5 Consequence Assessment & Impact Criteria 5.1 5.2 5.2.1 5.2.2 5.2.3 Input Required In order to carry out a reliable consequence assessment, it is important to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the input data. This includes process conditions such as temperature and pressure. In addition, the fluid composition should be defined on either the mass fraction or mole fraction basis. Therefore, the heat and material balance (HMB) made available for PEM/QRA should be a validated version. The metrological data made available should be up-to-date. Specific Requirements Averaging time / Sampling Time One of the input parameters that needs to be defined as part of the dispersion assessment is the averaging time (or sampling time). FRED offers only two choices — Instantaneous or 10 minute average. When calculating flammable effects (e.g. flammable plume contour), instantaneous sampling time shall be used. For toxic effects, there is slightly different approach. The instantaneous option shall be used when looking at toxic concentration greater than or equal to LC1 concentration (of H2S and S02) as specified in SP1190 [Ref 4]. This is due to the understanding that the toxic concentrations equal or greater than LC1 have “instantaneous effects” such as knock down effect or immediate death. 10 minute average sampling time shall be used only when looking at target criteria toxic concentrations less than LC1 concentration as specified in SP1190 [Ref 4]. (e.g. SIMOPs contour ~ 300ppm HS). While creating fuel files using FRED for use in SHEPHERD, the above-mentioned rule about sampling time shall be followed. The above rules shall be followed to avoid confusion and to obtain consistent results. A valid exception to the above can be a case where a specific averaging time is ‘specified in PDO SPs or Shell DEPs. Note: Dispersion results are inaccurate within close distance to the release (approximately a distance of 10 to 50 times the hole 1D). Dispersion results at very close range (typically 1 to 2 meters from the leak source) may not be suitable for critical decision-making PDO TSE SME can be consulted if any clarifications are necessary for any specific case, which is not covered above. Surface Roughness The surface roughness value is an important input dispersion modeling. A value of 0.001 represents the desert environment, which generally surrounds the facility. A value 0.1 represents the area covered by process units on plot. Therefore, for PDO applications - a value of 0.1 shall be used for on-plot modeling whereas for off-plot modeling a value of 0.001 shall be used. Fluid phases — (Liquid / Vapour / Mixed Phases) Depending on the potential release location the release phase should be determined (eg. release from vapour space of a vessel - the stream would be gas phase).5.2.4 5.2.5 Typically, only well-fluids releases (at wells, flow-lines, manifolds and other offsite equipment) are considered to be Mixed Phase. Once the well fluids enter on-plot into the separator, the release streams are considered to be either gas phase, or liquid phase (or aqueous phase) at operating conditions. Flammables / Thermal Radiation — Vulnerabilities PEM-Thermal Radi Criteria thermal radiation levels applicable to equipment spacing (layout), flare modeling, escape routes determination etc shall be referred from respective SPs and / or DEPs (e.g. SP-1127, DEP 80.45.10.10 and DEP 80.47.10.30). For the criteria thermal radiation levels related to FERM - refer to SP-1075 (HSE Specification - Fire and Explosion Risk Management (FERM)) and if necessary relevant DEPs. PEM-Flammable Cloud: Impairment Criteria: * For occupied buildings, an un-ignited flammable cloud concentration of 50% LFL outside the building shall be considered as threshold to cause impairment. Note: The 50% LFL criteria is based on current industry best practice and UK HSE documents: (a) Methods of approximation and determination of human vulnerability for offshore major accident hazard assessment [Ref 16] (b) On Defining a Safety Criterion for Flammable Clouds [Ref 17] Flare flame-out condition flammable gas dispersion criteria is defined in DEP 80.45.10.10 [Ref 6] Note: 40% LFL was used as criteria while developing CP-222 (PDO SCSSSV Policy 2016). This criteria was consciously selected by the team in order err on the conservative side because the results affect the decision to potentially removal of a critical barrier (SCSSSV) across PDO and public might be the receptors of the potential hazards. This criterion shall remain valid only for this specific case and same shall be used for calculations leading to the decision of removal of SCSSSVs. Note in this case of SSSV removal, the other criteria required to be met is thermal radiation s 3.15 kwim2 at fence. QRA ~ Flash Fire and Jet Fire Thermal Radi The built in standard point source scenarios within Shepherd should be used to model flammable calculations. Using ellipse scenarios for flammable could be tedious. For QRA modeling, the Shepherd “default” values of probability of mortality for flash fire and jet fire thermal radiation shall be used. Refer to the chapter “Risk Modeling With Shepherd” - Technical Guide of Shepherd [Ref 10] Escalation Impact - Vessel Failure [Ref 18] and [Ref 19] Escalation here refers to the consequence of an initial event causing subsequent events. For example the initial event could be a leak from an equipment with the consequences of a jet or pool fire and this initial event could cause subsequent events which could be failure of other equipment causing further consequences. This is generally referred to as the “Domino effects” or “escalation” Pressure Vessels and Piping Systems are the main candidates for causing escalation in process systems. The critical consequences of a rupture (BLEVE) of a vessel or piping system are mainly accelerated fragments (missiles), fire ball and blast overpressure.One of the main concerns is missiles from a catastrophic failure of a pressure vessel or piping. However as the nature of mechanical failure of piping and pressure vessel are very different, vessel rupture could create missiles at very low pressures compared to a piping system. Risk of missiles is considerably reduced when rupture pressure of a vessel is about 4.5 barg. In contrast the pressure at burst of a pipe needs to be above 20 barg to have escalation risk of damage to neighbouring piping/equipment due to large deflections when the pipe bursts. [Ref 18] Therefore, while analyzing adequacy of depressurization system it may be easier to analyze vessel failures, as vessel failures are generally governing cases compared to failures of associated piping. If required, specific piping failures may be analyzed separately. Inter-Unit (between two adjacent process units): A. Escalation due to vessel failure from a fire scenario in adjacent process unit (Inter- unit escalation) is addressed by spacing the process units as detailed in SP1127 [Ref 3]. This criteria shall be met for all Greenfield and Brownfield projects. Risk based assessment can be used for ALARP demonstration purposes and as a part of variance approval process only in case of Brownfield projects where it is not reasonably practicable to meet the above mentioned criteria and when all possible fire protection measures are exhausted. To meet the criteria the affected vessel shall not be exposed to thermal radiation 2 37.5 kwim2 at operating pressures with a frequency of 2 10 E-04. This risk assessment shall be performed in accordance with SP1258 considering complete hole set. As many individual point sources as practicably possible should be placed at appropriate locations instead of lumping the leak sources within the isolatable segment into one single point source. If the exact leak location can't be identified in the plot plan, then the source(s) can be placed at the edge of the segment. the process u Escalation from fire scenarios leading to vessel failure within the same process unit/ isolatable segment (intra-unit) can be assessed if necessary (e.g. to demonstrate ALARP for supporting alternative depressurization rate) using one of the following methods: B. FRED “Temperature Rise” scenario along with validated offline calculations can be used to determine time to vessel failure depending on the depressurization rate, by estimating decreasing Ultimate Tensile Strength (UTS) of the vessel under thermal load. The methodology (including assumptions), and any offline calculation tool used, if not already validated, shall be reviewed and validated by SME from PDO TSE funetion. C. Ata detailed level of assessment, specialist software, e.g. Vessfire or CFD, can be employed to estimate more accurate results related to vessel failure. These toolsimethodologies should be used in rare cases only when such detailed assessment is absolutely necessary to demonstrate ALARP. The methodology to be followed for any assessment of this complexity shall be approved by Technical Safety Engineering CFDH,TA-1 or his delegate. Note: Study C typically might assume that the source of the fire and affected vessel are depressured simultaneously at the same rate. Validity of this assumption needs to be verified if staggered blowdown is implemented.5.2.6 5.2.7 Toxic Effects The toxicity levels for Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S) and Sulphur Dioxide (SO), which are of interest when carrying out a PEM or QRA study are described in detail in SP-1190 [Ref 4) PEM: Criteria toxicity levels for Hydrogen Sulphide (HzS) and Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) applicable to flare modeling (flame-out and flame-in) shall be referenced from SP 1190 [Ref 4] and DEP 80.45.10.10-Gen [Ref 6]. Flare dispersion modelling shall follow the procedure provided in PR-2219 [Ref 1] Environmental air emission standards are presented in SP-2194 [Ref 7] and the compliance of flare and vent stack air emissions to SP-2194 [Ref 7] should be modelled using appropriate software i.e. CERC ADMS or USEPA AERMOD. QRA: The built in ellipse scenarios within Shepherd shall be used to model toxic calculations in QRA (which are linked internally with FRED to determine the ellipse properties and dimensions). Refer to SP1190-3 [Ref 4] for the current criteria concentration of H2S and SO; for lethality levels of LC1, LC50 and LC100. Occupied Building Risk Assessment (OBRA) / Facility Siting Refer DEP-80.00.10.11-Gen [Ref 8] for Occupied Building Siting requirements [Ref 8]. Occupied Building Risk Assessment (OBRA) is the ‘explosion risk per annum’ to an individual in the building, if occupied by the person 40 hours per week (considered as a nominal 100 % occupancy). Building Risk shall be calculated using Shepherd Exceedance method (CAM modelling method). Details are provided in PR-2219 [Ref 1] and Shell SHEPHERD Technical guide [Ref 10] Building Types and description can be seen in the drop-down menu in Shepherd - Exceedance Building object (Building Information tab). A table with this information is provided in PR-2219 [Ref 1] for ready reference. Occupied buildings located on or adjacent to sour process facilities shall be sited based on the Toxic Impairment Criteria (H2S, SO2) for Buildings as specified in SP-1190-3 [Ref 4]. Building Blast Resilience Refer to DEP 34.17.10.30 /34.17.10.32 [Ref 9] for defining the frequency based building explosion overpressure protection requirements. Note: From Feb 2017, both above DEPs are combined into DEP 34.17.00.32-Gen.3 QRA 3.1 3.1.1 This procedure is meant to supplement SP-1258 and should be used in conjunction with SP-1258. Parts Count The hydrocarbon hazards are defined according to the isolatable sections of plant from which a release could occur. These sections are based on the plant section contained within isolation valves, as defined in the PFS/PSFS and as shown in Figure 1. The potential release frequency for each isolatable section is derived by estimating the number of equipment items contained within that section. Gas Mixed Phase, =f a] Gas Inventory Boundary Figure 1: Definition of Hydrocarbon Isolated Inventory Isolatable Segment Each isolated inventory is assigned an identification number, description and location and releases from them are known as a LoC events (or top events). These events should be tagged logically in the QRA, with the description of the event identifying the ‘equipment item or system being considered. In some cases, for example in the system shown in Figure 1, the event may be further defined as two separate events to model as an oil or gas release. For QRA parts count following steps should be adapted. 1. Highlight isolatable sections in PSFS (if available). If PSFS is not available mark up isolatable sections in PFSs. Refer Figure 2. 2. Identify the streams which are associated with each isolatable segment. Mark-up each isolatable section on PEFS with different coloured highlighters (Refer Figure 2). 4. Pipework: Pipework details should be obtained from isometric drawings where available or calculated from assumed pipework routings on layout drawings or from 3D models. In the absence of isometric drawings (generally during FEED phase) piping component shall be considered as 10% of the total leak frequency of the isolatable segment. Refer to Section 3.1.2 for modelling inter unit piping containing critical sour, high pressure, large inventory. 5. Modeller should use the distinctive colours (provide legend) to mark on the PEFS for counting the manual valves, actuated valves, instrument connections and flange faces etc. This will make the audit / quality check easier and quicker.Figure 2: Typical PFS and PEFS Mark up (Isolatable Section) 3.1.2 Parts Count - Special Considerations Parts count of the liquid portion will be added to the parts count of the vapour stream for the following cases: (1) NNF liquid stream e.g. from the bottom of a compressor KOD (2) Compressor KODs having minimal liquid inventory which results in quicker liquid draining rate than the gas depressuring rate. For long critical piping (e.g. Acid gas with high partial pressure of H2S) between units the ESDVs on both ends are counted in respective units and the connecting piping is modelled as “pipe” in SHEPHERD. Multi-Phase Vessels: Where the vessel contains two or three phases, i.e. separators, distillation columns, KODs etc, the normal operating levels of different phases should be obtained to do a good assessment of vapour, liquid split of parts count. Where such information is not available, assume the following as rule of thumb:3.1.3. Modelling of fl Y Horizontal/vertical Separator : 50% filled with gas and 50% with liquid ¥ Compressor KODs (vertical): 80% filled with gas and 20% with liquid ¥ Column: 75% filled with gas and 25% with liquid. is transported by Pumps, Compressors + For pump discharge streams which are non-flashing: The release rate (leak to atmosphere) shall be limited to estimated mass flow rate based on pump curve if the pump curve is available (possibly in execute phase). If pump curve is not available (typically define phase) then the release rate shall be limited to Rated Capacity (mass flow rate) of the pump as given in the pump datasheet. In QRA hole set shall be modified accordingly - e.g. instead of 2mm,7mm, 22mm,70mm and150mm standard hole set, the new hole set may look like 2 mm,7 mm, 22 mm, 52mm where release rate from 52 mm hole size represents the rated capacity (mass flow rate) of the pump. Similarly in PEM — if the pump rated capacity is less than the release rate from 22mm hole at discharge pressure then hole size shall be modified to match the rated capacity mass flow rate of the pump. * For Intermediate and immediate downstream vessels and compressors in gas compression sections with minimal liquid inventory: The release rate (leak to atmosphere) shall be limited to the compressor rated mass inflow rate (available from compressor datasheet). In QRA hole set shall be modified accordingly - e.g. instead of 2mm, 7mm, 22mm, 70mm and150mm standard hole set, the new hole set may look like 2mm, 7mm, 22mm, 52mm where release rate from 52mm hole size represents the rated mass inflow rate of the compressor. Similarly in PEM — if rated mass inflow rate of the compressor is less than the release rate from 22mm hole at discharge pressure then hole size shall be modified to match the rated mass inflow rate of the compressor. 3.1.4 Taxonomy and Leak Frequencies 3.2 3.3 3.3.1 Refer Appendix 2 of SP-1258 [Ref 1] for taxonomy and leak frequencies for each component (e.g. valves, pumps, compressors etc.,) Leak frequencies used for Harweel 2A/B development, Rabab Harweel Integrated Project (RHIP) and Yibal-Khuff project are provided in Appendix 2 of this document. These can be used during concept phase when PEFS are not available and QRA is being performed on comparative basis. QRA Input Sheet The QRA input sheet (to be developed in MS Excel work book) should contain the required inputs for SHEPHERD modelling. This Excel sheet where formulae are visible (not hidden) will make the quality check easier. 1. The QRA Input sheet should contain list of all data input used in the QRA calculations (parts count sheet inputs for all the isolatable segments and process parameters as shown in Appendix-2 of SP-1258). 2. Use formulae provided in FRED technical guide [Ref 6] to calculate release rates and thereby ignition probal worksheet. 3. Refer to SP 1258 for ignition probabilities calculation [Ref 1]. SHEPHERD Modelling Fuel Files Following steps to be adapted for creating the fuel files in FRED 1. To maintain consistent model settings — input average humidity, average ambient temperature from Process Design Basis/ Basis for Design. It isadvised to create one scenario with correct data and copy the scenario so that the data remains consistent. 2. When creating the scenario, use the overall process flow scheme drawing or Plot plan in FRED and place the ‘pressurized release scenarios” at the appropriate location. This will be helpful for better visualization and easier @wac. 3. Input the hole size “150 mm” in hole diameter tab and use 5D weather condition. 4. Sampling Time shall be in accordance with SP1258 [Ref 1]. For example — for generating SIMOPS contours (300 ppm H2S), 10 minute average sampling time shall be used. 5. Mixed phase should only be used for specific cases typically for Trunklines, Flow Lines and inlet to Inlet Separator. Rest streams should either be liquid / gas phase. 3.3.2. Simulation Area/Grid Size 3.4 3.5 Refer to SP-1258 [Ref 1]. Meteorological Data specific meteorological data including wind speed, wind direction, stability and frequency distribution should be used in Shepherd model. In case site specific meteorological data is not available then generic data representing the North and the South of Oman presented in SP-1258 [Ref 1] may be used Modelling 3.5.1 Steps for Conducting Flammable Modelling 1. For flammable modelling, select the point scenario from tool bar located left side of the Shepherd model. Move the scenario to the designated area/unit on the plot plan. 2. Unstick the option of update leak frequency from site. Selection of this option tends to create frequency update every time the integration is run. Therefore, it should be ensured that this option is always un-ticked. 3. In Fuel properties tab, choose the appropriate fuel file for the isolatable segment Model chooses the fuel properties such as temperature, pressure, density and LFL from the selected fuel file. 4. Input the flammable leak frequencies for 2mm, 7mm, 22mm, 70mm and 150mm from Shepherd Input sheet (illustrating typical Inputs for flame characteristics, rupture events and overpressure. 5. Inall the leaks, ignition model "Cox Lees Ang —Gas or Liquid to be selected and early ignition fraction should be 0.33 [Ref 2]. 3.5.2 Steps for Conducting Toxic Modelling 1. Use the ellipse scenario for toxic modelling 2. In Leak scenarios tab: a. Input the toxic leak frequencies for 2mm, 7mm, 22mm, 70mm and 150mm from Shepherd Input sheet. b. Input the surface roughness as per SP-1258 [Ref 1]. ¢. Sampling Time shall be in accordance with SP-1258 [Ref1].d. Input the ellipse height as 5m (average) or appropriate to the specific scenario should be used. lent toxic (HS, SO2 etc) concentrations for LC1, LC50 Note: Toxic leak frequency is calculated in the SHEPHERD Input Sheet using below formula. Toxte Frequency = Flammable Frequency x (1 ~ Immidiate Ignition Probability ~ Delayed Ignition Probability 3.6 Manning Data Manning distribution data are required in order to estimate exposure of each individual to the hazards from the different process areas of the facilities to calculate Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA). This data to be obtained from Operations and Readiness Assurance team (OR&A)/site operations. Exposure Fraction is calculated using below formula ime Spent (hr) x Total working days ina Year 24x 365, Exposure Fraction 3.7 Results 3.7.1 Individual Risk Per Annum IRPA for each worker group is calculated by adding up components of Process Risk, Occupational Risk, Building Risk and (air and land) Transportation Risk applicable to the specific worker group. This section explains how each component of IRPA is calculated. 3.7.2 Location Specific Individual Risk Risk Contours are obtained from SHEPHERD which is mapped on to the Plot Plan. These Risk Contours represent Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR). LSIR values can be obtained from each area receiver by right clicking and selecting from the area results. Average area results shall be used as LSIR of that area for process risk calculations. 3.7.3. Process Risk The process risk is due to the potential hydrocarbon (flammable and toxic) accidental loss of containment hazards. The process risk is calculated for each worker category using below formula: Process Risk = LSIR x Exposure fraction 3.7.4 Land Transport Risk Refer to SP-1258 [Ref 1] land transport risk and air transport risk, ‘The land transportation risk for all worker groups is calculated using below formula: Land Transportation Risk = Fatalities per Kilometer x Total KM travelled/year 3.7.5 Air Transport Risk Refer to SP-1258 [Ref 1] land transport risk and air transport risk, ‘The air transportation risk for all worker groups can be calculated using below formulaAir Transportation Risk = Fatalities per million flights (departures) Number of Flights/year 3.7.6 Occupational Risk Refer to SP-1258 [Ref 1] for Occupational risk. The occupational risk is calculated using below formula: Occupational Risk = Average Fatality per hour x Total Working hours in a Year 3.7.7 Building Risk Building Risk for individual worker is calculated using below formula: Building Risk per Year = Building Risk (as obtained from SHEPHERD) x Hours Spent per Year 2-40 3.8 Simultaneous Operation — Toxic Sphere of Influence (SIMOPS) Refer to SP-1258 [Ref 1] and SP1190 [Ref 1]. 3.8.1 SIMOPS Modeling 1. 2. Create a separate copy of the SHEPHERD model for SIMOPS modelling. Calculate for each toxic ellipse scenario the equivalent concentration of H2S for the toxic concentration specified in SP-1190 [Ref 3] (e.g. H2S 300 ppm) as detailed in Section 3.2. Input the equivalent H:S concentrations for 300 ppm in each ellipse scenario. Make the fatality corresponding to 300 ppm as 100% for each Toxic Ellipse Scenario. Select the 10 min average option. Fuel files should be updated accordingly. And input the ellipse height as 5m (average) or appropriate height representing average height of the isolatable segment should be used. Select all the ellipse scenarios and run the SHEPHERD model.