAM's contention, the CA has the authority to confirm the title of Cresencia, as
the oppositor, over the property. This, of course, is subject to Cresencia's satisfaction of the evidentiary
requirement of P D No. 1529, in relation with C.A. No. 141 in support of her own claim of imperfect
title over the property.

The issue of whether Cresencia is entitled to the benefits of C.A. No. 141 and P.D. No. 1529

The RCAM lastly argues that the evidence belies Cresencia's claim of continuous, open and notorious
possession since the Spanish time. The RCAM points out that, first, Cresencia failed to declare for
taxation purposes the property in her name, thus effectively indicating that she did not believe herself
to be its owner. Second, Cresencia did not have the property surveyed in her name so that she could
assert her claim over it and show its metes and bounds. Third, Cresencia did not register the property
in her name although she previously registered the adjoining lot in her name. Fourth, Cresencia did
not construct any permanent structure on the property and no traces of the businesses allegedly
conducted by her and by her family on it could be seen at the time it filed its application. And fifth,
Cresencia did not perform any act of dominion that, by the established jurisprudential definition, could
be sufficiently considered as actual possession.

We agree with the RCAM on most of these points.

While we uphold the CA' s authority to confirm the title of the oppositor in a confirmation and
registration proceedings, we cannot agree, however, with the conclusion the CA reached on the nature
of Cresencia's possession of the property.
Under the same legal parameters we used to affirm the RTC's denial of the RCAM' s application, we
also find insufficient the evidence that Cresencia presented to prove her claimed possession of the
property in the manner and for the period required by C.A. No. 141. Like the RCAM, Cresencia was
bound to adduce evidence that irrefutably proves her compliance with the requirements for
confirmation of title. To our mind, she also failed to discharge this burden of proof; thus, the CA erred
when it affirmed the contrary findings of the RTC and confirmed Cresencia’s title over the property.

We arrive at this conclusion for the reasons outlined below.

First, the various pieces of documentary evidence that Cresencia presented to support her own claim
of imperfect title hardly proved her alleged actual possession of the property. Specifically, the
certificates of marriage, birth and death did not particularly state that each of these certified events,
i.e. marriage, birth and death, in fact transpired on the claimed property; at best, the certificates proved
the occurrence of these events in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal and on the stated dates, respectively.

Similarly, the certificate of ownership of two bancas in the name of Ponciano, the registration certificate
for their family s sheet manufacturing business, the photograph of the certificate of dealership in the
name of Ponciano given by a tobacco company, and the photograph of the plaque awarded to
Ponciano by ESSO Standard Philippines as sole dealer of its gasoline products did not prove that
Cresencia and her family conducted these businesses on the disputed property itself. Rather, they
simply showed that at one point in time, Cresencia and her family conducted these businesses in
Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal. In fact, Cresencia s claim that they conducted their gasoline dealership
business on the property is belied by the testimony of a witness who stated that the gas station was
located north (or the other side) of Cresencia s titled lot and not on the property.42

The presence on the property, as shown by photographs, of Cresencia s daughter, of the two bancas
owned by her family, and of the pile of gravel and sand they allegedly used in their gravel and sand
business also hardly count as acts of occupation, development or maintenance that could have been
sufficient as proof of actual possession. The presence of these objects and of Cresencia s daughter
on the property was obviously transient and impermanent; at most, they proved that Cresencia and
her family used the property for a certain period of time, albeit, briefly and temporarily.

Finally, the records show that the La Compania Refreshment Store business (that they allegedly
conducted on the property) actually stood on their titled lot adjoining the property.

Second, while Cresencia registered in her name the adjoining lot (which they had been occupying at
the time the RCAM filed its application and where their La Compania Refreshment Store stood), she
never had the property registered in her name. Neither did Cresencia or her predecessors-in-interest
declare the property for taxation purposes nor had the property surveyed in their names to properly
identify it and to specifically determine its metes and bounds. The declaration for taxation purposes of
property in their names would have at least served as proof that she or her predecessors-in-interest
had a claim over the property43 that could be labeled as "possession" if coupled with proof of actual
possession.

Finally, the testimonies of Ponciano and Florencia Francisco Mariano (Cresencia's daughter) on the
nature and duration of their family's alleged possession of the property, other than being self-serving,
were mere general statements and could not have constituted the factual evidence of possession that
the law requires. They also failed to point out specific acts of dominion or ownership that were
performed on the property by the parents of Cresencia, their predecessors-in-interest. They likewise
failed to present any evidence that could have corroborated their alleged possession of the property
from the time of their grandfather, Cipriano, who acquired the property from its previous owner,
Petrona Sta. Teresa. Interestingly, other than Ponciano and Florencia, none of the witnesses on record
seemed to have known that Cresencia owns or at least claims ownership of the property.

At any rate, even if we were to consider these pieces of evidence to be sufficient, which we do not,
confirmation and registration of title over the property in Cresencia' s name was still improper in the
absence of competent and persuasive evidence on record proving that the property is alienable and
disposable.

For all these reasons, we find that the CA erred when it affirmed the RTC's ruling on this matter and
confirmed Cresencia's imperfect title to the property.WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations,
we hereby DENY the petition. We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the decision dated April 10, 2007
and the resolution dated August 9, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84646 to the
extent described below:
 1. We AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals as it affirmed the January 17 2005 decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156, in LRC Case No. N-5811 that DENIED
the application for confirmation and registration of title filed by the petitioner, Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila; and

2. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the confirmation made by the Court of Appeals of the title
over the property in the name of respondent Cresencia Sta. Teresa Ramos for lack of sufficient
evidentiary basis.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177797 December 4, 2008

SPS. PEDRO TAN and NENA ACERO TAN, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated 28 February 2006 and
Resolution2 dated 12 April 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71534. In its assailed
Decision, the appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated 9 May 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 39, Cagayan de Oro City, in LRC
Case No. N-2000-055, and ordered herein petitioners, spouses Pedro and Nena Tan (spouses Tan),
to return the parcel of land known as Lot 1794, Ap-10-002707, Pls-923, with an area of 215,698 square
meters, located in Calingagan, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental (subject property) to herein respondent,
Republic of the Philippines (Republic). In its assailed Resolution, the appellate court denied the
spouses Tan’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual milieu of this case is as follows:

The spouses Tan were natural-born Filipino citizens, who became Australian citizens on 9 February
1984.4 They seek to have the subject property registered in their names.

The subject property was declared alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, as established by
a Certification5 dated 14 August 2000 issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Cagayan de
Oro City.

Prior to the spouses Tan, the subject property was in the possession of Lucio and Juanito Neri and
their respective spouses. Lucio and Juanito Neri had declared the subject property for taxation
purposes in their names under Tax Declarations No. 8035 (1952),6 No. 15247 and No. 1523 (1955).8

The spouses Tan acquired the subject property from Lucio and Juanito Neri and their spouses by
virtue of a duly notarized Deed of Sale of Unregistered Real Estate Property9 dated 26 June 1970.
The spouses Tan took immediate possession of the subject property on which they planted rubber,
gemelina, and other fruit-bearing trees. They declared the subject property for taxation purposes in
their names, as evidenced by Tax Declarations No. 501210 (1971); No. 11155,11 No. 10599,12 No.
1059813 (1974); No. 1170414 (1976); No. 0122415 (1980); No. 0631616 (1983); and No.
94300017 (2000); and paid realty taxes thereon.

However, a certain Patermateo Casiño (Casiño) claimed a portion of the subject property, prompting
the spouses Tan to file a Complaint for Quieting of Title against him before the RTC of Cagayan de
Oro City, Branch 24, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-204. On 29 August 1989, the RTC
rendered a Decision18 in Civil Case No. 88-204 favoring the spouses Tan and declaring their title to
the subject property thus "quieted." Casiño appealed the said RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals
where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 26225. In a Resolution19 dated 15 November 1990, the
appellate court dismissed CA-G.R. CV No. 26225 for lack of interest to prosecute. Casiño elevated
his case to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as UDK-10332. In a
Resolution20 dated 13 March 1991 in UDK-10332, the Court denied Casiño’s Petition for being
insufficient in form and substance. The said Resolution became final and executory on 3 June 1991.21

Refusing to give up, Casiño filed an Application for Free Patent on the subject property before the
Bureau of Lands.22 On 8 December 1999, Casiño’s application was ordered cancelled23 by Officer Ruth
G. Sabijon of DENR-CENRO, Cagayan de Oro City, upon the request of herein petitioner Pedro Tan,
the declared owner of the subject property pursuant to the 29 August 1989 Decision of the RTC in
Civil Case No. 88-204. Similarly, survey plan Csd-10-002779 prepared in the name of Casiño was
also ordered cancelled24 by the Office of the Regional Executive Director, DENR, Region X,
Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City.

In 2000, the spouses Tan filed their Application for Registration of Title25 to the subject property before
the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 39, where it was docketed as LRC Case No. N-2000-055.
The application of the spouses Tan invoked the provisions of Act No. 49626 and/or Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141,27 as amended. In compliance with the request28 of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) dated 29 August 2000, the spouses Tan filed on 5 October 2000 an Amended
Application for Registration of Title29 to the subject property.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance in LRC Case No. N-2000-055 on
behalf of the Republic, but failed to submit a written opposition to the application of the spouses Tan.

When no opposition to the application of the spouses Tan was filed by the time of the initial hearing of
LRC Case No. N-2000-055, the RTC issued on 23 April 2001 an order of general default, except as
against the Republic. Thereafter, the spouses Tan were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte.

After the establishment of the jurisdictional facts, the RTC heard the testimony of John B. Acero
(Acero), nephew and lone witness of the spouses Tan. Acero recounted the facts already presented
above and affirmed that the spouses Tan’s possession of the subject property had been open, public,
adverse and continuous.30

After Acero’s testimony, the spouses Tan already made a formal offer of evidence, which was admitted
by the court a quo.31

On 9 May 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision in LRC Case No. N-2000-055 granting the application
of the spouses Tan, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, [Spouses Tan] having conclusively established to the satisfaction of this Court
their ownership of the [subject property], Lot 1794, Pls-923, situated in Villanueva, Misamis
Oriental, should be as it is hereby adjudicated to the [Spouses Tan] with address at #166
Capistrano Street, Cagayan de Oro City.

Once this judgment becomes final, let the Order for the issuance of decree and corresponding
Certificate of Title issue in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended.32

In its appeal of the afore-mentioned RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 71534, the Republic made the following assignment of errors:

I. The trial court erred in ruling that [herein petitioners Spouses Tan] and their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous and notorious possession of subject property for the
period required by law.

II. The trial court erred in granting the application for land registration despite the fact that there
is a disparity between the area as stated in [the Spouses Tan’s] application and the tax
declarations of Juanito Neri, Lucio Neri, and [herein petitioner Pedro Tan].

III. The trial court erred in granting the application for land registration despite the fact that [the
Spouses Tan] failed to present the original tracing cloth plan.

IV. The trial court erred in relying on the Decision dated [29 August 1989] by the RTC-Branch
24, Cagayan de Oro City which declared [the Spouses Tan’s] "title" on the subject [property]
"quieted."
 V. The trial court erred in not finding that [the Spouses Tan] failed to overcome the presumption
that all lands form part of the public domain.33

On 28 February 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71534 granting
the appeal of the Republic, and reversing and setting aside the 9 May 2001 Decision of the RTC on
the ground that the spouses Tan failed to comply with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which requires
possession of the subject property to start on or prior to 12 June 1945.34 Hence, the appellate court
ordered the spouses Tan to return the subject property to the Republic.

The spouses Tan filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision of the Court of Appeals.
To refute the finding of the appellate court that they and their predecessors-in-interest did not possess
the subject property by 12 June 1945 or earlier, the spouses Tan attached to their Motion a copy
of Tax Declaration No. 4627 covering the subject property issued in 1948 in the name of their
predecessor-in-interest, Lucio Neri. They called attention to the statement in Tax Declaration No. 4627
that it cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2948. Unfortunately, no copy of Tax Declaration No. 2948 was
available even in the Office of the Archive of the Province of Misamis Oriental. The spouses Tan
asserted that judicial notice may be taken of the fact that land assessment is revised by the
government every four years; and since Tax Declaration No. 4627 was issued in the year 1948, it can
be presupposed that Tax Declaration No. 2948 was issued in the year 1944.

The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the spouses Tan in a Resolution dated
12 April 2007.

The spouses Tan now come before this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not [the Spouses
Tan] have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
[property], under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since [12 June 1945], or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title.35

The Court rules in the negative and, thus, finds the present Petition devoid of merit.

To recall, the spouses Tan filed before the RTC their Application for Registration of Title to the subject
property in the year 2000 generally invoking the provisions of Act No. 496 and/or Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.

The Public Land Act,36 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,37 governs lands of the public
domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately owned lands which reverted to the
State.38 It explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed of, to wit:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization.

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).39

Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act
because there are specific requirements and application procedure for every mode.40 Since the
spouses Tan filed their application before the RTC, then it can be reasonably inferred that they are
seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over the
subject property.

Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares,
may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073,41 which reads –

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
 been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. (Emphasis supplied.)

Not being members of any national cultural minorities, spouses Tan may only be entitled to judicial
confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended.

The Court notes that Presidential Decree No. 1073, amending the Public Land Act, clarified Section
48, paragraph "b" thereof, by specifically declaring that it applied only to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. Thus, based on the said provision of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, the two requisites which the applicants must comply with for the grant of their Application
for Registration of Title are: (1) the land applied for is alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants
and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and adversely since 12 June 1945.42

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order or administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of
Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply.43

In the case at bar, the spouses Tan presented a Certification from the DENR-CENRO, Cagayan de
Oro City, dated 14 August 2000, to prove the alienability and disposability of the subject property. The
said Certification stated that the subject property became alienable and disposable on 31 December
1925. A certification from the DENR that a lot is alienable and disposable is sufficient to establish the
true nature and character of the property and enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence.44 Considering that no evidence was presented to disprove the contents of the
aforesaid DENR-CENRO Certification, this Court is duty-bound to uphold the same.

Nonetheless, even when the spouses Tan were able to sufficiently prove that the subject property is
part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain as early as 31 December 1925, they
still failed to satisfactorily establish compliance with the second requisite for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title, i.e., open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

Through the years, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has been amended several times. Republic
v. Doldol45 provides a summary of these amendments:

The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which
provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by
Presidential Decree 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now
reads:
 (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, presently requires, for
judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title, the possession and occupation of the
piece of land by the applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, since
12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree heretofore cited. (Emphasis ours.)

As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession for thirty years or more is not sufficient.
It must be shown, too, that possession and occupation had started on 12 June 1945 or earlier.46

It is worth mentioning that in this case, even the spouses Tan do not dispute that the true reckoning
period for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title is on or before 12 June 1945. They
also admit that based on the previous evidence on record, their possession and occupation of the
subject property fall short of the period prescribed by law. The earliest evidence of possession and
occupation of the subject property can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of their
predecessors-in-interest only in 1952. However, the spouses Tan are now asking the kind indulgence
of this Court to take into account Tax Declaration No. 4627 issued in 1948, which they had attached
to their Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals but which the appellate court refused
to consider. Just as they had argued before the Court of Appeals, the spouses Tan point out that Tax
Declaration No. 4627 was not newly issued but cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2948; and should the
Court take judicial notice of the fact that tax assessments are revised every four years, then Tax
Declaration No. 2948 covering the subject property was issued as early as 1944.

Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

On the basis thereof, it is clear that evidence should have been presented during trial before the RTC;
evidence not formally offered should not be considered. In this case, it bears stressing that Tax
Declaration No. 4627 was only submitted by the Spouses Tan together with their Motion for
Reconsideration of the 28 February 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals. The reason given by the
Spouses Tan why they belatedly procured such evidence was because at the time of trial the only
evidence available at hand was the 1952 tax declaration. More so, they also believed in good faith that
they had met the 30-year period required by law. They failed to realize that under Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, a mere showing of possession for thirty years or more is
not sufficient because what the law requires is possession and occupation on or before 12 June 1945.
This Court, however, finds the reason given by the spouses Tan unsatisfactory. The spouses Tan filed
their application for registration of title to the subject property under the provisions of Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. It is incumbent upon them as applicants to carefully know
the requirements of the said law.

Thus, following the rule enunciated in Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, this Court cannot
take into consideration Tax Declaration No. 4627 as it was only submitted by the Spouses Tan when
they filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the 28 February 2006 Decision of the appellate court.

And even if this Court, in the interest of substantial justice, fairness and equity, admits and take into
consideration Tax Declaration No. 4627, issued in 1948, it would still be insufficient to establish open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property by the
Spouses Tan and their predecessors-in-interest since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

Tax Declaration No. 4627 was only issued in 1948, three years after 12 June 1945, the cut-off date
under the law for acquiring imperfect or incomplete title to public land. For the Court to conclude from
the face of Tax Declaration No. 4627 alone that the subject property had been declared for tax
purposes before 12 June 1945 would already be too much of a stretch and would require it to rely on
mere presuppositions and conjectures. The Court cannot simply take judicial notice that the
government revises tax assessments every four years. Section 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence
provides particular rules on which matters are subject to judicial notice and when it is mandatory47 or
discretionary48 upon the courts or when a hearing is necessary.49 It is unclear under which context this
Court must take judicial notice of the supposed four-year revision of tax assessments on real
properties. Moreover, the power to impose realty taxes, pursuant to which the assessment of real
property is made, has long been devolved to the local government units (LGU) having jurisdiction over
the said property. Hence, the rules pertaining to the same may vary from one LGU to another; and
regular revision of the tax assessments of real property every four years may not be true for all LGUs,
as the spouses Tan would have this Court believe. Given the foregoing, Tax Declaration No. 4627 is
far from the clear, positive, and convincing evidence required50 to establish open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property by the Spouses Tan and
their predecessors-in-interest since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

In addition, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they
constitute mere prima facie proofs of ownership of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the
absence of actual, public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes
does not prove ownership.51 They may be good supporting or collaborating evidence together with
other acts of possession and ownership; but by themselves, tax declarations are inadequate to
establish possession of the property in the nature and for the period required by statute for acquiring
imperfect or incomplete title to the land.

As a final observation, the spouses Tan purchased the subject property and came into possession of
the same only in 1970. To justify their application for registration of title, they had to tack their
possession of the subject property to that of their predecessors-in-interest. While the spouses Tan
undoubtedly possessed and occupied the subject property openly, continuously, exclusively and
notoriously, by immediately introducing improvements on the said property, in addition to declaring the
same and paying realty tax thereon; in contrast, there was a dearth of evidence that their
predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject property in the same manner. The
possession and occupation of the subject property by the predecessors-in-interest of the spouses Tan
were evidenced only by the tax declarations in the names of the former, the earliest of which, Tax
Declaration No. 4627, having been issued only in 1948. No other evidence was presented by the
spouses Tan to show specific acts of ownership exercised by their predecessors-in-interest over the
subject property which may date back to 12 June 1945 or earlier.

For failure of the Spouses Tan to satisfy the requirements prescribed by Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, this Court has no other option but to deny their application for judicial
confirmation and registration of their title to the subject property. Much as this Court wants to conform
to the State’s policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur
economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by the law’s stringent
safeguards against registering imperfect titles.52

The Court emphasizes, however, that our ruling herein is without prejudice to the spouses Tan availing
themselves of the other modes for acquiring title to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
for which they may be qualified under the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 28
February 2006 and Resolution dated 12 April 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71534
are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156117 May 26, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625,
dated 22 November 2002,1 which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,2 granting the application for land registration of the
respondents.

Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the
MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422
and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in
fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto
and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.3 Together with their application for registration, respondents
submitted the following set of documents:

(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; and Advance
Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent David;4

(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;5

(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)

dispensing with the need for Surveyor's Certificates for the Subject Lots;6

(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of certificates of title
covering the Subject Lots;7

(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of
the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963;8

(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 941800301831, in the
name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the
name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in 1994;9 and

(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel
Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons and respondents
herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No.
8423 was sold to David.10

On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition to the
respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to
comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents'
muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona
fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging
to the Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.11

The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.12 All owners of the land adjoining
the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing.13 A copy of the Notice was also
posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board
of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were located.14 Finally, the
Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 199915 and The Freeman Banat
News on 19 December 1999.16

During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special Default,17 with
only petitioner Republic opposing the application for registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents,
through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts.
The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence from the respondents and to
submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.

On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and confirmation
of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It
subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999,
final and executory, and directing the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue
a decree of registration for the Subject Lots.18

Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the Court of
Appeals.19 The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed the appealed
MTC Judgment reasoning thus:

In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered has been
classified as within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in
relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that "All things which are within
the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of
the State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the object of
prescription" and that "Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of
good faith."

As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already acquired the subject
parcels of lands, subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that they cultivated the
same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated
December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees or their predecessors-
in-interest had occupied and possessed the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively,
and adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that appellees' possession
can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject lots had been classified
as within the alienable and disposable zone, still the argument of the appellant does not hold
water.

As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO
Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of private
ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater right,
entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows
individuals to own land in any manner provided by law. Again, even considering that
possession of appelless should only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO declared
the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels of land
in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the
instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court finds no reason
to disturb the finding of the court a quo.20

The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments:

First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945
or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963
cannot be considered in determining compliance with the periods of possession required by law. The
Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENRO's
certification. It also alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription
period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol,21 where this Court declared that
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended and as it is
presently phrased, requires that possession of land of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945
or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application
consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner
Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the application for registration of title to land
shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file a single application only in case they
are co-owners. While an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the subject
parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of land are co-
owned) and are situated within the same province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is
conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly
complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to comply with the
procedure for land registration under the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before
the MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it.

Jurisdiction

Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed
with and hear the application for registration filed by the respondents but for reasons different from
those presented by petitioner Republic.

A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear
and proceed with respondents' application for registration.

Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even though they were not
co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually seeking the individual and separate
registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.

Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the respondents was fatal to
their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and hear their application for registration
of the Subject Lots, based on this Court's pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,22 to
wit:

. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the above-cited
sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or
jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as
prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering
all proceedings utterly null and void.

This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This procedural lapse
committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear
their application for registration of the Subject Lots.

The Property Registration Decree23 recognizes and expressly allows the following situations: (1) the
filing of a single application by several applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of
land sought to be registered;24 and (2) the filing of a single application for registration of several parcels
of land provided that the same are located within the same province.25 The Property Registration
Decree is silent, however, as to the present situation wherein two applicants filed a single application
for two parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and individual registration of the parcels of land
in their respective names.

Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this Court refers to
the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration
Decree itself provides that, "[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient."

Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the Property
Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint application for registration
filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead
of a single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately,
should have filed separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.

Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear
and proceed with the case.26 They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof.27 Instead,
under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied admission
of the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to
the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be
proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party
and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in
case of misjoinder of parties).

The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have been corrected by the
MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the MTC failed
to detect the misjoinder when the application for registration was still pending before it; and more
regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion
for severance of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court.

B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated by the
Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration
court.

Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered
a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming
jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration.

A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,28 and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless
there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.29

Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice of the Initial
Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following manner:

1. By publication. –

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of
Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official
Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however,
that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land
involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern."
Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and
time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.

Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property Registration Decree
expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon
the land registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals30 that
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly
confirm and register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration
Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements of publication, mailing, and posting of
the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements, including publication of the Notice in a
newspaper of general circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In
the same case, this Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the Notice
of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus –

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed

mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well
as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand.
The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and
circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices
published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such
parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real
estate. In sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of
disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction
of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.31

In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on 03 September
1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02
August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat News,
a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the
rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial
hearing.

Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would already be
worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat
News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for
him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents' application for
registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself
states, should the claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he
would be in default and would forever be barred from contesting respondents' application for
registration and even the registration decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did
issue an Order of Special Default on 03 September 1999.

The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is
tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the
publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire
jurisdiction over respondents' application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated
21 December 1999, ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and
David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000,
declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator
to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by
the MTC without jurisdiction.

II

Period of Possession

Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial
confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.

While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and proceed with
respondents' application for registration, this Court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the
legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring title to public land.

Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their title to the Subject
Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their
parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in
his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of
an owner since 1950.32

Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents themselves, the Subject
Lots are "within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of
Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963.
Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per Presidential
Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992."33 The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public
domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963.

As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, from the government;34 and it is indispensable that the person claiming
title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law.35

The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral
lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted to the State.36 It explicitly enumerates the
means by which public lands may be disposed, as follows:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease;

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

 (a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).37

Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act
because there are specific requirements and application procedure for every mode.38 Since
respondents herein filed their application before the MTC,39 then it can be reasonably inferred that they
are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over the
Subject Lots.

Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144
hectares,40 may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads –

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.

Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to judicial
confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12
June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only
on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as
alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been
classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply
thereto.41 It is very apparent then that respondents could not have complied with the period of
possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or
incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.

The confirmation of respondents' title by the Court of Appeals was based on the erroneous supposition
that respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under the Property Registration Decree.
According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of the
Property Registration Decree allows individuals to own land in any other manner provided by law. It
then ruled that the respondents, having possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application,
have acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in relation to
Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.42

The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration Decree and the
Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed
by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the land applied for
pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the same by
virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession.43 As established by this
Court in the preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may have acquired title thereto
only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.

However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire imperfect or incomplete
title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for judicial confirmation or
legalization thereof must be in accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the
Public Land Act reads –

SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right, claiming
any lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in every case present
an application to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged title
or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to them under the provisions of
the Land Registration Act.44

Hence, respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots must have complied with the
substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements
under the Property Registration Decree.

Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real rights apply in
general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands of the public domain.
Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be considered a special law45 that must take
precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an established rule of statutory construction that
between a general law and a special law, the special law prevails – Generalia specialibus non
derogant.46

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the
MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and its Order, dated 02
February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents' application for registration is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172011 March 7, 2011

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
TEODORO P. RIZALVO, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73647 which affirmed the Decision2 of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Bauang, La Union, in LRC Case No. 58-MTCBgLU, approving respondent’s application
for registration of an 8,957-square meter parcel of land located in Brgy. Taberna, Bauang, La Union.

The facts are undisputed.

On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of Bauang, La Union,
acting as a land registration court, an application for the registration3 of a parcel of land referred to in
Survey Plan Psu-200706,4 located in Bauang, La Union and containing an area of 8,957 square
meters.

Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcel of land, that he obtained
title over the land by virtue of a Deed of Transfer5 dated December 31, 1962, and that he is currently
in possession of the land. In support of his claim, he presented, among others, Tax Declaration No.
222066 for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment7 of real property taxes beginning in 1952
up to the time of filing of the application.

On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an Opposition alleging that neither
respondent nor his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier and that the tax
declarations and tax payment receipts did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
ownership. The OSG also asserted that the subject property was a portion of public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines and hence not subject to private acquisition.

At the hearing of the application, no private oppositor came forth. Consequently, the trial court issued
an Order of Special Default against the whole world except the Republic of the Philippines and entered
the same in the records of the case.

At the trial, respondent testified that he acquired the subject property by purchase from his mother,
Bibiana P. Rizalvo, as evidenced by a Deed of Transfer dated December 31, 1962.8 He also testified
that he was in adverse, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property; that no one
was questioning his ownership over the land; and that he was the one paying the real property tax
thereon, as evidenced by the bundle of official receipts covering the period of 1953 to 2000. He also
stated that he was the one who had the property surveyed; that no one opposed the survey; and that
during said survey, they placed concrete markers on the boundaries of the property. Further, he stated
that he was not aware of any person or entity which questioned his mother’s ownership and
possession of the subject property.

Respondent’s mother, Bibiana P. Rizalvo, was also presented during the trial. She stated that she
purchased the lot from Eufrecina Navarro, as evidenced by the Absolute Deed of Sale9 dated July 8,
1952. She confirmed that before she sold the property to her son, she was the absolute owner of the
subject property and was in possession thereof, without anyone questioning her status as owner. She
further stated that she was the one paying for the real property taxes at that time and that she even
installed improvements on the subject property.

After conducting an investigation and verification of the records involving the subject land, Land
Investigator/Inspector Dionisio L. Picar of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of San Fernando, La Union submitted a report10 on July 17, 2001. Aside from the technical
description of the land, the report certified that indeed the subject parcel of land was within the
alienable and disposable zone and that the applicant was indeed in actual occupation and possession
of the land.
On the part of the Republic, the OSG did not present any evidence.

As stated above, the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, rendered its
Decision11 on November 29, 2001, approving respondent’s application. The dispositive portion of the
trial court’s decision reads--

WHEREFORE, this Court, confirming the Order of Special Default, hereby approves the application
and orders the adjudication and registration of the land described in Survey Plan No. PSU-200706
(Exh. "A") and the Technical Description of the land (Exh. "B") situated at Brgy. Taberna, Bauang, La
Union containing an area of Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty Seven (…8,957) square meters.

Once this decision becomes final and executory let the corresponding decree be issued.

SO ORDERED.12

On December 21, 2001 the Republic of the Philippines through the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal. In
its Brief,13 the OSG argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the applicant proved a registrable title
to the property. However, the CA found no merit in the appeal and promulgated the assailed
Decision14 on March 14, 2006, affirming the trial court’s decision.

The Republic of the Philippines through the OSG now comes to this Court by way of petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to seek relief.

In its petition, the OSG argues that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion over all lands of public
domain and that the grant to private individuals of imperfect title by the Republic over its alienable and
disposable lands is a mere privilege. Hence, judicial confirmation proceeding is strictly construed
against the grantee/applicant.15

The OSG further contends that respondent failed to show indubitably that he has complied with all the
requirements showing that the property, previously part of the public domain, has become private
property by virtue of his acts of possession in the manner and length of time required by law. The OSG
maintains that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest failed to show convincingly that he or they
were in open, continuous, adverse, and public possession of the land of the public domain as required
by law. The OSG points out that there is no evidence showing that the property has been fenced,
walled, cultivated or otherwise improved. The OSG argues that without these indicators which
demonstrate clear acts of possession and occupation, the application for registration cannot be
allowed.16

On the other hand, respondent counters that he has presented sufficient proof that the subject property
was indeed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. He also asserts that his
title over the land can be traced by documentary evidence wayback to 1948 and hence, the length of
time required by law for acquisition of an imperfect title over alienable public land has been satisfied.17

Further, he argues that although not conclusive proof of ownership, tax declarations and official
receipts of payment of real property taxes are at least proof of possession of real property. In addition,
he highlights the fact that since the occupancy and possession of his predecessors-in-interest, there
has been no question about their status as owners and possessors of the property from adjoining lot
owners, neighbors, the community, or any other person. Because of this, he claims that his possession
of the land is open, continuous, adverse, and public -- sufficient for allowing registration.

Verily, the main issue in this case is whether respondent and his predecessors-in-interest were in
open, continuous, adverse, and public possession of the land in question in the manner and length of
time required by law as to entitle respondent to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

We answer in the negative.

Existing law and jurisprudence provides that an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
must prove compliance with Section 14 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152918 or the Property
Registration Decree. The pertinent portions of Section 14 provide:

SEC. 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
 (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions
of existing laws.

xxxx

Under Section 14 (1), applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject
land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.

The first requirement was satisfied in this case. The certification and report19 dated July 17, 2001
submitted by Special Investigator I Dionisio L. Picar of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La Union,
states that the entire land area in question is within the alienable and disposable zone, certified as
such since January 21, 1987.

In Limcoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Republic,20 we have ruled that a certification and report from
the DENR-CENRO enjoys the presumption of regularity and is sufficient proof to show the
classification of the land described therein. We held:

In the recent case of Buenaventura v. Republic,21 we ruled that said Certification is sufficient to
establish the true nature or character of the subject property as public and alienable land. We similarly
ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals22 and intoned therein that the certification enjoys a presumption
of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence.

Both the DENR-CENRO Certification and Report constitute a positive government act, an
administrative action, validly classifying the land in question. As adverted to by the petitioner, the
classification or re-classification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral, or forest lands is
now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government. Clearly, the petitioner has
overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the subject lot.

Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to ownership and possession. The MTC and
the CA both agreed that respondent has presented sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence
to show that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question. Said findings are binding upon this Court absent
any showing that the lower courts committed glaring mistakes or that the assailed judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts. In Buenaventura v. Pascual,23 we reiterated,

Time and again, this Court has stressed that its jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the findings
of fact complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is
based on the misapprehension of facts. The trial court, having heard the witnesses and observed their
demeanor and manner of testifying, is in a better position to decide the question of their credibility.
Hence, the findings of the trial court must be accorded the highest respect, even finality, by this Court.
x x x.

However, the third requirement, that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest be in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12,
1945 or earlier, has not been satisfied. Respondent only managed to present oral and documentary
evidence of his and his mother’s ownership and possession of the land since 1958 through a
photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale24 dated July 8, 1958 between Eufrecina Navarro and Bibiana
P. Rizalvo. He presented Tax Declaration No. 1107825 for the year 1948 in the name of Eufrecina
Navarro and real property tax receipts beginning in 1952.26 In Llanes v. Republic,27 the Court held that
tax declarations are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession.28] However,
even assuming that the 1948 Tax Declaration in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and the tax payment
receipts could be taken in this case as proof of a claim of ownership, still, respondent lacks proof of
occupation and possession beginning June 12, 1945 or earlier. What is categorically required by law
is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.29

But given the fact that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
subject land since 1948, is respondent nonetheless entitled to registration of title under Section 14 (2)
of P.D. No. 1529? To this question we likewise answer in the negative.

An applicant may be allowed to register land by means of prescription under existing laws. The laws
1avvphil

on prescription are found in the Civil Code and jurisprudence. It is well settled that prescription is one
of the modes of acquiring ownership and that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least
thirty years.30

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim
of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is
jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring
ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the
moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial.31 In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court ruled,

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2)32, and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.33

In the case at bar, respondent merely presented a certification and report from the DENR-CENRO
dated July 17, 2001 certifying that the land in question entirely falls within the alienable and disposable
zone since January 21, 1987; that it has not been earmarked for public use; and that it does not
encroach any area devoted to general public use.34 Unfortunately, such certification and report is not
enough in order to commence the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period under Section 14 (2). There is
no evidence in this case indicating any express declaration by the state that the subject land is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth. Thus, there appears no
basis for the application of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period in this case.

Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification and report is enough to signify
that the land is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth,
respondent is still not entitled to registration because the land was certified as alienable and disposable
in 1987, while the application for registration was filed on December 7, 2000, a mere thirteen (13)
years after and far short of the required thirty (30) years under existing laws on prescription.

Although we would want to adhere to the State’s policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution
of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice35 we
are constrained by the clear and simple requisites of the law to disallow respondent’s application for
registration.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 14, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 73647 affirming the Decision dated November 29, 2001 of the Municipal Trial
Court of Bauang, La Union, in LRC Case No. 58-MTCBgLU is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent’s application for registration is DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.