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    rheinz bryan

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    of 11
    The Verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban by Lynn R. Sykes and Jack B. Everaden 3H. FREEMAN AND COMPANY be K:ARKF The Verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Networks of seismic instraments could monitor a total test ban with high reliability. Even smal! clandestine explosions could be identified even if extreme measures were taken to evade detection by Lynn R. Sykes and Jack F. Evernden wo treaties put into elfect over the _1n 1965 the reliability of measures for ait or water, the seismological name ‘paul 20 yearshavesetlimitson the the verification of @ treaty Sannin ex- for them ix P (lor primary) waves, The {esting of nuclear weapons. ‘The plosions larger than about one Kiloton slower body vibrations are sacar waves, Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which may have been arguable, but it a0 fong- which are similar fo the waves on a hhas been signed by more than 120 a3. er is. We address ths question us sels. rating string, they are called (for sions. prohibits nuclear explosions in mologists who have been concerned for shear or secondary) waves An under he atmosphere, the oeeans and spuee, many years vith te detection of under- ground explosion is a source of nearly allowing them only underground. The ground explosions by seismic methods pure P waves because it applies a 21h- ‘Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, @ and with meansof distinguishing under- form pressure to the walls ofthe cavity bilateral agreement detween tie U'S. ground explosions from earthquakes, it eteates. An eacthquake, on tre other and the USS.R, prohibits underground We are certain that the state af knowl and, is generated when two blocks of fests of nuclear weapoas with a yield edge of seismology and the techniques the eavth's crust rapidly slide past each, lreater than 150 kiletons. In ihe present for monitoring seismic waves are suf}- other along the plane ofa fault Because slimate of widespread pressure or more cient to ensure that a feasible ceismic of this shearing motion an earéaquake ‘dlective control of nuclear arms the network could soon detect a clandes- radiates predominantly S-waves ‘es of a comprehensive ban on all au- tine underground testing. program in A result ofthe spherical symametry of lear testing is receiving renewed atter- volving explosions as statl as one kilo” the enplosion source i that all the se tion. Such an agreement would be an ton. In shart, the techaical capabilities mic waves it generates have a aearly ta. important measure. It might inhibit the needed 0 police a comprehensive test dial symmmetty around the faces of the development of new weapons by the ban down to explosions ef very small explosion, In Contrast, the highly dizee major nuclear powers, and it might also sige unquestionably exist; the issues to tional character of anearthquake source help to prevent the spread of nuclear be resolved are political gives rise 10 seismic waves with trons: ‘weapons technology to other countries Jy asymmetric patiorns. The symmetry 4 hallo all testing was te orginal An underground explosion sets up in te amplicode ofthe waves received goal of the negotiations that ied to une £\ clastic vibrations that propagate ax at selsmometers throughout ths world 1963 Limited Test Ban. New talks with seismic waves through the earth and provides the means whereby ismolo- the aim of achieving total bun were along is surface. The waves vavel great gists can determine tie faulting mech. bbegua in 197 by the US, the USSR. distances, and seismic monitoring in anism of @ given earthquake tnd Britain, but the talks Were suspends struments in common use are seasitive In addition to the Pand S body waves ‘ed in 1980. Tn both esses the main im- enough to record even those generat- there are aso two typesof seenic waves pediment to acomprehensive treaty was ed by very small explosions, Once the that propagate only over the surlace the contention by the US. and Britain waves have been detected the main task of the earth, They are called Rayleigh that compliance with the eaty could is to distinguish the selamie signals of waves and Love waves and they result ‘ot be verified because sufficiently amall explosions from those of earthquakes, from complex rellotions Of putt Of the vuadersround nuclear explosions could This can be done with x network of sev. body-wave energy inthe Upper Layers of not be reliably detected and identified, eral widely separated seismometers. the earthva crurt.A sample explosion ean, In July the Reagan Administration an- Two types of elastic vibrations can generate Rayleigh waves but not Love ‘nounced that the testtban negotiations propagate through the solid body of the aves, whereas ancarihqueke generates with the USSR. and Britain will aot be arth that is, through the crust and the Waves of both typen ‘resumed. Once again the primary reason rvanile, The Brst waves to arrive at a Seiamologists characterize the size of given was a lack of confidence in meth- seismometer are compressional waves, aseismic event by means of magnilces, ‘ods of verifying compliznes whieh are similar to sound waves in A given event can be assigned several 3 NUMBER OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS PER YEAR us. ‘mageitudes, each one based on a difer: 7 ‘enthind of seismic wave. A magnitude s the logarithm of the amplitude ofa par Hula ype of wave normalized for die tance and depth of focus. OF the numer- | ‘ous magnitudes that can be defined for 8 single seismic event we shal discuss FE H Daly tWo, which in seismological no- waves witha period of 20 seconds, the latter on one-second P waves The mag: nitude of aseismic signal is ultimately elated to the energy released at the ite Of the event, Fora nuclear explosion the customary measure of energy releaso is the yield in Kilotons, where one kilo- tom is the energy released by detonating 1,000 tons of TNT. ete eet wns nomena peemeeaayeae Sear oeiais SUaaiamraaee Sines memes oe pateatiea recent A Serge es : See oe “ | cite e Sees j Lenina eeeerr nor 10} iti) can be reliably classified by the amount | prada ee cede Sener a ear eaice sagt toned tee es nen eateanaret Sperry ae oes in ieee asa pra So oa Dee =a eens AA act Jteodeeitoernn See eee re Sor eee shores of the oeeans and on & fe crit t ical islands to measure pressure waves ¢ inseavater. The hydroacoustie signal of fan underwater explosion is s0 diferent NUCLEAR TESTS CONTINUE to be at~ a Hed guts sate f about 30 per jean, Pins eS ‘Spay by the Oro lading aucearweapons Deer the Sand the USSTC Ashe ar Treaty of 1963 (rote wea i) ‘nou te reduce the umber of test expe c Slane ba marty to dive moet thew ers T round Nica est explosions the stor 1S vaso 1088 Yasar ara {rom that of an earthquake and can be detected at such long range that the ‘entiication ofa seismic event at seu as tan explosion or an earthquake i simple and positive. Hence any event whose taleulated position sat Teast 25 kilome: ‘ersa sea (a margio allowing for errors) can be classified as an earthquake on the bass ofits location and the charac ter of is hydroscoustie signal ‘The accuracy with which the position of a seismic event ean be determined in fn area offshore of an island ure has been tested with an array of ocean-bot- tom scismometers off the Kamchatks Peninsula and the Kuril Islands inthe USSR. The tests indicate thatthe ae curacy ofa seismic network under these fircumstances is much better than 25 Iilometers. Holding to that standard, however, one finds that well over half ‘of the world’s seismic events are def- nitely at sea and are therefore easly ented as earthquakes ‘Another large group of detected events have their epicenters on land but in regions where no nuclear explosions are t be expected; these events too can be safely clasiied as earthquakes. In- eed, almost all the world's seismic ac tivity isin regions thatare of no concern for monitoring compliance witha com prehensive test ban. Thus the simple {ct of locating seimic events clashes ‘most of them as earthquakes (Ciculatine te depth of focus pro- vides a means of identifying a large fraction of the remaining earthquakes, From 93 to 60 peroeat of the world's fearthquakes are at depth of more than 30 kilometers) at least 90 percent are ‘more than 10 kilomsters deep. Any sie- mic event as deep as 15 lometers is certainly an earthquake. No one has yet Grilled into the earths crust as far down, 86 10 kilometers, andthe deepest nucle ar explosions have been at & depth of bout two Lilometers Several seismological procedures ean bbe employed to determine an event's depth of focus. In most cases the depth is caleulated at the same time as the 1 tion. When a seismic events detected at 20 stations or more, aroutine!y calculat- fed depth of 30 kilometers of more en fuces with 495 percent degree of cont dence thatthe event was at east 13 hilo meters below the surface. ‘A powerful technique for estimating depen can be applied if at least one seis mological station is within a few hun: dred Kilometers of the detected event. (A monitoring necwork for a compre: hensive test ban would be quite likely to ‘meet this condition in areas where tu clear testing might be expected.) A pal of P and $ waves generated atthe same instant and recorded by a station neat the event follow identical paths but propagate at diferent speeds, The dif: ference in their times of acrival, ia Love wave RAVEN wave FOUR TYPES OF SEISMIC WAVE are ilustrted, The two waves atthe throogh compresional body waves called P fer primary) waves eel fastest ad ae teh on sive ata sekmonnear they are the predominant type of oly wave prodeced bya ‘round explosion The lower boy waves called S (or shear o seconde) wavs bese tea lan anmveseo thee dreton of propagation they are the predominant peo boy wae froduced by an earthquake. The setae waver called Rayigh wares aed Love eee se {From complerreections af the P and body waver the upper lye the othe ee, ‘other words the diference in their phas- quakes from explosions is impressive. fe therefore serves to determine the More than 90 percent ofall eartnquakes time of origin ofthe event. With experi- either are under oceans oF are at east 30 fence the seismograms of a station near Kilometers deep (or both). Most of the the event can be successfully analyzed remaining earthquakes are of itl inlee- todeteet atleast one pair of sch Pand.S est because they sre in countries that are phases. Given the time of origin deter. unlikely to be testing nuclear weapons ‘mined in this way and the arival times or in countries where clandestine testing of the P waver at only a few distant would be impossible For the Us. of Feceivers, an accurate estimate of the course, the USSR. is the counisy of depth of Tocus ean be made. prime interest About 75 percent of the ‘There may remain critical seismic re- earthquakes in and near the USSR are gions where nearby stations donot exist, in the eastern part of the Coury near Data from large events can then be em- the Kamchatka Peninaula and the Kea Ployed to refine the calculated depth rile Islands, Almost all ofthe shocks in and location of smaller events. The es- these areas either have @ focal depth sence of the technique isto correct the greater than 50 kilometers or are well ‘observed times of small events by noting offahore It turns out that seismic events the differences between the observed whose calculated position ison land ia fand the calculated times for a large the USSR, of lessthan 23 kilometers at {vent in the same area, The procedure's sea and whove calculated dept i less in routine use by several networks. than $0 Kilometers constitute only about ‘The combined clfectiveness of loca- 5 percent of the world's earthquaes. tion and depth in distinguishing earth- This amounts to about 100 earthquakes 5 per year with an m, magnitude greater outward) the frst P-wave motion in than 3.8 for which other seismic dis- an earthquake can be either upward or Criminants must be employed. downward. None of the meusures we have dis. An important {actor contributing to ‘cussed so far relies oa the detailed char. the separation of earthquakes from es fcteristics of the waves radiated. by _plosions on an Ms: ms diagram ithat P facthquakes and explosions. Several waves {rom the two Kinds af events have Powerful discriminant are based on diferent radiation putierns, Explosions those characteristics, in particular on radiate short-period P waves equal) in the relative amounts of energy in waves all directions wherees earthquakes Bave of diferent types and periods. For ex: very asymmetric patterns. Hence most ‘mpl a shallow earthquake generates earthquake sources show a decrease of 2O.second Rayleigh waves with ampli- from 4 to one magnitude unit from the tudes atleast several times greater than peak values when the P-wave ampli those of an explosion tha feleases the fudes are averaged over pertinent radi sme amount of energy. In the noation- tion angles. A simple explosion does not Practive of seismology the compari- initially radiate aay shear waves, earth son of the two magnitudes isreferred to quakes typically generate large shear 4s the Mg:my rato, that is, the ratio Waves. AS result Rayleigh waves gen- fof long-period to shart-period waves. erated by miny types of earthquakes have a larger amplitude than the corre second spectral discriminant is sponding. waves generated. by under based on the observation that long. ground explosion of the same my. petiod Pand Swaves ae rarely or ney. There isa characteratie time for the fr seen in association with explosions formation of the source of a seismic ‘but one type or the other is routinely event; the time is equal tO the maxic detected today by simple seismometers mum’ source dimension divided for most earthquakes that have @ one- by the velocity of source formation. The second Povave magnitude of at least source dimeasion for earthquakes is 45. More sophisticated seismic stations the length of the break where most of and more sophisticated analysis of the the short period energy ie released, it Signals could lower the magaitade at [rom three to 20 timer greater, depend: Which such waves can be detected. "ing on the state of stress in the rocks, ‘A third distinction is that surface than the radius ofthe cavity and shatter waves of the Love type are generated far zone of & comparable explosion, ‘The more siroagly by shallow earthquakes velocity of source formation for earth- than they are by underground explo- quaker it {rom somewhat less to much sons including even abnormal explo. less than the Velocity of shear waves in Sons Still another characteristic feature the rocks surrounding the fault, where Of the seismic signal from explosions ita the relevant velocity for explosions {hat the frst motion of the earth summa iy the velocity of shock waves nthe lated by P waves is always upward be. rock, which is essentially the velocity fauuse the explosion itself is directed of compressional waves, As a result ‘PATHS OF SEISMIC WAVES are traced ova cot scion of the ert Boy waves frm a ‘arthquake or an explosion wave trouth te cst td man leg he eared pts alot 2:5. pPand 9.4 pP wave a compressional ware that produced bythe tection aft P sravltrm the srtace ofthe crt at above a cathuale or am exloiom ag rave ‘hear wave that ris rom the conversion of pat a the comproaionl energy et apward ‘ove Into taneerse energy asthe P wave fected from te surface. Surface Waves sock ‘=: Rayelgh wares and Love waves alin opi a ample With isreming dep The Eypocenter the focal ein ofan eorthguake or a waderpound caplanioe toms Woche ‘wares adit. The epicenter the point om the earth srtace Src ever tne hypocentes 6 of these diferences in the size of the ‘source andthe velocity of source forma: tion the characteristic times for earth ‘quakes and explosions difer by a factor Gf from sx to 40, leis therefore not sut- Drsing that differences are observed be {een the shor-period Povave spectra cof earthquakes and explosions Observations of several US. explo. sions have demonsirated the existence fa phenomenon called overshoot. [eis felated to shock waver in strong rock, butitcanbe thought of asthe equivalent Of cavity pressure rising to high valucs followed by a decrease in pressure by & factor of four or five: the lower pres: sure is then maintained for many tens of seconds, Overshoot, when it occurs, provides additional Pwave spectral dit rimination and augments diserimins tion by means of the Mg:my ratio for larger events ‘was once thought that an explosion ‘could aot give re toany Lave waves tall, A phenomenon that was of prest Significaace in thwarting President Ken nedy’s alfert to achieve a comprehen: sive test-ban treaty in 1963 was the ob Servaton that aay Underground nucle far explosions at the U.S. testing sie in "Nevada, particularly those in hard rock, senerated unmistakable Love waves ‘The fallure of the qualitative criterion “No Love waves fom explosion®” (at 8 time when such quantitative eriteria 1s the comparison of the magnitudes Of long-period and short-period waves were not adequately established) left selamologists unable to guarantee their ability to distinguish the seismic waves of underground explosions from those of earthquakes ‘The presence of Love waves in the Nevada tests has since been explained ‘What was not considered inthe earist lyse was th influence ofthe natural ‘Kresed state of the earth on the waves feenerated by an explosion. The creation ff a cavity and its surrounding shatter ‘cone by an underground explosion leads to the release of some of the natural sires, which in turn generates seismic ‘waves equivalent to those of a amall ‘earthquake, including Love waves The observed waves are a superposition of the waves from the explosion and {rom the zelease of the sre, ‘he release of natural ses alo al ters the amplitude of Rayleigh ‘waves ‘The perturbation has never been large enough, however, to put in doubt the ature ofan event identified by the rato of long-period to short-period waves Only rarely docs the perturbation sinit- icantly afect the amplitude of P waves; itisnot known eve tohave changed the Aireetion of their fret motion. More: ‘over, ifthe magaitude Ma ie deteremined feom Love waves rather than Rayleigh ‘waves, the ratio method (Ma:m,) pro- vides an excellent ditcriminant. LOVE WAE RALEIGH NAVE | r| | | | Powe le aT Jb [RADIATION PATTERNS af the P wave euting from a wader {und explson (a In short, if seismotogists had done their homework thoroughly by 1963, the nations ofthe world might well have achieved s comprehensive test-ban rea 'y then. Today the release of natural Stresses inthe earth is significant only as {perturbing factor that mut be taken into account when the yield of sn explo- son is estimated from Rayleigh waves, ‘Reports that earthquakes occasional ly have My: my vales like those of ex plosions have been cited as a factor that ‘might impede the effective monitoring of a comprehensive test ban. In aaly2. ing large set of earthquakes inal parts ofthe world and of underground explo- sions in the US. and the USSR. we found only one example ofthis kind of ambiguity. The focus of the event was far Grom the area in which the seismome ler network gave its best results, In 1972, ata meeting of the UN Com- mittee on Disarmament, the US. sub- milted a Tst of 25 “unomalous” events that were said tobe indicative ofa probe lem in discrimination. In 1976 the 25 ‘events were reanalyzed by one of us (Sykes) and two otter selsmologsts, Robert Tathum and Donald Forsythe It was established that about half of the events had My:my values that put them clearly in the eafthquake populstion. Most of the original magnitudes had been determined from only one or two statloas, and much existing informe tion had not even been consilted. When the records of other available stations ‘were examined the events ceased to be “anomalous” For the remaining problem events ‘Mam, measurements based on 20-se. fond Rayleigh waves gave values in the ‘ange characterise of explosions, Se: ral of these events were at depths of {rom 25 0 0 kilometers, where the pow sibility of nuclear testing can be exclud- fd in aay case, But the magnitide ratio fonetheless demanded explanation. [t's ‘Known {rom seismological theory that certain types of earthquakes at these depths excite long-period “Rayleigh ‘waves poorly. The theory predicts, how: ver, that Love waver and vibrations called higher-mode Rayleigh waves are in many instances vigorously generated in these circumstances. An analysis of recordings of the Love waves and the higher-mode Rayleigh waves identified several more of the problem events as ‘earthquakes, ‘Only a single sequence of events at ‘one place in Tibet remained as prob- Tem. tn that region underground auclear testing is unlikely, but the nature ofthe events could not be determined with cer {ainty from the magnitude ratios. We think the reason i that with the selsmo- fsraphic networks of the 1960% when the events were recorded, Love’ waves ‘ould not be detected for small-magn {ue events because they were obscured by background earth noise. New instal Sip aut, shown her, the Fourlobed radon {he sta for bath P waves and Rapligh wave es siple pois {ion ofthe thresinentnal Povare co lations and new modes of data process ing have greatly reduced the problem. If the same series of events of a similar series were to take place today, we think they would be identified unamsbiguous. 1y. Long-period selamographe in bere holes and routine digital processing of seismograms lead to a suppression of background noise and increate the de- teetabilty of many types of waves, in cluding Love waves. ‘As it happened, the nature of the Ti betan probiem sequence was resolved in spite ofthe inadequacies ofthe long-pe od data ofthe time. Atseveral stations he first motion of the P waves was downward, whichis aot possible for an ‘explosion. Hence the events must have been small earthquakes, seems reasonable to say that forthe networks we shall describe below there should no longer be any problem events ft my 4 or more. We know of no Eur asian earthquake vith a one-second P- ‘wave magnitude ofr more inthe past 20 years whose waves are clatsifid as those of an explosion. (OF course, nu merous smaller Eurasian earthquakes luring tha period went unideatined be ‘cause of inadequate dita) Furthermore, {0 our knowledge not one out of sever- al hundred underground nuclear expio. sons set off inthe same period radiated selumic waves that could be mistaken for those of an earthquake. Our experi ‘ence indicates an extremely low probe 7 bility that an event wil remain unidest-sciemic network that would be needed to was not st off during or soon after a fied when all he available techniques of very compliance with a comprehen- large earthquake; If one must consider Aiscriminntion ae brought to bear. sive test bin Two kinds of network can the possibility that a country would try be considered for maintaining seismic oevade a test-ban treaty by decoupling, Npmositorng tchnology can ofer surveillance of the USSR. Ove net- oc mulling, an explosion and thee ‘ababsoluteassurance that even the work consists of 15 stations outside the reducing the amplitude of the emited smallest ict explosion would be de- borders of the USSR. In the second seismic signals, an improved network tected, We presume that an ability to networkthe IS external stationsaresup- would be required, In principle such detect and identify events whose seismic plemented by 15 internal ones. ‘uulling could te done by detonating ‘magnitude i equivalent to an explosive" The ultimate limiton the detection of the explosion in a large cavity or bY Yield of about one Kloton would be ad- seismic signals is imposed by micro- using energy-absorbing material ina quate tis often assumed that for the Seisms, or random vibrations of the smaller cavity. The former stratagem USS. to subscribe t0 a comprehensive earth's surface, Most microseisms are might reduce the seismic sigaal of an twat ban it would require 90 percent con- induced by the earth's atmosphere and explosion by 1.9 magnitude units as fidence of detecting any violation by an- oceans. In order to detect a one-iloton measured by one-eond P waves (thal other party to the weaty. Developing a explosion in much of the USSR. a is, by ma). The later stratagem might few nuclear weapon, however, geneval- monitoring network Would have to be bring a reduction of one Uni lyrequiresaseries of tests, andthe prob- able torecogaize above the background The ute of an oversize cavity isclearly ability that atleast one explosion willbe noise any event with a shorvperiod P- the more worrisome possibilty, but it detected rises sharply as the number of Wave magnitude of 3.8 or mare. Ia or- could be attempted only in certain geo the tests is increased. Moreover, a 90 der to distinguish an explosion from an logic formations. a sult dome ora thick percentlevelof conidence orthe detec. earthquake by comparing the ong:perl- sequence of bedded salt deposits. Few tion of even asingle explosion probably od magaitude with theshort-period one, areas of the US.S.R. have Geporits of \s not needed. For a country secking t9 the network would also have to be able saltin which the construction ofa cavity evade the leat the expented probabil. todetectaurface waves withan Mymnag- large enough for decoupling a several ty of detection would certainly have to nitudeof2.3ormore. Theaetworkot 15 iloton explosion would be posible be less than 30 percent, and perhaps external stations could achieve these The maximum size of a cavity that such less, even if oaly one ilieit test goals Indeed, since almort all the seis could reasonably be constructed and ‘were planned. The testban agreements mic areas of the US.S.R. are along ils maintained sets a limit of two Kilotons that have been considered over theyears borders, the external network would be on explosions that might be mulled ia All include an “escape clause” through —seostive to events of even smaller mag- this way and escape detection by the ‘whicha country could renounceitsrea- nitude there. The mere detection of a 1S-sation external network. {y, obligations. Unless the probability Seismic eventin most areas of the inter Another way to reduce the amplitude of detestion were very low a country or would contitute Mentifeation ofthe of radiated seismic waves is by detonat ‘whose national interest seemed to de- event as an explosion. ing anexplosion inalow-coupling medi- ‘manda resumption of testing wouldpre- ~The lower limit of one kiloton on the um such asdry alluvium, The maximum sumably invoke the escape clause rath yield of an explosion that could be de- thickness of dry alluvium inthe USSR. ‘er than risk being caught cheating, tected by an external network is based setsalimitof 10 kilotons on explosions ‘Given these standards of relisbiliy oa the assumption thatthe coupling be- that might be concealed by this means, for 1 monitoring system, itis possible t9 tween the explosion and the telamic ra- again assuming that only the 13 exter” specify the size andthe sensiviy ofthe diationisefcientand thatthe explosion nal stations were installed. agone eammouace SerrOuSGR 8 are mye mn il nan Sg il floret ‘sureAce wes smog NG rEON WARE son mart me pu rs ee Ty SEC een area ae ee ee rd De acetauas eee ena Gem eaee eemeree Somes Some nee oes Sere eames | eee eee rors cee ee cag gees See eames Phe oat eee eer | Somerset ‘Another possible drawback of an ex clusvely external network should be ‘mentioned. Coafusion could arse when Signals from two or more earthquakes reached a station simultaneously. ‘The effect would be most troublesome when the long-period waver from small vent in the US SR arrived at the same time as similar waves from a much arg: er earthquake elsewhere in the World Under these circumstances it might be ificule to establish with certainty by comparing My with my the ideaty of the event in the USSR: With anetwork of 15 external staiions there would be a Tew events per year in which the smal earthquake was in the territory of the USSR. or within 25 klometere of its borders and at a depth of less than 50 Kilometers _Amositoring network mae up of 15 ‘eismographic stations outside the USSR and 15 inside it would large 'y eliminate the problem of coincident earthquake signals and would greatly reduce the maximum yield of an explo lon that might escape detection even if decoupling were atiempied. ‘The inter- nal monitoring stations would be simple Unattended ones, withthe eapabiliy of measuring vertical ground motion and vo orthogonal components of horizon- tal motion, so thatthe distance and di- rection of a nearby event could be esti- mated from the data of & single short. Fange station. With such a network in place, and assuming that moufling was auempted in the presence of normal arth noise, the Largest explosion that Would have a 30 percent chance of e3- caping detection in any setting except salt dome would be > Kloten. For salt domes the main area of con: etn in the USSR. is the region north fof the Caspian Sea. Our hypothetical network has three sitions there. Even, 2 small explosion in a large salt-dome ‘cavity would emit certain Pand S waves with an amplitude large enough to be Aetocted ‘by nearby stations, Further ‘more, detection by even one of the sa tions would immediately identify the event as an explosion besause the area has no natural seismic activity. As are sult evasion would not be likely to be attempted at'a yield grester than one Kiloton even in the salt dome area, ‘A posible strategy for evasion that has been mentioned from time 1 time i the one of hiding the sez signal of & nuclear explosion inthe signal of large ‘earthquake, which might be near the site of the explosion or far fom it For the USS.R-the only credible possibility is a distant earthquake because the only possible testing sites where earthquakes fre frequent enough to make the effort ‘worth while are on the Kamehatka Pe: ‘insula and ia the Kurile Islands, Clan destne testing there ie not likely beens selamle activity inthe area canbe mon % i A 2 B g EXPLOSIONS ek epee A "7 a = a5 $ co 7 MAGNITUDE OF ONE SECOND BEY WAVES ima (CLEAR DISTINCTION between earthquakes and cxpsons evden a hs plot ofthe Imazaltede of long-period srface waves (My) agin tat of short pred dy anes fon ‘The 385 carthavakes represented by the Mack dts were compiled fm 9 ofa the sare quakes recnded woe n'a armor ped hut ht ty va 3 mone {local depth of law than 30 kilometer, (Tere are fener dts than earthonkee bee ara events This sage event, which hal the saat magne of any o the etthqees a te Surrey, took place nthe soutawest Pacite Oceana togion mere the sesiiy ofthe nee ‘rer of sisson poorer than rin mnt of tne NerthersHemiopere Thome sano ‘Were adjusted to take lat ecountrepana rarnins athe amplitudes of snort peied waves METHODS OF DISTINGUISHING earthquakes trom explosions were tested by applying ‘he methods ol the eathgoakes with mayuitadn of 43 of marerecorded duro a Ta2-dat betel 1972 any of them coud be clastic a earthe tored in detail from tations in Japan ones the only effective evasion schemes From the viewpoint of verification a find the Aleutian islands Indeed, ocean- at yields of one kileton or more would comprehensive test ban would actually bottom seismometers and hydroscous- require both decoupling and hiding the extablish the equivalent of a very low Uesensors could be placed justoffshore. explosion signal in an earthquake, threshold, since weapons of exiremely "The frst defense again! evasion by Tow yield could bo tested underground the mashing of tet ina large eatth-- *[*he isues relating to the monitor- without the certainty of being detected {quake is the questionable feantbiity of Ling of a comprehensive text ban can and identified. A tealy that imposed a the subterfuge. Unless the evader main- be summarized as follows. The undet- threshold near the limit of seismological tained severtl testing siteythenamber of standing of seismology and the testing monitoring capability might therefore ‘opportunites per year for clandestine of seiemometer networks are suficien- be considered an altersative 10 a com: texting would be quite Limited In addi- ly complete to ensure that compliance test ban, Such a treaty might tion the evader would have to maintain with a treaty could be verified with @ ble to the preset quite igh his weapons in constant readiness for highlevel of confidence. The only explo- threshold, but it would have the dis- fring. To attain the evasion capability sions witha significant likelinood of e- advantage that arguments could aise fives below he would have toaet off an caping detection Would be those of very Over the exact veld of tests made neat Explosion within 100seconds of the time small yeld:lesethan one Alloton provid: the tweshold. Indeed, the judgment of ff arival ofthe short-period waves of ed the monitoring system includes sta. Whether or not atesthas taken place Wi the earthquake. He would have teat tons in the USSR. always be less equivocal than an exact ‘mate the maximum amplitude and the _Itisimportant to view the question of determination of yield. ‘lecuy rate ofthe earthquake waves with yield inthe context ofthe nuclear weap- Tn recent years there have been re: high accuracy, and he would have to be ons that have been tesied up to sow. poristhat the USSR may have repeat. Certain ofthe amplitide of the P vaves The ones that ushered in the nuclear edly violated the 1976 treaty by testing {encrated by the explosion to within age in 1945 had a yield of from 15 to devices with a yield greater than the ‘magnitude unit Even alter taking these 20 klofons, Yields increased rapidly to 130-tloton limit. Such reputed Viola. precautions the evader would have to the point where the USSR. tested thoes were revenily cited as evidence fceopt a high probabil that the event a'38,000-Kilotoa weapon in 1961. The thatthe threshold treaty, which has not Would be detested by atleast one mon- largest underground explosion had a been ratied by the US. Senate, i not Xoring station and a small probability yield of almost 3,000 kllotons.Unclassi-yerifable and should be renegotiated. that three stations would detect it He fed reports place the yield ofthe weap. Onthe basis of eur analysis we conclude ‘would also have to install and operate ons carried by intercontinental missles thatthe reports are erroneous; they are Is testing site incuding a large cavity) in the range from 40 to 9,000 kilotons, based on a miacalibration of one of the ‘and his own seismological network in The yielés of underground explosions curves that relates measured. seismic {olal sectecy over period of years. that might go undetected or unidentiied magnitude to explosive yield. When the Tn contrast to these daunting require. under a comprehensive test ban are correct calibration is employed, itis ap- ments for succesful evasion, the only therefore mich smaller than those of parent that none ofthe Russian weapons Fequitements for a monitoring nation the fist nuclear Weapons. I the thesh- tess exceed 130 kilotons, although sev fare to operatea network of high-quality old of reliable detection and ident eral come close ot Seismic stations and to process the data fication is one uloton, that is only Observations atthe Nevada Tes Site ‘with determination. Against a network one-1S0th ofthe limit specified by the (NTS), where American nvclear-veap- (of 15 external stations and 15 internal Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1976. — ons tests are held indicate there are lin ‘THRESHOLDS OF DETECTION for smi events i the Eastern ‘Hemisphere are delineated y thet St of contours dan om tis Pair a map ora proposed etvork a ses Satins establish ithe USK Colored dou pve he locaton 912 of the St. thre others ae of the maps. The mimber on eaeh contour in (hata event of that magne or argon as at let 490 10 IMPROVED DETECTION THRESHOLDS far sebnic events in (he tanere Hernpere are by ie to oo ‘drawn on ts pir t ape fers propovednetnek of 3 stomle Sonu ouside the USSR. and 1S nse Far mat ofthe USS ecto adding Ue 15 terior sations woul bet lower the de car correlations between the logarithm fof the explosive yield and the two mag nitude values, Mg and ma, for explo sons with yields greater than 100 kilo. tons. When the measured My aad i, ten values of explosions at the Ris site near Semipalatinsk are inserted into the NTS formulas, however the result: ing esimates of yield given by my are ‘more than four times as great as those siven by Mg. For explosions in hard Fock at many ist sites estimates of yield based on the NTS. My formula have invariably agreed. with actual yields, Whereas estimates based on the NYS me Formula have sometimes been in drastic

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