NAME : ADARSH NARAYAN . S.

CLASS : B.A. L.L.B (HONS)

YEAR : V YEAR

SECTION : ‘A’

REG NO : HA16003

SUBJECT : PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

TOPIC : Administrative Tribunals in India*

FACULTY SIGNATURE :
 Administrative Tribunals in India*

Introduction

The Preamble of the Constitution of India, declares India to be a Sovereign, Socialist, Secular,
Democratic, Republic. In the wisdom of our framers of Constitution, these ingredients were essential to
establish a society which is egalitarian and a state which bases itself on the tenets of welfarism.1 Rule of
law and the administration of justice; lie at the core of the phenomena of welfare state. The Constitution
of India, by way of the Preamble, expressly declares that “justice” is ensured to all citizens of the
country, justice not only social but economic and political as well. For justice (social, economic and
political) to prevail it is necessary that:

1. The ‘Justice Delivery System’ is not only robust but also capable (efficient and
effective);
1. There is an expeditious disposal of cases, the trials should be speedy & at the same time the
cases must be decided in due process of law;
2. Adherence must be paid to the ‘rule of law’ 2 (in its ideological sense, the concept of rule of law,
represents an ethical code for the exercise of public power, the basic postulates of which are
equality, freedom and accountability);
2. There must be adherence to the three timeless principles of natural justice:
a. Audi Alteram Partem (Rule of Fair Hearing)
b. Nemo Judex In Causa Sua (Rule against Bias)
a. Reasoned Order (Adjudicatory body, adjudicating a dispute must give necessary reasons for
such adjudication)
3. Law is the means, but justice is the end. In a democratic form of government for justice to
prevail, it is necessary that all laws share a common playfield of ‘Salus Populi est Suprema Lex’
that is, welfare of people is the supreme law.

‘Justice according to Law’ is different from ‘Law in accordance with Justice’, where the
latter prevails, welfarism flows.

*Shivam Goel [B.Com(H), Delhi University; LL.B, Faculty of Law, Delhi University; LL.M, NUJS, Kolkata]
1
Although words Socialist and Secular were added to the Preamble by way of the Constitutional (Forty-second Amendment)
Act, 1976
2
The term Rule of Law is used in contradistinction to Rule of Man and Rule according to Law. Even in most autocratic forms
of government there is some law according to which powers of government are exercised but it does not mean that there is
rule of law. Rule of Law means that the law rules, using the word “law” in sense of both jus and lex, it is an ideal and modern
name for natural law.

The traditional theory of ‘laissez faire’ has been given up and old ‘police state’ has now become a
 ‘welfare state’, and because of this radical change in the philosophy as to the role to be played by the
State, its functions have increased. Today it exercises not only sovereign functions, but, as a
progressive democratic State, it also seeks to ensure social security and social welfare for the
common masses. It regulates the industrial relations, exercises control over production, and fuels
enterprises. The issues arising there from are not purely legal issues. It is not possible for the
ordinary courts of law to deal with all these socio-economic problems. For example, industrial
disputes between workers and the management must be settled as early as possible. It is not only in
the interest of the parties to the disputes, but of the society at large. It is, however, not possible for an
ordinary court of law to decide these disputes expeditiously, as their functions are restrained by
certain innate limitations. All the same, it is necessary that such disputes should not be determined in
an arbitrary or autocratic manner. Administrative tribunals are, therefore, established to decide
various quasi-judicial issues which, if are adjudicated upon by ordinary courts of law, will result in
adjudication been neither cost effective, nor time effective.3

The Constitution of India, being a product of the philosophy of welfare state, was bound to recognise
the existence of tribunals. Tribunals are being established to provide for speedy disposal of cases,
and thus reduce the pressure on the Civil Courts. Once such a tribunal is established, the jurisdiction
of the Civil Court to entertain cases falling within the jurisdiction of tribunals is barred. One of the
main reasons favouring their creation is the delay in the proceedings in the High Courts. Tribunals
have grown in response to the need to provide for specialised forums of dispute settlement that
would possess some expertise and policy commitment, and would be comparatively cheaper, more
expeditious and relatively free from technical procedures. Tribunals came as a substitute for courts
when lesser formalism, greater expediency, and better expertise were required in adjudication of
disputes.4 Professor Dicey’s discourse on Rule of Law had created a bias against tribunals in the
minds of English, as well as Indian legal practitioners. In India, due to historical reasons, a unitary
system was adopted in which, unlike in France, the tribunals were subjected to superintendence of
the ordinary courts (See Appendix II).

3
See: C.K. Takwani, Lectures on Administrative Law, Eastern Book Company, Fourth Edition, Lecture VII- Administrative
Tribunals, p.228
4
See: Dr. Ashok K. Jain, Administrative Law- Supplement 2010, Ascent Publications, Ch.8 – Tribunals, p. S- 117

Therefore, even the draft Constitution contained reference to tribunals in Articles 136 and 227.

Under Article 136, the Supreme Court is empowered to entertain an appeal with special leave from
 tribunals, and under Article 227, the High Court has power of superintendence over courts and
tribunals. In India, such judicial control is preferred to a separate hierarchy of administrative courts
as exists in France. This is obvious from the fact that even though the word ‘tribunal’ was deleted
from Article 227 by the Constitution (Forty- second Amendment) Act 1976, the courts interpreted
that, the word ‘courts’ included tribunals for the purpose of judicial superintendence under that
Article5, and by the Constitution (Forty- fourth Amendment) Act 1978, the word ‘tribunal’ was
reinstated in that article.6 Articles 323-A and 323-B were added to the Constitution by the
Constitution (Forty- second Amendment) Act 1976. These Articles empower Parliament, and
appropriate legislatures respectively to provide for ‘the adjudication or trial by tribunals’ of the types
of matters mentioned therein.7 The tribunals established under Articles 323- A and 323-B have the
same status as the High Court; as the appeals from these tribunals can go directly to the Supreme
Court under Article 136.

Article 323-A empowers Parliament to set up tribunals for dealing with ‘disputes and complaints
with respect of recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and
posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority
within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation
owned or controlled by the Government’. Thus, Article 323-A provides for the establishment of
tribunals for adjudicating disputes relating to service matters of government servants, viz.
administrative tribunals.

Article 323-B empowers appropriate legislature, Central or State, depending upon the legislative
competence a propos the subject matter, to set up tribunals for dealing with matters such as tax,
foreign exchange, import and export, industrial and labour disputes, land reforms, ceiling on urban
property, elections to Parliament or State legislatures, production, procurement, supply and
distribution of foodstuffs and such other goods, as may be declared by the President to be essential
goods. Tribunals under Article 323-B can

5
See: S.D. Ghatge v. State of Bombay [AIR 1977 Bom 384]; Changanlal v. Naval Kumar [AIR 1977 Guj 180]
6
See: S.P. Sathe, Administrative Law, fifth edition, 1994
7
See: Dr. Ranbir Singh & Dr. A Laskhminath, Constitutional Law, LexisNexis Butterworths 2006, Chapter VI –
Tribunals, p.63

be authorised to try certain categories of criminal offences and thus impose penal sanctions. This is
an innovation in the Indian legal system for till now criminal punishments were imposed only by the
courts and not by non- judicial bodies.8
A law made under Article 323-A and Article 323-B is intended to specify procedures to be followed
by concomitant tribunals, and may also exclude the jurisdiction of all courts, except the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. It is pertinent over here to mention that in
S.P. Sampath Kumar v. UOI9, the Supreme Court held that a tribunal could be a substitute for the
High Court; however in L.Chandra Kumar v. U.O.I.10, Ahmadi CJ, speaking for the unanimous
Court held that:

“Administrative tribunals under Article 323-A could examine the constitutional validity of
various statutes or rules. There would be one exception to this rule: the administrative tribunals
would not be competent to examine the validity of the statute under which they are created. In
such cases, the appropriate High Court would have to be approached directly. Barring cases
where the constitutionality of the parent Act is challenged, all questions regarding services must
be raised only before an administrative tribunal and only writ appeals could go to a Division
Bench of a High Court. From a decision of a High Court’s Division Bench, an appeal could be
preferred under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to the Supreme Court”.

In exercise of the power conferred by Article 323-A of the Constitution, Parliament enacted the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. It is an Act to provide for the adjudication by administrative
tribunals of complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to
public services of Union or States or any local or other authority in pursuance of Article 323-A and
for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Act shall not apply to any member of the
naval, military or air forces or any other armed forces of the Union. The Act is also not applicable to
any officer or servant of the Supreme Court or of any High Court or Courts subordinate thereto,
secretarial staff of either House of Parliament or State Legislature.
 6

The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 provides for three types of tribunals:

1. The Central Government establishes an administrative tribunal called the Central

Administrative Tribunal (CAT), which has jurisdiction to deal with service matters
pertaining to the Central Government employees, or of any Union Territory, or local
or other government under the control of the Government of India, or of a corporation
owned or controlled by the Central Government.
2. The Central Government may, on receipt of a request in this behalf from any State
Government, establish an administrative tribunal for such State employees.
3. Two or more States might ask for a joint tribunal, which is called the Joint
Administrative Tribunal (JAT), which exercises powers of the administrative tribunals
for such States.

Each tribunal is to consist of a chairperson and such number of vice-chairpersons and

judicial and administrative members as the appropriate government might deem fit. The
ATA requires that every matter should be heard by a Bench consisting of two members,
one judicial and one administrative. The Act, however, authorises chairperson to allot
certain matters to a single member Bench. The SC maintains that this provision of the Act
must be read subject to the qualification that only matters that do not involve questions of
law or constitutional interpretation could be assigned by chairperson to a single member
Bench Mahabal Ram (Dr.) v. Indian Council of Agricultural Research11.12

The Doctrine of Separation of Powers has not been expressly provided for in the
Constitution but never the less, it can be made out from the scheme of the Constitution.
As per the doctrine of separation of powers, there are three wings of the State, namely:
the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The legislature enacts the laws, the
executive implements the laws and the judiciary interprets the laws. Now, when we speak
of Administrative Tribunals, we speak of quasi-judicial bodies whose function is two-
fold:

1. To relieve congestion in the ordinary courts; and

2. To provide for speedy disposal of disputes relating to service matters.

11
(1994) 2 SCC 401
12
Supra 4 at p. S-124- 126
 7

What the researcher has introduced up till now is India’s idea of constitutionalism that
promulgates the ideal of welfare state, whose necessary ingredient is the ‘rule of law’,
that sees law as the means and justice as the end and expatiates the proposition that
‘justice delayed is justice denied’ as well as ‘justice should not only be done but also seen
to be done’. A brief overview thus is given of Article 323-A, Article 323-B and the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The researcher considers this discussion as just a tip
of the iceberg and guarantees that the discussion shall intensify in the chapters following,
as his research advances.

Literature Review:

The research methodology adopted by the researcher is purely doctrinal, thus so, to a large
extent the research undertaken by the researcher is library-based. The researcher has prepared
this research paper in the shield of many authoritative books, journals and reports. The
researcher has critically reviewed the content (i.e. the substance, the form and the depth) of
each of these literary works on which he has relied upon.

1. Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, Lexis Nexis Butterworths
Wadhwa Nagpur, 8th Edition 2011, Vol. 9, Part XIV-A: Tribunals, p.2075- 2088—In
very authoritative terms the author tries to explain the purpose, the scope and the field
of operation of Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution of India, 1950. To a
great deal, the author has made synchronized efforts to discuss and explain the
constitutionality of Part XIV- A of the Constitution of India, 1950 with special
reference to Article 323-A, which in turn gave way to the enactment of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The author has made noticeable efforts to explain
the jurisdictional aspects of Article 323-A and Article 323-B. Efforts made by the
author to explain the points of similarity and distinction as between Articles 323-A
and 323-B of the Constitution of India, calls for appreciation.

2. I.P. Massey, Administrative Law, Eastern Book Company, 6th Edition, Chapter 13-
Constitutional Protection to Civil Servants and Administrative Service Tribunals, p.
494- 528—Major efforts directed by the author is towards the understanding of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. In length the author discusses, the constitutional
validity of the same. The author to great deal tries to explain the working of the
administrative tribunals and the same is worth appreciating; but quantitative analysis
 8

as to the number of matters addressed and adjudicated upon by the Central

Administrative Tribunal from 1985 is only up till the year 2000 and hence the data
available is quite out-dated in context of the critical appreciation of the working of the
administrative tribunals in the present scenario.

3. C.K. Takwani, Lectures on Administrative Law, Eastern Book Company, Fourth

Edition, Lecture VII- Administrative Tribunals, p.227- 271—The researcher is in full
appreciation of the momentous task carried out by the author to present the subject of
‘Administrative Tribunals’ with such lucidity. The author has dealt with a host of
topics and has categorically placed them in a systematic manner, starting from the
historical growth of the administrative tribunals to the reasons behind their growth;
from distinction between administrative tribunals, courts and executive authority to
the characteristics of the administrative tribunals. The author has also dealt with
issues in regards to the significance of and the compliance of the rules of procedure
and evidence and the principles of natural justice made use by the administrative
tribunals in their working. The author has placed necessary emphasis on the ‘Working
of the Tribunals’ and on the moot question as to, ‘Whether Administrative Tribunals
are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court and the High-Courts?’ apart from
the significance of judicial review of the decisions of the tribunals. The author has
made efforts to bring to light the recommendations of the Frank Committee in a
manner worth appreciating. The author has also discussed in length the 42 nd and the
44th Constitutional amendment and has finally closed the chapter with a vast- sea level
discussion on S.P. Sampath Kumar v. UOI and L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI, but what
the author has failed to take account of is the number of cases adjudicated upon by the
administrative tribunals and the number of cases pending before them, hence nothing
major has been discussed about the adjudicatory efficiency of the administrative
tribunals.

3. Dr. Justice A.R. Lakshmanan, The Judge Speaks, Universal Law Publishing Co.,
2009, Chapter: Administrative Tribunals in India, p.239- 262-- The author has made
significant efforts to examine and explain the background and significance of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and thereafter the author has undertaken the
critical evaluation of the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Bill, 2006.
Theauthor in the later-half of the chapter explains the background against which the
case of S.P. Sampath Kumar was litigated; thereafter the author explains the legal
implications of the Chandra Kumar judgement. What is worth appreciating is the
 9

manner in which the author shapes the discussion; from Pre- Sampath Kumar position
to the Post- Sampath Kumar position and thereafter the legal proposition upheld by
the L. Chandra Kumar judgement (which substantially brought an end to the much
wanted un-cherished legal speculation). The author however did not discuss anything
major in regards to the adjudication efficiency of the administrative tribunals i.e. the
number of cases decided or pending before such tribunals, as also the quality of
decisions given by such tribunals.

5. Dr. Ranbir Singh & Dr. A. Laskhminath, Constitutional Law, LexisNexis

Butterworths- 2006, Chapter VI – Tribunals, p.63- 83-- The area of focus of the
authors throughout the chapter has been the legislative intent behind the enacting of
Part XIV- A of the Constitution of India, 1950. After detailed explanation as to the
field of operation of Article 323-A and Article 323-B, the authors have made
significant efforts to explain the development of law in regards to the Administrative
Tribunals by way of case-laws from S.P. Sampath Kumar v. UOI to J.B. Chopra and
Ors v. UOI; and thereafter from M.B. Majumdar v. UOI and R.K. Jain v. UOI to L.
Chandra Kumar v. UOI; the researcher appreciates the clarity of thought, the quality
of explanation and in depth conceptualisation over legislative aspects of Part XIV- A
of the Constitution of India, 1950 of the authors. However, no focus or considerable
light has been shed upon the success and failures as to the overall working of the
administrative tribunals in India; nothing has been discussed majorly in regards to the
administrative and adjudicatory efficiency of the administrative tribunals in India.

4. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 6th Edition, 2010 -- The author in
comprehensive length discusses the legislative intent and significance of Articles 323-
A and 323-B mainly by way of case-laws. The author discusses the constitutionality
of Articles 323-A, 323-B and the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 at appreciable
lengths. However, not much stress has been paid to the characteristic features of
Administrative Tribunals or the points of similarity and distinction between Article
323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution of India. The author avoids sharing the
 10

political background in regards to which the Constitutional 42 nd, 44th and 45th
amendment Acts were passed.

Statement of Research Problem & Objectives of Research: The objective behind

undertaking this research work are manifold- to know the legislative intent behind the
enactment of Part XIV-A of the Constitution of India, 1956; to know the constitutional
validity of Articles 323-A and 323-B and so also of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985;
to crucially understand how the Indian model of administrative tribunal system is different
from the French model; to critically appreciate the development of law in regards to
administrative tribunals from S.P. Sampath Kumar v. UOI to L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI ; to
critically discuss and comment upon the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Bill, 2006
(which has now lapsed) and the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Bill, 2012.

Research Questions Formulated:

1. What is the legislative intent and legislative history behind the enactment of Part
XIV- A of the Constitution of India? What is the scope of Articles 323-A and 323-B
of the Constitution of India?
1. What is the background and significance of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985?
2. What is the Constitutional validity of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985?
2. What are the reasons for growth of Administrative Tribunals and what are their
characteristics?
3. How is an Administrative Tribunal different from a Court? What is the distinction
between an Administrative Tribunal and Executive Authority?
4. Compliance by the Administrative Tribunals of the ‘Rules of Procedure and
Evidence’? What role does the principles of natural justice play in the adjudication of
disputes by the Administrative Tribunals?
5. Administrative Tribunals: Whether are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court
and High Courts?
6. What is the jurisprudence that has developed over the period time- Post S.P. Sampath
Kumar v. UOI? What are the legal implications in regards to the judgement rendered
in L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI?
7. Critique on the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Bill, 2006 and the
Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Bill, 2012?
3. Critical analysis of the success and failures of the Administrative Tribunals?
 11

Research Methodology:

Research Methodology adopted by the researcher to carry out his research work is purely
doctrinal (library based research). To understand and appraise the legislative intent behind the
enactment of Part XIV- A of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in wake of the 42 nd amendment
Act, 1976); the researcher made use of the historical method of legal research. To analyse and
appreciate the administrative-justice-system of France, as so different from that exist in
common law countries (i.e. Britain and India) the researcher made use of the technique of
comparative legal research. To critically evaluate the change in the existing position of law,
from S.P. Sampath Kumar v. UOI to L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI, the researcher made use of
Case- Study based legal research. To evaluate the adjudication of disputes (in numbers or in
figures) by the Central Administrative Tribunal, over a period of time from 1985 to 2013
(June), the researcher relied upon quantitative method of legal research.

Chapterisation:

Chapter I: Legislative Intent & Legislative History behind the enactment of Part XIV-A
of the Constitution of India, 1950- Considerable focus has been placed upon by the
researcher on to the political and legislative scenario amongst which the Constitutional 42 nd
Amendment Act, 1976 had been passed, thus enacting Part XIV- A of the Constitution of
India, 1950. The researcher has discussed in apt length the scope of Articles 323- A and 323-
B (points of similarity as well as distinction) & the procedure adopted by the administrative
tribunals, as to their working.

Chapter II: Background and Significance of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985-
Critical analysis has been made by the researcher of Article 323-A, in the light of which the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 had been enacted. The researcher has discussed in apt
length the various aspects in regards to which the constitutionality of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985, had been challenged. The legislative intent behind the enactment of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985; the background, scope and objective of this legislation
has been the prima facie areas of concern for the researcher in this chapter.

Chapter III: Constitutional Validity of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985- Soon
after the enactment of Part XIV- A of the Constitution of India, 1950; several issues had been
raised challenging the validity of the enactment particularly in the light of Article 323- A (2)
(d) and Article 323- B (3) (d), of the Constitution of India, 1950. Section 28 of the
 12

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 also became an issue of critical review. Reviewing this
situation in particular, the researcher has made efforts to understand the efficacy of the 42 nd
Amendment Act of the Constitution in the light of the necessary case-laws.

Chapter IV: Reasons for growth of Administrative Tribunals and their Characteristics-
The reasons for the growth of Administrative Tribunals are manifold: administrative agencies
are better than ordinary courts in disposing cases timely; administrative adjudication is
cheaper than court adjudication; administrative adjudication is more convenient and
accessible to individuals compared to ordinary courts; the process of adjudication in
administrative agencies is flexible and informal compared the rigid, stringent and much
elaborated ordinary court procedures &; the special expertise knowledge administrative
tribunals manifest as compared to ordinary court judges. These reasons for the growth of
administrative tribunals have been discussed in good length by the researcher, elucidating
upon the characteristic features of the Administrative Tribunals aptly and succinctly.

Chapter V: Administrative Tribunals, Courts and Executive Authority- Administrative

Tribunals are distinct from Courts and the Executive Authority, not only in organisational
structure but also in regards to procedural compliance; the researcher has made efforts to
bring forth to light these specific distinctions in this chapter.

Chapter VI: Administrative Tribunals- Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Principles
of Natural Justice- One of the manifold purposes for the establishment of Administrative
Tribunals is the dispensation of justice in a time effective and cost effective manner.
Administrative Tribunals to a good extent avoid procedural rudimentariness and adjudicate
upon disputes relying upon the basic principles of natural justice i.e. audi alteram partem,
nemo judex in causa sua and reasoned orders. In the light of the same the discussion has been
furthered by the researcher.

Chapter VII: Administrative Tribunals- Whether bound by decisions of Supreme Court

and High Courts- In the light of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, 1950 and the case-
law: East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, the researcher has tried to
answer this question, i.e. Whether the administrative tribunals are bound by decisions of
Supreme Court and High Courts?

Chapter VIII: Jurisprudence developed Post- Sampath Kumar & legal implication of L.
Chandra Kumar v. UOI [AIR 1997 SC 1125] - The researcher has not only discussed in
 13

detail the case of S.P. Sampath Kumar v. UOI but also has discussed the various other cases
that finally led to the development of jurisprudence as so discussed in the decision of L.
Chandra Kumar v. UOI (the law as so presently exists).

Chapter IX: The Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Bill, 2006 and the
Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Bill, 2012- The researcher has discussed in apt
length both the Bills; that of 2006 and that of 2012. Although so far as the status of 2006 Bill
is concerned, the same has been withdrawn. The Bill of 2012, as so of 2006, tries to adjust
the present laws (legislative) in consonance with the judgement of L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI
and also with various recommendations given over the period of time by the Law
Commission.

Chapter X: Administrative Tribunals- Critical Appraisal- The reasons for the success and
that of failure of the Administrative Tribunals in regards to the Indian experience has been
discussed in good length by the researcher in this chapter.

Chapter I: Legislative Intent & Legislative History behind the enactment of Part XIV-A
of the Constitution of India, 1950

For a long time a search was going on for a mechanism to relieve the courts, including High
Courts and the Supreme Court, from the burden of service litigation which formed a
substantial portion of pending litigation. As early as 1958 this problem engaged the attention
of the Law Commission which recommended for the establishment of tribunals consisting of
judicial and administrative members to decide service matters. 13 In 1969 Administrative
Reform Commission also recommended for the establishment of civil service tribunals both
for the Central and State civil servants.14 Central Government appointed a committee under
the Chairmanship of Justice J.C. Shah of the SC of India in 1969 which also made similar
recommendation. In 1975, Swarn Singh Committee again recommended for the setting up of
service tribunals.15 The idea of setting up service tribunals also found favour with the SC of
India which in K.K. Dutta v. Union of India16 advocated for setting up of service tribunals to
save the courts from avalanche of writ petitions and appeals in service matters. In the
meantime various States17 had established their own service tribunals. Service Tribunal was
also established in Andhra Pradesh in 1973 by the Thirty-second Constitution Amendment.

It was against this backdrop that Parliament passed Constitution (Forty- second Amendment)
Act, 1976 which added Part XIV-A in the Constitution. Articles 323-A and 323-B enabled
Parliament to constitute administrative tribunals for dealing with certain matters specified
therein. Article 323-A provided that Parliament may by law, provide for adjudication or trial
by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and
 14

conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the
affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of
India or under the control of Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled
by the government. Parliament was further empowered to prescribe by law the jurisdiction,
power, authority and procedure of such tribunals and also to exclude the jurisdiction of all
courts except that of the SC under Article 13618. Empowered by these enabling provisions of

13
See: XIV REPORT OF REFORM OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, (1958)
14
See: REPORT ON PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION, 1969
15
See: Perspective, (1986) 1 SLJ (Journal Section), pp. 1-5
16
(1980) 4 SCC 38: 1980 SCC (L&S) 485: AIR 1980 SC 2056
17
In Gujarat, 1973; Uttar Pradesh, 1975; Rajasthan, 1976; Assam, 1977; In Bihar, an Act was passed in 1982
but the Tribunal was never established.
18
See: Article 323-A(2)(d) and 323-B(3)(d)
 15

the Constitution Parliament enacted Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 19 for the
establishment of administrative service tribunals for deciding service disputes of civil
servants of the Centre as well as of the States which was amended in 1986.20 Article 323-B
(1) empowers the appropriate legislature to provide for the adjudication or trial by tribunals
of any disputes, complaints or offences with respect to all or any of the matters specified in
clause (2).

The Constitution (Forty- second Amendment) Act, 1976 was the most debatable and
controversial amendment in the constitutional history of India. It effected drastic and
draconian changes in several provisions of the Constitution not only affecting rights of
citizens but also restricting, limiting, curtailing and even totally excluding power of judicial
review of High Courts and of the Supreme Court which was held to be a part of ‘basic
structure’ of the Constitution.

So far as administrative tribunals are concerned, mainly, the Amendment (the Constitution
Forty- second Amendment Act, 1976) made two changes:

1. It took away power of superintendence of High Courts over administrative tribunals

which they possessed under Article 227 of the Constitution; and
2. After Part XIV, it inserted Part XIV-A (Articles 323-A and 323-B) by enabling
Parliament to constitute administrative tribunals for the purposes specified therein.

Part XIV- A, as inserted by the 42 nd Amendment Act opened a new Chapter in the Indian
Constitutional and Administrative Law. The 42nd Amendment substantially excluded and
curtailed power of High Courts and of the Supreme Court of judicial review of administrative
action. It was a “retrograde innovation”21 and its object was to take away the supervisory
jurisdiction of the High Court over tribunals under Article 227. However, Articles 323-A and
323-B were not self- executor in as much as they themselves did not take away the
jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution, but they only
enabled Parliament or the appropriate legislature to make laws to set up such tribunals and to
exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or Article 22722.

19
The Act came into effect on November 1, 1985
20
See: I.P. Massey, Administrative Law, Eastern Book Company, 6th Edition, Chapter 13- Constitutional
Protection to Civil Servants and Administrative Service Tribunals, p. 515- 516
21
See: M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (1993) at p. 918
22
It is, however, submitted that the above legal position has now been substantially changed in view of the
decision of the SC in L.Chandra Kumar v. UOI
 16

By the Constitution (Forty- fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, Article 227 was amended and
jurisdiction of High Courts over administrative tribunals had been restored. No amendment,
however, was made in Part XIV-A, as inserted by the Constitution (Forty- second
Amendment) Act, 1976 and exclusion of jurisdiction of all courts and tribunals constituted in
exercise of powers under Articles 323-A and 323-B. For revival of that power and restoration
of majesty of High Courts, the legal fraternity had to wait for almost two decades (i.e. for the
position of law so to be clarified by L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI).23

Scope of Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution of India24:

These two Articles, inserted by the Constitution (42 nd Amendment) Act, 1976, open a new
Chapter in the Indian Constitutional and Administrative Law, by substantially excluding
judicial review of administrative decisions.

A. The features which are common to these two Articles are:

a. They empower the Legislature to set up Administrative Tribunals for the
adjudication of disputes between the State and the individual, relating to certain
specified matters, and to lay down the jurisdiction and powers of such Tribunals.
a. Such powers (as vested with the Administrative Tribunals, established under Part
XIV-A of the Constitution of India) may include the power to punish for their
contempt.
a. Such law may lay down the procedure to be followed by such tribunals, including
rules as to limitation and evidence.
a. Such law may provide for the transfer to such Tribunals cases which are pending
before a court or other authority at the time of establishment of each Tribunal.
a. Incidental provisions for their effective functioning may be included in such laws.
a. Such law may exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts, other than the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court under Article 32 or 136, in respect of such matters.
a. The provisions of both the Articles shall override the provisions in the Constitution
or any other law, to the contrary.

B. The points on which the two Articles differ are:

23
Supra 3 at p. 264-265
24
See: Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur,
8th Edition 2011, Vol. 9, Part XIV-A: Tribunals, p.2085- 2086.
 17

a. Article 323-A is confined to matters relating to the public services. Article 323-B
relates to Tribunals relating to any of the matters specified in clause (2), e.g.,
taxation, foreign exchange, labour dispute, land reforms, elections, essential
goods; offences and incidental matters relating to such matters.
a. Under Article 323-A, only one such Tribunal may be created for the Union and
one for each State or two or more States together (no hierarchy). So far as Article
323-B is concerned, the appropriate Legislature is empowered to establish a
hierarchy of Tribunals relating to each subject specified in clause (2).
b. Under Article 323-A, the power to make such law belongs exclusively to
Parliament. Under Article 323-B, the legislative power is divided between the
Union and State Legislatures according to their respective legislative competence
over each of the subjects.

Articles 323-A and 323-B cannot be interpreted to mean that they prohibit the legislature
from establishing tribunals not covered by these articles, as long as there is legislative
competence under an appropriate entry in the VII Schedule. These two articles do not take
away that legislative competence.25

It is pertinent to note that the word ‘adjudication’ in Article 323-A (1) and 323-B (1) indicate
that the jurisdiction of Tribunals set up under both the Articles shall be confined to the
adjudication of quasi-judicial issues relating to administrative matters, such as-

1. Disputes relating to the services26, as referred to in Article 323 (1).

2. Matters specified in sub- Cl. (a) (i) of Article 323-B (2), for example:
a. Determination of an election dispute.27
b. Assessment of a tax.28
c. Adjudication of Industrial disputes.29
d. Termination of services.30

25
See: State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharthi House Building Co-op. Society [(2003) 2 SCC 412 (Para 36, 37 and
49): AIR 2003 SC 1043] relying on U.O.I v. Delhi High Court Bar Association [(2002) 4 SCC 275: AIR 2002
SC 1479] and L. Chandra Kumar v. U.O.I [(1997) 3 SCC 261: AIR 1997 SC 1125]
26
See: U.O.I v. Saxena [2 SCJ 211 (Para 6)]
27
See: Indira Nehru Gandhi, Smt. v. Raj Narain [AIR 1975 SC 2299 (Para 329): 1975 Supp. SCC 1]
28
See: Suraj Mal Mohta & Co. v. Viswanatha Sastri [AIR 1954 SC 545: (1955) 1 SCR 448]; Dhakeswari
Cotton Mills v. Commissioner of I.T. [(1955) 1 SCR 941: AIR 1955 SC 65]
29
See: Express Newspapers v. Workers [AIR 1963 SC 569: 1963 (3) SCR 540]
30
See: Calcutta Dock Labour Bd. v. Imam Jaffar [(1965) II SCA 226 (230): AIR 1966 SC 282: 1965 (3) SCR
453: 1965 (2) LLJ 112]; State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei [AIR 1967 SC 1269: 1967 (2) SCR 625: 1967 (2) LLJ
266]
 18

a. Order of a Revenue Officer, like a Custom Authority, imposing penalty.31

a. Order affecting an individual’s property.32

Procedure33-

1. The Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, which inserted Article 323-A, itself did not
impose any conditions as to how the administrative tribunals will arrive at their
decisions.
1. That has since been laid down by the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

Chapter II: Background and Significance of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 198534

Background: The framers of the Constitution of India in their wisdom invested the Supreme
Court and the various High Courts with the power of judicial review by specifically enacting
Articles 32, 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 35 With the enactment of Articles 12, 14, 15,
16, 309 and 311 of the Constitution 36, a large number of service matters calling for the
adjudication of disputes relating to the recruitment and conditions of service of Government
servants and also of employees in other fields of public employment started coming up before
the various High Courts whose power of judicial review was invoked for the said purpose by
the aggrieved employees. The contribution by the High-Courts coupled with the growth in the
number of employees in the public field and the manifold problems arising in the context of
their recruitment and conditions of service and their implicit faith and confidence in the High-
Courts as the unfailing protector of their rights and honour, led to a gradual increase in the
institution and pendency of service matters in the High Courts. This, in turn, focused the
attention of the Union Government on the problem of finding an effective alternative
institutional mechanism for the disposal of such specialised matters. A Committee set up by
the Union Government in 1969 under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice J.C. Shah
recommended for setting up of an independent Tribunal to handle service matters pending
before the High Courts and the Supreme Court.

The Law Commission of India in its 124 th Report had recommended for the establishment at
the Centre and the State of an appellate Tribunal or Tribunals presided over by a legally
qualified Chairman and with experienced civil servants as Members to hear appeals from
Government servants in respect of disciplinary and other action against them.

The First Administrative Reforms Commission had also recommended for the setting up of
Civil Services Tribunals to deal with the appeals of Government servants against disciplinary
actions. Some of the State Legislatures thereupon enacted laws setting up Tribunals to decide
such cases. Part XIV-A, comprising Articles 323-A and 323-B was also inserted in the
 19

Constitution of India by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Bill, 1976 with effect from 3rd
January, 1977.
Article 323-A, inter alia, authorised Parliament to provide by law for setting up of
Administrative Tribunals for the adjudication of disputes and complaints with respect to
recruitment and conditions of service of certain categories of employees in the field of public
employment including Government servants and also to provide for the exclusion of the
jurisdiction of all courts, except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to
disputes or complaints of such nature. No immediate step was however taken in the direction
of enacting a law for the setting up of Administrative Tribunals as contemplated by the said
Article.

Ultimately, Parliament enacted the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 which received the
assent of the President on the 27th February, 1985. In pursuance of the provisions contained in
the Act, the Administrative Tribunals set up under it exercise original jurisdiction in respect
of service matters of employees covered under the Act.

Objective: The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Constitutional

Amendment Bill by which Article 323-A was sought to be inserted in the Constitution states
the following words:

“To reduce the mounting arrears in the High Courts and to secure the speedy disposal
of service matters… it is considered expedient to provide for administrative tribunals
for dealing with such matters while preserving the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in regard to such matters under Article 136 of the Constitution.”

The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the introduced version of the
Administrative Tribunals Bill, which on being passed and approved became the Act of 1985,
also contained similar recitals:

“…The establishment of Administrative Tribunals under the aforesaid provision of

the Constitution has become necessary since a large number of cases relating to
service matters are pending before the various Courts. It is expected that the setting up
of such Administrative Tribunals to deal exclusively with service matters would go a
long way in not only reducing the burden of the various Courts and thereby giving
them more time to deal with other cases expeditiously but would also provide to the
 20

persons covered by the Administrative Tribunals speedy relief in respect of their

grievances.”

Significance: The enactment of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 opened a new
chapter in the sphere of administering justice to the aggrieved Government servants in service
matters. The Act provides for establishment of Central Administrative Tribunal and the State
Administrative Tribunals. The setting-up of these Tribunals is founded on the premise that
specialist bodies comprising both trained administrators and those with judicial experience
would, by virtue of their specialised knowledge, be better equipped to dispense speedy and
efficient justice. It was expected that a judicious mix of judicial members and those with
grass-root experience would best serve this purpose.

The Administrative Tribunals are distinguishable from the ordinary courts with regard to their
jurisdiction and procedure. They exercise jurisdiction only in relation to the service matters of
the litigants covered by the Act. They are also free from the shackles of many of the
technicalities of the ordinary Courts. The procedural simplicity of the Act can be appreciated
from the fact that the aggrieved person can also appear before it personally. The Government
can also present its case through its Departmental officers or legal practitioners. Further, only
a nominal fee of Rs. 50 is to be paid by the litigant for filing an application before the
Tribunal.37 Thus, the objective of the Tribunal is to provide speedy and inexpensive justice to
the litigants.

The establishment of Administrative Tribunals was a right step in the direction of providing
an effective alternative authority to Government employees who feel aggrieved by the
decisions of the Government, in spite of the elaborate system of rules and regulations which
govern personnel management, for judicial review over service matters to the exclusion of all
courts including High Courts other than the Supreme Court, with the end in view of reducing
the burden of such Courts and of securing expeditious disposal of such matters.38

37
See: Section 7 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987
38
This happens to be the viewpoint of Dr. Justice A.R. Lakshmanan, as expressed by him in the book “The
Judge Speaks”, Universal Law Publishing Co., 2009, Chapter: Administrative Tribunals in India, p. 242 (within
the sub-heading “Significance of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985”).
 21

Chapter III: Constitutional Validity of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985

In exercise of the power conferred by Article 323-A of the Constitution, Parliament enacted
the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Section 28 of the Act39 excluded the power of
judicial review exercised by the High Courts in service matters under Articles 226 and 227.
However, it has not excluded the judicial review entirely in as much as the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution was kept intact.

The constitutional validity of the Act was challenged before the Supreme Court in the leading
case of S.P. Sampath Kumar v. UOI40. Undoubtedly, the question raised was of far reaching
effect and of great public importance.

The Constitution Bench upheld the validity of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
Speaking for the majority, Ranganath Misra, J. (as he then was) observed:

“We have already seen that judicial review by this Court is left wholly unaffected and
thus there is a forum where matters of importance and grave injustice can be brought
for determination or rectification. Thus, exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High-
Courts does not totally bar judicial review… It is possible to set up an alternative
institution in place of the High Court for providing judicial review… The Tribunal
has been contemplated as a substitute and not as supplemental to the High Court in
the scheme of administration of justice… What, however, has to be kept in view is
that the Tribunal should be a real substitute for the High- Court not only in form and
de jure but in content and de facto… Under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act41 all powers
of the Court in regard to matters specified therein vest in the Tribunal—either Central
or State. Thus, the Tribunal is the substitute of the High Court and is entitled to
exercise the powers thereof.”

In concurring judgement, Bhagwati, C.J. observed:

“If this constitutional amendment were to permit a law made under clause (1) of
Article 323-A to exclude the jurisdiction of the High-Courts under Articles 226 and
227 without setting up an effective alternative mechanism or arrangement for judicial

39
See: The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985- Section 28: Exclusion of jurisdiction of courts except the
Supreme Court.
40
(1987) 1 SCC 124: AIR 1987 SC 386: (1987) 1 SCR 435.
41
See: The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985- Section 14: Jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central
Administrative Tribunals; Section 15: Jurisdiction, powers and authority of State Administrative Tribunals.