Campos vs.

People of the Philippines GR 187401, Sept 17, 2014

Facts:

On March 17, 1995, Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from respondent First
Women's Credit Corporation (FWCC) in the amount of ₱50,000.00. She issued several postdated
checks in favor of FWCC to cover the agreed installment payments. Fourteen of these checks drawn
against her Current Account No. 6005-05449-92 withBPI Family Bank-Head Office. The checks were
declared by the draweebank to be drawn against a "closed account." After Campos failed to satisfy
her outstanding obligation with FWCC despite demand, she was charged before the (MeTC) of
Pasay City, with violations of B.P. 22. Campos was tried in absentia, as she failed to attend court
proceedings after being arraigned.

The Accused is hereby CONVICTED of fourteen (14) counts of violations of BATAS PAMBANSA
BLG. 22. She is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment for each
violation and to indemnify the complainant the sum of ₱46,666.62 representing the total value of the
checks, plus legal interest from date of default until full payment. Feeling aggrieved, Campos
appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). the RTC of Pasay City, Branch108 rendered its decision
upholding Campos’ conviction. A motion for reconsideration filed by Campos was denied for lack of
merit. Unyielding, Campos appealed the RTC decision to the CA, which rendered on July 21, 2008
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its decision  affirming the ruling of the RTC. Campos moved to reconsider, but her motion was
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denied via a Resolution  dated February 16, 2009. Hence, this petition.
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Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT A DEMAND LETTER THAT WAS SENT THROUGH REGISTERED MAIL IS
SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF [B.P. 22] AS TO KNOWLEDGE OF THE
FACT OF THE DISHONOR OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.

Held:

To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the
making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of
the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or creditor dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment. 11

The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced by Campos
through the present petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a written demand letter
from FWCC, the entity in whose favor the dishonored checks were issued. In a line of cases,
the Court has emphasized the importance of proof of receipt of such notice of dishonor,  although
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not as an element of the offense,but as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was aware of
insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the bank dishonored it, in relation to the second
element of the offense and Section 2 of B.P. 22. Considering that the second element involves a
state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge
of insufficiency of funds,  as it reads:
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Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing, and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence
of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the
holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by
the drawee.

In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC’s finding that the required notice of
dishonor from FWCC was received by Campos. Campos, nonetheless, still maintains that her
personal receipt of the notice was not sufficiently established, considering that only a written
copy of the letter and the registry return receipt covering it were presented by the
prosecution. The Court has in truth repeatedly held that the mere presentation of registry
return receipts that cover registered mail was not sufficient to establish that written notices
of dishonor had been sent to or served on issuers of checks.  The authentication by affidavit
1âwphi1

of the mailers was necessary in order for service by registered mail to be regarded as clear
proof of the giving of notices of dishonor and to predicate the existence of the second
element of the offense.

In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however, considers Campos'
defense that she exerted efforts to reach an amicable settlement with her creditor after the
checks which she issued were dishonored by the drawee bank, BPI Family Bank. Campos
categorically declared in her petition that, "[she] has in her favor evidence to show that she
was in good faith and indeed made arrangements for the payment of her obligations
subsequently after the dishonor of the checks."  Clearly, this statement was a confirmation
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that she actually received the required notice of dishonor from FWCC. The evidence referred
to in her statement were receipts  dated January 13, 1996, February 29, 1996, April 22, 1998
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and May 26, 1998 issued by FWCC to Campos for payments in various amounts ranging from
₱2,500.00 to ₱15,700.00. Campos would not have entered into the alleged arrangements
beginning January 1996 until May 1998 if she had. not received a notice of dishonor from her
creditor, and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds with the bank and the
dishonor of her checks.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 21, 2008 and Resolution dated
February 16, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31468 are AFFIRMED.

Chua vs. People of the Philippines, GR 196853, July 13, 2015

Facts:

Chua and private complainant Philip See (See) were long-time friends and neighbors. On different
dates from 1992 until 1993, Chua issued several postdated PSBank checks of varying
amounts to See pursuant to their rediscounting arrangement at a 3% rate. However, See
claimed that when he deposited the checks, they were dishonored either due to insufficient funds or
closed account. Despite demands, Chua failed to make good the checks. Hence, See filed on
December 23, 1993 a Complaint  for violations of BP 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
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Quezon City. He attached thereto a demand letter  dated December 10, 1993. In a Resolution  dated
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April 25, 1994, the prosecutor found probable cause and recommended the filing of charges against
Chua. Accordingly, 54 counts of violation of BP 22 were filed against him before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City.

Chua, however, objected  to its admissibility on the grounds that it is a mere photocopy and that it
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does not bear any proof that he actually received. However, sometime in February 2002, See
decided to have his house rented out such that he emptied it with all his belongings and had it
cleaned. It was during this time that he found the demand letter dated November 30, 1993. Chua
averred that the papers on which the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 are written were given
to him as blank papers. He affixed his signature thereon purportedly to give See the authority to
retrieve a car which was supposed to serve as payment for Chua’s obligation to See. Later, the
defense, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence.  It again pointed out that the demand
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letter dated December 10, 1993 attached to See’s affidavit-complaint is a mere photocopy and not
accompanied with a Post Office Registry Receipt and Registry Return Receipt. Most importantly, it
does not contain Chua’s signature that would serve as proof of his actual receipt thereof it argued
that while the November 30, 1993 demand letter contains Chua’s signature, the same should not be
given any probative value since it does not contain the date when he allegedly received the same.
Hence, there is simply no way of reckoning the crucial five-day period that the law affords an issuer
to make good the check from the date of his notice of its dishonor.

MeTC finds accused Robert Chua GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of fifty four (54) counts of
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and hereby sentence[s] him to suffer the penalty of six (6)
months imprisonment for each case and to restitute to the private complainant the total amount of
the face value of all the subject checks in these cases with legal interest of 12% per annum
reckoned from the filing of the informations until the full amount is fully paid and to pay the costs of
suit. RTC And CA affirmed. Hence this petition.

Issue:

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE RULINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURTS THAT THE ACCUSED AT THE TIME OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE DISHONORED
CHECKS HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE
CHECKS UPON THEIR PRESENTMENT, BASED MERELY ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE
DATE OF THE PREPARATION OF THE LETTER IS THE DATE OF RECEIPT BY THE
ADDRESSEE.

Held:
When Chua allegedly received the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 was not established by
the prosecution. Citing Danao v. Court of Appeals,  he thus contends that since there is no date of
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receipt from which to reckon the aforementioned five-day period, the presumption that he has
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds at the time of the issuance of the checks did not arise.

It is not disputed that the subject demand letter, while bearing the signature of Chua, does not
indicate any date as to his receipt thereof. There being no disagreement as to this fact, the propriety
of the conclusion drawn from the same by the courts below, that is, the date of the said letter is
considered as the date when Chua received the same for the purpose of reckoning the five-day
period to make good the checks, clearly refers to a question of law. Of the three (3) elements, the
second element is the hardest to prove as it involves a state of mind. Thus, Section 2 of BP 22
creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which, however, arises only after it is
proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt
thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment.

In the instant case, what is in dispute is the existence of the second element. Chua asserts that the
absence of the date of his actual receipt on the face of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993
prevented the legal presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds from arising. In Danao v.
Court of Appeals,  the Court discussed the importance of proving the date of actual receipt of the
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notice of dishonor. Thus, this Court further ruled in King, "in order to create the prima
facie presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or
she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the
amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment." Indeed, the prima facie presumption in
Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 "gives the accused an opportunity to satisfy the amount indicated in the
check and thus avert prosecution. This opportunity, as this Court stated in Lozano vs. Martinez,
serves to mitigate the harshness of the law in its application.

In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer
of the bum check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer,
then the presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 cannot
arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period."  (Italics in
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the original, emphasis supplied)

Similarly in the present case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period under
Section 22 of BP 22 would start and end since there is no showing when Chua actually
received the demand letter dated November 30, 1993. The MeTC cannot simply presume that
the date of the demand letter was likewise the date of Chua’s receipt thereof. There is simply
no such presumption provided in our rules on evidence. In addition, from the inception of this
case Chua has consistently denied having received subject demand letter. He maintains that the
paper used for the purported demand letter was still blank when presented to him for signature and
that he signed the same for another purpose. Given Chua’s denial, it behooved upon the prosecution
to present proof of his actual receipt of the November 30, 1993 demand letter. However, all that the
prosecution did was to present it without, however, adducing any evidence as to the date of Chua’s
actual receipt thereof. It must be stressed that ‘[t]he prosecution must also prove actual receipt
of [the notice of dishonor] because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned
from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused."  "The burden of proving notice rests
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upon the party asserting its existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove
notice.

The prosecution had proved also that private complainant personally sent a written notice of
dishonor of the subject checks to the accused and that the latter personally received the same.

Chua’s acquittal, however, does not entail the extinguishment of his civil liability for the dishonored
checks.Petitioner Robert Chua is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt and ordered RELEASED immediately / unless he is detained
for some other legal cause. He is ordered, however, to indemnify the private complainant Philip See
the total value of the 54 checks subject of this case plus legal interest of 12% per annum from the
time the said sum became due and demandable until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1,
2013 until fully paid.
Ongson vs People of the Philippines, GR 156169, August 12, 2005
FACTS:
Private complainant Samson Uy extended loans to petitioner and as payment therefor, he issued to
Uy eight (8) post dated checks. Upon presentment, the checks were dishonored and despite
demands, petitioner failed to make good the bounced checks. That on or about the 23rd day of
November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to SAMSON UY to apply on account or for value
Philippine Savings Bank Check No. 119789 dated November 23, 1992 payable to Cash in the
amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue
she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check
in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment was subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds/Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Samson Uy the amount of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.

RTC HELD: accused Victor Ongson is hereby declared GUILTY of Violations of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 on eight (8) counts and sentenced to serve 6 months imprisonment for each of the eight (8)
counts and to pay a fine equivalent to the amount of the said checks mentioned in the above-
numbered informations or a total of P582,149.72, and to indemnify, as actual and compensatory
damages, the private complainant Samson Uy in the same amount of the said checks, or
P582,149.72 plus interest at 12% from the date of this decision. CA HELD: with the
MODIFICATIONS that the penalty of fine is hereby DELETED and appellant sentenced to a prison
term of thirty (30) days in each of the eight (8) counts whereof he was found guilty by the lower
court, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and this appeal DISMISSED. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition is guilty of the crime under BP 22
HELD:

In the instant case, petitioner should be acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-43437 and Q-93-
43442, because the date of the check and the amount thereof as stated in the Informations vary with
the exhibits submitted by the prosecution, which inconsistencies violate petitioner's constitutional
right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged.

The Information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43437, described Check No. 492615 as dated
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October 15, 1992, for P3,117.00. The records, however, show that said check differ from Exhibit "I,"
because the date and amount stated therein are October 17, 1992 and 3,117.50, respectively.
Likewise in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43442, the date of Check No. 492580 as reflected in the
Information is September 28, 1992, while Exhibit "D" shows October 2, 1992. The variance in the
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identity of the check nullifies petitioner's conviction. The identity of the check enters into the first
element of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 - that a person draws or issues a check on
account or for value. There being a discrepancy in the identity of the checks described in the
information and that presented in court, petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of the nature of
the offense charged will be violated if his conviction is upheld.
With respect to Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-43435, Q-93-43436, Q-93-43438, Q-93-43439, Q-93-
43440 and Q-93-43441, the judgment of conviction should be affirmed. There is no merit in
petitioner's contention that the checks were issued without valuable consideration. We have
held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that
the same was issued for valuable consideration, which may consist either in some right, interest,
profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss
or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It
is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or
endorser. In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner received money in various amounts from private complainant. Petitioner is under
obligation to pay private complainant. Likewise, the prosecution proved that some of the checks
were payment for private complainant's commission from selling the products of petitioner. Hence,
the latter cannot successfully claim that the issuance of the checks were not for a valuable
consideration.

The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. So also, it is not the nonpayment of
the obligation that is being punished, but the making of worthless checks. What the law punishes is
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such issuance of a bum check and not the purpose for which the check was issued nor the terms or
conditions relating to its issuance. Thus, even if there had been payment through compensation or
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some other means, there could still be prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.

Second element: In the instant case, petitioner through counsel, admitted receipt of private
complainant's demand letters sent via registered mail, informing him of the dishonor of the checks
and the reason therefor; and demanding that the value of the check be paid in cash. Said admission
binds him considering that he never denied receipt of the notice of dishonor. Neither did he
contradict said judicial admission of receipt of the notice nor alleged a palpable mistake in making
the same. Thus, petitioner's receipt of the notice of dishonor without paying the value of the checks
or making arrangements for its payment within five (5) days from receipt of said notice, established
the prima facie presumption that he had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with
the bank at the time of the issuance of the checks. Failing to overcome this legal presumption, the
findings of the courts below must be sustained.

The third element of violation of B.P. 22, i.e., the dishonor of the check by the drawee bank, is also
attendant in the present case as shown by the reason for the dishonor as stamped in the dorsal
portion of the checks which are also prima facie presumptions of such dishonor and the reasons
therefor. Furthermore, the dishonor was bolstered by the pre-trial order duly signed by petitioner
where he admitted dishonor of the subject checks.

All told, the Court finds that all the elements of violation of B.P. 22 had been established beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Nevertheless, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals
should be modified.

When an obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, the interest due
should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. In the absence of such stipulation, the rate
shall be 12% per annum computed from judicial or extrajudicial demand. In this case, there was no
stipulated interest on petitioner's obligation to pay the value of the dishonored checks.
Demand for payment was made extrajudicially as evidenced by petitioner's receipt of private
complainant's demand letter with notice of dishonor. The applicable interest rate is therefore
12% per annum from the date of receipt of the demand letter on December 7, 1992
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 27, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18662 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.