Defending Author-Essentialism

Goodman, Jeffrey.

Philosophy and Literature, Volume 29, Number 1, April 2005, pp. 200-208
(Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/phl.2005.0001

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http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/phl/summary/v029/29.1goodman.html

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200 Philosophy and Literature

Notes and Fragments

DEFENDING AUTHOR-ESSENTIALISM

by Jeffrey Goodman

A growing number of metaphysicians and philosophers of lan-

guage—call them fictionalists—accept the claim that fictional
individuals, that is, the sorts of individuals mentioned in works of
fiction (for example, Sherlock Holmes, the U.S.S. Enterprise, the
kerchief around Dmitri Karamazov’s neck) actually exist. They believe
there really is such a thing, for example, as Sherlock Holmes, and given
a suitable context, the name “Holmes” can succeed in referring to that
entity.1 One species of fictionalist is the creationist. The creationist is
one who accepts that fictional individuals are abstracta that are brought
into existence by the authors responsible for the fictional works in
which those individuals are mentioned. According to creationism,
authors do not “tap into” a realm of necessarily existing abstracta and
there discover an individual identical to Holmes, for example; rather,
authors actively create individuals such as Holmes in writing (or orally
communicating) stories about them. Fictional individuals on this view
are thus contingently existing abstracta; they are non-concrete artifacts
of our world and various other possible worlds.2
Most creationists are also author-essentialists. That is, they also accept
the following stronger thesis: the author (or authors)3 responsible for
bringing a fictional individual into existence at a time is essential to the
existence of that individual.4 According to author-essentialism, it is
impossible that distinct authors at distinct times create one and the
same fictional individual because it is impossible that distinct authors at
distinct times write (or orally communicate) one and the same story.

Philosophy and Literature, © 2005, 29: 200–208

 Jeffrey Goodman 201

Author-essentialism, of course, has its detractors.5 Harry Deutsch, for

instance, has gone so far as to call the view “patently absurd.”6 However,
I think author-essentialism is correct. At least, I believe that if fictional
individuals exist, and if such individuals are the creations of the authors
responsible for the works in which they are mentioned, then the author
responsible for bringing a fictional individual into existence at a time is
essential to the existence of that individual. In this paper I wish to
defend author-essentialism from an argument that has recently been
put forth by one detractor in particular: Takashi Yagisawa (2001).
Before I proceed to consideration of Yagisawa’s argument, I think it
is important that we say a bit more about the central theses accepted by
the creationist/author-essentialist. We stated above that according to
these views, Holmes, for example, exists not only here but in various
other possible worlds. Which worlds exactly? He exists in all and only
the worlds where Doyle and the appropriate creative events involving
Doyle exist. Holmes is, in other words, ontologically dependent on
Doyle and Doyle’s literary works. It is the establishment of this depen-
dence relation that is fundamental to what an author does when she
succeeds in creating a fictional individual.7
Amie Thomasson (1999) is a creationist/author-essentialist who has
provided some helpful elaboration, however, of the nature of this
dependence relation, as well as some elaboration on the dependence
relation that obtains between fictional individuals and the literary works
in which they are mentioned.8 According to Thomasson, the sort of
dependence a fictional individual bears to the intentional acts of its
creator is rigid historical dependence. The dependence here is rigid—as
opposed to generic—because it is a dependence on an individual
intentional act or a number of individual acts rather than a depen-
dence on a general type of act or acts; it is historical because the
fictional entity depends on the acts of its creator to come into existence
initially, but it may continue to exist once those creative acts have
ceased. This is opposed to constant dependence, the sort of dependence in
which the dependent entity exists at all and only the times when the
entity on which it depends exists.
Applying Thomasson’s remarks to the fundamental notion of cre-
ationism given above, we may say that the creation of a fictional
individual entails the establishment of a relation of rigid historic
dependence of an abstract individual on the intentional acts of some
agent.9 But not any agent suffices; there is a necessarily a unique
agent—the author—that becomes so-related to a fictional individual in
202 Philosophy and Literature

virtue of having the appropriate intentional activity. For instance, the

intentional acts of Doyle brought Holmes into existence here, and they
serve to bring him into existence in other possible worlds. Moreover,
the fictional detective simply could not exist in a world where the
appropriate creative acts of Doyle himself (and the resulting literary
works of Doyle) failed to exist.
Let us now turn to Yagisawa’s argument against author-essentialism.
He begins by correctly noting that if fictional individuals are the
creations of an author that is essential to their existence, then there is
a tight analogy between the individuals themselves and the whole
literary works in which the individuals are mentioned. Thomasson
(1999) is Yagisawa’s main target here, and she offers the following in
support of the analogy. It would be a mistake to hold that we have
reason to doubt that fictional individuals exist as human artifacts either
because they are mind-dependent entities or because they are abstract
entities. Whole literary works are mind-dependent, abstract human
creations, yet we have no reason to doubt their existence. There is thus
an ontological parallelism between whole literary works and fictional
individuals that makes a commitment to fictional individuals no less
strange or theoretically costly than a commitment to whole literary
works. But according to Yagisawa, there is no such ontological parallel-
ism. Hence, we are not provided with the grounds for believing that
fictional individuals are the creations of an author, let alone an essential
author.
Yagisawa believes that the ontological parallelism maintained by
Thomasson fails to obtain because whole literary works are entities that
are ultimately reducible but fictional individuals are alleged by the
creationist/author-essentialist to be fundamentally irreducible. To under-
stand this charge, Yagisawa first invites us to consider just what it is to be
a whole literary work. He claims that a literary work composed in
English, say A Study in Scarlet, is just a collection of English sentences.
That is, A Study in Scarlet is nothing more than a well-formed sequence
of English words. That sequence of words is in turn reducible to a well-
formed sequence of letters of the English alphabet, which is in turn
reducible to a well-formed sequence of line-shape types. We may say
that A Study in Scarlet is a literary work written by Doyle in 1886 (or that
Doyle is responsible for that work, that he is its author, or loosely, that
Doyle created it), then, simply because Doyle in fact tokened an
instance of a particular sequence of line-shape types (without copying
another such instance) in 1886.
 Jeffrey Goodman 203

So, according to Yagisawa, “A Study in Scarlet ” (like all names for

literary works) is ambiguous between the story, or the abstract object
that is ultimately reducible to an abstract sequence of line-shape types,
and the story copy, or the instance of that sequence that was in fact
produced by Doyle. Now, Yagisawa wishes to know, to which of these two
entities does the creationist/author-essentialist claim the fictional indi-
vidual Holmes is ontologically parallel? Suppose it is the story copy. In
that case, the alleged parallelism fails to obtain because the story copy
of A Study in Scarlet is, unlike Holmes, a concrete object with a particular
spatiotemporal location. Moreover, once in existence, this story copy is
not dependent for its existence on any mental activities. Suppose it is
the story. In that case, too, the alleged parallelism fails to obtain
because the sequence of line-shape types to which the story is ultimately
reducible to did not come into existence when Doyle tokened them. It
follows that, unlike Holmes, the story existed prior to Doyle, and it
exists independently of anyone’s mental activities. Hence, the ontologi-
cal parallelism fails to obtain.
Yagisawa then considers a reply to his line of reasoning. It is an
objection that says that a story is not to be defined merely syntactically,
but rather a story is to be defined semantically as well. A story is an
ordered pair of a sequence of syntactic items (like line-shape types) and
the contents to which those items are mapped. Absent a suitable
interpretation, no well-formed string of symbols counts as a story. And the
existence of a suitable interpretation depends on the mental activities
of authors. So, given the proper account of storyhood, it turns out that
the parallelism obtains after all.
But Yagisawa claims that this reply is faulty. He believes that even if we
admit that a story ought to be defined semantically, the contents onto
which the syntactic items are mapped are not the sorts of things that are
dependent on the (mental activities) of any author. A perfectly suitable
mapping of syntactic item tokens onto contents may exist without any
mental activities whatsoever being responsible for those tokens. To say
otherwise is to confuse the ontological dependence of a story on its
author with the mere causal dependence of a story on whatever
produces it. While some stories are in fact causally dependent on their
human authors, we can imagine other stories being produced by
fantastic, purely natural forces or by the activities of creatures that lack
the relevant sorts of intentions. For instance, we can imagine a story
copy of A Study in Scarlet being produced by a chimpanzee randomly
striking keys on a typewriter, or tidal forces arranging sticks on the
204 Philosophy and Literature

shore with just the right pattern. Such a story copy could be a genuine
instance of the story A Study in Scarlet, according to Yagisawa, given a
perfectly matching mapping relation.
But the reply given above (by Yagisawa to his own line of reasoning)
seems to me to be correct. I maintain that a story copy is not a genuine
instance of a story unless there is a suitable interpretation of the
symbols that comprise the story copy. Furthermore, there can be no
suitable mapping relation of symbols onto contents without the rel-
evant sorts of intentions of authors because an author’s intentions are
partially responsible for determining what the contents are that the
symbols get mapped onto. It follows that a story simply could not exist
independently of (the mental activities) of its author.
Consider a world in which Doyle never existed. Suppose it is a world
where there is a duplicate token of the actual Doyle-tokened A Study in
Scarlet, but the story copy there was produced by a chimpanzee
randomly striking keys on a typewriter. What are the syntactic items of
the chimpanzee’s story copy mapped onto in that world? Many of those
items may be mapped onto the same contents that they are actually
mapped onto in such a world, but, as I will now argue, it is impossible
that all of them are. I have some general remarks that establish this
claim and some remarks that are more specific.
Generally, the actual meanings of the word tokens as they occurred
in the Doyle-produced token of A Study in Scarlet depend on the ways
Doyle intended to use those tokens at the time he produced them. The
meaning of a term is at least partially given by how it is used on a
particular occasion, so the meanings of the word tokens in the actual
copy of A Study in Scarlet depend at least partially on how they were used
by Doyle when he produced that story copy in 1886. How Doyle was
using the word tokens in 1886 depends partially on his mental activities,
his intentions, at the time. Since Doyle is absent in the chimp world, his
intentions cannot possibly be present there. Hence, there can be no
perfectly matching interpretation between the chimp world and our
world with respect to the distinct story copies. Hence the chimp-
produced story copy would not be a genuine copy of the actual story A
Study in Scarlet.
More specifically, we should consider what the contents would be of
the fictional proper names in the chimp world that were in fact
introduced into English by Doyle. If it is possible that the interpretation
between our world and the chimp world match perfectly, then the
content of “Holmes,” for example, must be the same in the chimp
 Jeffrey Goodman 205

world as it is here. Yet the content of “Holmes” cannot be the same in

both worlds.
Space for discussion of this topic is limited here, but we can rather
briefly point out that there are fundamentally two candidate theories
for the meanings of fictional proper names. To simplify, I will assume
that exactly one of these views is correct. These two views parallel the
two fundamental candidate theories of meaning for non-fictional,
ordinary, referring proper names. Call the first candidate theory
fictional anti-descriptivism. According to fictional anti-descriptivism, the
content of a fictional proper name is simply its referent. So, the content
of “Holmes” (given an appropriate context) would be (the contingently
existing abstract object) Holmes, were that entity to exist; otherwise,
the name would be meaningless. “Holmes” is clearly meaningful, so if
fictional anti-descriptivism is correct, “Holmes” just means Holmes. The
way a name gets initially attached to its referent, according to this view,
depends on how the name was introduced. Hence, the way a name gets
introduced partially determines what that name means. Hence, if
fictional anti-descriptivism is correct, then the fact that “Holmes” was
introduced by (the mental activities of) Doyle entails that the content
of “Holmes” partially depends on (the mental activities of) Doyle.
Hence, if anti-descriptivism is correct, then there can be no perfect
match of interpretations between the chimp world and our world
because “Holmes” was introduced by a chimp, and not Doyle, in the
chimp world.
Let us call the second candidate theory fictional descriptivism. Accord-
ing to fictional descriptivism, the content of “Holmes” is something that
is synonymous with a definite description (perhaps a description that
expresses a certain property that some story ascribes to Holmes);
“Holmes” may thus have the same content as “the clever pipe-smoking
detective living at 221B Baker Street in London.” “Holmes” is clearly
meaningful on this view even though “Holmes” will almost always fail to
refer. That is, it will fail to refer in all of the cases in which the definite
descriptions to which the name is synonymous fail to be satisfied (that
is, if nothing has the property expressed by such descriptions).10 If
fictional descriptivism is correct, then, it is at least possible that there be
a perfect match between the interpretations present in the chimp
world and our world; after all, the definite descriptions associated with
“Holmes” in the chimp’s story copy will be the same descriptions
appearing in Doyle’s story copy, so the properties expressed by those
descriptions may be the same.
206 Philosophy and Literature

However, it can be shown that fictional descriptivism is false using

examples similar to the ones used by Saul Kripke and others to show
that descriptivism is false (that is, descriptivism for non-fictional,
ordinary, referring proper names).11 Suppose there really happens to
be a clever pipe-smoking detective living at 221B Baker Street in
London, either here or in the chimp world. In neither world is that
person identical to Holmes, yet, if fictional descriptivism is correct, that
is precisely who we are all referring to all along when we use the name
“Holmes.”
So, given the reductive account of stories that is endorsed by
Yagisawa, one is forced to embrace an implausible view regarding the
actual meanings of fictional names. We thus ought to conclude that
fictional anti-descriptivism is correct and maintain that in the chimp
world, there is a duplicate story copy of the Doyle-produced copy of A
Study in Scarlet, but the story A Study in Scarlet does not exist there. The
appropriate mapping relation is absent. “Holmes” in the chimp world
cannot refer to the actual Holmes; hence our Holmes does not exist in
the chimp world.12
It thus seems correct to maintain that the causal origins of stories are
essential properties of the story, so the dependence of the story on the
author, and accordingly, the dependence of the fictional individuals
mentioned therein on the author, is in fact an ontological dependence.
Holmes can exist only in worlds where the appropriate intentional acts
of Doyle exist because the mental activities of Doyle are ontologically
necessary for the mappings needed to make the sequence of syntactic
items a Holmes story. It thus seems correct to maintain the ontological
parallelism suggested by Thomasson. Hence, Yagisawa’s argument
contra such parallelism has provided us with no reason whatsoever to
doubt author-essentialism, let alone creationism.

James Madison University

1. Some fictionalists hold that fictional names only succeed in referring some of the
time. See, for example, David Braun, “Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names,”
presented at the Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association
(2003). Absent an appropriate context, a fictional name fails to refer even though the
entity that it would refer to given an appropriate context in fact exists.
 Jeffrey Goodman 207
2. As I have argued in Jeffrey Goodman, “Where is Sherlock Holmes?” Southern Journal
of Philosophy 41 (2003): 183–98, however, it is unclear how to understand “abstract” in
this non-Platonic sense given that created fictional individuals do seem to have fuzzy, or
indeterminate spatiotemporal locations.
3. A fictional work may be simultaneously co-authored, hence, a fictional individual
may have simultaneous co-creators. I will simplify the present discussion, however, by
henceforth ignoring such cases of simultaneous co-authorship.
4. All of the following are author-essentialists: Jorge Luis Borges, “Pierre Menard,
Author of Quixote,” Ficciones (New York: New Directions, 1964); Jerrold Levinson, “What
a Musical Work Is,” Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 5–28; Amie Thomasson, Fiction and
Metaphysics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Kit Fine, “The Problem of
Non-Existents,” Topoi 1 (1982): 97–140.
5. See, e.g., Harry Deutsch, “The Creation Problem,” Topoi 10 (1991): 209–5, Takashi
Yagisawa, “Against Creationism in Fiction,” Philosophical Perspectives 15 (2001): 153–72,
and Alberto Voltolini (2002).
6. Harry Deutsch, “Making Up Stories,” in Anthony Everrett and Thomas Hofweber,
eds., Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence (Stanford, Calif.: CSLI, 2000),
pp. 149–81, footnote 141. Strictly, Deutsch thinks absurd the idea that two persons could
not independently create one and the same allographic work. Given the parity of whole
works of fiction and the individuals mentioned therein (that will be discussed in depth
below), however, he would assuredly believe the thesis of author-essentialism to be
absurd as well.
7. What else could the author be doing besides establishing this particular dependence
relation when she succeeds in creating a fictional individual (assuming that fictional
individuals are, in fact, created existents)? After all, fictional entities on this view are
non-concrete entities, so the creation of Holmes could not possibly be a matter of
succeeding in collecting the appropriate physical parts and putting them together in
proper array.
8. The varieties of dependence among fictional individuals, literary works, and authors
are fully discussed by Thomasson (1999), Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
9. Thomasson (1999), p. 36, also elaborates on the sort of dependence a fictional
individual bears to some literary work which mentions it. This sort of dependence is
generic constant dependence. The relation here is generic because a individual can remain
in existence provided any literary work of the relevant sort remains in existence (i.e.,
there must remain some literary work or other where the individual is mentioned), and
it is constant because an individual can exist when, and only when, some literary work of
the relevant sort remains. Literary works are in turn dependent in various ways on
creative acts of authors, copies or memories of the work, and an audience capable of
comprehending the work.
10. It may seem that the appropriate definite description would not be the one given
but rather one such as “the fictional individual that in the Doyle stories is said to be a clever
pipe-smoking detective. . . .” That description would, unlike the one I provide, at least
make the name referring, and would thus seem to be the natural choice for the sorts of
208 Philosophy and Literature
fictionalists under discussion. But if that is the description synonymous with “Holmes,”
then the view that Yagisawa wishes to rule in is automatically ruled out. Yagisawa needs a
case where one and the same story is authored by someone other than Doyle. “Holmes”
cannot be synonymous both with “the clever . . . in the Doyle story . . .” and “the clever . . .
in the chimp story . . . .”
11. Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).
12. One might be tempted to think that my results here are dependent on the
particulars of my chosen example; that is, they depend on the fact that I have chosen a
chimp rather than an agent in another possible world with the same sort of mental
capacity as Doyle. However, the fact that the causal origin of the duplicate story copy was
something lacking Doyle’s mental capacity is purely accidental, and I chose such an
origin simply to make the case vivid. Agatha Christie in another possible world—or any
causal origin lacking Doyle’s actual intentions for that matter—would have worked
equally well.