1. Registration - means the entry made in a book or public registry of deeds.

To register means to enter in a register; to record formally and distinctly; to

enroll; to enter in a list.

Po Sun Tun vs. Price (G.R. No. 31346, Dec. 28, 1929, 54 Phil. 192)
FACTS:
Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap was the owner of a certain parcel of land situated in the
municipality of Tacloban, Province of Leyte. He sold the land to Po Tecsi (Gabino’s
brother) for the sum of P8,000. Po mortgaged the land to W. S. Price in the amount of
P17,000 and the mortgage was duly noted in the office of the register of deeds of Leyte.
Po executed a deed of sale of the land to Price in consideration of P17,000 and the sale
was recorded with the register of deeds. Price, with the consent of his wife, sold the
land to the Province of Leyte for P20,570.
The original certificate of title was issued in the name of the spouses Price. Later, the
proper transfer certificate of title was provided for the Province of Leyte. Po Tecsi gave
a general power of attorney including the right to sell to Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap.
Acting under this power, Gabino sold the land for P8,000 to Jose H. Katigbak. On this
document there appears on the upper right-hand margin the following: "Register of
Deeds, Received, Dec. 15, 1923, Province of Leyte." In turn Jose H. Katigbak transferred
the property to Po Sun Tun for P8,000.
Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap and Po Sun Tun, the first the original vendor, and the latter
the person to whom the property eventually returned pursuant to the power of
attorney, are father and son. As to the possession of the property, it has been under the
control of Price and the Provincial Government of Leyte and has not been under the
material control of Po Sun Tun.
Po Sun Tun began an action in the Court of First Instance of Leyte to gain the possession
of the property and to secure damages in the amount of P3,600. Judge Causing sitting in
first instance decided the case on the pleadings and the evidence, absolving the
defendants W. S. Price and the Province of Leyte from the complaint, with costs against
the plaintiff.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial judge erred in finding that the deed is in favor of Jose H.
Katigbak had not been registered in the corresponding registry of property.
RULING:
The provision of law relied upon by the trial judge as authority for his decision was the
second paragraph of article 1473 of the Civil Code, which provides that if the same
thing should have been sold to different vendees, “Should it be real property, it shall
belong to the purchaser who first recorded it in the Registry of Deeds. The mere
presentation to the office of the register of deeds of a document on which
acknowledgment of receipt is written is not equivalent to recording or registering the
real property. Escriche says that registration, in its juridical aspect, must be understood
as the entry made in a book or public registry of deeds.
“REGISTRATION in general, as the law uses the word, means any entry made in the
books of the Registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and
cancellation, annotation, and even the marginal notes. In its strict acceptation, it is the
entry made in the Registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of
ownership and other real rights."
If any doubt remained on the subject, it would be dispelled by turning to Act No. 2837
amendatory of section 194 of the Administrative Code, and recalling that it is therein
provided that "No instrument or deed establishing, transmitting, acknowledging,
modifying or extinguishing rights with respect to real estate not registered under the
provisions of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, entitled ’The Land
Registration,’ and its amendments, shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto,
until such instrument or deed has been registered, in the manner hereinafter prescribed,
in the office of the register of deeds for the province or city where the real estate lies."
(There follows in the law the requirements regarding the books which it is the duty of the register
of deeds to keep and use.)

2. CONCEPT
Vagilidad vs. Vagilidad (G.R. No. 161136, November 16, 2006)
FACTS:
A parcel of land, Lot No. 1253, situated in Atabay, San Jose, Antique, measuring 4,280
square meters, was owned by Zoilo Labiao as per Original Certificate of Title No. RO-
2301 issued on March 3, 1931. Sometime in 1931, Zoilo died. Subsequently, on May 12,
1986, Loreto Labiao son of Zoilo, sold to Gabino Vagilidad Jr. a portion of Lot No. 1253
measuring 1,604 square meters as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Loreto.
On July 31, 1987, Gabino Jr., as petitioner, filed a Petition for the Surrender of TCT No.
T-16694, covering Lot No. 1253, against Loreto. The plaintiff alleged that, being the
owner of Lot No. 1253-B, under TCT No. T-16694, by virtue of the sale that took place
on May 12, 1986, he is entitled to ask for the surrender of the owner’s copy of TCT No.
T-16694 to the Register of Deeds of Antique in order to effect the transfer of title to the
name of the petitioner.
Gabino Jr. paid real estate taxes on the land he bought from Loreto as per Tax
Declaration No. 1038 where the property was specified as Lot No. 1253-B. Gabino Jr.
thereafter sold the same lot to Wilfredo Vagilidad as per Deed of Absolute Sale. The
Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of Land involving the opt-described property was
also executed by Loreto in favor of Wilfredo. The sale of Lot No. 1253-B to Wilfredo was
registered with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Antique under Entry No.
180425.
Spouses Gabino and Ma. Dorothy Vagilidad as plaintiffs, filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Damages, against spouses Wilfredo and
Lolita Vagilidad. The plaintiffs claimed that they are the lawful owners of Lot No. 1253-
B which was sold to him by Loreto in 1986. On January 15, 1996, the defendants filed
their Answer, denying the material allegations of the plaintiffs. Defendants claimed that
they are the lawful owners of Lot No. 1253-B. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners
Wilfredo and Lolita. Gabino, Jr. and Dorothy filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. Wilfredo and Lolita
moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in not applying the provision of
article 1544 of the new civil code and the doctrine of double sale that the buyer who is
in possession of the Torrens title and had the deed of sale registered must prevail.
RULING:
We disagree. Article 1544 of the Civil Code states, viz.:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership
shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring
it who in good faith recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents
the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
Petitioners’ reliance on Article 1544 is misplaced. While title to the property was issued
in WILFREDO’s name on February 15, 1990, the following circumstances show that he
registered the subject parcel with evident bad faith.
First, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land dated December 7, 1989 between
LORETO and WILFREDO is tainted with blatant irregularities. Second, the testimony of
a disinterested witness, Febe Mabuhay, established the irregularity. Third, the
testimony of Atty. Ernesto Estoya, then Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, supports the claim that there was bad faith in the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Portion of Land. Fourth, we give credence to the testimony of Gabino,
Jr. that Loreto and Wilfredo had employed the scheme to deprive him and his wife of
their lawful title to the subject property.
The subject parcel, being an inherited property, is subject to the rules of co-ownership
under the Civil Code.
Co-ownership is the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a
spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided. Before the partition of the
property held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite
portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate
share in the entire property.
LORETO sold the subject property to GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986 as a co-owner.
LORETO had a right, even before the partition of the property on January 19, 1987, to
transfer in whole or in part his undivided interest in the lot even without the consent of
his co-heirs. This right is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-
owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and substitute another person for its enjoyment.

Tiro vs. Phil. Estates Corporation (G.R. No. 170528, August 26, 2008)
FACTS:
Petitioners Guillerma Tiro, Dominga Tiro Nunez and Maximo Tiro filed before the RTC
a Complaint for Quieting of Title against respondent Philippine Estates Corporation, a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. Petitioners
alleged that they are the children of the late Julian Tiro and the authorized
representatives of the Heirs of the late Pedro Tiro. Both decedents were purportedly,
during their lifetime, the lawful absolute and registered owners of the disputed land as
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-1121.
Petitioners averred that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual
possession of the disputed land since time immemorial until they were prevented from
entering the same by persons claiming to be the new owners sometime in 1995. After
examining the records found in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City,
they discovered that OCT No. RO-1121 had already been cancelled as early as 1969 and
that the subject property, after several other transfers, was presently registered in the
name of respondent under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 35672.
The records in the Office of the Register of Deeds showed each transfer involving the
disputed land. Petitioners learned that OCT No. RO-1121, registered in the names of
Julian and Pedro Tiro, was cancelled on 10 September 1969. In its place, TCT No. 2848
was issued in favor of Spouses Julio Baba and Olimpia Mesa. The registration of the
disputed property in favor of the Spouses Baba was supported by two documents.
On 20 June 1979, TCT No. 2848 was cancelled to give way to the issuance of TCT No.
9415 in the name of Spouses Ronaldo Velayo and Leonor Manuel, after the Spouses
Baba sold the disputed property to them. Petitioners averred that Ochea, who executed
the document "Extrajudicial Declaration of Heir and Confirmation of Sale," which
resulted in the cancellation of OCT No. RO-1121 in the name of Julian and Pedro Tiro,
was not in any way related to Julian and Pedro Tiro.
In its Answer dated 10 February 1998, respondent claimed that its predecessor-in-
interest Pacific Rehouse Corporation acquired the subject land from the Spouses Velayo,
the registered owners of the property who were also in possession of the same at the
time of the sale. To support its allegations, respondent presented TCT No. 2914 in the
name of the Spouses Velayo as proof that they were the registered owners of the
disputed property at the time they sold it to Pacific Rehouse Corporation.
On 16 April 2002, the RTC issued a Decision in Civil Case No. 4824-L dismissing
petitioners’ Complaint. Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on 2 May 2002 questioning
the 16 April 2002 Decision of the RTC. The petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals
an appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 78582, questioning the decision rendered by the
trial court. In its Decision dated 1 July 2005, the Court of Appeals likewise denied the
petitioners’ appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78582 and affirmed the RTC Decision dated 16
April 2002 in Civil Case No. 4824-L.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in not applying the doctrine in
Spouses Santiago, et al. Vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. [No.] 103959, August 21, 1997.
RULING:
This Petition lacks merit.
Insofar as a person who has fraudulently obtained property is concerned, the
consequently fraudulent registration of the property in the name of such person would
not be sufficient to vest in him or her title to the property. Certificates of title merely
confirm or record title already existing and vested. The indefeasibility of the Torrens
title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real
property. Good faith must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration
would be an exercise in futility. However, where good faith is established, as in the case
of an innocent purchaser for value, a forged document may become the root of a valid
title.
A person is considered in law as an innocent purchaser for value when he buys the
property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or an interest in
such property, and pays a full price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before
he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. A person
dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title
of the vendor/transferor, and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the
certificate to determine the condition of the property. The courts cannot disregard the
rights of innocent third persons, for that would impair or erode public confidence in the
Torrens system of land registration. Thus, a title procured by fraud or
misrepresentation can still be the source of a completely legal and valid title if the same
is in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
In Spouses Chu, Sr. v. Benelda Estate Development Corporation, this Court pronounced that
it is crucial that a complaint for annulment of title must allege that the purchaser was
aware of the defect in the title, so that the cause of action against him or her will be
sufficient. Failure to do so, as in the case at bar, is fatal for the reason that the court
cannot render a valid judgment against the purchaser who is presumed to be in good
faith in acquiring said property. Failure to prove, much less impute, bad faith to said
purchaser who has acquired a title in his or her favor would make it impossible for the
court to render a valid judgment thereon, due to the indefeasibility and conclusiveness
of his or her title.

Cruz vs. Cabana (GR No. 171056, March 13, 2009)

FACTS:
This is a simple case of double sale of real property. Defendant Leodegaria Cabana sold
the land in question to defendants-spouses Teofilo Legaspi and Iluminada Cabana. The
said defendants-spouses attempted to register the deed of sale but said registration was
not accomplished because they could not present the owner's duplicate of title which
was at that time in the possession of the PNB as mortgage.
Likewise, when plaintiff tried to register the deed of sale executed by Leodegaria
Cabana on September 3, 1970, said plaintiff was informed that the owner thereof had
sold the land to defendants-spouses on October 21, 1968. Plaintiff was able to register
the land in his name on February 9, 1971 with the admission of both parties that the
land in question was sold to two persons.

ISSUE:
The main issue to be resolved in this appeal is as to who of said vendees has a better
title to said land.
RULING:
There is no dispute that the land in question was sold with right of repurchase on June
1, 1965 to defendants- spouses Teofilo Legaspi and Iluminada Cabana.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the right of ownership and title to the land must be
resolved in favor of the defendants- spouses Legaspi on three counts. First, the plaintiff-
appellant was not in good faith in registering the title in his name. Consistent is the
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction that in order that the provisions of Article 1544 of the
new Civil Code may be invoked, it is necessary that the conveyance must have been
made by a party who has an existing right in the thing and the power to dispose of it
(10 Manresa 170, 171). It cannot be set up by a second purchaser who comes into
possession of the property that has already been acquired by the first purchaser in full
dominion (Bautista vs. Sison, 39 Phil. 615), this notwithstanding that the second
purchaser records his title in the public registry, if the registration be done in bad faith,
the philosophy underlying this rule being that the public records cannot be covered into
instruments of fraud and oppression by one who secures an inscription therein in bad
faith (Chupinghong vs. Borreros, 7 CA Rep. 699).
A purchaser who has knowledge of fact which would put him upon inquiry and
investigation as to possible defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make such
inquiry and investigation, cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith. Knowledge
of a prior transfer of a registered property by a subsequent purchaser makes him a
purchaser in bad faith and his knowledge of such transfer vitiates his title acquired by
virtue of the latter instrument of conveyance which creates no right as against the first
purchaser (Reylago vs. Jarabe, L-20046, March 27, 1968, 22 SCRA 1247).
If immovable property is sold to different vendees, the ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the registry of property; and
should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession (Soriano, et al. vs. The Heirs of Domingo Magali et al., L-
15133, July 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 489).
The Court finds that in this case of double sale of real property, respondent appellate
court, on the basis of the undisputed facts, correctly applied the provisions of Article
1544 of the Civil Code that
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership
shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it
who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents
the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
As the Court held in Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals "it is essential that the buyer of realty
must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale to merit the protection of the
second paragraph of [the above quoted] Article 1544." As the writer stressed in his
concurring opinion therein, "The governing principle here is prius tempore, potior jure
(first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale
cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except only as provided by the Civil Code and that
is where the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first.
Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights under the
law, among them, to register first her purchase as against the second buyer. But in
converso knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if
he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration
with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second
buyer being able to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain
priority over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in
ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyer's rights) — from the time of acquisition until
the title is transferred to him by registration or failing registration, by delivery of
possession. The second buyer must show continuing good faith and innocence or lack
of knowledge of the first sale until his contract ripens into full ownership through prior
registration as provided by law."

3. Nature (Section 2, PD 1529)

 Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. Judicial proceedings for
the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be
based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests
therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power
to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.
The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration
Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and
decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the
 exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance
thereof.

A. In rem vs. In personam

 Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands under the Act are in rem and
based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system. The
decrees operate directly on the land and the buildings and improvements
thereon, and vest and establish title thereto.

 A proceeding is in rem when the object of the action is to bar indifferently all
who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought
to be established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the
strength of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest.

 But if the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular
person, with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to
bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are entitled
to be heard in defense, then the action is in personam.

b. Requisites – acquisition of jurisdiction in an in rem proceeding

Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Ribaya (G.R. No. 113549, July 5, 1996)
FACTS:
On the basis of the private respondents' exhibits,[5] on 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27
July 1920, a parcel of land located in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of
Ligao, Province of Albay, was surveyed for the spouses Luis Ribaya and Agustina
Revatoris by Telesforo Untalan, a Bureau of Lands surveyor.
The survey plan was denominated as Plan II-13961 and allegedly approved by the
Acting Director of Lands on 3 January 1922. However, as noted by the Court of Appeals
in its 9 January 1991 decision, these exhibits do not at all show the surveyor's signature.
In 1925, the spouses Ribaya applied for registration and confirmation of title of the lot
covered by Plan II-13961 before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Albay.
Sometime later, or on 18-21 November and 23-30 November 1925, a resurvey of the
parcel of land covered by Plan II-13961 was conducted at the instance of the spouses
Ribaya. Plan II-13961-Amd. appeared to have been approved by the Director of Lands
on 26 February 1926. The application was not amended to reflect the resurvey and the
amended plan was not published.
On 31 July 1926, the corresponding decree of registration was issued, while on 19
August 1926, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3947 covering the four lots
embraced by Plan II-13961-Amd. was issued in the names of the spouses Ribaya. On 11
September 1958, OCT No. 3947 was administratively reconstituted from the owner's
duplicate copy thereof and the reconstituted title was denominated as OCT No. PO-
10848 (3947).
In 1968, pursuant to a deed of partition executed by the private respondents herein, the
land covered by OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was subdivided per Subdivision Plan LRC
Psd-96075, approved on 16 December 1968. In a letter dated 6 January 1977, sixty-two
(62) farmers occupying the land and claiming ownership thereof, requested the Director
of Lands to institute an action to annul OCT No. RO-10848 (3947).
The petitioner claimed therein that OCT No. 3947 was obtained through fraud and that
the land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land for lack of
republication of the amended plan, neither did the spouses-applicants comply with
Section 45(b) of Act No. 2874.

The petitioner further alleged that at the time the petition for registration was filed, the
land covered therein was forest land, and therefore, inalienable.
In its decision of 11 November 1987[20] the Regional Trial Court (RTC) held for the
petitioner as follows:
Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 3947 and administratively reconstituted
Original Certificate of Title No. RO-10848 (3947) as null and void ab initio and without
force and effect
Ordering [respondents] Heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris to surrender their
copy of OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) as well as their separate transfer certificates of title to
the Register of Deeds of Albay, who (sic) is thereafter directed or ordered to cancel the...
same;
The trial court found that at the time the spouses Ribaya filed their petition for
registration, the land was already classified as alienable and disposable agricultural
land; however, the then CFI, as a land registration court, did not acquire jurisdiction
over the said lot... due to lack of publication or republication in the Official Gazette of
Plan II-13961-Amd., which was the basis of the decree of registration and OCT No. 3947.
The trial court likewise ruled that there was no evidence that the possession of the
spouses Ribaya and their predecessors-in-interests was open, continuous, and adverse
under a bona fide claim of ownership for the required number of years; moreover, they
failed to... present any tax declarations.
The private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 17351),
which, in its decision of 9 January 1991, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the
trial court.

Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz (G.R. No. L5246, Sept. 16, 1910, 17 SCRA
49

“Applying the in rem character of land registration proceedings, it was declared

in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz: 56 “(A) proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res
may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon
claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not
encounter any provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the
power of the court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be
impossible, were this not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction
between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who
were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all.”

Moscoso vs. CA (GR No. L-46439, April 24, 1984, 128 SCRA 719)

“The proceedings for the registration of title to land under the Torrens system is
an action in rem, not in personam, hence, personal notice to all claimants of the
res is not necessary to give the court jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the
res, and neither may lack of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate the decree
or title issued in a registration proceeding, for the State, as sovereign over the
land situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding
in rem or in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which shall be binding upon all
persons, known or unknown.”

4. Two systems of Registration

Melencio vs. CA (G.R. No. 148846, September 25, 2007)

Republic vs. Dignos-Sorono (G.R. No. 171571, March 24, 2008)