Evidence Notes by Erika Rule 128 129

I.
Introduction
A. Basic Concept(s)
Evidence vs Proof
Evidence is the medium of proof or the means sanctioned by the Proof is the effect or result of evidence
rules in ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact
Can be objected Cannot be objected
Factum Probandum vs Factum Probans

The ultimate fact or facts sought to be established The evidentiary fact or facts by which factum probandum is to be
established
Fact/proposition to be established; Fact to be proved Facts/materials evidencing the fact/ proposition to be
established
It is the fact which is in issue in a case and to which the evidence Probative/evidentiary fact tending to prove the fact in issue
is directed
The rules of evidence are specifically applicable ONLY in judicial proceedings. In quasi judicial proceedings, the same apply by
analogy, or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient, except where the governing law on that particular
proceeding specifically adopts the rules of evidence in the Rules of Court.
SOURCES of the Rules of Evidence:

1. 1987 Constitution
2. Rules 128-134 of the Rules of Court
3. Resolution of the Supreme Court
4. Judicial Affidavit Rule
5. Child Witness Examination Rule
6. DNA Evidence Rule
7. Electronic Evidence Rule
8. Rule 115 Rules on Crim Procedure
9. Anti Wire Tapping Act
10. Human Securities Act
11. Substantive and remedial stature
12. Judicial decisions
II. General Principles (Rule 128)
A. Definition
RULE 128
General Provisions
SECTION 1 . Evidence defined. — Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the
truth respecting a matter of fact. (1)
 Bustos v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948
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It is contended that section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court infringes section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution. It is said that
the rule in question deals with substantive matters and impairs substantive rights.
We cannot agree with this view. We are of the opinion that section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an adjective law and not
a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to
be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations.
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which
give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial
law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion.
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for
committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a
crime is to be punished. Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal
prosecution.
As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence - which is the "the mode and manner of proving the
competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" - is identified with
and forms part of the method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law
transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice. The entire rules of evidence have been
incorporated into the Rules of Court. We cannot tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out
the whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules.
1 EVIDENCE Notes by Erika Judi SY 2018-2019 (based on the course outline of Atty. Canamo)
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same.
 Tan vs. Hosana, G.R. No. 190846, February 3, 2016 citing Rule 128, Sec. 1, Rules of Court
In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of
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evidence. Moreover, the parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense
offered by their opponent.
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to
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be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as
it is worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
The force and effect of a void contract is distinguished from its admissibility as evidence.
While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it does not preclude the
admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters that occurred in the course of executing the contract, i.e., what each
party has given in the execution of the contract.
Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact, sanctioned by the Rules of
Court. The purpose of introducing documentary evidence is to ascertain the truthfulness of a matter at issue, which can be the
entire content or a specific provision/term in the document.
The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the truthfulness of the consideration stated and
its actual payment. The purpose of introducing the deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms written in the contract,
which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The deed of sale, rather, is used as a means to determine matters that
occurred in the execution of such contract, i.e., the determination of what each party has given under the void contract to allow
restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules. There is no provision in the
Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void document. The Rules only require that the evidence is relevant and
not excluded by the Rules for its admissibility.
Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the purpose of introducing it as evidence is to ascertain the truth
respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the terms of the document itself.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or
admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and not reject them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admit them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if
they are thereafter found relevant or competent. On the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.
The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive provision of law requiring the consent of both spouses for the sale of
conjugal property. There is, however, no question on the presence of the consideration of the sale, except with respect to the
actual amount paid. While the deed of sale has no force and effect as a contract, it remains prima facie evidence of the actual
consideration paid.
 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Ley Construction and Development Corporation, G.R.
No. 185590, December 3, 2014
There is a “question of law” when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and which does not
call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a
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“question of fact” when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. x x x.
The issue of whether or not the Bank was able to establish its cause of action by preponderant evidence is essentially a question of
fact. Stated in another way, the issue which the Bank raises in this petition is whether the evidence it presented during the trial was
preponderant enough to hold LCDC and the spouses Ley liable.
The required burden of proof, or that amount of evidence necessary and sufficient to establish one’s claim or defense, in civil cases
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is preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is defined as follows:
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term “greater weight of evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence
is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability to truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier
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of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)
As preponderance of evidence refers to the probability to truth of the matters intended to be proven as facts, it concerns a
determination of the truth or falsity of the alleged facts based on the evidence presented. Thus, a review of the respective findings
of the trial and the appellate courts as to the preponderance of a party’s evidence requires that the reviewing court address a
question of fact.
Moreover, a demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Evidence is the means,
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sanctioned by the Rules of Court, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. As such, the
question of sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence, the basic issue presented by the Bank, pertains to the question of whether the
factual matters alleged by the Bank are true. Plainly, it is a question of fact and, as such, not proper subject of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It was incumbent upon the Bank to demonstrate that this case fell under any of
the exceptions to this rule but it failed to do so.
This failure of the Bank to present preponderant evidence that will establish the liability of LCDC under the Letter of Credit
necessarily benefits the spouses Ley whose liability is supposed to be based on a Continuing Surety Agreement
guaranteeing the liability of LCDC under the Letter of Credit.
 Gomez vs. Gomez-Samson, G.R. No. 156284, February 6, 2007
On the first point, we agree with petitioner that positive evidence is, as a general rule, more credible than negative evidence.
However, the reason for this rule is that the witness who testifies to a negative may have forgotten what actually occurred, while
it is impossible to remember what never existed.
Expert witnesses, though, examine documentary and object evidence precisely to testify on their findings in court. It is, thus, highly
improbable for an expert witness to forget his examination of said evidence. Consequently, whereas faulty memory may be the
reason for the negative testimonies delivered by ordinary witnesses, this is unlikely to be so with respect to expert witnesses. While
we, therefore, cannot say that positive evidence does not carry an inherent advantage over negative evidence when it comes to
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expert witnesses, the process by which the expert witnesses arrived at their conclusions should be carefully examined and
considered.
Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not exclusive on questions of a
professional character. The courts of justice, however, are not bound to submit their findings necessarily to such testimony; they
are free to weigh them, and they can give or refuse to give them any value as proof, or they can even counterbalance such evidence
with the other elements of conviction which may have been adduced during the trial. The problem of the credibility of the expert
witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the
absence of an abuse of that discretion.
B. Purpose
The function of evidence is the means of ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact.
It is not necessarily actual truth but also judicial and legal truth. (Basically to determine what is the truth)
C. Scope
Sec. 2 . Scope. — The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided
by law or these rules. (2a)
 El Greco Ship Manning and Management Corporation vs. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 177188,
December 4, 2008;
Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of facts of the CTA are binding on this Court and can only be disturbed on appeal if not
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supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
A review of the records of the present case unveils the overwhelming and utterly significant pieces of evidence that more than
meets the quantum of evidence necessary to establish that M/V Neptune Breeze is the very same vessel as M/V Criston, which left
the anchorage area at Legaspi, Albay, without the consent of the customs authorities therein while under detention for smuggling
35,000 bags of imported rice.
From the foregoing, we can only deduce that there is actually no Glucer Shipping and no M/V Criston. M/V Criston appears to be a
mere fictional identity assumed by M/V Neptune Breeze so it may conduct its smuggling activities with little risk of being identified
and held liable therefor.
We cannot give much credence to the self-serving denial by El Greco that M/V Neptune Breeze is not the same as M/V Criston in
light of the substantial evidence on record to the contrary. The foreign registration of M/V Neptune Breeze proves only that it was
registered in a foreign country; but it does not render impossible the conclusions consistently reached by the Legaspi District
Collector, the CTA Second Division and the CTA en banc, and presently by this Court, that M/V Neptune Breeze was the very same
vessel used in the conduct of smuggling activities in the name M/V Criston.
Neither can we permit El Greco to evade the forfeiture of its vessel, as a consequence of its being used in smuggling activities, by
decrying denial of due process.
In administrative proceedings, such as those before the BOC, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and
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administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
The only vital evidence it presented before the Manila District Collector in Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 was the foreign
registration of M/V Neptune Breeze. It was still the same piece of evidence which El Greco submitted to this Court. Even when
taken into consideration and weighed against each other, the considerably sparse evidence of El Greco in Seizure Identification No.
2001-208 could not successfully refute the substantial evidence in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification No.
06-2001-A that M/V Neptune Breeze is the same as M/V Criston.
st
 Governor Sadikul A. Sahali et. Al., v. Commission on Elections (1 Div.), G.R. No. 201796, January 15,
2013;
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or
right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and
predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed,
deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration.
An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with a public interest. The purpose of an election protest is to
ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the
correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest therefore
involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates but paramount to their claims is the deep
public concern involved and the need of dispelling the uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. And the court has the
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corresponding duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is the real candidate elected by the people. (Emphasis ours)
Here, the technical examination ordered by the COMELEC First Division, by comparing the signature and the thumbmarks appearing
on the EDCVL as against those appearing on the VRRs and the Book of Voters, is a reasonable, efficient and expeditious means of
determining the truth or falsity of the allegations of fraud and irregularities in the canvass of the votes in the province of Tawi-Tawi.
Accordingly, the COMELEC First Division did not commit any abuse of discretion when it allowed the technical examination of the
said election paraphernalia.
 Ferrer vs. Carganillo, G.R. No. 170956, May 12, 2010 per Del Castillo, J. citing Rule 1, Section 4, Rules of
Court
Rule 1 Section 4. In what cases not applicable.

These rules cannot apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization, insolvency proceedings and other cases not
herein provided for except by analogy or suppletory in character and whenever practicable and convenient.
The DARAB Rules of Procedures explicitly provides that the Agrarian Reform Adjudicators are not bound by technical rules of procedure and
evidence in the Rules of Court nor shall the latter apply even in a suppletory manner. Thus, we find that the DARAB erred in holding
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the Katulagan as inadmissible since it was not formally offered and admitted. Moreover, reliance on our ruling in People v. Mongado, i.e., that
"[t]he court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered," is misplaced. We simply cannot find any legal basis for the DARAB to
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cite our ruling in a criminal case; the fundamental rule found in Rule 132 of the Rules of Court does not find any application in this agrarian case.
In appeals of agrarian cases, this Court cannot make its own factual findings and substitute the same for that of the DARAB, as the only function of
this Court is to determine whether the DARABs findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence (Reyes vs. Reyes, 388 SCRA 471).Substantial
Evidence is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
 Reyes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of
evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I the COMELEC Rules of Procedure shall be liberally construed in order x x x to achieve just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission. In view
of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then
the newly discovered evidence was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to argue her case
before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its
resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity
given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the opportunity or right to be
heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or
right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and
predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed,
deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be he rd on his motion for
reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
 Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 216914,
December 6, 2016
Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a
preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling
justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules. In addition, considering that under Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court, then the
testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol may not be admitted by the trial court if not presented in evidence by the prosecuting fiscal.
And, even if the prosecution does present such testimonies, petitioner can always object thereto and the trial court can rule on the
admissibility thereof; or the petitioner can, during the trial, petition said court to compel the presentation of Galarion and Hanopol
for purposes of cross-examination. (Citations and emphasis omitted)
Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its determination of possible money laundering offenses,
specifically its inquiry into certain bank accounts allowed by court order, does not transform it into an investigative body exercising
quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order, cannot be said to violate SPCMB's
constitutional right to procedural due process.
D. Applicability of Electronic Evidence
 People of the Philippines vs. Enojas, G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014 citing A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the
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Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to
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the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the
other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his
possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
 Rustan Ang Y. Pascua v. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Irish Sagud, G.R. No. 182835, April 10,
2010
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-
7-01-SC).
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first time before the Supreme Court. The
objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in
evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil
actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
 Miro v. Vda de Erederos, 20 November 2013
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by
such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here. Obviously the material facts recited in the reports as to
the cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation.
Was knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by them through official information? xxx.
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by the
reporting officers through official information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. [emphases
ours]
The NBI/Progress report, having been submitted by the officials in the performance of their duties not on the basis of their own
personal observation of the facts reported but merely on the basis of the complainants affidavits, is hearsay. Thus, the Deputy
Ombudsman cannot rely on it.
Non-applicability of strict technical rules of procedure in administrative or quasi-judicial bodies is not a license to disregard certain
fundamental evidentiary rules
While administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, are not bound by the technical rules of
procedure, this rule cannot be taken as a license to disregard fundamental evidentiary rules; the decision of the administrative
agencies and the evidence it relies upon must, at the very least, be substantial.
Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
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a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is
reasonable ground to believe, based on the evidence submitted, that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained
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of. It need not be overwhelming or preponderant, as is required in an ordinary civil case, or evidence beyond reasonable doubt, as
is required in criminal cases, but the evidence must be enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.
 G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL ENOJAS
 Ferrer vs. Carganillo, G.R. No. 170956, May 12, 2010
 Reyes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013
E. Classification of Evidence (3 classes)
1. Object/Real/Demonstrative Evidence – the kind of evidence which is directly addressed to the senses of the court and
consists of tangible things exhibited, viewed or demonstrated in open court. (Evidence by autopic preference)
2. Documentary Evidence – an evidence which consists of writing or any material containing letters, words, figures, symbols,
or other modes of written expression offered as proof of their contents.
3. Testimonial Evidence – an oral evidence given by the witness on the witness stand or in any proceeding. (may be written)
Other Kinds:
Direct Evidence Circumstantial Evidence
Evidence which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any Evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the
inference or presumption facts in issue may be established by inference
Cumulative Evidence Corroborative Evidence

Evidence of the same kind and to the same state of facts; the Is additional evidence which merely supplements evidence has
same kind and character tending to prove the same proposition already been given tending to strengthen the same. Different
(ex of same kind, both evidence are object evidence) kind but of the same point
Corroborative Evidence is deemed necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the
truth or that his observation had been inaccurate.
Prima facie Evidence Conclusive Evidence

Evidence which, standing alone, unexplained or Evidence which the law does not allow to be contradicted; an
uncontradicted, is sufficient to maintain the proposition evidence that establishes the fact.
affirmed; Means it is sufficient to establish a fact or raise a
presumption unless disproved or rebutted.
Primary Evidence (BEST evidence) Secondary Evidence (SUBSTITUTIONARY)

Evidence which assures the greatest certainty of fact sought to Any evidence other than the document itself. Permitted by law
be proved, which does not in itself indicate the existence of only when the best evidence is not available. ( ex. Copy, recital of
other and better proof. contents in some authentic doc, recollection of the witness)
Positive Evidence Negative Evidence

Evidence in which a witness affirms that a fact did or did not Testimony that a certain fact did not exist or he did not see.
occur
Positive testimony is entitled to greater weight since the witness represents of his personal knowledge the presence or absence of a
fact. Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eye witness
testifying on the matter prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence is negative an self-
serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.
Competent Evidence Incompetent Evidence

Kind of evidence which is not otherwise excluded by law or by Evidence which is excluded by law or by the rules
the rules
Relevant Evidence Material Evidence

Kind of evidence which has a relation to the fact in issue One that is directed to prove a fact in issue as determined by the
rules on substantive law and pleadings.
Rebuttal Evidence Sur-Rebuttal Evidence

Any component evidence to explain, repel, counteract or Evidence in reply to or to rebut new matter introduced in
disprove adversary’s proof. It is receivable only where new rebuttal.
matters have been developed by the evidence of one of the
parties and is generally limited to a reply to new matters.
Evidence in Chief Newly discovered Evidence (NDE)

The primary and main evidence presented by the parties to Evidence that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have
prove their cause or defense been discovered before the trial in the court below.
Conditions for new trial to be granted on the ground of NDE:
1. The evidence must have been discovered after the trial

2. The evidence could not have discovered at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence
3. Evidence is material
4. Evidence must affect the merits of the case and produce a different result if admitted.
HEIRARCHY OF EVIDENTIARY VALUES
1. Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt – the required quantum of evidence in order to convict an accused. A judgment of
conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty, moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind that it was the accused
who committed the crime, failing which the accused must be exonerated.
2. Clear and Convincing Evidence – is a kind of evidence which establishes in the minds of a trier of facts a firm belief
on the existence of the fact in issue.
3. Preponderance of Evidence – the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible
evidence”. Means probability of the truth; more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.
4. Substantial Evidence – the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact substantial evidence in proceedings
before administrative and quasi-judicial agencies.
F. Admissibility of Evidence
Sec. 3 . Admissibility of evidence. — Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these
rules. (3a)
 Requisites of Admissibility
1. It must be relevant to the issue sought to be proved (RELEVANCE)
2. It must be competent or not otherwise excluded by the law of these rules (COMPETENCE)
 Types/Kinds of Admissibility
1. Conditional Admissibility – where the evidence at the time of its offer appears to be immaterial or
irrelevant, unless it is connected with the other facts to be subsequently proved, such evidence may
be received on condition that the other facts will be proved thereafter, otherwise the evidence
already given will be stricken out. (there must be no bad faith on the part of the proponent)
2. Multiple Admissibility – where the evidence is relevant and competent for 2 or more purposes, such
evidence should be admitted for any or all the purposes for which it is offered provided it satisfies all
the requirements of law for its admissibility.
(example: with the evidence presented, the witness will prove the following, that he is in possession
of the land, that the is the owner of the land and that he built a structure over the land)
3. Curative Admissibility – the right of the party to introduce incompetent evidence in his behalf where
the court has admitted the same kind of evidence adduced by the adverse party. It is allowed to
answer the inadmissible evidence.
Requisites of Curative admissibility:

1. Whether the incompetent evidence was seasonable objected to
2. Whether regardless of the objection, the admission of such evidence will cause a plain and unfair prejudice to the party
against whom it was admitted.
G. Exclusionary Rules
Article 3 – Bill of Rights (1987 Constitution)
1. Section 1- Right of every party litigant to due process of law.

The essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit one’s evidence in support of his defense.
A formal type or trial type of hearing is not essential.
2. Section 1- Right of a person to equal protection before the laws

All persons or things similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.
3. Section 2- Right of the persons against unreasonable searches and seizure

The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizure of
whatever nature and purpose shall be inviolable.
4. Section 3- Right of the persons to privacy of communication and correspondence.

The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon:
a. Lawful order of the court or
b. Public safety and order requires otherwise as prescribed by law
5. Section 12- Right of the persons under custodial investigation

a. The right to be informed of his right to remain silent
b. To have a competent and independent counsel of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
c. The right against torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him.
d. The right against secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
e. Any confession or admission obtained in violation shall be inadmissible in evidence
f. The laws shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
6. Section 12- Right of the person to post bail
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
convicition, be bailable.
7. Section 14- Right of the person to be presumed innocent and to due process of law
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
8. Section 17- Right of the person against self incrimination

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself
9. Section 16- Right of the party for the speedy disposition of cases
Applies before all judicial, quasi judicial or administrative bodies. The number of postponement is not determinative of violation of
the right to speedy trail, particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Other laws:
10. RA 1405- Law on Secrecy of bank deposits
AN ACT PROHIBITING DISCLOSURE OF OR INQUIRY INTO, DEPOSITS WITH ANY BANKING INSTITUTION AND PROVIDING PENALTY
THEREFOR.
Section 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give encouragement to the people to deposit their money in
banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to
assist in the economic development of the country.
Section 2. 1 All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds
issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an
absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or
office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases
of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.
Section 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any person other than those
mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits.
1 This Section and Section 3 were both amended by PD No. 1792 issued January 16, 1981, PD 1792 was expressly repealed by Sec
135 of R.A. No. 7653, approved June 14, 1993. The original sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No.1405 are hereby reproduced for reference, as
follows;; "Sec 2 All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds
issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an
absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or
office, except upon written per--mission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases
of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials. or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation," "Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any person other than
those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits."
11. Section 8 of the Foreign Currency Deposit Act
Section 8. Secrecy of foreign currency deposits. – All foreign currency deposits authorized under this Act, as amended by PD No.
1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under PD No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely
confidential nature and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall foreign currency deposits be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or
legislative, or any other entity whether public or private; Provided, however, That said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever. (As amended by PD No. 1035, and further amended by PD No. 1246, prom. Nov. 21, 1977.)
12. Section 9 of the anti money laundering Act
Section 9. Prevention of Money Laundering; Customer Identification Requirements and Record Keeping. –
(a) Customer Identification, - Covered institutions shall establish and record the true identity of its clients based on
official documents. They shall maintain a system of verifying the true identity of their clients and, in case of corporate
clients, require a system of verifying their legal existence and organizational structure, as well as the authority and
identification of all persons purporting to act on their behalf.
The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, anonymous accounts, accounts under fictitious names,
and all other similar accounts shall be absolutely prohibited. Peso and foreign currency non-checking numbered accounts
shall be allowed. The BSP may conduct annual testing solely limited to the determination of the existence and true
identity of the owners of such accounts.
(b) Record Keeping – All records of all transactions of covered institutions shall be maintained and safely stored for five
(5) years from the date of transactions. With respect to closed accounts, the records on customer identification, account
files and business correspondence, shall be preserved and safety stored for at least five (5) years from the dates when
they were closed.
(c) Reporting of Covered Transactions. – Covered institutions shall report to the AMLC all covered transactions within five
(5) working days from occurrence thereof, unless the Supervising Authority concerned prescribes a longer period not
exceeding ten (10) working days.
When reporting covered transactions to the AMLC, covered institutions and their officers, employees, representatives, agents,
advisors, consultants or associates shall not be deemed to have violated Republic Act No. 1405, as amended; Republic Act No. 6426,
as amended; Republic Act No. 8791 and other similar laws, but are prohibited from communicating, directly or indirectly, in any
manner or by any means, to any person the fact that a covered transaction report was made, the contents thereof, or any other
information in relation thereto. In case of violation thereof, the concerned officer, employee, representative, agent, advisor,
consultant or associate of the covered institution, shall be criminally liable. However, no administrative, criminal or civil
proceedings, shall lie against any person for having made a covered transaction report in the regular performance of his duties and
in good faith, whether or not such reporting results in any criminal prosecution under this Act or any other Philippine law.
When reporting covered transactions to the AMLC, covered institutions and their officers, employees, representatives, agents,
advisors, consultants or associates are prohibited from communicating, directly or indirectly, in any manner or by any means, to any
person, entity, the media, the fact that a covered transaction report was made, the contents thereof, or any other information in
relation thereto. Neither may such reporting be published or aired in any manner or form by the mass media, electronic mail, or
other similar devices. In case of violation thereof, the concerned officer, employee, representative, agent, advisor, consultant or
associate of the covered institution, or media shall be held criminally liable.
13. RA 4200 Anti wire tapping law

Case: Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (admissible)
The main issue revolves around the meaning of the phrase “any other device or arrangement.” The law refers to a “tap” of a wire
or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the
communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other device enumerated un
Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose.
extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected
by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more.
Case: Salcedo-Ortañez vs. Court of Appeals (inadmissible)

The tape recordings are inadmissible. Relevant provisions of R.A. 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act) provides that:
Section 1: It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all parties to any private conversation or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone, or dictagraph or detectaphone
or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described x x x
Section 4. Any communication, or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same
or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained, or secured by any person in violation of the
preceding section of this Act shall not be admitted in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative
hearing or investigation.
Hence, absent any clear showing that both parties consented to the recording, the inadmissibility of the tapes is mandatory under
R.A. No. 4200
Case: Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals (inadmissible)

R.A. No. 4200 applies to recordings by one of the parties to the conversation. Section 1 of the Act clearly and unequivocally makes it
illegal for any person, not authorized by all parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means
of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized
to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, the CA was correct in concluding that “even
a person privy to a communication, who records his private conversation with another without knowledge of the latter, will qualify
as a violator under R.A. No. 4200.” A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports such conclusion.
Case: People vs Navarro (admissible)

A radio reported was killed by the accused a police officer. The killing was preceded by a heated altercation in front of several
people in the police station and was captured in tape recording by a fellow reporter. The SC held thath the tape recording is
admissible and is not a transgression of the provisions of RA 4200 because the recorded altercation is not a private communication,
since the heated discussion occurred in the presence of other persons, it could not be private.
14. Section 201 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997
Section 201. Effect of Failure to Stamp Taxable Document. -- An instrument, document or paper which is required by law to be
stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted or transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it
or any copy thereof or any record of transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence in any court until the requisite stamp or
stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled.
15. Article 203 of the Labor Code
Art. 203. Prohibition. No agent, attorney or other person pursuing or in charge of the preparation or filing of any claim for benefit
under this Title shall demand or charge for his services any fee, and any stipulation to the contrary shall be null and void. The
retention or deduction of any amount from any benefit granted under this Title for the payment of fees for such services is
prohibited. Violation of any provision of this Article shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred pesos nor more than
five thousand pesos, or imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than one year, or both, at the discretion of the court.
 Tan v. Hosana, 3 February 2016, Brion, J.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules. There is no provision in the
Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void document. The Rules only require that the evidence is relevant and
not excluded by the Rules for its admissibility
 Tolentino v. Mendoza, 440 SCRA 519 [2004]
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules. There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The only
question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for having been
obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the rule on
confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render
said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence
if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable
[15]
searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from interference by the government or the state.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence against
respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion
from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly taken
into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent.
 Jesus v. Sanchez-Malit, 8 July 2014
Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents obtained in violation
thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly considered in evidence the other notarized documents submitted by complainant as additional
evidence.
H. Relevancy of Evidence
Sec. 4 . Relevancy; collateral matters. — Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence
or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish
the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. (4a)
When is evidence relevant:

1. have a relation to the fact in issue
2. induce belief as to its existence or non existence.
Test of relevancy:
Is whether an item of evidence will have any value, as determined by logic and experience, in proving the proposition for which it is
offered, or whether it would reasonably and actually tend to prove or disprove any matter of fact in issue or corroborate other
relevant evidence.
The test is satisfied if there is some LOGICAL CONNECTION wither directly or by inference between the fact offered and the fact to
be proved.
I. Collateral Matters/Circumstantial Evidence
Collateral Matters – are matters other than the facts in issue and which are offered as a basis for inference as to the existence of
the fact in issue.
What the rules prohibit is evidence of IRRELEVANT collateral facts.
KINDS:
1. Antecedent
2. Retrospect
3. Concomitant
III.What Need Not Be Proved (Rule 129)
A. Introduction
 Reyes vs. Glaucoma Research Foundation, Inc., G.R. No. 189255, June 17, 2015.
16
It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. If he claims a right granted by law, he must
prove his claim by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his
17
opponent. The test for determining on whom the burden of proof lies is found in the result of an inquiry as to which party would
18
be successful if no evidence of such matters were given. In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to
19
prove that its dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an
20
employer-employee relationship must first be established. Thus, in filing a complaint before the LA for illegal dismissal, based on
the premise that he was an employee of respondents, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove the employer-employee relationship
21
by substantial evidence.
In regard to the above discussion, the issue of whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and
22
respondents is essentially a question of fact. The factors that determine the issue include who has the power to select the
employee, who pays the employee’s wages, who has the power to dismiss the employee, and who exercises control of the methods
23
and results by which the work of the employee is accomplished. Although no particular form of evidence is required to prove the
existence of the relationship, and any competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted, a finding that
the relationship exists must nonetheless rest on substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion
 Basay vs. Hacienda Consolacion, G.R. No. 175532, April 19, 2010.
We are not unmindful of the rule in labor cases that the employer has the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized
cause; however, it is likewise incumbent upon the employees that they should first establish by competent evidence the fact of their dismissal from
[17] [18]
employment. The one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and the proof should be clear, positive and convincing. In this case, aside
from mere allegations, no evidence was proffered by the petitioners that they were dismissed from employment. The records are bereft of any
indication that petitioners were prevented from returning to work or otherwise deprived of any work assignment by respondents.
[22]
In Abad v. Roselle Cinema, we ruled that the substantial evidence proffered by the employer that it had not terminated the employee should not
be ignored on the pretext that the employee would not have filed the complaint for illegal dismissal if he had not really been dismissed. We held
that such non sequitur reasoning cannot take the place of the evidence of both the employer and the employee.
 Atienza vs. Board of Medicine, G.R. No. 177407, February 9, 2011
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such
as the BOM. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in connection with evidence
which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that, “it is the safest policy to be
liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or
incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found
relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be
remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.”
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the
other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.
[12]
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact. Thus, they
likewise provide for some facts which are established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both
[13] [14]
mandatory and discretionary. Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology, include the structural make-
up and composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Edithas kidneys before, and
at the time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.
 Republic of the Philippines vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 175021, June 15, 2011
The trial court’s appreciation of the witnesses’ testimonies is entitled to the highest respect since it was in a better position to
70 71
assess their credibility. The RTC held Cruz’s testimony to be "not credit worthy" for being irreconcilable with petitioner’s earlier
admissions. Contrary to petitioner’s contentions, Cruz’s testimony cannot be considered as a judicial admission against his interest
as he is neither a party to the case nor was his admission against his own interest, but actually against either the petitioner’s or the
respondent’s interest. Petitioner’s statements on the other hand, were deliberate, clear, and unequivocal and were made in the
72 73
course of judicial proceedings; thus, they qualify as judicial admissions. In Alfelor v. Halasan, this Court held that:
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of
evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an
admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party,
and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The
allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently
take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.
Petitioner’s admissions were proven to have been made in various stages of the proceedings, and since the petitioner has not
shown us that they were made through palpable mistake, they are conclusive as to the petitioner.
 Fairland Knitcraft Corporation vs. Po, G.R. No. 217694, January 27, 2016
Under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the weight of evidence is not considered when a judgment is rendered based on the
complaint.
Section 6 is clear that in case the defendant failed to file his answer, the court shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon
plaintiff’s motion, based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for. The failure of the defendant
to timely file his answer and to controvert the claim against him constitutes his acquiescence to every allegation stated in the
26
complaint. Logically, there is nothing to be done in this situation except to render judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint.
The Judicial Affidavit Rule
On a final note, the Court deems it proper to discuss the relevance of the Judicial Affidavit Rule or A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC, where
documentary or object evidence are required to be attached. To begin with, the rule is not applicable because such evidence are
required to be attached to a judicial affidavit, not to a complaint. Moreover, as the rule took effect only on January 1, 2013, it
cannot be required in this case because this was earlier filed on December 12, 2012.
Granting that it can be applied retroactively, the rule being essentially remedial, still it has no bearing on the ruling of this Court.
In the Judicial Affidavit Rule, the attachments of documentary or object evidence to the affidavits is required when there would be
a pre-trial or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing. As stated earlier, where a defendant fails to file an answer, the
court shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon plaintiff’s motion, based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and
limited to what is prayed for. Thus, where there is no answer, there is no need for a pre-trial, preliminary conference or hearing.
Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule reads:
Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct testimonies. - (a) The parties shall file with the court and
serve on the adverse party, personally or by licensed courier service, not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary
conference or the scheduled hearing with respect to motions and incidents, the following:
(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take the place of such witnesses' direct testimonies; and
(2) The parties' docun1entary or object evidence, if any, which shall be attached to the judicial affidavits and
marked as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the complainant or the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and
so on in the case of the respondent or the defendant.
(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original document or object evidence in his possession, he may, after the same
has been identified, marked as exhibit, and authenticated, warrant in his judicial affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to
such affidavit is a faithful copy or reproduction of that original. In addition, the party or witness shall bring the original document or
object evidence for comparison during the preliminary conference with the attached copy, reproduction, or pictures, failing which
the latter shall not be admitted.
This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in place of the original when allowed by existing rules.
 People of the Philippines vs. Comesario, G.R. No. 127811, April 29, 1990
Doctrinally, an accused is presumed innocent. This presumption prevails unless overturned by competent and credible proof. To
sustain a conviction, the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Any doubt must be considered in his
favor. Evidence showing a mere possibility of guilt is insufficient to warrant a conviction
In a nutshell, the evidence for the prosecution is that accused-appellant had motive to kill Reynaldo; he allegedly felt bad when his
advances were spurned by Emilia; three (3) days before the killing, accused-appellant had an altercation with the father of the
victim; and, in the morning of 2 May 1989 accused-appellant was seen dragging a boy with his left hand while holding a scythe in his
right towards Oraan Creek. The lone witness for the prosecution who allegedly saw the boy dragged could not recognize him. All he
could say was that the boy was wearing a striped t-shirt and a pair of blue short pants.
We believe that under all these circumstances taken together accused-appellant should be acquitted.
The invocation of circumstantial evidence is misplaced. As already adverted to, for circumstantial evidence to be validly
invoked there must be more than one circumstance. In the instant case, the prosecution only presented a single circumstance and
that was when Napoleon Veloria supposedly saw accused-appellant dragging a boy wearing a striped t-shirt and a pair of blue short
pants towards Oraan Creek. From ten in the morning until ten in the evening of 2 May 1989 when the lifeless body of Reynaldo was
found near Oraan Creek, there was a paucity of evidence. We cannot decipher a pattern out of this single strand of circumstance as
to support the conclusion that it was accused-appellant who killed Reynaldo. From this angle alone, it is already clear that
circumstantial evidence cannot be successfully availed of.
Last. We are not implying that accused-appellant did not commit the crime. All we are saying is that when measured against the
required quantum of evidence in criminal cases, the case for the prosecution has miserably failed in all aspects. Simply put, if we are
to be guided by the established rules of evidence, we can safely say that the guilt of accused-appellant was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
 Mabunga vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 142039, May 27, 2004
While courts have consistently looked upon alibi with suspicion not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable as a defense,
[19]
but because it can easily be fabricated, the basic rule is for the prosecution, upon which lies the onus, to establish all the
elements of a crime to thereby hold him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Such burden does not shift as it remains with the
prosecution. Tasked with the burden of persuasion, the prosecution must thus rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the
[20]
weakness of the defense.
Admittedly, the evidence for the prosecution is circumstantial. The alleged robbery was discovered when the employees of the BFP
reported for work on October 2, 1994 and noticed that the hasp of the office door was broken and the typewriter was missing.
A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or group of facts found or
[21]
otherwise established in the action. It is an inference as to the existence of a fact not actually known, arising from its usual
connection with another which is known, or a conjecture based on past experience as to what course of human affairs ordinarily
[22]
take.
A presumption has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the party who would be disadvantaged by a finding of the
presumed fact. The presumption controls decision on the presumed fact unless there is counterproof that the presumed fact is not
[23]
so.
In criminal cases, however, presumptions should be taken with caution especially in light of serious concerns that they might
water down the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. As special considerations must be given to the right of the accused
to be presumed innocent, there should be limits on the use of presumptions against an accused.
Although possession of stolen property within a limited time from the commission of the theft or robbery is not in itself a
crime, it being possible to possess the same and remain innocent, such possession may be sufficient for the formation of an
inference that the possessor is the thief unless the evidence satisfactorily proves that the property was acquired by the accused by
legal means.
[24]
How the presumption under Section 3(j) Rule 131 is to be understood, United States v. Catimbang explains:
According to the modern view convictions in cases of this kind are not sustained upon a presumption of law as to the guilt of the
accused. The conviction rests wholly upon an inference of fact as to the guilt of the accused. If as a matter of probability and
reasoning based on the fact of possession of the stolen goods, taken in connection with other evidence, it may fairly be concluded
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the theft, judgment or conviction may properly be entered. x x x
The inference of guilt is one of fact and rests upon the common experience of men. But the experience of men has taught them that
an apparently guilty possession may be explained so as to rebut such an inference and an accused person may therefore put
witness on the stand or go to the witness stand himself to explain his possession, and any reasonable explanation of his possession,
inconsistent with his guilty connection with the commission of the crime, will rebut the inference as to his guilt which the
prosecution seeks to have drawn from his guilty possession of the stolen goods.
It is in this sense that it is sometimes said that the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods will sustain a conviction of the
[25]
crime of larceny. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Before an inference of guilt arising from possession of recently stolen goods can be made, however, the following basic facts
need to be proven by the prosecution: (1) that the crime was committed; (2) that the crime was committed recently; (3) that the
stolen property was found in the possession of the defendant; and (4) that the defendant is unable to explain his possession
[26]
satisfactorily.
For purposes moreover of conclusively proving possession, the following considerations have to be emphasized: (1) the
possession must be unexplained by any innocent origin; (2) the possession must be fairly recent; and (3) the possession must be
[27]
exclusive.
Contrary to the findings of both the trial and appellate courts, the People failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant was caught in exclusive possession of the recently stolen good.
While possession need not mean actual physical control over the thing for it may include constructive possession, it is still
necessary that for possession to be deemed constructive the accused knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time
[28]
to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person.
 People of the Philippines vs. Mingoa, G.R. No. L-5371, March 26, 1953
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by
any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved. It makes the failure of public officer to
have duly forthcoming, upon proper demand, any public funds or property with which he is chargeable prima facie evidence that he
has put such missing funds or property to personal use. The ultimate fact presumed is that officer has malversed the funds or
property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he has received them and yet he has failed
to have them forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from the fact proved, so that
it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two. Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima
facie presumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and will
stand the test of validity laid down in the above citations.
 Wa-Acon vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164575, December 6, 2006
Unfortunately, petitioners postulation has no legal mooring. Article 217, as amended by Republic Act 1060, no longer
requires proof by the State that the accused actually appropriated, took, or misappropriated public funds or property. Instead, a
presumption, though disputable and rebuttable, was installed that upon demand by any duly authorized officer, the failure of a
public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which said officer is accountableshould be prima
facie evidence that he had put such missing funds or properties to personal use. When these circumstances are present, a
presumption of law arises that there was malversation of public funds or properties as decreed by Article 217. A presumption of law
is sanctioned by a statute prescribing that a certain inference must be made whenever facts appear which furnish the basis of the
interference. This is to be set apart from a presumption of fact which is a [conclusion] drawn from particular circumstances, the
connection between them and the sought for fact having received such a sanction in experience as to have become recognized as
[14]
justifying the assumption. When there is a presumption of law, the onus probandi (burden of proof), generally imposed upon the
State, is now shifted to the party against whom the interference is made to adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut the presumption
and hence, to demolish the prima facie case.
After the government auditors discovered the shortage and demanded an explanation, petitioner Wa-acon was not able
[15] [16] [17]
to make money readily available, immediately refund the shortage, or explain satisfactorily the cash deficit. These facts or
circumstances constitute prima facie evidence that he converted such funds to his personal use.
Prima facie evidence is defined as:

Evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a
given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the partys claim or defense, and which if not rebutted or
contradicted, will remain sufficient. Evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a
judgment in favor of the issue it supports, but which may be contradicted by other evidence (emphasis
[18]
supplied).
The established rule is that [d]enials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are deemed negative and self-serving
[21]
evidence unworthy of credence. The court a quo is correct in holding that as compared to credible witnesses like the COA
auditors who testified on affirmative matters, the self-serving negative testimony of accused petitioner Wa-acon has no substantial
[22]
weight or credit.
Negative testimony is made clear as

testimony that a fact did not exist, that a thing was not done, that no one did not hearis admissible and, in the absence of opposing
testimony, is usually regarded as of sufficient probative force to sustain a verdict. It is however, a long recognized general rule of
evidence that all other things being equal, positive evidence is stronger than negative evidence.
B. Kinds of Judicial Notice
1. Section 1- Mandatory Judicial Notice

2. Section 2- Discretionary Judicial Notice
3. Section 3- Hearing is necessary
C. Mandatory Judicial Notice
What Need Not Be Proved

SECTION 1 . Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines,
the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and
the geographical divisions. (1a)

Rico Rommel Atienza v. Board of Medicine and Editha Sioson, G.R. No. 177407, February 9, 2011;

Sulpico v. NEDA et. Al., G.R. No. 178830, July 14, 2008;
Contrary to petitioners contentions that these declarations made by officials belonging to the executive branch on the Philippine
Governments decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project are self-serving, hence, inadmissible, the Court has no alternative
but to take judicial notice of this official act of the President of the Philippines.
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Judicial Notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without introduction
of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the rules, it is mandatory and the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official acts of the President of
the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our government. It is further provided in the above-quoted rule that the court
shall take judicial notice of the foregoing facts without introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of cancellation by
President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President
in China as an official act of the executive department, the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without need of
evidence.
[20]
Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the official duty of the executive officials of
informing this Court of the governments decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project is also presumed to have been regularly
performed, absent proof to the contrary. Other than petitioner AHIs unsavory insinuation in its comment, the Court finds no factual
or legal basis to disregard this disputable presumption in the present instance

Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 142295, May 31, 2001;
The trial court held that the copy of the license presented was blurred, and that in any event, the court could rely on the
certification dated May 10, 1996, of P/Sr. Inspector Roque, Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, Philippine National Police stating
that Vicente Vic del Rosario of Barangay Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and
[15]
caliber. As against this, petitioner submitted that he was not the person referred to in the said certification because he is Vicente
del Rosario y Nicolas from Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan.
[16]
The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of both barangay Tigbe and barangay Bigte, in Norzagaray, Bulacan. In fact, the
trial court erred grievously in not taking judicial notice of the barangays within its territorial jurisdiction, believing the prosecutions
submission that there was only barangay Tigbe, and that barangay Bigte in the certification was a typographical error. Petitioner
presented to the head of the raiding team, Police Senior Inspector Adique, PNP Criminal Investigation Command, a valid firearm
license. The court is duty bound to examine the evidence assiduously to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is true
that the court may rely on the certification of the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP on the absence of a firearm
[18]
license. However, such certification referred to another individual and thus, cannot prevail over a valid firearm license duly
issued to petitioner.
Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the proverbial fruit of
a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.

Vergara v. People, G.R. No. 128720, January 23, 2002;
Judicial notice could be taken of the travel time by car from San Pedro, Laguna to Pasig City, Metro Manila, because it is
[11]
capable of unquestionable demonstration, and nowadays is already of public knowledge, especially to commuters. We find no
error in the trial courts finding that it was not impossible for petitioner to be at the scene of the crime, despite his alibi that he was
engaged in intelligence work in San Pablo Laguna that same afternoon of October 19, 1990.
For alibi to prosper, it would not be enough for the accused to prove that he was elsewhere when the crime was
committed. He must further demonstrate that it would have been physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
[12]
crime at the time of its commission. It is essential that credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the accused to be
[13]
at the scene of the crime be presented to establish an acceptable alibi. Petitioner failed to meet this test. While petitioner could
have been working as intelligence agent in San Pedro, Laguna from October 19 21, 1990, contrary to his claim, it was not physically
impossible for him to have been in Pasig City, Metro Manila on the day of the commission of the crime.

Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 161602, July 13, 2010;
the Republic pointed out that the Office of the Ombudsman in fact conducted such a preliminary investigation in 1991
[5]
in OMB-0-91-0820 and issued on January 22, 1992 a resolution, recommending the endorsement of the matter to the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) for the filing of the forfeiture case.
although it was the Ombudsman who conducted the preliminary investigation, it was the OSG that instituted the action in Civil Case
0167 in line with the Courts ruling in the above-cited Republic and other cases that followed.
The Court cannot also subscribe to the Romualdezes claim that they are entitled to a new preliminary investigation since they had
no opportunity to take part in the one held in 1991, in OMB-0-91-0820. They admit that the subpoena for that investigation had
[11]
been sent to their last known residence at the time it was conducted. The Republic categorically insists that the appropriate
subpoena had been served on the Romualdezes.
While it is true that the Court characterized the departure of the Romualdezes as forced upon them by the uncertainty of the
[13]
situation in 1986, it also said that such was the case only until things shall have stabilized. The Court will take judicial notice of
the fact that the peoples ratification of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987 signaled the return to normalcy of the political
situation in the Philippines. Consequently, the Romualdezes had no valid excuse for not responding to the subpoena served on
them at their last known address in 1991, which they do not deny having received.

CLT Dev’t Corp. v. Hi-Grade Feeds Corp., 2 Sep 2015
CLT avers that taking judicial notice of the Senate Report is a violation of the Rules of Court and CLT's right to due process. First, the
Senate Report is inadmissible and should not be given any probative value because it was obtained in violation of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, considering that the Senate Report is unauthenticated and is thus deemed hearsay evidence.
CLT misses the point. Taking judicial notice of acts of the Senate is well within the ambit of the law. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
SECTION 1 . Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official
acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions, (1a) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof because these facts are
13
already known to them; it is the duty of the court to assume something as a matter of fact without need of further evidentiary
14
support. Otherwise stated, by the taking of judicial notice, the court dispenses with the traditional form of presentation of
15
evidence, i.e. the rigorous rules of evidence and court proceedings such as cross-examination.
The Senate Report, an official act of the legislative department, may be taken judicial notice of.

PCIB v. Escolin, G.R. 27936, 29 March 1974
It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of what are the laws of Texas governing the matters herein issue is,
in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to
be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare exception in instances when the said
laws are already within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and generally known or they have been
actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned do not claim otherwise.

Sps. Latip v. Chua, 16 October 2009
The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised
by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should
be promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that
of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be
dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so
notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is
not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are commonly known.
We hold that the practice of payment of goodwill money in the Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of judicial notice. Neither
was Rosalie able to provide sufficient evidence that, apart from the belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit of the stallholders of
Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for the payment of goodwill money, and not payment for advance rentals by Spouses
Latip.

New Sun Valley Homeowners’ Assoc. v. Sangguniang Bgy. of Sun Valley, 27 July 2011
Contrary, however, to Appellant's position, the above-quoted provision, which requires the passage of an ordinance by a local
government unit to effect the opening of a local road, can have no applicability to the instant case since the subdivision road lots
sought to be opened to decongest traffic in the area, have already been donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision to, and the titles
thereto already issued in the name of, the City Government of Paranaque since the year 1964. This fact has not even been denied
by the Appellant in the proceedings below nor in the present recourse. Having been already donated or turned over to the City
Government of Paranaque, the road lots in question have since then taken the nature of public roads which are withdrawn from the
commerce of man, and hence placed beyond the private rights or claims of herein Appellant. Accordingly, the Appellant was not in
the lawful exercise of its predicated rights when it built obstructing structures closing the road lots in question to vehicular traffic
for the use of the general Public. Consequently, Appellees' act of passing the disputed barangay resolution, the implementation of
which is sought to be restrained by Appellant, had for its purpose not the opening of a private road but may be considered merely
as a directive or reminder to the Appellant to cause the opening of a public road which should rightfully be open for use to the
[70]
general public.
Petitioner wants this Court to recognize the rights and interests of the residents of Sun Valley Subdivision but it miserably failed to
establish the legal basis, such as its ownership of the subject roads, which entitles petitioner to the remedy prayed for. It even
wants this Court to take "judicial knowledge that criminal activities such as robbery and kidnappings are becoming daily fares in
[
Philippine society."
The activities claimed by petitioner to be part of judicial knowledge are not found in the rule quoted above and do not support its
petition for injunctive relief in any way.
As petitioner has failed to establish that it has any right entitled to the protection of the law, and it also failed to exhaust
administrative remedies by applying for injunctive relief instead of going to the Mayor as provided by the Local Government Code,
the petition must be denied.
 Discretionary Judicial Notice
Sec. 2 . Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. (1a)
 Judicial Notice, when hearing necessary
Sec. 3 . Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may
announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
(n)

State Prosecutors v. Muro, A.M. No. RTJ-92-876, Sept. 19, 1994 (same in Sps. Latip vs Chua)

Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos II, August 4, 2009, cited in Republic of the Philippines v. Ma. Imelda
“Imee” R. Marcos-Manotoc, G.R. No. 171701, Feb. 8, 2012;
Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the death of Ferdinand E. Marcos, it is imperative therefore that the
estate be duly represented. The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to a litigation
who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself protected, as he continues to be properly
40
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. On that note, we take judicial notice of the
41
probate proceedings regarding the will of Ferdinand E. Marcos. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos II, we upheld the grant by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of letters testamentary in solidum to Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. and Imelda Romualdez-Marcos as
executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Unless the executors of the Marcos estate or the heirs are ready to waive in favor of the state their right to defend or protect the
estate or those properties found to be ill-gotten in their possession, control or ownership, then they may not be dropped as
defendants in the civil case pending before the Sandiganbayan.

People of the Philippines v. Neil B. Colorado, G.R. No. 200792, November 14, 2012;
Crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature
and experience (PP. vs. Agustin, 365 SCRA 167; PP vs. Garcia, supra). Though a medical certificate is not necessary to prove the
commission of rape (PP. vs. Bares, 355 SCRA 435), but when the victims testimony is corroborated by the physicians findings of
penetration (Exh. "A") or hymenal laceration as when the hymen is no longer intact, there is sufficient foundation to find the
existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge (PP. vs. Montejo, 355 SCRA 210; PP. vs. Bation, 305 SCRA 253). Further, no
young and decent woman in her right mind especially of tender age as that of AAA who is fifteen (15) years old would concoct a
story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial, if
she was not motivated solely by her desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. (PP. vs. Albior, 352 SCRA 35; PP.
14
vs. Vidal, 353 SCRA 194) Ï‚rÎ½ll (Emphasis ours)
Colorado also questions the weight of Dr. Sanchezs medico-legal certificate, arguing that AAAs hymenal lacerations could have
resulted from the sexual aggressions allegedly committed against her by DDD and their brother-in-law. Such contention, however,
deserves no consideration, given that results of an offended partys medical examination are merely corroborative in character. As
21
explained by the Court in People v. Balonzo, Ï‚rÎ½ll a medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a
medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in
character and not essential to conviction. An accused can still be convicted of rape on the basis of the sole testimony of the private
22
complainant. Ï‚rÎ½ll Furthermore, laceration of the hymen, even if considered the most telling and irrefutable physical evidence of
sexual assault, is not always essential to establish the consummation of the crime of rape. In the context that is used in the RPC,
"carnal knowledge," unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be
23
penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. Ï‚rÎ½ll Thus, even granting that AAAs lacerations were not caused by Colorado, the
latter could still be declared guilty of rape, after it was established that he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the victim.

Casimira S. Delacruz v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012;
 Doctrine of Presumed-Identity Approach or Processual Presumption
o
ATCI Overseas Corporation, Amalia G. Ikdal and Ministry of Public Health-Kuwait v. Ma. Josefa Echin,
G.R. No. 178551, October 11, 2010;
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign
law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take
judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine
of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded,
is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues
presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a
foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court.
o
Merope Enriquez Vda. De Catalan v. Louella A. Catalan-Lee, G.R. No. 183622, Feb. 8, 2012.
It is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under
the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was
[7]
established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce
in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage. Xxx
In the case of Garcia vs Recio, Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because
she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the
original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and
worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine
courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving
the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the
burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the
divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it
falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.Australian marital laws are not among those matters that
judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlandos divorce under the laws of the
United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial
court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
 Judicial Admissions
Sec. 4 . Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made. (2a)

Heirs of Antonio Feraren et. Al., v. Court of Appeals & Cecilia Tadiar, G.R. No. 159328, Oct. 5,
2011;
In any case, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that petitioners' statement in their Answer, that their parents built the
subject residential house as lessees under the authority given to them by private respondent's father in their contract of lease
21
executed in 1949, is a judicial admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, petitioners may not contradict this
judicial admission unless they are able to show that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. In
the instant case, petitioners' subsequent claim in their Position Paper that their house was built during the time that their parents
were the owners of the disputed lot is a direct contradiction of their judicial admission in their Answer. However, petitioners failed
to prove that such admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Hence, they may not
contradict the same.

Republic of the Philippines v. Estate of Hans Menzi, G.R. No. 183446, November 13, 2012.

ATCI Overseas Corp. v. Echin, 11 October 2010).

Section 7, 8, 10, and 11 of Rule 8 (Actionable Document and General Denial)
Section 7. Action or defense based on document. — Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or
document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof
shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like
effect be set forth in the pleading. (7)
Section 8. How to contest such documents. — When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or
attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath specifically denies them, and sets forth what he
claims to be the facts, but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to
the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused. (8a)
Section 10. Specific denial. — A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit
and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a
defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only
the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material
averment made to the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial. (10a)
Section 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. — Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to
the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a
complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied under oath. (1a, R9)

Section 8, Rule 10 (Admissions in Superseded Pleadings)
Section 8. Effect of amended pleadings. — An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, admissions
in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader, and claims or defenses alleged therein not
incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived. (n)

Section 2 and 3 Rule 26 (Failure to answer request for admission)
Section 2. Implied admission. — Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless,
within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such
further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party
requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or
setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by the party requested within the period for and prior
to the filing of his sworn statement as contemplated in the preceding paragraph and his compliance therewith shall be
deferred until such objections are resolved, which resolution shall be made as early as practicable. (2a)
Section 3. Effect of admission. — Any admission made by a party pursuant to such request is for the purpose of the pending
action only and shall not constitute an admission by him for any other purpose nor may the same be used against him in any
other proceeding. (3)

Section 2, Rule 118 (Factual stipulations in criminal pre-trial)
Sec. 2. Pre-trial agreement. – All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in
writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the
matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court.

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Evidence Notes by Erika Rule 128 129

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I.

Factum Probandum vs Factum Probans

SOURCES of the Rules of Evidence:

II. General Principles (Rule 128)

 Bustos v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948

 Gomez vs. Gomez-Samson, G.R. No. 156284, February 6, 2007

Rule 1 Section 4. In what cases not applicable.

 Reyes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013

D. Applicability of Electronic Evidence

 Miro v. Vda de Erederos, 20 November 2013

 Ferrer vs. Carganillo, G.R. No. 170956, May 12, 2010

 Reyes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013

Cumulative Evidence Corroborative Evidence

Prima facie Evidence Conclusive Evidence

Primary Evidence (BEST evidence) Secondary Evidence (SUBSTITUTIONARY)

Positive Evidence Negative Evidence

Competent Evidence Incompetent Evidence

Relevant Evidence Material Evidence

Rebuttal Evidence Sur-Rebuttal Evidence

Evidence in Chief Newly discovered Evidence (NDE)

Conditions for new trial to be granted on the ground of NDE:

1. The evidence must have been discovered after the trial

HEIRARCHY OF EVIDENTIARY VALUES

Requisites of Curative admissibility:

Article 3 – Bill of Rights (1987 Constitution)

1. Section 1- Right of every party litigant to due process of law.

2. Section 1- Right of a person to equal protection before the laws

3. Section 2- Right of the persons against unreasonable searches and seizure

4. Section 3- Right of the persons to privacy of communication and correspondence.

5. Section 12- Right of the persons under custodial investigation

8. Section 17- Right of the person against self incrimination

10. RA 1405- Law on Secrecy of bank deposits

11. Section 8 of the Foreign Currency Deposit Act

12. Section 9 of the anti money laundering Act

13. RA 4200 Anti wire tapping law

Case: Salcedo-Ortañez vs. Court of Appeals (inadmissible)

Case: Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals (inadmissible)

Case: People vs Navarro (admissible)

14. Section 201 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997

15. Article 203 of the Labor Code

 Tan v. Hosana, 3 February 2016, Brion, J.

 Tolentino v. Mendoza, 440 SCRA 519 [2004]

 Jesus v. Sanchez-Malit, 8 July 2014

When is evidence relevant:

I. Collateral Matters/Circumstantial Evidence

What the rules prohibit is evidence of IRRELEVANT collateral facts.

III.What Need Not Be Proved (Rule 129)

 Atienza vs. Board of Medicine, G.R. No. 177407, February 9, 2011

The Judicial Affidavit Rule

Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

Prima facie evidence is defined as:

Negative testimony is made clear as

B. Kinds of Judicial Notice

1. Section 1- Mandatory Judicial Notice

C. Mandatory Judicial Notice

What Need Not Be Proved

Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

 Discretionary Judicial Notice

 Judicial Notice, when hearing necessary

 Doctrine of Presumed-Identity Approach or Processual Presumption

In the case of Garcia vs Recio, Burden of Proving Australian Law

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