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evr deer CONTENTS Acknowledgments 6 ROBERT MOSES PROJECTS A Porc 7 Intropuction 45 ROBERT MOSES AND THE RISE OF NEW YORK The Fower Broker in Perspective 67 EQUIPPING THE PUBLIC REALM Rethinking Robert Moses ond Recreation 72 REBUILDING NEW YORK IN THE AUTO AGE Robor! Moses ond His Highways. 88 ROBERT MOSES AND URBAN RENEWAL The Tile | Progam 94 ROBERT MOSES, RACE, AND THE LIMITS OF AN ACTIVIST STATE 116 REVOLT OF THE URBS Robert Moses and His Cries 122 ROBERT MOSES AND CITY PLANNING 130 CATALOG OF BUILT WORK AND PROJECTS IN NEW YORK CITY, 1934-1968 134 Pools 135 Beaches 158 Neighborhood Ploygrounds and Parks. 174 City Parks 190 Roads ond Crossings 204 Housing and Urbon Renewal 242 Mizclloneous Projects 208 Selected Bibliography 324 CContibuor othe Catalog 227 Photogroph Credits 228 Index 220 , INTRODUCTION HILARY BALLON AND KENNETH T. JACKSON resources to keep the city strong. Yet even i the context ofthis hroie Iuilng tradition, Moses is in league of his 0 Moses reign a bulng maestro in New York City extended rom 1994, ‘when Mayor Fiorello La Guardia appointed him the fist city-wide comm Sloner of parks, to 1968, when the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority merged with the MTA and Moses was ousted as chairman. Daring that ‘hiny-fouryear period, Moses's output was remarkable by every measure ‘he number of public works completed: the speed of theie execution their e0uraphica scape across five boroughs: their exceptional quality; and, most specially, their range, inching beaches, swimming pools playgrounds, parks, andl golf courses bridges, parkways, and expreseways: garages and @ ‘convention center, He alo conceived and st into mation one ofthe largest lm clearance-urban renewal programs inthe United States. Mosess public works, now fly of mote years ald are so indispensable it is impossible to imagine New York without them: the Tborough, Whitestone, and Verrazano bridges: the Henry Hudson Parkway. Brooklyn Queens Expressway, Grosi-Brons Expressieay, to name a few. Other struc- tures, lesa widely known, have welcomed successive waves of ethnic groups: the pools parks, and playgrounds ave thriving points f entry into the civie realm Ineed, few New Yorkers recognize the extent to which thei city was shaped by Robert Moses. This book and the related shee-part exhibition Robert Moses and the Mader City—at dhe Museum of the City af New York, the Queens Museu of Ad and the Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Art Gallery at Columbia University—secover this important chapter in ety bulking. ‘The hook consists of seven essays by scholars with iflerent types of expert- jse—aurhan history, architectural history, African-American history—and an extensive catalog of Moses's publi works, built and unbuil. It amplifies the exhibitions but des not mize ther organization or contents All this comes a time when Moses’ reputation ion an upswing le the lon, the press and public admired Moses for turing federal id into a magnificent public works program and renewing the citys shabby nine- Aeenth-century recreational and road system. The postive view prevailed during the 1940s, when he organize the ety for an enaemous postwar build ing effort But in the 1950, Moves's standing sank asthe city experienced the physical destruction and social displacement caused by three major postwar bung programs: Interstate highways, urban renewal and public housing, Mose reputation reached nadir with that of New York Cty in the 1970s, when Robert Car's influential biography The Power Broker Robert Moses and the Fall of New York was published. As the tle inicates, the book links Moses tothe city's deene. Since the 1980s, Moses's reputation has been ising, propelled by a ear that New York can no longer execute ambitious projects because ofa mulli- layered process of eitizen and governmental review. A turning point was the defeat in 1985, afer fourteen years of debate and litigation, of Westway, @ federally funded project to eplace the West Side Highway with an unde ‘ound road and waterfront park development. In the twenty-first century, ‘afer along period when the citys infastrcture has been ignored, the desire for governmental ators that can tame the bureaucracy and overcome the ‘opposition is projected anto Moses, who, we imagine, would hve capitalized ‘on the opportunity to ebuild lower Manhattan afer 9/11, He has become a ‘symbolic figure in discourse about the future ofthe city, its eapacity to think and build big ‘This book brings to hear a new body of scholarly research in another ‘ound of historical revisionism. Although the contributors have divergent views of Moses, certain undesying themes and cancers emenge in these pages. They align Moses with national and municipal polices and deman- strate that he was symptomatic o his age. The intention is not to disavow his remarkable qualities, flatten his achievements, or diminish his filing, yet Moses looks different in « national context than he does in isolation, His building programs reflected federal priorities and required federal funds. By setting the Moses record agains the opportunities and constraints of his time, it becomes possible to beter calibrate his personal achievements, Kenneth T. Jackson's opening esay puts Moses in national context and argues thatthe ne effet of his programs ws to equip New York to function in the moder age. The impact of national policy is taken up in Owen Gutfeunds essay on wa building. Gutfeund, an authority onthe history of highways, conteasts Moses landscaped parkways in the 1980s with the bleak expressways ofthe 1950s an relates the change in engineering stan- dards, design qualities, and funding constains to federal mandates. Hilary Ballons essay on urban renewal likewise insists on the federal context of Moses’ slum clearance efforts and dlseribes his controversial revision ofthe federal procedures to make an ill-considered program work in New Yorks high-priced realestate market. Mapping Mosesspublie works onto national policies also clarifies the widely perceived divide in his career: the good Moses ofthe 1990s is associated wit a faith in governments abi ‘on the public behalf, and the bad Moses ofthe 1950s mitrrs los of fith rly in urban affairs where goveramen- tal programs however well intended, hal destractve consequences. A thrust ofthe research presented here isto sift attention from Moses's unbridled power to his effectiveness within « system of constraints, As Robert Fishman indicates in his essay on citizen planning, Moses fashioned his image of superpower, He skillfully publicized his projects with press releases, stylish brochures, and a disebution lit fr memos sometimes hal «page long He palled the levers of public opinion to create the impression of indefatigable energy, perception reinforced by his pugnacious andar ant personality. But as powerful as he was, Moses was not omnipotent. He fought other bureaucratic stakeholders inside government and alternatively threatened, manipulated, badgered, and appeased private-sector partners and federal and state officials to get his way. More often than is usually rc ‘ognized, Moses had to tim projects to accommodate objectors Fishman tell the story of Moses defeat at Washington Square Pak. Other unbult pro ects recorded in the book alo testify this limits. The outght failures wer, in government to act wisely, particu however, unusual. More typically, Moses compromised in response to palit cal, financial, community, and other pressures; thus the record of his set backs and concessions is wrapped up in the building history ofthe exeeut- ed works; this fine-grained information is provided in the catlog entries, Moses was a builder, andthe overarching purpose ofthe book is to focus ‘on what he built. His powesful personality tends to draw attention away from the structures themselves, but inthe end, they re what shaped New York City and continue to sustain it. Moreover, his public works substantially expanded the public realm and set standard of high-quality design that remains unmatched to this day. The exceptional distinction of Moses pub- lie works of the 1930s were due to the trio of Aymar Embury I, architect Gilmore D. Clarke, landscape architect; and Othmar Ammann, engineee Although Ammann’s genius asa bidge designer is well known, the impor- tant contribution of Embury and Clarke is here examined in depih forthe fist time. Moses believed that public architecture should be aligned with, ‘and not ahead of, public tate. Embury and Clarke, both conservative designers, shared this view and adapted the great wadition of historical architecture and landscape design to ennoble the public spre. ‘The rise of publie-prvate partnerships and blurred boundaries of public space in our time set in sharp relief Mosess expansion ofthe public realm ‘a well as his experimentation with public-private partnerships inthe urban :enewal work ofthe 1950s, Marta Gutman’ essay on the eleven monumen- tal outdoor swimming pools supervised by Embury and Clarke and opened inthe summer of 1936 leaves no doubt thatthe pools constitute one ofthe finest bodies of American public architecture, Gutman analyzes the engi neering ofthe pools as well as ther socal history, addressing in particular the charge that Moses promoted racial segregation at the pools, Matha Biondi, an authority on twentieth-century African-American history, also ‘explores the impact of More's polices on minorities and looks int his pre= ‘sumed racism, particularly in the realm of housing, where she tracks his ‘changing positions. Moses denounced the planning profesion but planning is undenialy what he did. The essay by Joel Schwartz adresses Moses relation to the planning tradition. Sadly, it is posthumously published. Underscoring Moses's debt to established planning theory, Schwartssketeh- his ties toa diseipine and mental outlook that favored large-scale, hol tie urban thinking. Moses grasped the city a8 whole. Although he was oriented othe aur mobile, his preferred point of view for planning was frm the sky, where peo- ple disappeared from sight and the city appeared asa physical tapestry of land masses, watereays, and structures. Moses use aerial photographs as «pla ning tol means tht represented the strengths and weaknesses of his plan- ning style. Aerial photos abetted his interest in the city as a whole He didnot ‘see distinct neighborhoods, nor five separate boroughs, or the kingdom of Mankattan. Moses saw New York City «unt His mission was to maderniae the metropolis and Keep it strong, and he dismissed as « necessary cost of progress the damage inflicted by publie works on neighborhoods an people. ‘The problem is that Moses felt himself uniquely able to interpret the public ‘00d, Putting his trust in experts, he doubted the capacity of demacatic meth- ‘us to ave atthe common good. What i the public gor and how to achieve itin the contest of ety building? Rater Moses and the Tangformation of New York offers new perspectives on these hard questions meine ineiidiiedaiatt ROBERT MOSES AND THE RISE OF NEW YORK THE POWER BROKER IN PERSPECTIVE KENNETH T. JACKSON Saree vas everynhete known a the Stel City. But by 2000, the astonishing pro- Alutivity of those ites was thing ofthe past. To an important degree, these changes affected all American cities, even those in the booming sunbelt, like Houston, San Diego, Dallas, and Jacksonville, f only because federal policies toward highways, ineome-tox ‘deductions for morgage interest payments, and the placement of public housing tend to fallow a national patter. In such places, the population rose because municipal boundaries were pushed out beyond the new subi visions. But inner city neighborhoods suffered in those cities also. Ths, in Memphis, the total population grew from 396,000 in 1950 to 675,000 in 2000, But because the area encompassed by the city grew by about five times in thove yeas, the absolute density of the community declined from 9,000 per square mile in 1950 to 2,000 per square mile in 2000, and many ‘once thriving neighborhoods seemesl deserted. [New York was part ofthis large sary. In 1950, it was the unchallenged center of American life, and its skyline was famas around the woe. The tity was a virtual United Nations in minature it eitizens drawn fom every continent and almost every nation, Its five boroughs were renowned for fexeellent public schools pore and abundant wate, spacious and well-kept parks, and matchless mass transit, New York was also the worlds leading industrial iy, and its many thousands of shops and factories produced most, ofthe nation’s womens clothes, ane-fith ofits heer, most of its magazines tnd books, and any ofits specialty goods. Its reat harbor, protected from North Atlantic storms by the narow opening between Brooklyn and Staten Iand—later the site of one of Robert Moses’ great bridges—was by many the world, twas also the busiest port any= ‘measures the largest and finest whore, and its hundreds of bustling docks and piers gave employment to tens of thousands of sailors, longshoremen, tugboat operator, maritime workers, ‘nd shipbuilders. Meanwhile, Wall Steet was the heart of American finance, Madison Avenue of advertising, Seventh Avenue of fashion, Fifth Avenue of elegant shopping, and Broadway of entertainment But Neve York, imperial though twas, could not resist the larger nation al pressures toward dispersion, and post-World War I Gotham experienced the same malaise that gripped the other great cities ofthe Northeast and Midwest. Between 1950 and 1975, New Yorks population declined by almost «million persons, is factory employment plummeted by two-thirds its public schools deteriorated, its infrastructure saga its parks fell vietim to vandals, and its public transit system lost half of its riders. Around the Ihuge city, crime rates rose, graffiti appeared on almost every surface, corpo- rations moved their headquarters either tothe suburbs oro the Sunbelt, the city fell toward bankruptey, and President Gerald Ford famously told the bbleaguered metropolis, “Drop dead ‘The Bronx became the postr child ofthe depressed metropolis. So many landlords abandoned their apartment buildings that the city covered their windows with decals of lampshades and curtains to camouflage the offend- ing residences, Whole blocks emptied of residents and habitable structures, and the results were compared unfavorably to bombed-out Dresden of Cologne in 1945. Just east of Crotona Park, in a neighborhoort once enlivened hy thowsands of Jewish and Italian residents, Chalate Steet Ihecame an interatinal symbol of abandonment and ruin. Popular percep- tion associated shopping malls, corporate office parks, and suburban resi- ential subdivisions withthe future; cities seemed dangerous and decrepit, places where the problems of poverty, rice, and rime came together in the perfect storm knows as the South Brows twas in this context that Robert A. Car's Power Broker: Robert Moses ‘andthe Fall of New York appeared in 1974, Extaontinary in conception and execution, the book generated exceptional attention and won both the Politzer and Francis Parkman prizes as the best book of the year twas a ‘page-turner: persuasively argued, beautifully written, and thoroughly researched, I held that Moses was brilliant and idealistic reformer who ultimately soured on polities and ruthlessly marsaled power to follow his ‘own muse and become the greatest builder the United Sates had ever seen. Although The Power Broker isn many respects a monument othe awesome achievements fa dedicated public servant, its subsitle and overarching the- sis suggest that the builder almost destroyed the city he was uying 0 save ‘nd that the desperation of Gotham in 1974 was partly the result of his mis- placed priorities 1 post a diferent hypothesis about Moses’ impact upon New York Unlike mos cites inthe Frost Belt (except perhaps Boston), New York has ‘experienced a renaissance since 1975. Inthe space of three decades it ‘hanged from a poster child of urban despair to a international symbol of lamous, sophistication, success, competition, and safety: Meanwhile, its ‘rime rate plimmeted, public trast ridership increased by 30 percent, srallti diminished, tourism exceeded forty million visitors per year Broadway ticket sales set new records, and realestate prices—perhaps the ukimate barometer of urban health in a capitalist soiety—reached levels ‘unequalled in any city inthe history of the world. Inthe single decade ofthe 1990, theofficial population of the five boroughs surged by 700,000. The reasons for New York's impressive turnaround since its nadie in the 1970s are many and varied. Some credit Mayor Edward 1. Koch's tako- charge atitude following his eletion in 197, Others edit mayors Rudolph Giuliani and Michael Bloomberg for restoring faith inthe eity’s ability to handle its own problems. Sill others pont tothe “broken-window theory” of ‘rime prevention, the legalization of abortion in New York and adjacent states, the tripling ofthe prison population, the decline i the numbers af minority male teenagers, the passing ofthe crack epidemic, the growth of ‘eighborhoo-watch associations, othe surge in foreign immigration (legal and illegal). Whatever the cause of the New York turnaround, it would not have been possible without Robert Motes, Had he not lived, o had he chosen to spend his productive years in isolation on a beach or a mountaintop, Gotham would hhave lacked the wherewithal to adjust to the demands ofthe modern wold Had the city not undertaken a massive program of public works between 1924 and 1970, had it not built an arterial highway system, and had it not relocated 200,000 people fom old-aw tenements to new public housing projets, New York would not have been able to claim inthe 1990s that it was the capital of the twentieth century, the capita of eapitaism, and the capital of the world. Moses was such a complex figure and his accomplishments so diverse ‘and aumerous that iis necessary to break down his public carer into a con- ‘eptual framework that allows us to sce him ina larger ational context. For ‘the purposes ofthis discussion let us consider the scope, price, and quality ‘ofthe things he bul dhe nature of his vision the question of his racism; the ‘quality of his housing: and the issue of his financial honesty. ROBERT MOSES IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT By any definition, Robert Moses ad an exceptional ie. Even a simple list of his various pool, beaches, playgrounds, parks, parkway expressway bridges, public housing projects, Tite I ffrts, and Mitchell-Lama develop- ments—not to mention Lincoln Cente, the Unite! Nations, and two wor faire—runs to many pages. As Caro noted, Moses was the greatest builder in American history. But The Power Broker exaggerates Mosess influence on American life and makes him too much of an evil genius. For example, despite the many miles of roadway attributed to Moses, New York never became as hospitable to the motorear ax other American cities, In Car's narrower context, we do not learn that Detroit voters chose the highway oxer publi transportation in of Cincinnati built subway tine in the 1980 and ularly, The Pover Broker ignores Los Angel tion of nine hundred miles of highways and twenty-one thousand miles of paved streets in the twentieth century, both totals substantially eclipsing tho of New York. The great builder simply was swimming withthe te af history. During mast of lifetime, the question was not whether to build | | highways or heavy ral system victually everyone believed thatthe private ‘ar was the greatest invention since fine or the wheel, Public transportation seemed 1o be nothing more than a ele of the past. Thus, in comparative sense, what is striking about dhe New York metropolitan region isnot the umber ofits expressways, but rather thei rat; not the existence of ta fic, ut rather that congestion is actually les of «problem than iin senall- crcites ike Atlanta, Houston, or Los Angeles: not the presence af a rubber- tire mentality, but rather that per-capita oil consumption in New York is ease ily the lowest in the United Stats. Caro argues not ony that Moses built rads onan unimaginable seale, but that he destroyed what was once the worlds greatest public transit system and foreclosed possible future improvement by reusing to save space in the ‘idle of his highways for rail lines. From the perspective ofthe 1970s it no doubt seemed tht the New York subways and buses were in risis, Since that time, however, ridership has increased dramatically and the riding ‘experience has become cleaner and safer How that happened runs count to Cato’ thesis, Indeed, the explanation is exactly the opposite of the argue ment in The Power Broker. A century ago, when Moses was just beginning his career, fewer than 20 percent ofthe nation’s transit riders were inthe "New York egin: in 2006, between 35 and 40 percent of America's us, sub- way, and commuter rail passengers ave in the same area. Why has Gotham’ public transit system survived when those ofthe rest ofthe nation have so often collapsed? 1s true that Moses took no action to save either the nickel fare or the subways. But those responsibilities were not his. Moreover as mos transit historians now agree, the nickel fare should have been abarvned in the 1920s, not the 1940s, when the infastrcture had deteriorated badly Because the fare box could not pay for every operating costs, let alone new tracks or equipment, the subway system could not make the improve- tents that might have stave of the deterioration that plagued it ater World War I. Finally, remember that Fiorello La Guardia, the sainted mayor of New York City between 1984 and 1945, was himself a vigorous advocate of the car who opposed eal transit and endorsed the ripping up of Manhattan telley tacks. (Or consider the ease of slum clearance and urban renewal. Moses seat notriusy fond of bulldozers and ever anxious to clear away “slums” and to replace them with new buildings. Frequently remarking that you cannot make an omelet without breaking eg, he felt confident that he was doing the right thing a he ran roughshod! over neighborhoods that many residents felt were viable, safe, affordable, and friendly. As Moses responded early in 1968 to 8 question about the concentration af low-income people in few neighborhoods, “There's anly one answer. That isto tear down every build ing inthe slums and put up new ones on less land, then bring the people back.” Moses did tear down slums in New York and he never built enough new projects to rehouse thee dispossesied residents, But ina comparative sens, he was not so quick to turn to the federal bulldozer asthe leaders of Detroit New Haven, and White Plains—and the complaints in ater cites were as Justified a those in Gotham. He was sustained and supported in his slum clearance efforts by the city’s eral establishment, which was perfectly niling to sacrifice working-class neighborhoods to luxury apartments, breathtaking medical and cultural centers and expanded college campuses. Inthe matter of public housing, Caro wrongly posits thatthe New York prijects were disproportionately large (in fact, its 345 public housing deve ‘opments in 2005 were not, on balance, as large as those in other cites) and that Moses cut comers i construction beeause he had such litle regard for the poor. Rather, it was congressional legislation of 1937 that limited the amount of money that could he spent on individual units, essentially dis ‘riminatng against Gotham, where land and constuction costs were above ‘average. Southern lawmakers were never eager to see Washington largesse lavished upon the nation’s largest city so they fought for, and won, stipule ‘ions that effectively tied Moses hands tis ofcourse tre that New Yor had (and has) the largest stock of gor- cemmment-atsiste units of any municipality inthe United States. This might be expected in the nation's largest city. But Moses didnot build as many partments per capita as neighboring Newark, where Louis Danzig was as ‘arrogant and ion-wiled ss Moses was. Nor wet his projects as large as such (Chicago behemoths as the Robert Taylor Homes. Inthe national context, what made Mases unusual was his bili shal the resources necessary to see a projet through from conception to ‘completion, He built ffctive and talented teams of engineers and workers ‘who were able to alter the physical environment with speed, efficiency. and attention to detail. The Brons- Whitestone Bridge for example, acclaimed by ‘many asthe most beautiful suspension bridge i the world when it opened ‘on April 29, 1939, was finished under budget and three months early. It ‘emains as impressive in the twenty-first century a it was before World War 1. In contrat the Tappan Zee Bride, only twenty miles away, which Moses didnot build, was over bdget and behind schedule when it opened in 1956; ‘and now in the frst decade ofthe twenty-first century civil engineers are ‘worried that without exceptional ells the structure will eallapse. Moses's projects were unusual in their beauty, their structral integrity, and their durability Fr example, Marta Gutman, in her essay on Moses and recreation, writes that it was not enough tl park: he wanted to build eautifal structures that could with test of time and the test of exited children, Not surprisingly, most of his projects merit ur attention decades aftr his death because they continue to serve the people andthe purposes for which they were firs built. He gave his engineers, architets, and planners the resources and the direction to produce bridges, highways, buildings, and public facilities of high qu And Moses prioritized ease of maintenance and inespensive upkeep. THE VISION OF ROBERT MOSES What did the power broke intend to do withthe pubic money? What was uikimate aim? Was the purpose of evelopment 1 build strong neigh- hoshoods with ative sidewalks and healthy real establishments, or was the metropolitan region essentially a trafic problem? Was it the task of reform ‘ers to move cars and people overlong distances quickly and efficiently? Did Moses realize that parkways would more likely allow breadwinners to drive tw work than families to drive tothe beach? Just as it soften said thatthe power broker liked the publi rather than individuals, 0 also did he see the metropolis as a whole rather than as series of discrete neighborhoods each wth a partielar feel ad history and patter, Indeed, as Robert Fishman reminds us, Moses asserted that urban agglomerations are ereated “by and for trafic.” Jane Jacobs, author of the acclaimed The Death and Life of Goat American Cites, published in 1961 as an antidote to Mosess vision, disagreed completely, arguing that vision aves should plan “by an fr neighborhoods,” Moses lifelong tendency to value big projects over human-scale inti tives is suggested by his 1969 plan for the Rockaway Peninsula on the extreme southeastern edge of Queens. Concerned that more than 35 percent fof New York's 6,600 acres of slums were located in either Bedfont Stuyvesant ar East New York, he proposed moving 160,000 tenants from those areas to the Rockaways and then rebuilding in Brooklyn, section by ‘section, Imagine the hubris of moving 160,000 people, but Moses proposed js that at a luncheon af the city’s Housing and Planning Couneil on May 8 1960. Had he male the sggeston twenty or tint years ea he wielded greater power it might have come to futon, The Power Broker suggests that Moses was a perceptive dreamer and a visionary, the kind of exeeptional intellect who could see beyond the limita he tions and clutter of contemporary life tothe possibilities and potential of « ‘very diferent future environment. Examples include his plan fora parkway that would follow the oute of the Brooklyn water supply, for a West Side improvement that would cover the oppressive mila tracks and junk heaps along Manhattan's Hudson River shaeline, or fr an arterial highway system fit for the worlds greatest metropolis In fact, none of those ideas was origi- nal to Moses all were derivative of plans conceived and published by others long before he laid claim to them. What made him unusual was nat the oig- inalty of his thought but the personal qualities that allowed him to build ‘where others could only dream Moses the visionary was secon rate; Moses the builder was in class by himself THE HONESTY AND INTEGRITY OF ROBERT MOSES A recurring theme of The Power Broker is that New York's great builder was «oerupt and only too willing to avert his eyes so that thers might fee ile sally at the public trough. Similarly, Caro suggests that Moses allowed investment bankers to overcharge fr bond, legislators to use inside infor- ‘mation to speculate realestate, and his own party givers to indulge in their ‘expensive culinary and aleohoie tastes. tis difficult to prove a negaive—that Moses never acted nefariouly or ilogally. How could we be sure? Certainly the history of cities, of builders, of politicians and of organied labor suggests that powerful men have long, been on the take and that opportunites for graft can overwhelm even standing and respectable individuals, Robert Moses was born to wealth and privilege; educated at Yale, Oxford, and Ci bias and accustomed to the finer things of life. He had resources todo as he wished and even to refuse payment when he thought it working for free might enhance his power and prestige. Tht sid he died telatively poor man. His estate in 1981 was valued at $50,000, less than that of» salary all thei lives, He never owned a fancy house or expensive automobile nividuals who were born with nothing and worked fora and was not known for his sucess as an investor. Ife spent any time at all trying to engage in unseemly a illegal activity, this estaoedinarily success fal man was a dismal failuge att Rather, we should acknowledge that Robert Moses was a dedicated public servant in the heat sense ofthat term. While he may not have built ‘what we would have wanted, while he may not have listened to cities or to residents about to lose their homes while he may not even have ike the cities he claimed to be serving, he nevertheless acted without the goal of faining wealth from his actions. In this regard, Robert Caro captured the essence of the man: Moses was no interested in possessing women, ot- ing teal estate, or enjoying world avel, He sought power, influence, and importance ROBERT MOSES AS A RACIST Raciam has been such a persistent and ubiquitous phenomenon in North America during the past four centuries that no one should be surprised that Moses was a racist. It would have been surprising if he could have overcome his time, place, and eieumstances and used his enormous power to lessen the burden on people of colo in a white man's world. The important ques- tions however, are not whether Moses was prejudiced—no doubt he was— but whether tht prejudice was something upon which he acted frequently Did he go out of his way to discriminate against African-Americans? Did he violate the trust placed in him by public officials to weigh all his actions and jects against a standard of equity for all citizens? ‘The evidence doesnot support Car's claims that racism was a defining aspect of Moses's character, ofthat his actions had a disproportionaely neg ative effect upon Altican-Americans, When he first came to a pesition of ‘eat responsibility inthe 1920s, prejudice based lor was an ‘ectublished fact in the metropolitan region. In the middle of Harlem, for ‘example, the most famous black neighborhood inal the world, restaurants, theaters, and stores routinely treated African-Americans as secon inens But Moses did try to place seizmning pools and park fa reach of black families and aecessible by convenient public transportation, He did not build bridges too low to accommedate buses 0 that black fam Ties would stay away fom Jones Beach, nor did he control the water temper ure s0 as to diseourage black patronage. Moses had contempt for the poor and rarely expressed admiration for on skin ies within Afican-Americans. But he did have a consistent and powerful commitment tothe public realm: to housing highways, parks, an great engineering proj- ‘cts that were open to everyone. While Moses was in power, the word "pub Tie” had not yet become pejorative, and the power broker was willing to over- ride private interests in order to enlarge the scope of public action. I the twenty-first century, when almost anything “public” is regueded as second- rateand when the ely canna alfon! t repai crlilices, that alone is «remarkable achievement Jet alone costrvct—grand | wish that Robert Moses ad bem in charge ofthe subways instead of the highways [wish that he had een as concerned about equality for African “Americans as he was about the importance of open spaces and beaches. 1 \vsh that he had been a attentive to neighborhoods as he had heen to high ‘nay interchanges and gigantic bridges, But he was what he was and on bal- ance he yas & positive influence onthe ety: Infact, he male possible New Yorks ability to remain i the font rank of world ities into the twenty-first ‘century. Had Moses never lived, Americas greatest city might have deterio- ‘ated beyond the capabilities of anyone to retum it to prosperity. Asis, the rower broker built the infrastructure that secured New York's place among, the greatest cites inthe history ofthe world. Alexander Garvin has sid it succinctly: "Nobody, not even Bazon Haussmann in 1Ob-century Pais, has ‘ever done more t improve a city.” Moses himself once sad ofthe man who rebuilt the French capital ia the 11850 and 1960s: “Baron Haussmann has been described as a talker, an ‘ogre for work, despotic, insolvent, fall of iniitive an daring, and earrying hot astra for legality.” Moses might have been desribing himself. And so also Moser'sconchision about Haussmann: “Everything about him was ona rand scale, both good qualities and faults. His dictatorial talents enabled him to accomplish a vast amount of workin an inredibly short time, but they also made him many enemies, for he was in the habit of running roughshod overall oppsition.”” Baron Haussmann operate under the tute lage of Napoleon I, Moses also operated ina special ime, when most peo- ple thought that government could and should do grand things fr ordinary families, In the twenty-first century, circumstances have change radically. Alan Altshuler and David Laberoff have even argued thatthe age of urban ‘megaprojects has passed But whether or not another American power bro ker should emerge in the decades to come, Robert Moses will be remem- bere asa ey actor inthe rise of New York, not its all, Notes 1, Mae Pad Rr Sr Sete ay fl tin, 2 Ml A. Altri sl eg Pgs Pr Ching Pais of ian an (at, DC: Baking tion 20,27 EQUIPPING THE PUBLIC REALM RETHINKING ROBERT MOSES AND RECREATION MARTA GUTMAN VE acces ele caer sel pepeieeteaeereme peered a eer = mingles the landscape is just a fringe of vrdure around the faces a jes ofthe erowd”™ iblic swimming pools that were built ‘under Moses's directive and infused with a social vision similar to hat which Murnforddisecmed in the refurbished Central Park. Casting about $1 mil lion each, eleven new pools opened-—one each week anal with great fa fare-—during the hot summer of 1936. Applauded ae “ogses in New York's heat ware My focus here is on the grand ‘the pools, afong with new wading pools and reconstructed beaches, could accommodate tens of thousands of people a day, offering » welcome respite from the sultry summer heat 72 cquirrng THe PUBL HEAIM ‘These grand works of eivie architecture immediately caught the public ye, presenting, asthe editors of Fortune pointed out, a “conspicuous exam= ple ofthe social dividend” promised by the New Deal: Brilliant, tempest ‘us, and arrogant, “Robert (Or-tU-Resign) Moses" arrived atthe Department of Parks fush with the success of having transformed 7-700 eres of swampy shoreline on Lang Island into the publie playground called Jones Beach. The commissioner had no qualins about manipulating, even Noting, the conventions of democrat polities to bring to fruition an even sander program of public works for recreation in New York City—a program that Robert Caro argued helped launch Moses's lifelong sear Sor power:* | shall step hack from relating the pool-buiing projet to that facet of the Moses phenomenon and instead assess the democratizng elects of his ‘remarkable vision for aquatic reeweaton. The decisions taken about social program, neighborhood location, and building design challenge the prevail- igh and mighty planner and a heavy-handed exeeu- tor of slum clearance programs. On the oonrary, in the mid-1930s Moses called on planning strategies rooted in the tefor urbanism of the Progressive Erato weave astonishing works of modern archi existing infrastructure of parks, schools, and playgrounds; that is, to inte= sate monymental modern buildings into the fabri of everyday urban life ‘The extent of the building inititive—designed to encourage active rere ation among adults, tcragers, and children-—and its architectural quality vere unique in the United States during the New Dea, although in keeping with and perhaps inspired by modemist experiments in Europe.” As Ken orpole has shown, the magnificent open-air swimming pols that were built in European cites during the turbulent interwar years created “new spaces ing view of Moses as a ‘of public informal ‘of modem architecture premoted demacracy—albeit principally for white re makes trong case that these remarkable works peoplo—and helped to break down boundaries between working-class men nd women by offering them the benefits of clean water, sunlight, and Sesh airin gender-inegrated settings.” ‘The Mosexers pools, each one open to the sun and fresh ar, enkanced the city’s publi landscape inthe manner that Worpole describes, becoming new public places that men and women could inhabit informally together and with their children. The new pool complexes also brought to working- class New Yorkers a range of madem recreational facilities previously reserved for wealthier clases. In spite of the commissioner's well-known Aisdain fr oninary people, aceess to publie recreation underwent remark tle, if uneven, democratization in New York after Mayor Fiorello La Guana appointed Moses head of the Department of Parks.” Frances Perkins, then the seeratary of labor, is reported to have sid, “He loves the publi, but not as people. The public is... a great amorphous mass o him; it neds tobe bathed, it needs to be ated, it needs recreation, but not for For these and other re personal reasons just to make ita beter publi." sons, the commissioner used New Del work-eief programs to New York's sebvantage, constructing faites for 90 hal, pubic at minimal or no charge. Uner Moses, new open-air f ‘svimming and bathing, and ations to existing ones, dotted the landscape tan than in the outer ing, harvall, tennis, she id other sorts of outdoor recreation, which were made available tothe for he entire ety albeit toa greater degree in Ma boroughs and 1 lesser degree in Afican-American neighborhoods than in site ones, Lill discuss the uneven distribution of this achievement, an it relation to race prejudice, alter a review of how the Mosesmade Lande scape came into being. THE PARKS CZAR AND THE NEW DEAL Knowa asthe Parks Czar for insisting that the Department of Parks be eon- rolidated into one agency, Moses orchestrated the largest urbae park a playground construction program inthe United States during the New Deal With one-third ofthe nation's entre work force unemployed when he took office in 1983, Franklin D. Roosevelt quickly pt in place several work- relief programs, intending to put 3.5 million people back to work in two year time. Prime among them was the Works Progress Administration (WPA), authorized by Roosevelt in 1985 to “cary on small useful projects designed wo assure a maximum employment in all localities." No eity ‘matched New York in dollars received from this program and in the scope of ‘ening constriction. La Guartia won forthe nation’s biggest city special status in the WPA administative famework, ad, propelled by Mosess ion wil and administrative genius, the ety proceeded o take in one-seventh of all expenitures made bythe WPA in 1935 and 1936, Moses directed most oF the funding tothe Department of Parks, spending in the fst two years some $113 million on patks and recreation alone." Across the city, physical evidence of the extent of the Moses endeavors qickly came o view, from the modest signs posted on construction sites announcing that WPA employees were at work tothe new pool, 200, play- ‘rounds, an ball fields that seemed 10 appear almost avemight in public parks. Through seope—I7 swimming pools, 11 bathhouses, 73. wading pools, 255 new playgrounds, the reconstruction af two 2008 aa three heach- ‘=, and one new beach paviion—and grand architectural scale, the inter ‘entions made tangible the expectation that reemployment woud pull the nation out ofthe Great Depression, The modernization ofthe New York park system, as was noted atthe time, became a monument nat only to Moses but to the Depression itself OF course the federal government had more than ‘ne motive in offering handsome subsidies for constructing swimming pools and other facilites for public rereation, As other historians have pointed ‘ont, Har ckes, the secretary of the Department ofthe Interior aa dizee- torof the rival Public Works Administration (PWA), endorsed the use of fed- ‘eral money to build reereatin facilities and community-based institution, seeing in them the potential to rejuvenate democracy. By contrast, Ha Hopkins, the director ofthe WPA, asserted that building moe facilities for ‘organized leisure would encourage mass consumption. The latter goal was ‘ken by some economists to he a surer cur to the nations economic prob- Jems than working toward full employment” Although mindful of these disputes about how best to jump-start the ‘economy, Moses brought tothe Department of Parks ater convictions about the need for publie works. Like other New Deal activists, Moses was n= tured on the Progressive Era ideal of paternalst reform. He believed recte- ton ought tobe organized forthe public good, especially for children, and he sought to stom the commercializtion of recreation and entertainment ‘which he staunchly opposed. At the same time, Moses was also aware of hanging patterns of leisure and thus intent on modernizing the city’s rete- atonal landscape to include sites for active reereation that woul appeal to adults ax wells attract young people—to mix adult playgrounds, as it were, with abundant facilities for childrens active play Moses was not alone in discerning the need 19 modernize municipal amenities by making public ecretion intergeneration rather than focused ‘on children. By the tine ofthe New Deal, as Phoebe Cutler has demonstrat ed, it was clear that the “entel bucolic setings” of the pleasure park “could not ill all the recreation nee of the leisure-tich twentieth centi- 15° In response tothe sports ow, which accelerated inthe 1920s, and mounting concerns about public health, reform organizations, most impor- tantly the National Reeretion Assocation (NRA), began to lay for sites for adult secreation ax wells fr children’s active play Dung the Great Depression, the group insisted that the predicament of enforced leisure, caning massive unemployment, underscored the value of property ong ine reereation fr all ages. “Leisure for everyone Joseph Lee, the presi- dnt of the NECA, wrote in 1981, “isa new thing under the sun, means the coming of something unheard of in all history—the eppertunity for every sat Live® ‘The forts-hour workweek, writen into federal law inthe 1930s, and the ‘peal of Prohibition led oretting among elites about the los f moral com- ‘pas among Americans, especially woking-elass men. They were perceived tw have a disconcerting abundance of fre time due tothe eallapse of the £2. River swimming, Now York, nd economy. “The challenge ofthe new leisure,” Jesse Steiner wrote in 1933, alter Congress repealed Prohibition, “presents to America not only an oppor tunity hut «problem of large-scale planing and social conto ‘one of President Herbert Hoovers aises, warned against the temptations ‘embedded in salons, movie theaters and ster amusem ‘federally funded public works ss He argued for ram—one that would alleviate unen- financing ployment, promote morality, and improve public health throug MODERNIZING NEW YORK’S AQUATIC LANDSCAPE In the 1930s, New York City aquatic landscape begged for government intervention, and for more reasons than offered by Steiner. When Moses rived atthe Department of Parks, the city's park, pool, and beaches we able contin, having been sullied for decades by poor mainte nance and comupt management, “I found « rundown park system, under stalled with od, inefficient personne,” Moses wrote in 1986, The physical degradation extend to the shoreline onely compromised by haphazard tallons of raw sewage poured into the water surounding the city, Moses scented ‘charge. As he explained with characers- ‘evelopent and grossly polluted boundary waters> Each day million tie Bravado, “A scientific analysis ofthe state of pollation of the waters around New York convinced me that the entire Huds River font ofthe city ta all the waters from Spuyten Dusyil to Mott Haven and from Hell Cate the Narrows wete not fit to bathe in and never would be again.” New Yorkers sill found free, o relatively inexpensive, places to swim. The triton of river scimming, pervasive inthe nineteenth century. had tly died out, despite exten Prompted by concerns about personal cleanliness, especially amo 3. eri of Bory Floating Both, co. 1898. rayosh ty Seo Fist free-oatng water bath a large 1 well for water. rants, the city opened in 1870 th woor-frame structure saspended on pontoons with an o filled the floating p hundreds of people during the summer months, even though wooden slats scarcely filtered out decaying fish, other detritus, and menaces to publi red at River wa cl, which were enthusiastically used by health, After the turn of the century, fifteen oatng pools were mi municipal recreation pices and at other docks along the watrfot ing wit industry for valuable space (ig. E-). The pool, used by men ad women separately, were by 1914 required by law to he watertight and filled wit purified water ‘The pursuit of cleanliness also led mide scr, sating in the 18806, to press for the construction of public bathhouses. The Association for Improving the Condition ofthe Poot opened the frst one, the Peop Baths, onthe Lawer East Side inthe early 1800s, al bona fide public fail- tat aw (1895) manda safer, prompted by new te Beaux-Arts buildings decorated with moralia- ing their construction. On © Goines” was emblazoned slgans—for example, “Cleanliness Next f the Poy working-class client ‘the fae " Baths—made there wa palpable wo ts Andrea Reser has shown, men ad Tnside the buildin the bathing experience was standardizes! i factrylike intro ‘women were offered twenty-minute showers in small stalls, cated on oppe- ass site sides ofeach facility, The routine was never popolae with worki New Yorkers, and afer 1904 swimming pools and gymnasia were aed to ‘municipal baths inthe hope that these amenities woul entice more people tose them." Tn the 1930s, Moses inherited the indor swimmin pools at the muni pul bathhouwses, which were showing signs of aging ad the three antiquat charge of pub ‘doting pools that also remained in service. He al Tie beaches in the Bronx and Brooklyn, which had been infinge pon by private interests, These faites, oo, were unsanitary and had een poorly ‘maintained.® As for utdoor pools, the ety had opened numerous wading pools for children in working-class neighborhoods duting the Progresive Fra bat owned only two swimming pools: one at Betey Head Park in Brownsville, Brooklyn, which was falling apart, and one in Faber Park on State Island, bil in 1932." The construction af outlor swimming pools had skyrocketed in the U.S, in the 1920s, but no in the nations largest ety." This i wot surprising ax there was relatively litle investment in any sort of public recreation during this period in New Yor, a point that Moses underscored after he took charge ofthe Department of Parks. N ‘ to New Yorks aquatic landscape is starting when compared with public bathing beaches in other North American cities The avid embrace of swimaing resulted rum the foesh ai, health, and athletics that erupted inter= werheles, the lack of moxernization of investment in swimming pools, wading pols ‘ationally—and across social classes—in the interwar period The eth ‘asm for onto exercise built onthe fascination with youth culture and ‘idealized human bas, bth seen a indicators of modernity the acceptance of swimming a «sport suitable for women andthe sense of swimming as a The NRA in its publications especially emphasized this last family sport: 4 Sand eta, poo, ond bathoure, Wich, Konsas, 1929 point an also noted tha moder rereaton facilities could produce revenue ‘ieeded to stabilize municipal budgets. In 1929, the NRA publication Playground and Recreation singled out for prise the new sand beach, pool, and bathhouse in Wichita, Kansas (ig. E-1). “The commodious bath house the expanse of water, andthe many tees and shrubs combine to make this spot especially appealing.” the editors wrote, approving the generous sizeof the pool and beach.» The journal als reported that 96,300 people used the pool during the preceding year and were charged ten cents for @ swim an ‘an alditonal five cents each fr a towel and a bathing suit, Inthe end, the city garnered almost $3,000 in revente rom the facili.” Ta Europe, givernments of all political persuasions funded the building ‘of exemplary swimming pools and bathhouses during the interwar years, responding tothe cultural changes jost mentioned and to concerns about public health (prevalent in counties devastated by World War I) In fact, the extent of investment in reteationa facilites in Europe created the sense inthe U.S. that it lagged behind, ture fr reteation in order hat it needed to put money int infrastruc 0 keep up with its European competitors: In adition 10 providing needed employment, the publi works programs for e building of the 1920s and n, radical architecture 1930s wth social experimentati and the intent 10 5, Pinger Heth Cente, London, 1985. Pacpagh by Ec One Wan improve the human body thraugh athlete endo High-quality. modem de Switzerland, and ater social demoen 2. Progressive city counsels eretes spectacular ope sr srimming pools with modemist designs and, in com trast to policies in place at municipal bathhoutes, allowed women and gies to.swim in these pools and use the surrounding public areas at the same time 2s men and boys" The benefits of swimming, sun, and fresh air were high lighted in other srt of public projects. For example, in 1935, aslek pal ic health center, designed by Eric Owen Williams, opened in the working «lass neighborhood of Peckham in South London fg. E-5) Run by progres doctors committed to preventive medicine, the philanthropic facility contained in addition medical offices, an Olympic-sice avicaming pool, a playground, » gymnasium, and a lounge with moveable glass panels that ‘pened to let in fresh ar Outside Bein, Richard Ermisch and Martin Wagner expanded the public beach at Wannsee, making it the largest lanl facility f this sort in Europe when completed in 1930 (ig, 6). The new the New Objectivity, was an enormous two-story structure with four halls, rf terraces for sunbathing pavilion, lauded as an outstanding example and sports, an! a grand promenade along the water: Aveare in all likelihood fat leas some ofthese project an wth the suc cess of Jones Beach not far behind him, Rober Moses launched an ambi- tious pool-buiing program in New York City during the New Deal, which the eoordinated with beach improvements and the construction of modern sewage matment plants. “Clean, healthfl, and adequate bathing facilities were practically out ofthe reach” he wrote, “oth geographically ara finan ions of he city's inbabitants:™ Although mindful of the need promoted by for an affordable program, Moses sped the econemie mod the NRA and insisted tha the pools be financially self-sustaining, He inst adults to swim and ten cents fr chil the Depression, even these meaest ren after 1.00 2. fs the lean years £6, Great Hal, Stondbod Wome [Beri co. 1990 changes elicited protest, leading the mayor to urge children to take & mom Neverthe witn and save thie parents a dime ‘a Davidson has the movest fees donot seem to have prevented many people f tusingthe new pool, given the numbers who locked to them as saan as they opened. La Guanlia and Moses faced tough choices in 1986 and 1937 as thos strug ment the public realm with new social services, an the pool fees were ane means ised to stabilize the municipal budget. The siteselection strategy directly addressed geographic ace ‘On July 23,1984, Moses announced that the parks department intended to build ough. The press release, written by the commissioner underscored that the air swimming pools on twenty-three sites across the five bor decentralized pool-building program was intended to counter the deleterious effects of water pollution on the daly lives of New ts one of the tragedies of Neve Yo lk lif, and a monument to pas indiference, waste, self iahness, a vary waters af pid planning that the magnificent natural the ety have been in lage measure destroyed for recreational purposes hy haphazant industrial and commercial development." Moses substantiated as that were unfit for bathing and those tls he chose to build new open-ie the claim with a map showing tl that could be improved. Not surpe ‘ea th ssvimming p 0 places. He also explained that siting would be directed toward eroded neighborhoods: problem therefore resolves ite into one of providing open-air swimming pool, properly local ced in the most congested sections." Moses would continue to emphasize this point. Soon magi nt new open-air swimming pools arose in existing ‘open spaces (nustly parks), with new construction, rather than stn clea relieve urban congestion. The press release concluded by tate Funds (the construction would begin a nine sites, all hut one located in existing parks iy resource available) would be used and that Mewes male it clear thatthe design process, relying on typical details and standard plans, had already started, Inthe end, the scope ofthe work was timoned from twenty-three to te new pools: one existing public pool wa also lly enovated. When asked in 1936 to explain the rationale fr site Wiliam H, Lathan the 2's mer etc, expanded on parks engineer and member of Mo the commissioner had made two years earlier. Latham stated that siting pub aly difficult in New York Cty, given seaeity ofan and in fuse ity cen determined by population density and available parkland, and also by the need to minimiae lad ad meet the tight Although he di nol mention politics, locating stellar works of public architecture in working lass, immigrant, ot African-American neighborhaads had an aed bene litieal constitvencies important to Mayor La ct overall ria (andthe New Deal political pr Most of the nee rks in working-class neighbor hoods, close to playgrounds or other existing rereational ad ive facil ties (figs. E78). In Manhattan, four outdoor pools were built next 10 Progressive Era municipal bathhouse; one was ereced next to a gyimnas sm rom the Progress Ens and brand-new bathhouses and large outdoor pools were added to Jefferson, Colonial, and Highbridge parks. In the Brons, another large poa wih bathhouse was constructed in Croona Park, vile the outd ‘swimming pools in Raber Park and Brownsville were enlarged, the latter being ally rebuilt, Enormous new pals an! bathous del to McCarren Parkin Brooklyn ane Astoria Park in Queens and 10 underuse sites along the waterfont that were heing tured into rand new parks, thanks to the WPA, These sites weve in Red! Hook, Brooklyn, close to.» parel slated for public housing: in Tompkinsvlle and Flushing Meadows in Queens (the site of the 1999 £7. Honiton Fab Pa bee Moser abwotons, 1922. Wor’ Fae em bathhouse and two p Why did Moses elect ites to the standing network of rereational space, rather than constricting Titel eee ol iE) build pe on existing public sites, adding facile an entirely new infastrctue for aquatic done for parkway and public housing)? The reasons historians have offered for this pragmtiam include siff competition for urban space and the need for economy and expediency, which prevailed in all WPA-funded projects (prompted by the concer that federal money would evaporate without waming) Moses's resistance to pressure frum private interests and his lough-minded realism have led out. Infact, when Moses explained his methodology, he underscored the need for prcticality, insist rather ing that city planners focus on slvng the aetual problems of e than trying to implement high-minded plans based on abstract aesthetic, Although important, these points do no connect the New Deal site seletion strategy to other dynamics that shaped urhan development inthe United States during the twentieth century, Many of the M ” Small Parke Act of 187 or on site that were deemed! in need of improve ment y the Regional Plan. The placement of WPA-funded public faci in New York ml emphasized the value of spe pools were lated in parks opened in response to ties on thee sites reinforced the reform landscape pat in p kind of recreation: eivi, not commercial; uplifting, wot honky-tonk; Public, nt private This aspect of Moses'’s recreational priject for New York shows that ms erated a physical amature, spatial framework tht welfare state. Ax T have sided the community building of the emergi £8. Hamiton Fh Prk, looking eam, September 8, 1997. 9. Flating pool ard bathhouse inthe Moston River 1938. shown to be the case in other 2, the linkage of new reeeaticnal facilities to existing infrastructure extended tothe fine geain of community In the eatly twentieth cen ‘gain drawing on Progressive Era wwdels tur: reformers prop rated near that small parks and playgrounds be public schools, setlement houses, and other reform outposts in working vs communities, The clastering of these facilities, which created nodes af ‘ivie amenities in oninary neighborhoods, integrated socal services into the The planning id plan, made sense to Moses, eho p Department of Packs (fg. E-10).” The movel eleaey influenced the sing fabvic of everyday life al referred to as the school-park. mote it in the annual reports af the stnsiegy used for pools and bathhowses. The pools at Sunset, McCarren, CCotoma, Colonial, Highbridge, and Jefferson parks were placed close 0 public schools and near playgrounds opened during the Progressive Era Similarly, the outdoor pools built next to bathhouses and gymmasia in 22222. oe i ROUND F559 33} £10, Schoolparkplayground diagram, 1940 WEALTH 3} CENTER 3| ae Manhattan and Brooklyn complemented improvements dating from the Pr ia Park, the p aligned with war memorial erected inthe 1920s four tm seve Era. In Olympic sine, wes ‘Ofcourse the master planner had more on bis mind than patently kit ting Neve Deal public works into the reform landscape of another era. Moses cited as much when he insisted that public pools be built in large pub Tic parks, that pool constr tion result in no loss of playground space and that in almost every instance park extensions mst replace play space tamed i on isolated small plats, He also promi The modifiations to Jefferson Park in East Harlem reveal how these motives shaped patk alterations (ig. E-11), Originally intended to provide a espite for Nalan immigsants and playgrounds for thei childeen, Jefferson Park in paradigm for th reform park, Two oval lawns, dotted with play spaces for children flanked a its pre-Mases lay ressive Era desi 1 respected the Pr sentcelpromen i ast River The park also included farm gardens § Je that opened onto a Beaux-Ans pavilion overlooking children, separa gy nasi for boys and gins, « kindergarten, and public baths." By placing the new pool complex inthe center of the park, Moses disrupted existing park and other facilities Fields, uses and replaced space for promenaing wih the po edith ath hocee courts, playgrounds, and pools, opened on June 27, 1936, th ishing work of public architecture made clear thatthe older model ofthe for active recreation. When the new complex, equip urban park was history SOUND VERNACULAR MODERNISM Architecturally speaking, the spacious brick bathhouses that opened dur the hot summer of 1936 belonged tothe hard-edged! moleristsensibil ity of the New Deal, nt o the gentel entee! decorum ofthe Beaus-Ats. Lewis Mumford invented an apt phrase forthe Moses-era pl building: “sound remacular modern architecture.” As he wn the long brick buildings, ws that fill their hays fora an excellent frame forthe and are well suited to the The swe fed up with the 2 hildeen of the Machine Age” sense is that employees ofthe parks departmenl, w Fussines of the Beaux-Arts park landscape, welcomed the new approach to jgn—the integration of active play, the use of har surfaces and modern materials, and the 1 Moses took aver the Moses reorganized the department by dividing it into uction divisions (similar to the New York City Ho hieed new, highly qualified professionals, some of wh rand scale—that arrived w department in 1934, design and Authority) mh previously worked with him and for organizers of ether park and poo! pre} (Gg. F-12). In short ord the Moses team ineluded the architects Aymar Embury Hl, John Matthews Hat Herbert Magoons the landsea n, Dwight James Baum, and D, Clarke; and the engineers W. Earle Andrews, Carl E. Sha, and Latham, the parks engineer architects Francis Comier and Gilmo Their mandate was to work fst very fast, As with site selection, the fear thatthe feral subsidies for design and construction would quickly eva rate had consequenc ‘New Deal traits of utility, ‘lected the po ize by the federal government The Department of Parks was required a what was bull The standaniizaton, and austerity, smc Caller as argued, architecture subi ny other work of workers (not necessarily highly skilled in construction) and to use a inied is that met the fiscal parameters set by the government These demands pled the Moses team betwee two pole, as Architectaral stretch New Dea dollars as far possible Forum pointe out: the desire and the intent o equip the new pools as fully as pousble. Fortunately, sin ple materials simply disposed” were wsed to great effsc The end result vets the extraoni tion of public buildings that won Mumfors vermacular modernism. sound examples Although capacious, Murfors words badly suggest the rnge of remark able structares that WPA construction ers built across the five boroughs, With the federal government amenable to slistic variety, low-slung mod 11 elleron Perk, 1927, £12 Plyland lye Beach, 1991 ade to Jellerson, Highbridge, an Sunset parks: monumental structures with enormous central mist buildings with « touch of clasical detail eieways, seemingly inspined by Roman imperial architecture, were built 4 Rest Hook parks; and sleek mdr bath- McCarren, Crotona, Colonial houses wens exected in Astoria and Betsy Head parks These complexes met the New Del ideal of providing leisure activities for all ages, whi and safety. Just be some segregation of uses for convenience tenelosed pool compleses, families could find more opportunities for active 19, Crane Pool convened to we (s0 bos coun, cn. 1999 recreation, inelating baseball diamonds, handball courts and playgrounds The Moses-ra pool complexes celebrate swimming in the open ai, turing the sport ino a grand public spectacle. The complexes were ena ‘mous (much bigger than most European public pools), dhe largest of them allowing several thousand people to swim atone ime: the red the re tisite variety of recreational amenities: and they were planned for year round use—pools could become dance far and changing rooms could dard site plan become basketball courts, for example (ig. F-13):” The uses and almost always thee in- pool for informal ‘wimaing and organized races: a smaller pool fo diving anda wading pool (outst the poo eneloute. The pools were also technically upto da tually symmetrical, inelided grand bath round pools: large often very large, reinforced-conere modern filtration and aeration systems that were expressive elements in themselves. Great fountains sprayed water into the pool, and underwater Tihs made i possible for working people to swim at night. Generous paved areas, bleachers, and rfp teraes offered places for sunbathing, informal 4 watching the ongoing pageantry, buth inside and outside the pool precincts The likely abjects of atlenton inchuded divers plunging from astonishing, ee foace-concrete diving platforms, which were graced with one, two, and even at tines thee tiers af diving boards Respeetng but not bound by strict definitions of madera, Embury and his colleges used brick, coneret, and pefabricated building materials to ral bathhouse that added to the sense of theatricality inthe 3 design the pool complexes. In accordance with the tenet of eatly moder Structural bays of the stelame buildings were expressed on brick-lad Clevalions and industrial sash and gas block were use to let light into Tocker rooms. Other design traditions were also freely incoporated, eather nore s0 than in Europe where streamline! modernism prevailed bli 14 lan of Aseria Poo, 1996 pool design. Al but one af the pool pavilions in New York was symmetrical ‘nd had monumental central entries. Decorative details ranged from hstri- izing to modemist: thin concrete lintels, stout columns, eurved brick, streamlined corners, and column capita that recalled different arehitee al trations. Cloek, towers, arches, domes, fountains, and bleachers also aude tothe drama of the stings. Standardized building plans helped to balance the WPA desite for frandeur with the mandate fr efficieney, econo, an hygiene also inher ited from the Progressive Era." The designers freely incorporated lessons from Beaux-Ants planning to give the buildings an urban presence and to ‘create remarkable architectural processions that alded to the sense of spectacle and underscored the importance of personal hygiene and sanita- tion fig. F-14), Usually a bathhouse was built along or else to actysteet and had grand, central doorway that was on axis with a street or a major feature in the park landscape. The entryway was given a clear geometric configuration; was endowed with astonishing architectural features ach as dome, grand arches, central column, an porticoes ad was open tothe sic olflerng swimmers a breath of fresh ar and a glimpse ofthe pool as they entered the sparkling clean bathhouse This structure formed atleast one de of the pool enclosure and contained big, sanitary locker roms for men and women, which opened directly onto the pool precinct. In keeping with the counsel of the American Public Health Association and other advisory ‘soups, men and women (and boys and gies) were strictly separated from ‘ach other al the entrance to and withia the bathhouse, meeting up again ‘on the pool deck.” On either side of he buillng, as noted in Architectural Forum, “th interior layout presents simple progression from admission booth through locker rooms, toilets, shower room (shower obligatory) and foothaths." The foobaths were also obligatory, part ofthe measures taken pool to assure swimmers personal cleanliness before they jumped into ‘A BETTER PUBLIC As the swimming pools opened, one each week daring July and August of 1936, they won praise in the lea press for the grandeur, modernity, and accessbility—qualites that revealed the best face of the New Deal, the ‘cal dividend that FDR had promise to deliver during his 1982 election campaign. Again and again, Moses and his ealleagues were lauded for pt ting ordinary people first for celebrating them with remarkable, technically sophisticated public architecture; for demacratizing access to recteaion; and for using New Deal dollars to run play schools an day camps and to ‘ler swimming lessons at the pool complexes.” The social objectives of these programs were evident to civic leaders, who praised them for expres ing Moses's ideas about children and reereation: “Out af the gangs and] into the playgraunds.”* The architectural press also chimed in, suguesting that innovative design and breath of socal vsion went hand in hand, “Hf you ane thinking of designing a system of parks for your own ety, you might well go to New York," Architectural Forum advised. "You will find Americas only ‘modem models for public beaches and public pools. You wil find some ‘extremely ingenious innovations in equipment. Aad above all you wll find ‘constant and invaluable awareness that recreation must e fr all the poo- ple, not only for the young, but equally foe the alt." The crowds tht throngel the pools and the pool openings only ade to the aura of extraodinaty success. Moses, a brilliant publicist, stage the ‘events to great elect, drawing thousands of people The celebrations rose to 4 crescendo when 75,000 attended the opening af McCarren Pool in Brooklyn atthe end of July and concluded in the middle of August, 40,000 coming to the last opening af the season atthe new park i Red Hook, Brooklyn. Like many others, it took place at night, to Heighten the rama, and was attended by Moses, the mayor and ater politicians who lise tened wo housewives, factory workers, shopkeepers, and children cheer a cach mention of President Roosevelt: name. Moses explained to the envwd thatthe swimming pool was the firs imprint ina much grander scheme that would cover about 50 acres when finished and bring running track; foot hull, haseball, and soceer fields: tennis and basketball courts and pli srmunds tothe working-class community. The films of this and other WPA pools and accounts of them in orl histories give some sense oftheir astn- ishing popularity and intensity oftheie use: by enthusiastic children learn- {gt swim, by ebullient crowds watching swimming races and diving com petitions, an by teenagers who courted on pool decks an played basket ball, softhal, and other sports in converted facilities during the off-season.” ‘The weleome was not uniform, however. According to the New York Timesy enerally a great fan of Moses, Ialian-American residents of East Harlem trie to halt the construction ofthe Jefferson Pook protesters marched a pool ‘openings disputing the WPA wage scale; the owners of private pools abject ‘10 competition from the government and patents objected to admission fees” The effects of ethnic and race prejudice also shape! the human ‘experience of the Moses-made aquatic anseape, underscoring the persist during the New Deal (even 28 seme of them cessfully challenged)" ence of ingrained social bi and other restrictive cultural practices. mere For example, Charlote Oppenheim, a young German-lewish émigré who arrived in New York City in 1938, weloomed the eutural openness toward ‘women swimming in public, selecting sites in the New York metropolitan ‘tea where young men and women felt confortable swimming together, as ‘he had done in Germany. Yet, Mrs. Oppenheim never swam ina public pool inthe city, going instead to Jones Beach and the Rockaways. “That was ‘where working people ike ws spent our weekend,” she recalled, emphasiz- ing thatthe beaches were affordable and offered weleome relief from the summer heat. Although aware of the notable quality ofthe architecture at ‘Jones Beach, she preferred i for ether reasons “Jones Beach was a beach for everybody”—clean, safe, and “mixed” meaning that all areas of the breach were safe for women and open to Jews and other immigrants That was tot the cas, though, for African-American, “They had their own beach Mrs. Oppenheim sai, implying that they swam elsewhere, perhaps on another area of this beach, She noted that Rockaway Beach was even more rigidly segregated than Jones Beach, where sections that remained privately ‘owned were closed to Jews, blacks, and other groups. What about other migrants who arived in New York during the Great Depression? Although Moses siting decisions have been tarred. with ‘charges of race prejudice the commissioner did not ignore the needs ofthe city’s rapidly growing black comunity inthe pool building eampaign.® For ‘example, his decision to expand Colonial Park along a rock outerop in west fem Harlem tumed an underused pice of land into a much-needed civic amenity The need for this sor of investment hal been made clear the pre- onal ‘ius year when race riots exploded in Harlem and the lack of rete facilities was cited asa contributing cause The park improvements inclu ced the construction of a grand new seimning pol, mall, muse pavilion, playgrounds, and Emburys magificen! and fortresslike brick bathhouse. "The pol opened even efore the building was fll Ginished, i part because ofthe urgent socal need, part o counter charges of racial bias in the elys public works program. At dhe opening ceremony, La Guardia promised a cheering crowd of 25,000 Harlem residents that their community would receive equal treatment as longa he was mayor, and he offered the pool as evidence thatthe "knockers," who criticized his administration for treating Harlem unfair, were wrong. Speaking ater the mayor, Moses reported that the pool hal been bull by the people of Harlem and would be operated by them: he also urged the erowd to take care of the pool (advice that was ‘olfered at each opening). The progeam featured the African-American per formers Reland Hayes and Bill Robinson and celebrated black athletic achievement. Nonetheless, wth the rice riots in recent memory, the stern imagery ofthis building may have had more than one meaning to peuple at the festivities, In Brooklyn, stories of race prejudice cloud the WPA achievements at Betsy Heal Parkin Brownsville, Christopher Legre, whose grandparents emigrate! from the Deep South, was taught about the racist polices that restieted use ofthe Belsy Head Pool inthe late 1980s and early 1940s Exclusion based on race was in effect in oer public swimming pools in the [New York metropolitan area, as Martha Biondi has shown, with racial inte= ising for whites the unwelcome “prospect of interacial intimacy” “racist ideas of unclean badies."" Although Jewish members of the Brownsville community joined with African- ‘Americans to support racial integration, it was an unwritten rule that Alrican-Americans could swim in this Brooklyn pool only in the late afer. rn, after white residents had vacated the premises—a rule that was ‘enforced by employees atthe Department of Parks, aecording to Mr. Leste. is recollection of segregation at the pool confined by film footage from the late 1930s that shows &whitesonly environment isin accord with other ‘memories that the park was strictly offtints to blacks during the New Deal” Moses himself recognized that the dilferntial provision of rere- ‘sell as being associated wi tional facilites in Brownsville was problematic. “Even at the present time, Betay Head Park is hardly large enough to meet the nee of the neighbor ‘oor. he stated in 1941, acknowledging thatthe completion of Brownsville Houses, « public housing. project, would exacerbate the problem. Ax Wendell Pritchett has pointe out, in communities like Brownsville blacks ‘competed for recreational facilites that did not exis.” ‘ro these olervations lend credence to claims, in The Power Broker and clteyhere, that Moses used public swimming pool, playgrounds, and other facilities for public recreation to physically underscore the power of white privilege? Some of Carts most damning charges concer Jefferson Pool in Fast Harlem, largely an lalian-American neighborhood in the 1930s, where, he alleges, the Department of Parks, at Moses insistence, hire white lifeguards to work at the pool, This practice, called lagging, was intended to dissuade blacks, who were moving into central Harlem, and Peto Ricans, who were moving into blocks closer tothe poal, fom swim ‘ming init signal to people of color that the facility was for whites ony. Car also asserts that this particular practice was coupled with an explicit Ainectve, from Moses, to Fill the pool with cold water, supposedly because ‘blacks in particular isiked eimming in i" Given that Car's sources are ‘ot fly iene or dated, these charges cannot be confirmed. But photo- ‘raph and unedited fil Footage from the mid- an! late 1980s in the parks Apartment archives show Jefferson Pool to be a white-only envionment. Whether or aot Moses condoned (ordered) this policy, visual evidence an siher accounts of extteme racial tension in East Harlem in ths perio lem fredence to Cards point about de facto racial segregation in this pol rqualy important, however, the water in all WA pools in New Yor, include ing Jefferson Pol and Colonial Pool in Harlem, was capable of being heat- fe Although this amenity was unusual for outdoor pools inthe 1990s, espe- cially those intended only for summer se, it meant that black New Yorkers ‘oul sim in tel water, just lke other residents* ‘ral histories and unedited fil fonage inthe parks department archives hed light on this important issue of Moses, race, and swimming, The films show that inthe main white a black New Yorkers swam in different pool, fn unsurprising finding given the prevalence of ethnic enclaves an racial Segregation in the city’s neighborhoods in the 1930s and 1940s [Nevertheless the films also show that on oceasion black and white New ‘Yorkers dd swim in the same public pools, and with apparent to each other: African-Americans used the predominantely white Highbridge and McCarren pools, and whites the predoninantely black illerence Colonial Pol" Oral histories also testify to racial integeation, on occasion, ‘at Colonial and MeCareen pools In some pools, at least, the parks depart- ‘ment staf tolerated black and white bodies coming in close contact wih one “another—ratherexteoninary given prevailing social norms (a least among seites) ithe 1930s andl 19405." Tithe end, and as Judith Davidson has argued persuaivels, Moses did use public money io equip black neighborhoods with rereational facilities, espe- tially when pressed by African-American pratest. She points out thatthe smber of recreational facilites inreased in Harlem and other black neigh= borhoods daring the New Deal and thatthe African-American comamunity benefited from these resources, even thoagh they may have been built to *eflect black hostility and resentment” ofthe La Guardia ainsi and to create physical “ules” between black and immigrant neighborhoods Although the stops wore Limite, she argues that tis unlikely that his sort of| povisioing ofthe public real during the New Deal would have taken place without Moses—specfially without his masterful manipulation of federal fans. Davidson aid ther historians have als stated that, the egregious Hots of racial segregation notwithstanding, blacks benefited from the com ritment of publi resources to recreation during the New Deal in ater ways thatthe Department of Parks hire African-Americans as ark workers and that they tended o benefit more than whites fom elie employment because they remained unemployed fr lnger periods of time (again due to the esre= ious elects of racial segregation in private sect)” This last benefit may have been an unintended consequence of New Deal public policy but was ronetheless important tothe economy of New Yorks black communi Any use of public recreation to inseibe racial boundaries justly deserves to he comlemned. But examples of antidemocratc practices frm the 1980s shuld wot blind us othe considerable achievements ofthe New Deal pool building project, inching eecasional tolerance of racial integration. The history of the WPA pools revels tha the contradictory ieals of democratic ocistes are eae in public space and architecture, with the relations bbetween civic architecture an the public changing as definitions of citizen- hip expand or contact Robert Moses invested in extraedinary public Inilings and outdoor spaces that celebrated new ideals of leisure and made clear that providing recreational space is « responsibilty of goverment Adhering a the New Deal vision of active reereation for adults and children, Moses superimpnsed monumental modern buildings on existing infrastruc ture and underused sites. The siting decisions, especialy, which were roat- fe inthe reform urbanism of the Progressive Bra, made new civic amenities accessible an helped to integrate them into the fabric of everyday ura life. The architectural chats made by Moses au his design team atthe Department of Parks stood New Yorkers in gol stead in the 1930s and have ontined to do so extending the public realm and in the lng run ang the democratization of reeeation over Taday, most of the WPA pools remain open for public use and, despite sms of wear, are fll ofall sorts of New Yorkers families with childrens summer campers; African-American, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and many others who have arived inthe city on the successive waves of migra Much ion that continue to entich the socisl and cultural fabie of the ‘as Moses envisioned in the 1930s, new immigrants and young people espe= aly, come tothe pools year-round: to seek relief from the summer hea, 10 Tearn to svn, to play games on outdoor athlete elds and inside bathhouse ‘changing rims, which are sil converted to gymnasiums after the pools are trained for the winter. This continuing succes, hased on forging a progres- sive relation between citizenship, public health, publie space, and the Fhuman bod should be inspirational i our time, when the developing and maintaining public amenities has waned and dhe spread of ‘private inloor facilities supplant the New Deal goal of equipping the pub- Tie eal with lfondale outdoor reereation for all Nores 1 tee pei aks Hy Bln se Kath Jaco wll = My Beh es ‘inn Ren, Nie Cosi Suh ae! ao Cope Kee oy Rady. td Beja at tt and comer et ed rcp a od oe ee alo ‘Sy CVn r,s an Spc Cale at ‘eke Oyen al Csr Lge or dt Ph ant Rt anc hig woah may Cone Spin fer ie tone ing he sore gs he es grt! oh Srna on, of We i 778 desis Pa Py pn gig vs aed rt Tes “Mao eae Big Sie “no Cy ens Needy” fe 21 Eat {hy Opens Rofo 2419 se” ne 198 ‘ep Ser Oy Ha” aly 1 ‘es J 5 ToS ed a Op by Mss “Ra Open eo” Io Mr pee Po Hg kl 1,186 Mao Opn Pay Ba PJ “Sn eB Pad Opening” ay 25,198 rs ised ine 23h pongo Hae Pa” tel a Pa Aap i We i Re its Hat WaT No ue Siig Pu New Yk Tsay 9 2 i if i & ‘amin, A Tho FS S99 Kr alert Mor Sie Miedo, Late “Rint Sh 1c M2 et Re Me gual Vise Pls cm 2 (198, 90 alee A. 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APL cd Md ee ME 00 Pad ay 151589) Cll Pd QE 3 Pl tes 9,189 ed ay 2.1 Be the Map on a he ed Cre Tice Monday Eck Ia ind iMate tl Bios ten Aes a Nie Nor tS pe rice by hte Mater, New, Mach 24,20 Maan, Lat One a {Dilan eked oom! el Decatinton of Remain Spent” 20. ‘hi 5a er New Dal nd se Unogre 291-38. ‘7 Hk sing he Sth Sie 9-3 Mt Rb, Rl Sp Balding he Hos of he Pe Hara 8 Cal Ui Pe 2853-13 aay an one Pa ee Boy wnt Bal, 125108) Gain aes Hine Univer Tn, 190, om Nie Wap Hr Came he Sn 125 REBUILDING NEW YORK IN ROBERT MOSES AND HIS HIGHWAYS. OWEN D. GUTFREUND 1924, congestion was slowly stan ling the great metropolis, Growing numbers of automobiles competed for eare treet space wth streetcars, elevated trains, horse-drawn freight ears, tnd pedestrians, The citys set system, much of which ha been planned ‘and mapped more thon century earlier, could not handle all de trafic. By the time he Tost power forty-four years Inter, Moses had supervised the con struction of dozens of parkways, bridges, and expresways, His projects “pannel al fve boroughs ad extended far into the noe and eastem sub- urs, giving New York a coherent highway network to complement its com prehensive nil-based masetransit system, The resultant balanced transport ster, combining extensive subway and commuter rail ines with far-fung, teeb of major roads, enabled the city to grow and thrive in the auto age. ‘An assesment of Mose’ impact, however, must take into account not only his impressive record of accomplishments but also the context of his times, Moses was the right person in the right place at the right time He did ‘ot invent a vision ofa new New York frm whole cloth, but instal he def Ty appropriated innovations and plans of ethers, adapting and combining them to suit his purposes and then readapting them as circumstances changed. He was a gilted opportunist and pragmatic administrator, able to shepherd publi works projects through to completion ata breakneck pace by shrewdly accumulating institutional power and harnessing evershifting fanvng streams. These remarkable talents in combination with god! timing, ‘enabled him to cas larger-than-life shadow over New York City’s histo Moses started building ads in 1924, as soon as he tok om his fist pubs Tie works project, Jones Beach State Patk. In onler to prove access to his lavish new reereational facility the south shore of Long Island, he simul THE AUTO AGE taneously began work on a network of parkways that would span the eon, The first of these, the Southern State Parkway, opened in 1927, fllowed sn thereafter by the Wantagh way in 1920, as well a& Ocean Parkway an dhe fist major sections ofthe Northern State Parkway in 1990) ig. F-15). Last among this first batch of Moses Long Island parkway was the Mealowbrook State Parkway, which opened in 1984. ike mos of his subsequent public works projects, these parkways were the product of Moses's blend of ambition and ereative pragmatism. They itt, and probably foremost, Moses sere parkways fr two main reasons had not heen putin charge of highways of roads, which were tightly con trolled in keeping with federal mandates, by the engineers atthe Stale Highway Department an the federal Bureau of Public Roads. But when he rated the enabling statutes forthe two new administrative positions that he ‘assumed in 1924, the chairmanship ofthe State Council of Parks andl of the Long Island State Park Commission, he shrewdly followed the precesent set hy the Westchester Parks Commission the year before. His new posts could rot officially encompass regular highway construction, so he ensured that they included the authority to build rereational routes and access roads within parks, He used this artflly created loophole to create ibbontike parks wth landscaped roads within them, i, parkeays. Second, Moses had ‘scesafl model to fallow, Jut as he embark on his public works career, the landscape architects Hermann Merkel and Cilmore Clarke completed the Bronx Itiver Parkway, hailed as the fist modern American parkway (ig 216). This pioneering praject—propased in 1906, under construction since 1916, and officially opened in 1923—was widely praise asa glimpse of futute where automailes would enable the urban masses to drive through 15, Southern Site Prkway, 1927, the countryside and escape the overcrowded city? Moses, ever the keen njct would gamer the publie and p lie civil service reform eflots, Building ot that had escaped his a upon Clarke's innovative design and pul ic acclaim, Moses assembled his > inliding Clarke himsel n team of landscape architects and engi 2 consultant) and built the web of parkways that would link his Jon a. As would happen in and again in his career, Moses demonstrated that he w mate opportunist, adapting his activities tothe spending priorities of the times, even while selectively hrrowing the planning an design ideas inno Moses nest ume to what was to become one of his must celebrated ments, the projet know as the West Side Imp ale aaa and redesign of Manhattan's westem shore ste that grat cities should have great waterfront parkways but it was Moses who got the jb done along the Hudson River, In 1005, Daniel Burhan ha pm shoreline parka in his Chicago in 198, Jn Nolen ha Robert Mi ul alo have similarly scenic water haart dive for San Di nize that New York fat. The idea had frst been publicly proposed by the city eng neer Nelson deat annual wept for 1922 and was sation (RPA) Harold, was later Lewis in the Mantattan borg pre pamptly taken wp and advorated by the Regional Plan when iw ommed that same year Lewis, lng wit his by the RPA to survey the areas tranaportation faites and develo heme for weaving to there entire metropolitan tea with a coherent ne 16. Bron iver Prkwoy, ear Woodlawn MatroNorth Ritood Slaon, 1922 work of nee highways. The resultant plan was eventually published in the landmark Regional Plan of New York and hs Environs of 1929 (ig. E-17). Ia out, conceptually, many ofthe routes that Moses would eventually build including watefoat highways on the shore of Manhattan’ By the time they ‘were completed, Moses hal eft his omn imprint onthe projects that he super vised, always adjusting and updating them according to the circumstances, In srhich included the Henry Hludeon and the Henry thie respect, the West Side Inprovement Parkway the ep Hudson Merri the sion and relandscaping of Riverside Pak, Bridge—in classic example fa mes projet He wast but in the end he was the person who tok the idea, shape it by applying the 31 design principles and lesson learned from previous work, and eased it through to completion Fortuitously, in the mid 1980s, just as Mos first parks and parkway get ae, the federal goverment initiated an unprecedented flood of quently, in 1935, things funding eared hin a reputation as.a man who public works projects: the New Deal, Cos Moses was putin charge ofthe state's Emergency Public Works Commission He p rams together with the park funds that he al form Manhattan's ad Lng imagined, but als o build federal workrelief pro- eral, not only to pty used money from the generous new sly 6 1 network of wew bridges and parkas stretching fom Manhattan through o suburban Westchester County. The Save Mill Parkway Memorial Bridge in 1936, the West Side uthway in 1938, and the Hutchins the Bron andi pened in 1935, the Henry Hux Highway in 1997, the Henry Husson : River Parkway in 1941, For th Westchester parkway fom this period a £ a 8 @ - g = i= 72 x a z z 2 5 a C4 To finance these project, Moses had to reach beyond parks money and New Deal work programs. Therefore forall he nev bridges an many ofthe ew roadways he installed tll booths and crested epecial stand-alone government agencies to build, own, operate, and maintain the new facilites As with his earlier appropriation of the innovations of the Bron River Parkway, Moses tke ofthese special public benefit corporations was also patterned aller « nearby pioneer that he had observed up clot, the Port of New York Authority, run by Julius Coben and Austin Tain.’ He recognined 1 Tegal structure similar to the Port Authoriys would ensure that his new fgencies would be flexible and durable tols to build his power, establish is ach, Moses use the agencies to obtain construc pmpretary funding sources, aed evel expand revenues gathered by these new tall-eolee tion loans, pay forthe inital planning stages of potential fature projets, and eventually secure additonal borrowing that funded subsequent projects. AL fed rev firs, he could take only an incremental approach to growing histo ‘nye machine. For example, the Henry Hurl Memorial Bridge was init Iy bai 9 lenders were uncertain if tall rev Je strctue, As ‘8 4 single-decked span beea ees would he sulicent to epay th first phase Aitably, Moses could borrow the atonal money needed to complete the cont af amore expen was opened and the toll receipts flowed in p second level ofthe bridge ‘These new free-standing agencies seemed like a panacea to elected of als, who were seduced by the seemingly magical combination: major new P upefont outlay and no drain on public budgets f Furthermore, the bonded debt of these agencies didnot require approval via Hie works projects, in the midst ofthe Great Depression, with ite or no ongoing mainten ‘cumbersome and unpredictable ballot measures. Nor would the det count ‘owan state and municipal debt limits, which were already strained Moreover, as Moses well knew fra his earlier research and from his direct involvement inthe ereaton of these agencies, they woul have aif of thei ‘own, insulated from typical oversight and accountability measures The Triborough Brie, of all Mosess tll roads and tll bridges, was by farthe bigaest revenue generator. Tiiborough the keystone of Moses other pened to wise fragmented highway network, was finished in 1936, Once drivers it quickly beeame the cash cow that sustained the growth of his rap idly expanding empive (fig. E-18) Iwas these tll revenues, collected bythe Tiiborough Bridge Authority and the many other bridge ities that he controlled, that enabled Moses toca nd parks ath parks and long alable Jong after he hal outgrow the limited fads ion ofthe New Deal work programs, Not only was Moses. ovata by oth ser the exp prized Tiiborough Bridge Authority based upon a strc on, but the Tibor eines hl os heen conceived, initiated, and approved long before Moses ot invalved ten halted at the onset ofthe Depression only tobe res cers, the pie benefit compo runistic administrative and resouree-gahering sills, Similarly, when the New York City Tunnel Authority ran out of money partway dhrough the construction of dhe Queens Midtown Tunnel in 1938, ok over the conto: Ting agency, merging it with Tiborough to form the Tiborough Bridge and Moses rescued the project, completed it by 1940, and Tunmel Authority, He was inthe right place at the right ime, with the right roa of the situation, skills ane he tok every opportunity to make Ul expanding Ding this same period, Mayor Fiorello La Guardia put Motes in charge ofthe 1989 New York Wolds Fair. Among the Popular exhibits were two that offered the public a view ofthe future similar is power, his tol, and his mandate i most famous and most to that which Moses was already building: General Motos” Futue designed by Noman Bel Geddes; and Democracy, the core exhibit within the fairs iconic Persphere. Hoth depicted « farang futuristic city held together by bridges an highways, with no maes transit, Even before the fai, many Americans had shared this view of the tute, but these immensely popular scale models created even mite converts. Ouside the fungus, £18, Manhoton el ploae,Teborough Bdge, co. 1937. Pty by Rho! Ae Suh Calon MIA Weg nd ual ps ce Robert M ill t work, remaking the metropolitan area along ntocenti Hines and the public seemed to embrace each new project 4 a stp into the future, Subsequently, Moses has often been exiiined for ‘excluding mass-transit facies from all his projects And, in hindsight, iti feaay to se that it woul have been desirable to integrate mass transit into them, Is also apparent that his failure 1 do so kept poorer New Yorkers— many of whom were Afrcan-American=—from using most of his new trans ot network There is ile evidence, however that anyone at the time was ‘ectively advocating a transil-based altematve to Mose’ auto based m ropolitan transport plans, Prompted by federal policies that encouraged the lispersal of the hudled masses across the open countryside, the vast major ity ofthe public shared his opinion thatthe automobile was integral to an ‘optimistic view ofthe future, and that al-based transit was associated with th ply the most visibly effectve instrument of these government ererowded and dysfusetional it the past. Robert Moses was sim- ices and Cooral Ps i the related cultural preferences. re ‘As time passed the desig of Moses’ oad projects gradually changed rhe Initially this was 4 result ofthe rapidly advancing state ofthe rt of sways, Late, it was a prot of shifs in the sources of funding and tusage palms, The design approach used on the Bron River Parkway was simultaneously groundbreaking and flawed, hanpered by tribe ina ‘i that eame to light as auto use increased and technological advances allowed for higher speeds. Trough the 1930 and 1940s, Mos om implemented improvements even while etining many signature ele- iments uch as overly wide rghto-way with careful land sping, roadway rouies thet were integrated ino the existing topography, rustc-tyle wooden. signs, and grade separation al erosin ten uilizing architecturally is. Iwidges (figx E-19-21). The Meadowbrook Parkway (1934) © first to divide tac in opposite directions along the entire rou cithor by center barrier oeby sping the parkway into two separate road vray cach with its own carefully ranged aligament. This ater approach sped was use increasingly, and and dans of vaviable widths bee standard parioway feature tationwie, Also, while earlier designs had lanes! that were ony ten feet crs sometimes even narrower to get under bridges ‘or around obstacles, the lanes were ler more consistent and wider fiat n Clark ces al geeater tale om ao deceleration lanes were lengthened; clover: vently and thee di lies innovations increasingly allowed for higher i capacities. Accele meter expanded. i 7 aloo gradually iproved, with even smoother transitions and eyaa enter curves, now carefilly banked. Instead of two narrow lanes in each Aiection, later roadways ypically provided three wide lanes plus a ful fen known asa break-down lane, One curl tually, by the 1950s, Me projects Ios their parkway aesthetic altogether? This transit aller, which tive impact ofall these changes was that twas not soley because te ineremental design changes andthe increased so ly Timits and on boosting technical nc ‘nts also a consequence af changes in the institut of Mow a and financial fous 21. Grond Cental Parkway, wih adjacent bike path, Febuary 14,1941 mauling power As toll revenues rose on Moses's ridges and parkway he grew lest ‘dependent on park funds. Also, as predicted! at the World's Fair, Americans including com- muting to and from new suburban homes. Furthermore, although his many parkway had made it easier for ears to get around the metropolitan ane, they had done nothing fr trucks, which eared evergreater quantities of increasingly tured to automobiles for routine transportation fright through the region each year, Not only id the physical limitations of the parkwaye—narrow roadways, low bridges, difficult entrances and cxite—make truck ure impractical, the rules of the paskways prohibited tele. Moses cauld ao longer proceed under the unrealistic re sumption that his rads were mainly for recreational excursions, a he no Jonge needed to pretend that his als were atually parks inorder to obtain funding. Accordingly, when he resumed building after the end of World War is highways placed diminished emphasis on eaeflly landscaped bor sees and medians an favored desgas that were lest scenic andl ote tli with wider lanes, longer sighines, and broader shoulders. This change in emphasis led wo changes in Moveds design stall. Whereas the ear- lier parkways had been overseen by landscape architects like Gilmore Clarke, neers who only occasionally brought in lanscape architects to consult on ded by engineers, the later expressways were supervised by engi ‘minor matters. This sit in professional dominance, fom landscape archi= tects to engineers, was manifest both intemally, within Moses staf s well, ‘as externally, For example, while Clarke's consulting firm was sill retained by Moses fr fequent projets, these were mae likly time passed, tobe prtks and not highways, For the later, Moses engaged his favorite consul Madigan-Hyland. At the same eof Moses poj- ing engineering firma, auch Jack Madigan time, hecause of changes in funding sources, more alm ‘cts hal to meet sre federally mandated technical design guidelines neers at the State also were requited—by law—to closely involve Highway Department and the federal Bureau of Public Rows, In order to ‘ease this bureaucratic process, Moses shrewdly ensured tha the plans for his projets were always prepared and submited by staff or constants with the same background and taining as the bureaucrats themselves. Once federal Interstate Highway funds became available in enormous ‘quantities after 1956, incremental design changes ceased and Moses entre- ly diseared the last vestiges of parkway design characterises, For more than tiny year, he had heen able to bypass the federally imposed structure highway planning an financing. Starting with park money, later making the most of the Nev D ing tolls, Moues was able to realize his erter projects almost whey ind Dndent of the State-Aid and Feleral-Aid high these sways and prohibited | al and generating his own revenue sources by levy il systems had exclude! urban hi ls, exeept ‘on ridges. Furthermore the grants wete tightly controled by highway eng Doers in Albany and Washington. After the Rederal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 added “urban extensions” tothe grun-cigible highway #y ‘ver, ad the amount of avilable feral sid ballooned stating in 1946, ‘matched dollar for dllar by marulatory state contributions, Moses adapted his development approach 0 that some of his projects could qualify. The first of these was the Van Wyck Expressway, which was finished i 1950; the em, how £22, Booty Queens Expresneny, co. 1960 1955, At prin Parkway, in Westchester County, 0 portions ofthe naw almost obec Prospect Expressway followed same time, he was no enti Iy finished building parkways. The running early parallel tothe northern lete Bronx River Parkway, was completed in 1953, Then in 1956, when the rie i BO persed Inter jalation tised Highway he fe struction costs, with enticing allotments for utban project, Moses focused almost exclisively om qualifying projets.” Nevertheless, with this sbundant new federal support cate strict design standards and aban on tll roads In this environment, Masessrle changed a well In many instances his formal relation to these projects was as City Construction Coordinate Yet, in some eases, he was abe to construe new highways as approaches to 7 Toe these projects he used his insti Iridges controlled by ane oe ancther of his authorities, fhe had greater supervisory responsibilities, In all case nad ard financial resources to expedite the projects, handling. the e sate an loa svitable political issies by drawing pon his extensi influence, while alo speeding the design proceaes by drawing on existing ffthe-shelf plans prepared hy staff engineets or extemal consulting eng to remake New York for the auto ag, ut now with an expressway aesthetic ners. Mones adapted, conforming othe new fasting syste al cont that was more efficient a safer than his earlier parkway efforts markedly less scenic and attractive Daring the next ten years, Moses oversaw the completion of sme of biggest highways thus fa, vital links in the citys mole transport system, They included portions af the New England Thruway, which opened to dei ers in 1958; the Major Deegan the Cross-Bronx Expressway and in 1963; and the Staten Inland Expressway, which opened to trafic in 1964, ‘Qucens Expressway. presway, which was completed in 1961 ve Whitestone Expressivay, both finished the same year thatthe las seganents ofthe Brook red for more trafic lanes to accommodate evernounting traffic lows, ‘meant that the later highways were muuch bigger and much uglier Thin al across the nation, in city after ety, urban Anveieans were beginning to tei the constuction of additional expressway, Public sentiment no longee aut matically lined pin nearly unanisous support of highway projects, asin cater periods. Resistance grew. In New York, Moses had over the year ise ‘layed litle sympathy for those who were displaced by his highways, not had the demonstrated! much willingness t listen to those who opposed his poj- fects. On the comtary, his heayy-handed and imperious manner had ta ished his once-gleaming reputation. Moses himself fostered the growth of his own opisiton. For afew year, Moses was able to fight pst this growing resistance, The CChss-Bronx Expressway and portions of the Brooklyn-Queens Expresivsy were controversial, hut he completed them anyveay, He was less successful, however, with a series of projects that would have ently reananged Manhattan's core, the very heart of New York City He revived plans fortwo highways that had originally been proponed in the 1920s hy the Regional Plan Assocation, large expressways crossing from the East River to the Huason, one thraygh Midtown and one throagh lower Manatan. hn an abstract and theoretical way, the two expressways seemed to make sense: connecting the Hudson River tunnels with the East River crossings and] removing al the through tlic fom the ety streets. But, in practice, both of these projects promised todo immeasurable damage to their highly devel- oped surroundings. displacing many thousands of residences and busines sive barriers, and slicing up the center of the metropolis. At the same time, Moses was also advocating two other highly controversial project: a huge bridge across Long Island Sound, from Oyster Bay to Westchester County, ad a widening ofthe lower portions of Filth Ave inlatng an incursion through Washington Square Park. None of thse cane ‘o fruition. Finally, Moses could push his tansportation efforts no further, The city’s appetite for his highways seemed to have reached its practical Timi even as his remarkable ability to adapt his to changing ci umstances seemed to have similarly run ot. Times ad changed, and bis projects had changed the two were not aligned and instead were in confit ee was no longe the Fight man, in he right places at the right tine. | 1960, as Moser's ability Yo launch new projects waned, al amidst mounting plitial problems relate to his housing activities, he was per sunded 1 relinguish some of his New Yark City goverment positions in exchange for a lucrative seven-year contract as bead of the 1961 Works Fair. Then, stating in. 1962, Coveenoe Nelon Rockefeller gradually reclaimed power fom Moses at the state level. Whereas his talents and resources had once made him indispensable, s0 mich so that successive mayors and governors had concluded that they absolutely needed him, Moses gradually became dispensable. In 1968, Rockefeller delivered the final blow, merging the Tiborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority into the newly formed Metropolitan Transporation Authority and removing Moses fom power altogether Moses: hihway-building efforts seemed to have been the right moment. Tbe sure, without his remarkable ped at exactly nts, New York ‘adaptation to the ato age would probably have been les extensive, and con sequently less successful, leaving the city ill-equipped for midern times Nevertheless, if he had been allowed to proceed, completing his list pro- posed spate of massive new expressways he might have pushed the city past proverbial tipping pint destroying its eenter in favor af easing subur- than and peripheral travel and thereby undermining the long-term sust ability ofthe city’s core. Instead, America's dominant city af the nineteenth ‘century survived o thrive in the twenty-fiestcentury. It is worth noting, bo that despite Moses's extraonlinary elletiveness, New York Ci the Teast auto-dependent city in the United States, by fa. Ultimately, it was the conjunction of Moses ras with the regions word lass massransit system that sustained the meteopaitan economy. Despite his frequent and outspoken disdain for urban planners, Robert Moses was ove of the mst influential figures involved in the planning and ‘construction of urban infrastructure in the twentieth century, He has been both celebrate for his sccomplishments—the completion of public works tm a scale unrivaled by anyother public oficial in Ameriean history—and vilified forthe manner in which he achieved them. He earned a national rep ‘tation such that he and his stalf were sagt aftr as consultants and expert adesers by many cites across the United States, Neither an architect nor an cengincer—all of his projets were actually planned and design by oth- fer—Moses built his reputation upon his remarkable effectiveness as an administrator, his opportunist appropriation of eters visions, and his a fal public relations effors, including 8 consistent outpouring of pes rele illustrated brochures, and guided tours for reporters. His expansive rep tation yas also hase on his remarkable ability to gather and sustain power, to take advantage of ever-changing funding steams and lina, o com plete highly visible public works projects that eters cud only imagine. Nores "or min in Men i jl ame sno Nat! app ant Kaya Mes Sng Md Gs Borie foe cer et cf eet ol ey irene coe “Noe Caren 4-1 me mi ey fen isn Ph whan vn 2-0 _ eet ttn gh a od rt Mea Hina” 9-210 9 3, 9. For dal on he nln eo chy on on cain etna rt 99 ROBERT MOSES AND URBAN RENEWAL THE TITLE | PROGRAM HILARY BALLON tes with New tetion by private developers! Scores of cities, even in Alaska and avail joined the program. Although slow to take off, by 1960 Tite {fun ing had set 838 projects in motion, Moses was the pacesetter and experi smenteninrchie: A chairman ofthe Mayor's Comittee on Slum Clearance, the entity Ahrough which he ean Tile I from 1949 to 1960, Moses demonstrated his characteristic skill -apturng federal funds and expediting public works, in December 1948, and putin place enabling lege ne law, in July 1949, New York alone was hile other cities were sill dumbatruck He bean planning ear ialtion so that when Tile Ibe primed for action. In January 19% by the innovative legislation, Moses announced seven shum clearance proj- cts, and he maintained that hectic pace tothe end, asa ally of his work cunfiems. Moses obtained planning grants for thiey-wo urban renewal ruj- cts, moved seventeen redevelopments into execution (anather four were «aried out by his successors (fig. F-28). Due to his ffrs, New York won ‘more Title Iai than any othe city. During his twelve-year reign ove Title 1, the city ceived $65.8 million: Chicago, the second biggest spender, amount, $3038 million? received lest than half th A productive recor, yet it has long heen considered disaster, both fr the ity and for Moses, since Tile I brought hima down. Ia March 1960, when Moses was foreed 1 resign as ehaimnan of the Committee on” Shum Clearance, his appraach urban renewal was publi rejected and his rep- ‘uation was in tatters, Mayor Robert Wagner disbanded the committee and lonen's erat ways ie secretive inalled a new system designed to core selection of sites and spansors privatization of relocation, and opposition to preservation, His antidemoeratic methods and iniference to community ‘values had incited a citiaen planning movement that he Aad ould not accommodate. “The democratic way iso allow the p the community to havea voice in its projected ute,” a citizen wrote the gen ‘comprehend ope of ‘eral. “We urge you to schedule public hearings in which we may participate Tefoe you proceed, We cers the rght to participate i the planning of our ‘community: To which the uncomprehending general replied, “It must be ‘obvious that this [planning ise] eannot be setled by a mass meeting.” Moves trusted the wisdos of professional expertise over the local concerns ‘of residents, and he pt the interests ofthe city oer those af a neighborhood, ‘Our historical distance and experience of « thriving, resurgent city incitably eas the Tile [work in anew light, When Robert Caro published The Power Broter in 197, the city was failing, the wounds of large-scale clearance were fresh, and wba renewal was sill dee way, Caro highlight- ‘ed the sponsor seandals and Moss's Olympian blindness to the misery he ‘eased. What we se is year ater rater different: the Moses projects have been absorbed nt the fabric ofthe ety: problems that he identified, such asthe vulnerable sake af the middle class in the city remain a chal particular, the potential lenge: an solutions that be devised emain valid ‘of ant centers and univesies to serve as engines of redevelopment. It is time to reassess Moses whan renewal program aa is impact on the growth ‘of New York City TITLE | SLUM CLEARANCE PROGRESS defines the basic job Moses faced: managing the dificult and ill-defined partnership between the federal government, the city and private develop rs in urban cone “The feral bulldozer” was Martin Anderson's moniker for Tile Tin his 1904 critique ofthe program. Tie, the Funding was mostly federal, bat in ther respects urban renewal was a local program. The U.S. Housing Aet of 1949 gave responsibilty for planning to local authorities, who structed their own urban renewal programs and detennined the ste, plans, minture ‘of uses, developers, an methods of execution and relacation-—albeit subject to federal approval. The local authority was also reliant on private i to buy the lan and redevelop it. The blinding effect of Moses—his larger than-life persona, autoeatic methods, astounding productivity, and public ty machine—obscures all but his role as decision maker, yet in truth be functioned as an intermediary between the goverment and private investors. He had o induce reluctant developers to enter the risky business of urban renewal while restraining counterpodicive federal ations th undermined Tile I. Moses may’ have had the personality of «commanding seneral, ut in reality he was a middleman, segotiating between public and private interests in land wee. Throughout his ife, Moses was devoted to bath the public realm andthe private masket, two values that wore at times in confit Inde, the are of his career and his evolving approach to public works take on greater mean- ing when seen in light of this historical American dilemma: how to balance private property rights and the public goad. The intratable problem of the slums—a city killer—posed the conflict between public and private control ‘of land in an acute form. Shims were the dark side of the private property regime: the cost of city services exceeded tax revenues, yet alumlords ‘extract profits from impoverished residents. Ax Moses sit he was ons imide course between the lftwingers who want govemment todo every thing ‘vay its basic, legally inalienable, national resources.” His work on Tite 1 and the old-fashioned tyeaons who still demand thatthe State give can be seen asa culminating chapter of «careerlong attempt to shape the processes ofthe market through planing. The second major elaim ofthis essay ean be put simply: Moses had a eoherent and intelligent plan, Whereas the standard view holds that he was subservient to eal estate interests ‘larger purpose, Tare that Moses had strategic vision, His atm was to ‘strengthen the center city in an age of decentralization, suburban dit and urhan decay. Toward this end he pursued a three-part strategy: build hose ing forthe mille class expand higher education, and promote the citys cultural preeminence. Admittedly, this eevelopment agenda did not bene fit all alike. The laers were those displaced fom tenement districts the poor, Puerto Ricans and blacks, and small-business cwners often banished ul proceed opportunistially without to other shams, The beneficiaries were middle- and upper-class residents; "universities, ellege students, and an economy propelled by brainpower and cultural institutions, suburbanites, and ouriats who saw New York asa ul- tural magnet What stands behind the Title I work isan idew of New York as an ire- sisible center of gravity “am not much of an evangelist,” Moses allowed, “but I share the latent American idealism which Turks under the hairiest ‘est and the hanlest ens” The ltkingidealisen in that most pragmatic of| ‘men stemmed from diving faith in the city, He said For youth fan ge aware rant, inrssonabl, th ity iene icin ing and hat ine 0 ay aie gave oppo cers, why bacon ine tobe sabre al sti, hy Ue vant ted my alk gin he big ae, ple t, iniiv t atrations, blac can't hepa From thy our dome evs car, san, ewe, vent thi spleen tae ae tater theelves aay. yin apie fang with ayn ond ab, tle tnd ther congestion, wil ever be dispersed dear an shun. It is unfamiliar to hear Moses speak in this Iyrical me, but his remarks convey something that was pat and parcel ofthe expediter, master builder, and power broker: « commitment tothe survival of New York City, which ‘motivated his urban renewal work. ‘THE FRAMEWORK OF TITLE | In retrospect, Title I seems a reckless assault onthe urban fabri, both its physical and socal onder, but the willingness to shred and reshape the city at mideentury grew out of « broad consensus om the slum problem, It had heen forged during the previous thirty to forty years and hal become as streetcentered model is today. Precisely is dfcult to ‘widely aecepted as our regnan hecause « countertheory of urbanism is now supreme ard il fathom how what we see as misguided was once idealized, we should begin Dy recouping the convictions that shaped national policy and. Moses’ ‘The three elements of Title I—lange-sale clearance, replanning nd p= vate redevelopment—emerged fom a long-established view of the slum prablem. According to that view, improvement af slum conditions required large-scale operations, The slums were a “cancer” endangering the future of the ety, which if ot excised would spread and destroy it Reha individual buildings o elearaneeof single lock was not enough to change the character of « neighborhood. Indeed, as Title T mana explainel “Patching up hopelessly yorn-out buildings on a temporary oF minimum basis presents the possible result of slum preservation rather than slum clearance.""To achieve areawide change, the solution was to aggregate large properties, clear them, a rebuild on lange scale A second, elated conviction concerned the configuration of the built and housing reformers as varied as Frederick Law ion of environment, Urbanist Olmsted, Jacob Ris, Lewis Mumford, and Le Corbusier agreed on one thing the traditional patter of stretoriented, gridiron urbanism created unhealthy Tiving conditions. It produced damaging population density and high land coverage that deprived people of basic human needs: open space, light, and ait. Disnclined to atribute these problems to propery relations and economic forees, American urbanists put their faith in changing the physical order ofthe city. Create tabula rasa, enlarge the dimension of the vid by merging several blocks into on tnd replace stect walls with free= standing towers on superblocks. This reform recipe had been promoted by ‘modem architects since the 1920s and ultimately was rendered ficial doc trine by Tile [A Title T manual summed it up: “Bad housing is only one ‘manifestation of shu conditions and fixing up substandard houses wll nei- ther cure nor even seriously alter the factors that make slums—unwise mix ture of residential and commercial uses of land, overcrowding and bad plan- ning ofthe land, lack of recreational facilities, frozen patterns of street ly ‘outs and trai congestion.” Comprehensive replanning was needed The thin premise of Tile Iwas that housing construction and redevelop ‘ment were private-market activities. An exception was made in te cite setibed field of low-income housing, which didnot intrest the private sec- tor, but even in that area there was considerable resistance to government intervention. ln order o appease the ome-buiing industry and alles ‘opysined to public housing, the sponsors ofthe U.S. Housing Aet of 1949 choked funding fr low-income housing while more generously subsidizing Private redevelopment of slums. Acknowledging the anxiety about govern- ‘ment intervention i the field of housing, Moses positioned Tile Twork asa ‘mde path between the fee hand of the market, which on its own would not cure the slums clumlords made money), and a federal takeover of housing. “The size af New York's problem ca be measured by th 9.000 acres of ree ognized slums which cannot be eradicated by onlinary private, speculative brildng (But) obviously, private capital must be brought into the pie- ture on large scale if we hope to escape a tremendously enlarged publi housing program with all the implications which go with i"® Asin ather cea of federal policy, the idea of public subsidy was more realy accep fe when the heneficiares were not only the poor. Although reflecting a consensus view ofthe slum problem, ite I came without road map. Moses truthflly stated at the begining of each slum clearance plan that the field of urban renewal was “new, untied and experi> ‘etal an that progres was therefore likely to be “slow and cumbersome.” File | proposed an unfaniliar mode of public-private partnership. Suck part- netships, now the nor in urban redevelopment, have become sophisticated instruments for shifting public responsibilities to private management, but Tile [launched the fist wide-scale use of this madel of development. AL that, time, there was virtually no empirical experience to call upon in defini Public and private roles, aly the knowledge that previous efforts to interest Private capital in the slum problem had largely failed Moses approach to Title Tyas informed by his efforts in the 1940s to involve private capital in slum clearance, In 1942, New York State passed the Redevelopment Companies Law, an important step in expanding the powers of eminent domain andthe definition af «public purpose to facilitate slum clearance. Taking advantage of the powers granted! hy this la, Moses ‘ssisted the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ie assembling the sites for three slum elearance-redevelopment projects in Manhattan: Stuyvesant Town, Riverion Houses, and Peter Cooper Village, The Redevelopment Companies Law solved the problem of site assemblage but did not provide sulicient incentives to motivate private investor: Met Life stood alone. In tn effort to appease Met Life and to atact ater private investment, Moses ‘oneetened the terms of the deal. The state lw as amended in 1943 retained rent controls but relieved private sponsors of rchousing obligations and ‘extended tax exemptions, Moreover, Moses acquiesced to housing segrewa- tion in order to accommodate prevailing market conditions. The develop- ‘ment of Stuyvesant Town embroiled MetLife in damaging controversies over tenant relocation, racial segregation, and rent contrls—more reasons for private investors to avoid the messy business of sha Despite the Met Life experience, Moses remained committed to private sum clearance, and this bias shaped is attitude to the postwar program of the New York City Housing Authority In 1946, it advance a plan to build ‘moderate-income units on undeveloped sites, where land costs were lower than those on developed sites. Although Moses was sen to dictate NYCHA poliy and site selection, he initially opposed what was called the “no-eash subsidy progran” fr two reasons: he regarded the construction of midle- ‘lass housing asa private-sector activi, an he favored redevelopment in innercity sms over construction on undeveloped land. Moses ultimately hacked the programa, which had Mayor William O‘Dwyer's suppot, but he disappruved ofthe approach kn drawing the line between public and private action, Moses firmly believed that the private sector could adequately meet the housing needs of the middleclass Putin the contest of housing pro- ‘grams in the 1940s, in particular the failure of state laws to induce private investment and the expansion of NYCHA into middle-class housing, Moses’ Title I work can be seen as a more aggressive eff to enlist private capital in urban redevelopment ‘The essence of Tile Iwasa land subsidy known as the write-down. The coat othe city of assembling and clearing a redevelopment site was greater than the market value ofthe eleared land. The federal government covered two-tinds ofthe loss or write-down, with the city absorbing the other thin vas expected thatthe ety would recoup this loss through higher tax rev= tenes as the vale ofthe redeveloped property rose overtime. The explicit purpose of the program was to stimulate private investors to bul market- tate housing in sim areas. But while the Tile I write-down discounted the cost of land it didnot dininish ther expenses—construction, debt service, ‘an taxes—that raised housing costs beyond the reach ofthe mide elas Congress had assumed that lowering the cost of land would be sufficient to decrease the cost of housing, but as Jeanne Lowe put it in her groundbreak- ing early study of Tile I, “Congress was unsophisticated in its howsing co omnes." In an expensive city ike New York the framework o Tile yield ced luxury housing, To obtain moderate-priced housing, government would noel to provide other subsidies THE MOSES RULES As king of Title I, Moses had more concentrated power over the physical ‘development of New York than any man had ever had ori ever likely to have ‘gain. Shum clearance involved all aspects of wrhanism—not just reads and reereation, the domain Moses had command in the 1930s; not jast hous ing, which was add to his portfolio inthe 1940s but every aspeet of city tromth—site selection, sets, circulation, sanitation, community facilities, ial use, and design, Renewal projects were crafed by the Mayors Ptr rleelopment pla Nee ra Perm ated ere demotion of igh washington square southeas! £25. Pages tom Washington Square Seuthes: Som Ceorance Pan unde Tite | oh Roving Ac of 1949, Aug! 1983. Commitee on Slum Clearance, which included leaders of relevant muni pal departments: the New York City Housing Authority, City Planning CCominission, oar of Estimate, Department of Builngs, C mptoler, ad Corporation Counsel. But it was cornice in name onl Cone sing power in a redevelopment czar was not sual. M cites with robust Tile programs had powerful leaders: Louis Danzig in ‘Newark, Baward Logue in New Haven and then Boston, Edmand Bacon in Philadelphia. Comverely, mhere power was dispersed, redevelopment often lagged, asin Boston until Logue arrived. Redevelopment intersected mont tw eu through the thicket of bureaucratic obstacles pars of iy compel coord rs ike Mo ‘Bt while wielding giant power at home, entrated power and fierce Tea ‘and Logue eer ed el atively litle ower wih the fodeealgoverament. Iva leal contest, Moses bo came closer to David. Moses challenge fe bstrcted the Ti ke Goliath in dealings wth the federal government, he sometimes nght ar area: sponsor selection arance procedures, The nitty-gritty information al ules that he 1 1 program in theee partic spprasal standards, and e bout perational intricacies presented here explains how Moses made a . P rogh-hewn federal program work in a realestate market ase Manat RULE 1: Prenego tublic and private parts ofthe redevelopment process in prescribing the fl ste Sales, The federal guidelines neatly divided the lowing sequence of events, The city sleet renewal site, buys it locates tenants and desmoishesthe buildings then and only then does dhe ity sell, a ‘ed the sequence so that ity and sponsor interacted before the sale selection the vacant land io a edeveloper whe subsequently takes over, Moses up and site coincided al the outset ofthe Tn the federal ma of spon sand preceded the city acquisition ofthe 1, competitive land auetions ‘slublished fir market yale on which the werite-doen was based the high er the sale price, the smaller dhe write-down, In New York the land auction a ceremonial ocasion with one party bidding on a prenewtiate sale vould inform prospective sponsors, but in practice, the advanced state of planning and In theory, the auctions were open to oer bidders, as Mi tastomized terms al auction precluded ater parties—only one rom co to the a. Moves argued that cites could nt afford to purchase and clear a mul acre site only to discover afterward that noone would bay it.“ you ing private capital, you cant in a City like this persuade elected office rndem and clear shuns fis and then lok around press and publi for sponsors. You must snare them fr,” Moses explained tothe Urban 1s there anyone dumb enough to think any Committe New York the Board 50 ed acres Renewal Agency Shum € > could permnde the governing body ‘of Estimate, with it ested land in the center of Manhattan ike the Li ‘ut the tenants and taze the bung, inthe hope that in year ors DEMONSTRATION OF BLIGHT conto of existing sretaree Mg of exagsrctaree 1 tant oroage Ying ing VW atest ebeicene & emanate sors of music, education, housing and what mot would any old pice to bail the City out?” Detroit and Newark leamed thie lesson the han way. In Dei, alcials spent several years planing the redevelopment of the Gratiot area before testing the interest ofthe private setor. There were no bidders ln up eager to pay the fist land buyers reneval scheme proved unaccept- able, the city canceled the sale and was stork for time with a desolate site auction, in 1952, and ony two bidders at «second auction, in 1953, was sold and cleared, but whe AMter similar experience, the Newark Housing Authority the local level- ‘opment agency, changed procedures and gave precedence to developers. “We an afal chance inthe North Want by guessing at what redevelop- rs wanted," an alicia reflected, “Then we had to go aroun pding vacant "The new rue: no" As Haro ly of the Newark Tile T program, site feasibility hard-core slums. The Title I requirement to tract private capital dictated quest forthe “right blight” with investment Potential In due course, the federal government accepted the procedure of renegotiated sale, whi Site feasibility land. Now we let edveloper tell us where they wat ob find a redeveloper first, and then see what interests h Kaplan explains in his forse the city to bypass tl became standard operating practice valved more than site selection it include he develop ‘ment of a business plan to make the deal economically feasible for the investor The Slum Clearance Commitee was conceived as “a negotiating romp of ity officials." sept plained, with Moses as the negotiator” Upon matching a sponsor witha sit, he shaped a viable del ‘determining the land resale pric, the numberof dvelling units in resden- tial projects and tax abatements, if any. Thus, by the time a project was introduced to the publi, it was a flly packaged deal Moses presented the redevelopment projects tothe public in stunning Irochures designed hy Richard C. Guthridge. T images, detailed plan cir bold graphics, potent ‘construction schedules, and financial calculations ‘made untested experiments in uebanism look like irefutable, routine proj- ects fig. E-25) The brochures constructed powerful visual argument al demonstrated Moses's sophisticated use of images, chars, and ater visual material to shape pereepions. “don’t want the texts to be long” Moses instructed his staffer “Ws the schedules themselves, the plans and pictares withthe statement that we mean business, tha the procedure will bbe entirely fairand orderly and that hardships willbe, so faras humanly pos sible, avoided.” The brochures also demonstrated Moses: commitnent to professional expertise. The materials were prepared by Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM), whom Moses appointed at coondinating architects for the Title program, and by two reputable ral estate firms, Charles F. Noyes Company and Wood, Dolson Compan. Deaf to the citizen's vice, Moses lecture and engineeting to enewal plans, ‘lid on experts in eal estate an finance, ar o specific tranaate the public ood i The br tures were organized in three parts: the eeelopment pl on of lum conitons, and appendices. The redevelopment plan was cast in tems of aquarefoot and dolla ealeulatons rather than social vision It included a site plan, aerial rendering ofthe redevelopment, apart= ‘ment layouts business plan, and relocation schedule. The demonstration of indeed, a slum conditions made the ease thatthe area i question w slum. Title Idi not define a slum or blighted area: it let the determination to the federal administrator” For a definition of sm, one hal to refer to the US. Housing Act of 1937: ‘dwellings predominate which, by reason of dilapidation, overerowding, tion, light or sanitation faci re detrimental to safety, health or “The term “sum means any area wheee faulty arrangement of design lack of ve ties, ar any combination of these factors, morals." Following these indicators, Moses pre el data on structures: thee age, condition, heating and sanitary facilites ‘age; population density: and tenant data, including family size and income.® The appendices preemptively addressed controversial matters vith supporting evidence: acquisition and resale appraisal to rebut Feder: exiting land cover- al questions about the write-down, an letters from eity officials about ten nt relocation ‘The brochures were submitted othe Board of Estimate and City Planning Commission for public hearings and approvals, then tothe federal adminis: trator, the Federal Housing and Home Finance Ageney, a division of the Urban Renewal Administration, fo federal review and approval. “Be sure to ‘mention the fat thatthe City Planning Commission will ultimately have an ‘opportunity to report onthe Title I projet” Moses instacted stl ed ing a brochure “ want this inthe booklet so noone wil be able to ay that they will not, in the end, be consulted before final ation is taken.”® To Moses, public input was accomplished through such gestures. The degree to sthich he controlled the Hearings has been overstate, however: OF the firs set of seven plans, all published in January 1951, Moses dropped or revised four, ashe learned how to tailor more succesful projects During the pub lie review process, projects were often delayed and modified to accom : for example, the City Planning Commission rejected. the enlargement of West Broadway when it approved the Washinglon Square Southeast Tile I Sill Moses had an overwhelming rate of sucess, which vets primarily due to the buy-in ofthe ety political and business leader: ship in the renewal program 1 Board of Estima RULE 2: Appeal Based on Future Use, Not Market Value. The write how the key to Tile I, was soft number It was the diference between the cquisition price, which could be fiemly established, and the resale price, which was based on guesswork, The write-down raised many questions, How, for example, would the city fun is one-third share ofthe write-down? “Can pile contr of the this be dane by some special type of City-wide assessment based pon the theory thatthe amortization and interest wil be met as the new buildings go ‘up ae become taxable?” Moses queried Spargo, his numbers man, “We eer tainly have to have some theory in mind to guide us in determining how fe doen we can write these values... . know how difficult i isto spell things ut ofthe Federal rales, but it is time we got down to essentials: Moses develope an unaticulated theory of the write-down: quasi-public institutions serving the common good should not pay market valve for lan Values shouldbe based on the prospective use ofthe land. The concept of use vale, now accepted, was a contentious part of Moses’ Tile I plans and sparked skirmishes with the federal government "New York University (NYU) agreed to pay $5 per square fot forthe prop ‘erty on Washington Squate South where the university library now stands The city approved the deal, which covered the three-black area extending to Mereer Steet, about a thin of the Washington Square Southeast renewal area, but federal alfcials challenged the price. A private developer had centered bid of $10.50 per square fot forthe land dreetly to the sout (here Washington Square Village was later bul), Land valuations should the the same om adjoining land: his was the position of the federal adminis trator James Folin, regional director ofthe Division of Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment of the Housing and Home Finance Agency. Moses and NYU countered thatthe lower bid properly refleted the publi parpone of the universiy ‘The chancellor of NYU, Henry Heal, was well verse in the eiviearg- ‘ments for slum clearance. As president ofthe Illinois Insitute of Technology inthe 1940s, he had pioneered in this domain, taking advantage of sate ws iced the construction of tw acquire and eleara slum ares where be ls iconie campus, designed by Mies van der Rohe. Upon ariving at NYU in 1952, Heald responded enthusiastically to an overture from Moses. When Moses conveyed his dismay with NYU’ previous leader, hecause of his silent response to vocal erties, Heal offered reassurance: “You need have ‘0 fear about my backing out of the program because there is some opposi= tion to it. Teamed long ago that no slum clearance project could ever be 100% populaz”™ When the federal government rejected the low NYU appraisal, Heald mounted a vigorous ease for use value. He argued that first, the university should not “be penalized beeause the are in which itis locate is ideal for redevelopment”; secon, New York City hd stake in the quality anl scope ofthe service provide! by NYU; an thind, NYU would raise surrounding property values. “In many proctitis in the best inter ‘ts of the public to include areas for institutional ar public use which by their very nature will paduce no direct dolar income. Such inclusion sj tified ehere the institutional or public use serves abroad publie purpose and where sh a use, by adding an increment of valet the vides greater security for the private investment.” Ulimately, Heald acknowledged, “here is no formula by which « fair value price can be rived at for lanl for education use." Lacking an exact formula, Mones and NYU agreed on a 50 percent discount ventually, Moses and NYU prevailed, but the federal government ‘mounted a similar challenge to the appraisal of the Lincoln Center site, sthich was lower than that of the aljacent housing site Diflerent tions benefited about a dosen quas eval 1 awd ons, which ps prices well below market value because they served « public purpose, Although the framework of Title I dictated a realestate orientation, Moses ‘id not naeroly pursue the bottom line, His position was consistent wth his career-lng view of public works as an engine of economic development: a civie investment in public infrastructure will drive up property values and tukimately make economie sense. {conn pleco il enranen as mcicipl nepali Mae pee 21 Spomor Relocation and Clearance. Fedral guidelines defined srork was supponed to precede the land sale, Mos lo these rakes he ld redevelopment sites before relocation and clearance and required the The federal medal sponsor to handle these operat sumed that ‘would better manage the challenge. Moses believed that if the ety ran cation, political prestures would produce interminable delays. He was eor- rect alter the cily took contol of relocation in 1960, it slowed to sails pace. Efficiency was Moss's critical concer. Conceiving of relocation ws a cial problem, he envisioned elo- be Meibly with the phasing of constrction rather thn as a stage precedent to cansruc tion2* Phasing allowed for the gradual spl uibjected them to abuses, and Mosess system alfred no protect practical and technical challenge, not a sent of site residents, but it As a result of Moses's hands-off approach, recat procedures varied foe bjt a project, dope tad sponsors, the most notorious being the team at Manhattantown. fn 1954 & Senate investigation threw a national spotlight on this Upper West Side 4, lonted between Cental Park West ond Amsterdam Avenue fom shad acquired the renewal stein 1951 omelet el etat o t ho 100th Steet. The spon toe years ater, there site ha been eleaged. Meanwhile the sponsors were making money a ol fashioned slunnlords and demoed tenements while let- ce subeequcnlly inponed unica monitor, but he Tile Up ting them rot. M iercey defended raccntious spemmus, ike Lincoln Center for the etek clcation fi rmning Arts and Fordham University. They hired a teputl ie, Brislin, Porter & Whe xd maintenance department. Communicating with owners ani tenants in Spanish aswell as English, the fm br rnplanee, nuintained apartments during the waiting period, and actively assisted in ack, which staffed an onsite ht buildings into code the search for new housing. They paid brokers fr listings and landlords ments. The on-site office hansed representatives the New York City Housing Authority, who assisted in the search for pl is andthe New York City Bureau of Real Estat, the municipal hy that monitored relocatio I developer, also tried o han g. E-26) He had come tothe rescue in Detroit where he baught the Gratiot area, and reseed the Pratt Institute defauhing sponsor. Greenwald updated Moses on his progress £26, Hub 1 Grenwol, May 27,1957, tooo by hig After Title Ts the federal government, Mose, Greenwald indica plating recat ow startin the early 1950s, all pats press, and the publio—demanded results, The pressure was to clear and Imild quickly, but responsible relocation attempting to address individual needs mived ata slower poce Even at its best, relocation was hobbled by structural frees with brutal laa natn sequences: underfunding of relocation and «se able housing. Tile I provided meager support for relocation expenses, mwnets and tenants received no compensation under The Housing Act of 1956 permite relocation pa (Commercial property the 1949 Ty nts up $500; Linco 500, depending were $100, Most important, thre was ina tage at 1304000 wit cits was aggravated by the postwar infix 52,000 to busine 1) Residential property owners received Center and Fordham added bonuses for xelf-rlocators (8275, on the apartment size: by comparison, NYCHA grants uate replacement on 1060 study pt the Puerto Ricans and southem of clearance necessitated by public hous le I, and Tenses ples ‘lacks, by the cumulative eff by Title 1 omth of the public housing program. nen ance could not lord the on-site replacement housing, which was intended for higher income residents. Nor could they typically afford to remain inthe entified neighborhood, In theory the best option was public housing, but ‘twas in short suppl, with waiting ists in the tens of thowsand, I relo= ‘ation analysis ofthe fit five hundred evicted faniles, Lincoln Center doo: tumented trends that generally characterized the Tile I diaspora in New York City: 70 percent moved outside the neighborhood (brady defined in case as the Upper West Side}: the average rent ofthe displaced rose from {$51.82 o $65.26; nd only 11.4 percent moved into public housing.” PAIRING UP WITH PUBLIC HOUSING One response tothe demand for low-income housing was to use a Tile I site for that purpose. Moses pursued this strategy inthe Washington Square South plan, which dedicated seven of forty acres toa New York City Housing Authority project, named Houston Houses on the plan (Gg. E27). Ax Joel Schwartz established, the lending community opposed this integrated approach." So did the federal administator who reminded Moses tha Title {as intended fr redevelopment by private enterprise: “I would nt appear ‘that the use of sites cleared under the Title I program exclusively orto a pre- dominant degree for redevelopment in publie housing woul be consistent with this general policy" Moses never again inched public housing in Title I project. He did not, however, abandon the idea of mixing incomes. Momingside Gardens (the Moringsde-Manhattnsille Title 1) intro= duced a new approach, which coordinated the Title project with « neigh- boring public housing project. The expectation was that tenants displaced fom the Title I site could be leallyrehoused in the NYCHA prec. n his report “Essential Postwar Improvements” of April 1946, Moses alld fr the ‘oondinated construction of pubic and medera There i eynd question bythe tages indi le pt as ppaton ‘hem om fly uncer bn dlls are the ly measremen The alps the goverment ld tbe ered sul hy wighbrhos This ie why eevelope, nite iden a specie ing witha te services tha with them, sak! pon sep hy step sn black by black ‘ith public hosing forthe oes gps onning oro cher da sea sino They mt he ind og ge hich weil ne decent Iginla unless ner 1e woull seem that Moses had contradicted this position in the 1940s when, asthe city construction coordinator, he was associated wih housing program, that rebuilt much ofthe Laer East Side as public housing. Nevertheless, in the 1950, hen he contoled site selection for Title I he locate welve of his seventeen executed projects beside public housing, Only in two cases, “Momingside and Menhattantown, weve the Tale I apatnents built in tandem with new NYCHA projets, the General Grant Houses and Frederick Douglass Houses respectively (fig. E28). In the other instances, Moses chose Tile 1 site adjacent to preexisting NYCHA projects Ga, E29," Coordination proved dificult: NVYCHA andl Tile I were pulled inde. ‘ent directions by divergent constituencies, locational stralegies, and funding ‘constraints, Moses was obliged to target more expensive, developed land for

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