BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK DIWATA MAGBUHOS vs THE HONORABLE ENRICO LANZANAS

CARPIO, J.:

Parties:

Bangus Fry Fisherfold Diwata Magbuhos, et al. – petitioners

Honarable Enrico Lanzanas, DENR, et al. – respondent

Nature: petition for review of the Order dated 7 November 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 7 (Manila RTC), dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction.

Keywords: Jurisdiction, exhaustion of administrative remedies, mooring facilities, DENR, Napocor

Facts: On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe (RED Principe) of Region IV,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), issued an Environmental Clearance
Certificate (ECC) in favor of respondent National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). The ECC authorized
NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San Isidro,
Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a
mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.[3]

The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCORs power barge, which, due
to turbulent waters at its former mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, required relocation to a
safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts power barge would provide the main source of power
for the entire province of Oriental Mindoro pending the construction of a land-based power plant in
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC for the mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its
date of issuance or until 30 June 1999.[4]

Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto Galera,[5] sought reconsideration of
the ECC issuance. RED Principe, however, denied petitioners plea on 15 July 1997. On 21 July 1997,
petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the
ECC and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility.
Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need to exhaust administrative
remedies. They argued that the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of Presidential Decree No.
1605,[8] Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160,[9] and the provisions of DENR Department
Administrative Order No. 96-37 (DAO 96-37) on the documentation of ECC applications. Petitioners also
claimed that the implementation of the ECC was in patent violation of its terms.

RTC: Dismissed the complaint. Petitioners have clearly failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
before taking this legal action in Court. The decision of the regional director may still be elevated to the
secretary of the DENR

Issue: The issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction.

Held: The petition has no merit.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the reliefs
sought.[11]

A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners principal cause of action is the
alleged illegality of the issuance of the ECC. The violation of laws on environmental protection and on
local government participation in the implementation of environmentally critical projects is an issue that
involves the validity of NAPOCORs ECC. If the ECC is void, then as a necessary consequence, NAPOCOR or
the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro could not construct the mooring facility. The subsidiary
issue of non-compliance with pertinent local ordinances in the construction of the mooring facility
becomes immaterial for purposes of granting petitioners main prayer, which is the annulment of the
ECC. Thus, if the court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, then it has
jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioners complaint.

Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, although
it could not issue an injunctive writ against the DENR or NAPOCOR. However, since the construction of
the mooring facility could not proceed without a valid ECC, the validity of the ECC remains the
determinative issue in resolving petitioners complaint.

Ruling: The Court commends petitioners for their courageous efforts to safeguard and maintain the
ecological balance of Minolo Cove. This Court recognizes the utmost importance of protecting the
environment.[33] Indeed, we have called for the vigorous prosecution of violators of environmental laws.
[34]
 Legal actions to achieve this end, however, must be done in accordance with established rules of
procedure that were intended, in the first place, to achieve orderly and efficient administration of
justice.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. v. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, GR No. 191427, 2011-05-30

Facts:

Universal Robina Corp. (petitioner) is engaged in, among other things, the manufacture of animal feeds
at its plant in Bagong Ilog, Pasig City.

Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, through its Pollution Control Division -
Monitoring and Enforcement Section, after conducting on March 14, 2000 a laboratory analysis of
petitioner's corn oil refinery plant's wastewater, found that it failed to comply with... government
standards provided under Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative
Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990.

LLDA later issued on May 30, 2000 an Ex-Parte Order requiring petitioner to explain why no order should
be issued for the cessation of its operations due to its discharge of pollutive effluents into the Pasig River
and why it was operating without a clearance/permit from the

LLDA.

Still later, the LLDA, after receiving a phone-in complaint conducted on August 31, 2000, another
analysis of petitioner's wastewater, which showed its continued failure to conform to its effluent
standard in terms of Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand

(BOD), Color and Oil/Grease.

Despite subsequent compliance monitoring and inspections conducted by the LLDA, petitioner's
wastewater failed to conform to the parameters set by the aforementioned DAOs.

Petitioner soon requested for a reduction of penalties, by Manifestation and Motion[3] filed on August
24, 2007 to which it attached copies of its Daily Operation Reports and Certifications[4] to show that
accrued daily penalties... should only cover a period of 560 days.

After conducting hearings, the LLDA issued its Order to Pay[5] (OP) dated January 21, 2008

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby ordered to pay within fifteen (15) days from
receipt hereof the accumulated daily penalties amounting to a total of Pesos: One Million Two Hundred
Forty-Seven (Thousand) Pesos Only (PHP 1,247,000.00) prior to dismissal of the... case and without
prejudice of filing another case for its subsequent violations.

Petitioner moved to reconsider, praying that it be ordered to pay only accumulated daily penalties in the
sum of Five Hundred Sixty Thousand (P560,000) Pesos[7] on grounds that the LLDA erred in first,
adopting a straight computation of the periods... of violation - based on the flawed assumption that
petitioner was operating on a daily basis − without excluding, among others, the period during which the
LLDA Laboratory underwent rehabilitation work from December 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001 (covering 212
days); and... second,  in disregarding the Daily Operation Reports and Certifications which petitioner
submitted to attest to the actual number of its operating days, i.e., 560 days.

Petitioner challenged by certiorari the twin orders before the Court of Appeals, attributing to LLDA grave
abuse of discretion in disregarding its documentary evidence, and maintaining that the lack of any plain,
speedy or adequate remedy from the enforcement of LLDA's order... justified such recourse as an
exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to judicial action.

By Decision of October 27, 2009 the appellate court affirmed both LLDA orders, which it found to be
amply supported by substantial evidence, the computation of the accumulated daily penalties being in
accord with prevailing DENR guidelines.

Issues:

Petitioner cites deprivation of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as grounds
which exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Ruling:

The petition fails.

EO 192 also created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which took
over the powers and functions of the National

Pollution Control Commission with respect to the adjudication of pollution cases, including the latter's
role as arbitrator for determining reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from
pollution.[13]

Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary.

It is noted that during the hearing on June 19, 2007, the LLDA gave petitioner the opportunity "to submit
within fifteen (15) days....any valid documents to show proof of its non-operating dates that would be
necessary for the possible reduction of the accumulated daily... penalties,"[16] but petitioner failed to
comply therewith.

Without belaboring petitioner's assertions, it must be underscored that the protection of the
environment, including bodies of water, is no less urgent or vital than the pressing concerns of private
enterprises, big or small. Everyone must do their share to conserve the national... patrimony's meager
resources for the benefit of not only this generation, but of those to follow.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 27, 2009 Decision and the February 23, 2010
Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 107449, are AFFIRMED.

Republic vs. Lacap

Facts:

The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an "Invitation To Bid"

Respondent, doing business under the name and style Carwin Construction and Construction Supply
(Carwin Construction)
Since respondent submitted the lowest bid, he was awarded the contract for the concreting of Sitio 5
Bahay Pare.

District Engineer Rafael S. Ponio issued a Notice to Proceed with the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.[5]
Accordingly, respondent undertook the works, made advances for the purchase of the... materials and
payment for labor costs.

Accordingly, the Office of the District Engineer... issued Certificates of Final Inspection and Final
Acceptance.

Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment for the completed project.[8] The DPWH prepared the
Disbursement Voucher in favor of petitioner.[9] However, the DPWH withheld payment from
respondent after the District Auditor of the

Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of funds on the ground that the contractor's
license of respondent had expired at the time of the execution of the contract.

the DPWH Legal Department opined that since Republic Act No. 4566 (R.A. No. 4566), otherwise known
as the Contractor's License Law, does not provide that a contract entered into after the license has...
expired is void and there is no law which expressly prohibits or declares void such contract, the contract
is enforceable and payment may be paid

Despite such recommendation for payment, no payment... was made to respondent.

respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner before the RTC.

petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on
the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
nature of the action since respondent did not... appeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to
disapprove the claim.

the RTC... denying the Motion to Dismiss.

the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
doctrine of non-suability of the State.

The RTC held that petitioner must be required to pay the contract price since it has accepted the
completed project and enjoyed the benefits thereof; to hold otherwise would be to overrun the long
standing and consistent pronouncement against enriching oneself at the expense of... another.

petitioner filed an appeal with the CA... rendered its Decision sustaining the Decision of the RTC.

Issues:

(b)

IT IS THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT WHICH HAS THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE RESPONDENT'S
MONEY CLAIM AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.

Ruling:

The present petition is bereft of merit.

The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all
the means afforded him by administrative processes.[29] The issues which administrative agencies are
authorized to decide should not be summarily... taken from them and submitted to a court without first
giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction;
that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of... that question by the administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.

Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not
inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is... estoppel on the part
of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant;

(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e)
where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of
justice;[32] (f) where judicial... intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;[33] (j) when there is no... other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto
proceedings.[34] Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to the present case.

Notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH Legal Department rendered in 1993 and 1994 that
payment to a contractor with an expired contractor's license is proper, respondent remained unpaid for
the completed work despite repeated demands. Clearly, there was unreasonable... delay and official
inaction to the great prejudice of respondent.

Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired license at the time of the execution of its contract is
entitled to be paid for completed projects, clearly is a pure question of law. It does not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the... parties. There is a question of
law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to
the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.[35] Said question at best could be resolved only tentatively...
by the administrative authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with the
courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an
administrative nature is to be or can be done.[36] The issue... does not require technical knowledge and
experience but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law.

BORACAY FOUNDATION v. PROVINCE OF AKLAN, GR No. 196870, 2012-06-26

Facts:

original petition for the issuance of an Environmental Protection Order in the nature of a continuing
mandamus
Petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (petitioner) is a duly registered, non-stock domestic corporation. Its
primary purpose is "to foster a united, concerted and environment-conscious development of Boracay
Island, thereby preserving and maintaining its culture, natural beauty... and ecological balance, marking
the island as the crown jewel of Philippine tourism, a prime tourist destination in Asia and the whole
world."

Respondent Province of Aklan (respondent Province) is a political subdivision of the government created
pursuant to Republic Act No. 1414, represented by Honorable Carlito S. Marquez, the Provincial
Governor (Governor Marquez).

Respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority (respondent PRA), formerly called the Public Estates
Authority (PEA), is a government entity created by Presidential Decree No. 1084,[3] which states that
one of the purposes for which respondent PRA was created... was to reclaim land, including foreshore
and submerged areas.

PEA eventually became the lead agency primarily responsible for all reclamation projects in the country
under Executive Order No. 525, series of 1979.

In June 2006, the President of the Philippines issued Executive

Order No. 543, delegating the power "to approve reclamation projects to PRA through its governing
Board, subject to compliance with existing laws and rules and further subject to the condition that
reclamation contracts to be executed with any person or entity (must) go through... public bidding."

Respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources Environmental Management Bureau

(DENR-EMB), Regional Office VI (respondent DENR-EMB RVI), is the government agency in the Western
Visayas Region authorized to issue environmental compliance certificates regarding... projects that
require the environment's protection and management in the region.

Issues:

Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic

Whether or not the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing this case

Whether or not respondent Province failed to perform a full EIA as required by laws and regulations
based on the scope and classification of the project

Whether or not respondent Province complied with all the requirements under the pertinent laws and
regulations

Whether or not there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project

Ruling:

not sufficient to render the petition moot and academic,... as there are explicit conditions imposed that
must be complied with by respondent Province.
Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan it is stated that "any vertical structures to be constructed shall be
subject for barangay endorsement... learly, what the barangay endorsed was the reclamation only, and
not the... entire project that includes the con

Clearly, what the barangay endorsed was the reclamation only, and not the... entire project that
includes the construction of a commercial building and wellness center, and other tourism-related
facilities. Petitioner's objections, as may be recalled, pertain not only to the reclamation per se, but also
to the building to be constructed and the entire... project's perceived ill effects to the surrounding
environment.

petition should be dismissed for petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies and even to
observe the hierarchy of courts

Section 6. Appeal

Any party aggrieved by the final decision on the ECC / CNC applications may, within 15 days from receipt
of such decision, file an appeal on the following grounds:

Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the deciding authority, or

Serious errors in the review findings.

The DENR may adopt alternative conflict/dispute resolution procedures as a means to settle grievances
between proponents and aggrieved parties to avert unnecessary legal action. Frivolous appeals shall not
be countenanced.

Respondents argue that since there is an administrative appeal provided for, then petitioner is duty
bound to observe the same and may not be granted recourse to the regular courts for its failure to do
so.

We do not agree with respondents' appreciation of the applicability of the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies in this case.

Pagara v. Court of Appeals,... The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and
fast rule. It is not applicable (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the
controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or... in excess of jurisdiction; or
(3) where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear
the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or (4) where there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of... judicial intervention, - Gonzales vs. Hechanova, L-21897,
October 22, 1963, 9 SCRA 230; Abaya vs. Villegas, L-25641, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA; Mitra vs.
Subido, L-21691, September 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 127.

Said principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,...
1)... or where the protestant has no other recourse (Sta.

Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 637).

Petitioner had no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to determine
the questions of unique national and local importance raised here that pertain to laws and rules for
environmental protection, thus it was justified in coming to this
Court.

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 196219, July 30, 2014 ]

SPOUSES MAURICIO M. TABINO AND LEONILA DELA CRUZ-TABINO, PETITIONERS, VS. LAZARO M.
TABINO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the August 25, 2010 Decision [2] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107957, entitled "Lazaro M. Tabino, Petitioner, versus Spouses Mauricio
Tabino and Leonila dela Cruz-Tabino, Respondents," as well as its March 18, 2011 Resolution[3] denying
reconsideration of the assailed judgment.

Factual Antecedents

Proclamation No. 518[4] (Proc. 518) excluded from the operation of Proc. 423 [5] which established the
military reservation known as Fort Bonifacio situated in the then municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Pateros
and Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City certain portions in said reservation known and
identified as Barangays Cembo, South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo, and
Pitogo, situated in Makati, and declared the same open for disposition in accordance with Republic Act
(RA) No. 274,[6] and RA 730[7] in relation to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. [8]

Among others, Proc. 518 allowed a maximum area of 300 square meters for disposition to any bona
fide occupants/residents of said Barangays Cembo, South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo,
Pembo, and Pitogo who have resided in or occupied such areas on or before January 7, 1986.

In 1985, petitioner Mauricio M. Tabino (Mauricio) a technical sergeant in the military and his brother,
respondent Lazaro M. Tabino a colonel in the military occupied a 353-square meter lot in Pembo, Makati
City. Mauricio established residence within the lot, while respondent continued to reside in Novaliches,
Quezon City.[9] The lot was later subdivided into two portions, denominated as Lots 2 and 3, Block 255,
Zone 12, Group 10, Sampaguita Extension, Pembo, Makati City.

Lot 2 containing an area of 184 square meters was applied for coverage under Proc. 518 by Mauricio,
while Lot 3 containing an area of 169 square meters was applied for by respondent. Respondent was
later on issued by the Fort Bonifacio Post Commander a Revocable Permit [10] to occupy his lot, but the
permit authorized him to occupy an area of only 150 square meters.

In 1988, Lot 3 was awarded to respondent, and a Certificate [11] to such effect was issued by the Bureau
of Lands (now Land Management Bureau).
On May 11, 2004, respondent filed an ejectment case against Mauricio and the latter's wife, Leonila dela
Cruz (petitioners) with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati (MeTC). Docketed as Civil Case No. 85043
and assigned to Branch 64, the ejectment case is based on the theory that respondent is the true and
sole owner of the 353-square meter lot; that he used Mauricio only for the purpose of circumventing
the 300-square meter limit set by Proc. 518 by asking the latter to apply for the purchase of a portion of
the lot after subdividing the same into two smaller lots; that Mauricio's stay in the premises is merely by
tolerance of respondent; that petitioners introduced permanent structures on the land; and that
petitioners refused to vacate the premises upon respondent's formal demand. Respondent thus prayed
that petitioners be ordered to vacate Lots 2 and 3 and to pay the former rentals, attorney's fees, and
costs of suit.[12]

Petitioners countered in their Answer [13] that respondent had no right to eject them; that the parties'
true agreement was that petitioners would act as caretakers of respondent's Lot 3, and for this,
respondent would pay petitioners a monthly salary of P800.00; that respondent failed to honor the
agreement; and that relative to Lot 2, there was a pending Protest filed with the Regional Executive
Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) National Capital Region.

Protests in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

It appears that petitioners and respondent both filed Protests with the DENR relative to Lots 2 and 3. In
a June 13, 2006 Decision, respondent's Protest docketed as Case No. 2004-821 and entitled "Lazaro M.
Tabino, Protestant, versus Mauricio Tabino and Leonila C. Tabino, Protestees" was resolved as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Protest should be as it is hereby "DENIED" for lack of
merit. The Miscellaneous Sales Application filed by Mauricio Tabino over Lot 2, Block 255, Zone 12,
Group 190, Sampaguita St., Pembo, Makati should now be given due course by this Office. x x x [14]

The DENR held in Case No. 2004-821 that respondent is not qualified to acquire Lot 2 under Proc. 518
since he was already awarded a home lot in Fort Bonifacio, specifically Lot 19, Block 22, Fort Bonifacio
(AFPOVAI), Taguig. Moreover, he failed to prove that Mauricio was not a bona fide resident/occupant of
Lot 2; on the contrary, it has been shown that Mauricio, and not respondent, has been in actual
possession and occupation of the lot.

In an August 28, 2007 Order,[15] the above disposition was reiterated after respondent's motion for
reconsideration was denied.

On the other hand, petitioners' Protest, docketed as Case No. 2005-939 and entitled "Leonila Tabino
and Adrian Tabino, Protestants, versus Lazaro Tabino and Rafael Tabino, Respondents", was resolved in
an August 28, 2007 Order,[16] which decreed thus
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Protest lodged before this Office on 21 January 2005 by Leonila
Tabino and Adrian Tabino as against the Application of Lazaro/Rafael Tabino over Lot 3, Blk. 255, Zone
12, Pembo, Makati City is, as it is hereby "GRANTED". As a consequence, the MSA (Unnumbered) of
Rafael H. Tabino is hereby CANCELLED and DROPPED from the records of the Office. Thus, the Order
dated July 16, 2004 re: Cancellation Order No. 04-032 should be, as it is hereby SET ASIDE. After the
finality of this Decision, Claimant-Protestant Adrian Tabino may now file his land application over the
subject lot.

SO ORDERED.[17]

The ruling in Case No. 2005-939 is similar to the pronouncement in Case No. 2004-821: that respondent
was disqualified from acquiring any more lots within Fort Bonifacio pursuant to Proc. 518, since he was
previously awarded a home lot therein, specifically Lot 19, Block 22, PEMBO, Fort Bonifacio (AFPOVAI),
Taguig; that respondent is not a bona fide resident/occupant of Lot 3, as he and his family actually
resided in Novaliches, Quezon City; and that Mauricio has been in actual possession and occupation of
Lot 3 since 1985.

Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

On April 4, 2008, a Decision[18] was rendered in Civil Case No. 85043, as follows:

The only issue to be resolved in this action to recover possession of the subject property is the question
on who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises. In ejectment cases, the word
"possession" means nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession, in the sense
contemplated in civil law.

It is undisputed that the revocable permit extended to the plaintiff was to occupy a parcel of land with
an area of 150 square meters. Suffice it to say that beyond the 150 square meters would be contrary to
the permit extended to the plaintiff to occupy the lot. Plaintiff therefore, would violate the provisions of
the revocable permit if he goes beyond what was specified therein or up to 150 square meters. When
the land was declared open pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 274 and Republic Act No. 730
both parties applied in their respective name pursuant to the size of the land which they are permitted.
Since then defendants have been in possession of the subject property up to the present pursuant to
the permit to occupy the subject land. Furthermore, defendants had acquired the property in their own
name, a valid claim to establish possession.

Plaintiff's contention that defendants' stay on the premises is by mere tolerance is devoid of merit. Well-
established is the rule that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also
finality when the decision or order is not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to
grave abuse of discretion. The order dated August 28, 2007 by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources affirming its previous decision in Case No. 2004-821 dated June 13, 2006 clearly
stating therein that defendants are awardees of Lot 2, Block 255, Zone 12, Sampaguita Street, Pembo,
Makati City, are accorded with respect and finality. Truly, defendants are rightful possessors of the
subject property.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the complaint as well as defendants' counterclaim are hereby
ordered Dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[19]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Respondent appealed before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC), [20] but in a February 19, 2009
Decision[21] the RTC affirmed the MeTC in toto, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 64, Makati City
dated April 4, 2008 in Civil Case No. 85043 is hereby AFFIRMED in TOTO.

SO ORDERED.[22]

The RTC agreed with the MeTC in ruling that respondent is not entitled to possession of the disputed
premises on account of the DENR findings in Case Nos. 2005-939 and 2004-821 that petitioners are
registered claimants and bona fide residents thereof, and have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership, while respondent was permitted to
occupy an area of only 150 square meters and not more; petitioner would be in direct violation of his
permit if he were to occupy more than the allowed area stated in said permit.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Respondent filed his Petition for Review [23] with the CA, assailing the RTC Decision and insisting that he
had a better right of possession since he was the bona fide occupant of the disputed lot and Mauricio
was merely his caretaker. He added that in 1994, Mauricio executed an Affidavit [24] (1994 affidavit)
acknowledging that respondent was the true owner of Lot 2 and that he was merely allowed by the
latter to occupy the same and introduce improvements thereon; this operated as an admission against
interest which may be used against petitioners. Finally, respondent argued that the decision in the DENR
Protest is not yet final and executory on account of his pending appeal; thus, the courts may not rely on
the findings contained therein.

On August 25, 2010, the CA issued the assailed Decision, which held thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is GRANTED. The assailed decisions of
the RTC and the MeTC are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ejectment suit filed by the petitioner
against the respondents over Lot Nos. 2 and 3 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the respondents are ordered to
vacate the subject premises.

SO ORDERED.[25]

In reversing the trial court, the CA held that the 1994 affidavit which petitioners do not dispute should
be taken as an admission by Mauricio that he was merely appointed by respondent as the caretaker of
Lot 2, and that respondent is the true possessor and owner thereof. This being the case, petitioners
occupy the premises by mere tolerance of respondent, and are bound to the implied promise that they
shall vacate the same upon demand. The CA added that while respondent was authorized to occupy
only 150 square meters, this was irrelevant since the only issue that must be resolved in an unlawful
detainer case is actual physical or material possession, independent of any claim of ownership; since
respondent has satisfactorily shown by preponderant evidence that he was in actual possession of Lots 2
and 3, he is entitled to recover the same from petitioners.

The CA also held that while respondent's application for Lot 2 was denied by the DENR in its June 13,
2006 Decision since he was already an awardee of another lot within Fort Bonifacio, the issue of
possession was not touched upon. For this reason, the DENR Decision has no bearing on the unlawful
detainer case. Additionally, the DENR rulings are still the subject of appeals, and thus could not have
conclusive effect.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but in a March 18, 2011 Resolution, the CA stood its ground.
Hence, the instant Petition.

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

1. CAN THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE DENR IN RESOLVING CONFLICTING CLAIMS AS TO WHO HAS A
BETTER RIGHT OF POSSESSION BETWEEN PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENT OVER SUBJECT PARCELS OF
LOT BE NULLIFIED BY THE COURT UNDER AN EJECTMENT CASE?

2. HAS THE COURT VALIDLY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND ADJUDICATE ON REVIEW THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY WITHOUT HAVING ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES FIRST
EXHAUSTED?

3. HAS RESPONDENT VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST FORUM- SHOPPING IN FILING EJECTMENT CASE
AGAINST PETITIONERS DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE MISCELLANEOUS SALES APPLICATION CASES
BEFORE THE DENR WHICH ADMINISTRATIVE BODY, IN EXERCISE OF ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION, HAS
FIRST ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME PARTIES, SAME SUBJECT MATTER AND SAME ISSUES OF
FACT AND LAW?[26]

Petitioners' Arguments

In their Petition and Reply,[27] petitioners seek a reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and the
reinstatement of the MeTC's April 4, 2008 Decision, arguing that the ejectment case constituted an
attack on the DENR rulings in Case Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939 which disqualified respondent from
acquiring Lots 2 and 3 on the ground that he was already an awardee of a lot within Fort Bonifacio; that
Mauricio has been in actual possession and occupation of Lots 2 and 3 since 1985; and that respondent
is not a bona fide resident/occupant of Lot 2 or 3 which is not allowed, as it encroached on the
administrative authority of the DENR. They argue that respondent should not have resorted to the
ejectment case; instead, he should have exhausted all administrative remedies made available to him
through the DENR.

Petitioners add that respondent is guilty of forum-shopping in filing the ejectment case without awaiting
resolution of the pending DENR Protests, which necessarily touched upon the issue of possession.

Respondent's Arguments

Respondent argues in his Comment[28] that petitioners are estopped from claiming that the ejectment
case indirectly attacked the DENR rulings and that it constituted forum-shopping, since these issues
were not raised by petitioners in their pleadings below; that the courts are not divested of jurisdiction
over the ejectment case, since the only issue involved therein is possession and not who is entitled to a
miscellaneous sales application covering the disputed lot which the DENR is tasked to determine; and
that as a consequence of Mauricio's 1994 affidavit, petitioners are estopped from questioning
respondent's possession.

Our Ruling

The Court partially grants the Petition.

Respondent is correct in arguing that petitioners may not raise the issues of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and forum-shopping, after having voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
MeTC and the RTC trying the ejectment case. Besides, these issues are being raised for the first time at
this stage of the proceedings. Moreover, petitioners in the instant Petition pray for the reinstatement of
the MeTC Decision; as such, they cannot be allowed to simultaneously attack and adopt the proceedings
or actions taken by the lower courts.

Nonetheless, the Court finds that the appellate court erred in ordering petitioners to vacate the
premises. With the pendency of the DENR Protests Case Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939 respondent's
claim of possession and his right to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue. If the ejectment
case Civil Case No. 85043 is allowed to proceed without awaiting the result of the DENR Protests, then a
situation might arise where the existing structures thereon would have to be demolished. If petitioners'
position, as affirmed by the DENR, is further upheld with finality by the courts, then it would mean that
respondent had no right to occupy or take possession of the subject lots, which thus negates his right to
institute and maintain the ejectment case; and an injustice would have occurred as a consequence of
the demolition of petitioners' residence and other permanent improvements on the disputed lots.

Indeed, DENR Case Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939 have found their way to the CA, and the
pronouncements of the latter do not exactly favor respondent. Thus, in CA-G.R. SP No. 125056,
entitled "Lazaro M. Tabino, Petitioner, versus Mauricio M. Tabino and Leonila C. Tabino, Respondents,"
the CA dismissed respondent's Petition for Review of the DENR Secretary's affirmance of the DENR NCR
Regional Executive Director's June 13, 2006 Decision in Case No. 2004-821. In its January 13, 2014
Decision,[29] the CA's 6th Division held as follows:

The DENR Secretary, acting through the OIC, Assistant Secretary for Legal Services, denied the appeal on
the basis that upon findings of the Regional Executive Director, Mauricio has all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications based on the disposition of Public Lands. The DENR further ruled that upon
ocular inspection made, it was ascertained that 1) per records, Mauricio is a survey claimant of Lot 2,
Block 255, Psd-a3-0054204 with an area of 184 sq.m. situated in Pembo, Makati City; 2) that the land is
residential in nature, a house stands erected in said area where Mauricio and his family reside; 3) that a
portion of the said area is being utilized as a carinderia and a sari-sari store as their family's business; 4)
that Mauricio is occupying the area since 1985 up to the present; 5) that Lazaro Tabino (petitioner) is
actually residing in Quezon City; and, 6) the Yvonne Josephine Tabino, petitioner Lazaro Tabino and
Rafael Tabino are bonafide residents of Quezon City for no less than twenty years, per Certification of
Barangay Chairman Almario Francisco on 2 September 2004 of Barangay San Agustin, Novaliches,
Quezon City. Further, the DENR held that the above findings were never refuted by the petitioner.

On this point, it is worth stressing that the courts generally accord great respect, if not finality, to factual
findings of administrative agencies because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling
under their jurisdiction. Echoing the explanation of the private respondent DENR, citing the case
of Ortua vs. Encarnacion, the findings of facts of the Director of Land (now the Regional Director) is
conclusive in the absence of any showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud,
imposition or mistake, other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence,
regardless of whether or not it is consistent with the preponderance of evidence, so long as there is
some evidence upon which the findings in question could be made.

Moreover, notwithstanding the issue of physical possession having been ruled upon by the Court in CA-
G.R. SP No. 107957, it is well to note that in the case of Estrella vs. Robles, it was explained that the
Bureau of Lands determines the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands, but it does not have
the wherewithal to police public lands. Neither does it have the means to prevent disorders or breaches
of the peace among the occupants. Its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation and any
power to decide disputes over possession is but in aid of making the proper awards.
xxxx

In disposing of the case of Estrella, the Supreme Court held that, "Under the Public Land Act, the
Director of Lands primarily and the DENR Secretary ultimately have the authority to dispose of and
manage public lands. And while the DENR's jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority
of courts of justice to resolve questions of possession, the DENR's decision would prevail with regard to
the respective rights of public land claimants. Regular courts would have no jurisdiction to inquire into
the validity of the award of the public land."

Under the circumstances, the Court finds no reason to disturb the ruling of public respondent DENR in
its disposition of the subject property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

In the second case decided by the CA CA-G.R. SP No. 126100 entitled "Lazaro M. Tabino and Rafael H.
Tabino, Petitioners, versus Leonila C. Tabino and Adrian C. Tabino, Respondents" relative to the
disposition in DENR Case No. 2005-939, the appellate court's 9th Division held in a June 28, 2013
Decision[30] that

We agree with the respondents and dismiss the petition for petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of Our judicial system. The thrust
of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge
their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this
doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies.
Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed.

Another important reason for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins the
Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively)
within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in
a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed
by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. Strict
enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which
otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets.

Thus, the party with an administrative remedy must not only commence with the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking
judicial intervention to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself
correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court. The non-observance of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is one of the
grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the dismissal of the complaint.

Indeed, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exceptions, but none of these
apply in this case. Consequently, Lazaro and Rafael should have first appealed to the Office of the
President, which has the power to review the orders or acts of the DENR Secretary, being his
subordinate, before coming to Us through a petition for review. x x x

xxxx

FOR THESE REASONS, We DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

In Samonte v. Century Savings Bank,[31] this Court made the following pronouncement:

Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of a pending civil action. In Vda. de
Legaspi v. Avendaño, and Amagan v. Marayag, we ordered the suspension of the ejectment proceedings
on considerations of equity. We explained that the ejectment of petitioners therein would mean a
demolition of their house and would create confusion, disturbance, inconvenience, and expense.
Needlessly, the court would be wasting much time and effort by proceeding to a stage wherein the
outcome would at best be temporary but the result of enforcement would be permanent, unjust and
probably irreparable.[32]

On the other hand, Vda. de Legaspi v. Hon. Avendaño,[33] which Samonte refers to, states:

x x x Where the action, therefore, [is] one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry,
and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial
proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical
possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of
legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for
preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case
in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or
ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to
physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the
fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved,
thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without
resorting to the courts.[34]
More significantly, Amagan v. Marayag[35] dictates, thus

As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing before the
regional trial court (RTC) of another action raising ownership of the property as an issue. As an
exception, however, unlawful detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal, on considerations of
equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners' house would result from the enforcement of the
municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgment. [36]

In light of the developments in the DENR Protests, the Court cannot in good conscience order the
petitioners to vacate the premises at this point. The better alternative would be to await the outcome of
these Protests, before any action is taken in the ejectment case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed August 25, 2010 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107957 is MODIFIED, in that the directive for petitioners to vacate the subject
premises is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accordingly, the proceedings in the ejectment case, Civil Case No. 85043, are ordered SUSPENDED until
the proceedings in DENR Case Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939 are concluded.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

ECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011 ]

ROSITO BAGUNU, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES FRANCISCO AGGABAO & ROSENDA ACERIT, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the motion for reconsideration[1] filed by Rosito Bagunu (petitioner) to reverse our April 13,
2009 Resolution[2] which denied his petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
R.L.O. Claim No. 937/DENR Case No. 5177

The present controversy stemmed from a protest filed by the spouses Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda
Acerit (respondents) against the petitioner's free patent application over a parcel of unregistered land
located in Caniogan, Sto. Tomas, Isabela (subject land), pending before the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (DENR Regional Office).

The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first sale) to Felicisimo
Bautista (Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject land (second sale) to Atty. Samson Binag.

On December 12, 1961, Atty. Binag applied for a free patent [3] over the subject land with the Bureau of
Lands (now Lands Management Bureau).[4] On November 24, 1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject land
(third sale) to the petitioner,[5] who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent applicant. The parties'
deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the same lot subject of Atty. Binag's pending
free patent application.[6]

The deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land, the Bureau of Lands' survey, [7] and the free
patent applications uniformly identified the subject land as Lot 322. The deeds covering the second and
third sale also uniformly identified the boundaries of the subject land. [8]

On December 28, 1992, the respondents filed a protest against the petitioner's free patent application.
The respondents asserted ownership over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Sale, dated June 23, 1971 and April 15, 1979, executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael Bautista.
[9]

The Office of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR conducted an ocular inspection and formal
investigation. The DENR Regional Office found out that the petitioner actually occupies and cultivates
"the area in dispute including the area purchased by [the respondents]." [10]

On July 10, 1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully included Lot 322 in his
free patent application since this lot belongs to the respondents. The DENR Regional Office ordered:

1. [The respondents to] file their appropriate public land application covering Lot No. 322, Pls-541-
D xxx;

2. [The petitioner's free patent application] be amended by excluding Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D, as
included in Lot No. 258;

3. [A] relocation survey xxx to determine the exact area as indicated in [the parties'] respective
technical description of x x x Lot Nos. 258 and 322, Pls-541-D. [11]
The petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional Office denied the motion ruling that in
determining the identity of a lot, the boundaries and not the lot number assigned to it - are controlling.
Since the boundaries indicated in the deed of sale in the petitioner's favor correspond to the boundaries
of Lot 258, what the petitioner acquired was Lot 258, notwithstanding the erroneous description of the
lot sold as Lot 322.[12]

On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed [13] the ruling of the DENR Regional Office. After noting the
differences in the boundaries stated in the parties' respective Deeds of Sale, the DENR Secretary
concluded that the land claimed by the petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that claimed by the
respondents. The DENR Secretary ruled that based on the parties' respective deeds of sale, the
Subdivision Plan of the lot sold to the petitioner and Atty. Binag's affidavit - claiming that the designation
of Lot 322 in the Deed of Sale in the petitioner's favor is erroneous - what the petitioner really acquired
was Lot 258 and not Lot 322.[14] The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).

COURT OF APPEALS' RULING

The CA affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the CA
ruled that since questions on the identity of a land require a technical determination by the appropriate
administrative body, the findings of fact of the DENR Regional Office, as affirmed by the DENR Secretary,
are entitled to great respect, if not finality. [15] The petitioner assails this ruling before the Court.

Civil Case No. 751

In the meantime, on November 22, 1994 (or during the pendency of the respondents' protest), Atty.
Binag filed a complaint for reformation of instruments, covering the second and third sale, against
Bautista and the petitioner (the civil case) with the Cabagan, Isabela Regional Trial Court (RTC). Atty.
Binag alleged that while the deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land correctly identified
the boundaries of the land sold, the deeds, nevertheless, erroneously identified the subject land as Lot
322, instead of Lot 258.[16]

On December 9, 1994, the petitioner and Bautista filed a motion to dismiss with the RTC, citing the
pendency of the land protest before the Bureau of Lands. The RTC held in abeyance its resolution on the
motion to dismiss.[17]

After obtaining a favorable ruling from the DENR Regional Office, the respondents joined Atty. Binag in
the civil case by filing a complaint-in-intervention against the petitioner. The complaint-in-intervention
captioned the respondents' causes of action as one for Quieting of Title, Reivindicacion and Damages.
[18]
 The respondents alleged that the petitioner's claim over Lot 322 is a cloud on their title and
ownership of Lot 322. The respondents also alleged that they were in peaceful, continuous, public and
adverse possession of Lot 322 from the time they fully acquired it in 1979 until sometime in August of
1992, when the petitioner, through stealth and strategy, ejected them from Lot 322 after transferring
his possession from Lot 258.[19] The respondents asked the RTC to declare them as owners of Lot 322.

After the CA affirmed the DENR Secretary's favorable resolution on the respondents' protest, the
respondents asked the RTC to suspend the civil case or, alternatively, to adopt the DENR Secretary's
ruling.[20] In their prayer, the respondents asked the RTC to:

1. [Adopt] the findings of the DENR as affirmed by the Court of Appeals xxx thus, the cause of
action xxx for reformation of contracts be granted;

2. [Order the petitioner] to vacate Lot 322 xxx and his [Free Patent Application] be amended to
exclude Lot 322 xxx.

3. [Set the case] for hearing to receive evidence on the claim of the [respondents] for damages[.]

THE PETITION

The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the DENR Secretary's jurisdiction to resolve the
parties' conflicting claims of ownership over Lot 322, notwithstanding that the same issue is pending
with the RTC. By ruling that the petitioner bought Lot 258 (and not Lot 322) from Atty. Binag and for
adjudicating Lot 322 to the respondents, the DENR effectively reformed contracts and determined
claims of ownership over a real property matters beyond the DENR's competence to determine.

The petitioner faults the CA for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction since the issue of who has a
better right over Lot 322 does not involve the "specialized technical expertise" of the DENR. On the
contrary, the issue involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and the application of
the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are matters within the competence of the courts.

The petitioner claims that the DENR Secretary's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, is contrary to the
evidence. The petitioner asserts that the Deed of Sale in his favor clearly identified the property sold as
Lot 322, which was the same land Atty. Binag identified in his free patent application; that the area of
Lot 322, as previously determined in a survey caused by the vendor himself (Atty. Binag), tallies with the
area stated in the deed in his favor; that he has been in possession of Lot 322 since 1987, when it was
sold to him; and that his present possession and cultivation of Lot 322 were confirmed by the DENR
Regional Office during its ocular investigation.

The petitioner also invites our attention to the incredulity of the respondents' claim of ownership over
Lot 322, based on Atty. Binag's testimony during the hearing on the respondents' protest. According to
the petitioner, the respondents could not have expressed interest in buying Lot 322 from Atty. Binag had
they already acquired Lot 322 from the heirs of one Rafael Bautista. The petitioner adds that as early as
1979, the respondents were already aware of Atty. Binag's free patent application over Lot 322. Yet,
they filed their protest to the free patent application only in 1992 when the petitioner had already
substituted Atty. Binag. The petitioner claims that the respondents' inaction is inconsistent with their
claim of ownership.

Lastly, the petitioner contests the adjudication of Lot 322 in the respondents' favor by claiming that the
respondents presented no sufficient evidence to prove their (or their predecessor-in-interest's) title.

In our April 13, 2009 Resolution, we denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible
error in the assailed CA Decision and for raising substantially factual issues. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration, confining his arguments to the issue of jurisdiction and the consequent applicability of
the primary jurisdiction doctrine.

THE RULING

We deny the motion for reconsideration.     

Questions of fact generally barred under Rule 45

The main thrust of the petitioner's arguments refers to the alleged error of the DENR and the CA
in identifying the parcel of land that the petitioner bought an error that adversely affected his right to
apply for a free patent over the subject land. In his motion for reconsideration, the petitioner apparently
took a cue from our April 13, 2009 Resolution, denying his petition, since his present motion limitedly
argues against the DENR's jurisdiction and the CA's application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

The petitioner correctly recognized the settled rule that questions of fact are generally barred under a
Rule 45 petition. In the present case, the identity of Lots 258 and 322 is a central factual issue. The
determination of the identity of these lots involves the task of delineating their actual boundaries in
accordance with the parties' respective deeds of sale and survey plan, among others. While there are
instances where the Court departs from the general rule on the reviewable issues under Rule 45, the
petitioner did not even attempt to show that his case falls within the recognized exceptions. [21] On top of
this legal reality, the findings and decision of the Director of Lands [22] on questions of fact, when
approved by the DENR Secretary, are generally conclusive on the courts, [23] and even on this Court, when
these factual findings are affirmed by the appellate court. We shall consequently confine our discussions
to the petitioner's twin legal issues.

The determination of the identity of a

public land is within the DENR's exclusive
jurisdiction to manage and dispose of lands
of the public domain

The petitioner insists that under the law [24] actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, to which a suit for
reformation of contracts belong, and those involving ownership of real property fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Since these actions are already pending before the RTC, the
DENR Secretary overstepped his authority in excluding Lot 322 from the petitioner's free patent
application and ordering the respondents to apply for a free patent over the same lot.

In an action for reformation of contract, the court determines whether the parties' written agreement
reflects their true intention.[25] In the present case, this intention refers to the identity of the land
covered by the second and third sale. On the other hand, in a reivindicatory action, the court resolves
the issue of ownership of real property and the plaintiff's entitlement to recover its full possession. In
this action, the plaintiff is required to prove not only his ownership, but also the identity of the real
property he seeks to recover.[26]

While these actions ordinarily fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, the court's jurisdiction to
resolve controversies involving ownership of real property extends only to private lands. In the present
case, neither party has asserted private ownership over Lot 322. The respondents acknowledged the
public character of Lot 322 by mainly relying on the administrative findings of the DENR in their
complaint-in-intervention, instead of asserting their own private ownership of the property. For his part,
the petitioner's act of applying for a free patent with the Bureau of Lands is an acknowledgment that the
land covered by his application is a public land [27] whose management and disposition belong to the
DENR Secretary, with the assistance of the Bureau of Lands. Section 4, Chapter 1, Title XIV of Executive
Order No. 292[28] reads:

Section 4. Powers and Functions. - The Department [of Environment and Natural Resources] shall:

xxx

(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral
resources and, in the process of exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals
and any such form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or
gathering of such resources;

xxx

(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public
domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and
titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies[.] (Underscoring supplied.)

Under Section 14(f) of Executive Order No. 192,[29] the Director of the Lands Management Bureau has
the duty, among others, to assist the DENR Secretary in carrying out the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141)[30] by having direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or
any other forms of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain.

As the CA correctly pointed out, the present case stemmed from the protest filed by the respondents
against the petitioner's free patent application. In resolving this protest, the DENR, through the Bureau
of Lands, had to resolve the issue of identity of the lot claimed by both parties. This issue of identity of
the land requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands, as the administrative agency with
direct control over the disposition and management of lands of the public domain. The DENR, on the
other hand, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to manage and dispose of public lands, must likewise
determine the applicant's entitlement (or lack of it) to a free patent. (Incidentally, the DENR Regional
Office still has to determine the respondents' entitlement to the issuance of a free patent [31] in their
favor since it merely ordered the exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioner's own application.) Thus, it is
the DENR which determines the respective rights of rival claimants to alienable and disposable public
lands; courts have no jurisdiction to intrude on matters properly falling within the powers of the DENR
Secretary and the Director of Lands,[32] unless grave abuse of discretion exists.

After the DENR assumed jurisdiction over Lot 322, pursuant to its mandate, the RTC must defer the
exercise of its jurisdiction on related issues on the same matter properly within its jurisdiction, [33] such as
the distinct cause of action for reformation of contracts involving the same property. Note that the
contracts refer to the same property, identified as "Lot 322," - which the DENR Regional Office, DENR
Secretary and the CA found to actually pertain to Lot 258. When an administrative agency or body is
conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its
specialization are deemed to be included within its jurisdiction since the law does not sanction a split of
jurisdiction[34]

The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil
Code is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now
performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial
function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of
regulating certain activities falling under their particular expertise. [35]

The DENR has primary jurisdiction to

resolve conflicting claims of title over
public lands

The petitioner argues that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, claiming that the
issue (of who has a better right over Lot 322) does not require the "specialized technical expertise" of
the DENR. He posits that the issue, in fact, involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence
and application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are all within the competence of regular
courts.
We disagree.

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversy involving
a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the
latter, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact[36]

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply [the doctrine of primary jurisdiction] to
cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies[. It may occur
that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter
involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical
matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is
within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.] It applies "where a
claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view."[37]

The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the
case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of [the Lands
Management Bureau] are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served. [38] (Emphases added.)

The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the regular courts' area of
competence and, concededly, this issue is judicial in character. However, regular courts would have no
power to conclusively resolve this issue of ownership given the public character of the land, since under
C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192, [39] the disposition and management of public lands
fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject to review by the DENR Secretary. [40]

While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to alienate and dispose of public land
do not divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants
(to protect their respective possessions and occupations), [41] the respondents' complaint-in-intervention
does not simply raise the issue of possession whether de jure or de facto but likewise raised the issue of
ownership as basis to recover possession. Particularly, the respondents prayed for declaration of
ownership of Lot 322. Ineluctably, the RTC would have to defer its ruling on the
respondents' reivindicatory action pending final determination by the DENR, through the Lands
Management Bureau, of the respondents' entitlement to a free patent, following the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretary's exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioner's free patent application
and his consequent directive for the respondents to apply for the same lot are within the DENR
Secretary's exercise of sound administrative discretion. In the oft-cited case of Vicente Villaflor, etc. v.
CA, et al,[42] which involves the decisions of the Director of Lands and the then Minister of Natural
Resources, we stressed that the rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to
questions on the identity of the disputed public land since this matter requires a technical determination
by the Bureau of Lands. Since this issue precludes prior judicial determination, the courts must stand
aside even when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary
jurisdiction of the administrative agency.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the motion for reconsideration. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, GR No. 189185,
2016-08-16

Facts:

After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City

The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members, namely:
Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed
their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance

They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the
equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and
lacked publication pursuant] to Section 511[6] of Republic Act No. 7160

On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid
and constitutional

The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power[13] under the General Welfare
Clause of the Local Government Code;[14] that the ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of
pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial
drift;[15] and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and could be invalidated
only upon a clear showing that it had violated the Constitution.

On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.[22] It
declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and
oppressive;

The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the public and the
environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of the ban
against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the other.
Issues:

whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds
for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban on
aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month
transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring the
maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.

Ruling:

The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its corporate powers... the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance should be
appreciated.

Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their
exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of
Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically
the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as a valid license for the
City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line
separates authority to enact legislations from the method of accomplishing the same.

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause

A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid piece of local
legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.[109]In the State's exercise of police power, the
property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives
of the Government.[110] A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police
powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive.[111] The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution;
the second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.[112]Substantive due process requires that a
valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the Government's action.[113] This means that in
exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact
the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate
public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without
unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.

The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume
considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the
plantations.[117] As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three
months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of
the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even
cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.

The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the
ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all
agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking
without just compensation.

The position of the respondents is untenable.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes confiscatory
if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause

The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal protection
secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's
duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs
impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to
the legitimate governmental objective.

Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without
distinction,[120] nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the
territory in which it is to operate.[121] The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among
equals determined according to a valid classification.[122] If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently
from another.[123] In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2)
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally
applicable to all members of the class.

In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies herein.
Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means and
the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial
spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all
persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.

Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift causes
inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this justification, does
the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?We
answer in the negative.

The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any
mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift
that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community
and to the environment.[141] A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the
ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive"
because the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law
seeks to eliminate.[143] A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or
end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose
of the law.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of merit;
AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring
Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL;