LIM VS BROWNELL (G.R. No.

L-8587) Constitutional Law

BENITO E. LIM, as administrator of the Intestate Estate of Arsenia Enriquez, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

HERBERT BROWNELL, JR., Attorney General of the United States, and ASAICHI KAGAWA, defendants-
appellee, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellee.

Ponente:

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

Action:

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila

Facts:

The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land situated in Tondo,City of Manila. The lands
were,after the last world war, found by the Alien Property Custodian of the United States to be
registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, national of an enemy country, Japan. On August 3, 1948,the
Philippine Alien Property Administrator (PAPA) and the President of the Philippines, executed two
formal agreements, whereby the said Administrator transferred all the said four lots to the Republic of
the Philippines under the Trading with the Enemy Act.

On November 15, 1948 , the latter's son Benito E. Lim filed a formal notice of claim to the property with
the PAPA On the theory that the lots in question still belonged to Arsenia Enriquez. that they were
mortgaged by her to the Mercantile Bank of China Asaichi Kagawa, who, by means of threat and
intimidation succeeded in preventing Arsenia Enriquez from exercising her right of redemption

On March 7, 1950, the claim was disallowed by the PAPA. On November 13, 1950, the claimant Benito E.
Lim filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the PAPA (later substituted by the
Attorney General of the United States) for the recovery of the property in question with back rents. The
complaint was later amended to include Asaichi Kagawa as defendant.

Issues:

Whether or not lntervenor-Appellee (Republic of the Philippines) be sued?

Ruling:

The order appealed is affirmed, but revoked insofar as it dismisses the complaint with respect to Lots 3
and 4, as to which the case is hereby remanded to the court below for further proceedings.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949

DECISION
(En Banc)

MORAN, C.J.:

I.      THE FACTS

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in

the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military
Commission of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the
National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended
the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international. 

II.    THE ISSUES

Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

III.   THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]

YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that –

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day
including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been
guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of
humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and
enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with
the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.

xxx                  xxx                  xxx

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for
acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied
that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly
based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles
were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to
the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory.
 Co Kim Cham vs Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon
G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945
Facts:
Respondent Judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in
petitioner’s civil case on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by
General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military
occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance
of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.

Issues:
1. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under
the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and
valid and remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
United States and Filipino forces;

2. Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur,
Commander in Chief of the United States Army, in which he declared “that all laws,
regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control,” has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and
proceedings of the said courts; and

3. If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by said proclamation,
whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior
to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue
those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and
liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines
were reestablished in the Islands.

Ruling:
1. YES. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of
the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and
valid. The question to be determined is whether or not the governments established in these
Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments. If
they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those governments remain good and valid
even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino
forces.

2. NO. The proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944, which declared that “all
laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the
said Commonwealth are null and void without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control,” has not invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings, which
are not a political complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines that were continued
by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation, and that said judicial acts and proceedings were good and
valid before and now good and valid after the reoccupation of liberation of the Philippines by
the American and Filipino forces.

3. YES. It is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, “Law once established
continues until changed by the some competent legislative power. It is not changed merely
by change of sovereignty.” (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary
Section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in
his Treatise on the Conflict on Laws (Cambridge, 1916, Section 131): “There can no break
or interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into existence with the first-felt
corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of human
society. Once created, it persists until a change take place, and when changed it continues
in such changed condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or colonization is
impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues
unchanged until the new sovereign by legislative acts creates a change.”

It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final
judgment, the proceedings in cases, not of political complexion, pending therein at the time
of the restoration of the Commonwealth Government.
 G.R. No. L-7995             May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME
HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila,respondents.

Constitutional Law – Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police
Power

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his
fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June
1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose
of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then
petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties
concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund
servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country
who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles?

HELD: 

Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no
conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal
protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a
statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power
which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a
treaty. Hence, Ichong  can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay
city market.
Facts: 

Executive Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from
private sources. Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, filed a petition questioning said act because Republic Act No. 3452
which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 2207 — explicitly prohibits the importation
of foreign rice by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

Hechanova countered that the importation is authorized by the President for military stock pile
purposes (the president is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of war or emergency
without waiting for special authority). He also contends that there is no prohibition on
importation made by the “Government itself”. He also further that the Government has already
entered into 2 contracts with Vietnam and Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive
agreements under international law; and, that such agreements became binding and effective
upon signing thereof by the representatives of both parties. Hechanova also maintains that the
status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the petition herein
and secure the relief therein prayed for and that Gonzales has not exhausted all administrative
remedies available to him before coming to court".

Issues:

1. Does Gonzales have sufficient interest to file the case?

2. Whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is required in this case

3. What is the nature of the government contracts with Vietnam and Burma? Are they valid?

4. May an international agreement be invalidated by our courts?

Held:

1. Yes. Apart from prohibiting the importation of rice and corn, RA 3452 declares that "the
policy of the Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these basic foods directly from
those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines who wish to
dispose of their products at a price that will afford them a fair and just return for their labor
and capital investment. ... ." Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a planter with a rice
land of substantial proportion, is entitled to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it
now seeks to buy abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will have to be
effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner
petitioner must necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality and
interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be
an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds.
2. No. The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one", or where the
controverted act is "patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego
of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually
disapproved by him, or where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention. The case at bar fails under each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general
rule.

3. The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as executive
agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as executive
agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint,
said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system enter into
executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the
latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments
that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 138, in all purchases by the Government, including those
made by and/or for the armed forces, preference shall be given to materials produced in the
Philippines. The importation involved in the case at bar violates this general policy of our
Government, aside from the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.

4.  Yes. The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived
"of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of
error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts in — (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question". In other words, our Constitution
authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law,
but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress. (Gonzalez vs. Hechanova, G.R. No. L-
21897, October 22, 1963)
MANALO VS SISTOZA
Facts: 

On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Republic
Act 6975, creating the Department of Interior and Local Government.  The said Act
states that the PNP Chief, Chief Superintendent and Director General shall be
appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino, through Executive Secretary Franklin S.
Drilon, promoted 15 police officers to permanent positions in the Philippine National
Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The said police officers took
their oath of office and assumed their respective positions.  Thereafter, the Department
of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III,
authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of
subject appointments and disbursements made therefor. He contents that: (1) RA 6975
requires confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of senior
superintendent and higher by the CA; (2) The PNP is akin to the Armed Forces where
the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the CA, and (3) Respondent
Secretary in allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent officers
despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their appointments is acting without or in
excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation 

2) Whether or not the PNP is akin to the AFP
3) Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 are constitutional 

Held:

1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of
the government to be appointed by the President:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require
the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent
officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments.  As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law
expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.  

The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the
1987 Constitution, “The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen
armed force which shall undergo military training and service, as may be provided by
law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State.”

On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains that: “The
State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and
civilian in character to be administered and controlled by a national police commission.
The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be
provided by law.”

The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in
the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police.  Thus, directors and
chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do not
fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

3. Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on

Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are
not required by the Constitution to be confirmed are unconstitutional.  The rest of
Republic Act 6975 stands.  It is well-settled that when provisions of law declared void
are severable from the main statute and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions
would not affect the validity and enforceability of the other provisions, the statute
remains valid without its voided sections. (Manalo vs. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369, August
11, 1999)