Republic of the Philippines vs.

Zenaida Guinto-
Aldana
Republic of the Philippines vs. Zenaida Guinto-Aldana
G.R. No. 175578, August 11, 2010
 
FACTS:
 
Respondents filed an application for registration of title over 2 pieces of land, professing
themselves to be co-owners of these lots having acquired them by succession from
their predecessors. That until the time of the application, they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in actual, open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous
possession of these lots in the concept of an owner and that they had consistently
declared the property in their name for purposes of real estate taxation. In support of
their application, respondents submitted to the court the pertinent tax declarations,
together with the receipts of payment thereof. Petitioner opposed the application for the
reason that the tax declaration submitted to the court did not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition in good faith or of prior possession in the
concept of an owner.
 
ISSUE:
 
WON respondents have occupied and possessed the property openly, continuously,
exclusively and notoriously under a bona fide claim of ownership.
 
HELD:
 
Respondents’ possession through their predecessors-in-interest dates back to as early
as 1937 when the property had already been declared for taxation by respondent’s
father. Respondents could have produced more proof of this kind had it not been for the
fact that, the relevant portions of the tax records on file with the Provincial Assessor had
been burned when its office was razed by fire in 1997. With the tax
assessments therecame next tax payments. Respondents’ receipts for tax expenditures
were likewise in therecords and in these documents the predecessors of respondents
were the named owners of the property. Tax declarations and realty tax payment are
not conclusive evidence ofownership, nevertheless, they are a good indication of
possession in the concept of an owner. No one in his right mind would be paying taxes
for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. Indeed,
respondents herein have been in possession of the land in the concept of an
owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without interference and opposition from the
government or from any private individual. Itself makes their right thereto
unquestionably settled and hence, deserving of protection under the law.

MARIANO ANGELES v. ELENA SAMIA, GR No. 44493, 1938-11-03

Facts:
The question involved herein refers to the ownership of a parcel of land
having an area of 7 hectares... in the municipality of Bacolor, of the Province
of Pampanga... registered end issued on December 15, 1921, in the name of
Macaria Angeles, Petra Angeles, Felisberto
Samia, and Elena Samia as their common undivided property in the following
proportion: One third to Macaria Angeles, 1/6 to Petra Angeles, 1/4 to
Felisberto Samia, and 1/4 to Elena Samia.
The plaintiff claims to be the exclusive owner of the property in question, and
the defendant alleges the same thing saying: (1) That said property was
allotted to her when her coowners made a partition of all the properties owned
by them in common, and (2) that if the... plaintiff ever had any right thereto
prior to the issuance of said original certificate of title, such right prescribed a
long time ago.
Issues:
The lower court erred in not holding that the plaintiff's claim is contrary to the
principal objective of the Torrens System established in this country.
Ruling:
It appearing that said certificate granted her much more than she expected,
naturally to the prejudice of another, it is but just that the error, which gave
rise to said anomaly, be corrected
The defendant and her coowners knew or, at least, came to know that it was
through error that the original certificate of title in question was issued by the
court which heard cadastral case No. 11 of Bacolor, not only in or prior to
March,... 1933, but from the time said certificate was issued in their favor, that
is, from December 15, 1921.
This is evidenced by the fact that, ever since, they remained passive without
even attempting to make the least showing of ownership over the land in
question until alter the... lapse of more than eleven years.
Principles:
The purpose of... the Land Registration Act, as this court has had occasion to
so state more than once, is not to create or vest title, but to confirm and
register title already created and already vested, and of course, said original
certificate of title No. 8995 could not have vested in the... defendant more title
than what was rightfully due her and her coowners.
The Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the
holders of a title in good faith and does not permit its provisions to be used as
a shield for the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the
expense of... another

G.R. No. L-44493             November 3, 1938

MARIANO ANGELES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELENA SAMIA, defendant-appellant.
Jose Gutierrez David for appellant.
Filemon Cajator for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
The question involved herein refers to the ownership of a parcel of land
having an area of 7 hectares, 13 ares and 81 centiares, situated in the
municipality of Bacolor of the Province of Pampanga, included in lot No. 3679
described in cadastral record No. 11 of the said municipality, G. L. R. O.
Cadastral Record No. 148 of Pampanga, and now covered by original
certificate of title No. 8995 of the registry of deeds of Pampanga, registered
and issued on December 15, 1921, in the name of Macaria Angeles, Petra
Angeles, Felisberto Samia, and Elena Samia as their common undivided
property, in the following proportion: One third to Macaria Angeles, 1/6 to
Petra Angeles, ¼ to Felisberto Samia, and ¼ to Elena Samia.
The plaintiff claims to be the exclusive owner of the property in question, and
the defendant alleges the same thing saying: (1) That said property was
allotted to her when her co-owners made a partition of all the properties
owned by them in common, and 2 that if the plaintiff ever had any right thereto
prior to the issuance of said original certificate of title, such right prescribed a
longtime ago.
The lower court decided the question in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the
defendant to execute the necessary deed of conveyance to the plaintiff of the
land described in the complaint, which constitutes the northern portion of 7
hectares, 13 ares and 81 centiares of said lot No. 3679, the sketch of which
appears in the plan Exhibit P as lot No. 3679-A, and to pay the costs of the
trial. From this judgment the defendant appealed, assigning in her brief the
following alleged errors as committed by the lower court to wit.
1. The lower court erred in not sustaining and holding that the plaintiff's action
has prescribed.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the plain- tiff has neither alleged
nor proven facts constituting a cause of action.
3. The lower court erred in not holding that the plain- tiff's claim is contrary to
the principal objective of the Torrens System established in the
country. lawphi1.net
4. The lower court erred in concluding and holding that a constructive or
implicit trust exists in the present case, as claimed by the plaintiff.
5. The lower court erred in not holding that the case of
"Villarosa vs. Sarmiento" (46 Phil., 814), is applicable to and decides the
present case, and in holding that the case of "Dizon vs. Datu", decided by the
Supreme Court as case G.R. No. 30517, applies to the case at bar.
6. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint in this case with costs
to the plaintiff.
7. The lower court erred in denying the defendant- appellant's motion for new
trial.
It is not disputed by the parties that the land in question was inherited by the
plaintiff from his father Antonio Angeles some time before the year 1896; that
thereafter the plaintiff possessed and occupied the land in question under
claim of ownership up to the present that about the year 1909, he attempted
to register his title to said property in the registry of deeds, pursuant to the
Land Registration Act but his application was denied due to errors to and in
his plan; that, this notwithstanding, he continued to exercise acts of ownership
over the land in question openly, uninterruptedly and peacefully at least until
March, 1933; that on December 15, 1921, without the plaintiff's
knowledge and without having been purposely applied for by the defendant
and her coparticipants Macaria, Petra, and Felisberto, said original certificate
of title No. 8995 was issued in the name of the latter four co-owners; that the
said co-owners having decided to partition among themselves the properties
held by them in common, the land in question was allotted to the defendant;
that the defendant, desiring to know the area of said land, had it relocated
about the end of February of the beginning of March, 1993, and, as soon as it
had been done, although she was then aware that neither she nor any of her
former coparticipants ever occupied it before, because it had always been
occupied by the plaintiff long before 1896, she entered upon said land to
exercise acts of ownership, for which purpose she cut and availed herself of
the leaves of nipa palms found therein, notwithstanding the protests and
objections of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff, for the purpose of avoiding frictions,
requested the defendant, inasmuch as it was through error that the land in
question had been adjudicated to her and her co-owners, to deign to execute
the corresponding deed of transfer thereof in his favor, the land being lawfully
his; that the defendant refused todo so claiming that her title was already
indefeasible; and that, in view of such attitude of said defendant, the plaintiff
brought this action one or two days later.
The defense of prescription which the defendant-appellant seeks to avail of to
support the irrevocability of her title and to counteract the action of the
plaintiff-appellee, is untenable because, aside from the fact that neither she
nor her co-owners ever possessed the land in question in any capacity, they
never claimed to be the owners thereof, and if she has done so after the lapse
of more than eleven years from the issuance of the title in their favor, it was
due to the fact that they were declared owners thereof through error. The
purpose of the Land Registration Act, as this court has had occasion to so
state more than once, is not to create or vest title, but to confirm and register
title already created and already vested, and of course, said original certificate
of title No. 8995 could not have vested in the defendant more title than what
was rightfully due her and her co-owners. It appearing that said certificate
granted her much more than she expected, naturally to the prejudice of
another, it is but just that the error, which gave rise to said anomaly, be
corrected (City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil., 324). The defendant and her co-
owners knew or, at least, came to know that it was through error that. the
original certificate of title in question was issued by the court which heard
cadastral case No. 11 of Bacolor, not only in or prior to March, 1933, but from
the time said certificate was issued in their favor, that is, from December 15,
1921. This is evidenced by the fact that, ever since, They remained passive
without even attempting to make the least showing of ownership over the land
in question until after the lapse of more than eleven years. The land
Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title
in good faith and does not permit its provision to be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the expense of
another (Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil., 442; Angelo vs. Director of Lands, 49
Phil., 838). The above-stated Acts do not give anybody, who resorts to the
provisions thereof, a better title than he really and lawfully has. If he happened
to obtain it by mistake or to secure, to the prejudice of his neighbor, more land
than he really owns, with or without bad faith on his part, the certificate of title,
which may have been issued to him under the circumstances, may and should
be cancelled or corrected (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil., 590).
This is permitted by section 112 of Act No. 496, which is applicable to the
Cadastral Act because it is so provided expressly by the provisions of section
11 of the latter Act. It cannot be otherwise because, as stated in the case of
Domingo vs. Santos, Ongsiako, Lim y Cia. (55 Phil., 361), errors in the plans
of lands sought to be registered in the registry and reproduced in the
certificate of title issued later, do not annul the decree of registration on the
ground that it is not the plan but the land itself which is registered in the
registry. In other words, if the plan of an applicant for registration or claimant
in a cadastral case alleges that the land referred to in said plan is 100 or
1,000 hectares, and the land which he really owns and desires to register in
the registry is only 80 ares, he cannot claim to be the owner of the existing
difference if afterwards he is issued a certificate of title granting him said area
of 100 or 1,000 hectares.
Let it not be said that, as the decree of registration which gave rise to original
certificate of title No. 8995 was on December 15, 1921, and the plaintiff failed
to ask for the review of said decree within one year, in accordance with
section 38 of Act No. 496, he still has the right to question the legality or
validity of the decree in question, because the action brought by him in this
case is not for said purpose but merely to ask that the land in dispute, which
was erroneously included in original certificate of title No. 8995, be transferred
to him by the defendant, he being the owner thereof. This is possible and it is
authorized by law, upon the amendment of the plan which must be approved
by the competent court, for which purpose there is no necessity of altering or
modifying in the least the decree already issued. For the foregoing reasons
and for those taken into consideration in the cases of Dizon vs. Datu (G.R.
No. 30517, promulgated on June 3, 1929, not reported); Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (49 Phil., 433);
and Palet vs. Tejedor (55 Phil., 790), which are not repeated herein, for the
sake of brevity, this court holds that the errors attributed to the lower court are
unfounded; that the appeal is unwarranted, and that the appealed judgment is
in accordance with the law.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment in question is affirmed in toto, and it is
ordered that, upon the amendment of the plan of parcel No. 3679 of cadastral
survey No. 11 of Bacolor, G. L. R. O. Cadastral Record No. 148 of Pampanga,
the corresponding writ for the execution of said judgment be issued by the
lower court, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-27594 November 28, 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, and the ARMED

FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR C. REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, Branch III, PARAÑAQUE INVESTMENT and DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, ROMAN C. TAMAYO, THE COMMISIONER OF THE LAND
REGISTRATION COMMISSION and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NUEVA
ECIJA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-28144 November 28, 1975

ALIPIO ALINSUNURIN, now substituted by PARAÑAQUE INVESTMENT and

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY and the ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors-appellants.

ANTONIO, J.:

These cases are interrelated, and so are decided jointly.

In his application originally filed on February 24, 1964 with the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin, claiming ownership in fee simple by
inheritance from the late Maria Padilla, sought the registration of title under Act 496, as
amended, of a vast tract of land, containing an area of 16,800 hectares, more or less,
situated at the municipality of Laur, province of Nueva Ecija, admittedly inside the
boundary of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay.1

On May 5, 1966, the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces of
the Philippines opposed the application, claiming that the applicant was without
sufficient title and was not in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding
the filing of the application; that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of
the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay established under Proclamation No. 237,
dated December 10, 1955 of the President.2

On May 10, 1966, the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin filed a motion for substitution of
parties, requesting that the Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation be
considered as the applicant in his place, it having acquired all his rights, interests,
ownership and dominion over the property subject matter of the application.3 The motion
was granted by the lower court in its order dated June 10, 1966.4

It is beyond dispute that the land subject of the application is included within the area
reserved for military purposes under Proclamation No. 237, dated December 19, 1955,
of the President. The land is largely uncultivated, mountainous and thickly forested with
a heavy growth of timber of commercial quantities.5 Except for a small area cultivated for
vegetation by homesteaders issued patents by the Director of Lands, there were no
occupants on the land.6
It is claimed by the applicant that Melecio Padilla acquired the land by virtue of a
possessory information title issued during the Spanish regime on March 5, 1895, and
upon his death in 1900, he transmitted the ownership and possession thereof to his
daughter and sole heir, Maria Padilla. The latter in turn continued to cultivate the land
thru tenants and utilized portions for pasture, until her death sometime in 1944.

On November 19, 1966, the lower court rendered decision holding that the parcel of
land applied for, described in the technical description Plan II-6752, is adjudicated to
and ordered to be registered in favor of (a) Parañaque Investment and Development
Corporation, a Philippine corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens, with address at
Manila, Philippines, two-thirds (2/3) portion, subject to the rights of Ariosto Santos per
Joint Manifestation of Alipio Alinsunurin and Encarnacion Caballero-Alinsunurin, Ariosto
Santos and Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation dated July 19, 1966
and marked as Exhibit "AA-4 "7 and (b) Roman C. Tamayo, Filipino citizen, married,
resident of Cullit, Lallo, Cagayan, one-third (1/3) portion of the said property.

On December 12, 1966, the oppositors Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines filed a Notice of Appeal from the said decision to the
Supreme Court,8 copy of which notice was furnished counsel for the applicant
Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation; however, no copy was furnished
to counsel for Roman C. Tamayo, to whom one-third (1/3) portion of the land was
adjudicated.

On January 18, 1967, within the extended period granted by the court, the oppositors-
appellants filed the corresponding Record on Appeal, copy of which was duly served
upon appellees Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation and Roman C.
Tamayo.

By an order dated March 8, 1967, the lower court required the Provincial Fiscal to file an
Amended Record on Appeal, so as to include therein certain orders and pleadings,
within ten (10) days from receipt of the order. 9

On March 16, 1967, the Amended Record on Appeal was duly filed and copies served upon the appellees.

Pending the approval of the Record on Appeal, the applicant Parañaque Investment
and Development Corporation filed a motion for the issuance of a decree of registration
pending appeal. Likewise, Roman C. Tamayo, thru counsel, filed a motion for the
issuance of a decree of registration. Both motions were opposed by the Government.

On March 11, 1967, the lower court, ruling that its decision of November 19, 1966 had
become final as to the share of Roman C. Tamayo, directed the issuance of a decree of
registration of the entire land, one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso in favor of Roman C. Tamayo,
and two-thirds (2/3) pro indiviso in favor of Parañaque Investment and Development
Corporation, subject to the final outcome of the appeal.

On March 14, 1967, the Commissioner of Land Registration forthwith issued Decree No.
113485 pursuant to the said order, and, on March 15, 1967, the Register of Deeds
issued Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds of the Province
of Nueva Ecija.

On April 12, 1967, the lower court approved the Amended Record on Appeal which,
together with the evidence and transcripts, was forwarded to this Court in due course of
appeal.

As the lower court denied reconsideration of the order directing the issuance of a
decree of registration, on May 29, 1967, the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and
the Armed Forces of the Philippines instituted before this Court a special civil action for
certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction (L-27594), seeking to nullify the
order dated March 11, 1967, the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto (Decree
No. 113485 dated March 14, 1967) and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the
Register of Deeds for the province of Nueva Ecija, and to command the respondent
court to certify the entire proceedings and to allow appeal to the Supreme Court from its
decision in toto in LRC Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545.

On June 5, 1967, We issued a writ of preliminary injunction as follows:

NOW, THEREFORE, until further orders from this Court, You (respondent
Judge) are hereby restrained from issuing a writ of possession in Land
Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. 25545 of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, entitled "Parañaque Investment and
Development Corporation versus Director of Lands, et al."; You
(respondent Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation and
Roman C. Tamayo), your agents or representatives are hereby restrained
from taking possession and/or excercising acts of ownership, occupancy
or possession over the property in question subject matter of Land
Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545; and You
(respondent Register of Deeds) are hereby restrained from accepting for
registration documents referring to the subject land until petitioners shall
have filed a notice of lis pendens as to the title certificates of Roman
Tamayo and Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation, under
Sec. 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court, subject of the above-mentioned Land
Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545.

Accordingly, petitioners-appellants caused the entry of a notice of lis pendens to be duly

inscribed in the primary entry book of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija and
annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-
3151.

In due time, the respondents filed their answers to the petition for certiorari. The parties
having filed their respective memoranda, the case is deemed submitted for decision.

At the outset, We shall resolve the petition for certiorari and mandamus

(L-27594).
I

Under the circumstances of this case, the failure of the appellants to serve a copy of
their Notice of Appeal to the counsel for adjudicatee Roman C. Tamayo is not fatal to
the appeal because, admittedly, he was served with a copy of the original, as well as
the Amended Record on Appeal in both of which the Notice of Appeal is embodied. 10
Hence, such failure cannot impair the right of appeal. 11

What is more, the appeal taken by the Government was from the entire decision, which
is not severable. Thus, the appeal affects the whole decision. 12

In any event, We rule that execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land
registration proceeding. It is fraught with dangerous consequences. Innocent
purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment
which may be reversed on appeal.

A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is
violative of the explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act which requires that a
decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and
executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the Register of Deeds concerned
issues the corresponding certificate of title.

Consequently, the lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in
ordering the issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timely taken from
the entire decision a quo.

II

In the instant case, as a precaution, oppositors-appellants caused notice of lis

pendens to be duly inscribed in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija, thereby keeping the whole land subject matter of the appeal
within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated. 13

Such entry of notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled until the final termination of the
litigation. The notice of lis pendens must be carried over in all titles subsequently
issued, which will yield to the ultimate result of the appeal. 14

During the pendency of the appeal, it appears that Honofre A. Andrada, et al., filed with
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (Branch I, not the land registration court), a
complaint against the appellee Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation,
Rodolfo A. Cenidoza and Roman C. Tamayo, for reconveyance of a portion of the land
in question (Civil Case No. 4696). The trial court assumed jurisdiction over the case
despite the pendency of the appeal involving the same land, and decided the case in
favor of plaintiffs. In violation of Our injunction adverted to above, Parañaque
Investment and Development Corporation executed a subdivision plan of the original
single parcel of land subject of the land registration proceedings covered by Original
Certificate of Title No.
0-3151, and deeded over six (6) lots of the subdivision plan to plaintiffs Honofre A.
Andrada and Nemesio P. Diaz. By an order dated September 23, 1968, entered in Civil
Case No. 4696, the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija was directed to cancel Original
Certificate of title No. 0-3151 and to issue new titles to the above-named transferees
"free from all liens and encumbrances." Immediately, transfer certificates of title were
issued to them and other transferees in which the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija did
not carry over the notice of lis pendens originally inscribed in Original Certificate of Title
No. 0-3151. Subsequently, other transactions were entered into involving portions of the
land reconveyed in Civil Case No. 4696, including a transfer of about 4,000 hectares to
the Land Bank of the Philippines in consideration of P8,940,000.00.

We find the order to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 03151 and to issue
subsequent titles free from all liens and encumbrances to be void ab initio.

Civil Case No. 4696 is an action in personam to which the appellants are not parties; its
object was to decree reconveyance to plaintiffs of a portion of the area adjudicated to
the Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation and Roman C. Tamayo in
Land Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545, which is subject to the
outcome of the appeal. Such action is barred by the pendency of the appeal. In that
case, the court is without jurisdiction to order the Register of Deeds to cancel Original
Certificate of title No. 0-3151 and to issue titles to transferees "free from all liens and
encumbrances ." 15 Nor can such order be construed to authorize the Register of Deeds
to cancel the notice of lis pendens, which was not entered by virtue of the reconveyance
case. Thus, the Register of Deeds was duty bound to carry over the said notice of lis
pendens on all titles subsequently issued. But, in plain violation of lis pendens in said
titles; such act constitutes misfeasance in the performance of his duties for which he
may be held civilly and even criminally liable for any prejudice caused to innocent third
parties, but cannot affect the petitioners-appellants who are protected by Our writ of
injunction and the notice of lis pendens inscribed in the original title. It must be
remembered that Our injunction restrained the Register of Deeds "from accepting for
registration documents referring to the subject land until the petitioners shall have filed a
notice of lis pendens as to the title certificates of Roman C. Tamayo and Parañaque
Investment and Development Corporation under section 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court,
subject of the above-mentioned Land Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No.
25545." Its plain meaning is to enjoin registration of documents and transactions unless
the notice of lis pendens is annotated and so subject the same to the outcome of the
litigation. In such case, subsequent transferees cannot be considered innocent
purchasers for value.

On the other hand, the lower court's order dated September 23, 1968, in Civil Case No.
4696, cannot overrule an injunction of this Court (in L-27594). As a result, We consider
the notice of lis pendens entered in virtue of this litigation to remain in full force and
effect, and affects all subsequent transferees of the title of the land subject of this
appeal.
At any rate, it is well-settled that entry of the notice of lis pendens in the day book
(primary entry book) is sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to all
persons of such adverse claim. 16

III

We now consider the appeal on the merits.

1. To begin with, the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for, which must be
approved by the Director of Lands, was not submitted in evidence. The submission of
such plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. 17 Unless a plan and its
technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of
much value. 18

It is true that blueprints of two survey plans were presented before the trial court (both
marked Exhibit "D"). The first blueprint copy of a plan of land as surveyed for Maria
Padilla (Exhibit "D", p. 4, Exhibits of Applicant), was not formally offered in evidence.
The second plan of the land, as surveyed for Parañaque Investment and Development
Corporation (also marked as Exhibit "D", p. 3, Exhibits of Applicant) was submitted by
the said applicant, but it lacks the approval of the Director of Lands.

Of course, the applicant attempts to justify the non-submission of the original tracing
cloth plan by claiming that the same must be with the Land Registration Commission
which checked or verified the survey plan and the technical descriptions thereof. It is not
the function of the LRC to check the original survey plan as it has no authority to
approve original survey plans. If, for any reason, the original tracing cloth plan was
forwarded there, the applicant may easily retrieve the same therefrom and submit the
same in evidence. This was not done.

It is also asserted that a blue print copy of the plan (Exhibit "D", p. 5, Exhibits of
Applicant) was superimposed in the military plan of the reservation under Proclamation
No. 237, which military plan was presented in evidence by the oppositors-appellants
(Exhibit "6"), and it was agreed by the parties that the plan, Exhibit "D", superimposed in
the plan of the area covered by the proclamation, is the plan of the land applied for (p.
15, Brief for Applicant-Appellee).

Obviously, the superimposition of the copy of the survey plan of land as surveyed for
applicant in the military map of the area under Proclamation No. 237 was for the sole
purpose of showing that the land applied for is situated within the area covered by the
military reservation of Fort Magsaysay appropriately indicated in the perimeter map of
said reservation (Exhibit "6"). But the applicant is not relieved from the original tracing
cloth plan approved by the Director of Lands as required by law. One of the
distinguishing marks of the Torrens System is the absolute certainty of the identity of a
registered land. Consequently the primary purpose of the aforesaid requirement is to fix
the exact or definite identity of the land as shown in the plan and technical descriptions.
Hence, the applicant is not relieved of his duty of submitting the original tracing cloth of
the survey plan of the land duly approved by the Director of Lands.

It will be noticed that the plan (Exhibit "D", p. 5, Exhibits of Applicant) does not bear the
approval of any officer authorized by law.

In similar manner, the surveyor's certificate, also required in original land registration
proceedings, was not offered in evidence.

2. We next consider the question of whether the applicant has a registerable title to the
land applied for.

The applicant relies on a purported titulo de informacion posesoria issued in the name

of Melecio Padilla (Exhibit "T" pp. 64-68, Exhibits of Applicant). However, neither the
original of the said titulo de informacion posesoria, nor a duly authenticated copy
thereof, was submitted in evidence, and there are serious flaws on the faces of the
alleged copies of the document, as in the circumstances surrounding their execution.
Thus, the two (2) purported photostat copies of the said informacion posesoria title
materially differ on the date when said informacion posesoria was issued. One copy
showed that the said document was issued on March 5, 1895 (Exhibit "T") while the
other indicated that it was issued twelve (12) years earlier, or on March 5, 1883 (Exhibit
"2").

Moreover, according to the official records of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, on
the basis of the "List of Possessory Information Titles (Spanish Titles) of Nueva Ecija",
the corresponding supporting documents of which are kept in the vault of said office, the
name of Melecio Padilla does not appear among those listed as holders of informacion
posesoria titles as of the year 1898 covering lands situated in Santor (now Laur) Nueva
Ecija. According to said document, the name Melecio Padilla appears only in the list of
holders of possessory information titles over lands situated in Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija,
but of a substantially smaller acreage. 19 Thus, the seven (7) parcels recorded in the
name of Melecio Padilla covered only a total area of 49 hectares, 18 acres and 325
centares. 20 In addition, the list of property owners in Santor (now Laur), Nueva Ecija
existing in the Division of Archives does not include the name of Melecio Padilla. 21 It is
true that an alleged copy of an informacion posesoria in the name of Melecio Padilla,
was recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds on November 10, 1942 by one
Rodolfo Baltazar, Register of Deeds (Exhibit "H"), but the Register of Deeds of Nueva
Ecija could not certify to its veracity, as the supposed document does not exist in their
records. 22 There is another factor which weighs heavily against the claim of the
applicant. The alleged informacion posesoria covers an area of "seis mil quiñiones,
poco mas e menos" or an equivalent of 16,800 hectares. Under the Royal Decrees in
force at the time of the supposed acquisition, no one could acquire public land in excess
of 1,000 hectares. Thus, the Royal Decrees of November 25, 1880 and October 26,
1881, prohibited any grant of public land in excess of one thousand (1,000) hectares. 23
Besides, the document described in Exhibit "H" is not the titulo de informacion
posesoria, because it was merely a certification of possession of Melecio Padilla over
the property, and was issued without prejudice to a third party or parties having a better
right. 24 Thus, it states: "En su virtud habiendo examinado el Registro nuevamente
formado por la perdida o destruccion del mismo y no hallando en ningun asiento
contrario a lo relacionado reinscribe la posesion de la finca de este numero a favor de
Don Melecio Padilla sin perjuicio de tercero que puede tener mejor derecho a la
propiedad." Under Spanish law, in order that an informacion posesoria may be
considered as title of ownership, it must be proven that the holder thereof has complied
with the provisions of Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.

It cannot be claimed that the registration of possession has been legally converted into
a registration of ownership because Melecio Padilla had not complied with the
requirements of Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law, to wit: "that the applicant has
been in open possession of the land; that an application to this effect be filed after the
expiration of 20 years from the date of such registration; that such conversion be
announced by means of a proclamation in a proper official bulletin; that the Court order
the conversion of the registration of possession into a record of ownership; and that the
Registrar make the proper record thereof in the Registry." 25 Evidently, Melecio Padilla,
having died on February 9, 1900, barely five (5) years after the inscription of the
informacion posesoria, could not have converted the same into a record of ownership
twenty (20) years after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage
Law.

One year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or on April 17, 1895, the right to
perfect possessory information title under the law expired. After that date, full property
right of the land reverted to the government and the right of the cultivator and possessor
to obtain gratuitous title was extinguished. 26

Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to

possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous
and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that
approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. During the lifetime of
Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was cleared and cultivated under the
"kaingin" system, while some portions were used as grazing land. After his death, his
daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables and had about forty (40)
tenants for the purpose. 27 During the Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. Alipio
Alinsunurin and Encarnacion Caballero took possession of the land approximately in
1950, but they had to abandon the place due to the unsettled peace and order
conditions in the area. In 1955, entry by them was prevented by the Army.

It seems obvious, on the basis of the facts in the record, that neither applicant
Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation nor Alipio Alinsunurin nor the
latter's predecessors-in-interest have been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation" of the property in question, "under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title." 28

A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon
of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense,
possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from
the State. 29 While grazing livestock over land is of course to be considered with other
acts of dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock
upon it, without substantial inclosures or other permanent improvements, is not
sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription. 30 The possession of
public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto
upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does
not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to
constitute a grant from the State. 31

Apart from the aforesaid inconclusive evidence of possession to support the applicant's
claim of title, it does not appear that the said property has ever been declared for
taxation purposes by either applicant or applicant's predecessors-in-interest. Thus, the
only tax declarations submitted were those of Mamerto Garcia and Honofre Andrada, et
al. (Exhibit "G", Tax Declaration No. 5576, covering an area of 7,340 hectares) and
Mamerto Garcia, et al. (Exhibit "H-1", Tax Declaration No. 5577, over an area of 9,547
hectares) but both were filed only in 1958. The latter declaration contains an annotation
that the property described therein is an unidentified property, as the declarant failed to
identify the same, and it "was only through his insistence" that it was assessed. Neither
applicant Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation nor its predecessor,
Alipio Alinsunurin had submitted any tax declaration supporting its/his claim over the
property. It is true that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes
are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, but they constitute at least proof that the
holder had a claim of title over the property.

It is obvious that the applicant has failed to submit convincing proof of actual, peaceful
and adverse possession in the concept of owner of the entire area in question during
the period required by law. This is especially true in view of the basic presumption that
lands of whatever classification belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must
be "well-nigh incontrovertible." 32

Even more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to
public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forest are excluded. 33 It is
well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title,
whether such title be one issued during the Spanish sovereignty or under the present
Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title. 34

Finally, the applicant urges that Proclamation No. 237 recognizes the existence of
private property within the military reservation. It is true that the proclamation states that
the same is subject "to private rights, if any there be", but applicant must prove its
private rights over the property, which said party failed to do. 35 For it is well-settled that,
unless the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the property in
question was ever acquired by the applicant or his ancestors either by composition title
from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for
the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public
domain. 36

WHEREFORE, decision in the above case is hereby rendered:

(1) in G. R. No. L-27594, the petition for certiorari is granted; the order dated March 11,
1967 in LRC Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545, the decree of registration issued
pursuant thereto (Decree No. 113485 dated March 14, 1967), and Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-3151 of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija are all declared void; the
Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija is ordered to recall and cancel all transfer certificates
of title, including owners' duplicates and mortgagees' copies, if any, arising out of
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151; the preliminary injunction issued on June 5, 1967
and the temporary restraining order issued on June 1, 1973 are made final and
permanent, with costs against respondents (except respondent Judge); and

(2) in G. R. No. L-28144, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and set aside, and
judgment is rendered dismissing the application for registration. Costs against appellee.

G.R. No. L-61462 July 31, 1984

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Director of Lands), petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEDITA INFANTE TAYAG, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Luis General Jr. for private respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
This is an application for registration of land with an area of more than 11
hectares located at Barrio Tambo, Buhi, Camarines Sur which was opposed by the
Director of Lands.
Tedita Infante-Tayag (40 in 1977), the applicant, a resident of Quezon City,
testified that the land was first possessed by her father, Froilan Infante, who died
in 1937. He was succeeded by his three children and widow, Gertrudis M. Vda. de
Infante. The four heirs settled in 1969 his estate consisting of twenty-two (22)
parcels of agricultural and residential lands (Exh. G).
That 11-hectare land was adjudicated to Soledad Infante-Yago who exchanged it
in 1975 for another parcel of coconut land (Lot No. 6652) with an area of 23
hectares belonging to her sister, Mrs. Tayag, the applicant (Exh. H).
Mrs. Tayag filed the instant application in 1976. She possessed the land in
question for barely a year. She knows that the land is coconut land but she does
not know the number of coconut trees planted therein nor the person who
planted the same. Of the boundary owners, she knows only one, her aunt, Severa
Peñoso. She does not know the actual area of the land(17-18 tsn, June 9,1977).
The only other witness, Abraham Morandarte (56 in 1977), testified that he came
to know the land in 1935 because his father was the overseer of Froilan Infante,
Mrs. Tayag's father. He lived in the land and planted coconuts thereon some of
which are 80 years old. The land has been administered by Mrs. Tayag's brother,
Antonio. He and the overseer, Solomon Buenaflor, did not testify in this case.
Morandarte became the overseer only in 1973.
The land was declared for tax purposes in 1973 by Pablo Yago, applicant's
brother-in-law (Exh. I). The realty taxes for 1946 to 1976 were paid only on April
23, 1976 by Mrs. Tayag (Exh. J) or five months before the application for
registration was filed.
The application is in the form prescribed in section 21 of Act No. 496 but it does
not contain the paragraph included in Judicial Form No. 20 of the Land
Registration Commission which reads:
(8) Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, he
hereby applies for the benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as he
has been in possession of the land since ___ ... (See Torrens System by Ponce, p.
158; 1 Tanada and Rodrigo, Legal Forms, p. 542).
The instant application, like similar applications, is for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title under section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1942.
Under that law, the applicant must prove that he, by himself and through his
predecessors in interest, have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of public agricultural land, under a  bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by force majeure.
The trial court and the Appellate Court granted the application. The Director of
Lands appealed to this Court. The Solicitor General's first contention, that the
application should be denied because Mrs. Tayag failed to present the original
tracing cloth plan, cannot be sustained.
It is indubitably indicated that the "cloth plan of Psu-112106" was  attached to the
application (p. 3, Record on Appeal). It was detached and kept by the Land
Registration Commission. It could not be marked as an exhibit.
The second contention is that Mrs. Tayag "miserably failed to prove ownership or
possession in the concept of owner for thirty years" prior to September 7,
1976 when the application was filed.
After a study of the records, we find that contention to be meritorious. The
testimonies of Mrs. Tayag (who does not know the boundary owners and the area
of the land) and Morandarte, her overseer since 1973, are not sufficient to prove
the alleged thirty years' possession in the concept of owner by the applicant, her
sister, mother and father.
The taxes for 31 years, 1946 to 1976, were paid only in 1976, a few months prior
to the filing of the application.
It is true that the plan (Exh. A) shows that the said land, Psu-112106 (an abaca
and coconut land) was surveyed in 1940 by Rafael Tayag for the heirs of Froilan
Infants. Mentioned in that plan as one of the boundary owners are the heirs of
Froilan Infante, owner of the 31-hectare parcel of land, Lot 1-B, Psd-16074 which
was adjudicated in 1969 to Mrs. Infante, the widow of Froilan Infante. It is item A
in the deed of partition, Exhibit G. Curiously enough, item A does not mention at
all the Infante heirs as boundary owners.
The applicant failed to satisfy the requirements for judicial confirmation of her
alleged title (Maloles vs. Director of Lands, 25 Phil. 548). The said land must be
presumed to be still a part of the public domain (Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75
Phil. 890).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and
the application for registration is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-58867 June 22, 1984

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO VALERIANO, GABRIELA VALERIANO
VDA. DE LA CRUZ, LETICIA A. VALERIANO and MARISSA VALERIANO DE LA
ROSA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Carlos C. Serapio for private respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioners-public officials, through the Solicitor General, seek a review of the
Decision and Resolution of the then Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of
the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, decreeing registration of
a parcel of land in private respondents' favor. The land in question, Identified as
Lot 2347, Cad-302-D, Case 3, Obando Cadastre, under Plan Ap-03-000535, is
situated in Obando, Bulacan, and has an area of approximately 9.3 hectares. It
adjoins the Kailogan River and private respondents have converted it into a
fishpond.
In their application for registration filed on May 10, 1976, private respondents
(Applicants, for brevity) claimed that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the
land applied for partly through inheritance in 1918 and partly by purchase on May
2, 1958; that it is not within any forest zone or military reservation; and that the
same is assessed for taxation purposes in their names.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development opposed the application on the principal ground that the
land applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, per BF Map
LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; and that areas within the unclassified region are
denominated as forest lands and do not form part of the disposable and alienable
portion of the public domain.
After hearing, the Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of
the Applicants. This was affirmed on appeal by respondent Appellate Court, which
found that "through indubitable evidence (Applicants) and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession
of the subject parcel of land under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than
30 years prior to the filing of the application" and are, therefore, entitled to
registration. It further opined that "since the subject property is entirely devoted
to fishpond purposes, it cannot be categorized as part of forest lands. "
Before this instance, the principal issues posed are: (1) whether or not Courts can
reclassify the subject public land; and (2) whether or not applicants are entitled to
judicial confirmation of title.
The parties, through their respective counsel, stipulated that the land is within an
unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, as shown by BF Map LC No. 637, dated
March 1, 1927. 1 No evidence has been submitted that the land has been
released or subsequently classified despite an Indorsement, dated November 17,
1976, of the District Forester, to the Director of Forest Development, containing
the following recommendation:
Subject area requested for release was verified and found to be within the
Unclassified Region of Obando, Bulacan per BF LC Map No. 637, certified March 1,
1927. However, on-the-spot inspection conducted by a representative of this
Office, it disclosed that the same was devoid of any forest growth and forms part
of a well-developed and 100 percent producing fishponds. Two houses of light
materials were erected within the area for the caretakers temporary dwelling.
In view thereof, and in fairness to the applicant considering the investment
introduced therein this Office believes that the release is in order,
Recommended for approval and be disposed of in accordance with the Public
Land Law.2
The Government's case is meritorious.
In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from
the unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The
classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom
and rendered open to disposition. 3 This should be so under time-honored
Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that
all lands of the public domain belong to the State, 4 and that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. 5
The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject property from
the unclassified region is not the ultimate word on the matter. And the fact that
BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927 showing subject property to be within
the unclassified region was not presented in evidence will not operate against the
State considering the stipulation between the parties and under the well-settled
rule that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its
officials or agents, 6 if omission there was, in fact.
While it may be that the Municipality of Obando has been cadastrally surveyed in
1961, it does not follow that lands comprised therein are automatically released
as alienable. A survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely Identifies each lot
preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title to any of the lands
upon claim of interested parties. Besides, if land is within the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Forest Development, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the
Cadastral Court to register it under the Torrens System.
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants
may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. 7
The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged
titling of properties around it, does not automatically render the property as
alienable and disposable. Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the property
from its present classification. In fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that
there are titled lands around the subject property, petitioners-officials should give
serious consideration to the matter of classification of the land in question.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is reversed and the application for
registration in Land Registration Case No. N299-V-76 of the former Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, is hereby dismissed, without prejudice to the
availment by the applicants of the proper administrative remedy. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 203384               January 14, 2015

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SPS. JOSE CASTUERA PERLA CASTUERA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
petition challenges the 26 March 2012 Decision2 and 14 August 2012
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85015, affirming the 31
January 2005 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 70, Iba,
Zambales, in Land Registration Case No. RTC-N-92-I and denying the motion for
reconsideration, respectively.
The Facts
Andres Valiente owned a 3,135-square meter land in Barangay Siminublan, San
Narciso, Zambales. In 1978, he sold the property to respondents Jose and Perla
Castuera (Spouses Castuera). On 21 May 2003, the Spouses Castuera filed with
the RTC an application5 for original registration of title over the property.
The Spouses Castuera presented three witnesses to support their application. The
three witnesses were (1) former barangay captain and councilman Alfredo
Dadural, (2) Senior Police Officer 2 Teodorico Cudal, and (3) Perla Castuera. All
witnesses testified that the Spouses Castuera owned the property.
The Spouses Castuera also presented documentary evidence to support their
application. The documents included tax receipts and an advance plan6 with a
notation, "Checked and verified against the cadastral records on file in this office
and is for registration purposes. This survey is within the Alienable and Disposable
land proj. No. 3-H certified by Director of Forestry on June 20, 1927 per LC Map
No. 669 Sheet 1."
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the application for original registration.
The RTC’s Ruling
In its 31 January 2005 Decision, the RTC granted the application for original
registration of title over the property. The RTC held:
From the evidence submitted by the applicants, they have shown preponderantly
that they are the lawful owners in fee simple and the actual possessors of Lot
6553 of the San Narciso Cadastre. They are entitled therefore to a judicial
confirmation of their imperfect title to the said land pursuant to the provisions of
the new Property Registration Decree (PD 1529).7
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decisionto the Court of Appeals. The Spouses
Castuera attached to their appellees’ brief a certification8 from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), stating:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the tract of land situated at Brgy. Siminublan, San Narciso,
Zambales containing an area of ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
(1847.00) SQUARE METERS as shown and described in this sketch as verified by
Cart. Nestor L. Delgado for Sps. Jose Castuera and Perla Castuera was found to be
within the Alienable or Disposable, Project No. 3-H, certified by then Director of
Forestry, manila [sic] on June 20, 1927 per LC Map No. 669, sheet No. 1. 9
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
In its 26 March 2012 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision.
The Court of Appeals held that:
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, provides for the instances when a person may file for an application for
registration of title over a parcel of land:
"Section 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may file in the proper
Court of first Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest havebeen in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier." Accordingly, pursuant to the aforequoted
provision of law, applicants for registration of title must prove the following: (1)
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain; and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Section 14(1) of the law requires that the
property sought to be registered is already alienable and disposable at the time
the application for registration is filed.
Applying the foregoing in the present case, We find and so rule that the trial court
is correct in granting appellees’ application for original registration of the subject
land. A scrutiny of the records shows that there is substantial compliance with the
requirement that the subject land is alienable and disposable land. It bears to
emphasize that the Advance Plan has the following notations:
"Checked and verified against the cadastral records on file in this office and is for
registration purposes.["]
"This survey is within the alienable and disposable land proj. no. 3-H certified by
Director of Forestry on June 20, 1927 per LC Map No. 669, Sheet 1."
In Republic v. Serrano, the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the trial court
and this Court that the parcel of land subject of registration was alienable and
disposable. It held that a DENR Regional Technical Director’s certification, which is
annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence, constitutes substantial
compliance with the legal requirement:
"While Cayetano failed tosubmit any certification which would formally attest
tothe alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification
by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the
subdivision plan submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes substantial
compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been
verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18,
1925.["]
"The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence
to the contrary. It bears noting that no opposition was filed or registered by the
Land Registration Authority or the DENR to contest respondents’ applications on
the ground that their respective shares of the lot are inalienable. There being no
substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the Certification
may thus be equitably extended in favor of respondents."
While in the case of Republic v.T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Supreme Court
overturned the grant by the lower courts of an original application for registration
over a parcel of land in Batangas and ruled that a CENRO certification is not
enough to certify that a land is alienable and disposable: ["]Further, it is not
enoughfor the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the
PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as
a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed
to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable."
However, in the recent case of Republic vs. Carlos R. Vega, et al(2011)., as an
exception to the strict application of the stringent rule imposed in the above
pronouncement that the absence of these twin certifications justifies a denial of
an application for registration, the Supreme Court, in its sound discretion, and
based solely on the evidence on record, may approve the application, pro hac
vice, on the ground of substantial compliance showing that there has been a
positive act of government to show the nature and character of the land and an
absence of effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only
apply to applications for registration currently pending before the trial court prior
to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future applications.
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the trial court only on
January 31, 2005, prior to the above pronouncement[.] We believe that the same
rule shall apply to the present case allowing the registration of the subject
property as there is substantial compliance with the requirement that the land
subject of registration is an alienable and disposable land. Besides, appellees had
attached to their appellees’ brief a Certification from the DENR-CENR Office
issued on December 2, 1999, which states the following:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the tract of land situated at Brgy. Siminublan, San
Narciso, Zambales containing an area of ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY
SEVEN (1,847) SQUARE METERS as shown and described in this sketch as verified
by Cart. Nestor L. Delgado for Sps. Jose Castuera and Perla Castuera was found to
be within the Alienable or Disposable, Project No. 3-H, certified by then Director
of Forestry, Manila on June 20, 1927 per LC Map No 669, Sheet No. 1." 10
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 14 August 2012 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hence, the present petition.
The Issue
Petitioner raises as issue that the advance plan and the CENRO certification are
insufficient proofs of the alienable and disposable character of the property.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the
alienable and disposable character of the property. The Spouses Castuera, as
applicants for registration of title, must present a certified true copy of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary’s declaration or
classification of the land as alienable and disposable. In Republic of the Philippines
v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,11 citing Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,12 the Court held
that:
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it is not enough for the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO to certify
that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant
must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President.
Such copy of the DENR Secretary's declaration or the President's proclamation
must be certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of such official record.
These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.13
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the 26 March 2012
Decision and 14 August 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
85015. Respondents Jose and Perla Castuera's application for registration is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.