The Policy of the British Cabinet in the Nootka Crisis

Author(s): John M. Norris

Source: The English Historical Review, Vol. 70, No. 277 (Oct., 1955), pp. 562-580
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/558040
Accessed: 23/07/2010 22:38

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The English
Historical Review.

http://www.jstor.org
 562 October

The Policy of the British Cabinet in the

VNootkaCrisis
THE Nootka Sound crisis of 1790 presents an interesting study
in the danger of assigning simple motives to the policies of
Governments. The younger Pitt's Administration has been tra-
ditionally regarded as a paragon of all the progressive and pacific
virtues, and its conduct in threatening Spain with war and bullying
her into surrendering her claims to exclusive sovereignty over the
unsettled areas of the North American continent appears to have
been curiously out of character. Attempts have been made to
attribute this apparent aberration to the Government's desire to
establish a new principle of imperial sovereignty based on actual
occupation of territory and freedom of trade; 1 and to excuse it
because it implemented the sacred mission of Anglo-Saxon progress
to eliminate the last vestiges of effete Latin tyranny.2 But no
examination has been made of the complex forces which actually
motivated British policy in I790.
The Government's first news of the seizure, received on z2
January I790 in a despatch from Anthony Merry, the British chargi
d'affaires at Madrid, consisted of vague and conflicting Spanish
reports that a British vessel had been seized while trying to form a
settlement at Nootka Sound. Neither the name of the vessel nor
the date of the seizure were mentioned; but the report emphasized
that the incident had taken place in territory claimed by Spain on
the basis of the Papal Bull Inter Caetera of I493, the Treaty of
Tordesillas, subsequent treaties and recognitions by European
Powers, and the doctrine of contiguous occupation.3 Later
despatches from Merry added that Don Estevan Martinez of the
Spanish navy, in the process of supplementing a reconnaissance of
1788, had planted a settlement at Nootka in the spring of I789, and
had seized an English vessel whose avowed intention was to estab-
lish a settlement in the same place.4 The British Foreign Minister,
1 Lennox Mills, 'The Real
Significance of the Nootka Sound Incident', Canadian
Hit. Rev. vi. 110-22.
2
J. Holland Rose, William Pitt and the National Revival(Lolldon, I9II), p. 588.
3 Merry to the duke of Leeds, 4 January I790, Great Britain, P[ublic] R[ecord]
O[ffice], F[oreign] O[ffice] MSS. 72/I6, fos. 3-4.
Same to same, 7, I5 January I790, ibid. fos. 64, 70.
1955 BRITISH CABINET POLICY IN THE NOOTKA CRISIS 563
the duke of Leeds, instructed Merry on 2 February to secure more
information, particularly as to the state of the Spanish defences in
the New World, to be guarded in his statements, and under no
circumstances to surrender any British rights to trade on, or occupy
the north-west coast of North America, 'to which we undoubtedly
have a complete right, to be asserted and maintained with a proper
degree of vigour, should circumstances make such an exertion
necessary '.1 On I I February the Spanish ambassador, the marquis
del Campo, presented a Note to the British Government which shed
additional light on the incident. Del Campo stated that Martinez
had already established a settlement and taken possession of Nootka
when an armed British ship, the Argonaut, arrived in port. Accord-
ing to the ambassador, the captain of the Argonaut, James Colnett,
had been commissioned 'as governor by the South Sea Company',
to make an establishment at Nootka. The Note requested that His
Britannic Majesty should restrain his subjects from making expedi-
tions to territory claimed by Spain by virtue of prior exploration or
claim.2
' His
Majesty's Ministers ', runs the semi-official account of the
negotiations,
conceiving the seizure of a British ship in time of peace to be an
offence against the law of nations and an insult to His Majesty,lost
no time in taking the only step in their power, uninformed as they
were of the circumstances attending the transaction, unfurnished
with any proofs, except the letteritself from the Spanishambassador,
and not even knowing whose property, or whose persons had thus
been injured.3
But in point of fact the Cabinet were not united on policy, and their
action after receiving del Campo's Note was hesitant and ambiguous.
They apparently questioned from the outset the validity of these
Spanish claims, and decided that the question of the seizure should
be taken up ' with a high hand '. The duke of Leeds observed that
'it might not be unbecoming of the dignity of the government to
insist upon satisfaction for that insult before entering upon other
subjects '.4 Even though he was not Foreign Secretary, Pitt, on
this-as on other important occasions-drafted the despatches and
decided the policy.5 He approved of Leeds's decision with some
reservations. On 26 February an answer to del Campo's letter was
despatched, which demanded complete restoration of the property
1 Leeds to Merry, 2 February 1790, ibid. fo. 87.
2
[James Bland Burges] A Narrative of the NegotiationsOccasionedby the Dispute
betweenEnglandandSpain in the Year 7ygo(London, I790), pp. 9-11.
3Ibid. p. I2.
4 Leeds to Pitt, 23
February 1790, P.R.O. 30/8, Chatham MSS, vol. cli.
5 Cambridge ModernHistory,viii. 290. Pitt found it necessary at this point to censure
Leeds for not having circulated the papers on the incident for Cabinet discussion.
(Pitt to Leeds, 23 February I790, Chatham MSS., vol. cli.)
564 THEI POLICY OF THE October
seized and satisfactionfor the insult to the British flag, before any
further discussion of claims and rights on the coast could be
undertaken.1
Pitt's reservationswere sensible. Relationswith Spainhad been
good for the previousfour years,and therewas no reasonto suspect
that that country wanted war.2 British policy after the disastrous
peace of 1783 had been to foster friendship with the victorious
Bourbon Powers while Britain revived her economic and naval
strength. In 1786 Britain had signed a commercial treaty with
Spain and a convention which provided for the removal of the
British logwood-cutters from the Mosquito Shore in central
America, The latteragreement,in regulatingthe remainingBritish
settlementsin Yucatanand Honduras,had formally acknowledged
the absolute sovereignty of Spain over areas occupied by British
settlers-an acknowledgementwhich was to embarrassthe British
Government in their subsequent negotiations over Nootka.3
After the convention of I786 relations with Spain rapidly
improved, and so did Britain'sposition among the Great Powers.
Spain gave moral support to the Triple Alliance in its attempt to
curb the ambitionsof Russiaand Austria,and approvedof Britain's
role as peacemakerin the Belgian revolt againstAustria. After the
outbreakof the French Revolution and the consequent weakening
of the Bourbon Family Compact, the Spanish Foreign Minister,
Count Florida Blanca, proposed an alliance with Britain. The
purpose of the projectedagreementwas to preservethe established
order in Europe from the revolutionaryvirus.4 Britain, on the
other hand, realizedthat she was now free from the menace of the
Bourbon coalition, and in 1790 the Governmentfound itself in the
position of choosing between converting a moribundenemy into a
doubtful and not particularlyuseful friend, or asserting Britain's
new power by avenging an apparentinsult to the British flag. It
was a situationto tempt a most unmilitaryGovernmentto vigorous
and ruthless action.
The fact that the Cabinethad formerlytaken an interest in the
north-westcoast of North Americaand its commercealso helped to
1 Leeds to del Campo, 26 February 1790, F.O. 72/I6, fos. 126-33.
2 Cf. Narrative of the Negotiations,p. i.
3
Alleyne Fitzherbert to Leeds, 9 October I79o, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 28,066, fo.
293. Cf. 'Convention between His Britannic Majesty and the King of Spain, signed
at London, the 14th of July, I786 ', Annual Register,xxviii. 262-6.
4
Merry to Leeds, 25 January I790, F.O. 72/x6, fo. 77; same to same, 28 January,
8 February I790, F.O. I85/6, No. 9. The prospects for such an alliance were not good,
but George III probably reflected an idea current in Government circles when he
wrote to William Grenville during the Nootka crisis: 'In the present posture of
affairswith Spain I do not see that we can take any step toward that Court, but should
that storm blow over there cannot be any objection to assure her of our resolution
not to prevent the French constitution from being established on terms conformible
to the sentiments of the Comte d'Artois.' (George III to W. W. Grenville, 28 March,
1790, Chatham MSS., vol. ciii.)
 1955 BRITISH CABINET IN THE NOOTKA CRISIS 565

influence its decisions, though only incidentally. The Portlock-

Dixon fur-tradingexpedition, sent out by RichardCadmanEtches
and his associatesin 1786,had been instructed,apparentlywith the
Government'sapproval,to establishfactorieson the coast, and had
been granted official trading licences by the East India and South
Sea Companies.' At this time HenryDundas, the presidentof the
Board of Control, was endeavouring to replace the East India
Company'sterritorialjurisdictionwith direct British rule in India.
Part of his plan was embodiedin the complicatedand unsuccessful
Investment Schemeof I785. The scheme was designed to transfer
the Company'sIndian debts to England and to improve its trading
position and bullion supply with the assistanceof investment by
English and European merchants in Indian commerce.2 The
interest which Dundas manifested in I785 and I786 toward the trade
of north-west America was perhaps inspired by the hope that it
would provide a reliablesource of specie for the Company. Like
David Scott, his ally among the East India Directors, he also
probablysaw an opportunityfor meeting the growing demandsof
the Britishmercantileand industrialinterestsfor a sharein the East
India and South Sea trades, by allowing private tradersto develop
the new commerce.3
Whatever his motive, he secured detailed information on the
trade with China and North America,4and in 1786 he encouraged
his future son-in-law,JamesStrange,to make a voyage of discovery
1 [John Cadman Etches] An Authentic Statementof the Facts Relative to Nootka
Sound (London, I790), pp. 5-6, 17-I8, 24-6; Nathaniel Portlock, A VoyageRound
the World(London, 1788), p. 4. These instructions, however, were not fulfilled (John
Meares, Voyages (London, 1790), p. liv; George Dixon, Remarks on the Voyagesof
John Meares,Esq., in a Letter to that Gentleman(London, 1790), p. I3). Instructions
were also given to Portlock to forward all his despatches to Etches through George
Rose, the secretary of the Treasury (An Authentic Statementof the Facts, p. 29). The
Government showed particular interest in one by-product of this exploration. This
was the settlement made by Portlock on Staten Island, off Tierra del Fuego, which
was to form a base for a British whale fishery. Proposals were made to the Govern-
ment as early as 1785 for the regular maintenance of such a fishery; Samuel Enderby
urged Pitt to make its protection a sine qua non of the negotiations in 179o, and Pitt
did indeed regard it as of equal importance with the settlement of the Nootka question
(An Authentic Statementof the Facts, pp. 5-6; Portlock, VoyageRoundthe World,p. 6;
Temple Luttrell to William Pitt, October 1785, Samuel Enderby to Pitt, 30 August
1790, Chatham MSS., vols. cliii, cxxxiii).
2 C. H. Philips, The East India
Company,1784-1834 (Manchester, I940), pp. 45-9.
Thomas Coutts, the banker, suggested the development of trade between the Philippines
and India, in which silver from South America might be channelled into the hands of
the Company. Merchants in Manilla could draw bills upon London for the purchases
made in Asia (Marquis of Carmarthen to William Pitt, 17 January 1785, Brit. Mus.
Egerton MSS. 3498).
3 The
policy of encouraging private exporters to augment the trade of the Company,
under Company regulation and in Company ships, was adopted in 1788. Dundas
had previously contemplated a more extended scheme of private competitive trading
during the operation of the Investment Scheme (Philips, op. cit. pp. 71-2).
4 Holden
Furber, HenryDundas,First ViscountMelville, 1742-18II (London, I931),
pp. 65-8.
566 THE POLICY OF THE October
and trade to the north-west coast. The primary purpose of the
venture was mercantile, but Strange also intended to establish
British claims on the coast.1 Despite great hopes, the profits from
the venture were meagre. Dundas, meanwhile, had revised his
policy with respect to the East India Company. The close par-
liamentary vote on the East India Declaratory Act of 1788 had shown
the Government that parliament disapproved of the threat to the
Company's chartered rights. Dundas halted the attack and devoted
himself to building up a Government majority among the Directors
and Proprietors.2 Coincidentally, no further Government support
was given to private trading ventures to north-west America.
But the demands of private traders for a share in the Indian
trade, which Dundas had hitherto encouraged, could not be easily
quieted. In 1787 a decline in the price of copper had forced the
Cornish and Anglesey miners to combine under the leadership of
the Birmingham Commercial Committee. This combination nego-
tiated with the Government to force the East India Company to
allow an annual shipment of 4,000 tons of copper in the Company's
ships for ultimate private sale in India.3 In co-operation with
Liverpool merchants and Manchester manufacturers, it also tried
to force the Company to allow the shipment of private trade goods
in the Company's ships, and the establishment in India of agents of
British manufacturing companies.4 The campaign of this pressure
group against the monopoly of the East India Company reached its
greatest intensity during I790,5 and was to have an important
influence on the Nootka negotiations.
In the spring of I790, however, the Government was far more
concerned with domestic political arrangements-especially the
1 A. V. Venkatarama
Ayyar, 'An Adventurous Madras Civilian: James Strange,
1753-1840 ', Proceedingsof the Indian Historical Records Commission,vol. xi, passim;
C. H. Philips (ed.), The Correspondence of David Scott, Directorand Chairmanof the East
IndiaCompany,Third Camden Series of the Royal Historical Society, vol. lxxv (London
195I), pp. xi-xii, 2, 229, n. 2; Mrs. Anne Durham to Henry Dundas, 17 August 1786,
William Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Melville Papers, vol. ii; Furber,
op. cit. p. 70.
2 Philips, The East India Company,1784-1834, pp. 59-63.
3 Samuel Garbett to Lord Lansdowne, 17
May, 15 September I787, Birmingham
Reference Library, Copies of Letters and Other Papers, Chiefly Correspondence
Addressed from Samuel Garbett of Birmingham to the Earl of Shelburne, Afterwards
Marquis of Lansdowne, I766-I802, vol. ii, fos. II8, I27.
4 Garbett to
Lansdowne, 15, 20, 25 September 1787, ibid. fos. I26-9, I30-I; Petition
of the committee of Liverpool merchants, 23 March 1792, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS.
38,228, fo. 153.
5 Garbett to Lansdowne, 22 April, 8 May, 25 November, 6 December 1789, ibid.
fos. I86-8, 191, 2i6, 228; Garbett to Lord Hawkesbury, 23, 27 March 1790, Brit. Mus.
Add. MSS. 38,225, fos. 95, 12; Philips, East IndiaCompany,pp. 75-7. The suggestion
was made to Pitt at the time of the Nootka Convention that the South Sea Company's
monopoly be abolished, on the grounds that only by this means could the terms of
the convention, requiring free trade in the Nootka areafor the subjects of both nations,
be fulfilled ( to William Pitt, 1791; Stephen Cotterell to Pitt, 31 March 1791,
Chatham MSS., vols. cccxli, cxxviii).
1955 BRITISH CABINET IN THE NOOTKA CRISIS 567
forthcoming dissolution of parliament-than with the international,
imperial or commercial implications of a controversy over Nootka.
Pitt's Government no longer possessed that confidence in its own
invincibility which it had shown on the morrow of the election of
I784. It looked forward confidently to the dissolution, but was,
at the same time, apprehensive of an Opposition resurgence.' In
the Cabinet the divisions revealed by the Regency crisis of the
preceding year had not yet healed. Thurlow, the politically
unreliable lord chancellor, was engaged in a protracted hair-
splitting argument with William Grenville over the exact status of
the British settlers formerly established on the Mosquito Shore, and
he was soon to oppose the policy of his colleagues with regard to
Nootka.2 The duke of Leeds shared Thurlow's jealousy of the
ascendancy of Pitt and Grenville, and made a point of being in the
minority on almost all disagreements over policy. Dundas, the
other minister most concerned with policy, was preoccupied with
the Hastings impeachment and with the political arrangements
necessary to ensure the continued loyalty of Scottish burghs in the
forthcoming election.3
After the despatch of Leeds's letter of 26 February, the nego-
tiations hung fire. On 25 February Merry reported that the Spanish
were reinforcing their garrisons in America and were preparing a
fleet of twelve ships of the line. Spain had also sent a justification
of her conduct to France, and had apparently opened negotiations
with Russia and Austria for an alliance against Prussia and Britain.4
During the following month Merry and the British consuls in
Spanish ports were kept busy reporting on the growth of the
Spanish fleet and the enforcement of new Spanish port regulations
5
designed to cut off trade with Britain; for the Spanish Government
was already convinced that Britain was determined on a quarrel and
was preparing for war. Florida Blanca was personally anxious to
maintain peace and a close understanding with Britain in the face of
the threat of revolutionary France, but he was often overruled by

1Lord Broome to Commodore William Cornwallis, I6 May 1790; bishop of

Lichfield to Commodore Cornwallis, 7 June I790; Earl Cornwallis to Commodore
Cornwallis, 19 September i790, Historical Manuscripts Commission, VariousCollections,
vi, 354, 356, 360; Edmund Malone to the earl of Charlemont, I5 April 1790, ibid.
x3th Report, Appendix, Part viii, p. 124; Pitt to George Rose, io June I790, William
Clements Library, Letters from William Pitt to George Rose, fo. 4; Earl Stanhope,
Life of the Right HonourableWilliam Pitt (London, i86I-2), ii. 5I--3.
2 H.M.C., FortescueMSS., i. 559, 571-7, 582-3.
3 Dundas to Commodore Cornwallis, 9 May I790, H.M.C., Various,vi. 354; Furber,
op. cit. pp. 73-5.
4
Merry to Leeds, 8 February, 22 March I790, F.O. 72/16, fos. 97-9, 228-9. Cf.
Extract from a despatch of M. de Sandoz Rollin, Prussian minister at Madrid, 22 March
1790, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 28,065, fo. 21.
5Merry to Leeds, I8, 22 February, I, 4 March I790; James Duff (consul at Cadiz)
to Leeds, 2 March 1790; Daniel Budd (consul at Alicante) to Leeds, 6 March 1790,
F.O. 72/16, fos. 109, II3-I4, 138-9, I44-6, I69-70, I88-9, 204-15; F.O. I85/6, fo. 29.
 568 ITHEE POLICY OF 1THEE October
his Cabinet colleagues, and his repeated assurances of Spain's
peacefulintentions failed to allay British suspicions arousedby the
warlike preparations.l
For their part, the British were unsure of their position. They
still knew hardlyany of the details of the incident,2and their policy
alternatedbetweendemandand concession. At the end of February
Merry complainedthat he lacked clear and informed instructions.
In discussingthe questionof Britishrights at Nootka, he was forced
to surrenderthe initiativeto FloridaBlanca.3 Leeds himself, how-
ever, was quite as much in the dark as his subordinate. It was not
until April 4 that Merry was able to make any firm statementof
British policy. On that day he informed Florida Blancathat since
the Spaniardscould not allow the British to make a settlementon
the north-west coast, they should have contented themselves with
merely sending the offendingvessels away or detainingthem until
the orders of the Spanish Court should have been received.4 If
that had been done, Merry assuredhim, no claim for satisfaction
would have been made, and the British Government would not
have been forced to assert the rights of British subjects so vigor-
ously.6 In making this declaration,which almost amountedto an
indirect concession of Spanish territorial claims, Merry and his
principals were probably influenced by the news that Spain was
negotiating with Russia and the Northern Powers for a grand
allianceagainstBritain.6 Neither Pitt nor Leeds wanted to involve
the nation in a generalwar over an incident about which they knew
practicallynothing.
Two new developments soon reversed this trend toward
moderation. On 20 April the Spanishreply to the British Note of
26 Februaryannounced that the crews of the offending ships had
been liberated, but only as an act of courtesy to His Britannic
Majesty,and on the assumptionthat 'nothing but ignoranceof the
rights of Spaincould have encouragedthe individualsof any nation
to resort to those places with the idea of establishingthemselvesor
of carrying on commerce there'. The reply also complained of
other apparentviolations of Spanishsovereigntyby Britishships in
Peru and Cuba.7 It did not allude to the demandfor satisfaction,
1
Merry to Leeds, 22, 29 March, 5 April 1790, F.O. 72/16, fos. 228-9, 238-40,
243-5.
2
Merry to Leeds, 22 February 1790, ibid. fo. 1x3.
Ibid. Cf. Leeds to del Campo, 26 February 1790, ibid. fo. I27. ' ... pour ce
qui conceme les details de la satisfaction ulterieure qu'on pourra trouver necessaire
il faut attendu [sic] une plus ample connaissance des circonstances de cette affaire.'
4 There is no record of specific instructions to this effect having been given, but
the moderate tone of Merry's declaration was not out of harmony with the mood of
the Cabinet in March 1790, and certainly no attempt was made to repudiate this venture
in conciliation.
5 Merry to Leeds, 5 April I790, ibid. fos. 243-5. 6 Ibid.
7 Del
Campo to Leeds, 20 April 1790, ibid. fos. 275-7.
 1955 BRITISH CABINET IN THE NOOTKA CRISIS 569
and the sceptical Leeds assumed that the evasion was a disguised
refusal.
Suspicion became conviction when John Meares, the principal
owner of the seized ships, returned to England early in April.
Almost immediately after his arrival he must have laid his case
before the Cabinet,l because his Memorial,which was to be one of
the Government's most important instruments of propaganda, may
have been ready for publication as early as the third week in April.2
This publication was then undertaken at the Government's expense.3
The Cabinet were probably in possession of Meares's version of the
incident as early as the second week of April, when their attitude to
Spain began to harden. For the first time they had learned that
more than one ship had been seized, and that the Spaniards had
attempted to establish a claim to territory in which a British company
had apparently already made a settlement. In order to strengthen
his case with the Government, Meares exaggerated the indignities
inflicted on his ships and crews, and asserted that he had made a
formal claim to the territory and established a permanent settlement
at Nootka in 1788.4
In fact, however, the evidence tends to contradict this assertion.
Neither his original instructions for his expedition of 1787-8, nor
his instructions to his subordinates in 1788 make any mention of a
territorial claim to Nootka, and Meares's own Voyages (a more
reliable work than the Memorial, which was written for polemical
purposes) mentions only a claim made in the Strait of Juan da Fuca.5
Moreover, in the plans for these expeditions the principal emphasis
1 Meares's initial contact with the Cabinet was
probably through Richard Cadman
Etches, whose brother and partner, William Etches, was at that time acting as a
Foreign Office spy with the Russian fleet in the Baltic. (Hugh Elliot to Leeds,
26 April; William Etches to Elliot, 25 April 1790, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 28,065,
fos. 305, 306. Cf. Richard Cadman Etches to Evan Nepean, 28 September I796,
Chatham MSS., vol. cxxxiii).
2 One
Opposition pamphlet stated that the Memorialwas in the hands of the Govern-
ment as early as 3 April (Errors of the British Ministerin the Negotiationswith the Court
of Spain (London, I790), p. 46). It must certainly have been received not later than
20 April for it to have been published by the end of April.
3 In the official
correspondence of the first earl of Liverpool, preserved in the
British Museum, there is a letter from George Chalmers, secretary to the Committee
of Council for Trade, to his principal, Lord Hawkesbury, discussing the details of the
publication and the payment to be made to Meares (Chalmers to Hawkesbury, I5
November I790, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 38,225, fo. 313).
4
Burges's semi-official Narrative of the Negotiationsrecords that Meares's account
'proved the conduct of the Spaniardsto have been infinitely more hostile and imperious
towards His Majesty' than had hitherto been supposed (Narrative of the Negotiations,
p. 23).
5 'Instructions to
John Meares, 24 December 1787', reprinted in British Colonial
Development,1774-i834: Select Documents,ed. Vincent T. Harlow and Frederick
Madden (Oxford, 1952), pp. 30-2; 'Instructions to Captain William Douglas, 24
September 1788 ', reprinted in TheJournalof CaptainColnett,ed. F. W. Howay for the
Champlain Society (Toronto, I940), pp. 32-6; Memorialof John Meares, Esq., to the
Right HonourableWilliam WyndhamGrenville,April 3o, I790 (London, I790), pp. I-4;
Meares, Voyages,p. 173.
57? THE POLICY OF THE October
was placed on the need to secure as much as possible of the Pacific
Coast fur trade before it was overrun by traders and destroyed or
rendered unprofitable.1 All the expeditions to the coast at this
time were trading ventures, organized on a joint-stock basis for one
or at most two voyages, with precarious financial backing which
required the maximum profit to be realized for each voyage. The
traders were not ordinarily concerned with questions of sovereignty
because, other considerations apart, they generally came to the coast
as interlopers in a preserve of the South Sea Company. Accordingly
it was not until Meares, in the autumn of 1788, had made an alliance
with the Etches Company, which gave him a share in a South Sea
Company trading licence and what he imagined to be a monopoly
of the trade, that he ordered his subordinate, Captain Funter, to
secure that monopoly by laying formal claim to all discoveries
made.2
Much the same situation obtained with regard to Meares's
alleged settlement at Nootka. It was to be a principal contention
of Meares and the British Government, during the negotiations, that
the Spanish had made no permanent settlement on the north-west
coast and therefore were not in effective occupation of the area and
could not legitimately claim to exercise exclusive sovereignty over
it. Yet Meares and his associates did not themselves make a
permanent settlement at Nootka, and had no intention of doing so
until 1789, when they were assured of a virtual monopoly of the
trade there. Plans were certainly made for future trading, but all
the indications are that Meares and his associates in 1788 had not
the slightest intention of laying claim to the area in the name of
King George III. Indeed, the use of the Portuguese flag by Meares
in 1788, and by two of his ships in 1789, indicated an anxiety to
avoid being identified as British by the British, Spanish, and Chinese
officials.3 On his arrival at Nootka in the late spring of 1788,
1 Meares, Memorial, 8; '
p. Agreement of Messrs. John Etches and Richard Cadman
Etches & Co., and Messrs. John Henry Cox and Daniel Beale & Co., 30 November
1788,' Colnett'sJournal,pp. 3-4. In 1788 Meares and his partners had noted that the
trade' is such as must shortly destroy all competition and give us the exclusive posses-
sion of this valuable branch of trade, much to the advantage of our country' (British
Colonial Development,1774-1834, p. 30).
2 'Instructions to
Captain Robert Funter, 3 February 1789', Colnett's Journal,
p. I9. The fact that the licences of the Etches Company were due to expire in 1790
gave a sense of urgency to Meares's plans for 1789 (ibid. pp. 4-6).
3 'Instructions of the Merchant Proprietors to John Meares, Esq., 24 December
1787 ', Meares, Voyages, Appendix i; George Dixon, Further Remarks on Meares's
Voyages (London, 1790), p. 55. The Portuguese colours were used ostensibly to
secure lower duties in Chinese ports than were ordinarily available to British ships.
They were also used to evade the licence regulations of the South Sea Company and
to secure better treatment from the Spanish authorities than would have been accorded
to British ships on the north-west coast (W. R. Manning, 'The Nootka Sound Con-
troversy', Annual Report of the American Historical Association, I904 (Washington,
I905), p. 289; H. I. Priestley, ' The Log of the Princessaby Estevan Martinez ', Oregon
HistoricalQuarterly,xxi, no. i, pp. 30-I).
 95 5 BRITISH CABINET IN THE NOOTKA CRISIS 57I
Meares, according to his own account, negotiated with the local
chief, Maquinna, and was allowed a plot of land on which to build
a house ' for the accommodation of the people we intended to leave
there '.1 In his Memorialhe referred to this transaction as a purchase
giving title to the whole area, but it was a purchase of doubtful
validity. As Professor Manning has pointed out,
There is nothing in his narrative which indicates that at that
time Meares had any thought of acquiringa permanenttitle, either
for himself or for his government. Neither is there any unmis-
takableindication to the contrary. Under these circumstances,any
title to sovereignty thus acquiredwould have to depend on subse-
quent operations.2
Meares built a house at Nootka in May 1788 and left a party
behind to make a depot for trade along the coast. On leaving, he
promised Maquinna 'that when we finally left the coast he should
enter into full possession of the house and all goods and chattels
thereunto belonging '.3 This promise, and Meares's orders to
Captain Douglas to winter in the Sandwich Islands,4 implied that
there was no intention to form a permanent settlement. Moreover,
if the evidence of the captains of the American vessels which spent
the winter at Nootka can be believed, Douglas tore down the house
before shifting to his winter base.5 Certainly Martinez made no
mention in his log of a house being at Nootka when he arrived in
the spring of 1789, and his men were forced to pitch a tent when
they went ashore.6
Meares's preparations for the season of 1789, as has been noticed,
were much more substantial than those for 1788. He informed
Captain Douglas in his instructions that the purpose of the alliance
with the Etches Company was to monopolize the trade of the
district and set up a factory which was to be a ' solid establishment,
and not one that is to be abandoned at pleasure .7 Yet this
was merely a declaration of future intention, and Meares, in his
Memorial, did not claim that his house at Nootka was a permanent
establishment.8 His intention, then, was to make such an establish-
ment in the spring of 1789, but by that time the Spaniards had
forestalled him, and his ships were seized when they appeared at
Nootka.
With a questionable claim to the occupation of Nootka and a
status which could best be described as that of an interloper, Meares
appeared to be a most unpromising symbol of the British Govern-
ment's determination to protect British traders in their lawful
pursuits. Yet the Government could not afford to be particular in
1 Meares, Voyages,p. 114. 2 Manning, op. cit. p. 291.
3 Meares, Voyages,p. 130. 4 Ibid.
Appendix, p. 217.
5 Manning, op. cit. p. 312. 6 Priestley, op. cit. p. 32.
7 Meares, op. cit. 8 Manning, op. cit. p. 313.
Appendix ii.
57z THE POLICY OF THE October
its choice of symbols. With an election imminent, the Opposition
was ready to make the most of any of the Government'smistakes
in negotiating. Pitt was acutelyawarethat the defenceof the rights
of a British trader, especially one who representeda challenge to
the monopoly of the East India Company,had a powerful attraction
for the whig mind. As Burkepointed out, a war with Spainwas a
war of plunder, and whig orators could still rouse the nation by
stirringthe immortalmemoryof Jenkins'Ear. Moreover, Spanish
naval mobilizationwould soon force the Governmentto reveal the
negotiationsto parliamentin order to securesupply.1 At the same
time a split was developing in the Cabinet,where Leeds, reflecting
the Opposition's attitude, objected to prolonged negotiation over
questions of sovereignty and urged an ultimatum for restitution
and satisfaction. Pitt was forced to patronizeMearesfor fear that
the Opposition would do so.
He thereforehurriedon his plans, and on 30 April the Cabinet
decided to mobilize the navy.2 On the evening of 4 May a general
pressfor the navy was institutedall over the United Kingdom. On
the following day, while Meares'sMemorialwas being published
broadcastthroughout the nation, a royal message announced the
crisis to parliament,3and Pitt appealedfor a vote of credit for the
navy.
His speechon this occasionreflectedthe influencewhich Meares's
appearancehad had on British policy. What the Government
demanded,he declared,was the surrenderof 'a claim on the part
of Spain, the most absurd and exorbitantthat could be imagined,
a claim which they had never heardbefore, which was indefinitein
its extent and which originatedin no treaty,no formalestablishment
of a colony, nor restedon any one of those grounds on which claims
of sovereignty, navigation and commerce usually rested'. If
Britain accepted this claim, he continued, 'it must deprive this
country of the means of extendingits navigation and fisheryin the
southern ocean, and would go towards excluding His Majesty's
subjectsfrom an infant trade, the future of which could not but be
essentiallyto the commercialinterest of Great Britain'.4 Here at
1 Continuous reports on increased Spanish armaments were still coming in
(George
Rose to Lord Auckland, April I790, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34,430, fo. 284; Daniel
Budd to Leeds, io April; James Murough to Leeds, io April; Merry to Leeds, I2, 15
April I790, F.O. 72/16, fos. 247-52, 254, 256-9, 260-2, 264-8).
2 Cabinet Minute,
30 April I790, William Clements Library, Correspondence of
George III, 1789-91 (Transcripts of Sir John Fortescue), vol. iii, no. 115I; William
Grenville to George Rose, 30 April I790, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 42,772, fo. 32; H.M.C.,
FortescueMSS., i. 579-82. An additional reason for the suddenness of the decision
was a desire to test the administrative machinery of the navy, which had recently been
improved by Sir Charles Middleton's reforms (Middleton to Pitt, 17 May 1790, Letters
and Papers of Charles,Lord Barham,Navy Records Society (London, 19I0), ii. 35 -2;
LettersandPapersof Admiral of theFleet Sir ThomasByamMartin, Navy Records Society
(London, I901), iii. 38I-2).
3 ParliamentaryHistory, xxviii. 765-6. 4 Ibid. p. 770.
I955 BRITISH CABINET IN THE NOOTKA CRISIS 573
last was a full statement of British aspirations. Spain must abandon
her ancient claims to sovereignty in order that British interlopers
might be free to carry on a trade in new areas which was forbidden
them in regions under British control.
Parliamentary opposition to the Government's policy was
vigorous but inept. The supporters of Charles James Fox criticized
the secrecy of the negotiations and demanded that the Government
secure full restitution and satisfaction. But Pitt had presented them
with two accomplished facts in the form of the preliminary demand
for satisfaction and the mobilization of the navy, and they were
reduced to trying to outdo the Government in protesting their
abhorrence of Spain.l
Few questioned the justice of the cause for which the nation was
threatening to go to war. Burke paused from his labours on the
impeachment of Hastings to suggest that the sovereignty over
Nootka belonged to neither of the Great Powers, but to the natives
of the area. 'Extent of dominion', he declared, 'would do us no
good. . . . The effect would prove to us, what it was at the moment
to Spain; we should be the weaker for our accumulation of distant
dominion.' 2 Daniel Pulteney gave his support to the fleet mobil-
ization because Spain was preparing for war, but he expressed doubt,
on the basis of the facts produced in parliament, whether there had
been any insult to the British flag, since the arrest of ships engaged
in contraband trade was approved by the law of nations. The
Government, he pointed out, were still not sure of what had
actually occurred at Nootka, and their demand for a complete
restitution and satisfaction before discussion of rights of sovereignty
was begging the question. If the Spaniards had rights on the
coast, the seizure of the ships was merely the exercise of those
rights.3
Nevertheless the Government was criticized primarily for its
methods of negotiation rather than for its coercion of Spain. An
Opposition motion to have the relevant documents in the nego-
tiations published was defeated; a vote of credit of two millions
for the navy was passed almost unanimously; and having success-
fully negotiated the hurdle of parliamentary criticism, Pitt quickly
secured a prorogation of parliament on io June and later a dis-
solution. Before the Government's policy could be examined in
detail, it was clcuded over by a jingo election campaign, in which
patriotic fervour and the judicious expenditure of the vote of credit
1 Fox, for
example, declared 'that there could not be a single man in the House.
or in the country, but must see the necessity of a vigorous armament', and ridiculed
the Spanish claims based on the Papal Bull InterCaeteraof 1493 (Ibid. pp. 772-6. Cf.
ibid. pp. 794-9, 801-4).
2 Ibid.
pp. 780-I. Cf. Burke to Lord Charlemont, 25 May 1790, H.M.C., Charlemont
MSS., ii. I26.
' Ibid. pp. 778-9.
574 THE POLICY OF THE October
in the port boroughs helped to vindicate, or at least palliate, the
Government'sconduct in the eyes of the English public.1
Nevertheless the issue of the contest was not yet decided.
Warned by the unhappy precedent of Shelburne'sAdministration
in 1782, Pitt was conscious that he must negotiate an agreement
acceptableto the new parliamentwhen it met in the autumn,or face
politicalannihilation. Pressurewas steadilygrowing in the country
to impose a Carthaginianpeace on Spain. Meares's testimony
beforethe Committeeof Councilfor Tradeimpressedthe mercantile
communitywith the value of the fur trade between the north-west
coast of Americaand Asia, and the possibilityof using it to develop
a free marketfor British manufacturesin both areas.2 For a time
the exaggerationsof Meares and John CadmanEtches were cir-
culated to help the growing campaign among merchants and
industrialistsagainst the commercialmonopoly of the East India
Company.3 In a fierce pamphlet war, ancient prejudices were
inflamedon behalfof restitutionfor Mearesandthe Etches Company
and victory for the Foxites. Lurid and mendacious tales of the
tortures and tribulationsendured by the crews of Meares's ships
while in the hands of the Spaniards,were industriously spread
abroad. Religious prejudicedelighted in ridiculing the Papal Bull
on which the Spanish claim was based, and in conjuring up the
horrors of the SpanishInquisition to which British seamen might
possibly be subjectedif the pretensionsof Spainwere not destroyed.4
Emotion was reinforcedby cupidity, and suggestions were made
that Nootka could be used as a bargainingcounter to secure the
Manila ransom, Puerto Rico, Minorca, or the Floridas, or that
Britain might seize the opportunity to revolutionize the Spanish
empire and secure the best parts for herself.5 Whig pamphleteers
1 One pamphleteer pointed out, probably with considerable justification, that Pitt
had opportunely dissolved Parliament 'while the two millions was floating through
Hampshire, and at other port towns [sic] ' where he knew he was most vulnerable (The
Plain Dealer or Freeman'sBudget(London, 1792), no. 3, p. I 8. Cf. Pitt to Lady Chat-
ham, 24 June I790, Chatham MSS., vol. cxi).
2 Minutes of the Committee of Council for Trade, i January to 29 December
I790,
Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 38,392, fos. 114-21.
3[Etches] An AuthenticStatement the Facts, pp. 9-I i; Samuel Enderby to
of Pitt,
30 August, 25 November I790; anonymous letter to Pitt, January 179I, Chatham
MSS., vols. cxxxii, ccxli; Stephen Cotterell to Leeds, I7 April I790, F.O. 72/I6,
fos. 262-8. Cf. supra,p. 566 and n. 5.
4 Alexander Dalrymple, The SpanishMemorial
of 4th JuneConsidtred (London, I790),
passim; [Etches] An AuthenticStatement,p. 24; [Etches] A Continuation of an Authentic
Statementof all the Facts Relative to Nootka Sound(London, I790), pp. 2-3; [James
Bland Burges] Letters Lately Publishedin the 'Diary' (London, 1790), pp. 23-4; An
Address to the Parliamentof Great Britain on the Past and PresentState of Affairs between
Spain and GreatBritain, Respectingtheir AmericanPossessions(London, 1790), pp. I-36;
Commentson the Convention with Spain (London, I790), p. 4.
6Dalrymple, The Spanish PretensionsFairly Discussed (London, I790), p. 6; An
Address to the Parliamentof Great Britain, pp. 37-9; A Continuationof an Authentic
Statement,pp. Io-i6; An AuthenticStatement,pp. 22-3; John Napier to Pitt, 7 July
I790, H.M.C., 12th Report, Appendix, Part ix, 'MSS. of P. V. Smith ', p. 368; Francis
19 5 BRITISH CABINET IN THE NOOTKA CRISIS 575
accused Pitt of executive tyranny for keeping the negotiations
secret, and of undue leniency toward the Spaniards because he had
not presented them with a simple alternative between granting
satisfaction and being attacked.1 Meanwhile pamphleteers defended
the Government on the ground that only careful persuasion could
secure the essential British demands without arousing the hostility
of most of the Powers of Europe.2
These jingo pressures also roused latent hostilities within the
Cabinet. The duke of Leeds, veering violently from one extreme
of policy to another, took exception to the pacific counsels of his
leader and refused to attend a Cabinet meeting on 2 June. The
meeting had been called to give approval to instructions for Alleyne
Fitzherbert, the new British ambassador to Madrid, to allow the
Spaniards, subject to restrictions, to reopen the question of claims
to sovereignty, once they had granted the British demand for
satisfaction. But Leeds disapproved of any measure short of a
'direct unqualified satisfaction for the insult, without a single
engagement on our part tendering the probable event of a future
discussion of any one of the objects in dispute, by way of purchasing
the compliance of Spain with the satisfaction demanded'. At the
same time he displayed a paradoxical solicitude for Spanish feelings.
He believed that Pitt's plan to force the cession of Nootka im-
mediately after satisfaction had been obtained would be dangerously
and unnecessarily humiliating. to Spain. It would be better for
Spanish honour, and ultimately for Anglo-Spanish friendship, if
war were declared immediately and Spain lost the territories as a
result of military defeat.3 In fact Leeds had convinced himself that
war was inevitable, and was anxious to force Spain to declare it
while Britain was prepared. If the negotiations were allowed to
drag on, he reasoned, other powers would take a hand and a new
coalition would be formed to crush Britain.4 His views in this
Wadkins to Leeds, I5 June I790, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 28,066, fos. 23-4. An
extended correspondence between Pitt and Francisco de Miranda, the Venezuelan
patriot, on the subject of revolutionizing Spanish America, is summarized in a letter
of Miranda to Pitt, 8 September 1791, Chatham MSS., vol. cccxlv.
1 Errorsof theBritishMinisterin theNegotiations,passim; An Address to the Parliament
of GreatBritain, pp. 40-4.
2 LettersLately Publishedin the'
Diary ', pp. 30-86, An AuthenticStatement,pp. 3i-6.
3Leeds to Pitt, 2 June 1790, Chatham MSS., vol. cli. Leeds reiterated these
objections a month later with regard to instructions which were to be sent to Fitz-
herbert to present an ultimatum to Spain. (Same to same, 5 July 1790, Brit. Mus.
Add. MSS. 28,066, fos. 67-8.)
4 James Bland
Burges, Leeds's under-secretary, was merely reflecting the con-
victions of his principal when he wrote: '. . . before we know where we are, we
shall have the Americans, and possibly the Russians on our backs, if we lose a week
commencing the war with Spain by some vigorous and decisive stroke, which may
crush their naval power, and incapacitate them from standing against us at sea. Should
we fail in doing this . . . in two months time, we shall have to cope with an united
navy of Spaniards, French and Americans' (Burges to Leeds, 27 June I790, Brit.
Mus. Add. MSS. 28,066, fos. 55-6).
576 THE POLI~CY OF lti% October
regard were shared by Lord Camden 1 and Lord Thurlow. Leeds
was persuaded with difficulty to remain at the Foreign Office, but
he continued to disagree with and obstruct Pitt's policy.2
The British reply to del Campo's note of 20 April, delivered on
5 May, introduced the new policy of intransigence into the nego-
tiations. Complaining of the failure to grant satisfaction, Leeds
pointed out that according to new information received from Meares
four ships had been seized, and that 'the soil at Nootka and in some
other parts of the coast, particularly in a strait in or about the
Latitude of 48 Degs. 30 Minutes, had, previous to this transaction,
been purchased of the natives by a British subject, and the British
flag hoisted '. Although the British Government would always be
prepared to restrain British subjects from interfering with the
legitimate rights of Spain, they ' could never in any shape accede
to those claims of exclusive sovereignty, commerce and navigation'
which the Spanish Government had asserted. Furthermore, the
British Government were determined to protect British subjects
trading on the coast, where they had 'an unquestionable right to a
free and undisturbed enjoyment of the benefits of commerce,
navigation and fishery, and also to the possession of such establish-
ments as they may form, with the consent of the natives, in places
unoccupied by other European nations .3
It was becoming increasingly apparent, though it had not yet
been formally defined, that the satisfaction which was being de-
manded constituted a complete surrender of Spanish claims to
territorial sovereignty over unoccupied areas in the New World.
On i6 May Fitzherbert was instructed, in discussing the satisfaction
and the prevention of further disputes, to demand a declaration by
Spain that she would not enforce her claims against British subjects
in the future. It was not, however, a formulation of a broadly
inclusive doctrine, applicable in all other instances of a similar
nature, but rather an ad hocattempt to make a predatory policy look
respectable. 'His Majesty', wrote Leeds in the instructions,
' conceives it more advisable to endeavour to form, prospectively,
such a settlement as may secure the just interests of both parties,
and distinctly ascertain their situation for the future.' Such a
settlement would include: security for British subjects to whale and
fish in all Pacific waters and to land and provision on all unsettled
coasts, the return of Nootka (on the basis of Meares's claim) to
British possession, the opening of the north-west coast to settlement
by all European nations, a guarantee of the mutual freedom of the
1 Lord Camden to Pitt, 29 June I790, Chatham MSS., vol. cxix.
2 Pitt
to Leeds, I9 June 1790, Stanhope, Life of Pitt, ii. 54; Leeds to Pitt, 5 July
1790, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 28,066, fos. 67-8.
3' Draft of a Representation to be made by Mr. Merry to the Court of Spain,
4 May 1790 ', F.O. 72/17, fos. 17-I9; Leeds to del Campo, 5 May 1790, ibid. fos. 23-4.
Cf. Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34,43 , fos. 77-9.
1955 BRITISH CABINET IN THE NOOTKA CRISIS 577
subjects of both nations to trade in each others' settlements and a
mutual agreement not to plant settlements in the southern ex-
tremities of South America unless a third nation did so. If, on the
other hand, Spain should insist on discussing rights of sovereignty,
'His Majesty can never admit the territorial claim of that Court,
extending as it does to places which can in no sense be alleged to be
either possessed or occupied by the subjects of that Crown; such
a claim being contrary to the established principles of the Law of
Nations, and to the plain sense of treaties subsisting between the
two courts, particularly that of I670 '.1
In later instructions to Fitzherbert the British demands were
modified in order to make them more palatable to Spain. The
Spaniards were conceded permission to reopen the question of
sovereignty on a basis different to that of the Nootka claims,2 when
once they had granted the British demand for satisfaction,3 but at
the same time those claims were ridiculed in advance. On 13 June
the Spanish Government, as though to test the sincerity of the
British concession, issued a circular to all European Powers justi-
fying the claims of Spain on the basis of treaty rights, established
in some cases for two centuries, and including terms of the Treaty
of Utrecht by which England had guaranteed Spanish control over
the American continents.4 The British Government quickly
withdrew its concession. It warned that no further detailed
discussion of these or other Spanish claims or of the Spanish rights
of sovereignty would be permitted.5 The meaning was perfectly
clear. The Spaniards must give up all claims to the territory or go
to war.
Florida Blanca continued to avoid a decision for some time
longer, but his power to manoeuvre was being inexorably circum-
scribed. At the demand of Britain he gave the fullest assurances of
peaceful intentions.6 At home he was forced by his colleagues in
the Spanish Government to continue mobilization,7 though the

1 Leeds to Fitzherbert, i6
May 1790, F.O. I85/7, nos. I, 2.
2 That
is, they were to be allowed to put forward any valid claims to north-west
America other than those of prior exploration and occupation of Nootka and the
north-west coast generally.
3 Leeds to
Pitt, 2 June I790, Chatham MSS., vol. cli.
4 This
document, incorrectly entitled 'Memorial of the Court of Spain, delivered
3 June to Mr. Fitzherbert, the British ambassadorat Madrid ', is printed in the Annual
Register,xxxii, 294-8.
5Fitzherbert to Florida Blanca, 13 June 1790, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34,43I, fos.
402-4.
6
Merry to Leeds, 17, 20 May 1790, F.O. I85/6, nos. 38, 39; same to same, 21, 26
May 1790, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 28,o65, fos. 380-I, 404. Florida Blanca had at
first tried to persuade Merry that the Spanish armament was a defensive measure
against revolutionary France, but later admitted that it had been inspired, in part, by
the possibility of a dispute with Britain (Merry to Leeds, 19 April 1790, F.O. 72/16,
fo. 27I; same to same, 20 May 1790, F.O. I85/6, no. 39).
Manning, op. cit. pp. 372-3.
VOL. LXX-NO. CCLXXVII 00
578 THE POLICY OF THE October

prospect of war found Spain without reliable friends. Whereas

Britain, by the end of June, had the active and generous support of
Holland 1 and the passive support of Prussia,2 Spain had been able
to secure from France no more than a promise of aid which was to
be subject to ratification, amendment, or rejection by the revolu-
tionary French Constituent Assembly.3
Under these circumstances, Florida Blanca took refuge in
procrastination. In a memorial to Merry of 4 June he offered
restitution and compensation for the seizure, while maintaining the
Spanish claims of sovereignty on as practical a basis as possible.4
At the same time he opened negotiations with Russia and the United
States, and even suggested an alliance with England against
revolutionary France, in return for a settlement of the controversy
favourable to Spain.5 But the British were adamant in their
demands. On 13 June Fitzherbert sent a memorial to Florida
Blanca declaring that there could be no further negotiation until
the British claims for restoration, indemnity and satisfaction had
been met.6 A reasonable request from Florida Blanca for arbitra-
tion of the dispute, or at least for proof of the British case and
protection of Spanish rights subsequent to satisfaction, was rejected.7
So was a proposal to divide the disputed territory along an east-west
line north of Nootka, though in this case Fitzherbert, probably
reflecting the British Government's general indifference to the
actual territory in dispute, indicated the possibility of a compromise.8
But following instructions, he emphasized that adequate satisfaction
must embody the surrender of Spain's claims to exclusive sovereignty
over the whole north-west coast. Presenting drafts of a declaration
and counter-declaration granting this satisfaction, Fitzherbert
demanded that the Spaniards sign them forthwith.9 Florida Blanca,

1 Leeds to Auckland, 4, i8 May I790, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34,431, fos.
67-7I,
8i, I95; Narrative of the Negotiations,pp. 66-70, 95-7, ioo ff.; Auckland to Grenville,
5 May, 8 June; Dundas to Grenville, 30 May 1790, H.M.C., FortescueMSS., i. 585-6,
588-9.
2 Count
Hertzberg to William Ewart, 20 May I790, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34,431,
fos. 205-7; Narrative of the Negotiations,p. 67.
3
Manning, op. cit. pp. 389-94; Narrative of the Negotiations,p. 68.
4' Spain's not having fixed establishments on a coast, port or bay, does not prove
that it is not hers. If this reason should prevail, any nation might establish herself on
the same coasts of the dominions of another nation in America, Asia, Africa and even
Europe, where should be no fixed establishment.' (Florida Blanca to Merry, 4 June
1790 (translation), F.O. I85/6; Narrative of the Negotiations, pp. 115-19; Annual
Register,xxxii. 292.)
5 Fitzherbert to Leeds, i6 June, 1790, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS.
28,o66, fos. 32-4.
6 Fitzherbert to Florida
Blanca, 13 June I790 (translation), Brit. Mus. Add. MSS.
34,43 , fos. 402-4; Annual Register,xxxii. 298.
7 Narrative
of the Negotiations,pp. I29-38; Leeds to Fitzherbert, 5 July 1790, F.O.
72/18, fo. 96.
8 Narrative of the Negotiations,p. I52.
Leeds to Fitzherbert, 5 July I790, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 34,43I, fos. 33-6;
Fitzherbert to Leeds, 15 July I790, F.O. 186/6; Narrativeofthe Negotiations,pp. 142-3.
1955 BRITISH CABINET IN THE NOOTKA CRISIS 579
after securing some slight modifications in the declaration, and
having exhausted all the resources of diplomacy, surrendered. On
24 July the two documents were signed.1
This decided the principal issue of the controversy. The British
Government had secured its own political survival and a new outlet
for British commercial endeavour. For three months more the
negotiations were to continue, and at one time they were to threaten
to involve almost all Europe in war, yet in this late stage the object
sought was merely a definition of the concessions to be made to
Britain. The decision to make those concessions had been forced
on Spain in the declaration of 24 July.
It has been maintained that the instructions to Fitzherbert of
16 May to reject all Spanish claims to sovereignty not based on
actual occupation of territory marked the beginning of a new British
theory of colonial sovereignty. According to one writer, 'in its
essence the Nootka incident was the inevitable conflict between
irreconcilable British and Spanish principles of colonial sovereignty'
and 'the purpose of the whole negotiation, in so far as it was
concerned with the north-west coast, was to vindicate the British
principles of sovereignty.2
In fact, it marked no such original departure. From the
historical viewpoint the idea was not new; the English had dis-
agreed with the Papal Bull, Inter Caetera,from its promulgation, as
Henry VII's grant to John Cabot in 1496 makes evident.3 But they
had not consistently applied the occupational theory of sovereignty.
The occupational theory was frequently and successfully asserted
with respect to Georgia. It was asserted with equal frequency but
with considerably less success in the case of the logwood settlements
on the Honduras and Mosquito coasts.4 On the other hand, the
English claim to Newfoundland had been maintained for centuries
without actual occupation, and in the settlement of the Nootka
question the British Government accepted as Spanish certain

1Annual Register,xxxii. 300; Narrative of the Negotiations,pp. I56-8.

2Lennox Mills, op. cit. pp. I 13, 22.
3 Rymer's Foedera,xii.
595-
4 The
English claimed that the Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1670, and its confirmation
in the Treaty of Utrecht, by reverting to the statusquoantehad implied Spanish surrender
of sovereignty over the settlements of logwood cutters in the province of Campeachy.
The Spaniards consistently refused to accept this interpretation. The English claim
on the basis of the treaty of I670 was much weaker with respect to the later settlements
of Belize and the Mosquito Shore. After the War of the Austrian Succession the
British Government did exercise a loose supervision over the Mosquito Shore, but
by the Peace of Paris of 1763 they agreed to withdraw their military protection and
supervision of the settlements and the Spanish agreed to tolerate the presence of the
alien settlers (Richard Pares, War andTradein the West Indies,1739-i763 [Oxford, I936],
pp. 41-3, I02-4, 540-55, 569-73, 602-3). The Spaniards improved their position by
successful military action during the American Revolutionary War, and the Conven-
tion of 1786 made an express acknowledgement of Spanish sovereignty in the area
(Fitzherbert to Leeds, 5 October 1790, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 28,o66, fo. 293).
580 BRITISH CABINET POLICY IN THE NOOTKA CRISIS OCt.

districts which were not actually settled by Spaniards.l Nor can

it be argued with any degree of plausibility that the suggestion, put
forward in Fitzherbert's instructions, that all European nations
should be permitted freely to purchase and occupy unsettled areas
and carry on commerce with the settlements of other nations,
constituted an important element in British colonial policy.
The British Government adopted the ' new principle of colonial
sovereignty' to give a gloss of respectability to a ruthless act of
expropriation; and the decision to commit that act was not
occasioned primarily by a desire to correct injustice, still less by a
coherent theory of imperial domain. Domestic political considera-
tions in an election year, the ambitions of certain trading interests,
and the desire to secure Britain's position in Europe, determined
British policy in the crisis of I790.
JOHN M. NORRIS.
1 Narrative of the Negotiations,pp. I8o-I. For a contemporary account challenging
the British case on sovereignty claims, see William Belsham, Memoirs of the Reign of
GeorgeIII (3rd edn.; London, I790), iv. 294-303.