LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES

PHILIPPINE NATURAL RESOURCES LAW (JOURNAL)

Vol. 1 No. 2
ISSN 0016-8282
December 1988

REGALIAN DOCTRINE: Whither the Vested Rights?

By Antoinette G. Royo
Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center

The Philippine government mandate over her so-called public domain was not established in a
fit of absentmindedness nor was it a product of chance. It was a natural and logical systematic
consequence of obsessively expansionist goals of two colonial masters which had spelled out the fate
of one of their reluctant colonies.

The present definition of public lands runs as follows:

The general public domain, unappropriated lands; lands belonging to the government and
which are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws and not reserved or held back for any
specials governmental or public purpose.

Off hand, there seems nothing objectionable about this legal concept of public domain. The
various land laws including the Public Land Acts and the Property Registration Decree were in fact
promulgated to satisfy government’s legitimate and compelling interest in knowing what lands belong
to the public domain. What bothers some concerned sectors of the present Philippine society is the
fact that there exists a major disagreement between government policy makers and some legal some
legal scholars as to the real definition of public lands or public domain. This disagreement is brought
about by the existence of approximately 7.5 million Filipinos within prime public lands, among who
4.5 million are tribals, claim possess the right to occupy, till, use and own the lands and resources
found within their native soil. These tribal occupants have generally held these lands as private
owners as far back as memory goes, hence their ownership will presumed to have been such even
before the Spanish conquest, and deemed never to have been public.

At present, however, the Constitution has already contained a blanket public domain
provision. “All lands of public domain are owned by the State” It is not surprising to find this in the
fundamental law.

The government has to have a clear mandate. But the motivations behind this claustrophobic
provision must seriously evaluated, Then, it was the colonialist’s need to assure herself of economic
boon in exchange for the time, men, money and artillery wasted to occupy the territory. Now, it is not
merely a blind adaptation of a supposedly grand legal tradition but a means adopted by government to
overcome the nation’s economic insufficiency.

The need to industrialize an economically beleaguered third world nation had prompted
government to initiate developmental projects like agri-business, power generation, and other dollar
earing activities like logging over public domain areas. Operating upon the premise that public lands
are owned by the state, large scale economic projects have been freely and indiscriminately
introduced, not without vehement opposition from the affected local and tribal communities, by public
entities, private or quasi-public corporations licensed by government under the gallant banner of
“development”.

In implementing airtight blueprints of this “development’” the government seems to labor at

the dilemma of whatever or not the indigenous cultural communities affected to be consulted or
convinced of the economic value of instituting developmental infrastructures in these communities to
the extent of displacing the tribal dwellers, when resistance seems always inevitable.
The framework of the aforementioned dilemma was established not so much because the bureaucracy
recognizes prior vested rights of these indigenous cultural communities over their lands and resources,
but because these communities have succeeded to some extent in carrying out war against these
governmental forces.

In fact, initially, these indigenous cultural communities were regarded as threats to the social
order and generally chronicles as rebels, whose hostility to the Spanish government justified the
atrocities of the Spanish King’s representatives.

In 1919, the case of Ruby v. Provincial Board of Mindoro illustrated the State’s
condescending attitude towards the indigenous cultural communities. In that case, they were treated as
nothing but “uncivilized and backward peoples with barbarous practices and a low order of
intelligence.” This same attitude, unwittingly, still pervades the present governmental set up: by its
failure to impugn a system that forecloses all possible means by which tribal communities can
exercise their rights. This is the system that upholds the Regalian Doctrine as the backbone of all land
classification laws.

The 1987 Constitution

Under the 1987 Constitution, there is an apparent recognition by the bureaucracy of vested
rights of the indigenous cultural communities.

Article XIV section 14 and 17, and Article II sec. 2 seem to allow concessions to native title
by stating:

The State shall foster the preservation, enrichment and dynamic evolution of a Filipino
national culture based on the principle of unity in diversity…

The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of the indigenous cultural
communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these
rights in the formulation of national plans and policies.

The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural within the framework of
nationality unity.

but Article XII section 5 provides an impregnable limitation clause:

The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and
programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities of their ancestral lands and to
ensure their economic, social and cultural wellbeing. (underscoring supplied).

Indeed. A glaring provision of this 1987 Constitution, Article XII section 2, states that:
.
All lands of the public domain are owned by the State with the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated…

Alienable lands of the public domain under a present constitution shall be limited to
agricultural lands. The rest of the public domain, which includes forest or timber, mineral lands and
national parks are inalienable. Propriety characterized, the premise that lands of the public domain
belong to the state. By virtue of the fact that it is public, it must be state’s property. The advocates for
recognition of ancestral domain as private property of indigenous cultural communities find
themselves more concerned with the popular but misguided belief that the public domain necessarily
includes lands which have been occupied by indigenous cultural communities since time immemorial
if these indigenes, either individually or as community, failed to obtain title to their occupied lands as
required by law.

Here lies the root of the controversy which, since the late 1500’s and 466 years thereafter, has
continually threatened the entire tribal populations of the nation. The Constitutional Commission, in
drafting the provisions on the national economy, was one in declaring that the foundation of Article
XII Section is the age-old but equivocal doctrine of Jura Regalia, commonly known as the Regalian
Doctrine, it would seem that under this concept, all the lands in the territory belong to the State. The
concept, as traced, must have been patterned by Spain from the English conquests of the 11 th century
whereby it was made the rule that private ownership or title must emanate from the State. This was
later on adopted quite unwittingly into the legal system via the Philippine Supreme Court,
notwithstanding the earlier pronouncement of Cariño.

The act of upholding seemingly impregnable doctrine, the Jura Regalia, is tantamount to an
irreversible foreclosure of whatever rights the indigenous communities may have had from the time of
the establishment of the first government of the Philippine Islands.

A study of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the doctrine of Jura Regalia into
the Philippine legal system against the backdrop of Spanish and subsequently American law and
jurisprudence would thus be essential to evaluate the propriety of using the Regalian Doctrine as the
foundation of the present land laws.

Legal Foundation of Native Title

Spanish Era

There is no room for the application of the Regalian Doctrine during the Spanish era. Strictly
speaking, under the Spanish Law, not at all of the Philippine Islands came under the political
jurisdiction of the Spanish Government.

It was not a concealed historical fact that earlier on, the Philippines coming under the colonial
rule of Spain was a hotly contested issue, intimately connected with the apparently conflicting
spiritual goals of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy as against the temporal pursuits of the Secular Spanish
rulers.

Under Spanish law at the time, there was no provision applicable to the situations where
Spanish expeditions found themselves in inhabited territories to justify their claim over such
territories. Law 29, Title XXVIII of Partida III, which gave the legal right over any newly discovered
land to whoever inhabited it first, has to be reconciled with the fact that the Philippine Island was
already inhabited by civilized and organized society prior to the coming of the Spaniards.

The fact that Spanish Law provided opportunity to own only uninhabited lands prompted
Spain to appeal to the Roman Pontiff – such act was in keeping with the tradition of consulting him as
the universal lord of the world on matters relating to the political dominion over non-Christian
Princess – for more plausible legal title.

The manipulative manner of obtaining such legal title King Ferdinand of Spain and the
equally dubious motives of Pope Alexander VI in granting such favor seriously put to question the
historical pronouncement that the Papal Bulls played significant Monarchs in their acts of occupation
and rule of the Indies.

The first of the series of Papal Bulls issued by Pope Alexander VI was Inter Caetera,
allegedly issued on May 3, 1943, which provided for the right of the Spanish King to acquire
inhabited territory by papal grant to preach God’s gospel.
 As it turned out, the Spanish Christianizing rule became a ruthless imperial power in the
Philippine Islands. This is evidenced by the widespread opposition against excessive taxation brought
about by the encomienda system, the consequent abuses of the encomenderos and their cohorts and
the sporadic attacks by the natives on the Spanish colonists.
Hence the convening of an ecclesiastical Junta in 1582. This Synod, among others, interpreted
the papal grant of ownership to mean acquisition only for purpose of preaching God’s gospel and
nothing more.

The first advocate of such proposition was a Spanish theologian, Francisco de Vitoria. His
reasoning is set in four propositions.

1) The Pope is not civil or temporal lord of the whole world in the proper sense of
the temporal power. Such dominion he cannot claim either by natural, human or
divine law. In the supposition that Christ had that power, He could not give to
the Pope, as he has no jurisdiction over infidels. Again Christ’s words to Peter,
“feed my sheep,” clearly show that power in temporal matters is meant

2) Even assuming that the Sub-supreme Pontiff had this secular power over the whole
world, he could not give it secular princes. This is made clear because that power would
be annexed to the Papacy and not to the particular Popes; and being all the popes equal
in juridical power, none of them could deprive the others of the prerogatives of the papal
office.

3) The Pope has temporal power only so far as it is in subservience to matters spiritual that
is, as far as necessary for the administration of spiritual affairs xxx in so far as the
Pope’s dominion over temporal things as these impede man from attaining his ultimate
end. Laws therefore that contravene the attainment of eternal happiness can be rescinded
by the Pope for the good of the faithful xxx.

4) The pope has no temporal power over the indian oborigines or over other unbelievers.
This is manifest from the first and third propositions for he has no temporal power save
such as subserves spiritual matters xxx. If the barbarians refuse to recognize any lordship
of the Pope, that furnishes no ground for making war on them and seizing their property.
And even if they refuse to accept Christ as their lord, this does not justify making war on
them or doing them any hurt.

After years of friar controversy as to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of Spanish rule in the
Island which reached the confines of King Philip II’s chambers, the latter issued a decree “ordering the
Governor General of the Philippines to call together the authorities of the Islands to determine ways
and means, first, to restore tribute unjustly collected from pagan natives, over whom the King had no
legal power, and second, to obtain without coercion ratification of the native’s submission to Spanish
authority.” (undergoing supplied)

That in effect was a recognition of the fact that Spanish colonial rule cannot be arbitrary
imposed upon them and native submission to Spanish rule was only discretionary. Thus, since most of
these native communities never voluntarily submitted to Spanish authority, they did not come under
Spanish sovereignty.

The Laws of the Indies provide some evidence of recognition of indigenous rights over
property. Contrary to the popular belief that respect or recognition of time immemorial possession by
“Indians” is an exemption to the general rule that all lands belong to the crown, these laws ordain that
native or Indian land rights are primary and superior.

Law VII, Title 12, Book 4 (1588) declared that “lands be assessed without unfair
discrimination among persons and without offense to the Indians.” Laws IX, Title 12, Book 4 (1594)
declared: “Let not lands be given with prejudice to the Indians and those already given be returned to
their owners,” Law XVII, Title 12, Book 4 (1646) refused the admittance of applications for
adjustment of lands owned by Indians or with defective title; Law XVII, Title 12, Book 4 (1646)
refused the admittance of applications for adjustment of lands not possessed for 10 years and gave
preference to Indians; Law XXVII, Title 1 Book 6 (1572) gave Indians the freedom to sell their farms
with judicial authority; Law XXX, Title 1, Book 6 (1546) prohibited commissioners to succeed the
lands left vacant upon death of the Indians; Law XXXII, Title 1, Book 6 (1580) allowed Indians; Law
IX, T le 3, Book 6 (1560) prohibited the deprivation of Indians of Lands they previously owned.

Other laws promulgated by the Spaniards to secure registration of lands were generally taken
to mean an abrogation of Spanish recognition of native title. A close perusal of these laws however
gives the reader no hint of such intention.

Law XIV, Title 12. Book 4, referred to by Justice J. Willard in the case of Valenton v.
Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, 542 (1903) as the “first of the long series of legislative acts intended to compel
those in possession of public lands, without written evidence of title to present evidence as to their
possession or grants and obtain the confirmation of their claim to ownership,” significantly contains a
clause which proscribes any statement negating native title as follows” … and after distributing to the
native what may be necessary tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they have now and giving
them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose
as we may wish.” (undergoing supplied)

In the landmark case of Cariño v. Insular Government, Justice Oliver W. Holmes must have
referred to this same point when he posted:

White it (Law 14, Title 12, Book 4) commands viceroys and others when it deems proper to
call for the exhibitions of grants, direct them to confirm those who hold by good grants or just a
prescription (sic). It is true that it begins by the characteristics assertion of feudal overlordship and the
origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was the titles
were admitted to exist that owned nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their
books.” (undergoing supplied)

The royal cedula of October 15, 1754, which required occupants since the year 1700 to show
title deeds or ancient possession as a valid title by prescription, is silent as to occupants prior to 1700. It
further admitted prescription even against Crown lands.
 Contrary to the popular belief that recognition of time immemorial possession by “Indians” is
an exemption to the Regalian Doctrine, the laws of the Indies ordain that native or “indian” land
rights are primary and superior.

The royal decree of June 25, 1988, in is Art. 1, defined royal lands as:

all lands whose lawful ownership is not vested in some private person, or what is the same thing,
which have never passed to private ownership by virtue of cession by competent authorities made either
gratuitously o for a consideration.

Art. 4, stated:

for all legal effects, those will be considered proprietors of the royal lands herein treated who may
prove that they have possessed the lands without interruption during the period of 10 years, by virtue of good
title and in good faith.

Upon these provisions, the contention that native title has always been respected and recognized is
further strengthened.

The royal decree of February 13, 1894, popularly known as the Maura Law, which declared forfeited to
the State all titles that were capable of adjustment has not been sought, was overthrown by the Caraño doctrine.

In 1906, the Philippine judiciary, when plaintiff Cariñoo first appealed is case, was not clear whether
the Maura Law required the natives to seek adjustment or obtain a deed from the State first before they become
absolute owners of the land occupied by them. Further, the premise of such acts of seeking adjustments was that
these lands were wrongfully withheld, or that they are without gratuitous title, or payment or any kind of
consideration. The Indians is were never considered wrongful or unlawful possessors/occupants of the land, and
native titles have always been legally cognizable.

American Era

Native title is rooted in Roman Law and updated under common law as aboriginal title. It is recognized
by the American government as an exemption to the rule as of state ownership of the public domain. The term
“aboriginal title’s is used in early United States Supreme Court decisions to refer to the original, ancestral lands
of native title. Both can be held by native inhabitants even though the government is not yet aware of the
specific titles. Both are accorded constitutional protection. Since they are not public, they necessarily fall under
the category of private property and are thus entitled to state protection. There is again no room for the direct
application of the Regalian Doctrine under the above premises.

During the American regime, government policy towards tribal Filipinos was consistently made in
reference to native Americans. Tribal Filipinos were not only of different racial stock than the Americans, they
posted problems in terms of culture, pacification and economic development. The American distinction was
couched in paternalistic language. The policy of segregation, however, heightened existing divisions between
“”a national majority”… and a national minority.” It is institutionalized and nurtured the development of an
arrogant, widespread and enduring prejudice which to this day distains indigenous Philippine culture.
Nevertheless, from a legal point of view, certain benefits can be drawn from the comparison to native
Americans. The American judiciary has struggled for more than two hundred years with the ancestral land
claim of indigenous Americans. Many of decisions rendered support the Indian claim to land. Some of the
decisions are part of the Philippine common law. All are persuasive value in the Philippine context.

Two theories or concepts evolved in common law involving indian ancestral lands may find relevance
in the case of the tribal Filipinos claim of native title. First is the Extinguishment for Consideration Theory
based on the Fifth Amendment, the due process clause of the United State Constitution which found its way into
the Philippines Constitutions: Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. IV, Sec. 1 of the 1973 Constitution;
Art. II, Sec. 9 of the 1987 Constitution.
 The same formulation still obtains: “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.” This literal lifting carries with it all applicable jurisprudence of English and American
constitutional law cases. This was in fact the basis of the U.S. Supreme Court in stating:

it is hard to believe that the United States…meant by property only that which had become such by
ceremonies which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never heard, and that it proposed to treat as
public land what the, by native custom and by long association, one of the profoundest factors in human thought
regarded as their own.

Due process dictates that native title prevail over government’s claim for reversion of private due to the
failure of their claimants to comply with the requirements of subsequently promulgated land registration laws,
when said claimants could not, for justifiable reasons, comply with such laws.

The second is the Trust Relationship Doctrine as a resource of tribal rights against the government. The
idea is to require the federal government as fiduciary to act in the tribe’s best interest and to be accountable for
failure to do so. The same doctrine is reemphasized in the 1987 Constitution:

The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to
preserve and develop their cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation
of national plans and policies.

The State … shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to
ensure their economic, social and cultural well-being…

Owen J. Lynch Jr., in his efforts at responding to the challenge of laying down the foundations for the
genuine recognition of native title, has noted:

In their struggle for survival and cultural integrity, tribal Filipinos have generally not been aware of
non-indigenous, legal procedures for acquisition and recognition of title. Rights to land are determined by
indigenous custom law. Carino acknowledge this fact by moral, customary and legal standards of justice and
native title. In Herico, the Supreme Court once again implicitly reaffirmed that Filipino citizens, who have
occupied and cultivated public, agricultural land for atleast thirty seven years, have acquired vested rights of
ownership.

As guardian of the rights of her people under the doctrine of parent’s patria, the State must abide by its
own social justice provisions and protect the native title.

Worthy to note is the analysis of one of the most renowned legal scholars of common law which states:

…The notion that long occupation is to be deemed lawful in the absence of proof to the contrary is
ancient as the concept of property itself: indeed the right to use that which one has created, possessed or
occupied without wrongfully taking them from another is fundamental to any legal system. The rights of first
occupants have been widely supported by moral philosophers (in particular by the followers of Rosseau) and in
their early development almost all legal systems acknowledged continuous use and occupation as the sole
source of title…it was regarded by Roman jurists as a rule of natural law which was immune from challenge.

The Regalian Doctrines vs. Native Title

The Regalian Doctrine appears to destroy the strong and impregnable foundations of native title. It
permeated the thinking of the then contemporary legislators for want of any stronger ground to bolster their
claims to the rich lands of the Indies. The doctrine however suffers a legal ambiguity as to its origin and its
application, and as such runs the risk of misuse by the powers that can very well use it. Further, it is a clear by
product of an unjust exercise of pontifical mandate by the morally disintegrating hierarchical structure of the
pre-renaissance Catholic Church.

Further inquiry into the origins of the Regalian Doctrine led the writer to no substantial materials
which could possibly supports its contemporary usage: that which forecloses all claims of native title over the
public domain. In the earliest translated Spanish works, the closest word that may possibly be its source is
“realengas.” The Crown lands then were originally referred to as realengas. Clearly, these were lands not owned
by the villages or were outside their dominion and included those who held without legitimate cause by the
friars and other later occupants. These realengas “which cannot be absolutely owned or alienated since grantees
only enjoy the use and usufruct of them” were out in the same footing as communal lands, referring to the lands
owned by the natives. The caciques were legally recognized. This recognition in effect validated the claim that
the Regalian Doctrine does not and could not cover the indian or tribal lands.

In Cariño, the Supreme Court of the United States through Justice Holmes confirmed the above
position. In his opinion upholding the applicant Mateo Cariño, he stated:

If the applicant’s case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that it was
bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited by
the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands,
irrespective of any royal grant, In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all native inhabitants of the
Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will.

The Making of Jura Regalia Philippine Style

The American occupation saw another era of renewed zeal for the eventual classification of all lands
acquired through the Treaty of Paris. One of the first Acts of Congress, the Philippine Bill of 1902 July, entitled
“An Act Temporarily to Provide for the Administration of the Affairs of the Civil Government of the Philippine
Islands and for Other purposes,” can be said to have substantially contained provisions purely on land
classification and distribution which were later specifically embodied in CA No. 141, otherwise known as the
“Public Land Act.”

This frantic classification activity had preoccupied the American bureaucracy as well as its legislators,
the former insisting on the need to maximize agricultural benefits from the land potentials of the archipelago and
the latter conducting research and hearings in the legality of such occupation including the property of
subsequent laws promulgated to strengthen such claims.

The American government was not remiss of the fact that Spanish laws on land classification suffered
patent as well as latent ambiguities. It had learned, from the reports submitted to it by Congress, of the pathetic
plight of native claims and the preponderance of the acts of Spanish bureaucracy in the Islands to extend the
doctrine of Jura Regalia to lands not in fact covered by it, and to tolerate if not to justify landgrabbings
perpetrated by its contemporary: the church.

Such impediment notwithstanding, the U.S. Government proceeded to approve the abovementioned
law, sec. 14 of which:

Provides that the government of the Philippine Island shall be authorize and empowered enact rules
and relations to prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to public lands in said
islands who have fulfilled all or some of the conditions with regard to the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the
King of Spain for the acquisition of legal title, but have failed to secure conveyance of title. By the same section
the Commission is authorized to patent to any native 16 hectares of public land actually occupied by him prior
to August 13, 1898.

For the first time, it clarified the status of native in the American colonial perspective. That was
landmark. Native land rights were clearly subserved tot the state’s claim of ownership of all the islands in the
territory, contrary to the intent and spirit of the first Spanish laws. This baseless ambiguity called the Regalian
Doctrine was then carved into the formidable legal structure of the United State’s colonial period.

There was no trace of vocal opposition from the articulate Filipinos. In fact, it was no less than the
memorandum submitted by the Filipino Solicitor General, Don Gregorio Araneta, that was used by the
Philippine Commission to guide them in drafting the provisions of sec. 54 Chap. IV of the Public Land Act of
1903. Out of the five members of the commission who signed the letter to the Secretary of War explaining the
Public Land Act, two were Filipinos, T.H. Pardo de Tavera and Benito Legarda, the other being W.H. Taft, L.
Wright and H.C. Ide. That memorandum adopted almost in toto the royal decree of Feb. 13, 1894.

The natives who were directly concerned did not for obvious reasons Interpose any objection. Cariño
case was an isolated one that reached the U.S. Supreme Court. Cariño had the means. The others however did
not have the chance to read the law, much less the opportunity to object. The law was clear. From that moment
on, they had become no different from the insignificant and, more often, wrongful occupants.

There is a deafening and dangerous silence on the part of the scholars, historians and lawmakers as to the
Regalian Doctrine question … Meanwhile, the native claims continue to “disturb” the nation’s peace.

__________________________________________________________________________________________

Conclusion

The premise upon which the Regalian Doctrine as it is understood today is founded is patently unjust
and legally and historically flawed. Its jurido-christian foundations, being unjustly instituted, proves a weak
support. This doctrine, which failed to recognize the characteristics limitations of the Spanish claim of
sovereignty over the Philippine archipelago, is being used to justify laws on land titling and, more importantly,
land classification. The inherent defect consequently takes its toll in the mass displacement of tribal
communities which have for so long resisted colonial expansionism and have not been assimilated into the
“Filipino” culture.

It is an indisputable fact that the natives have since time immemorial exercised dominion over their
lands, coupled with the inherent rights of self-determination; and that they have been restive for want of
recognition of their sovereign will.

There is a deafening and dangerous silence on the part of the scholars, historians and lawmakers as to
the Regalian Doctrine question, if ever it is asked at all. Meanwhile, the native claims continue to “disturb” the
nation’s peace.

Bennett aptly put a concrete suggestion to the courts:

In the absence of a compelling legislative or executive extinguishment, these courts must be urged to
accept the patent justice of the native claim and to place that the claim on its only legal basis – that of simple
immemorial possession.

In the Philippines, the problem of recognition native title and the socio-economic and political
conditions intertwine. Until the international land disputes are discussed along an authentic and just framework,
or any and all efforts to settle or negotiate the prevailing socio-economic and political tensions are doomed to
fail.

This involves a democratic reorientation of planners and policy makers; reformulation of policy and
reevaluation of result/output which mechanics this paper does not attempt to discuss.

If suffices at the moment to point out that the Philippine legal system is building its structures on the
wrong block, such that anything that builds on it may not be any better. Worthy to note is the yearning of Don
Gergorio Basa, an employee of the then Spanish land office and the subsequent Bureau of Public Lands during
the crucial years of land legislation (from Sept. 8, 1880, date of the publication of the regulations of June 25,
1880, to August 13, 1898), who “witnessed the vissicitudes which have attended the efforts to adjust the titles of
lands” in the Philippines Islands:

…He who successfully regulates the adjustment of titles to the lands in these islands will merit a crown
of glory, receive the congratulations of an obedient and grateful people and guarantee the political policy
which may be implanted, promote agriculture – the basis of wealth in any country – and as a consequence,
contribute to the welfare of its inhabitants and prevent repetition of the evils of the past.

With subtle caveat he continued, citing a learned Spanish writer Jovellanes:

Everything relating to society is intimately allied to politics, as surely as the phenomena of nature are
bound together, one bad law may ruin an entire nation, as a spark ignited in the bowels of the earth produces
convulsions and earthquake extending at times over a great extent of its surface.

This has not lost it meaning today.