INSTITUTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, foreign policy-making in European countries was the concern of concerned

foreign office and the minister-in-charge. Secrecy was the motto of foreign policy-making.
Neither the public opinion was allowed to be formulated nor even national parliaments
normally debated foreign policies.
But, in a parliamentary democracy as in India, decision-making in foreign policy is highly
diffused. It is difficult to decide as to who makes a policy decision, and at what level was it
decided. Thus, it is necessary for us to know foreign policy decision-making process.
Whe we use the ter pro ess it a suggest that de isio -making is a smooth flow
amongst the predetermined participants. But often, foreign policy-making is a zigzag
process. All participants do not necessarily participate in all decision-making.
Yet it is accurate to say that foreign policy in India, broadly speaking, is finalised by the
Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister.
A globalizing geopolitical environment crucially also comes into play, particularly concerning
the growi g i pa t of I dia s usi ess o u ity, edia and diaspora. This greater
complexity also undermined the importance of analysing the different political stances and
persuasions within international relations, as well as the critical role played by political and
historical precedents.
Moreover, the making of foreign policy in India shows how the process is often actor-
specific and leadership driven, with personality and charisma continuing to play a central,
deliberative role.
As per K. Subrahmanyam, I dia foreig poli y was always a leadership function and more
ofte tha ot did ot o a d a o se sus.
However, even though in India, the political leadership gives final shape to its foreign policy,
but it is largely the outcome of inputs from various institutions in the government, the most
important instrument being the Ministry of External Affairs.
 PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE –
INVOLVEMENT IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

Overview
Over time, the office of the head of the Cabinet – the PMO – has taken on a greater role in
foreign policy making. The PMO includes officials on deputation from the MEA, who serve as
working-level advisors on foreign policy – especially on those issues in which the Prime
Minister has a personal interest or those considered to need the highest level of attention.
After Nehru s death, greater e phasis as put o the PMO as the ful ru of foreig poli
making, leading to the further centralization of power away from Parliament.
Institutionalised under Shastri, the PMO has gradually assumed many functions previously
undertaken by other ministries, giving any Indian prime minister greater control over both
domestic and foreign policy.
It is well known that parliamentary government became cabinet government and gradually
after the Second World War, it has increasingly become Prime Ministerial government.
Since then PM has become very important in all the decision- making processes. Prime
Mi ister s Offi e PMO plays a major role in policy formulation including foreign policy
decision-making.
However powerful a PM is, he/she cannot decide every issue relating to the foreign policy.
Naturall o l su h issues hi h a PM thi ks is i porta t for I dia s se urit , foreign policy
goals or e o o i de elop e t or that is ital to part s sta di g i the ou tr a d his
own power and prestige ould e de ided i the PM s office.
In addition, the Prime Minister can appoint envoys on particular issues or regions of
importance. For example, in recent years there have been special envoys for climate change
negotiations, the India-US nuclear talks, Afghanistan – Pakistan issues, as well as
disarmament and non-proliferation. In the past, Indira Gandhi used an envoy to conclude
discussions on the India-Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1971.
Prime Ministers can also appoint task forces to focus on particular issues. One on global
strategic developments, for example, was set up in 2005 under the chairmanship of K.
Subrahmanyam with member from outside government, but with the NSC secretariat
(NSCS) providing support.

PM s Leadership i Foreig Poli

The relative influence of the Prime Minister has varied over time (with the power, interests,
and the style of functioning of the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, National Security
 Advisor (NSA) and Foreign Secretary). For example, some have identified the era of Indira
Gandhi as one of movement away from MEA to the PMO.
Because of such a concentrated power base, the importance of individual actors cannot be
overstated with regard to foreign policy making in India. Major policy initiatives have
frequently o e fro a leader s politi al capital and rhetoric – such as:
Gujaral Doctrine  Gujaral s redefi itio of I dia s relatio s ith her eigh ours
 ‘aji Ga dhi s re ersal of I dia s positio o her order ith Chi a
 Ma oha Si gh s e phasis o a ala ed ulti-polar Asia a d I dia ei g a
respo si le great po er. Focus on enhancing economic interdependence
 I dira Ga dhi s de elop e t of lose relatio s ith USS‘
 Narsi ha ‘ao s strategi eapo s progra e Modi doctrine since 2014
 Vajpa ee s e phasis upo e o o i li eralizatio a d glo alizatio Smart power, realism
pragmatism in IFP
K. Subrahmanyam had oted: I dian foreign policy is always a leadership function and
more often than not, does ot o a d a o se sus.
Furthermore, any such initiatives only become policy if they are successful, and if they
suita l arr together I dia s u derl i g se urit i terests with the overriding geopolitical
environment.

Constituents of PMO
The PMO includes large number of joint-Secretaries, deputy-secretaries, OSDs and other
officials, each dealing with different aspects of Prime Ministerial functioning.

Involvement of the Principle Secretary

But there have been more recent instances of principal secretaries being involved in the
foreign policy formulation as well. For example, Brajesh Mishra, Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpa ee s pri ipal se retar , as considered by some to have essentially functioned as
NSA even before he took on that role formally.
He not only discussed a wide range of foreign policy issues but also made public policy
pronouncements on several occasions. He had also hinted at important foreign policy
decisions on visits to other countries. This also provoked media reaction that National
Security Adviser is overshadowing the Minister of External Affairs.

Conclusion
Foreign policy in India is currently made by a select few through the dominant power base
of the PMP and the prevailing influence of the prime minister, especially over institutions
such as MEA. At the same time, the scope of foreign policy making influences in
u dou tedl roade i g, as I dia s e pa di g i ter atio al i teraction demands the
involvement of more disparate voices and opinions.
Therefore, while the process may not be fully transparent, we can no longer consider the
formation of foreign policy to be dominated by any one individual leader or indeed any
single political party, as the range of foreign policy making stimuli has multiplied in recent
decades.
 MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is the principle governmental instrument for the
formulation and implementation of foreign policy. It is expected to provide intelligent,
accurate answers to the questions that are supposed to be the storehouse of expert
knowledge on foreign affairs.
The Minister of External Affairs (sometimes called Foreign Minister) is the head of the MEA.
He is the political appointee, member of the Cabinet, not necessarily an expert in foreign
affairs decision -making. But, all policy and decisions recommended by the experts in the
Ministry are cleared, or modified, by the Minister before their implementation. Several
policy decisions cleared by the Minister require final approval of the Cabinet.
In a number of instances, sitting Prime Ministers such as Nehru, P.V. Narsimha Rao,
Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh have also held this position, albeit for different duration.
The relative power of all External Affairs Ministers has varied depending on the Prime
Mi iste ’s i te ests a d p efe e es, as ell as the elati e le el of i flue e a d e pe tise
of the person holding the office.
Under Nehru, many observers had already discerned the marked influence of one
i di idual’s ie of the o ld a d its eaffirmation by the exclusive but largely powerless
elite entrusted with its implementation. This trend continued under Indira Gandhi, leading
to the inadequate development of institutions to organize and conduct foreign policy; the
low salience of foreign policy concerns in public opinion; the weakness of popular political
and legislative inputs; and the low correlation between foreign policy as conceived and
articulated by decision makers and national interests in security and geopolitical terms.
In fact, many External Affairs Ministers were seen as little more than relay systems for the
views of their professional bureaucrats, reading out the speeches and talking points
presented to them. In one or another respect, therefore, India’s i iste s of e ternal affairs,
with very few exceptions, never quite emerged as credible and autonomous sources of
policy-making, let alone strategic thinking, in their own right, and in their failure to do so
they vacated the policy-making arena to the prime minister.

Structure and Composition

The Foreign Secretary is the senior-most bureaucrat in the ministry, responsible for overall
supervision and coordination
The Indian Foreign Service (IFS) officials, selected through the competitive examinations
conducted by the Union Public Service Commission, primarily man the MEA. The Foreign
Secretary is a very senior and experienced IFS officer, and the permanent head of the
Ministry. He is an important adviser to the Foreign Minister. There are two other senior
officials to assist the Foreign Secretary known as Foreign Secretary (West), and Foreign
Secretary (East).
These officials normally are very senior persons chosen to head the work in MEA. There are
three additional secretaries to assist Foreign Secretary. The work of MEA is divided into 24
divisions. A joint secretary heads each division. There are 12 territorial divisions, dealing
with a group of countries belonging to a limited region like Canada and America, Latin
American and Caribbean countries, Gulf, East Asia etc. There are eleven functional divisions
like Protocol, External Publicity, Historical, Policy Planning, and the UN etc.
The number of divisions has varied over time; with regions or issues rising to the forefront,
new divisions can and have been created.
In addition, MEA official reach out to outside experts, depending on need. Overall, there
continues to be very limited lateral entry into the ministry, but those entering the IFS
include engineers, doctors, and individuals with management degrees.

Indian Foreign Services

Bureaucratic positions in the MEA are largely staffed by officers of the IFS, a service
established just before independence to conduct Indian diplomatic, consular and
commercial activities abroad.
India is served by the smallest diplomatic corps of any major country, not just far smaller
than the big powers but by comparison with most of the larger emerging countries.
India has the fewest foreign service officers among the BRICS countries. It is ironic that India
– ot just the o ld’s ost populous de o a ut o e of the o ld’s la gest
bureaucracies – has a diplomatic corps oughl e ual to ti Si gapo e’s. The size and
human capacity of the IFS suffers by comparison with every one of its peers and
interlocutors.
To remedy the ills affecting the services, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri had appointed a
committee on the foreign service, headed by N. R. Pillai in 1965.
Pillai Committee
The Pillai Committee was asked to review the structure and organization of the Indian
Foreign Service, with particular reference to recruitment, training and service conditions,
and to consider other matters conducive to the strengthening and efficient functioning of
the services at headquarters and abroad.
Every one of these conclusions could be repeated today.
Weaknesses: The Pillai report discerned four basic weaknesses in the Foreign Service and
the MEA:
 1. The diplomatic corps was not large enough and did not draw on wide professional
experience
2. Coordination within the MEA was poor
3. Coordination with other ministries was which dealt with foreign policy was almost
non-existent
4. Finally, the professional training was limited, and, where it existed, inadequate.
Recommendations:

 It urged increased recruitments and the selection of older professionals

 Revival of the post of secretary-general, abolished by Shastri upon the appointment
of a full-time foreign minister
 To facilitate coordination of policy and administration within the MEA and with other
ministries
 Better training facilities as well as increased specialization in the foreign office
The Pillai report also stressed the importance of the non-political aspects of diplomacy,
calling particularly for greater economic and commercial expertise.
Moreover, lateral entrants have also not been encouraged because of the hierarchy minded
u eau a . I toda ’s multilateral diplomacy, for instance, the MEA needs expertise that it
cannot provide from its own ranks. For instance, climate change has become a hot-button
diplomatic issue that needs to be discussed and negotiated in multilateral forums where
other delegations rely on technical and scientific expertise that they find indispensable, but
which the MEA eschews because it is unwilling to look beyond its own rank.
In an era when a certain level of specialization is considered essential by many foreign
ministers, Indian diplomacy still abounds in talented generalists.
According to Shashi Tharoor, at a time when the country is seen as stretching its global
sinews, the frugal staffing patterns of its diplomatic service revels a country punching well
below its weight on the global stage.

Embassies
The IFS officials are sent abroad to man the Embassies in different foreign capitals. Besides
other functions, the embassies actually act as the official centres for collecting information
on developments in the foreign countries. They gather information that may not be openly
available in the country.
 INSTITUTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

The Parliament
Since the time of Nehru, the Indian Parliament has demonstratively placed limitations on the
exercise of executive authority in the broader domain of international affairs. But this does not
mean that Parliament’s dictate India’s approach to the world, in the same way as Germany.
Rather, the Indian system resembles that of the UK system.

Yet, 60 odd years of India’s political history is rife with instances of executive authority being
checked in matters of foreign policy.

Moreover, the interest of Parliamentarians in foreign affairs have heightened over the years.
Like others in the political class, members of the Parliament have generally become more
outward looking.

Constitutional Role in Foreign Policy Making

In the early years, there was no dedicated session on the Parliament and Foreign policy, apart
from the particular instances of discussion on non-alignment. Rather, heated discussions with
regards to emerging alliances and membership to the commonwealth obscured any serious
attention to the functional jurisdiction of the Parliament in shaping foreign policy. The defining
role of the Parliament in the construction of the foreign policy was largely left to the legal
lettering of the Constitution.

As per the 7th Schedule, question of foreign policy was left to the centre. State Legislature
has no legal jurisdiction in this domain.

Further, treaties could be entered into without the need for a vote in the Parliament. War
could be declared without a formal authorization by the Parliament. This is different than the
system in the US where many of the features that offer US senators and representatives
powerful voice in influencing parliamentary system or else operate only in an attenuated way.
Mechanisms
1. There is no legal mechanism by which the government is required to seek Parliamentary
endorsement in the persuit of foreign policy, except for extreme measures such as the
vote of no confidence.
2. Parliament can exercise financial control on the budgets allocated by the Cabinet for a
variety of activities. Example : The role of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the
External Affairs is one example of this limited mandate. Like other such committees, its
powers and basically advisory. It comments on the proposed budget of MEA. It
examines and reports on bills pertaining to MEA and can act as a sounding board when
the government is considering new approaches. It can also originate new studies of its
own on foreign affairs related matters, which are publicized and can have an impact on
public and political opinion. The committees may not have the authority to reshape the
government’s policy, but the latitude to reshape the government’s decisions does force
ministers to explain the government’s reasoning.
3. Members of Parliament may propose motions and resolutions to deliberate on a range
of issues, and doing so, push the government to justify its decisions.
4. Observable limitations have also been placed because of what might be called the
paradox of majority governance. Although a government which commands majority
support in Parliament, does not require parliamentary approval for the conduct of
foreign policy but there is a much greater need to enjoy and maintain legitimacy.
NEHRU had little hesitation in acknowledging that external affairs will follow internal
affairs.

Parliament and Foreign Policy

1. International Arrangements: Parliamentary security with respect to international
arrangements was evident when in 1949, the Prime Minister moved the resolution for
the continued membership in the commonwealth, despite considerable criticism from
within the Congress Parliamentary Party members of the constituent Assembly. This
reinforced the popularly held view that Nehru was only lightly checked by domestic
forces.
2. Dealing with Neighbours : Domestic pressure was also evident in responding to
international alliances forged in India’s neighbourhood.
a) Pakistan :In 1954, following President Eisenhower’s decision to enter into a Mutual
Defence Pact with Pakistan, Nehru’s government found itself pressured within India
 from both the right and the left. The Central aim of the opposition led by CPI was to
make sure that the government aid not embraces a similar agreement offered by
Eisenhower- with USA.
In the end, what is clear is that the Prime Minister was pushed into making
sharper statements against the Pact and America more generally. Once again, the
efficacy of the opposition – even in minimal numbers-was telling.
b) China : The feedback loop between opposition demands including those from within
the Congress and the government’s approach is evident in two instances.
I. Swapping Territories : While the legislature has little legal authority in foreign
policy, changing territorial borders requires parliamentary approval.
II. Parliamentary pressure was noticeable immediately after the war of 1962 : In
exchange for western arms and military assistance, both the British and
American administration pushed Nehru to enter into negotiations with Pakistan
on Kashmir. However, any concessions remained out of question due to
opposition in Parliament, led by Vajpayee who even warned US & UK against
interfering in Kashmir issue.
Also, For the most part, scholars and analysts have focused on what they
deem to China’s unwillingness to conclude a border agreement with India. In
fact, what few have considered is the sheer difficulty in ratifying such an
agreement within India.

3. Exchange of Enclaves : Legislature check was also exercised in context of exchange of

enclaves with Bangladesh , which merely reflected formalizing lines and boundaries
accepted by the Radcliff Award, but which could not be implemented in 1947 because
of the hastened way in which Bengal was partitioned.

To do so, a constitutional Amendment- in accordance with provisions outlined in Article

368 of the Constitution would, according to the bench, be necessary and needed to be
passed with 2/3rd majority in both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. The Constitution
Amendment bill, initially introduced in 2013, to give effect to the Gandhi – Majibur deal
regarding the Land Boundary Agreement, was ultimately passed in 2015. In such cases,
the role of Parliament in the execution of foreign policy is all too evident.

4. Civil Nuclear Deal: Parliamentary confrontations affecting foreign policy outcomes occur
principally under coalition or minority governments. This almost happened in 2008
when four anti – US Left Front parties threatened to withdraw their support from Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh’s INC led coalition government following the announcement
of negotiating the civil nuclear agreement. This episode illustrates how a foreign policy
 negotiation can lead to high stakes parliamentary policies, which even led a major
opposition grouping headed by the BJP to demand a vote of no- confidence.
However, it was saved since the BJP’s suggestion was ambiguous from the start. In essence,
what the debates around the nuclear deal demonstrated was that opposition demands also
need legitimacy of their own.
Later, though, while passing the Nuclear Liabilities Bill, the opposition’s view had a lot more
merit and played a key role in pushing the government to include clauses in the bill (section
17(b) and 46) that ensured legal action could be taken against suppliers in the event of an
action caused by malfunctioning equipment.
In this case, the importance of parliamentary oversight and the role of Standing Committee
were also clear.
The present milieu is said to be one of which a shift is underway from what commentators
call centralized decision making process- arguably visible during the single party rule of the
Congress- to a decentralized process of foreign policy formulations.
 ROLE OF CABINET IN FOREIGN POLICY

The political body ultimately responsible for foreign policy-making is the Cabinet. The role of
any minister other than the Foreign Minister on foreign policy issues, however, has varied
according to the power and personality of the Prime Minister, the interests and relative
power of other ministers, as well as the issues involved.
Many o sider I dia’s first pri e i ister Ja aharlal Nehru, for e a ple, as only informing
the cabinet as a whole of foreign policy decisions rather than actually involving them in the
making of the decisions.
More recently, when coalition governments have been in place, the views of Cabinet
members - especially those representing coalition partners – have been critical in key
instances. More ofte tha ot, this is the ase o poli to ards I dia’s eigh ours.
The effect of domestic politics – coalition politics and the centre-state dynamic – on the
go er e t’s de isio aki g apa it as e ide t i o strai i g the a ilit of the e tral
government to strike a deal with Bangladesh on the sharing of water from the River Teesta
and in shaping the decision that the Prime Minister would not attend the Commonwealth
Heads of Government Meeting in Colombo.
The influence of the Cabinet can also be felt on the functional issues such as multilateral
trade negotiations, which involve the jurisdictions of various ministries and are thought to
have domestic political implications. While earlier such views might have stayed with the
Cabinet, with the changed media landscape, everyone has a megaphone – one that policy-
makers sometimes use to strengthen their hand in internal deliberations.
Prime Minister Vajpayee said in the context of India offering to cooperate with the United
States (US) in its fight against international terrorism after 11 September 2001 that in policy-
aki g de ates a d dis ussio s do take pla e as they meet. But once we take a position
e er o e falls i li e.

Cabinet Committees:
Cabinet is the inner circle of the Council of Ministers. But even Cabinet is too large a body to
take all policy decisions. The Cabinet has a sub-committee called Cabinet Committee on
Security (CCS), which decides most of the issues affecting vital foreign policy and national
security issues. Thus, within the government it is this CCS that gives final shape to foreign
policy and security related issues.
 NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER & NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL

The National Security Advisor is also becoming an important official. The NSA is part of the
National Security Council system and is the principle foreign and security policy advisor to
the Prime Minister. The NSA as also e isio ed as ei g the ha el for ser i i g the
National Security Council.
The appointment of the NSA is largely political and they are mostly chosen from the Foreign
services as well as intelligence organizations. They are awarded the rank of minister of state,
a prestigious subcabinet position senior to the foreign secretary. NSA gets rank of a Cabinet minister
‘eporti g dire tl to the er top as a e er of the Pri e Mi ister s Offi e, the NSA is a
key figure i I dia s atio al se urit a age e t stru ture.
The critics call attention to how badly the different parts of the structure function and how
ineffectively they interplay with one another. But there seems to agreement that the NSA
position or something like that it is required. Unless, as seems very unlikely, a prime
minister comes to power who wants to eliminate or radically change the role of the NSA,
the adviser will continue to be a key player in Indian foreign policy.
The NSA s responsibilities and physical proximity to the prime minister in the South Block
secretariat cement his leading role in formulating Indian and foreign security policy,
ensuring that it is properly implemented, and coordinating the policy input of the main
bodies in the National Security Council structure.
Some national security advisers have overshadowed incumbent foreign secretaries and
even foreign ministers.
The national security adviser and his office spend much of their time dealing with major
foreign policy issues involving countries most crucial for India, such as China, the United
States, and Pakistan. When the Prime Minister goes abroad, the NSA often advances his trip
and ordinarily accompanies him. Such travel, and the proximity to the PM it has afforded,
further e ha e the NSA s i flue e – provided, of course, that his activities are successful.

National Security Council

The NSC was established in 1999 by the Vajpayee government, after earlier failed efforts. It
is a deliberative body. It does not have a mandate to make decisions, but rather to think
through and discuss critical issue sin an integrated, long term fashion. Some cross-cutting
foreign policy are successfully discussed in this forum.
The National Security Council is chaired by the Prime Minister and its membership consists
of the external affair defense, home and finance ministers. Depending on the issue being
discussed, other ministers and officials can be invited to attend meetings of the NSC. For
e a ple, I dia s relatio s ith Nepal a i lude offi ials like the Chief of the I tegrated
Defense Staff, the Chief of Army Staff, as well as the principle secretary to the Prime
Minister.

Purpose:

 The task of foreign policy had become too complex

 India had acquired nuclear weapons. All the countries having nuclear weapons have
professional bodies like the NSC.
The PMO, NSC and NSA are supported by the NSCS, which provides them briefings and
advise. The National Security Council also has strategic and intelligence components. As part
of the constitution of the NSC system, the Joint Intelligence Committee, which earlier
reported to the Cabinet Secretariat, was folded into the NSCS. In addition, the strategic
programme staff within the NSCS aids the National Command Authority, which controls
I dia s u lear deterre t.
Another body which is part of the NSC system is the National Security Advisory Board
(NSAB). It has no executive authority; it is an advisory group with experts with different
backgrounds from outside government. Its mandate is to provide long-term prognosis and
analysis to the National Security Council and recommend solutions and policy options to the
issues raised by them.
 THINK TANKS AND UNIVERSITIES

OVERVIEW
Although I dia s thi k ta ks a d u i e sities ha e helped shape poli at so e pi otal
moments in the history of independent India, on most occasions they have proved less
influential than might have been expected.
The impact of universities and think-tanks i shapi g I dia s foreign policy has been
considerably less than it could or should be in a democracy.
The landscape of think-tanks and other such related non-governmental organizations
remains incipient (with some exceptions), offering research outputs often lacking the rigour
of many Western counterparts, and failing to garner international recognition.
Their positioning and efficacy are often determined by the relationships they maintain with
other related government institutions, particularly in a newly independent country like India
where the central government tends to maintain a tight grip on policy, particularly policies
dealing with external relations.

General Reasons for low impact:

1. If there is one o e a hi g easo fo the eag e fo eig poli i pa t of I dia s
universities and think-ta ks, it has ee the go e e t s dete i atio ,
particularly within its powerful bureaucracy, to jealously hold the policy reigns.
2. A second cause, however, is not government s fault at all: it is, athe , the e te t to
which Indian academic thinking on international relations has often distanced itself
from the parameters, limitations, and hard realities of foreign policy.

Recurring Strands in Indian Thinking About Foreign Policy and the

Institutional Context
The thinking about the external world has revolved around questions of ethics and justice in
the international system and a strong belief in multilateralism as the best means of dealing
with conflicts around the world.
After independence, the whole enterprise of foreign policy making became centralised in
the hands of the Prime Minister and his inner Cabinet. Even the MEA was restricted to policy
implementation only.
With the establishment of Policy Planning Review Division in 1966, an organization similar to
the i flue tial US State Depa t e t s Poli Pla i g Stuff as e isaged. But with no
outside expertise, with time the division came to be plagued with internal squabbles,
personality clashes, and ministerial rivalries. Indrani Bagchi has also described the division
as a de epit, i tuall defu t, pa t of the MEA, hi h is tu ked a a so e he e i the
o e he e the light of the da a el pe et ates .
In a research paper by Daniel Markey titled De eloping India’s Foreign Policy “oft are ’,
the author diagnoses the institutional easo s i pe di g I dia s ise to a g eat-power
status. He suggests impediments include: a shortage of staff in IFS; inadequate midcareer
training; indifference towards outside expertise; the often pitiable state of poorly funded
and highly regulated public universities; and the inability of think-tanks to conduct high-
quality policy research due to insufficient access to information or resources. These
elements need to e o side ed i the o te t of the la ge i stitutio al e olutio of I dia s
foreign policy making process and the role that universities play in it.

ROLE OF THINK-TANKS

A working definition of think-tanks relates more directly for informing and influencing
government policy; it does not pursue knowledge or understanding of foreign policy for
purely academic purposes.
Even though India has notionally the fourth largest number of think-tanks in the world after
US, China and the UK, most of its approximately 268 such institutions do not affect or
influence foreign policy-making in India in any significant way.
The quality of think-tanks related to foreign and security policy is mixed, and often below
world-standards, as reflected in the relatively low ranking of most of these institutions,
compared to their Western and a growing number of Asian counterparts.

Weaknesses:
 Think-tanks, universitites and the media and general public in India are
disadvantaged by a lack of access to policy information. The Official Secrets Act, a
lack of systematic timeline for declassifying diplomatic archives, and the evryday
reluctance of bureaucrats to talk candidly to reserachers lead to a lack of reliable
information about policy. This naturally affects the accuracy and policy-relevance of
what thinktanks can generate, even when equipped with quality researchers and the
best will in the world.
 In most of Indian think-tanks, there is no dearth of former-practitioner expertise in
policy-making at medium and higher levels, since retired ambassadors, servicemen,
and bureaucrats hold most of these positions. However, as Sanjay Baru points out,
most of these organizations offer little in the crucial area of middle-level intellectual
 leadership. Moreover, since the leadership is primarily comprised of former and
retired policymakers, with a reputational stake in existing policy, their conclusions
will tend to be prejudiced in favour of the status quo.
 Another problem is the lack of adequate funding. Even though Indian institutions
now urgently seek private funding, it remains for the most part elusive. In a situation
where neither the government nor the corporate sector is willing to fund them,
these institutions have been forced either to submit or to cast their net wider,
seeking international patrons.

All these issues notwithstanding, a few relatively successful stories emerge of Indian think-
tanks working on foreign and security issues which, even though they may have little direct
impact on foreign policy-making, are nevertheless influential in some ways.

Influence:
These include as both platforms for prominent thinkers and as convening hubs where
strategic and foreign policy elite can debate and discuss issues of international importance,
sometimes engaging with business, media, academics, foreign diplomats, and wider sections
of society.
These institutions also serve as hubs fo se o d t a k o i fo al diplo a ith othe
nations and their experts – a role increasingly undertaken by non-government and business
entities such as the Confederation of Indian Industry

Examples
1. The oldest think-tank in India is the Indian Council for World Affairs (ICWA) was
established in 1943, and subsequently declared a san institution of national
importance. Its contributions include playing host to the Asian Relations Conference
in 1947 and the United Nations and its New World Order conference in 1994.
After lying low for many years and developing something of a reputation as a
predictable platform for retired diplomats and the like to discuss familiar issues, the
council has boosted its research profile in recent times. In 2013, ICWA challenged
I dia a d fo eig poli thi ke s alike to e plo e the e Indo-Pacific’ construct
and its meaning for policy.

2. Set up in 1965 after the Sino-India war of 1962, the Institute for Defence Studies
and Analyses (IDSA) is ega ded as I dia s leadi g thi k-tank on strategic issues.
Funded by the Ministry of Defence, it functions autonomously and is mandated to
produce objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspect of defence and
security. The organization ascended under the leadership of K. Subrahmanyam, who
 had unquestioned impact on such pivotal security policy decisions as the 1971 war
which liberated Bangladesh and the 1974 decision to test a nuclear explosive device.
IDSA also provides annual training programmes to Indian military and civilian
officers.

3. The Observer Research Foundation (ORF) is an exception among the list of foreign
policy think-tanks in India. Started in 1990, it was one of the first organizations of its
kind to be established by a business group. It is increasingly connecting with policy,
for instance, as the partner of choice for Indian government in hosting a range of
sometimes sensitive and high level second track foreign dialogues.

Steps Taken by the Government

Even though little attention has been paid in the past to the development of foreign policy
expertise in India, the government is increasingly recognising an urgent need to take
remedial steps:
i. Over the past few years the MEA has opened its doors somewhat, becoming more
supportive of convening dialogue with scholars. This includes conference bringing
together scholars of international studies from all over India to reflect on the state of
the discipline and debate and discuss issues related to methodology, theory-building
and pedagogy.
ii. I e e t ea s, the MEA s p oa ti e Pu li Diplo a Di isio has spo so ed
o asio al T a k II o 1.5 t a k ( o posite go e e t/thi k-tank) dialogues to
help advance bilateral relationships at challenging times, such as the Australia-India
Roundtable which helped the two states build a broad-based relationship and move
beyond bilateral differences over such sensitive issues as Indian student welfare in
Australia and Australian Uranium sales to India.
iii. The ongoing existence and relevance of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB)
is another positive trend, as it invites the establishment to seek opinions from, and
to engage with, external scholars and experts.

ROLE OF UNIVERSITIES

INITIAL PHASE
Kanti Bajpai a gues that su h as the effe t of Neh u s au a, e pe tise a d k o ledge
about international affairs, that domestic academia remained trapped in a virtual
intellectual vacuum sustained by the belief that they could not engage as equals given his
understanding of foreign policy, nor offer critiques.
Consequently, state policy was very rarely objectively analysed and academics would often
employ their intellect in rationalizing the official position rather than critically evaluating it.
However, he also needs to be acknowledged as an institution builder. U de Neh u s
patronage, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru founded the Indian Council for World Affairs (ICWA) in
1943. The ICWA played a critical role in setting up the Indian School of International Studies
(ISIS)in 1955 as a part of the University of Delhi.
In 1970s, ISIS became part of Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) under a new name, the
School of International Studies (SIS).
The same year ISIS was established, the Department of African Studies was inaugurated at
the University of Delhi, and a year later, in 1956, Jadavpur University set up its own
Department of International Relations. This produced a quantitative expansion of
departments offering courses in International Studies (IS).
Today individual scholars of great excellence and expertise on foreign countries and regions
or specific foreign policy issues are to be found all over India, but generally operating solo
rather than within a wider department reflecting their own standards.
Disappointingly all this scholarly activity is yet produce the kind of policy-minded experts or
scholar-practitioners that have so enriched foreign practitioners that have so enriched
foreign policy debated in the US.

Reasons for Low Impact

The reasons universities have failed to play a significant role in analysing, critiquing and
o t i uti g to shapi g I dia s fo eig poli a e a ifold. The a e s ste i , i stitutio al
and disciplinary. They also relate to questions of leadership.
Even though the subject International Studies (IS) is taught in many departments, it is yet to
be mainstreamed as an independent discipline. Lack of disciplinary boundaries and absence
of training in theory-driven research and methodological tools have deprived the subject of
the academic respectability which attracts the best talent and students, most of whom
prefer hard sciences, medicine, or commerce. Keeping up with the tradition of not
uestio i g the state s e te al poli ies, I dia IS s hola s i ge e al a e et to li e ate
themselves from the dependence on the state, and those who do present a different point
of view tempt sanction and professional disadvantage.
Finally, the lack of resources and the weak infrastructure that hampers the Indian university
system have had a telling impact, particularly on area studies.
Despite the size of its population and its clear need for the best possible foreign policy
thinking in a challenging regional environment, India is under-supplied with specialist policy
analysts on foreign countries – even countries in its immediate neighbourhood.
In the US, foreign policy officials habitually interact with foreign affairs thinkers in
universities and think-tank, and take note of their proposals. After all, some of these
scholar-practitioners routinely occupy senior administration roles, in the State Department,
at the Pentagon, and on the National Security Council. In India, on the other hand, a career
in the MEA is a job for life, and lateral entry is still highly unorthodox, as are sabbaticals for
MEA officials in think-tanks and academic institutions. MEA officials have little incentive to
consult think-tanks in developing policy initiatives, although this may be changing to some
extent. Part of the problem is the closed shop and elitist nature of the MEA; another, is the
reluctance of the political leadership to entrust the diplomats with much input into the
policy in the first place.

Way Forward
Whate e the ups a d do s of I dia s e e ge e a d e gage e t ith the o ld this
century, it is clear that Indian foreign policy-making is entering an era of great challenge and
great possibility.
I dia s i e se hu a a d i telle tual pote tial, a d it tradition of democracy and debate,
constitute enormous resources for sound policy-making, to help a growing India navigate a
competitive world. Whether this will be harnessed, or remain largely under-utilised, will rest
on smart leadership in officialdom, academia interest, and ultimately throughout the
political class.
It is no longer purely a matter of academic interest, but one which will help determine
whether India can adapt to the geopolitical challenge ahead, in the Indo-Pacific region and
beyond.
 ROLE OF PRIVATE SECTOR

The paper uses this threefold classification to argue that, in the period from the 1980s to
today, contrary to the general perception, the role of the Indian business sector (and
espe iall of i dust asso iatio s) o I dia s foreign policy has been marginal and restricted
to some specific sectors.
I the ook I the Natio al I te est: A “t ategi Fo eig Poli fo I dia , Ku a a d Ku a ,
ha e a al sed I dia s fo eig poli f a e o k as ha i g th ee disti t o po e ts:
security, economic prosperity and global public goods.
The second component of foreign policy, whose importance has expectedly increased since
the liberalization of the mid-1980s has been the pursuit of economic prosperity,
encapsulated in the objective of achieving rapid and sustained economic growth.

ORIGIN
The uestio of the I dia p i ate se to ha i g a ole i the desig of the out s fo eig
policy would not have even arisen prior to 1990. That the issue merits a discussion today is
perhaps due to the unprecedented dynamism of the Indian private sector since the mid-
1990s and the extraordinary potential for growth and spirit for expansion it has
demonstrated over the last two decades.

Reasons for Non-involvement:

During the first three decades after independence, it had virtually no role in any aspect of
I dia s fo eig poli . This was due to several factors:
1. The relatively closed and autarkic development model adopted by India during the
first three decades after independence permitted only a limited scope for interaction
with the external world.
2. The predominance of public sector enterprises in the Indian corporate sector during
this pe iod ea t that the p i ate se to s oi e as uite a gi alised.
3. In line with the relatively smaller share of the private sector in the overall economy,
the role of their representative organizations, like FICCI and CII and ASSOCHAM was
also marginal.
4. The geostrategic stance of the Indian government during the Cold War, as a leader of
NAM and an effective tilt towards the socialist bloc lead by the Soviet Union,
virtually ruled out any role for the private sector in external affairs as it was seen
with a degree of suspicion by the public-sector dominated policy stance of the
period.
 5. This is also exacerbated by the apparent inability of the private sector to adopt
higher norms of self-regulation that could give it the material and ethical basis for
holding the government accountable.
6. Most importantly, during those three decades, the Indian private sector was in effect
fighting an existential struggle with it back to the wall against the dominant pro-state
capitalist ideology and policy stance of the government.
This was not an environment in which the private sector could be expected to play even a
marginal role in either the formulation or execution of foreign policy in India.

POST LIBERIZATION PHASE

Greater external sector openness has also seen the expansion of the Indian private sector in
other countries and the emergence of Indian multinationals (MNCs.) Consequently, the
period since the mid-1980s has seen a far greater interaction between the Indian and the
global economy with the private sector also expanding its operations and presence
overseas.
The period has also witnessed India adopting a more active and assertive role in multilateral
trade negotiations, starting with the Uruguay Round.
India has become more accommodative towards the formation of regional trade blocs like
SAARC and entered into other regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and
comprehensive economic cooperation pacts.
It can, therefore, be asserted that the material and political economy basis for the Indian
p i ate se to s ole i I dia s poli e e ged o l si e the latte half of the s.

THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND INDIA “ ECONOMIC AND COMME‘CIAL

POLICY
The egi i g of the p i ate se to s i flue e o I dia s fo eig e o o i a d o e ial
policy can be traced back to the mid-1980s when economic liberalization was initiated by
the Rajiv Gandhi government.
From the mid- s u til the p ese t ti e, the p i ate se to s ole/i flue e i I dia
economic policy can be divided into three phases:
1. The first phase would broadly overlap with the two Congress-leg governments of
Rajiv Gandhi and P.V. Narsimha Rao from 1984 to 1996.
2. The second phase, which saw a further strengthening of this role coincided with the
tenure of the Atal Bihari Vajpayee led NDA government from 1998 to 2004.
 3. The final current phase started in May 2004 with the coming to office of the Dr.
Ma oha “i gh s UPA go e e t a d o ti ues ith ost e e t NDA
government led by Mr. Modi.

First Phase:
The p i ate se to s i ol e e t i fo eig e o o i poli e ei ed a ajo fillip du i g
the time of Rajiv Gandhi who had invited them for greater participation on his state visit to
the Soviet Union in 1985.
Case Study: The mid-1980s saw the first tangible case of the private sector influencing the
go e e t s egotiati g sta e o T‘IP“ issues, e ause of hi h, i the U ugua ou d,
the Indian negotiators, with active support from the private sector producers, were
successful in diluting the agreement considerably.
The p i ate se to s i flue e i this ase as i othe s as due to the o e ge e of its
i te est ith the go e e t s o geopolitical goals in projecting India as the leader of G-
77, the group representing developing and emerging economies.

Second Phase:
The second phase under Prime Minister Vajpayee, virtually started with Pokhran II saw India
being faced with international economic sanctions and a marked cooling off of government
to government (G2G) relations between India and major global powers.
Case Study:
a. The role of track II diplomacy by the private sector (most often under the aegis of CII)
came to the fore. The first important instance was the initiation of an Indo-US Track
II strategic dialogue in 2002 led by Ratan Tata and Henry Kissinger from the two
sides.
The NDA government was apparently more open to and receptive of the private
se to s i ol e e t a d ie s in framing its foeign economic and commercial
policies.
Since 1999, it has become regular government practice to involve private sector
organizations and business leaders in bilateral and regional trade negotiations.
But it is difficult to gauge the exte t of the p i ate se to s i flue e oth e ause of
the off-the- e o d atu e of these dialogues a d the la k of a o je ti e
assessment of their contribution to the official G2G negotiations.
b. Even in case of Global climate change negotiations, the private sector has led the
way in India on developing adaptive and mitigating measures for reducing the
climate intensity of economic activity.
It is worth pointing out that in nearly all major forieng economic policy cases like the Indo-
US Track II dialogue, the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, the role of the private sector
was evidently supportive of and supplementary to the ongoing high-level G2G interaction.
However, the private sector seems to have played more of a facilitating role in improving
the ambience and environment for bilateral or multilateral negotiations rather than
contributing substantially to the direction, content, and nature of these relations.

Third Phase:
It began in 2004 and the most important policy initiative during the initial time was the
Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Treaty in 2005. This was a result of intensive and high level G2G
interaction and the role of private sector, if any, to drum up support for the treaty within
India.
However, the state of private sector Track II dialogue deteriorated by 2005. The CII s effo ts
at Track II diplomacy were supplemented by other chambers like FICCI.
The government has actively sought and taken on board the private sector has evidently
sought a d take o oa d the p i ate se to s o t i utio s i glo al i te et go e a e
even when its evolving position has been somewhat at variance with the stand taken by the
private sector.

CONCLUSION
With barely three decades of real experience in this role, the Indian private sector is still
finding its feet and at this time is unable to exercise any tangible influence on foreign policy
except in some instances where its stance converges with the official stance.
It has a more visible and effective role in the software and cyber sectors, which emerged
after the liberalization of the 1990s and where Indian private companies have been
externally oriented since the very inception.
Going forward, some necessary conditions have to be achieved for the private sector to
exert influence on the foreign policy in line with its increasing economic clout and share in
the economy.
These conditions are just getting in place but the direction is irreversible and in the coming
period a more robust, independent, and globally engaged Indian private sector will
presumably exercise an enhanced influence on foreign policy.

---
It has ot t aditio all ee I dia s p a ti e to adopt a f ee ide sta e to a ds
negotiations which determine the nature of agreements governing the conduct of these
global public goods negotiations in which it is cost effective for India to become a free rider.
O othe s, he e I dia a ot si pl e a ule take and its interests are vitally affected by
the emerging global architecture, the private sector has begun to participate in the
p epa atio of I dia s egotiati g sta e a d is likel to do so i easi gl i the futu e as
well.
This will again require that the private sector creates the research, analytical and
egotiati g apa ilit to pla its e pe ted ole i I dia s i te e tio i the egotiatio s o
global public goods.
 MEDIA IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

The Media have a direct and fundamental effect on almost every aspect of the lives of people.
This is especially so for the entire spectrum of the political process.

There is a vital difference in a way media work relative to do esti a d foreig poli ies. I dia s
lively and well – informed print and electronic media pay considerable attention to foreign
policy issues- some of broad national interest, others of only parochial concern – and seek to
influence the way the government deals with them.

The importance of garnering domestic support for foreign policy is recognized and underscored
by the fact that Ministry of External Affairs Public Diplomacy Division and External Publicity
Decision goes into the management of what has ee referred to as I dia s media diplomacy͛,
͚soundbite diplomacy͛, ͚instant diplomacy͛ & ͚real time diplomacy͛.

Since people often depend to a greater degree on the media to report and explain foreign
policy developments, media practioners and policy makers have a close relationship which is a
two-way street. This is exercised by the government exerting a certain degree of pressure to
guide (and manipulate) information concerning policy and the National interest; and the media,
through its reportage and commentary, nudging policy in certain directions

Role of Media
 Media can, primarily, draw and sustain attention to a policy issue.

 Media can alter the discourse around a policy by framing or defining the issue in a
particular way.
According to Manoj Joshi, there are two prominent theories on media and policy
making in agenda setting, and issue framing.

 The new technologies have appeared to reduce the scope for calm deliberation over
policy. Rather, it often forces policy makers to respond to whatever issue journalists
focused on.

 Media s i pa t o foreig poli y a also e u derstood ith the larger role that it
plays in providing and understanding of foreign countries and their foreign policies to
the domestic audience.
 But it is also true that Indian media continue to view developments abroad through the
eyes of foreign news agencies since Indian news agencies, too, have just a handful of
correspondents abroad.

 With the end of the era of consensual foreign policy, replaced by approaches that very
from being simply different, to being partisan and ideological, the media end up playing
the role of arbiter, rather than a reporter, to contending political views.

 The I dia edia also pro ide a i porta t foru ith hi h to i tera t ith I dia s
large diaspora, which is an important source of remittances, lobbying and
representative power, with successive Indian governments attempting to harness its
influence in host states.

 Indian media as a whole has emerged as a significant business opportunity attracting

large investments. This has helped the media to become more autonomous players in
the foreign policy debates in the country, often adopting contrarian positions with the
goal of attracting audience.

Case Studies
The influence of the media continues to be apparent when it comes to the deliberation
of international affairs in India.

 This impact dates from the anti- Chinese rhetoric that surrounded the April, 1960
Zhou Enlai- Nehru meeting which effectively preventive any Indian compromise on
their shared border.

 In responding to the Sri Lankan military offensive against the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Tamil Nadu based parties, including coalition partner DMK
attacked the government. The state level media also went along with the Tamil
Nadu parties.

 Fallout from the India-Pakistan joint statement after the Sharm el-Sheikh summit in
July 2009 - the battle lines saw the government on one side, and virtually the entire
media and opposition against it. There was a storm of criticism in India within media
articles describing this variously a betrayal, sellout and blunder. As a result, the talk
of reapproachment with Pakistan ground to a halt.
  Interestingly, the media showed consistent support of the government at the time
of the 2008 Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement, despite considerable opposition
especially from the Left parties, and the call for a no-confidence motion.

Conclusion
Thus, there can be little doubt that the media play a significant role in informing,
shaping or skewing the foreign policy debate. But it remains questionable as the whether it
can actually lead a government to adopted, modify, or abandon a chosen foreign policy
discourse.

Moreover, the extent to which the media influence government policy depends to a
great degree on the government itself. A strong government with a coherent policy can tide
over media storms, whereas an unsure course within the government can buffet the policy
ship in one direction or the other or bring it to a grinding halt.

The media, in a democratic country do play the role of an autonomous fourth estate of
the government, but the influence of the media, in case of India is limited by a variety of
factors. These include access to information, quality of reportage, etc.

All this ensures that the Indian media still have a long way to go before they can make a
significant role in the making of foreign policy.