Colonial Masters, National Politicos, Provincial Landlords

Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local
Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900-1913

Author(s): Paul D. Hutchcroft
Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 2 (May, 2000), pp. 277-306
Published by: Association for Asian Studies
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2658657
Accessed: 17-03-2020 02:09 UTC
REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2658657?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Association for Asian Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to The Journal of Asian Studies
This content downloaded from 180.191.179.219 on Tue, 17 Mar 2020 02:09:21 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Colonial Masters, National
Politicos, and Provincial Lords:
Central Authority and Local
Autonomy in the American
Philippines, 1900-1913
PAUL D. HUTCHCROFT
W HEN THE UNITED STATES EMBARKED ON A CAMPAIGN of overseas colonial

conquest a century ago, it was for some Americans an unquestionably righteous
venture in political tutelage. "[Godi has made [the English-speaking and Teutonic
peoples] adept in government that we may administer government among savage and
senile peoples," proclaimed Indiana Senator Albert J. Beveridge. "And of all our race
He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the
regeneration of the world" (Snyder 1962). The largest and most important U.S. colony
was of course the Philippines, where a campaign of military conquest began in 1898
and continued into the early years of the new century. The conquest involved intense
fighting, brutal torture, forced resettlement, and horrific massacres-and was at the
same time combined with determined efforts to conciliate important elements of
Filipino society through a process of "benevolent assimilation." By July 4, 1901, a
civil government was established with President William McKinley's instructions to
promote "the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands
... [conforming] to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the
fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of
just and effective government" (Salamanca 1984, 32),
What kind of state was this to be? To answer this question, one must pay
particular attention to the Taft era, 1900-13, when American colonials-building on
the residual architecture of the previous Spanish colonial state and responding to a
Paul D. Hutchcroft is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Wis-

consin-Madison.
For offering comments that contributed to the ideas in this article, I am especially grateful
to Michael Cullinane, as well as to Benedict Anderson, Mark Beissinger, Donald Emmerson,
Edna Labra Hutchcroft, David Leheny, Resil Mojares, Crawford Young, participants in a 1996
roundtable of the Asian Institute of Management (in Manila), participants in a 1997 panel of
the Association of Asian Studies (in Chicago), and anonymous readers of The Journal of Asian
Studies. Valuable research assistance was provided by Gwendolyn Bevis and Steven Hong. All
errors, of course, are mine alone.
TheJournal of Asian Studies 59, no. 2 (May 2000):277-306.

C) 2000 by the Association for Asian Studies, Inc.
277
278 PAUL D. HUTCHCROFT
revolutionary challenge-established the foundations of the modern Philippine polity.

During these years, the expedient strategies and political ideals of U.S. officials
encouraged very close ties with Filipino elites, and the resulting interactions produced
a state quite distinctive in the annals of colonialism. This is especially apparent when
one examines relations between capital and countryside. Both administrative and
political structures were in most important respects very decentralized, and provincial
powerholders came to enjoy a great deal of influence over all levels of governance-
from local bodies up to the executive agencies in Manila. The thorough penetration
of the bureaucracy by extensive systems of patronage, moreover, further promoted
local autonomy at the expense of central authority.
Clearer understanding of this decisive period of state formation is of particular
relevance today, as a sweeping program of decentralization has been initiated partly
in response to common-but flawed-perceptions that the Philippine polity is
historically "overcentralized." One public administration study, for example, asserts
that "our colonial history left an indelible stamp of centralism that contemporary
forces have sustained."' These sentiments are echoed by key policy makers, including
a recent interior secretary who condemned the way in which "imperial Manila"
historically exercised a "stranglehold on local governments.' '2 The logical means of
righting the wrongs of the past, in this analysis, is a far-reaching program of
devolution-and the Philippines has indeed, in the 1990s, undertaken what is
probably the world's most ambitious such initiative (Blair 1996, 18).
My first major objective is to challenge important assumptions underlying this
effort by reexamining the origins and territorial character of the modern Philippine
state. As this article will demonstrate, a distinctive American colonial heritage has
fostered a complex web of central-local ties in which Manila can seem to be at once
overlord and lorded over. One key aspect of postwar central-local relations has indeed
been centralized: even the most trifling of administrative decisions must be approved
in Manila, and many local and provincial authorities chafe at restrictions on their
autonomy. At the same time, Manila has long displayed a notably weak capacity for
sustained administrative supervision of provincial and local officials. National
politicians, moreover, must commonly rely heavily on local power (and the brokering
of arrangements with local bosses and their private armies) in order to succeed in
electoral contests. Sorting out the longstanding complexity of how territorial
dimensions of administrative structures interact with those of political structures
provides many valuable lessons for current efforts at reform.3
My second major objective is to demonstrate how careful examination of the Taft
era offers many insights for comparative inquiry into state formation, colonial state
'Ocampo and Panganiban 1985, 2. This assertion of a "centralist" history is a common

argument in postwar analysis of Philippine public administration. See also Romani and Thomas
1954, 119-22; various selections in Abueva and de Guzman 1969, 415-75; de Guzman,
Reforma, and Panganiban 1988, 208-12; and Tapales 1993, 8.
2Alunan 1995, 49. This official simultaneously boasted of how "local power elites are
being dismantled to level the political playing field" through his department's efforts to con-
fiscate the firearms of private armies. If Manila is really imperial, one might ask, how did local
elites come to exercise so much power?
3Because their focus is indeed upon administrative structures, scholars of public admin-
istration tend to concentrate far more attention on formal structures of authority than on
informal networks of power. While they may well be aware of the importance of the latter, it
is rarely incorporated into their analysis. For a critique of public administration's formalistic
tendencies, and a discussion of the interaction between authority and power, see Hutchcroft,
forthcoming.
AUTONOMY IN THE AMERICAN PHILIPPINES, 1900-1913 279
formation, and central-local relations. In particular, this analysis focuses attention on

issues of compromise, ideology, and the historical timing of the creation of
administrative and representational structures-each of which plays a major role in
both influencing the character of a national state and shaping the manner in which
central states and local forces relate to one another.
The following section introduces a framework for analyzing the territorial
dimensions of administrative and political structures. In the second and core portion
of the article, I use this framework to analyze the character of relations between Manila
and the provinces4 as they evolved throughout the course of the Taft era, when
recurrent tensions between central authority and local autonomy were largely resolved
in favor of provincial elites who were empowered in new and important ways by
American structures of governance. Within these structures, the quest for self-
government became nearly synonymous with the quest for local autonomiy, national
legislative authority, and patronage opportunities. The third section very briefly
surveys how the initial course of state formation in the Taft years is essential for
understanding the general weakness of central authority in the Philippines throughout
the remainder of the colonial era and into the second half of the twentieth century.
In the conclusion, I return to my two major objectives by summarizing how clearer
understanding of this basic period of state formation is critical to any effort to reshape
the polity today, and reviewing how issues of compromise, ideology, and historical
sequence help to explain the unusual character of the American colonial state in the
Philippines.
Assessing Territorial Dimensions of Politics and

Administration5
Over time, Michael Mann emphasizes in a discussion that draws heavily on

Weber, the modern state has come to "[embodyl centrality, in the sense that political
relations radiate to and from a center, to cover a . . . territorially demarcated area
over which it exercises . .. some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed
up by some organized physical force" (Mann 1993, 55). As the recent work of James
Scott highlights, the very formation of a modern state depends in many fundamental
ways upon its capacity to make "legible" the "chaotic, disorderly, constantly changing
society beneath it" (Scott 1998, 2, 82). The degree to which a state embodies centrality
and makes legible its society, however, differs a great deal from one case to another.
In attempting to analyze this variation, I begin by distinguishing two commonly
noted aspects of centralization and decentralization: that which exists in the
administrative realm of civilian and military bureaucracies and that which exists in th
political realm of legislatures, elections, political parties, patronage systems, and the
4My focus, throughout, will be on the lowland Christian provinces in which the bulk of
the population resided. From the beginning, American colonials established distinct structures
for the governance of the "non-Christian tribes" of the Mountain Province in northern Luzon
and the Muslim regions of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. On these areas, see Finin
(1991) and Abinales (1997). For a very insightful comparison of a military-dominated process
of state formation in Mindanao and a civilian-dominated process of state formation in the
"Christianized" regions of the archipelago, see Abinales 1999.
5This discussion draws and builds upon a framework developed in more detail in Hutch-
croft, forthcoming.
like.6 For heuristic purposes, these realms can initially be conceived as two distinct
continua, each defining relatively more centralized or decentralized polities. After
providing this conceptual foundation, it is possible to proceed to examine the complex
interplay that exists between the two spheres.
Scholars of state formation have devoted considerable attention to historical
strategies of administrative centralization (see, e.g., Weber 1978, 1042-43; Tilly 1992,
100, 114), and have demonstrated how prefectoralism was the single most effective
historical strategy of centralizing rulers. In this system, "the national government
divides the country into areas and places a prefect in charge of each." Fesler explains
that the prefect "represents the whole government, and all specialized field agents in
the area are under his supervision" (1968, 374); "he is a 'little king' " (1962, 120).
While the prefectoral system is most closely associated with the Napoleonic reforms,
it later came to be the dominant mode of administration in colonial settings, and has
more recently been found in many postcolonial authoritarian settings. It is most
effective in accomplishing such basic tasks as the imposition and maintenance of law
and order and the extraction of revenue and resources (Callaghy 1984, 106).
Whether or not prefectoral systems are adopted, there are a range of other ways
by which modern states may seek to impose their administrative authority throughout
the territory. A central bureau, commonly the Interior Ministry, often claims a leading
position among other national agencies by virtue of its jurisdiction over lower-level
governmental units throughout the country. When appointments are made for local
posts, a centralizing state commonly favors persons who do not have (and are not
likely to acquire) close ties to their area of responsibility.7 To ensure their loyalty to
the center, they may be chosen from other regions and/or inculcated into a bureaucratic
elite culture very distinct from the societal groups they are to govern. A centralizing
state will also commonly try to rotate personnel on a regular basis, and attempt to do
so at the first hint that an official is seeking to build a local fiefdom. In addition, a
centralizing state will seek to provide regular and extensive supervision of local
governments, and ensure in particular that anything having to do with revenue and
coercive capacity is carefully controlled by officials loyal to the capital. Finally, national
agencies may require local officials to obtain permission for a range of tasks performed
at the subnational level, and insist on overturning or reversing the rulings and actions
of which it does not approve.
At the other end of the continuum lie the diverse phenomena of administrative
decentralization. This may result merely from the de facto lack of integration-or
disintegration-of a polity. Weber's analysis of patrimonialism provides valuable
descriptions of some of the most common ways in which polities can quite effectively
be carved up by the personal interests of those who staff the administrative apparatus,
as when elites are able to monopolize control over local government positions and
"extend the authority which they already exercise over their own dependents to all
inhabitants of a given region" (Ertman 1997, 8). Most threatening of all to a central
ruler, logically enough, is the combination of both military and economic power in
the hands of a single district official; particularly in outlying areas, such independence
becomes increasingly probable and can often be passed on from one generation to the
'While my focus is on the administrative and political spheres, I fully recognize that
examination of any polity requires prudent attention to how both economic and sociocultural
ties also exert powerful centripetal and centrifugal pressures that often vary greatly over time.
7Throughout this article, for the sake of simplicity, the use of the term "local" is meant
to signify municipal, provincial, and regional levels of government.
next. "[Tihe patrimonial ruler cannot always dare to destroy these autonomous local
patrimonial powers," writes Weber; in attempting to do so, the ruler "must have an
administrative organization of his own which can replace them." In general, fear of
resistance and lack of an alternative apparatus led central rulers to compromise with
these local lords (Weber 1978, 1040, 1044, 1051, 1055, 1058).
In other cases, administrative decentralization comes about as part of a planned,
de jure strategy. Here, scholars of modern public administration have developed
typologies that include the widely used distinction between deconcentration and
devolution (the latter a more extensive transfer of decision-making authority and
responsibility to local government units). Combining the various elements of the
analysis above, one can say that toward the centralized side of the continuum lie
prefectoral systems; toward the decentralized side of the continuum lie administrative
systems that exhibit high levels of "local patrimonialism" and/or systems in which
high levels of authority and responsibility have been devolved to the local level.
While the administrative continuum rests on well-developed literatures in state
formation and public administration, its companion continuum of political
centralization and decentralization requires examination of four broad issues related to
both local and national politics. As with the administrative continuum, judgements
on the character of a given polity require careful attention to its historical specificities.
First, it is important to examine whether local executives are appointed by the center or
elected by popular vote. Officials appointed by the center have far less potential to
represent local interests than those elected by popular vote. In each case, however,
other political dynamics can serve to counter these generalizations. An appointed
official able to control significant electoral and/or coercive resources, for example, will
have considerable bargaining power vis-a-vis the center; conversely, an elected official's
tendencies to support local interests may be neutralized by the centralizing influence
of his or her political party.
Second, on a more informal level, is there a concentration of socioeconomic and/or coercive
power in local patrons and bosses, and how do these powerholders affect the character of
ostensibly democratic institutions? In particular, to what extent do local powerholders
influence the election of national legislators, governors, mayors, and local legislators?
The greater the concentration of local power, the more difficult it will be for the center
to impose its will on the localities and regions. Weber, it will be recalled, expected
the combination of economic and coercive roles in single individuals to promote a
tendency toward decentralization.
Third, moving on to the national level, is there a legislature with significant decision-
making authority? Quite obviously, a polity that concentrates authority solely in the
executive is far more centralized, politically, than one in which authority is shared
between the executive and legislators. While this criterion does not inherently address
territorial dimensions of authority, the potential for representation of diverse
territorial interests is certainly heightened by the existence of a functioning legislature.
For reasons explained elsewhere, the American presidential system as well as single-
member district plurality (or "first past the post") electoral systems generally offer
more potential for the legislative representation of local interests than do
parliamentary systems and proportional-representation electoral systems (see
Hutchcroft forthcoming).
Fourth, to what extent are administrative structures insulated from party patronage?
Where party patronage and spoils effectively permeate administrative structures, the
character of central-local ties may be significantly different than what one finds in
settings with a strong "constituency for bureaucratic autonomy" (Shefter 1994, 28).
In Italy, Putnam explains, patronage practices "allowed local elites and national
deputies to bargain for local interests against national directives in return for electoral
and parliamentary support. Political channels to the center were more important than
administrative channels" (1993, 19). Patronage-based American political parties in
the late nineteenth century similarly promoted the "broad dispersion of particularistic
benefits downward to the localities at a time in which social interactions and economic
conflicts were becoming increasingly national in scope" (Skowronek 1982, 39). In
short, democratic political systems with a strong element of patronage may provide
important informal avenues for the promotion of local interests, and at the same time
undercut the supervisory capacity of the center.
This raises causal issues that are of particular importance to the analysis below.
In Martin Shefter's insightful analysis, the historical timing of the creation of modern
bureaucracies and the emergence of mass political participation is essential in
determining the relative strength of a "constituency for bureaucratic autonomy" versus
a "constituency for patronage." To state his nuanced argument in the simplest terms,
if the formation of a "constituency for bureaucratic autonomy" has preceded the
mobilization of a mass electorate (as in Germany), parties will be unlikely to control
the administrative structures through spoils and patronage; if the timing is reversed
(as in Italy), patronage-ridden administrative structures are the probable result (1994,
21-60).
Using this framework, one can examine the particular features of a given political
system and determine its placement on a continuum of relatively more centralized vs.
relatively more decentralized. In general terms, however, one can expect a highly
centralized political system to be one in which one finds some extensive combination
of the following features: (1) local and regional officials are appointed by the center;
(2) there are no local bosses to challenge the authority of the center; (3) decision-
making authority at the capital is concentrated in the executive (or, if there is a
national legislature, it has little real say); and (4) bureaucracies are well insulated from
systems of patronage. Conversely, one can expect that a highly decentralized political
system will have a significant combination of the opposing features.
Conceiving of two separate continua of centralization vs. decentralization-one
for the administrative sphere and one for the political sphere-is a valuable heuristic
exercise, and I have highlighted above the major factors that roughly determine where
a given polity might be placed on each continua.8 The next step is to apply this
analysis to the early American colonial state in the Philippines, and examine the
complex interplay of administration and politics within this distinctive polity. In the
course of this examination, I will explain the historical genesis of the generally
decentralized administrative and political structures of the modern Philippine state.
The Taft Era, 1900-1913: The Origins of the

Modern Philippine State
The key figure in the construction of American colonial rule was William Howard
Taft, who first arrived in the Philippines in 1900 and served as the first Civil Governor
"It is important to emphasize that this framework does not attempt to resolve what are
sure to be often very difficult problems of determining precisely where on the (political or
administrative) continua a given polity should be placed. As with the concepts of state auton-
omy and state capacity (Skocpol 1985), these two continua help to chart the conceptual terrain
but do not propose methods for definite measurement. Others are welcome to attempt such
precision, but my suspicion is that B. C. Smith was correct in asserting that the measurement
of decentralization (and, one should add, centralization) "cannot be a precise exercise; rough
judgements will have to be made" (1980, 139).
from 1901 to 1903. On returning to the United States, he proceeded to become U.S.
Secretary of War from 1904 to 1909 (thus "America's de facto colonial secretary")
and then President of the United States from 1909 to 1913.9 At the time of his arrival
in the Philippines in mid-1900, a widespread Filipino guerrilla struggle for
independence was uniting much of the population and tying down some 72,000 U.S.
troops (Golay 1998, 93); steady reports of atrocities, meanwhile, fanned anti-
imperialist sentiment at home. Out of a combination of expediency and ideals, the
blueprints for a new colonial state were drawn.
I will first briefly survey important legacies of the Spanish colonial state, and then
examine both the expedient strategies and political ideals of early American colonials.
The following three subsections examine major periods of the Taft era (1900-3, 1903-
6, and 1906-13), after which I provide more in-depth analysis of the era as a whole.
The Spanish Heritage
To begin, it is important to recall that the state constructed through the

interaction of U.S. colonials and a collaborating Philippine elite in the first decades
of the twentieth century both built upon and responded to socioeconomic and political
patterns of development in the Spanish colonial era. The first systematic investigation
of the Americans into Philippine political conditions, conducted by the Schurman
Commission in 1899, found much about this previous regime that demanded to be
reformed. One of the commission's major targets was what they perceived as the
excessive centralization of the Spanish colonial state. While central government
intervention in local affairs "is foreign to American practice," they noted, it "is
fundamental to the whole political life and thought of the Filipinos." Decentralization,
they declared, was "one of the crying needs" of the archipelago (Report of the Philippine
Commission [hereafter RPCJ 1900 1:70).
This common American analysis of the territorial dimensions of the Spanish
colonial state has many problems worthy of brief review. There were means by which
Manila intervened in local government affairs, to be sure, not the least of which was
the ability to make appointments to provincial posts. But one must also note that-
throughout the Spanish era-the government based in Manila was so understaffed
that it had to rely heavily upon ecclesiastical personnel in order to extend its reach
throughout the archipelago. Jose Rizal's late nineteenth-century novels vividly portray
the enormous local power exercised by some friars in their communities-in patterns
initially established some three centuries earlier. Friars not only exercised a large
degree of influence over local government affairs, but were often outside the control
of central supervision by either secular or ecclesiastical authorities (Corpuz 1957, 118-
22; Stanley 1974, 10-11). Provincial governors, moreover, "established nearly
autonomous fiefdoms" outside Manila's reach (just as Governors-General in Manila
were highly autonomous from their superiors in Acapulco and Madrid) (Steinberg
1994, 57-58). Despite the creation of a larger state structure and the spread of
universal religion-both commonly associated with breaking down local identities
and promoting long-distance trade (Young 1976, 30-33)-the Spanish period
initially promoted a strengthening of local identities and a curtailing of many
elements of internal trade. As Peter Stanley concludes, "the tumult[ujous impact of
9Paredes 1989b, 46. Although far from the archipelago in these later years, Taft's attention
to Philippine affairs remained keen. As a later Governor-General (Cameron Forbes, 1909-13)
noted in his journal, the Philippines was "Mr. Taft's favorite hobby" (Paredes 1989b, 47).
Spanish conquest was followed not by centuries of exposure and exploitation but by
two hundred years of deliberate, planned isolation" (Stanley 1974, 14, 10, quotation at
10, emphasis added).
Even when there was a dramatic opening of the Philippines to world agricultural
markets beginning in the late eighteenth century, the particular character of
agricultural commercialization strengthened local power of another sort, as
increasingly powerful landed elites (generally of mestizo heritage) emerged in the
provinces (McCoy 1982, 8; Larkin 1982). Although there were indeed efforts to reduce
the role of the priest and standardize local government administration in the latter
years of the Spanish regime (as in the Maura Law of 1893), such reforms had yet to
be implemented in most areas by the close of Spanish rule (Stanley 1974, 38). With
an economic base outside the control of the central government in Manila, the
circumstances were ripe for this highly dispersed group of prosperous local elites to
obtain political power as well. Both by force of circumstances and ideological
inclination, as we shall see, the arrival of the Americans provided countless
opportunities for this elite to do so.
A Fusion of Expediency and Ideals
Anxious to win over both a cosmopolitan ilustrado (educated) elite as well as a

broader group of local "caciques" that had-particularly in the vicinity of Manila-
given strong support to the revolutionary effort, Taft and his associates not only
drafted administrative reforms that envisaged the creation of strong local
governments, but also made longer-term plans for the convening of a national
representative assembly (the promise of which was formalized in the Organic Act
passed by the U.S. Congress in 1902). Taft privately considered the educated mestizos
"difficult persons out of whom to make an honest government," but needed the
cooperation of precisely this group in order to pacify the archipelago (Stanley 1974,
66-67). As part of the bargain of "benevolent assimilation," therefore, the United
States began to provide greatly expanded opportunities for political power to elites
that had already developed a strong economic base throughout major regions in the
latter decades of the Spanish era.10 The strength of anti-imperialist opinion at home-
amply represented in Congress, which played a major role in determining colonial
policy-provided further impetus for ensuring that Taft's overarching initial objective
was to end the war (Golay 1998, 75, 99). If only "our countrymen who are decrying
and hindering" American efforts could see the program of "offering these people
complete local autonomy," suggested one Taft aide, perhaps their opposition might
be quelled (Williams 1913, 182)."
Expediency alone, however, does not explain the manner in which U.S. colonials
crafted a new Philippine state; distinctively American notions of governance also
played a major role. Perhaps the clearest exposition of ideological precepts guiding
the new colonial master can be found in the April 1900 instructions written by
Secretary of War Elihu Root (on behalf of President McKinley) to Taft's Philippine
"0Whereas previously such opportunities were confined to the municipal level (as examined
in May 1989), the American regime steadily gave elites a strong role at all levels of government
(municipal, provincial, and national). In the process, as we shall see, formerly quite localized
elites forged deep and enduring linkages among themselves-first at the provincial and later
at the national level.
"1For an overview of various ways in which expediency guided Taft's statecraft, see Alfonso
1968. See also Yabes 1967, 20, 22.
Commission (Salamanca 1984, 31-32, 237-45). Root initially tried to prepare himself
for the task by studying the British colonial experience, but soon concluded that "the
precedents of other countries were less important than the legal rights and moral
traditions of his own" (Stanley 1974, 60). Although the United States had come to
enjoy "complete sovereignty" over the Philippines, Root nevertheless emphasized
"that there are certain things the United States Government couldn't do" because of
the inherent limitations on government embodied in the Bill of Rights. There were,
of course, many aspects of the Bill of Rights often denied to Filipinos-particularly
in the course of the protracted Philippine-American War; Root's own racism,
moreover, led him to consider the Filipinos "little advanced from pure savagery" and
thus not yet worthy of government based on popular consent (quoted in Stanley 1974,
60-61). But even while rights could be restricted and democracy delayed, it is
important to emphasize that American officials began the task of colonial state
formation with a strong belief in necessary limitations on governmental authority. In
addition, Root mandated the rapid establishment of municipal governments "subject
to the least degree of supervision and control . .. consistent with the maintenance of
law, order, and loyalty," and set out clear instructions for favoring local units in "the
distribution of powers among the governments" (Salamanca 1984, 239, 241).
In both these aspects, Root was of course drawing on important elements of
American political thought. Observers of the United States have long noted the
relative historical absence of a powerful, clearly demarcated, and centralized state; in
de Tocqueville's words, "society governs itself for itself .. . so feeble and so restricted
is the share left to the administration" (1953 [18351 I, 57). The typical American,
argues Huntington, "is so fundamentally anti-government that he identifies
government with restrictions on government.. .. Confronted with the need to design
a political system which will maximize power and authority, he has no ready answer.
His general formula is that governments should be based on free and fair elections"
(1968, 7). In his analysis of the nineteenth-century "state of courts and parties,"
Skowronek observes that the "broad diffusion of power among the localities was the
organizational feature ... most clearly responsible for the distinctive sense of
statelessness" (Skowronek 1982, 24, 23).
Colonial state formation in the Philippines began just as the American state was
in the midst of a period of extensive reform, and "new national administrative
institutions first emerged free from the clutches of party domination, direct court
supervision, and localistic orientations" (Skowronek 1982, 15). In the Philippines,
however, the major builders of the colonial state were, by the standards of their day,
conservatives rather than reformers or progressives (May 1984, xviii; see also Golay
1998, 63). There was indeed a "new American state" emerging at home, and there
were elements of that state that made their way to the Philippines (most notably, as
we shall see, the attempt to introduce a professional civil service). Nevertheless, it
was in many ways an older version of that state that U.S. colonials ended up implanting
in the Philippines. 12 Emerging from a system in which courts and parties still played
12Indeed, one can observe that just as Britain bequeathed an "antique polity" upon its
former American colony prior to experiencing a high degree of state centralization in the
seventeenth century (Huntington 1968, 93-139, at 135), so too did the United States bequeath
elements of the "early American state" upon the Philippines precisely at a time in which major
reform of that state was being accomplished at home (Skowronek 1982, 23). Abinales (1999)
discusses the coexistence in the American Philippines of (1) Jacksonian traditions of "machine
politics" and (2) more recent antimachine Progressive reforms (such as efforts to create a
professional civil service), and demonstrates how patterns of machine politics eventually
emerged dominant even in "special provinces" of the Cordillera and Mindanao that had earlier
been governed by the military (and thus relatively insulated from such patterns).
a dominant role, it is not surprising that Taft explicitly set out to make the "modern
lawyer-politician" (rather than the "medieval-religious type" of Spanish times) the
dominant figure in Philippine society (quoted in Steinberg et al. 1987, 277).
The Impulse Toward Devolution, 1900-1903
Through a combination of expediency and ideals, therefore, Taft and other

architects of American colonial rule demonstrated a strong inclination to grant
substantial authority to local officials throughout most of the archipelago and thus
replicate the spirit of local self-rule practiced at home (Cullinane 1971, 18). With
fond reference to New England, Taft proclaimed "town government" to be "the
practical way of building up a general government" (May 1984, 41).
The Philippine Commission enjoyed broad authority in crafting new policies. The
ultimate goal was to educate the Filipinos in the ways of representative government,
but Taft himself expected it to be "at least a generation" -and perhaps three-before
the Philippines would be prepared for self-government (May 1984, 14-15). The
Commission, composed of five Americans, was initially given legislative powers; after
the establishment of civil government in July 1901 it enjoyed both legislative and
executive powers. Soon thereafter, its ranks were augmented by the appointment of
three members of the Taft-supported, pro-American, and primarily Manila-based
Partido Federal (Cullinane 1989, 82, 89-90; Golay 1998, 76-77).
In the midst of continuing conflict, the American military government had
already begun to hold municipal elections-first granting wide rights of suffrage and
later limiting the franchise. Even if municipalities had little real authority (May 1984,
44-45), this early reliance upon an electoral process can be said to reflect distinctly
American notions of how to construct a state. After its formation in late 1900, Taft's
Philippine Commission quickly put in place the legal framework for more systematic
organization of local governments (building on the units and boundaries already
established in Spanish times). In the municipalities, a sharply circumscribed electorate
was given the right to elect a president (mayor), vice-president, and council. The
president appointed a municipal treasurer and secretary, and the council was given
considerable latitude for planning projects and appropriating town funds. Provinces
were to be governed by a three-member board, headed by a governor (indirectly elected
by municipal officials in his province) and also comprising a treasurer and supervisor
(of public works) appointed by Manila. The provincial governments were charged
with three major functions: collection of taxes (by the offce of the treasurer),
construction and maintenance of local infrastructure (by the office of the supervisor),
and supervision of municipal governments (by both the governor and the treasurer)
(Cullinane 1971, 19-21; Hayden 1942, 266). Both levels of local government received
an allocation of insular (central) revenues, and relied as well on a poll tax (the cedula),
an unpopular and generally unproductive tax on land, and various other sources such
as licenses and fees (Golay 1998, 114, 117; Hayden 1942, 273; Luton 1971, 143).
In providing for the election of provincial governors, the Americans significantly
expanded the political arena in which Philippine elites could vie for power. Under
the Spanish, provincial governors (exclusively Spaniards) were centrally appointed,
and elections allowed only at the municipal level. The revolutionary Philippine
Republic, established in 1898, had a more extensive system of elected municipal and
provincial officials, but its influence was short-lived. Beginning with the election of
governors in 1902, there developed new and more extensive types of intraprovincial
linkages among various municipalities that soon emerged as provincewide political

factions. In the coming years, as the American project of "self-government" moved
beyond municipalities and provinces to the creation of an Assembly in Manila, these
provincial factions were to become a major building block of national-level political
maneuvering (Cullinane 1989, 227, 255, 513-14).
Nearly all municipal officials were Filipino, as were roughly three-quarters of top
provincial officers. In seeking to maintain "firm control over the provincial
governments," however, the Commission reserved the posts of provincial treasurer and
supervisor for Americans (Cullinane 1971, 19-20, 45, 47, quotation at 19). The
treasurer was to be the major figure overseeing both provincial and municipal affairs
on behalf of the insular government. In Manila, the Executive Bureau was established
both as the clearinghouse for the executive branch as a whole and as the major body
overseeing local units of government. As such, its top official-the Executive
Secretary-came to be "recognized throughout the Archipelago as one of the
outstanding members of government." Even if the Executive Bureau had a dominant
role in dealing with the provinces, it is also important to note that it was not the
only agency to enjoy an extensive network of field offices: the bureaus of constabulary,
education, land, forests, mines, and posts also had their own direct dealings with their
provincial units (Hayden 1942, 275; Barrows 1914, 17). As such, the Executive
Bureau was far lower in stature than the powerful interior ministries associated with
prefectoral systems (where one central agency tends to monopolize the dealings of the
central state with lower tiers of authority).
The Executive Bureau looked over all legislation coming out of provincial bodies
(some 20,000 to 30,000 statutes per year) and examined as well the titles and
occasionally the substance of municipal acts. The goal was to detect and disallow
illegal acts and "deliberate abuse of authority," but, as Cullinane points out, this
method of supervision by correspondence had little impact either on the way in which
the legislation was implemented or on the behavior of the officials involved (Hayden
1942, quotation at 272; Cullinane 1971, 23, 26). This approach was very formalistic,
implicitly assuming a strong correlation between written statutes and the actual
behavior of local officials. Another element of long-distance supervision included
requirements that local officials obtain central approval for budgets, loans, and certain
governmental tasks (Hayden 1942, 273). Finally, as analyzed in greater detail below,
the Executive Bureau investigated charges of wrongdoing against local officials and
recommended a range of sanctions for those found guilty. In order to promote honest
and efficient government at all levels, the Commission enacted a Civil Service Act in
1901. Taft expected the law to save the colony from "the most marked evil of
American politics, the spoils system," and the Commission declared that "without
this law American government in these islands is . .. foredoomed to humiliating
failure" (Hayden 1942, 91).
At the same time that Taft was seeking to promote considerable autonomy at
local levels and sound administration throughout the colony, he was also determined
to assist in the formation and expansion of a favored political party, the Federalistas.
Political party formation is a not a normal activity for most colonial masters, but in
the Philippines Taft considered it an important element of his larger project of
"political education." He supported the Federalistas very openly, not only giving them
a privileged position on the colony's premier governmental body but also providing
ample opportunities for them to transcend their thin elite Manila political base and
begin to build a larger following throughout the provinces. Most importantly, the
Federalistas were given a powerful role in making appointments to key provincial
offices (a privilege formerly enjoyed primarily by American military officers)

(Cullinane 1989, 90, 93-96).
At a point in history when most colonial powers were building powerful
bureaucracies in the capital and relying on prefectoral systems to centralize control
over the countryside, therefore, the American colonial government in Manila began
the task of state formation with a pronounced emphasis on local autonomy and party
patronage. There were indeed provisions for central administrative supervision, but
at the same time local interests were able to attain political office amid expectations
of gaining an ever-widening role in governmental affairs. In a setting in which de
facto decentralization was already far advanced (as landed elites held sway in many
localities), Taft promoted the devolution of a considerable degree of decision-making
authority to (1) elected local officials and councils and (2) indirectly elected provincial
governors. At the same time, a Manila-based party struggling to expand its political
base to the countryside was given ample patronage opportunities, and thereby able to
influence the character of local administration. In terms of expediency, this strategy
of building a state through compromise with established provincial lords was
remarkably successful in enabling U.S. colonials to defeat the Philippine struggle for
independence.13 As an effort to duplicate New England-style town government in a
distinctly contrasting socioeconomic milieu, however, the strategy was quickly
revealed to be a monumental failure.
Frustrated Supervision, 1903-1906
Despite their initial intentions, American colonial officials soon found that the
goal of local autonomy quite often conflicted with the goal of seeking to ensure that
government was doing its job well (building roads and ports, providing law and order,
dispensing good justice, fighting disease, and the like). There were also increasing
concerns-as voiced by Taft himself in 1902-over "caciqueism" and "feudal relations
of dependence" in the countryside; the previous Spanish regime was also blamed for
failing to provide sufficient "examples of fidelity to public interest . . . to create a
proper standard of public duty" (Owen 1971, 5; Cullinane 1971, 18). Many municipal
councils were appropriating funds to their own salaries, leaving roads untended and
teachers unpaid. "The truth is," Taft acknowledged, "that the municipal governments
have not been as satisfactory in their operations as could be wished" (RPC 1903 1:83).
Beginning in 1903, concern over inefficiency and corruption in local governance
led to an increasing tendency to try to supervise from the center. Several examples are
instructive. Municipal treasurers became civil service appointments, selected and
deputized by an American provincial treasurer who now had the authority to examine
municipal books. The provincial board was empowered to annul acts of municipal
councils deemed illegal, and the general supervisory and disciplinary authority of
provincial officials over the municipalities was given new emphasis (e.g., governors
were now specifically instructed to inspect municipalities once every six months, and
given the authority to make on-the-spot suspensions of misbehaving officials). In 1905
and 1906, the Executive Bureau took charge of the activities of provincial treasurers
(formerly supervised by the Insular Treasurer), a new corps of district auditors
operating out of Manila was charged with looking over the books of provincial
1 3Onofre D. Corpuz speaks of the " 'co-optation' of nationalism": as the Filipino elite was
"co-opted into the colonial regime," there was a "moderation of Filipino nationalism" (Corpuz
1965, 65-66). See also Yabes's analysis of "diluted nationalism" (1967, 23-25).
treasurers, major responsibility for both public works and public health was removed
from the localities and vested with central bureaus in Manila, and the Bureau of
Internal Revenue took more control over the controversial process of land assessment
(Cullinane 1971, 21-23, 66; RPC 1906 1:97, 105; Hayden 1942, 266, 270; Barrows
1914, 17; Luton 1971, 130-31). There was also a 1903 reform to try to improve the
much-denigrated municipal police, who were "often used as the personal servants of
the municipal presidentes" (RPC 1903 1:84-85).
Despite these efforts to centralize, however, key bureaus in Manila often lacked
the capacity to supervise effectively. One major constraint was the weakness of the
bureaucracy created by the Americans. As Anderson explains, "unlike all the other
modern colonial regimes in twentieth century Southeast Asia, which operated through
huge, autocratic, white-run bureaucracies, the American authorities in Manila ...
created only a minimal civil service and quickly turned over most of its component
positions to the natives" (1988, 11). There were weak incentives for attracting
qualified Americans to join the colonial service, exacerbated by uncertainties over the
longevity of American rule (Corpuz 1957, 179-80). These problems led Executive
Bureau Secretary Arthur W. Fergusson to conclude that Americans were somehow
different creatures from their European counterparts, who were trained in the colonial
service and "content to live and die 'East of Suez' " (RPC 1905 1:104).14 Fergusson
even found it difficult to find competent Americans for the most critical post, that of
provincial treasurer (Cullinane 1971, 31). The instability of the bureaucracy involved
both American and Filipino employees; within the Executive Bureau-the premier
agency tasked with supervising provincial and local government-there were in 1906
only seven employees (out of a total of 156) who had served since its foundation in
1901 (RPC 1906 1:98). If central rulers are to succeed in their struggle against local
patrimonial lords, Weber observed, they must develop and control an administrative
structure capable of replacing them. Concerned over abuses of governmental power
in the countryside, the United States sought to increase central supervision and thus
improve the quality of local government. It soon became apparent that they lacked
the administrative capacity to do so.
These tentative efforts at administrative centralization were accompanied, in the
political realm, by the rapid and substantial provincialization of the national elite.
The Partido Federal that Taft initially nurtured had by 1905 lost his active support-
and thus lost their hold on provincial appointments. "Increasingly," explains Michael
Cullinane, "the political forces in the provinces were playing their own games to gain
access to patronage and political influence" (1989, 240). In 1905, Taft put out
instructions for colonial officials to look to provincial governors for a new group of
Filipino leaders in order to "strengthen your hold on the entire archipelago" (Paredes
1989b, 53-60, quotation at 60). Some did so with great skill, and in the process
promoted both their own careers and the careers of the provincial elites whom they
elevated to the national stage (Cullinane 1989, 413-29).
In the first national convention of provincial governors, held in Manila in 1906,
two politicians in particular emerged as dominant figures: Sergio Osmenia of Cebu
(elected presiding officer) and Manuel Quezon of Tayabas, each of whom had emerged
through close ties to rising American officials. As the new colonial authority
consolidated its control over the archipelago, both of these budding lawyers had been
quick to discern that the path to power lay in the political sphere-not in the judicial
and bureaucratic sphere as during Spanish times (Cullinane 1989, 228, 515). These
14For a useful analysis of American colonials' comparative assumptions, see Adas 1998.
two "lawyer-politicians" continued to dominate national politics for several decades

to come, and proved masterful in using the rhetoric of American democracy and subtle
understandings of American institutions simultaneously to consolidate their
provincial bases of power and build a nationwide network among other provincial
powerholders (Cullinane 1989, 384-90; 1971, 25). From 1906 on, the national
political leadership was thoroughly provincial in both its origins and its base.
Shared Authority: The Commission and the Assembly,

1906-1913
Amid these major changes, American colonials continued to follow through with
ongoing plans to turn over increasing levels of political authority to Filipino elites.
Upon the recommendation of the governors, the Commission in 1906 made two major
changes in the composition of the provincial government: governors were to be elected
directly (instead of indirectly) by the voters, and one of the two members of the
provincial board formerly appointed by the center was to be replaced by an elected
official.15 Prior to the reform, there had often been considerable tension between the
governor and the two appointed Americans on the provincial board, with the latter
frequently pressuring the former to investigate municipal officials (on whom the
governor depended for votes!) for misconduct and other charges (Cullinane 1971, 21;
see also Hayden 1942, 270). After the reform, a majority of provincial board members
became both elected officials and Filipino, and-according to the Philippine
Commission-provincial leaders now "realize that they are on trial ... to prove their
capacity for local self-government." They further reported that friction between
governors and treasurers "has entirely disappeared" (RPC 1907 1:44). Whether or not
these assertions are true, it is clear that the attempt to reduce friction led to
considerable advancement in the decentralization of the political system.
Provincial treasurers continued to be centrally appointed, but each year more and
more posts were assumed by Filipinos instead of Americans (reaching nearly 40
percent of the total by 1913) (Cullinane 1971, 48). To the extent that appointed
officials remained loyal to Manila rather than cultivating ties to the locality in which
they were assigned, nationality need not be a defining issue in examining central-
local relations; the critical factor is that officials feel themselves to be distinct from
the societal groups they are to govern-as when a strong esprit de corps emerges
within the bureaucracy. But it became increasingly apparent (for reasons discussed
further below) that the bureaucracy constructed by the Americans was never to become
well demarcated from the society it was supposed to serve-or from patronage
structures on the verge of major expansion in influence and scope.
These provincial reforms were very important in reshaping Manila's ties to the
provinces, but an even more transformative change came at the national level, in 1907,
when the American-dominated Philippine Commission began to share legislative
power with a Filipino Assembly elected by a highly circumscribed electorate.16 The
leadership that emerged in the 1907 elections confirmed the shift toward provincial
"5This had originally been the provincial supervisor, and later (after 1905) the superin-
tendent of schools (Cullinane 1971, 22).
16This Assembly had been planned since 1902, and was to "be established two years after
the publication of the Census provided that there was complete peace certified by the Governor
General.... The census was published in 1905" (Kalaw 1926, 308). The Assembly was
elected by a franchise composed of roughly 3 percent of the entire population (Salamanca 1984,
56).
power that had become evident two years earlier. Sergio Osmenia was elected Speaker
of the new Assembly, and Manuel Quezon named majority floor leader (Golay 1998,
139). Together, these two young and highly skilled politicians were the major figures
in the newly formed Nacionalista Party, a purportedly proindependence party which
was to dominate Philippine politics for much of the next four decades. Together with
others of similar background, they represented a qualitatively new type of national
politician. Unlike the earlier group of Manila-based politicians who had become
"solely dependent on American patronage," the new Nacionalista leadership enjoyed
"a more permanent political base upon which to collaborate and compete with the
colonial authorities." Unlike many other provincial-based politicos, as well, they had
also been quick to see that it was possible to combine a provincial base with access to
national power (Cullinane 1989, 389-90, 513-14, quotations at 514).
Secretary of War Taft came to witness the opening of the Assembly, and at a
banquet gave his blessings to the leadership change by declaring Osmenia to be "the
second man in the Philippine Government" (Kalaw 1926, 315). Behind the scenes,
the Commission had been working furiously to pass a range of bills in the final days
before it gave up its exclusive control over the legislative process. Many of these had
a centralizing intent: granting authority to the Executive Secretary to regulate the
salaries of provincial employees, enabling provincial boards to review the acts of
municipal councils, restricting municipal councils' rights to impose taxes, and
tightening restrictions on ownership of firearms. The Commission's last-minute rush
to legislate produced bitter feelings in the new Assembly (Golay 1998, 125-26), and
there were soon a host of lower-house proposals that sought to move policy in the
opposite direction. A large number of bills sought to decrease supervison and increase
the powers and resources of local government, fulfilling earlier campaign promises
(May 1984, 60-61, 189-92; Golay 1998, 139). The Nacionalista's founding principle
of "immediate independence" was set aside immediately, and was not to be a matter
that Osmefia and Quezon pursued with any sincerity. As a publicly proclaimed goal,
however, this slogan was an effective vote-getter-and had the additional utility of
forcing concessions from the Americans that advanced the new national politicos'
ultimate objective: "self-government or political autonomy under colonial rule"
(Salamanca 1984, 147-52; Cullinane 1989, 498-99, 517-18, quotation at 518).17
The civil service law was an early target in this effort to promote a greater degree
of "self-government." In 1908, one successful measure reestablished the control of
municipal councils over municipal treasurers (since 1903, this post had been subject
to appointment by the provincial treasurer, who was in turn appointed by the
Executive Bureau). This measure removed one of the most important local posts from
civil service protection and transformed it into an explicitly political post. The
American Director of Civil Service was very vocal in opposition, charging that it "will
practically destroy the open competitive principle." The treasurer would become
beholden to the councils rather than to the center; because the occupants of this post
would be judged according to political rather than bureaucratic criteria, moreover,
the overall quality of local governance would likely sink even lower. The new
17As Salamanca concludes, Osmefia and Quezon "did not really desire immediate inde-
pendence, or even want to have a date fixed for the future recognition of Philippine indepen-
dence. What they wanted was for the United States to make an authoritative declaration that
it would ultimately recognize Philippine independence, and accompany this declaration with
the grant of more substantial powers to a Philippine government composed almost entirely of
Filipinos" (1984, 152).
Assembly also frequently acted upon requests for exemptions of specific hirings from
the Civil Service Act, and in 1908 tried to downgrade the status and independence
of the Bureau of Civil Service (Hayden 1942, 92-93). The latter proposal was defeated
by the Philippine Commission (now the upper house of the Legislature). 18
Other proposed measures had the potential to affect central-local relations in more
indirect but nonetheless significant ways. These included efforts to reduce taxes and
provide extensions for payments of the land tax (in an extractive system already
struggling to generate revenues from the landed class), increase control over
governmental appropriations, promote Filipinization of the bureaucracy and cabinet
posts, and supplant the Commission with an elective Senate. Osmenia pushed for a
"quasi-parliamentary" system of government, in order that Nacionalista legislators
could simultaneously take control of cabinet posts; although this idea was rejected by
Taft in Washington, one additional Filipino member was brought on to the
Commission in 1909 (Rafael Palma, a close Osmefia associate), and for the first time
a Filipino commissioner was given a cabinet post. When battles over appropriations
threatened to shut down the government, Taft convinced the U.S. Congress to amend
the 1902 Organic Act to ensure that the previous year's budget would be
automatically renewed in the event that the Philippine Legislature failed to approve
a new appropriations bill.
Overall, the opening of the Assembly presented American colonials with far
greater constraints on determining colonial policy; by 1913, only 29 percent of the
Commission's measures were passed by the Assembly. The provincial-elites-turned-
national-politicos elected to the Assembly very skillfully utilized their new authority,
and consistently worked both to consolidate their power at the national level and
extend their autonomy at the local level. Even if Osmefia's effort to claim a chunk of
executive power was not to succeed until the following decade, the Nacionalista
leadership soon learned the art of "seizing power ... by burrowing from within"
(May 1984, 60-67; Golay 1998, 139-59, quotation at 144).
In sum, American colonial rule further reinforced the decentralized nature in the
Philippines by concentrating far less on the creation of a central bureaucracy than on
the introduction of representative institutions. As the framework outlined above
suggests, the creation of a national legislature expands opportunities for the expression
of local interests,19 as does the permeation of administrative structures by systems of
patronage and spoils. The representative institutions enabled local caciques to
consolidate their hold on the national state, and fostered the creation of what Benedict
Anderson has called "a solid, visible 'national oligarchy.' " Under Spanish rule, these
elites enjoyed municipal power, but there was no larger political arena for fostering
regular interaction with other municipal elites. Thanks to American representative
institutions, municipal elites first coalesced into provincial factions, and soon
181t is not known why the Commission approved the bill removing central control over
municipal treasurers. But as the subsequent Governor-General (Cameron Forbes) remarked in
his diary in 1909, the Commission agreed to some "very pernicious . .. but popular" measures
in order "to keep the Assembly in the frame of mind of approving our measures" (May 1984,
62). Cullinane points out that Forbes was also keen on showing Taft that he had strong
influence with the new Filipino leadership he had helped to cultivate, and regularly conferred
with Osmefia and Quezon to trade legislative favors (1989, 499). This early harmony, however,
soon deteriorated (May 1984, 62-70).
19This is particularly true when, as was the case in the American Philippines, legislators
are elected through a single-member district plurality electoral system and expected (in what
was developing to be a presidential system) to represent the interests of their districts.
thereafter leading probinsiyano politicians enjoyed a new arena of power-and social

interaction-in Manila:
They might dislike one another, but they went to the same receptions, attended the
same churches, lived in the same residential areas, shopped in the same fashionable
streets, had affairs with each other's wives, and arranged marriages between each
other's children. They were for the first time forming a self-conscious ruling class.
(Anderson 1988, 11, emphasis in original)
While reforms were reshaping political structures at all levels of government,

certain longstanding problems remained unresolved. Among the most persistent was
that of the municipal police, who continued to be widely perceived as the
"muchachos" of local mayors. As the Constabulary commander reported in 1905,
"municipal police organization as a whole is worse than useless" (RPC 1905 111:32).
Despite earlier tentative attempts at reform, supervision by outside authorities was
sporadic at best. In 1912, the Constabulary was given the authority to govern, inspect,
and discipline all municipal police forces (RPC 1912, 147). Nonetheless, they
remained "a joke and a scandal" throughout the American period (Hayden 1942,
291).
Throughout the Taft years, a large number of charges of misconduct (e.g., neglect
of duty, abuse of authority, malversation, extortion, bribery, false arrest, "bad habits
and immorality," and gambling) were brought against local officials. It was the task
of the Executive Bureau's Law Division to investigate these charges and suggest
sanctions that could then be imposed by the Governor General (ranging from
reprimand to removal from office). Some types of officials, it seems, were more likely
to be punished than others. "[Flor obvious reasons," explained Executive Secretary
Fergusson in 1906, "the Government has acted on the theory that Filipino officials
ought not to be as yet and they have not been held up to the standards required of
Americans." In 1902 and 1903, seventeen Americans (fifteen of whom worked at the
provincial level) were caught with their hands in the till and sent to prison. Quite
significantly, five of these were provincial treasurers, the officials entrusted by Manila
with the critical task of watching over the condition of municipal and provincial
finances (Cullinane 1971, 39, 56-57, 59, quotation at 39).
There was a notable reluctance, on the other hand, to remove Filipino officials at
the provincial level. Between 1903 and 1911, a total of only four governors, six
prosecuting attorneys, and twenty officials of lower rank were removed from a total
of some thirty-four provinces. When it came to governors, in particular, both Taft
and one of his successors admitted a hesitancy to remove them from office: not only
were they prominent individuals in the colony, but the Executive Bureau relied heavily
upon them for supervision of the municipalities. Among Filipino officials of the
roughly 600-1000 municipalities (the number fluctuated over time), a total of over
2300 cases were investigated and nearly 1500 penalties assessed between 1903 and
1913. In the years for which more precise data are available (1904-6, 1909-13), a
total of 733 persons were removed from office-including 128 presidents and 16
municipal treasurers.
Political considerations played a regular role in this process of administrative
supervision. Charges against officials were to be channeled through provincial boards;
not surprisingly, those that involved political rivals were pursued with vigor while
those involving allies were not. Sometimes governors used their powers of suspension
and failed to inform the Executive Bureau; when Manila did at times get directly
involved by sending in investigators from the Law Division, it was nearly impossible
to judge charges, countercharges, or the reliability of witnesses without a thorough

understanding of the local power structure.20
Nonetheless, a large number of cases were examined each year by either insular
or provincial authorities. The effectiveness of these penalties for promoting central
government interests is impossible to assess; as Cullinane observes, we do not know
whether they tended "to make the next official more dedicated to the public good or
merely more subtle in his activities and more wary of the supervisory authorities."
But as Taft explicitly acknowledged in 1908, officials felt more pressure from Manila
than from the (narrow elite) electorate-and previous punishment had no obviously
negative impact on officials' subsequent success at the polls. At least 40 percent of
the members of the new Assembly had received some sort of sanction while serving
as local officials, and several had faced court convictions and removals from office
(Cullinane 1971, 27-29, 36-37, 54-55, 59, 64, 70, quotation at 29).
The Taft Era in Retrospect
By 1903, when Taft left Manila for higher office in Washington, it was already
clear that his strategy of conciliating Philippine elites had been highly effective in
enabling the American colonials to defeat the Philippine struggle for independence.
By 1913, as Taft was leaving the White House and a new era was to unfold in the
Philippines, one can also observe that America's leading colonial master had succeeded
entirely in his goals of promoting local autonomy and making the "modern lawyer-
politician" the dominant figure in Philippine society. As one might expect of an
American colonial state, mayors, governors, and national legislators had far greater
stature than did bureaucrats working for central agencies based in the capital.
At the same time, the promotion of local autonomy and representative institutions
had not produced much democratic substance, either at the local level (where town
government had more in common with Tammany Hall than New England) or at the
national level (where the most ambitious of the provincial lords now enjoyed a new
arena for exerting authority and power over the rest of the population). Taft himself
was not entirely comfortable with the overall results of his strategy: as early as 1908,
he expressed concern that the effect of American colonial policy might merely be "to
await the organization of a Philippine oligarchy or aristocracy competent to administer
government and then turn the Islands over to it. "21
This was, in fact, the result. For reasons of expediency, Taft had crafted an intimate
American alliance with the mestizo class. Over the longer term, however, he hoped
that American ideals would shine through and undercut what he had once called "a
kind of quasi slavery called caciquism" (Stanley 1974, 67). More specifically, he hoped
2"For two revealing examples of politically sensitive cases against governors that were
treated with great caution by the Executive Bureau, see Cullinane 1971, 42-44. Writing in
the Commonwealth years, Hayden observes that "[iun view of its powers and central position
it is perhaps inevitable that the Executive Bureau should have become a very important factor
in Philippine party politics" (1942, 274). In related analysis, Alfonso reports that Taft was
willing "to blink at irregularities if the wrongdoer was pro-American or a convert to the
American cause" (1968, 250).
2'Even stronger American sentiment along these lines can be found in the 1914 study of
Philippine Commissioner Dean Worcester: "We have utilized the services of Filipino politi-
cians who are openly opposed to the policy which we are endeavoring to carry out, and have
thus placed between ourselves and the people a screen of shrewd and hostile men.... For this
condition of things," he concludes, "we have ourselves to thank, and these are the men who
would be governors under 'self-government' " (quoted in Cullinane 1989, 528).
the combination of an American-style civil service and widespread public education

would, eventually, promote "popular self-government" and enable the common people
to maintain their civil rights "against a more powerful class" (Cullinane 1971, 16;
Steinberg 1987, 278). As Cullinane explains, Taft felt that "one of the main roles of
the United States was to be the protector of the Filipino masses from the menacing
upper classes," who were considered "a major hindrance to the functioning of a truly
democratic society" (1971, 15).
Leaving aside the paradox of foreign colonials giving rhetorical support to the
long-term goal of "popular self-government" (see Paredes 1989a), it is important to
note that we once again find the Americans acting quite unlike most other colonial
powers. In the African colonial state, Crawford Young explains, the notion of civil
society was highly circumscribed: "the completeness of its domination freed the state
from responsiveness to its subjects to a remarkable degree" (1994, 118, 159, quotation
at 159). In the Philippines, on the contrary, the Americans not only put limits on
the scope of their domination (as expressed in Root's initial instructions to the
Philippine Commission) but also expressed the ultimate goal of expanding the notion
of civil society downward toward the masses (albeit in a careful, controlled, and highly
conservative fashion) in order to undercut the emerging oligarchy's hold over the
state.22
Over time, however, it became clear that the expedient strategies of the initial
years severely undercut any hopes of realizing the ideals that continued to be expressed
in later years. The Philippines did emerge with a powerful civil society, but it was
anything but democratic in character. Both the colonial and postcolonial state have
been very responsive to civil society, but except in rare cases this responsiveness has
been limited to a narrow, privileged group at its pinnacle. At the same time that the
Americans were "elaborating the evils of elite rule," writes Cullinane, they were
"allowing such rule to become firmly implanted through their association with and
their dependence on" this very elite (1971, 15). Before long, Owen argues, the
Americans realized that their alliance with the Philippine elite frustrated the "full
panoply of programs the United States envisaged for the islands . . . above all, the
genuine democratization of the Philippine polity." It was always easier for the United
States to obtain the support of the elite than to try to implement a reform program
without their help (1971, 6). Neither political education nor attempts at greater
central supervision proved effective in curbing the dominance of this class over the
basic processes of governance. Indeed, Taft's policies effectively ensured that politics
would be a playground for the elite: he not only limited the right of suffrage to a
small percentage of the population, but also discouraged any sort of popular
mobilization that might threaten their political dominance.23 In the end, the
American regime provided the perfect opportunity for provincial elites to build upon
their previously constructed local economic base, consolidate a powerful local political
22Young also observes elements of clear differentiation between the African colonial state
and that of either the Spanish or the American Philippines. Given its distinctive background,
he terms the Philippines "a unique colonial hybrid" (1994, 257-58, 275-76).
23By the time political participation was expanded in later decades, the oligarchy's dom-
inance was so well entrenched that challenges from below-motivated by deep social injus-
tices-faced monumental odds. In the postwar years, the United States actively supported the
domestic hegemony of the oligarchy in order to safeguard its major strategic assets in the
Philippines: the military bases at Subic and Clark. Thanks to Benedict Anderson for high-
lighting how Taft's policies limiting the suffrage and curbing popular mobilization effectively
ensured oligarchic dominance of colonial "self-government."
bailiwick, and proceed to emerge as a national oligarchy able to take control of the
central government in Manila. This, in turn, brought countless new opportunities for
further enrichment and empowerment (see Hutchcroft 1998).
At the local level, the Americans provided considerable autonomy, but the result
was certainly not quality municipal and provincial governance. It is common to
associate decentralization with democracy, but this is a case that clearly shows its not
infrequent capacity to promote local authoritarianism instead (Hutchcroft,
forthcoming). Supervision from Manila was sporadic and generally ineffectual; as local
bosses worked to appropriate governmental structures for their own benefit,
competition from other bosses was generally a far greater obstacle than opposition
from central authority. Plagued by a shortage of personnel, the Executive Bureau had
to supervise municipalities through increasingly autonomous provincial governments.
This is not to overlook the elements of centralization that did exist, nor to deny
the great importance of Manila decision-making in local politics. The Executive
Bureau reviewed local (particularly provincial) statutes, and overturned those it
deemed objectionable or illegal. Manila also enacted a host of regulations requiring
provincial and local officials to obtain permission for a range of governmental tasks
performed at the subnational level. In addition, local officials had to master the art of
lobbying the new legislature for public works appropriations (May 1984, 62). The
central government quite obviously had a prominent role, but the overall strategies
of American colonials ended up heightening rather than challenging the position of
local bosses and provincial lords. "Despite Manila supervision," concludes Hayden,
"to a considerable degree the quality of Philippine local government has been
determined locally" (1942, 277).
At the national level, systems of patronage overwhelmed the capacity of central
agencies to supervise lower levels of government. Shefter does not include colonial
states within the scope of his analysis, but in doing so it can be seen that the
administrators of modern colonial states are very commonly a powerful "constituency
for bureaucratic autonomy. "24 Crawford Young's study of Africa makes this point
most clearly:
Good government ... meant "sound administration." Rational, prudent

management of the colonial estates by a professional cadre of administrators apply
increasingly scientific methods to their development and impartial adjudication of
conflicts: this was the refrain of the self-composed encomium to colonial rule. As a
Platonic guardian class, colonial officialdom represented itself as the disinterested
servant of the subject population . .. still enclosed in the cave of ignorance.
(1994, 165)
In trying to construct a reliable civil service, therefore, the Philippine Commissio

was doing nothing unusual. What makes American colonial rule distinctive is the
simultaneous pursuance of policies promoting the rapid emergence of an extremely
potent "constituency for patronage." At times, the promotion of patronage was a very
conscious policy: recall Taft's strategic grant of patronage privileges to the Partido
Federal whose growth he wanted to nurture. More important, however, was how the
creation of legislative institutions created a logic for patronage at a point when
bureaucratic structures had barely had a chance to consolidate their strength. Before
24In other words, modern colonial states should thus be added to the two historical coa-
litions that Shefter already notes: those led by absolutist monarchs and those led by "a ration-
alizing middle class" (1994, 31).
long, these structures were to be overwhelmed by those who were able to milk their
resources for particularistic advantage. Nascent attempts at building an effective
system of administration, in other words, were engulfed by another, more powerful
logic. By undercutting central supervision, this further (yet unwittingly) advanced
the cause of local autonomy.
In many accounts, the Americans appear as the defenders of civil service and
Filipinos as its detractors. Quezon said it best, perhaps, when in later years he
proclaimed his preference for a government "run like hell by Filipinos to one run like
heaven by Americans.' 25 U.S. political scientist Ralston Hayden (and former vice-
governor, 1933-1935) wrote of a "halcyon condition of affairs" in which "American
administrators were entirely non-political" thanks to (a) a lack of ambition for
(electoral?) political activities; (b) a system of incentives for promotion based on
administrative capabilities; and (c) "the conviction of the great Americans who were
politically responsible for the Philippines" that the merit system was essential to U.S.
success in "giving this backward country an honest and efficient administration and
... preparing its people for democratic self-government" (1942, 90). Philippine
political scientist Onofre D. Corpuz, similarly, writes that "the pioneer Americans
were . . . unhampered by obstructive vested interests" and able to pass a civil service
law that they claimed was more advanced than any existing at the time in the United
States (1957, 165).
To be sure, since few Americans ran for public office in the Philippines there was
less need to use patronage to expand a political base or build a political machine.26
As such, it would not be surprising if American colonials in the Philippines were less
inclined to patronage and corruption than were American politicians at home. This
is not to ignore the considerable corruption that did exist, but rather to point out
that the corruption of American colonials was likely to be motivated more strictly by
personal gain. Forbes complained of "white men of a very low order" who sometimes
entered government service (1945, 91), and it has already been noted that many
Americans-including five provincial treasurers-were convicted of stealing public
funds in 1902 and 1903.27
Explanations of Filipino propensities toward patronage and corruption have
commonly tended toward simplistic cultural interpretations, and Spanish and Malay
customs generally get the rap. Surprisingly, these explanations can be found in both
colonial and postcolonial, American and Filipino, analyses. A colonial-era head of the
American Chamber of Commerce in Manila blamed "Latin Malayism" for the
corruption that reemerges from "lessened [American] control" of government
(Veneracion 1988, 107), and Hayden spoke of "ancient national evils" not easily
corrected by the American-sponsored "campaign for good government" (1942, 298).
More recently, Salamanca explains away the shortcomings of local- and provincial-
25Quezon was responding, in the early 1920s, to Governor-General Leonard Wood's as-
sertion that Filipinos were unprepared for self-government (Gopinath 1987, 12).
26This is not to say that Americans eschewed patronage altogether: in the endless legis-
lative horse-trading between the Commission and the Assembly, the colonials did find pa-
tronage a useful tool in urging Filipino politicians to support their measures. Thanks to
Michael Cullinane for highlighting this point.
27Writing in 1914, Mrs. Taft spoke of "a little band of white men in Bilibid prison in
Manila today because of their venality and breach of trust. Our mission . . . is based upon the
highest principles and we have always striven to maintain a high moral tone in the government
personnel, so it is particularly painful when, as happened too often at first, an American went
wrong" (Gleeck 1976, 135).
level government as an inheritance of a social milieu "partly native and partly

Castilian" (1984, 51) while Veneracion says that Filipinization enabled "the
traditional vices of Filipinos . . . to emerge again" (1988, 107; for a similar analysis,
see also de la Torre 1986, 55).
Among the many problems with these analyses is the failure to acknowledge that
it was precisely American-inspired structures of governance that encouraged the
particular type of patronage-driven corruption most commonly associated with
Filipinos. This behavior was by no means "traditional" but rather a distinctly mo
outcome of the particular configuration of the U.S.-crafted colonial polity. Shefter's
insights are valuable in understanding why, within the context of this polity,
American colonials tended (with some notable inconsistencies) to form the backbone
of the "constituency for bureaucratic autonomy," while Filipino politicians-precisely
because they were politicians-constituted the major "constituency for patronage. "28
When representative institutions were created in 1907, the bureaucratic constituency
had yet to extend its influence very broadly or more deeply. Not surprisingly, the
logic of patronage emerged supreme. Hayden tends toward a rosy picture of the
American colonial record, but nonetheless acknowledges that
elective Filipino officials in the municipalities, the provinces, and, after 1907, in the
Philippine Assembly were driven, as politicians are always driven, to utilize
"government jobs" as political currency. ... Patronage was their political lifeblood
and there were neither inhibitions within themselves nor restraints from their people
to prevent its use. These differences in background and political necessity between
appointed Americans and elected Filipinos sufficiently explain the conflicts between
them over the strict maintenance of high standards in the civil service.
(1942, 91-92)
Manila-based politicos and provincial lords-the new, national oligarchy-took

advantage of their independent base of power, and came to exercise powerful,
particularistic control over all levels of the governmental apparatus through a spoils
system that had become well entrenched at the national level early in the century.
"Civil servants frequently owed their employment to legislator patrons, and up to the
end of the American period the civilian machinery of state remained weak and
divided" (Anderson 1988, 12).
To return to the framework introduced at the outset, we can characterize the Taft-
era state as decentralized in both major spheres of activity. Administratively, the
prefectoral models common in other colonial states were rejected in favor of a clearly
articulated devolution of authority to provincial and municipal governments; this
occurred in a setting where there was already a high degree of de facto decentralization
enjoyed by local patrimonial lords. Politically, the American colonial state was highly
decentralized in each of the four areas specified: nearly all local executives were elected
rather than appointed, bosses wielded enormous power in many localities, an
increasingly influential national Assembly provided wide-ranging expression of local
interests, and the bureaucracy was not well insulated from systems of patronage. The
28Given the major restrictions on suffrage that existed during the colonial era, Shefter's
insights need to be modified slightly to highlight not the impact of the emergence of mass
electoral participation but rather the impact of the introduction of representative institutions.
Discussing an entirely different historical era, Ertman demonstrates how the presence or ab-
sence of territorially based national representative bodies is essential to understanding the
process of state formation in early modern Europe (1997, 28-34).
initial impulse towards local autonomy was accompanied by tentative efforts at

centralization and formalistic requirements that the actions of subnational
governments be approved in Manila (in effect, supervision by correspondence). But
the central bureaucracy's capacity for sustained and effective supervision was hobbled
by instability of personnel as well as patronage pressures. Provincially based
legislators, meanwhile, displayed little allegiance to the goal of developing a
meritocratic civil service.
Reflections on the Post-Taft Philippine State
These general trends toward the simultaneous consolidation of provincial power

at the national level and the retention of a high degree of autonomy at the local level
actually intensified in subsequent years. Between 1913 and 1921, as aspirations for
Philippine independence were given enthusiastic support by a Democratic governor-
general, provincial powerholders were able to consolidate their control of legislative
institutions (as an elective Senate replaced the Philippine Commission) and exert a
considerable degree of executive authority as well (through a Council of State in which
House Speaker Osmefia and Senate President Quezon played a leading role). In 1916,
an Osmefia ally became responsible both for supervision of local governments and the
Philippine Constabulary; during this period, notes Hayden, there was "scarcely a
pretense of American supervision and inspection" (1942, 282). More general control
over appointments and budgets enabled the two leading politicians to enjoy even
greater patronage links with the Philippine bureaucracy.
A hard-nosed Republican governor-general tried to reverse some of these trends
in the early 1920s, but the already widespread dispersal of power made it difficult for
Manila to exert control with any great effectiveness. By the late 1920s and early 1930s,
the agency charged with overseeing local governments was widely regarded as being
highly partisan, and in any case repeatedly complained of insufficient personnel to
effect regular supervision of localities. Between 1921 and 1931, the Executive Bureau
averaged formal annual inspections of less than half of all provinces and 19 percent
of all municipalities (Annual Reports, Executive Bureau, various issues, 1921-31).
Despite repeated attempts at reform, the condition of municipal police did not
improve; meanwhile, the state's dominance over coercive power declined notably: by
the 1930s, there were estimated to be ten times as many licensed and unlicensed
firearms in private hands as in the hands of the Constabulary and the municipal police
(Baja 1933, 243-45, 116).
The assumption of Philippine leadership, under the Commonwealth established
in 1935, also did little to promote systematic administrative control from the center.
President Manuel L. Quezon was given broad powers of supervision over local
governments in the 1935 constitution, but his attention seems to have been directed
primarily towards centralizing control over patronage resources; the relationship of
localities to the center is determined more by electoral objectives than the promotion
of administrative effectiveness. In these political strategies, Quezon achieved
extraordinary success (see McCoy 1989, 120).
The early postwar system had many characteristics that one would not expect to
find in an "overcentralized" polity, as even the most cursory examination suggests.
Administrative decision making was quite centralized (as even minor matters required
permission from Manila), but there was by no means any sustained central supervision
of local affairs (Romani and Thomas 1954, 123). As in colonial years, moreover,
mayors enjoyed considerable control over local police forces, and the heightened
postwar prevalence of "loose firearms" fostered "warlord" armies that were especially
active at election time. Local leaders delivered blocs of votes in exchange for benefits
from allies in Manila, while "national" politics itself was often dominated by the need
of congresspersons to consolidate local bailiwicks (through such means as rampant
pork-barrel spending).29
Under the martial-law regime of Ferdinand Marcos (1972-86), there were
important elements of centralization, including measures to bring police forces under
national control, collect "loose firearms," and form twelve new regional planning
bodies to coordinate national policy at a new supraprovincial level. In reality, however,
Marcos restructured but did not overturn the local, familial basis of Philippine
politics; like Quezon, he was more interested in centralizing patronage resources than
in centralizing administrative structures. Since the fall of Marcos in 1986, many
patterns of pre-martial-law politics have returned. The reopening of Congress marks
the return of democratic institutions after a long nightmare of highly repressive and
crony-infested authoritarianism; at the same time, however, it has given many old
provincial dynasties new opportunities to reassert their influence over national politics
(Gutierrez 1994). By 1991, enough high-powered firearms had been smuggled into
the country to create two additional national armies (PCIJ 1992, 90-91). The
administration of Corazon Aquino showed itself highly accommodating to local power
in the provinces (including many "warlord" figures associated with the previous
regime), and very responsive as well to longstanding sentiment in favor of providing
more authority to municipal and provincial bodies. In part out of a strong reaction
against previous authoritarian excesses, the Philippines in 1991 adopted its sweeping
program of decentralization (Rood 1998, 116-17).3?
Conclusion
As noted at the outset, proponents of this project commonly begin by asserting

the longstanding centralized character of the Philippine polity, and proceed to push
decentralization as a means of resolving past ills. This is, of course, a highly
problematic analysis, not only for its historical interpretation but also for its failure
to acknowledge the continuing importance of local power in Philippine politics (see,
e.g., Kerkvliet and Mojares 1991; Lande 1965; McCoy 1994; Rocamora 1995; and
Sidel 1995). Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of the current decentralization
is that it is being undertaken in the absence of any strong historical process of
centralization. The Taft era left a legacy of considerable administrative and political
decentralization, albeit not without certain centralizing tendencies. If contemporary
29For analysis of the premartial law "pork barrel" system, see Carinio 1966. In his exam-
ination of the political career of Sergio Osmenia, Jr. (son of the masterful colonial politician),
Mojares (1986) provides a rich portrait of machine politics in the early postwar years.
30The importance of the national bureaucracy was downgraded, as local officials were
provided with greater autonomy in carrying out many basic governmental functions. Some
70,000 national government employees were devolved to the local level, and local government
units' share of internal revenue allotments jumped from 11 percent to 40 percent. Local gov-
ernments were given greater control over the planning process, as well as important new powers
intended to promote local revenue mobilization.
reforms are to succeed, their formulation must be based on careful analysis of relations
between Manila and the provinces. Local structures should indeed be strengthened
when they are capable of promoting democracy and development, but in many cases
devolution may end up promoting forces hostile to democracy and detrimental to
development-and certain measures of centralization could prove essential in
furthering these goals. In short, convenient and formalistic simplifications must be
replaced by historically grounded analysis able to capture the complex interplay of
administrative and political systems.
The second major objective of this article is to demonstrate how analysis of the
Taft era provides insights for comparative inquiry into state formation, colonial state
formation, and territorial dimensions of modern states. Examination of this period
puts particular focus on issues of compromise, ideology, and the historical timing of
the creation of administrative and representational structures. Each of these issues
plays an essential role in explaining the relative weakness of central authority in the
modern Philippine state.
We know from Charles Tilly that compromise was part and parcel of European state
formation, as central rulers were frequently forced to bargain with competing
concentrations of coercion and capital. Crawford Young, similarly, explains that many
African colonial states instituted systems of indirect rule that accommodated and
incorporated indigenous structures of authority. In each case, however, it is generally
expected that over the long term rulers will prefer-if possible-to move toward
more centralized forms of rule and larger degrees of autonomy from (and dominance
over) civil society. Imperatives of war were the leading catalyst for European state-
building, forcing rulers to confront local powerholders with whom they may
previously have been content to compromise (Tilly 1992, 25-26; Young 1994, 107-
8, 118). Applied to modern polities, "a prime motivation for state leaders to attempt
to stretch the state's rule-making domain within its formal boundaries, even with all
the risks that has entailed, has been to build sufficient clout to survive the dangers
posed by those outside its boundaries, from the world of states" (Migdal 1988, 21).
Upon arriving in the Philippines in 1900, Taft and his fellow state-builders used
compromise (dressed up as "benevolent assimilation") to achieve their overarching
objective of defeating a war of independence; to quote David Steinberg, "Taft reversed
Karl von Clausewitz's maxim by making politics an extension of war by other means"
(1994, 67). The previous century's process of agricultural commercialization had
created an elite with independent bases of economic power throughout the
archipelago, and Taft proceeded to win over this elite by granting them political
power as well-beginning in the municipalities and quickly proceeding also to the
provincial and national levels. As such, the creation of the modern Philippine state
was very much a joint, compromise venture of both American colonials and Filipino
collaborators. Compromise remained the dominant theme: when an external threat
(from Japan) did come to be perceived by American officials, the reaction of some
(including Theodore Roosevelt) was not to build a more centralized state and confront
local powerholders but rather to let loose the colony. By the second half of American
colonial rule, the goal of Philippine independence had already become official U.S.
policy (Stanley 1974, 220, 214).
Ideology is another key element in the formation of the modern Philippine state.
Taft's brand of compromise was clearly motivated not only by expediency but also by
ideals; unlike the rulers of a centralizing state, he did not share the same telos of
overcoming competing centers of local power and achieving larger degrees of
autonomy from (and dominance over) civil society. He was, instead, acting out of
distinctly American notions of what a state is to be. As Root's instructions make clear,
these ideas include definite limits on governmental authority and a strong bias in
favor of local autonomy. This is not to say that the American Philippines was destined
to become decentralized, since there are indeed diverse strands of political thought
within the American tradition (as evidenced by ongoing tensions on issues of central
control versus states' rights since the founding of the republic). But in setting out to
develop colonial governance in the Philippines, Taft and his fellow state-builders drew
heavily on their own experience of the "radically deconcentrated" nineteenth-century
American "state of courts and parties" (Skowronek 1982, 24). My emphasis on the
role of ideology in state formation builds on the work of others, most notably James
Scott's analysis of the horrific consequences that have come from state leaders'
application of "high modernist" ideals in a range of settings worldwide (1998). The
Taft era reveals how a dramatically contrasting ideology is capable of producing its
own, very distinct, dysfunctional consequences.
Both expediency and ideals led American officials toward very close ties with
collaborating Filipino elites, and through these interactions the modern Philippine
state came to be. Knowledge of the historical timing of the introduction of a national
representative institution further enhances our understanding of the character and
shape of this state. Drawing on the work of Martin Shefter, I have shown that the
"constituency for bureaucratic autonomy" had hardly had a chance to consolidate itself
when the Assembly was convened in 1907, and as a result administrative structures
were soon overwhelmed by enormous pressures for patronage. Viewed from a
bureaucratic perspective, one can say that the colonial administrative apparatus was
itself largely colonized by emergent Filipino politicians from the provinces. This
clearly stunted the coherence of the Philippine state, undermined central efforts to
supervise local affairs, and encouraged the patterns of rampant patronage under which
it still suffers today. More fundamentally, however, we must recall how these
provincially based national politicos came to have so much influence over the character
of the colonial state. This resulted, quite clearly, from the particular type of state
formation initially pursued by William Howard Taft and other American state
builders in the years 1900-13. Having defeated the Philippine struggle for national
independence, the Americans effectively diverted the quest for self-government toward
a simultaneous quest for increased local autonomy, expanded national legislative
authority, and more extensive opportunities for patronage.
List of References
ABINALES, PATRICIO N. 1997. "State Authority and Local Power in the Southern
Philippines, 1900-1972." Ph.D. diss., Cornell University.
1999. "Progressive-Machine Conflict in Early Twentieth Century American
Politics and Colonial State-Building in the Philippines." Unpublished ms.
ABUEVA, JOSE VELOSO, and RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, eds. 1969. Foundations and
Dynamics of Filipino Government and Politics. Manila: Bookmark.
ADAS, MICHAEL. 1998. "Improving on the Civilising Mission? Assumptions of
United States Exceptionalism in the Colonisation of the Philippines." Itinerario
22: 44-66.
ALFONSO, OSCAR M. 1968. "Expediency in Taft's Philippine Administration."
PhilippineJournal of Public Administration 12: 246-55.
ALUNAN, RAFAEL M. III. 1995. "Democratic Consolidation in the Philippines." In

Focus on the Philippines: Dialogue on Political Developments, edited by The Asia Soci
and the Asian Institute of Management Policy Forum. New York: The Asia
Society.
ANDERSON, BENEDICT. 1988. "Cacique Democracy and the Philippines: Origins
and Dreams." New Left Review, no. 169: 3-33.
BAJA, EMANUEL A. 1933. Philippine Police System and Its Problems. Manila: Pobre's
Press.
BARROWS, DAVID PRESCOTT. 1914. A Decade of American Government in the
Philippines, 1903-1913. Yonkers-on-Hudson, N.Y.: World Book.
BLAIR, HARRY. 1996. "Supporting Democratic Local Governance: Lessons from
International Donor Experience-Initial Concepts and Some Preliminary
Findings." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, San Francisco, California, 29 August-I September.
CALLAGHY, THOMAS M. 1984. The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative
Perspective. New York: Columbia University Press.
CARINO, LEDIVINA V. 1966. "The Politics and Administration of the Pork Barrel."
Manila: University of the Philippines School of Public Administration.
CORPUZ, ONOFRE D. 1957. The Bureaucracy in the Philippines. Manila: University of
the Philippines Institute of Public Administration.
.1965. The Philippines. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
CULLINANE, MICHAEL. 1971. "Implementing the 'New Order': The Structure and
Supervision of Local Government During the Taft Era." In Compadre Colonialism:
Studies on the Philippines Under American Rule, edited by Norman G. Owen.
Michigan Papers on South and Southeast Asia, no. 3, Ann Arbor.
1989. "Ilustrado Politics: The Response of the Filipino Educated Elite to
American Colonial Rule, 1898-1907." Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan.
DE GUZMAN, RAUL P., MILA A. REFORMA, and ELENA M. PANGANIBAN. 1988.
"Local Government." In Government and Politics of the Philippines, edited by Raul
P. de Guzman and Mila A. Reforma. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
DE LA TORRE, VISITACION. 1986. History of the Philippine Civil Service. Quezon City:
New Day Publishers.
ERTMAN, THOMAS. 1997. Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in
Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
EXECUTIVE BUREAU. 1921-193 1. Annual Report, various issues.
FESLER, JAMES W. 1962. "The Political Role of Field Administration." In Papers in
Comparative Public Administration, edited by Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes. Ann
Arbor, Mich.: Institute of Public Administration.
1968. "Centralization and Decentralization." In International Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences, vol. 2, edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan.
FININ, GERARD A. 1991. Regional Consciousness and Administrative Grids:
Understanding the Role of Planning in the Philippines' Gran Cordillera. Ph.D.
diss., Cornell University.
FORBES, W. CAMERON. 1945. The Philippine Islands, rev. ed. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
GLEECK, LEWIS E., JR. 1976. American Institutions in the Philippines (1898-1941).
Manila: Historical Conservation Society.
GOLAY, FRANK HINDMAN. 1998. Face of Empire: United States-Philippine Relations,
1898-1946. Madison: University of Wisconsin-Madison Center for Southeast
Asian Studies.
GOPINATH, ARUNA. 1987. Manuel L. Quezon: The Tutelary Democrat. Quezon City:
New Day.
GUTIERREZ, ERIC. 1994. The Ties That Bind: A Guide to Family, Business, and Other
Interests in the Ninth House of Representatives. Metro Manila: Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism and Institute for Popular Democracy.
HAYDEN, JOSEPH RALSTON. 1942. The Philippines: A Study in National Development.
New York: Macmillan.
HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
HUTCHCROFT, PAUL D. 1998. Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the
Philippines. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
. Forthcoming. "Centralization and Decentralization in Administration and
Politics: Assessing Territorial Dimensions of Authority and Power." Governance,
scheduled for publication January 2001.
KALAW, MAXIMO M. 1926. The Development of Philippine Politics (1872-1920).
Manila: Oriental Commercial Co.
KERKVLIET, BENEDICT J., and RESIL B. MOJARES. 1991. From Marcos to Aquino:
Local Perspectives on Political Transition in the Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo de
Manila University Press.
LANDEt, CARL H. 1965. Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics.
New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies.
LARKIN, JOHN A. 1982. "Philippine History Reconsidered: A Socioeconomic
Perspective." American Historical Review 87: 595-628.
LUTON, HARRY. 1971. "American Internal Revenue Policy in the Philippines to
1916." In Compadre Colonialism: Studies on the Philippines Under American Rule,
edited by Norman G. Owen. Michigan Papers on South and Southeast Asia, no.
3, Ann Arbor.
MANN, MICHAEL. 1986, 1993. The Sources of Social Power. Vols. 1 and 2. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
MAY, GLENN A. 1984 [19801. Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution,
and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913. Quezon City: New Day
Publishers.
1989. "Civic Ritual and Political Reality: Municipal Elections in the Late
Nineteenth Century." In Philippine Colonial Democracy, edited by Ruby R. Paredes.
New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies.
McCoY, ALFRED W., ed. 1994. An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the
Philippines. Madison: University of Wisconsin Center for Southeast Asian Studies.
.1982. "Introduction: The Social History of an Archipelago." In Philippine
Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations, edited by A. W. McCoy and
E. C. de Jesus. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii.
1989. "Quezon's Commonwealth: The Emergence of Philippine
Authoritarianism." In Philippine Colonial Democracy, edited by R. R. Par
Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Monograph No. 32.
MIGDAL, JOEL S. 1988. Strong Societies and Weak States. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
MOJARES, RESIL B. 1986. The Man Who Would Be President: Serging Osmega and
Philippine Politics. Cebu: Maria Cacao Publishers.
OCAMPO, ROMEO B., and ELENA M. PANGANIBAN. 1985. The Philippine Local
Government System: History, Politics, and Finance. Manila: Local Governm
College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.
OWEN, NORMAN G. 1971. "Philippine Economic Development and American

Policy: A Reappraisal." In Compadre Colonialism: Studies on the Philippines Under
American Rule, edited by Norman G. Owen. Michigan Papers on South and
Southeast Asia, no. 3, Ann Arbor.
PAREDES, RUBY R. 1989a. "Introduction: The Paradox of Philippine Colonial
Democracy." In Philippine Colonial Democracy, edited by R. R. Paredes. New
Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies.
. 1989b. "The Origins of National Politics: Taft and the Partido Federal." In
Philippine Colonial Democracy, edited by R. R. Paredes. New Haven: Yale
University Southeast Asia Studies.
PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM AND ATENEO CENTER
FOR SOCIAL POLICY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS. 1992. 1992 and Beyond: Forces and
Issues in Philippine Elections. Metro Manila: PCIJ and Ateneo CSPPA.
PUTNAM, ROBERT D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Report of the Philippine Commission (RPC). 1900-13. Various annual reports.
Washington, D.C.
RIZAL, Jost. 1996 [18871. Noli Me Tangere. Translated by Ma. Soledad Lacson-
Locsin. Metro Manila: Bookmark.
ROCAMORA, JOEL. 1995. "Classes, Bosses, Goons, and Clans: Re-imagining
Philippine Political Culture." In Boss: Five Case Studies of Local Politics in the
Philippines, edited by Jose F. Lacaba. Metro Manila: Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism.
ROMANI, JOHN H., and M. LADD THOMAS. 1954. A Survey of Local Government in
the Philippines. Manila: University of the Philippines Institute of Public
Administration.
ROOD, STEVEN. 1998. "Decentralization, Democracy, and Development." In The
Philippines: New Directions in Domestic Policy and Foreign Relations, edited by David
Timberman. New York: Asia Society.
SALAMANCA, BONIFACIO. 1984 [19681. The Filipino Reaction to American Rule, 1901-
1913. Quezon City: New Day Publishers.
SCOTT, JAMES C. 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
SHEFTER, MARTIN. 1994. Political Parties and the State: The American Historical
Experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
SIDEL, JOHN THAYER. 1995. "Coercion, Capital, and the Post-Colonial State:
Bossism in the Postwar Philippines." Ph.D. diss., Cornell University.
SKOCPOL, THEDA. 1985. "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in
Current Research." In Bringing the State Back In, edited by P. B. Evans, D.
Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
SKOWRONEK, STEPHEN. 1982. Building a New American State: The Expansion of
National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
SMITH, BRIAN C. 1980. "Measuring Decentralisation." In New Approaches to the Study
of Central-Local Government Relationships, edited by G. W. Jones. Westmead,
Farnboroush, Hampshire: Gower Publishing.
SNYDER, LOUIS L., ed. 1962. The Imperialism Reader: Documents and Readings on Modern
Expansionism. Princeton: Van Nostrand.
STANLEY, PETER W. 1974. A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United
States, 1899-1921. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
STEINBERG, DAVID JOEL. 1994. The Philippines: A Singular and a Plural Place. 3rd
ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
, ed. 1987. In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History. Honolulu: Universit
of Hawaii Press.
TAPALES, PROSERPINA D. 1993. Devolution and Empowerment: The Local Government
Code of 1991 and Local Autonomy in the Philippines. Quezon City: University of the
Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies.
TILLY, CHARLES. 1985. "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime." In
Bringing the State Back In, edited by P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
. 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
ToCQUEVILLE, ALEXIS DE. 1953 [18351. Democracy in America. Vol 1. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf.
VENERACION, JAIME B. 1988. Merit or Patronage: A History of the Philippine Civil
Service. Quezon City: Great Books Trading.
WEBER, MAX. 1978 [19221. Economy and Society. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press.
WILLIAMS, DANIEL R. 1913. The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission. Chicago: A. C.
McClurg.
WILLIS, HENRY PARKER. 1905. Our Philippine Problem: A Study of American Colonial
Policy. New York: H. Holt.
WORCESTER, DEAN C. 1914. The Philippines Past and Present. 2 vols. New York:
Macmillan Company.
YABES, LEOPOLDO Y. 1967. "The American Administration in the Philippines."
Solidarity 2: 16-26.
YOUNG, CRAWFORD. 1976. The Politics of Cultural Pluralism. Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press.
. 1994. The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. New Haven: Yale
University Press.

Colonial Masters, National Politicos, Provincial Landlords

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Colonial Masters, National Politicos, Provincial Landlords

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local

Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900-1913

W HEN THE UNITED STATES EMBARKED ON A CAMPAIGN of overseas colonial

Paul D. Hutchcroft is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Wis-

TheJournal of Asian Studies 59, no. 2 (May 2000):277-306.

revolutionary challenge-established the foundations of the modern Philippine polity.

'Ocampo and Panganiban 1985, 2. This assertion of a "centralist" history is a common

formation, and central-local relations. In particular, this analysis focuses attention on

Assessing Territorial Dimensions of Politics and

Over time, Michael Mann emphasizes in a discussion that draws heavily on

The Taft Era, 1900-1913: The Origins of the

The Spanish Heritage

To begin, it is important to recall that the state constructed through the

A Fusion of Expediency and Ideals

Anxious to win over both a cosmopolitan ilustrado (educated) elite as well as a

The Impulse Toward Devolution, 1900-1903

Through a combination of expediency and ideals, therefore, Taft and other

linkages among various municipalities that soon emerged as provincewide political

offices (a privilege formerly enjoyed primarily by American military officers)

Frustrated Supervision, 1903-1906

two "lawyer-politicians" continued to dominate national politics for several decades

Shared Authority: The Commission and the Assembly,

thereafter leading probinsiyano politicians enjoyed a new arena of power-and social

While reforms were reshaping political structures at all levels of government,

to judge charges, countercharges, or the reliability of witnesses without a thorough

The Taft Era in Retrospect

the combination of an American-style civil service and widespread public education

Good government ... meant "sound administration." Rational, prudent

In trying to construct a reliable civil service, therefore, the Philippine Commissio

level government as an inheritance of a social milieu "partly native and partly

Manila-based politicos and provincial lords-the new, national oligarchy-took

initial impulse towards local autonomy was accompanied by tentative efforts at

Reflections on the Post-Taft Philippine State

These general trends toward the simultaneous consolidation of provincial power

As noted at the outset, proponents of this project commonly begin by asserting

ALUNAN, RAFAEL M. III. 1995. "Democratic Consolidation in the Philippines." In

OWEN, NORMAN G. 1971. "Philippine Economic Development and American

You might also like