1.

Control vs supervision

"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for test of the latter."

"Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties.

If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties.

Chief Executive/ President wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local governments
or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He
cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority.
"Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body;
it does not include any restraining authority over such body,"

2. Local autonomy defines

Local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization

The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national
government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local
governments from the imperialism of Manila."

Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the
central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The
Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to
regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance
self-government

3. Decentralization of administration vs power: Now, autonomy is either decentralization of

administration or decentralization of power.

1. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative

powers to political subdivisions

WHY? in order to broaden the base of government power and

in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and

"ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the pursuit of national development and social progress."

At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables
it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but
only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in
the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
2. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abandonment of political power in the
favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government
is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in
that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.55

4. President’s power

The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.

5. Principles in the case of Ganzon 1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere
decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the
central government in the manner the law may provide;

2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism; Federalism is a mixed or compound mode of
government that combines a general government (the central or "federal" government) with regional
governments (provincial, state, cantonal, territorial or other sub-unit governments) in a single political
system.

3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny
legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations
provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;

4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in
the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;

5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control"
(which the President does not have);

Supreme Court held that, although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units,
the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of
supervision by the President.

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.

7. Local government defined A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is
constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs.

Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to
be an imperium in imperio, the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more
powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.

Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the
peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with
their own resources and assets.
 27. Attys. Humberto Basco, et al. vs. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991; 

 Principle of Local Autonomy

FACTS: The PH Amusement and Gaming Corp. was created by PD 1067-A and granted a franchise under
PD 1067-B. Subsequently, under PD 1869, the Government enabled it to regulate and centralize all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under declared policy. But the
petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR
Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because of
the following issues:

 ISSUES:

(1) WON it waived the Manila City gov't's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by
law.

 (2) WON it has intruded into the LGUs' right to impose local taxes and license fees, and thus contrary to
the principle of local autonomy enshrined in the Constitution.

 (3) WON it violates the equal protection clause as it allows some gambling acts but also prohibits other
gaming acts.

(4) WON it violates the Cory  gov't's policy of being away from monopolistic and crony economy, and
toward free enterprise and privatization.

HELD:

(1) No. The fact that PAGCOR, under its charter, is exempt from paying tax of any kind is not violative of
the principle of local autonomy. LGUs' have no inherent right to impose taxes. LGUs' power to tax must
always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed by the state itself which has the
inherent power to tax. The charter of LGUs is subject to control by Congress as they are mere creatures
of Congress. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over LGUs. And if Congress can grant the City
of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the
power.

 (2) No. LGUs' right to impose license fees on "gambling", has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the
power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was
withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government. Furthermore, LGUs'
have no power to tax instrumentalities of the gov't such as PAGCOR which exercises governmental
functions of regulating gambling activities.

 (3) No.  The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not
have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution. The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be
treated in law as though they were the same.

 (4) No. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not
what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the
political branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power. On
the issue of monopoly, the same is not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still
decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be "regulated" or prohibited. Again, this is a
matter of policy for the Legislature to decide. The judiciary can only intervene when there are violations
of the statutes passed by Congress regulating or prohibiting monopolies.

28. Rodolfo T. Ganzon vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 93252 [consolidated
with G.R. Nos. 93746 & 95245], August 5, 1991;

GANZON VS CA
FACTS:
A series of administrative complaints, ten in number, were filed before the Department of Local Government
against petitioner Mayor Rodolfo T. Ganzon by various city officials sometime in 1988 on various charges, among
them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, etc.

Finding probable grounds, the respondent Secretary of the Department of Local Government Luis T. Santos issued
3 successive 60- day suspensions. The petitioner then instituted an action for prohibition against the secretary in
the RTC of Iloilo City where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. He also instituted actions for
prohibition before the Court of Appeals but were both dismissed. Thus, this petition for review with the argument
that the respondent Secretary is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials as the
1987 Constitution no longer allows the President to exercise said power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has the authority to suspend
and remove local officials.

RULING: Yes

The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the
Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no
prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not
exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.

In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because that the
President cannot exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But
in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in
sustaining him.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal
power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless
to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all
intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and
purposes, his suspension permanent.

28. Limbonas v. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786;

FACTS:

Petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook,
representing Lanao del Sur.

Petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao (Assembly for brevity). Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said
members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed with the Commission on Elections
their respective certificates of candidacy in the congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur
but they later withdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positions as
members of the Assembly. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner instructed Acting Secretary
Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session on said
date as petitioner and Razul will be in the committee hearing.

The Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice. After declaring the presence of a
quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the
seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair
declared said seat of the Speaker vacant.

Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable. Pending further
proceedings, the Court received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang Pampook, on the grounds,
among other things, that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash
from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly,"
and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on
question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the
respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic".
 

Issue:

Whether or not, the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted,
subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts (what is the extent of self-government given to the two
autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?) –Yes. Autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they
are now constituted, are subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts

Ruling:

It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the
courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts.

It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters
for the respective regions," except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and
competence of the National Government," "which include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) National defense and security;

(2) Foreign relations;

(3) Foreign trade;

(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external borrowing,

(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural resources;

(6) Air and sea transport

(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;

(8) Customs and quarantine;

(9) Immigration and deportation;

(10) Citizenship and naturalization;

(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and

(12) General auditing. 

 
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.

There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative

powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process
to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," "and ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress."

At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over
them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. 

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local governments units declare to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free
to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in
that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency. 

Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao,and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 

Sec. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity
of the Republic of the Philippines. 

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec.
15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects
and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as
we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous
in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way
that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is
autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction.
 

Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power
of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." In the second place, the Sangguniang
Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:

SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local legislative
powers over regional affairs within the framework of national development plans, policies and goals,
in the following areas:

(1) Organization of regional administrative system;

(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;

(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;

(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;

(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;

(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;

(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the Autonomous Region;

(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social services, programs
and facilities;

(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture indigenous to the
Autonomous Region; and

(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of such measures as
may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region.

The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that enactment and acts of
the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this
Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and programs.

The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa.

Hence, we assume jurisdiction.

Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the
Sanggunian, in convening the sessions (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker
vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on
recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of quorum.

 
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the Assembly sessions were invalid. It is true that under
Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except
by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook,” but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his
discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals." Of course, there is disagreement between the
protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner is the "recess of short intervals"
referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes,
it was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when
arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate
dissenssion [sic] and disunity. The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly, the
Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have
validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the date session opens
under the same Rules. Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any
session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents own, we still invalidate the twin
sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter
whether or not he could. do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on
Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission
sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the
respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the
sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find
equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent,
since, as we said, a recess cannot be validly declared without a session having been first opened. In
upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses in the future
in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof. Neither are we, by this
disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful prerogatives.
Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the event that be petitioner should initiate obstructive
moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to thwart them. 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is
ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2)
REINSTATE him as

30. Lina v. Pano, G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001;

FACTS:

On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto.  He asked Mayor Calixto
Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet.  This was denied by
Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996.  The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which was issued on
September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial
Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling. It is
likewise a valid exercise of the provincial government's police power under the General Welfare Clause
of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.6 They also maintain that
respondent's lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and approval by the local
government were sought before it was implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c)
and 27 of R.A. 7160.7

For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the questioned resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the
power of the state since in this case the national legislature itself had already declared lotto as legal and
permitted its operations around the country.8 As for the allegation that no prior consultations and
approval were sought from the sangguniang panlalawigan of Laguna, respondent Calvento contends this
is not mandatory since such a requirement is merely stated as a declaration of policy and not a self-
executing provision of the Local Government Code of 1991.9 He also states that his operation of the
lotto system is legal because of the authority given to him by the PCSO, which in turn had been granted
a franchise to operate the lotto by Congress.

ISSUE: WON the local government may deny the operation of lotto in the said locality

The Local Government may not deny lotto operation in its locality.

Local government’s autonomy involves airing out its views which may be contrary to that of the national
government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments
may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress.

In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and
resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. Ours is still a unitary form of
government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments will
necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It does not
make local governments sovereign within the state.

A local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits.
Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board
may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
RULING:

NO. The ordinance, Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, merely
states the “objection” of the council to the operation of lotto. It is but a mere policy statement on the
part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the
operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. Even petitioners admit this in their petition. As a
policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is
part of the local government’s autonomy involves airing out its views which may be contrary to that of
the national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local
governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress.

In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and
resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. Ours is still a unitary form of
government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments will
necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It does not
make local governments sovereign within the state.

Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a
measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto. To conclude our resolution of the first issue,
respondent mayor of San Pedro cannot avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial
Board of Laguna as justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an
expression of the local legislative unit concerned. The Board’s enactment, like spring water, could not
rise above its source of power, the national legislature.

The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of
Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise
to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly
a game of chance, the national government deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance
that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by
law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.

 
HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ,
petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONY CALVENTO, respondents. G.R. No. 129093

QUISUMBING, J.:

August 30, 2001

FACTS:

         On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked
Mayor Calixto  Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open lotto outlet. This
was denied by Mayor Cataquiz on the ground that an ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.1995 which reads: “ISANG KAPASIYAHAN
TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA ILLEGAL GAMBLING LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA”

         As A Result of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer
for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Petitioners contend that : (1)the assailed
resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement
objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling;(2) It is likewise a valid exercise of the
provincial government’s police power under the General Welfare Clause of R.A. 7160 otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991;(3) they also maintain that respondent’s lotto operation
is illegal because no prior consultations and approval by the local government were sought before it
was implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160. For his part,
respondent Calvento argues that the resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the power of the state
since in this case the national legislature itself had already declared lotto as legal. As for the allegation
that no prior consultations and approval were sought from the sangguninang panlalawigan of Laguna,
respondent stated as a declaration of policy and not a self-executing provision of LGC of 1991.The
respondent judge, Francisco Pano promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from
implementing or enforcing resolution of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. Motion for reconsideration
was denied. Thus, petitioners filed petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE/S:

1.  Whether  Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the
denial of a mayor’s permit based thereon are valid

2.  Whether prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a
lotto system can be operated in a given local government unit.

RULING:

         The Petition is denied. The Court ruled that the ordinance merely states the “objection” of the
council to said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not
self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the
province of Laguna. As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto,
such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which maybe
contrary to that of the national government’s.  However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does
not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by
Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be
interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.

         As for the second issue, Court ruled that petitioners erred in declaring that sections 2 (C) and
27 of RA 7160 apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around the country. From careful
reading of said provisions, the Court find that these apply only to national programs and/or projects
which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project
of the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO.  Though sanctioned by the
national government, it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Section 2 (c)
and 27 of the Local Government Code.

31. Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002

FACTS: In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances of
P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge.

On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the disputed Local
Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that:

xxx xxx xxx

2.3.2. In the light of the authority granted to the local government units under the Local Government
Code to provide for additional allowances and other benefits to national government officials and
employees assigned in their locality, such additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates not
exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities may be granted subject to the
following conditions:

a) That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the LGUs;

b) That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including the implementation of R.A. 6758
shall have been fully provided in the budget;

c) That the budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324 and 325 of R.A. 7160 should be
satisfied and/or complied with; and

d) That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of functions/personnel in accordance with R.A.
7160.3 (italics supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein
petitioners, in excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Beginning October, 1994, the additional
monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They were also asked to
reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to September, 1994.

The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest against the notices of
disallowance. But the City Auditor treated the protest as a motion for reconsideration and indorsed the
same to the COA Regional Office No. 7.

On September 21, 1995, respondent COA rendered a decision denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration contending that here being no statutory basis to grant additional allowance to judges in
excess of P1,000.00 chargeable against the local government units where they are stationed, this
Commission finds no substantial grounds or cogent reason to disturb the decision of the City Auditor,
Mandaue City, disallowing in audit the allowances in question.

Appropriation ordinance of local government units is subject to the organizational, budgetary and
compensation policies of budgetary authorities In this regard, attention is invited to Administrative
Order No. 42 issued on March 3, 1993 by the President of the Philippines clarifying the role of DBM in
the compensation and classification of local government positions under RA No. 7160 vis-avis the
provisions of RA No. 6758 in view of the abolition of the JCLGPA. Section 1 of said Administrative Order
provides that:

Section 1. The Department of Budget and Management as the lead administrator of RA No. 6758 shall,
through its Compensation and Position Classification Bureau, continue to have the following
responsibilities in connection with the implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991:

a) Provide guidelines on the classification of local government positions and on the specific rates of pay
therefore;

b) Provide criteria and guidelines for the grant of all allowances and additional forms of compensation to
local government employees; xxx. (underscoring supplied)

To operationalize the aforecited presidential directive, DBM issued LBC No. 55, dated March 15, 1994,
which shall take effect immediately.

 
It is a well-settled rule that implementing rules and regulations promulgated by administrative or
executive officer in accordance with, and as authorized by law, has the force and effect of law or partake
the nature of a statute

ISSUE: Whether or not LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the
President and for not having been published

RULING: Yes. LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President and
for not having been published

Supreme Court held that, although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units,
the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of
supervision by the President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that:

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x

In Pimentel vs. Aguirre, we defined the supervisory power of the President and distinguished it from the
power of control exercised by Congress. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution has
been interpreted to exclude the power of control.

In Mondano v. Silvosa, the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision over local government
officials with that of his power of control over executive officials of the national government. It was
emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and control -- differed in meaning and extent. The Court
distinguished them as follows:

"x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may
take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.”

In Taule v. Santos, we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of
checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the
fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within
the scope of their authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere
oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body," we said.

 
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim, the difference between control and supervision was further
delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If
these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their
subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not
lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not
prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see
to it that the rules are followed. Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities
of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of
the Presidents supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her
alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the
parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her
alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local
government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of
powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.

In this case, LBC 55 provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a local government
unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities. Section 458, par. (a)(1)
(xi), of RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of
additional allowances to judges when the finances of the city government allow. The said provision does
not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges. Thus, we
need not belabor the point that the finances of a city government may allow the grant of additional
allowances higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city government exceed its annual
expenditures. Thus, to illustrate, a city government with locally generated annual revenues of P40
million and expenditures of P35 million can afford to grant additional allowances of more than P1,000
each to, say, ten judges inasmuch as the finances of the city can afford it. Setting a uniform amount for
the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section
458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local government
units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other
words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.

32. Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, et al. vs. Hon. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 118303,
January 31, 1996;

FACTS:
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the House of
Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author.

Several public hearings on HB No. 8817 were conducted by the House Committee on Local Government
which submitted to the House a favorable report, with amendments, on December 9, 1993.

HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of Representatives on Second Reading and was approved on
Third Reading. On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate.

Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago," was
filed in the Senate on May 19, 1993. This was just after the House of Representatives had conducted its
first public hearing on HB No. 8817.

A little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate, the Senate Committee on
Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. The said committee submitted a
committee report on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be approved without amendment.
Senator Alvarez, one of the herein petitioners, indicated his approval thereto by signing said report as
member of the Committee on Local Government.

The Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading and was approved on
Third Reading. The House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved
the amendments proposed by the Senate.

The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by on May 5, 1994 as
Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the
registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.

Now, petitioners question the validity of RA 7720 since they claim that the Municipality of Santiago has
not met the minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city.

Petitioners contend that the average annual income of the Municipality for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required annual income of Twenty Million Pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a city. In their computation of the average annual income,
petitioners deducted the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) and thus, arrived an annual average income
of P13,109,560.47.

Petitioners also alleged that the certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the
Department of Finance, which indicates Santiago's average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is not
accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the computation. Petitioners
asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national
government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land
and equal sharing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the IRAs are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a
municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city

RULING:

Yes, the Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units.

A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed
of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one
sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, the local government unit is
autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. Power
which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the
peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with
their own resources and assets.

The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system certainly
concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a
local government unit must now operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn,
entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every
local government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge
its powers and effectively carry out its functions. Availment of such resources is effectuated through
the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of
revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of
internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of
the utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.

The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local
government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of
any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the
local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.

For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of Finance certified,
among others, that the municipality had an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for
the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of Finance did
after including the IRAs in its computation of said average annual income.

Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that "the average annual income
shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income." To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too,
to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all
its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds
or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "funding support from the national government, its
instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations".

Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 35-93 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above
disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be "revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities
and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue
allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-
recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed
assets, and similar others". Such order, constituting executive or contemporaneous construction of a
statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of interpreting and applying the same, is
entitled to full respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless such construction is
clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the governing statute, or other laws.

33. Reynaldo R. San Juan vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 92299, April 19, 1991;

Facts: The position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) of Rizal was left vacant by its former holder,
Henedima del Rosario.

Petitioner wrote a letter to Director Reynaldo Abella of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) Region IV. He said that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988
pursuant to a Memorandum issued by the petitioner who further requested Director Abella to endorse
Ms. Dalisay Santos’ appointment to the contested position of PBO of Rizal. Ms. Dalisay Santos was then
Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal before she discharged the functions of acting PBO.

In a Memorandum addressed to the DBM Secretary, Director Abella recommended private respondent’s
appointment as PBO of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all Municipal Budget Officers of Rizal
including petitioner’s three (3) nominees. Abella said that private respondent was the most qualified,
since she was the only Certified Public Accountant among the contenders.

DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr. signed private respondent’s appointment papers

Petitioner wrote a letter to Secretary Carague and reiterated his request for the appointment of Dalisay
Santos. He was unaware of the earlier appointment made by Undersecretary Cabuquit.

DBM Regional Director Agripino G. Galvez wrote the petitioner that Dalisay Santos and his other
recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the
position of a local budget officer. Director Galvez further required the petitioner to submit at least three
(3) other nominees who are qualified for the position of PBO of Rizal for evaluation and processing.

After having been informed of the private respondent’s appointment, the petitioner wrote Secretary
Carague. He protested against the said appointment on the grounds that: 1) Cabuquit as DBM
Undersecretary is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO; 2) the private respondent lacks the
required three-year work experience as provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31; and 3) under Executive
Order No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the
power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO. - Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 provides
that: Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be appointed henceforth by
the Minister of Budget and Management upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned,
subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, and they shall be placed under the administrative
control and technical supervision of the Ministry of Budget and Management. The petitioner maintains
that the appointment of the private respondent to the contested position was made in derogation of
the provision so that both the public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding
Almajose's appointment.

Respondent DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio A.
Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the petitioner's letter-protest is not meritorious considering
that public respondent DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling up the contested position, since
none of the petitioner's nominees met the prescribed requirements.

The petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the BLLA ruling. The DBM Secretary denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The petitioner wrote public respondent CSC protesting against the appointment of the private
respondent and reiterating his position regarding the matter. In two Resolutions, the CSC dismissed
petitioner’s appeal and upheld private respondent’s appointment.

Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 7, Article IX(A) of the present
Constitution. Petitioner prayed for the nullification of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolutions.

Issues:

(1) WON the head of the Department of Budget and Management is vested with the (primary) authority
to appoint the PBO and is free to appoint anyone he fancies in the event that the Governor recommends
an unqualified person.

- The head of the Department of Budget and Management is not vested with the primary authority to
appoint the PBO and is free to appoint anyone he fancies in the event that the Governor recommends
an unqualified person.

-The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If
none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the
legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and
qualifications.
-The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. More important, however, is the proper
administration of fiscal affairs at the local level. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the
local level and after completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. They are prepared by
the local officials who must work within the constraints of those budgets. They are not formulated in the
inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments whether or not
they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment
process involves a sharing of power between the two levels of government.

-The clear mandate on local autonomy must be obeyed. Where a law is capable of two interpretations,
one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales
must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

-Any creation, merger, abolition, or substantial boundary alteration cannot be done except in
accordance with the local government code and upon approval by a plebiscite.

-The power to create sources of revenue and to levy taxes was specifically settled upon local
governments.

(2) WON private respondent is lawfully entitled to discharge the functions of PBO of Rizal pursuant to
the appointment made by public respondent DBM's Undersecretary upon the recommendation of then
Director Abella of DBM Region IV.

Rulings:

(1) No. Under Sec. 1 of EO No. 112, the petitioner is the one vested with the authority to appoint the
PBO subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position. The qualifications are set
out in Sec. 216, subparagraph (2) of BP Blg. 337 or the Local Government Code, to wit: (2) No person
shall be appointed provincial budget officer unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, of good moral
character, a holder of a degree preferably in law, commerce, public administration or any related course
from a recognized college or university, a first grade civil service eligibility or its equivalent, and has
acquired at least five years experience in budgeting or in any related field.

The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none
is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal
requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.

The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. More important, however, is the proper
administration of fiscal affairs at the local level. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the
local level and after completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. They are prepared by
the local officials who must work within the constraints of those budgets. They are not formulated in the
inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments whether or not
they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment
process involves a sharing of power between the two levels of government. The clear mandate on local
autonomy must be obeyed. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized
power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of
autonomy.

The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy. However, in distinguishing between
presidential control and supervision as follows: The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 11, Article VII, 1935
Constitution) the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general
supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls the executive departments. He has
no such power over local governments. He has only supervision and that supervision is both general and
circumscribed by statute. In Tecson v. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 282 (1970), this Court stated: X X X the
presidential competence is not even supervision in general, but general supervision as may be provided
by law. He could not thus go beyond the applicable statutory provisions, which bind and fetter his
discretion on the matter. X X X supervision goes no further than "overseeing or the power or authority
of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties."
X X X Control, on the other hand, "means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter." It would follow then, X X X that the President had to abide by the then
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code on suspension and removal of municipal officials, there
being no power of control that he could rightfully exercise, the law clearly specifying the procedure by
which such disciplinary action would be taken.

Pursuant to this principle under the 1935 Constitution, legislation implementing local autonomy was
enacted. In 1959, Republic Act No. 2264, "An Act Amending the Law Governing Local Governments by
Increasing Their Autonomy and Reorganizing Local Governments" was passed. It was followed in 1967
when Republic Act No. 5185, the Decentralization Law was enacted, giving "further autonomous powers
to local governments."

The provisions of the 1973 Constitution moved the country further, at least insofar as legal provisions
are concerned, towards greater autonomy. It provided under Article II as a basic principle of
government: Sec. 10. The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units,
especially the barangay to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.

An entire article on Local Government was incorporated into the Constitution. It called for a local
government code defining more responsive and accountable local government structures. Any creation,
merger, abolition, or substantial boundary alteration cannot be done except in accordance with the local
government code and upon approval by a plebiscite. The power to create sources of revenue and to levy
taxes was specifically settled upon local governments. - The exercise of greater local autonomy is even
more marked in the present Constitution. Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides: Sec. 25. The
State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines but give in greater
detail the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful. Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Article X
provide: Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. Sec. 3. The Congress
shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal,
term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units.

When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as
purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional. provisions on local autonomy.
If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local
governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of
meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back. The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31
which states: Sec. 6.0 — The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the
nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements. Ultra vires and is, accordingly,
set aside.

(2) No. Since the DBM head did not have the authority to appoint private respondent, her appointment
was nullified. The Department of Budget and Management was ordered to appoint the Provincial
Budget Officer of Rizal from among qualified nominees submitted by the Provincial Governor

 
 

34. Arsadi M. Disomangcop, et al., vs. The Secretary of DPWH Simeon A. Datumanong, et al., G.R.
No. 149848, November 25, 2004

FACTS:

Sections 14 and 15, Article X mandate the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras. Section 15 specifically provides that "[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures,
and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." To effectuate this mandate,
the Charter devotes a number of provisions under Article X. Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate,
R.A. 6734 was signed, and a plebiscite was held.  Out of more than 15 provinces called for plebiscite,
only 4 provinces voted for the creation of the creation of an autonomous region. These provinces
became the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.

In accordance with R.A, 6734, Pres. Aquino issued E.O. 426, entitled “ Placing the Control and
Supervision of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao”. She then signed EOs devolving to ARMM the powers of cabinet
departments.

9 yrs later, DPWH Sec. Vigilar issues D.O. 119 which creates Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office. This
law had jurisdiction over all national infrastructure within Marawi and Lanao Del Sur.

2 yrs later, Pres. Estrada signed R.A 8999 which established an Engineering district in the First district of
the Province of Lanao Del Sur and appropriated funds thereof.

Congress later on passed R.A. 9054, entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An
Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended." A plebiscite was held and
Basilan and the City of Marawi voted to join ARMM.

Petitioners addressed a petition to DPWH Sec. Datumanong, seeking the revocation od D.O. 119 and the
non-implementation of R.A. 8999, however, no action was taken.

Hence, they filed this instant petition. They seek to prohibit the  DPWH secretary from releasing funds
for public works projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office and other administrative regions of DPWH and  to compel the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to release all funds for public works projects intended
for Marawi City and the First District of Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in
Lanao del Sur only.

To support their petition, petitioners allege that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of discretion and
that it violates the constitutional autonomy of the ARMM. They point out that the challenged
Department Order has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with functions that have
already been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. They asserted
that prior to the sponsorship of the law, no public hearing nor consultation with the DPWH-ARMM was
made.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. 8999 is Constitutional.

RULING:

The Court held that R.A 9054 repealed R.A 8999 and rendered D.O. 119 Functus officio.

The 1987 Constitution mandates regional autonomy to give a bold and unequivocal answer to the cry for
a meaningful, effective and forceful autonomy. According to Commissioner Jose Nolledo, Chairman of
the Committee which drafted the provisions, it "is an indictment against the status quo of a unitary
system that, to my mind, has ineluctably tied the hands of progress in our country . . . our varying
regional characteristics are factors to capitalize on to attain national strength through
decentralization."43

-The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate
development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. These cultures, as a matter of right,
must be allowed to flourish.

-However, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of a sovereignty
distinct from that of the Republic, as it can be installed only "within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

-Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by the local government unit vis-à-vis
the central government.

-A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization. Decentralization is a decision by the central

government authorizing its subordinates, whether geographically or functionally defined, to exercise
authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making by subnational units. It is typically a delegated
power, wherein a larger government chooses to delegate certain authority to more local governments.
Federalism implies some measure of decentralization, but unitary systems may also decentralize.
Decentralization differs intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-units that have been authorized to
act (by delegation) do not possess any claim of right against the central government.

-Decentralization comes in two forms—deconcentration and devolution.

-Deconcentration is administrative in nature; it involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of

authority and responsibility from the national office to the regional and local offices. This mode of
decentralization is also referred to as administrative decentralization.
-Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of powers,
responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions from the central government to
local government units. This is a more liberal form of decentralization since there is an actual transfer of
powers and responsibilities. It aims to grant greater autonomy to local government units in cognizance
of their right to self-government, to make them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and
technical capabilities.

The creation of autonomous regions contemplates the grant of political autonomy—an autonomy which
is greater than the administrative autonomy granted to local government units. It held that "the
constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution (Art. X, Sec. 2) refers to administrative
autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority…. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political
autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions.

This is true to subjects over which autonomous regions have powers, as specified in Sections 18 and 20,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Expressly not included therein are powers over certain areas. Worthy
of note is that the area of public works is not excluded and neither is it reserved for the National
Government.

In treading their chosen path of development, the Muslims in Mindanao are to be given freedom and
independence with minimum interference from the National Government. This necessarily includes the
freedom to decide on, build, supervise and maintain the public works and infrastructure projects within
the autonomous region. The devolution of the powers and functions of the DPWH in the ARMM and
transfer of the administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds to the ARG are meant to
be true, meaningful and unfettered. This unassailable conclusion is grounded on a clear consensus,
reached at the Constitutional Commission and ratified by the entire Filipino electorate, on the centrality
of decentralization of power as the appropriate vessel of deliverance for Muslim Filipinos and the
ultimate unity of Muslims and Christians in this country.

With R.A. 8999, however, this freedom is taken away, and the National Government takes control again.
The hands, once more, of the autonomous peoples are reined in and tied up.

The challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which, by virtue of E.O. 426, have been
previously devolved to the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.

Evidently, the intention is to cede some, if not most, of the powers of the national government to the
autonomous government in order to effectuate a veritable autonomy. The continued enforcement of
R.A. 8999, therefore, runs afoul of the ARMM Organic Acts and results in the recall of powers which
have previously been handed over. This should not be sanctioned, elsewise the Organic Acts' desire for
greater autonomy for the ARMM in accordance with the Constitution would be quelled. It bears
stressing that national laws are subject to the Constitution one of whose state policies is to ensure the
autonomy of autonomous regions.

Now, the question directly related to D.O. 119.

D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructure
projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of E.O. 426. The Executive
Order was issued pursuant to R.A. 6734—which initiated the creation of the constitutionally-mandated
autonomous region87 and which defined the basic structure of the autonomous government.88 E.O.
426 sought to implement the transfer of the control and supervision of the DPWH within the ARMM to
the Autonomous Regional Government. In particular, it identified four (4) District Engineering Offices in
each of the four (4) provinces, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.89 Accordingly,
the First Engineering District of the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur has jurisdiction over the public works
within the province.

The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-
ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department
order, in effect, takes back powers which have been previously devolved under the said executive order.
D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions of E.O. 426. The DPWH's order, like spring water, cannot rise
higher than its source of power—the Executive.

The fact that the department order was issued pursuant to E.O. 124—signed and approved by President
Aquino in her residual legislative powers—is of no moment. It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory
construction that a special provision or law prevails over a general one.90 Lex specialis derogant
generali. As this Court expressed in the case of Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court,91 "another
basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to special
legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the
special provisions are not applicable, that specific statute prevails over a general statute and that where
two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially
should prevail."

E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general law reorganizing the Ministry of Public Works
and Highways while E.O. 426 is a special law transferring the control and supervision of the DPWH
offices within ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government. The latter statute specifically applies to
DPWH-ARMM offices. E.O. 124 should therefore give way to E.O. 426 in the instant case.

In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a plebiscite in effect superseded E.O. 124.
In case of an irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails
because it is the later legislative will.92

Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states that "all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, and
other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Organic Act, are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly."93 With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O. 119, it necessarily follows
that D.O. 119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.

 Without doubt, respondents committed grave abuse of discretion. They implemented R.A. 8999 despite
its inoperativeness and repeal. They also put in place and maintained the DPWH Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office in accordance with D.O. 119 which has been rendered functus officio by the ARMM
Organic Acts.

35. Mayor Pablo B. Magtajas, et al. vs. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 111097,
July 20, 1994;

Facts:
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of
chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.

Then Mayor Magtajas together with the city legislators and civil organizations of the City of Cagayan de
Oro denounced such project. In reaction to this project, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro
City enacted two (2) ordinances prohibiting the issuance of a business permit and canceling existing
business permit to establishment for the operation of casino (ORDINANCE NO. 3353) and an ordinance
prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for its violation. (ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93).

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor
and supplemental petitioner.

Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied against petitioners.

Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

Issue

Whether the assailed ordinances are valid

Ruling

No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the
purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under
what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows: Sec. 16.

General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within
their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other
things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an
ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino
gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on
them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units
can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate
by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the
operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced
therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

36. Alfredo De Leon, et al. vs. Hon. Benjamin Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987

FACTS:

In the Barangay elections held on May 1982, De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other
petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222,
otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.

De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor
Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain. The
designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government." OIC
Governor Esguerra also signed another Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986, designating the
other respondents as members of the Barangay Council of the same barangay.

Thus, petitioners instituted the instant petition for prohibition praying that the Memoranda be declared
null and void and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain
and Barangay Councilmen, respectively.

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of BP Blg. 222, their terms of office "shall be six (6) years
which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have been elected
and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to
designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated
on March 25, 1986, which provided:
"SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall
continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one
year from February 25, 1986."

By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted
provision and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the
Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to
have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional
Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made.

RULING:

No, the designation of respondents was invalid.

There is no question that petitioners, as elective officials under the 1973 Constitution, may continue in
office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events mentioned in Sec. 2,
Article III of the Provisional Constitution. However, since the promulgation of the Provisional
Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective
Barangay officials.

Considering the Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, February 8, 1987, should be considered as the
effective date of replacement and not December 1, 1986 to which it was antedated, in keeping with the
dictates of justice. But while February 8, 1987 is still within the one year deadline, the aforequoted
provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Sec. 27, Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading:

"Sec 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions."

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative,
respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents
to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.

Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure especially considering that the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy
of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities." Similarly, the 1987
Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the
barangays form a part, and limits the President’s power to "general supervision" over local
governments.
Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

“The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years . . ."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of
six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern. Contrary to the stand
of respondents, there is nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay
officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative,
pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:

"Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other
executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed or revoked."

37. Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. COA, G.R. No. 79956, January 29, 1990;

38. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Hon. Alexander Aguirre, et al., G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000;

FACTS:

This is an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to annul Section 1 of Administrative
Order (AO) No. 372, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25
percent of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services; and (2) to enjoin
respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal
revenue allotments.

SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges,
government-owned and controlled corporations and local governments units will identify and implement
measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized
regular appropriations for non-personal services items, along the following suggested areas:

Petitioner (Roberto Pagdanganan, an intervenor, then provincial governor of Bulacan and chairman of
the League of Leagues of Local Governments) contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in
effect exercising the power of control over LGUs. However, the Constitution vests in him only the power
of general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy.

Petitioner further argues that the directive in Sec. 4 to withhold 10% of their IRA is in contravention of
Section 286 of the LGC and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing for the automatic
release to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue.
The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims that AO 372 is within the powers of  the
President and that in sec.4 it was only temporary in nature.

ISSUES:

1.     Whether or not Sec. 1 of AO 372, insofar as LGUs are concerned, is valid. Yes, Sec. 1 may be upheld
as an advisory effected in times of national crisis.

2.     Whether or not Sec. 4 of AO 372 is valid. No. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld because the
Constitution mandates automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. Any
retention is prohibited. Since Section 4 of AO 372 orders the withholding, it is thus invalid.

RULING:

The Petition is partly meritorious.  

1.     Yes. In this case, Sec. 1 of AO 372 is merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a
mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. The language used, while
authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern. Rather, the
provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fisestraint in a
period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well to heed the President's call to unity,
solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may
be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such advice. It is in this light that the
solicitor general's contention in regard to Section 1 is sustained.

It’s important to define certain crucial concepts: (1) the scope of the President's power of general
supervision over local governments and (2) the extent of the local governments' autonomy.

A.    As to Scope of President’s power of supervision over LGUs:  In Taule v. Santos,7 we further stated
that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local governments or
their officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He
cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority.
"Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body;
it does not include any restraining authority over such body," we said.

B.    As to extent of local autonomy: Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's
power over local governments is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy.

The extent of the local governments' autonomy is still subject to regulation, however limited, for the
purpose of enhancing self-government. The President exercises 'general supervision' over them, but
only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. He has no control over their acts in
the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. (see: Guanzon v. CA -definition of local
autonomy)

 
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely
relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative
powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to
make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political
and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth
and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected
locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for
the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.

C. As to the nature of AO 372:

Local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions,
enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national
government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with national goals.

The President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the
government, primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and
integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country.

Under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs are
subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local
government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.

 The Local Government Code provides:

"x x x [In the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of
the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary
of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to
consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to
make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no
case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue
taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."

There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an
unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers
of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3)
the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local
Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no
case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third
fiscal year preceding the current one.

2.     Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld because the Constitution mandates automatic
release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue.

A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national
internal revenue.
The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU
concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or
holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose."

As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The
provision is, therefore, imperative.

In this case,  Sec. 4 of AO 372 orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the
LGUs' IRA. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it
is equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held back or withheld, often temporarily." Hence,
the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national government does not matter.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents and their successors are hereby permanently
PROHIBITED from implementing Administrative Order Nos. 372 and 43, respectively dated December 27,
1997 and December 10, 1998, insofar as local government units are concerned.

39. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. vs. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, et al., G.R. No.
195770, July 17, 2012;

Facts:

·  In 2007, the DSWD started a poverty reduction strategy with the poorest of the poor as target
beneficiaries. It was dubbed as “Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino” was pre-pilot tested in some municipalities
and cities upon the release of the amount of P50 Million Pesos under the Special Allotment Release
Order issued by the Department of Budget and Management.

·  In 2008, the DSWD issued AO No. 16 Series of 2008, setting the implementing guidelines for the
project renamed “Panatawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program” (4Ps). [see full text for the objectives]

·  This government intervention scheme was referred to as Conditional Cash Transfer Program
(CCTP) which “provides cash grants to extreme poor households to allow the members of the families to
meet certain human development goals.” Eligible households are selected from priority target areas
consisting of the poorest provinces classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NCSB). A
household beneficiary could receive from the government an annual subsidy for its basic needs up to an
amount of P15,000 under some conditionalities [see full text for the conditionalities].

·  Under AO No. 16, Series of 2008, the DSWD also institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency
network among the DepEd, DOH, DILG, National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) and the LGU,
identifying specific roles and functions in order to ensure effective and efficient implementation of the
CCTP. DWD took the role of lead implementing agency that must “oversee and coordinate the
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the program”

·  A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed by the DSWD with each participating LGU
outlines in detail the obligation of both parties during the intended five-year implementation of the
CCTP.
·  Congress sought to ensure the success of the CCTP by providing it with funding under the
General Appropriation Act (GAA) of 2008 in the amount of P298,550,000. The budget increased to P5
Billion Pesos in 2009 with the amount doubling to P10 Billion Pesos in 2010. The biggest allotment given
to the CCTP was in the GAA of 2011 at P21,194,117,000.

·  Petitioner former Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., joined by Sergio Tadeo, and Nelson Alcantara
challenges before the Court the disbursement of public funds and the implementation of the CCTP
which are alleged to have encroached into the local autonomy of the LGUs.

Issue:

·  Whether or not the P21 Billion CCTP budget allocation under the DSWD violates Art. 8, Sec. 25
and Article X, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sec. 17 of the LGC by providing for the
recentralization of the National Government in the delivery of basic services already devolved to the
LGUs

Ruling:

·  No.

·  The LGC does not imply a complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter
of providing basic facilities and services. The national government is not precluded from taking a direct
hand in the formulation and implementation of national development programs especially where it is
implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.

·  The petitioners argued that the manner by which CCTP is implemented is questionable. It is the
LGU’s responsibility to deliver social welfare, agriculture, and health care services. Giving DSWD full
control over the identification of beneficiaries and the manner by which services are to be delivered or
conditionalities are to be complied with would have enhanced its delivery of basic services. This results
in the "recentralization" of basic government functions”, which is contrary to the precepts of local
autonomy and the avowed policy of decentralization.

·  The court ruled that Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of proving the invalidity of
the provisions under the GAA of 2011. The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the
autonomy of local governments ( Sec 3, Sec 14 Art 10 1987 Constitution). To fully secure to the LGUs the
genuine and meaningful autonomy that would develop them into self-reliant communities, Section 17
LGC vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and
facilities. However, par (c) of Sec 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-
funded projects, facilities, programs and services.

·  Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power

o   Decentralization of administration - when the central government delegates administrative powers to

political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and make local governments
‘more responsive and accountable’ and ‘ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.’
The President exercises ‘general supervision’ over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law.’ He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.

o   Decentralization of power - involves an abdication of political power in favor of LGUs   declared to be

autonomous. The autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. This amounts to ‘self-immolation,’ since the autonomous
government becomes  accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.

·  It is thus clear that the LGC does not imply a complete relinquishment of central government
powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services. The national government is not
precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national development
programs especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.

·  Ganzon v. Court of Appeals - while it is through a system of decentralization that the State shall
promote a more responsive and accountable local government structure, the concept of local autonomy
does not imply the conversion of local government units into "mini - states." With local autonomy, the
Constitution did nothing more than "to break up the monopoly of the national government over the
affairs of the local government" and, thus, did not intend to sever "the relation of partnership and
interdependence between the central administration and local government units."

Provisions cited by the SC:

Sec 3, Sec 14 Art 10 1987 Constitution:

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization xxx

Section 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar bodies
composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices,
and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the regions for purposes of
administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the
economic and social growth and development of the units in the region.

Section 17 of the LGC:

 
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(a) Local government units shall xxx discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and
offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise xxx discharge such
other functions and responsibilities as are necessary to xxx provision of the basic services and facilities
enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

40. Sultan Alimbusar P. Limbona vs. Conte Mangelin, et al., G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989;

Facts: 

Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly
or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid
Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited
petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through
the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the
house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in
defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the
session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the
Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly
expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a
case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should
have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that
the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.

Issue: 

Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. 

Ruling: 
 Yes, the Court has jurisdiction over autonomous governments. An autonomous government that
enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of
the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other
hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the
national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the
Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably
beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of
the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes
unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy
in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he
President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence,
we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with
more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of
local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang
and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is
true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or
adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the
respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called
the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the
invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a
plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it
does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead,
they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the
circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground
of good faith.

41. Hon. Jose D. Lina, Sr., et al. vs. Hon. Francisco Dizon Paño, G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001;

41. Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 120865-71,
December 7, 1995;

Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to execute
the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.

Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed
exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149
thereof provides: “Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the
municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore…” Big fishpen operators took advantage
of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA.

The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with
fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna
Lake.

The LLDA then served notice to the general public that:

(1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993
are declared illegal;

(2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal
Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and

(3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as
amended by PD 813.

A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures
otherwise demolition shall be effected.

ISSUE:

Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of
permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the
region?

HELD:

LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local
Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law.
It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law,
cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to
the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which
grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government
Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

43. League of Provinces of the Philippines vs. Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
et al., G.R. No. 175368, April 11, 2013;

Facts:

Golden Falcon filed with the DENr Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. III (MGB R-
III) an Application for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) covering an area of 61,136
hectares situated in the Municipalities of San Miguel, San Ildefonso, Norzagaray and San Jose Del
Monte, Bulancan which was denied on 1998 for failure to secure area clearances from the Forest
Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of the DENR Regional Office No. III. golden Falcon
then filed an appeal with the MGB-General Office, which was subsequenty denied on July 2004 and
became final of August 11, 2004.

Pending the appeal of Golden Falcon, on February 2004, Mercado, Cruz and Sembrano filed with the
PENRO of Bulacan their respective Applications for Quarry Permit covering the same area. 

On September 2004, AMTC filed with the PENRO of Bulacan and Application for Exploration Permit
covering 5,281 hectares of area covered by Golden Falcon's Application. On May 2005, it notified the
PENRO of Bulacan and the MGB-III Director that the Applications for Quarry Permit fell within its existing
valid and prior Application for Exploration Permit, and the former area of Golden Falcon was open to
mining location only on August 11, 2004 per Memorandum of the MGB Director, Central Office. 

On August 2005, MGB R-III Director endorsed to the Provincial Governor of Bulacan the Applications for
Quarry Permit that had apparently been converted to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit. The
PENRO issued four memoranda recommending to the Provincial Governer the Applications for Small
Scale Mining, leading to the issuance of Small Sacle Mining Permitsin favor of Mercado, Cruz and
Valdez. 

AMTC appealled to the Secretary of the DENR which rendered a decision in favor of AMTC.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DENR SECRETARY HAS EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT EXERCISEd
THE POWER OF CONTROL OVER THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BULACAN. 

Ruling: 

No, the DENR Secretary did not exceed its jurisdication when exercised the power of control
over the provincial governor of Bulacan. 

Section 4, Article X of the Constitution states that the President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local government, and Section 25 od the Local Government Code reiterates the
same. General supervision by the President means no more than seeing to it that laws are faithfully
executed or that subordinate officers act within the law. 

The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution
Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local governments sovereign
within the State. Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but subject to limitations
like following national policies or standards, and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the
structuring of local governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the
different local government units and local officials have been placed by the Constitution in the hands of
Congress under Section 3, Article X of the Constitution.

In this case, the Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale
mining law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and
review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise exploration, development, and utilization of the
country's natural resources. 

44. The Province of Batangas vs. Hon. Alberto G. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004;

FACTS:

In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program for Devolution Adjustment
and Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services
devolved to them through the LGC.

The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-
005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The
guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for
funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the
DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the
corresponding funds.

Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void
certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as
they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for
the release thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe
the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.

 
RULING:

Yes. The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a
“withholding” of a portion of the IRA – they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by
LGUs and must be struck down.

According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, “the State shall ensure the local autonomy of local
governments“. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s
power over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays down the rules in the doing of
an act – the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it
himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed but has no authority to set down the
rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.

The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible.
The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the
Constitution mandates that the “just share”shall be automatically released to the LGUs. Since the
release is automatic, the LGUs aren’t required to perform any act to receive the “just share” – it shall be
released to them “without need of further action“. To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of
the implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001
and the OCD Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate.

The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national
internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd
preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case.

The Oversight Committee’s authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of 1991 not to supplant
or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over the IRA of the LGUs.

Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a separate law and not through
appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that
should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.

A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of
money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit –any provision therein which is intended
to amend another law is considered an “inappropriate provision“. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs
fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of general & substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake
these amendments through the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.
 

The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our
national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should
also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.

45. Alfredo Tano, et al. vs. Gov. Salvador P. Socrates, et al., G.R. No. 110249, August 21, 1997;

Facts:

On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-
92 banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City effective for five years.
To implement the ordinance, the City Mayor of Puerto Princesa City issued Office Order No. 23 dated
January 23, 1993, ordering inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out
from air and sea. Likewise, on February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Provincial
Government of Palawan, enacted Resolution No. 33 and Ordinance No. 2, series of 1993, prohibiting the
catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms for a period of five years.

Petitioners challenged the aforementioned ordinances and office order on the ground that it deprived
them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade.

Issue:

Whether or not the challenged ordinances are unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the challenged ordinances do not suffer any infirmity, both under the
Constitution and applicable laws, including the Local Government Code. There is no showing that any of
the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.

The Local Government Code vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal
waters and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor. The Sangguniangs are directed to enact ordinances
that protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing. One of the devolved
powers under the Code is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the
conservation of mangroves. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution and the
powers granted therein to local government units under the General Welfare Clause and those which
involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
 

The ordinances find full support under R.A. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environment Plan
(SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19 June 1992 which adopts a comprehensive framework for the
sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources
and endangered environment of the province.

The dissenting opinion of Justice Bellosillo relies upon the lack of authority on the part of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact Ordinance No. 15, series of 1992, as the subject
thereof is within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR) under P.D. No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975, and the ordinance is unenforceable for lack of
approval by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) under P.D.
704. But BFAR is no longer under the Department of Natural Resources (now DENR), but under the
Ministry of Agriculture and Food and converted into a mere staff agency thereof. The approval that
should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture. However, the
requirement of approval by the Secretary has been dispensed with.

46. City of General Santos vs. COA, G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014;

47. Gov. Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr., et al. vs. Hon. Jesse M. Robredo, G.R. No. 195390,
December 10, 2014;

Facts: The COA conducted an audit on the manner the LGUs utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment
for the calendar years 1993-1994. The examination yielded an official report showing that a substantial
portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects
but was diverted to expenses chargeable against the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
(MOOE), in violation of the Local Government Code of 1991. The DILG issued memorandum circulars
enumerating the policies and guidelines on the utilization of the development fund component of the
IRA. It likewise carried a reminder to LGUs of the strict mandate to ensure that public funds, like the 20%
development fund, "shall be spent judiciously and only for the very purpose or purposes for which such
funds are intended.

A Joint MC was then issued pertaining to the guidelines on the appropriation and utilization of the 20%
of the IRA for development projects, which aims to enhance accountability of the LGUs in undertaking
development projects. The said memorandum circular underscored that the 20% of the IRA intended for
development projects should be utilized for social development, economic development and
environmental management.
Respondent, in his capacity as DILG Secretary, issued the assailed memorandum entitled "Full Disclosure
of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings," which aims to promote good governance
through enhanced transparency and accountability of LGUs. 

Issue: Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal
autonomy enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution has expressly adopted the policy of ensuring the
autonomy of LGUs. To highlight its significance, the entire Article X of the Constitution was devoted to
laying down the bedrock upon which this policy is anchored. It is also pursuant to the mandate of the
Constitution of enhancing local autonomy that the LGC was enacted. This is evident in the declaration of
policy embodied in the Constitution.

Furthermore, local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization. In a case decided by the Supreme Court, it held that
autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local
governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress."

48. Lucena D. Demaala vs. COA, G.R. No. 199752, February 17, 2015;

Facts:

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan enacted Provincial Ordinance No. 332-A, Series of
1995,entitled "An Ordinance Approving and Adopting the Code Governing the Revision of Assessments,
Classification and Valuation of Real Properties in the Province of Palawan" (Ordinance). Chapter 5,
Section 48 of the Ordinance provides for an additional levy on real property tax for the special education
fund at the rate of one-half percent or 0.5%

In conformity with Section 48 of the Ordinance, the Municipality of Narra, Palawan, with Demaala as
mayor, collected from owners of real properties located within its territory an annual tax as special
education fund at the rate of 0.5% of the assessed value of the property subject to tax. This collection
was effected through the municipal treasurer.
On post-audit, Audit Team Leader Juanito A. Nostratis issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM)
No. 03-005 dated August 7, 2003 in which he noted supposed deficiencies in the special education fund
collected by the Municipality of Narra. As a result, COA Regional Cluster Director held Demaala, the
municipal treasurer of Narra, and all special education fund payors liable for the deficiency in special
education fund collections.

The Municipality of Narra, through Demaala, filed the Motion for Reconsideration. This was denied by
the Regional Cluster Director. Following this, the Municipality of Narra, through Demaala, filed an
Appeal which was also denied by the Commission on Audit’s Legal and Adjudication Office. Finally, it
filed a Petition for Review with the COA.

The Commission on Audit ruled against Demaala and affirmed LAO Local Decision No. 2006-056 with the
modification that former Palawan Vice Governor Joel T. Reyes and the other members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan who enacted the Ordinance were held jointly and severally liable
with Demaala, the municipal treasurer of Narra, and the special education fund payors. The Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Demaala was also denied.

Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari.

Issue:

Whether a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area, a city, or a province may have an
additional levy on real property for the special education fund at the rate of less than 1%.

Ruling:

Yes. Setting the rate of the additional levy for the special education fund at less than 1% is within the
taxing power of local government units. It is consistent with the guiding constitutional principle of local
autonomy.

The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty. It is inherent in the state. Provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays are mere territorial and political subdivisions of the state. They act only as
part of the sovereign. Thus, they do not have the inherent power to tax. Their power to tax must be
prescribed by law.
Consistent with the view that the power to tax does not inhere in local government units, this court has
held that a reserved temperament must be adhered to in construing the extent of a local government
unit’s power to tax.

It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no inherent power of
taxation. The charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality,
cannot assume it. And the power when granted is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or
ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting that power must be resolved against the municipality.
Inferences, implications, deductions – all these – have no place in the interpretation of the taxing power
of a municipal corporation. (Icard v. City Council of Baguio)

Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution is the basis of the taxing power of local government units:

Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to
levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively
to the local governments.

The taxing power granted by constitutional fiat to local government units exists in the wider context to
"ensure the autonomy of local governments.”

In addition to stating that local government units have the power to tax (subject to Congressional
guidelines and limitations), Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution adds the phrase "consistent with
the basic policy of local autonomy." Further, it is definite with the use of funds generated by local
government units through the exercise of their taxing powers, providing that "[s]uch taxes, fees, and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments."

The limits on the level of additional levy for the special education fund under Section 235 of the Local
Government Code should be read as granting fiscal flexibility to local government units.

Section 235 of the Local Government Code allows provinces and cities, as well as municipalities in Metro
Manila, to collect, on top of the basic annual real property tax, an additional levy which shall exclusively
accrue to the special education fund:

Section 235. Additional Levy on Real Property for the Special Education Fund. - A province or city, or a
municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area, may levy and collect an annual tax of one percent
(1%) on the assessed value of real property which shall be in addition to the basic real property tax. The
proceeds thereof shall exclusively accrue to the Special Education Fund (SEF)
The operative phrase in Section 235’s grant to municipalities in Metro Manila, cities, and provinces of
the power to impose an additional levy for the special education fund is prefixed with "may," thus, "may
levy and collect an annual tax of one percent (1%)."

Section 235’s permissive language is unqualified. Moreover, there is no limiting qualifier to the
articulated rate of 1% which unequivocally indicates that any and all special education fund collections
must be at such rate.

48. Dr. Rolando B. Mangune, et al. vs. Hon. Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 182604,
September 27, 2016;

48. Michael L. Rama, et al. vs. Gilbert P. Moises, et al., G.R. No. 197146, December 6, 2016;

48. Congressman Hermilando I. Mandanas, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.,
G.R. No. 199802 [consolidated with G.R. No. 208488], July 3, 2018;

DOCTRINE: The share of the LGUs, heretofore known as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), has been
regularly released to the LGUs. According to the implementing rules and regulations of the LGC, the IRA
is determined on the basis of the actual collections of the National Internal Revenue Taxes (NIRTs) as
certified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have
the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national
taxes released by the National Government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in
accordance with their own priorities.  Such autonomy is as indispensable to the viability of the policy of
decentralization as the other.

 FACTS:

Consolidated case: G.R. No. 199802 and G.R. No. 208488 The petitioners in this consolidated cases
challenge the manner in which the just share in the national taxes of the local government units (LGUs)
has been computed.

 In G.R. No. 199802 (Mandanas, et al.) is a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
assailing the manner the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for FY 2012 computed the IRA for the LGUs.
Mandanas, et al. allege herein: that certain collections of NIRTs by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) -
specifically: excise taxes, value added taxes (VATs) and documentary stamp taxes (DSTs) - have not been
included in the base amounts for the computation of the IRA; that such taxes, albeit collected by the
BOC, should form part of the base from which the IRA should be computed because they constituted
NIRTs; that, consequently, the release of the additional amount of ₱60,750,000,000 to the LGUs as their
IRA for FY 2012 should be ordered; and that for the same reason the LGUs should also be released their
unpaid IRA for FY 1992 to FY 2011, inclusive, totaling ₱438,103,906,675.

In G.R. No. 208488, Congressman Enrique Garcia, Jr., the lone petitioner, seeks the writ of mandamus to
compel the respondents thereat to compute the just share of the LGUs on the basis of all national taxes.
His petition insists on a literal reading of Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. He avers that the
insertion by Congress of the words internal revenue in the phrase national taxes found in Section 284 of
the LGC caused the diminution of the base for determining the just share of the LGUs, and should be
declared unconstitutional; the exclusion of certain taxes and accounts pursuant to or in accordance with
special laws was similarly constitutionally untenable; that the VATs and excise taxes collected by the
BOC should be included in the computation of the IRA; and that the respondents should compute the
IRA on the basis of all national tax collections, and thereafter distribute any shortfall to the LGUs.

Contention of the Respondensts: In response to the petitions, the several respondents, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), urged the dismissal of the petitions upon procedural and
substantive considerations.

Procedural considerations: The OSG argues that the petitions are procedurally defective because, firstly,
mandamus does not lie in order to achieve the reliefs sought because Congress may not be compelled to
appropriate the sums allegedly illegally withheld for to do so will violate the doctrine of separation of
powers; and, secondly, mandamus does not also lie to compel the DBM to release the amounts to the
LGUs because such disbursements will be contrary to the purposes specified in the GAA; that Garcia has
no clear legal right to sustain his suit for mandamus; that the filing of Garcia's suit violates the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts; and that Garcia's petition seeks declaratory relief but the Court cannot grant such
relief in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.

Substantive considerations : The OSG avers that Article 284 of the LGC is consistent with the mandate of
Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution to the effect that the LGUs shall have a just share in the
national taxes; that the determination of the just share is within the discretion of Congress; that the
limitation under the LGC of the basis for the just share in the NIRTs was within the powers granted to
Congress by the 1987 Constitution;  that the LGUs have been receiving their just share in the national
taxes based on the correct base amount; that Congress has the authority to exclude certain taxes from
the base amount in computing the IRA; that there is a distinction between the VATs, excise taxes and
DSTs collected by the BIR, on one hand, and the VATs, excise taxes and DSTs collected by the BOC, on
the other, thereby warranting their different treatment; and that Development Budget Coordination
Committee (DBCC) Resolution No. 2003-02 dated September 4, 2003 has limited the base amount for
the computation of the IRA to the "cash collections based on the BIR data as reconciled with the Bureau
of Treasury;" and that the collection of such national taxes by the BOC should be excluded

ISSUE:

WON, Section 284 of the LGC is unconstitutional for being repugnant to Section 6, Article X of the 1987
Constitution -Yes.

RULING:

The extent of local autonomy in the Philippines

Two groups of LGUs enjoy decentralization in distinct ways. The decentralization of power has been
given to the regional units (namely, the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao [ARMM] and the
constitutionally-mandated Cordillera Autonomous Region [CAR]). The other group of LGUs (i.e.,
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays) enjoy the decentralization of administration. The
distinction can be reasonably understood. The provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are given
decentralized administration to make governance at the local levels more directly responsive and
effective. In turn, the economic, political and social developments of the smaller political units are
expected to propel social and economic growth and development. In contrast, the regional autonomy of
the ARMM and the CAR aims to permit determinate groups with common traditions and shared social-
cultural characteristics to freely develop their ways of life and heritage, to exercise their rights, and to be
in charge of their own affairs through the establishment of a special governance regime for certain
member communities who choose their own authorities from within themselves, and exercise the
jurisdictional authority legally accorded to them to decide their internal community affairs. 24

Illustrative of the limitation is what transpired in Serna v. Commission on Elections,26 where the Court
struck down Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 (An Act to Strengthen and Expand the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act
No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," as Amended)
insofar as the provision granted to the ARMM the power to create provinces and cities, and
consequently declared as void Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan for being contrary to Section 5, Article VI and Section 20, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. The Court clarified therein that
only Congress could create provinces and cities. This was because the creation of provinces and cities
necessarily entailed the creation of legislative districts, a power that only Congress could exercise
pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution; as such, the ARMM would be thereby usurping the power of Congress to create
legislative districts and national offices.27

The LGC has further delineated in its Section 3 the different operative principles of decentralization to be
adhered to consistently with the constitutional policy on local autonomy.

Sec. 3. Operative Principles of Decentralization-The formulation and implementation of policies and

measures on local autonomy shall be guided by the following operative principles:

(a) There shall be an effective allocation among the different local government units of their respective
powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources;

(b) There shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient, and dynamic
organizational structure and operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service
requirements of its communities;

(c) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, local officials and employees paid wholly or mainly
from local funds shall be appointed or removed, according to merit and fitness, by the appropriate
appointing authority;

(d) The vesting of duty, responsibility, and accountability in local government units shall be accompanied
with provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge their powers and effectively carry out
their functions: hence, they shall have the power to create and broaden their own sources of revenue
and the right to a just share in national taxes and an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization
and development of the national wealth within their respective areas;

(e) Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with
respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions;
(f) Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and
resources commonly beneficial to them;

(g) The capabilities of local government units, especially the municipalities and barangays, shall be
enhanced by providing them with opportunities to participate actively in the implementation of national
programs and projects;

(h) There shall be a continuing mechanism to enhance local autonomy not only by legislative enabling
acts but also by administrative and organizational reforms;

(i) Local government units shall share with the national government the responsibility in the
management and maintenance of ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction, subject to the
provisions of this Code and national policies;

(j) Effective mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of local government units to their respective
constituents shall be strengthened in order to upgrade continually the quality of local leadership;

(k) The realization of local autonomy shall be facilitated through improved coordination of national
government policies and programs an extension of adequate technical and material assistance to less
developed and deserving local government units;

(l) The participation of the private sector in local governance, particularly in the delivery of basic
services, shall be encouraged to ensure the viability of local autonomy as an alternative strategy for
sustainable development; and

(m) The national government shall ensure that decentralization contributes to the continuing
improvement of the performance of local government units and the quality of community life.

Based on the foregoing delineation, decentralization can be considered as the decision by the central
government to empower its subordinates, whether geographically or functionally constituted, to
exercise authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making by subnational units, and is typically a
delegated power, whereby a larger government chooses to delegate authority to more local
governments.31 It is also a process, being the set of policies, electoral or constitutional reforms that
transfer responsibilities, resources or authority from the higher to the lower levels of government. 32 It is
often viewed as a shift of authority towards local governments and away from the central government,
with total government authority over society and economy imagined as fixed. 33

As a system of transferring authority and power from the National Government to the LGUs,
decentralization in the Philippines may be categorized into four, namely: (1) political decentralization or
devolution; (2) administrative decentralization or deconcentration; (3) fiscal decentralization; and (4)
policy or decision-making decentralization.

Political decentralization or devolution occurs when there is a transfer of powers, responsibilities, and
resources from the central government to the LOU s for the performance of certain functions. It is a
more liberal form of decentralization because there is an actual transfer of powers and responsibilities.
It aims to grant greater autonomy to the LGUs in cognizance of their right to self-government, to make
them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and technical capabilities. 34 It is an act by which
the National Government confers power and authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific
functions and responsibilities.35 It encompasses reforms to open sub-national representation and
policies to "devolve political authority or electoral capacities to sub-national actors. " 36 Section 16 to
Section 19 of the LGC characterize political decentralization in the LGC as different LGUs empowered to
address the different needs of their constituents. In contrast, devolution in favor of the regional units is
more expansive because they are given the authority to regulate a wider array of subjects, including
personal, family and property relations.

Administrative decentralization or deconcentration involves the transfer of functions or the delegation

of authority and responsibility from the national office to the regional and local offices. Consistent with
this concept, the LGC has created the Local School Boards, the Local Health Boards and the Local
Development Councils, and has transferred some of the authority from the agencies of the National
Government, like the Department of Education and the Department of Health, to such bodies to better
cope up with the needs of particular localities.

Fiscal decentralization means that the LGUs have the power to create their own sources of revenue in
addition to their just share in the national taxes released by the National Government. It includes the
power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It thus extends to the
preparation of their budgets, so that the local officials have to work within the constraints of their
budgets. The budgets are not formulated at the national level and imposed on local governments,
without regard as to whether or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. Hence, the necessity
of a balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals from both local and national officials,
who in any case are partners in the attainment of national goals, is recognized and addressed.

Fiscal decentralization emanates from a specific constitutional mandate that is expressed in several
provisions of Article X (Local Government) of the 1987 Constitution, specifically: Section 5;42 Section 6;43
and Section 7.44

The constitutional authority extended to each and every LGU to create its own sources of income and
revenue has been formalized from Section 128 to Section 133 of the LGC. To implement the LGUs'
entitlement to the just share in the national taxes, Congress has enacted Section 284 to Section 288 of
the LGC. Congress has further enacted Section 289 to Section 294 of the LGC to define the share of the
LGUs in the national wealth. Indeed, the requirement for the automatic release to the LGUs of their just
share in the national taxes is but the consequence of the constitutional mandate for fiscal
decentralization.

For sure, fiscal decentralization does not signify the absolute freedom of the LGUs to create their own
sources of revenue and to spend their revenues unrestrictedly or upon their individual whims and
caprices. Congress has subjected the LGUs' power to tax to the guidelines set in Section 130 of the LGC
and to the limitations stated in Section 133 of the LGC. The concept of local fiscal autonomy does not
exclude any manner of intervention by the National Government in the form of supervision if only to
ensure that the local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with the national goals. 46

Lastly, policy- or decision-making decentralization exists if at least one sub-national tier of government
has exclusive authority to make decisions on at least one policy issue. 47

In fine, certain limitations are and can be imposed by Congress in all the forms of decentralization, for
local autonomy, whether as to power or as to administration, is not absolute. The LGUs remain to be the
tenants of the will of Congress subject to the guarantees that the Constitution itself imposes.
Section 284 of the LGC deviates from the plain language

of Section 6 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution

Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution textually commands the allocation to the LGUs of a just share
in the national taxes (Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in
the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them).

Section 6, when parsed, embodies three mandates, namely: (1) the LGUs shall have a just share in the
national taxes; (2) the just share shall be determined by law; and (3) the just share shall be automatically
released to the LGUs.48

Congress has sought to carry out the second mandate of Section 6 by enacting Section 284, Title III
(Shares of Local Government Units in the Proceeds of National Taxes), of the LGC, which is again quoted
for ready reference:

There is no issue as to what constitutes the LGUs' just share expressed in percentages of the national
taxes (i.e., 30%, 35% and 40% stipulated in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of Section 284 ). Yet, Section 6,
mentions national taxes as the source of the just share of the LGUs while Section 284 ordains that the
share of the LG Us be taken from national internal revenue taxes instead. Has not Congress the

by infringed the constitutional provision?

Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature, congressional lawmaking remains
subject to the limitations stated in the 1987 Constitution. 49 The phrase national internal revenue taxes
engrafted in Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the term national taxes written in Section
6. As such, Congress has actually departed from the letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that national
taxes should be the base from which the just share of the LGU comes. Such departure is impermissible.
Verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of a statute there should be no departure). 50 Equally
impermissible is that Congress has also thereby curtailed the guarantee of fiscal autonomy in favor of
the LGUs under the 1987 Constitution.

In view of the enumeration of what are the national internal revenue taxes, Section 284 has effectively
deprived the LGUs from deriving their just share from other national taxes, like the customs duties.

52. Mark Anthony V. Zabal, et al. vs. Rodrigo R. Duterte, et al., G.R. No. 238467, February 12,
2019;

52. Republic of the Philippines, et al., vs. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867
[consolidated with G.R. No. 185941], December 4, 2018)Cases: (Limbonas v. Mangelin, (see
prior citation);

53. Datu Firdausi I.Y. Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC

 
Facts: Datu Firdausi Abbas, et.al. challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 6734 (AN ACT PROVIDING FOR
AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO) on the following grounds: 
1) R. A. 6734 conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement (what conflicts the case doesn’t say) 
2) R. A. 6734 provides for the unconditional creation of the ARMM and not through the mode of a
plebiscite as provided in the Constitution. 
3) The Constitution provides that ARMM shall be approved by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite by
all voters residing in the provinces and cities affected, but R.A. 6734 says “by a majority or votes cast by
the constituent units in a plebiscite and only those provinces and cities where a majority of votes cast in
favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the Autonomous Region. R.A. 6734 thus conflicts the
Constitution.
4) R. A. 6734 includes provinces and cities which do not have the same cultural and historical heritage
and other relevant characteristics needed for admission to the ARMM. 
5) R. A. 6734 violates constitutional guarantee on freedom of exercise of religion as some its provisions
run counter to the Koran.
6) The creation of an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer of power to the ARMM is contrary
to the constitutional mandate that the creation of the autonomous region hinges solely on the result of
the plebiscite 
7) R. A. 6734 says “…that only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the ARMM. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided however, that the
President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions. This provision, Abbas
claims, is contrary to the Constitutional mandate that, “No province city, municipality or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established with the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the units directly affected.” (Art. 10, Sec. 10, 1987 Constitution)
 
Held: Abbas is wrong. 
1) R. A. 6734 as an enactment of Congress, is superior to the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law
to the Tripoli Agreement.
2) The transitory provisions of R. A. 6734 does provide for a plebiscite.
3) The framers of the Constitution must have intended that the majority of votes must come from each
of the constituent units and not all the votes of the provinces and cities.
4) It is not for the Court to decide on the wisdom of the law concerning the inclusion of provinces and
cities should not be included in a plebiscite. 
5) There is no actual controversy yet as to any violation of freedom of religion, only a potential one.
6) The creation of an Oversight Committee is merely procedural and in fact will aid in the timely creation
of the ARMM.
7) The power of the President to merge administrative regions is inherent in his power of general
supervision over local governments. Besides, administrative regions are not territorial or political
regions. Examples of administrative regions are Regions I to XII and the NCR Republic of the Philippines.

1. Arsadi M. Disomangcop, et al. vs. The Secretary of DPWH Simeon A. Datumanong, et al., G.R.
No. 149848, November 25, 2004;

FACTS:

Sections 14 and 15, Article X mandate the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras. Section 15 specifically provides that "[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures,
and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." To effectuate this mandate,
the Charter devotes a number of provisions under Article X. Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate,
R.A. 6734 was signed, and a plebiscite was held.  Out of more than 15 provinces called for plebiscite,
only 4 provinces voted for the creation of the creation of an autonomous region. These provinces
became the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.

In accordance with R.A, 6734, Pres. Aquino issued E.O. 426, entitled “ Placing the Control and
Supervision of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao”. She then signed EOs devolving to ARMM the powers of cabinet
departments.

9 yrs later, DPWH Sec. Vigilar issues D.O. 119 which creates Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office. This
law had jurisdiction over all national infrastructure within Marawi and Lanao Del Sur.

2 yrs later, Pres. Estrada signed R.A 8999 which established an Engineering district in the First district of
the Province of Lanao Del Sur and appropriated funds thereof.

Congress later on passed R.A. 9054, entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An
Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended." A plebiscite was held and
Basilan and the City of Marawi voted to join ARMM.

Petitioners addressed a petition to DPWH Sec. Datumanong, seeking the revocation od D.O. 119 and the
non-implementation of R.A. 8999, however, no action was taken.

Hence, they filed this instant petition. They seek to prohibit the  DPWH secretary from releasing funds
for public works projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office and other administrative regions of DPWH and  to compel the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to release all funds for public works projects intended
for Marawi City and the First District of Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in
Lanao del Sur only.

To support their petition, petitioners allege that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of discretion and
that it violates the constitutional autonomy of the ARMM. They point out that the challenged
Department Order has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with functions that have
already been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. They asserted
that prior to the sponsorship of the law, no public hearing nor consultation with the DPWH-ARMM was
made.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. 8999 is Constitutional.

RULING:

The Court held that R.A 9054 repealed R.A 8999 and rendered D.O. 119 Functus officio.

The 1987 Constitution mandates regional autonomy to give a bold and unequivocal answer to the cry for
a meaningful, effective and forceful autonomy.42 According to Commissioner Jose Nolledo, Chairman of
the Committee which drafted the provisions, it "is an indictment against the status quo of a unitary
system that, to my mind, has ineluctably tied the hands of progress in our country . . . our varying
regional characteristics are factors to capitalize on to attain national strength through
decentralization."43

The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate
development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions.44 These cultures, as a matter of right,
must be allowed to flourish

However, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of a sovereignty
distinct from that of the Republic, as it can be installed only "within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."54

Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by the local government unit vis-à-vis
the central government.

A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization.

Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates, whether

geographically or functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making
by subnational units. It is typically a delegated power, wherein a larger government chooses to delegate
certain authority to more local governments. Federalism implies some measure of decentralization, but
unitary systems may also decentralize. Decentralization differs intrinsically from federalism in that the
sub-units that have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess any claim of right against the
central government.

Decentralization comes in two forms—deconcentration and devolution. Deconcentration is

administrative in nature; it involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of authority and
responsibility from the national office to the regional and local offices. This mode of decentralization is
also referred to as administrative decentralization.

Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of powers,
responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions from the central government to
local government units.66 This is a more liberal form of decentralization since there is an actual transfer
of powers and responsibilities.67 It aims to grant greater autonomy to local government units in
cognizance of their right to self-government, to make them self-reliant, and to improve their
administrative and technical capabilities.

This Court elucidated the concept of autonomy in Limbona v. Mangelin,69 thus:

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision"
over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control
over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in
that event the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.

A year later, in Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit,71 the Court, with the same
composition, ruled without any dissent that the creation of autonomous regions contemplates the grant
of political autonomy—an autonomy which is greater than the administrative autonomy granted to local
government units. It held that "the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution (Art.
X, Sec. 2) refers to administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority…. On the other hand, the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution,
contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions.

This is true to subjects over which autonomous regions have powers, as specified in Sections 18 and 20,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Expressly not included therein are powers over certain areas. Worthy
of note is that the area of public works is not excluded and neither is it reserved for the National
Government.

In treading their chosen path of development, the Muslims in Mindanao are to be given freedom and
independence with minimum interference from the National Government. This necessarily includes the
freedom to decide on, build, supervise and maintain the public works and infrastructure projects within
the autonomous region. The devolution of the powers and functions of the DPWH in the ARMM and
transfer of the administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds to the ARG are meant to
be true, meaningful and unfettered. This unassailable conclusion is grounded on a clear consensus,
reached at the Constitutional Commission and ratified by the entire Filipino electorate, on the centrality
of decentralization of power as the appropriate vessel of deliverance for Muslim Filipinos and the
ultimate unity of Muslims and Christians in this country.

With R.A. 8999, however, this freedom is taken away, and the National Government takes control again.
The hands, once more, of the autonomous peoples are reined in and tied up.

The challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which, by virtue of E.O. 426, have been
previously devolved to the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.

Evidently, the intention is to cede some, if not most, of the powers of the national government to the
autonomous government in order to effectuate a veritable autonomy. The continued enforcement of
R.A. 8999, therefore, runs afoul of the ARMM Organic Acts and results in the recall of powers which
have previously been handed over. This should not be sanctioned, elsewise the Organic Acts' desire for
greater autonomy for the ARMM in accordance with the Constitution would be quelled. It bears
stressing that national laws are subject to the Constitution one of whose state policies is to ensure the
autonomy of autonomous regions.
Now, the question directly related to D.O. 119.

D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructure
projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of E.O. 426. The Executive
Order was issued pursuant to R.A. 6734—which initiated the creation of the constitutionally-mandated
autonomous region87 and which defined the basic structure of the autonomous government.88 E.O.
426 sought to implement the transfer of the control and supervision of the DPWH within the ARMM to
the Autonomous Regional Government. In particular, it identified four (4) District Engineering Offices in
each of the four (4) provinces, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.89 Accordingly,
the First Engineering District of the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur has jurisdiction over the public works
within the province.

The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-
ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department
order, in effect, takes back powers which have been previously devolved under the said executive order.
D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions of E.O. 426. The DPWH's order, like spring water, cannot rise
higher than its source of power—the Executive.

The fact that the department order was issued pursuant to E.O. 124—signed and approved by President
Aquino in her residual legislative powers—is of no moment. It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory
construction that a special provision or law prevails over a general one.90 Lex specialis derogant
generali. As this Court expressed in the case of Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court,91 "another
basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to special
legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the
special provisions are not applicable, that specific statute prevails over a general statute and that where
two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially
should prevail."

E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general law reorganizing the Ministry of Public Works
and Highways while E.O. 426 is a special law transferring the control and supervision of the DPWH
offices within ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government. The latter statute specifically applies to
DPWH-ARMM offices. E.O. 124 should therefore give way to E.O. 426 in the instant case.

In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a plebiscite in effect superseded E.O. 124.
In case of an irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails
because it is the later legislative will.92

Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states that "all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, and
other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Organic Act, are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly."93 With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O. 119, it necessarily follows
that D.O. 119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.

Without doubt, respondents committed grave abuse of discretion. They implemented R.A. 8999 despite
its inoperativeness and repeal. They also put in place and maintained the DPWH Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office in accordance with D.O. 119 which has been rendered functus officio by the ARMM
Organic Acts.

 
 2. Dr. Lampa I. Pandi, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116850, April 11, 2002;

The Facts

On August 9, 1993, Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director [4] and as Secretary[5] of the Department
of Health of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao  ("DOH" and "ARMM", respectively, for
brevity), issued a Memorandum designating Pandi, who was then DOH-ARMM Assistant Regional
Secretary, as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH,   Lanao del Sur. In the same Memorandum, Macacua
detailed Dr. Mamasao Sani ("Sani" for brevity), then the provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH,
Lanao del Sur, to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City.

On September 15, 1993, Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan issued Office Order No. 07
designating Saber also as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.

On August 12, 1993, Sani filed a complaint [6] with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur, Branch 10,
Marawi City challenging the August 9, 1993 Memorandum transferring him to the DOH-ARMM Regional
Office in Cotabato City, alleging that he is the holder of a permanent appointment as provincial health
officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.

On October 5, 1993, Saber filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for quo warranto with prayer for
preliminary injunction, claiming that he is the lawfully designated Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH,
Lanao del Sur. On October 14, 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
Pandi from further discharging the functions and duties as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao
del Sur.  On October 25, 1993, Pandi and Macacua filed their comment on the petition and opposition to
the application for writ of preliminary injunction.

On October 29, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 133 transferring the
powers and functions of the Department of Health in the region to the Regional Government of the
ARMM.   On November 6, 1993, Macacua, again in her capacity as DOH-ARMM Secretary-Designate,
issued a Memorandum reiterating Pandi's designation as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del
Sur, as well as Sani's detail to the Regional Office of the DOH-ARMM in Cotabato City.

On November 19, 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing by
Saber of a  P100,000.00 bond.  On November 24, 1993, Pandi and Macacua filed a motion for
reconsideration  or  recall  of  the  writ of preliminary injunction. With an offer of a P200,000.00 counter-
bond, Pandi and Macacua moved on December 13, 1993 to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction. 
The Court of Appeals denied both motions.

On December 8, 1993, Sani filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for intervention accompanied by a
complaint in intervention. Pandi, Macacua and Saber opposed the same.

On March 21, 1994, Pandi and Macacua filed a motion seeking the dismissal of Saber's petition, on the
ground that the issues therein had become moot and academic.  Pandi and Macacua cited as reason the
enactment by the ARMM Regional Assembly of the Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 25, otherwise
known as the ARMM Local Government Code ("ARMM Local Code" for brevity), as well as the execution
of the Memorandum of Agreement dated March 14, 1994 between the DOH of the National
Government and the ARMM Regional Government. [7]

On April 15, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. [8] In a resolution dated August
16, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied Pandi and Macacua's motion for reconsideration and
supplemental motion for reconsideration of the decision. [9]

The Issues

The petitioners raise the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SABER IS THE LEGALLY
DESIGNATED OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THE IPHO-APGH, LANAO DEL SUR, PURSUANT TO SECTION
478 OF THE 1991 LGU CODE MAKING MANDATORY FOR PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS THE
APPOINTMENT OF A HEALTH OFFICER, AND VESTING IN GOVERNOR MAHID MUTILAN OF LANAO
DEL SUR THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO APPOINT THE PROVINCIAL HEALTH OFFICER;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
133 DATED OCTOBER 29, 1993, THE ARMM LOCAL CODE, AND THE MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (NATIONAL) AND THE
ARMM, DID NOT RENDER MOOT AND ACADEMIC THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITION;

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL
GOVERNOR OF THE ARMM HAS ONLY A RECOMMENDATORY PREROGATIVE IN THE
APPOINTMENT OF PROVINCIAL HEALTH OFFICER UNDER SECTION 457 OF THE ARMM LOCAL
CODE;

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORGANIC ACT OF
1989 IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE 1991 LGU CODE AND THAT THE FORMER PREVAILS OVER THE
LATTER;

5. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE DECISION IN
CA-G.R. SP NO. 32242; AND
 6. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
APPROVING THE BOND POSTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT WITHOUT AFFORDING THE
PETITIONERS OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON OR EXCEPT TO ITS SUFFICIENCY OR OF THE
SURETY OR SURETIES THEREON, AND IN ISSUING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
WITHOUT HEARING.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

All the issues raised by petitioners can be reduced into three basic questions.  First, whether an
incumbent provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur can be assigned to another province and if so, who
can order such assignment.  Second, who can designate the Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health
office of Lanao del Sur  - the Provincial Governor  or the ARMM Secretary of Health.  Third, who
is empowered to appoint the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur - the Provincial Governor, the
Regional Governor or the ARMM Secretary of Health.

The answers to these questions require an examination of the laws before and after the enactment of
the Organic Act of 1989. The relevant laws cover five periods.   The first period is the time prior to the
enactment of the Organic Act of 1989.  The second period is the time after the enactment of the Organic
Act of 1989 but before the adoption of the 1991 LGU Code.   The third period is the time after the
enactment of the 1991 LGU Code but before the adoption of the ARMM Local Code. The fourth period is
the time after the adoption of the ARMM Local Code but before the enactment of the Organic Act of
2001.  The fifth period is the time after the enactment of the Organic Act of 2001.

First Period: Prior to the Organic Act of 1989

Prior to the passage of the Organic Act of 1989, the law governing the appointment of provincial health
officers was found in Executive Order No. 119, [18] then the charter of the Department of Health, issued
on January 30, 1987 by then President Corazon C. Aquino.   The provincial health office was an agency of
the Ministry of Health, and the Minister of Health was the appointing power of provincial health
officers.  Section 17 of Executive Order No. 119 provided as follows:

"Section 17. Provincial Health Office.  The integrated Provincial Health Office created under Executive
Order No. 851 shall remain as the Ministry agency in the province. It shall exercise supervision and
control over district health offices and other field units of the Ministry in the province, except those
otherwise placed under the Ministry proper or directly under the Regional Health Office.

The Provincial Health Office shall be headed by a Provincial Health Officer.   x x x. The Provincial Health
Officer and Assistant Provincial Health Officer shall be appointed by the Minister to a region, and their
assignment to a province shall be made by the Minister on recommendation of the Regional Director." 
(Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 17 of Executive Order No. 119, a provincial health officer is appointed to "a region" and
not to a province.  The Minister of Health, upon recommendation of the Regional Director, can assign
the provincial health officer to any province within the region.

The Local Government Code of 1984 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, or the "1984 LGU Code" for brevity) did
not include the provincial health officer as an official of the provincial government.  Section 199 of the
1984 LGU Code stated that:

"Sec. 199. Officials of the Provincial Government.  (1) There shall be in each province a governor, a vice-
governor, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, a provincial secretary, a provincial treasurer, a
provincial assessor, a provincial budget officer, a provincial engineer, a provincial agriculturist and a
provincial planning and development coordinator."

The enumeration of provincial officials in Section 199 clearly excluded the provincial health officer. 
Although called the provincial health officer, this official was not a provincial government official but a
national government official appointed by the Minister of Health and paid entirely from national funds.

Under the 1984 LGU Code, the Provincial Governor could appoint only "heads of offices and other
employees of the provincial government" whose salaries came mainly from provincial funds, unless the
law made him the appointing power regardless of where the salaries of the appointees were sourced. 
Section 203 of the 1984 LGU Code provided that:

"Sec. 203. Provincial Governor as Chief Executive of the Province; Powers and Duties.  -   (1) The
governor shall be the chief executive of the provincial government and shall exercise such powers and
duties as provided in this Code and other laws.

(2) The governor shall:

(a) x x x;
xxx
(e) Appoint the heads of offices and other employees of the provincial government whose salaries are
entirely or mainly paid out of the provincial funds and whose appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint;
x x x."  (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the Minister of Health appointed all provincial health officers who were in reality national
government officials paid entirely from national funds.  The appointment of a provincial health officer
was to a specific region, and the Minister (later renamed Secretary) could assign him to any province
within the region upon recommendation of the Regional Director.  This was the state of the law
immediately prior to the effectivity of the Organic Act of 1989.

Second Period: After the Organic Act of 1989

Congress enacted the Organic Act of 1989 on August 1, 1989 and the President signed it into law on
August 21, 1989.   The creation of the ARMM itself took effect on November 19, 1989 when a majority
of the ARMM residents voted in a plebiscite to create the autonomous region.  Section 3, Article III of
the Organic Act of 1989 provided as follows:

"Sec. 3. The Regional Government shall adopt a policy on local autonomy whereby regional powers shall
be devolved to local government units where appropriate: Provided, however, that until a regional law
implementing this provision is enacted, the Local Government Code shall be applicable."  (Emphasis
supplied)

At the time of the effectivity of the Organic Act of 1989, the 1984 LGU Code was the existing law
governing local government units.  Thus, the 1984 LGU Code applied to the ARMM until the Regional
Government adopted its own regional local government code.  This meant that provincial health officers
were not officials of the provincial government since the 1984 LGU Code did not list the provincial health
officer as a provincial government official.

Under the Organic Act of 1989, the power of the Secretary of Health to appoint provincial health officers
to a region, and to assign them to any province within the region, was not immediately devolved to the
Regional Government.  Section 4, Article XIX of the Organic Act of 1989 immediately placed certain line
agencies and offices of the national government under the supervision and control of the Regional
Government upon the organization of the Autonomous Region following the election of the Regional
Government's first set of regional officials on February 12, 1990.  However, other line agencies and
offices of the national government, including the regional offices of the Department of Health, were not
immediately placed under the supervision and control of the Regional Government.   Section 4, Article
XIX of the Organic Act of 1989 provided that:

"Sec. 4.  Upon the organization of the Autonomous Region, the line agencies and offices of the National
Government dealing with local government, social services, science and technology, labor, natural
resources, and tourism, including their personnel, equipment, properties and budgets, shall be
immediately placed under the control and supervision of the Regional Government.

Other National Government offices and agencies in the Autonomous Region, which are not excluded
under paragraph (9), Section 2, Article V of this Organic Act, together with their personnel, equipment,
properties and budgets, shall be placed under the control and supervision of the Regional Government
pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the Oversight Committee mentioned in Section 3, Article XIX of this
Organic Act: Provided, however, That the transfer of these offices and agencies and their personnel,
equipment, properties and budget shall be accomplished within six (6) years from the organization of
the Regional Government.  (Emphasis supplied)
x x x."

It was not until October 29, 1993, when then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 133,
that the regional offices of the Department of Health in the ARMM were placed under the supervision
and control of the Regional Government.  Executive Order No. 133 was the operative act that actually
transferred the powers and functions of the Department of Health, together with its regional personnel,
equipment, properties, and budgets, to the Regional Government.
Thus, until the effectivity of Executive Order No. 133, the Secretary of Health of the National
Government continued to appoint provincial health officers in the ARMM, with the authority to assign a
provincial health officer to any province within the region.   This was the state of the law after the
passage of the Organic Act of 1989 until the effectivity of Executive Order No. 133.

A few months after the effectivity of the Organic Act of 1989, the Revised Administrative Code of 1987
took effect on November 24, 1989.  The reason for this delayed effectivity is that R.A. No. 6622 directed
that "[T]his Code shall take effect two years after its publication in the Official Gazette." The Revised
Administrative Code retained the power of the Secretary of Health to appoint provincial health officers
who remained national government officials.  Section 19, Chapter 5, Title IX, Book IV of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that:

"SEC. 19. Provincial Health Office.  The Provincial Health Office shall be the Department agency in the
province. x x x.

The Provincial Health Office shall be headed by a Provincial Health Officer.  x x x.  The Provincial Health
Officers and Assistant Provincial Health Officers shall be appointed by the Secretary to a region, and
their assignment to a province shall be made by the Secretary on recommendation of the Regional
Health Director."

The foregoing Section is practically a reenactment of Section 17 of Executive Order No. 119, the former
charter of the Department of Health. Nevertheless, the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, although a
later law than the Organic Act of 1989, did not alter the terms of the devolution under the Organic Act
of 1989.

An ordinary statute, whether general or special, cannot amend an organic act that provides for an
autonomous region which under the Constitution may only be created, and therefore changed, through
a plebiscite called for the purpose.  Under Section 3, Article XVIII of the Organic Act of 1989, any
amendment to the Organic Act required the approval of a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose within the constituent units of the ARMM.  Section 3 of Article XVIII provides as follows:

"Sec 3.  Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than
sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision."

Unless this amendatory process is followed, no subsequent law can amend or revise the Organic Act of
1989.   In any event, with respect to the appointment and assignment of provincial health officers, the
Revised Administrative Code did not change the existing law applicable to the ARMM under the Organic
Act of 1989.

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, however, applies to the ARMM on matters not covered by the
devolution under the Organic Act of 1989.  These matters are: (a) foreign affairs; (b) national defense; (c)
postal service; (d) coinage and fiscal and monetary policies; (e) administration of justice; (f) quarantine;
(g) customs and tariff; (h) citizenship; (i) naturalization, immigration and deportation; (j) general
auditing, civil service, elections; (k) foreign trade; (l) maritime, land and air transportation and
communications affecting areas outside of the ARMM; (m) patents, trademarks, tradenames, and
copyrights.[19] Still, nothing in the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 can reduce or diminish powers
and functions devolved or to be devolved to the ARMM under the Organic Act of 1989.

Third Period: After the Local Government Code of 1991

The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160, or the "1991 LGU Code" for brevity) took effect on
January 1, 1992.  Unlike the 1984 LGU Code, the 1991 LGU Code made, for the first time, the provincial
health officers one of the officials of the provincial government to be appointed by the provincial
governor if his salary came mainly from provincial funds.   Section 463 of the 1991 LGU Code states that:

"Section 463.  Officials of the Provincial Government.  (a) There shall be in each province a governor, a
vice-governor, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, a secretary to the sangguniang
panlalawigan, a provincial treasurer, a provincial assessor, a provincial accountant, a provincial engineer,
a provincial budget officer, a provincial planning and development coordinator, a provincial legal officer,
a provincial administrator, a provincial health officer, a provincial social welfare and development
officer, a provincial general services officer, a provincial agriculturist, and a provincial veterinarian.  x x x.

(d) Unless otherwise provided herein, heads of departments and offices shall be appointed by the
governor with the concurrence of the majority of all the sangguniang panlalawigan members, subject to
civil service law, rules and regulations. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall act on the appointment
within fifteen (15) days from the date of its submission; otherwise the same shall be deemed
confirmed."  (Emphasis supplied)

The proviso in Section 463 (d) refers to Section 465 of the 1991 LGU Code which limits the appointing
power of the provincial governor to officials and employees paid mainly from provincial funds.  Section
465 provides as follows:

"Section 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.

(a) x x x.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
province and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the provincial governor shall:
(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the
provincial government, and in this connection, shall:

(i) x x x.
x x x.

Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages  are wholly or mainly paid out
(v) of provincial funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as
well as those he may be authorized  by  law to appoint;  x x x."  (Emphasis supplied)
The 1991 LGU Code, however, although a later law like the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, did not
amend the Organic Act of 1989 because the Organic Act could only be amended through the ratification
process laid out in the Organic Act itself.  Section 526 of the 1991 LGU Code provides that:

"Section 526. Application of this Code to Local Government Units in the Autonomous Regions.  This Code
shall apply to all provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays in the autonomous regions until such
time as the regional government concerned shall have enacted its own local government code."

Section 526, however, should apply only to autonomous regions created after the effectivity of the 1991
LGU Code, or in the absence of a statute governing a specific situation within a region.  Otherwise,
Section 526 of the 1991 LGU Code will collide directly with Section 3, Article XVIII of the Organic Act of
1989.

Thus, even after the passage of the 1991 LGU Code, the Secretary of Health continued to be the
appointing power of provincial health officers who remained national government officials.  The
Secretary of Health also continued to exercise the authority to assign provincial health officers to any
province within the region.   This situation, however, was only temporary, arising from the need for a
phased transfer of the personnel, equipment, properties and budgets of the Department of Health in
the ARMM to the Regional Government pursuant to Section 4, Article XIX of the Organic Act of 1989.

On October 29, 1993, Executive Order No. 133 was issued, finally transferring the powers and functions
of the Department of Health in the autonomous region to the Regional Government.  Section 2 of
Executive Order No. 133 stated that:

"Sec 2. General Powers and Functions.  The following powers and functions of the Department of Health
(DOH), as enumerated in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 119, series of 1987, shall be transferred to the
Autonomous Regional Government (ARG) subject to the specific conditions or limitations provided in
this Executive Order.  x x x."

Notably, Executive Order No. 133 referred to the powers and functions of the Department of Health
under Executive Order No. 119 and not under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 because
Executive Order No. 119 was the existing charter of the Department of Health at the time of the
effectivity of the Organic Act of 1989.

Executive Order No. 133 was issued upon recommendation [20] of the Oversight Committee created by
Section 3 of the Organic Act of 1989 "for  the purpose of supervising the transfer to the Autonomous
Region of such powers and functions vested in it by this Organic Act x x x."  Section 3 of the Organic Act
mandated the President to "act on the report and recommendations" of the Oversight Committee
within ninety days after receipt thereof.

The devolved powers under the Organic Act of 1989, as implemented by Executive Order No. 133,
included the power of supervision and control over provincial health officers, as well as the power to
appoint provincial health officers.  The power of supervision and control, previously exercised by the
Secretary of Health, carried with it the authority to assign provincial health officers to any province
within the region pursuant to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 119.  Assignment within a region of
personnel appointed to a region is an administrative matter exercised by the head of office who is
vested with the power of supervision and control over the office.  Section 3 of Executive Order No. 133
provided as follows:

Sec. 3. Functions of Department Secretary to be Transferred.   Hereunder are the authority and

responsibilities of the Secretary of the Department of Health which shall be vested in the Head of the
Regional Department of Health (Regional DOH):
a.  x x x;
x x x;
c.  Exercise supervision and control over the functions and activities of the Regional Department within
the autonomous region;
x x x.   (Emphasis supplied)

Upon the effectivity of Executive Order No. 133, the administrative authority of the Secretary of Health
to assign provincial health officers to any province within a region was transferred to the ARMM
Secretary of Health as the regional counterpart of the national Secretary of Health.  This transfer of
administrative authority to the Regional Secretary was essential to insure the continuation of vital health
services to residents in the ARMM.

There could be no gap or lacuna in the transfer of administrative authority from the National
Government to the Regional Government because basic and essential services were involved that
affected the lives of people.  This is the reason why Section 3 of Executive Order No. 133 expressly
stated that "the authority and responsibility of the Secretary of the Department of Health x x x shall be
vested in the Head of the Regional Department of Health."

On the other hand, the power to appoint provincial health officers, previously conferred by law on the
Secretary of Health, was devolved to the Regional Governor. The Organic Act of 1989 devolved specified
powers of the National Government to the three branches of the Regional Government, executive
power being devolved to the Regional Governor, legislative power to the Regional Assembly and judicial
power to the Shari'ah and tribal courts.  Section 2, Article IV of the Organic Act of 1989 provided that:

"Sec. 2.  The powers devolved to the Autonomous Region shall be exercised through the Regional
Assembly, the Regional Governor, and the special courts as provided in this Act."

Moreover, Section 1, Article VIII of the Organic Act of 1989 expressly vested executive power in the
Regional Governor:

"Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in a Regional Governor who shall be elected at large by
direct vote of the people of the Autonomous Region."

The Regional Governor therefore acquired certain executive powers that the President of the Philippines
and the Secretary of Health used to exercise prior to the Organic Act of 1989, subject to the limitations
on the devolved powers under the Organic Act.
As the holder of executive power, the Regional Governor was made the appointing power in the
executive branch of the Regional Government in accordance with Section 17 of Article VIII of the Organic
Act of 1989:

"Sec. 17.  The Regional Governor shall appoint, in addition to the members of the Cabinet, their
deputies, the chairmen and members of the commissions and the heads of bureaus of the Regional
Government, and those whom he may be authorized by regional law to appoint.  The Regional Assembly
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers or officials lower in rank in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards."

The appointing powers of the Regional Governor were those expressly granted to him under the Organic
Act of 1989, as well as those that he might be granted pursuant to regional law.   The Regional Assembly
could also enact a law authorizing regional department heads, like the ARMM Secretary of Health, to
appoint lower officials.

The power to appoint provincial health officers is one that the Regional Assembly could thus grant by
law to the Regional Secretary of Health.  However, the Regional Assembly has not enacted a law
authorizing the Regional Secretary of Health to appoint provincial health officers.   Since the power to
appoint must be expressly conferred by law, and cannot be implied from the power of supervision and
control, this ruled out the Regional Secretary of Health as the appointing power of provincial health
officers.  Significantly, the power to appoint provincial health officers is not one of the powers
transferred to the Regional Secretary of Health under Executive Order No. 133.

On the other hand, the Regional Governor is the official to whom the executive powers of the national
government have been expressly devolved.  This is clear from the language of Section 2, Article IV of the
Organic Act of 1989 when it stated that the "powers devolved to the Autonomous Region shall be
exercised through the Regional Assembly, the Regional Governor, and the special courts provided in this
Act."  It is understood that, unless otherwise provided in the Organic Act of 1989, the Regional Governor
would exercise the devolved executive powers, the Regional Assembly the devolved legislative powers,
and the Shari'ah and tribal courts the devolved judicial powers.  Again, there could be no gap or lacuna
in the devolution of powers from the National Government to the Regional Government because the
exercise of these powers was essential to the maintenance of basic services for the general welfare.

As provided in Section 2 (9), Article V of the Organic Act of 1989, part of the devolved powers were the
"[P]owers, functions and responsibilities exercised by the departments of the National Government,"
except those expressly excluded like foreign affairs, national defense and security, postal services and
others mentioned in the Organic Act.  Since the Department of Health was not excluded, the power to
appoint provincial health officers, previously vested in the Secretary of the Department of Health, was
indisputably one of the executive powers devolved to the Regional Government to be exercised by the
Regional Governor.

Until the Regional Assembly enacts a law authorizing some other ARMM executive official to appoint
provincial health officers, the power to appoint provincial health officers would remain with the
Regional Governor pursuant to the devolution of powers under the Organic Act of 1989 as implemented
by Executive Order No. 133.  The provincial health officers, after being devolved to the Regional
Government, became regional officials upon the effectivity of Executive Order No. 133.

Fourth Period: After the ARMM Local Code

On January 25, 1994, the Regional Assembly enacted the ARMM Local Code which was approved by the
Regional Governor on March 3, 1994.  Section 457 of the ARMM Local Code provides that:

"Sec. 457. Officials of the Provincial Government.  (a) There shall be in each province a governor,  a vice-
governor, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, a secretary to the sangguniang panlalawigan, a
provincial treasurer, a provincial assessor, a provincial accountant, a provincial planning and
development coordinator, a provincial legal officer, a provincial administrator,  a provincial health
officer, x x x.

(b) In addition thereto, the governor may appoint a provincial population officer, a provincial natural
resources and environment officer, x x x.

Provided, that the governor shall submit a list of at least three (3) qualified recommendees to the
autonomous regional government for appointment, according to Civil Service law to the positions of a
Provincial Health Officer, a Provincial Social Welfare and Development Officer, a Provincial Agriculturist,
a Provincial Natural Resources and Environment Officer, and a Provincial Tourism Officer, to be paid by
regional funds."

(c)  x x x

(d) Unless otherwise provided herein, heads of departments and offices shall be appointed by the
governor with the concurrence of the majority of all the sangguniang panlalawigan members, subject to
civil service law, rules and regulations.  The sangguniang panlalawigan shall act on the appointment
within fifteen (15) days from the date of its submission; otherwise the same shall be deemed
confirmed."  (Emphasis supplied)

Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial health officer in the ARMM, previously a regional official,
has also become a provincial government official, catching up with the status of provincial health officers
outside of the ARMM.  The Regional Governor appoints the provincial health officer from a list of three
recommendees of the Provincial Governor.  The ARMM Local Code provides that the salary of the
provincial health officer shall be paid from regional funds.

The ARMM Local Code also states that if the salary of the provincial health officer comes mainly from
provincial funds, the Provincial Governor is the appointing power.  The power of the Regional Governor
to appoint provincial officials applies only to provincial officials "paid by regional funds."  Section 459 of
the ARMM Local Code expressly provides that:
"Sec. 459.  The Chief Executive. Powers, Duties, Functions, and Compensation. (a) The provincial
governor, as the chief executive of the provincial government, shall exercise such powers and perform
such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
province and its inhabitants, the provincial governor shall:
(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the
provincial government and in this connection, shall:

xxx

(v) Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of
provincial funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he
may be authorized by law to appoint; (Emphasis supplied)

x x x."

The ARMM Local Code must be interpreted liberally in favor of the powers of the provincial governor as
against those of the Regional Governor.  Section 5 (a) of the ARMM Local Code mandates that:

"Sec. 5.  Rules of Interpretation.  In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules
shall apply:

Any provision on the power of the autonomous government and its local government units shall be
liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in
(a) favor of the devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit.  Any fair and reasonable
doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit
concerned; (Emphasis supplied)
  x x x."
Consequently, if a province can afford and is willing to shoulder the salary of its provincial health officer,
then the Provincial Governor becomes the appointing power in place of the Regional Governor since this
will favor the devolution of power to a lower local government unit.

Section 459 of the ARMM Local Code vests in the Provincial Governor the power to exercise supervision
and control over all provincial government officials.  The conversion of the provincial health officer from
a regional government official to a provincial government official under Section 457 of the ARMM Local
Code placed the provincial health officer under the supervision and control of the Provincial Governor. 
Consequently, with the passage of the ARMM Local Code the Regional Secretary of Health lost the
authority to assign provincial health officers to other provinces within the region.

The state of the law after the enactment of the ARMM Local Code became more favorable to Provincial
Governors, at least with respect to the appointment and assignment of provincial health officers. While
before the appointment of provincial health officers was solely the prerogative of the Regional
Governor, now a Provincial Governor has the power to recommend three nominees.  The Regional
Governor can appoint only from among the three nominees of the Provincial Governor even though the
salary of the provincial health officer comes from regional funds.  Likewise, while before the Regional
Secretary of Health could assign provincial health officers to other provinces within the region, this
authority of the Regional Secretary ceased to exist.   Since a provincial health officer was now appointed
to a specific province, he could no longer be assigned to another province without his consent. 
Moreover, the Provincial Governor now exercises supervision and control over the provincial health
officer who has become a provincial government official. Finally, if the provincial government assumes
payment of the salary of the provincial health officer, then the Provincial Governor becomes the
appointing power of such provincial official.

Fifth Period: The Organic Act of 2001

Republic Act No. 9054 ("Organic Act of 2001" for brevity) took effect on August 14, 2001, the date of its
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose within the constituent
units of the ARMM.  The Organic Act of 2001 incorporates the salient features of the Peace Agreement
entered into between the National Government and the Moro National Liberation Front on September
2, 1996.[21] The Organic Act of 2001 is a completely new autonomy act for Muslim Mindanao since it
totally replaced the Organic Act of 1989.  It is not an ordinary amendment but a total substitution since
the Organic Act of 2001 is as comprehensive as the Organic Act of 1989.

The Organic Act of 2001 expressly adopted, as a minimum, the devolution under the 1991 LGU Code. 
This gave the local government units within ARMM the same devolved powers, functions and tax-
sharing entitlements enjoyed by local government units outside of the ARMM.   Section 3, Article III of
the Organic Act of 2001 provides that:

"Sec 3. Devolution of Powers.  x x x.

The Regional Assembly may not pass any law to diminish, lessen, or reduce the powers, functions, and
shares in the internal revenue taxes of the said local government units as provided by Republic Act No.
7160, the Local Government Code of 1991."   (Emphasis supplied)

To stress the importance of this legislative policy, the provisions of Section 3 of Article III are reiterated
in Section 1 of Article IV of the same Organic Act, to wit:

"Section 1. Powers and Functions.   x x x.

The Regional Government may enact its own regional administrative code and regional local
government code consistent with the Constitution.  The powers and functions already vested upon and
the shares of the national taxes provided by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991,
to provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays in the autonomous region shall not be reduced." 
(Emphasis supplied)
Congress expressly made the devolved powers and functions under the 1991 LGU Code as the basic
minimum for all local government units in the ARMM precisely to put them on equal footing with local
government units outside of the ARMM.  Congress was aware that the 1991 LGU Code took effect after
the Organic Act of 1989 became law, and therefore the devolved powers and functions under the 1991
LGU Code could not have been incorporated into the Organic Act of 1989.  Congress was also aware that
the Supreme Court had ruled, in Matalam vs. Pangandaman,[22] that the 1991 LGU Code "being a
general law, may not be made to prevail over a special law or code" like the ARMM Local Code.   Section
3 of Article III and Section 1 of Article IV of the Organic Act of 2001 corrected this imbalance in the
devolved powers and functions between local government units within and those outside of the ARMM.

In contrast, the Organic Act of 1989 adopted, as a minimum, the devolution under the 1984 LGU Code
which was the existing local government code at that time.  Under the Organic Act of 1989, the Regional
Assembly could not diminish or reduce the powers, functions and responsibilities that the local
government units "already enjoyed" at the time of the effectivity of the Organic Act of 1989.  This did
not prevent, however, Congress from subsequently increasing the share in national taxes of local
government units within the ARMM to the same level as that of local government units outside of the
ARMM.  Such increase in allotment of national taxes did not amend or revise in any way the Organic Act
of 1989 since the formula for the tax sharing is found in the 1991 LGU Code, not in the Organic Act of
1989.  There was still, however, the issue of whether the Regional Government could reduce the share
of local government units in national taxes as provided in the 1991 LGU Code.  With the passage of the
Organic Act of 2001, this issue has been resolved in favor of local government units in the ARMM.

The passage of the Organic Act of 2001 means that the powers and functions of a Provincial Governor
under the 1991 LGU Code are now enjoyed, as a minimum, by a Provincial Governor in the ARMM.  
Thus, the Provincial Governor appoints the provincial health officer if the latter's salary comes from
provincial funds.  If the provincial health officer's salary comes mainly from regional funds, then the
ARMM Local Code applies, in which case the Regional Governor is the appointing power but he must
appoint only from among the three nominees of the  Provincial Governor. Moreover, the Provincial
Governor exercises supervision and control over the provincial health officer because the ARMM Local
Code has classified him as a provincial government official.  This is now the present state of the law on
the appointment of provincial health officers in the ARMM.  This is actually the same as the law after the
effectivity of the ARMM Local Code but prior to the passage of the Organic Act of 2001.  The only
difference is that the Regional Assembly cannot amend the ARMM Local Code to reduce or diminish this 
power of the Provincial Governor because this devolved power,  emanating from  the 1991 LGU Code,  is
now part of the Organic Act of 2001.

Application of the law to the designation of Saber

Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan designated Saber as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-
APGH, Lanao del Sur, on September 15, 1993.  On this date the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur
was still a national government official paid entirely from national funds. The provincial health officer
was still appointed by the national Secretary of Health to a region and not to a province.  The Secretary
of Health exercised supervision and control over the provincial health officer.  The Secretary of Health
was also the official authorized by law to assign the provincial health officer to any province within the
region. Indisputably, on September 15, 1993, Provincial Governor Mutilan had no power to designate
Saber as Officer-in-Charge of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.  Consequently, the designation of Saber as such
Officer-in-Charge is void.

The provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur became a provincial government official only after the
effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, which was enacted by the Regional Assembly on January 25, 1994
and approved by the Regional Governor on March 3, 1994.  Prior to the ARMM Local Code but after the
issuance of Executive Order No. 133, the Regional Governor appointed the provincial health officer while
the Regional Secretary of Health could assign the provincial health officer to any province within the
ARMM.   The Provincial Governor had no power to appoint or even designate the Officer-in-Charge of
the provincial health office.

The Court of Appeals' reliance on Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code as Provincial Governor Mutilan's
authority to appoint Saber is misplaced.  Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code, which provides that "[T]he
appointment of a health officer shall be mandatory for provincial, city and municipal governments," is
not a grant of power to governors and mayors to appoint local health officers.  It is simply a directive
that those empowered to appoint local health officers are mandated to do so. In short, the appointment
of local health officers, being essential for public services, is a mandatory obligation on the part of those
vested by law with the power to appoint them.  Moreover, as explained earlier, the 1991 LGU Code did
not amend the Organic Act of 1989.

Application of the law to the appointment and transfer of Sani

Sani was appointed provincial health officer by then Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon on January
1, 1988.  He was appointed as "Provincial Health Officer (R-05 5 th Step), Office of the Regional Health
Director, Regional Health Office No. XII, Cotabato City."  Sani was appointed provincial health officer in
Region XII since at that time Executive Order No. 119, the charter of the Department of Health, expressly
stated that provincial health officers were to be appointed to a region.  The Secretary of Health, upon
recommendation of the Regional Director, could assign provincial health officers to any province within
the region.  In Miclat vs. Ganaden,[23] this Court held that:

"While the doctrine x x x to the effect that the transfers of officers against their will amount to a
removal, the same is predicated upon the theory that said officers are appointed to particular stations
and as such cannot be transferred without their consent.  x x x.

The case before us, however, does not involve any appointment to any particular station. It merely
concerns an assignment to  a  station  made  in  the interest  of the service. x x x."

Consequently, Sani cannot claim any security of tenure as provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur
because he was never appointed to that office.

Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and ARMM Secretary of Health, detailed Sani to the DOH-
ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City on August 9, 1993.  As of that date, the powers and functions of
the Department of Health were not yet transferred to the Regional Government, and the Secretary of
Health of the National Government still exercised the power to assign the provincial health officers in
the ARMM.  Consequently, the August 9, 1993 directive of Macacua detailing or assigning Sani to the
Regional Office in Cotabato City is void.

However, on November 6, 1993, Macacua issued another Memorandum reiterating Sani's detail or
assignment to the Regional Office in Cotabato City.   This second Memorandum was issued after the
issuance of Executive Order No. 133 which expressly transferred "supervision and control over all
functions and activities of the Regional Department of Health" to "the Head of the Regional Department
of Health." In Gen. Renato de Villa vs. City of Bacolod,[24] this Court ruled that the power of
administrative control encompasses the power to transfer personnel who under the law may be
reassigned to other stations.  The second detail or assignment of Sani to the Regional Office in Cotabato,
issued on November 6, 1993, is within the authority of Macacua as Regional Secretary of Health.  Thus,
the second detail of Sani is valid.

Application of the law to the designation of Pandi

Macacua, as Regional Director and Regional Secretary of Health, designated Pandi Officer-in-Charge of
the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, on August 9, 1993 and again on November 6, 1993.  The designation
dated August 9, 1993 is void since the Regional Secretary at that time did not yet exercise supervision
and control over the provincial health offices of the ARMM.  However, the designation of Pandi on
November 6, 1993 is valid since at that time Executive Order No. 133 had already been issued vesting in
the Regional Secretary of Health supervision and control over all functions and activities of the
Department of Health in the ARMM.  The designation of Pandi, however, while valid is only temporary in
nature, good until a new designation or a permanent appointment is made.

As Regional Secretary of Health, Macacua was, as of November 6, 1993, the official vested by law to
exercise supervision and control over all provincial health offices in the ARMM.   The Regional Secretary,
by virtue of Executive Order No. 133, assumed the administrative powers and functions of the Secretary
of Health of the National Government with respect to provincial health offices within the ARMM.  The
official exercising supervision and control over an office has the administrative authority to designate, in
the interest of public service, an Officer-in-Charge if the office becomes vacant. Macacua, therefore, had
the authority on November 6, 1993 to designate an Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office of
Lanao del Sur pending the appointment of the permanent provincial health officer.  After the effectivity
of the ARMM Local Code, the Regional Secretary of Health lost the authority to make such a designation.

Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial health officer became for the first an official of the
provincial government even though he is appointed by the Regional Governor and draws his salary from
regional funds.  The ARMM Local Code vests in the Provincial Governor the power to "exercise general
supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the provincial
government."   Upon the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the power of supervision and control over
the provincial health officer passed from the Regional Secretary to the Provincial Governor.   From then
on the Provincial Governor began to exercise the administrative authority to designate an Officer-in-
Charge in the provincial health office pending the appointment of a permanent provincial health officer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 15,
1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 32242 is SET ASIDE.  The designation on September 15, 1993 of Dr. Amer A. Saber
as Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office of Lanao del Sur is declared void.  On the
other hand, the designation on November 6, 1993 of Dr. Lampa I. Pandi as Officer-in-Charge of the
Integrated Provincial Health Office of Lanao del Sur, and the assignment on November 6, 1993 of Dr.
Mamasao Sani to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City, are declared valid.  No costs.

3. Bai Sandra S. A. Sema vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597 (consolidated with G.R. No. 178628), July
16, 2008;

FACTS:

The Province of Maguindanao consists of two legislative districts. The first legislative district consists of
Cotabato City and eight municipalities. Maguindanao is part of the ARMM, created under its Organic
Act, RA 6734, as amended by RA 9054. Although Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao’s first
legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the
ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.

On August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
(MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the
first district of Maguindanao. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting
its second legislative district.

The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite held on October 2006.
On February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed a resolution requesting the
COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of
Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201.

In its answer, the COMELEC issued a resolution maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of
Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. However, in preparation for the 14
May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated another resolution stating that Maguindanao’s first
legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.

Thereafter, the COMELEC issued a third resolution renaming the legislative district in question as “Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”

Sema, who was a candidate in the May 2007 elections for Representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan with
Cotabato City," prayed for the nullification of the COMELEC resolution and the exclusion from
canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is
entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the resolution.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and

2. Whether or not a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201, pursuant
to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives
without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province.

RULING:

1. No, Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities;

The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or
its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units – province, city, municipality or barangay
– must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the
criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

Under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to
create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with
any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and
municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with
the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution.

Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM.

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative
bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives.

A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also
be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a
population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district.

The power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. For
Congress to validly delegate the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the
same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly
delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of
Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
Under the present Constitution, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5
(1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion
legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to
create legislative districts out of existing ones. The allowable membership of the House of
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only
through a national law passed by Congress.

The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its
organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear
from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion
legislative districts for Congress.

Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national
elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections.
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its
occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous
for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its
legislative powers extend only to its regional territory.

To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to
operate outside the ARMM’s territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assembly’s legislative powers within
its territorial jurisdiction. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be
delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself.

2. No, MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void.

A province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates
that each province shall have at least one representative. Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional.

Only an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation of the
Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative
district.

MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, leaving
Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao. However,
Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it
had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the surviving first legislative
district of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires that
each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, shall have at least one
representative.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section
20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies
are limited within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and
national laws.

4. Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 79956 (consolidated with G.R.
No. 82217), January 29, 1990;

4. Cordillera Regional Assembly Member Alexander P. Ordillo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 93054,
December 4, 1990).

Ordillo v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990

Gutierrez, J.

FACTS

1. January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region”, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a
plebiscite. 

2. Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 in the
rest provinces and city. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population, and as
such has the second smallest number of inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.

3. February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the
Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast only in the province of
Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for the President reiterating COMELEC
resolution, stating that “…Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably – then. Alone,
legally and validly constitutes CAR.”

4. March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugao on
first Monday of March 1991.
 5. Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5, 1990 a memorandum
granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera
Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.

6. March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that
the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices under
Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of Organic Act.

7. Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more
than one constituent unit.

8. Petitioners therefore pray that the court:

a.     declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice,
Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents
from implementing the same and spending public funds for the purpose

b.     declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera
Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until another organic law for the
Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters
in the constituent units. 

ISSUE

WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the
Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such region. 

RULING:

The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

    The keyword in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution – provinces, cities, municipalities
and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The
term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.

The rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language of the Constitution, as much as
possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in
constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed.

1. The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused
with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.

2. It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the
autonomous region.
 3. If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials: a
set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and
legislative powers over exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in
the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art V, sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA
6766)

4. Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional Government for its initial organizational
requirements can not be construed as funding only a lone and small province [Art XXI sec
13(B)(c)]

5. Certain provisions of the Act call for officials “coming from different provinces and cities” in
the Region, as well as tribal courts and the development of a common regional language. (Art
V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)

Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not only violate the letter and
intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be impractical and illogical

6. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) vs. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., G.R.
No. 135962, March 27, 2000;

Facts:

• Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila, including “transport and traffic management.” Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. is
the registered owner of Neptune Street, a private road inside Bel-Air Village. 

• Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from the
petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. 

• The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons
and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No.
7924. 

• On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. 

• Bel-Air instituted against MMDA a case for injunction and prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and
prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. 

• MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an
agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila so that
there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune Street to the public.

Issue:
• WON MMDA cannot exercises police power (NO)

Ruling:

• Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested
by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the
subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying
measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.

• It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be
exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as
the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the
agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking
body

• A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law

and has substantial control of local affairs." The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local
government unit as a "body politic and corporate." — one endowed with powers as a political
subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its
territory. Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. They are also
the territorial and political subdivisions of the state.

• Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local Government Code
of 1991 and this delegation is found in Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare
clause.

• Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The
legislative body of the provincial government is the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city
government is the sangguniang panlungsod, that of the municipal government is the sangguniang
bayan, and that of the barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991
empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to "enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city
or municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code .
. . " The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the power to "enact ordinances as may be
necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the
general welfare of the inhabitants thereon." 

• Metro-wide services” are those “services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local
political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be
provided by the individual local government units comprising Metro Manila.” There are seven (7)
basic metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover the following: (1) development
planning; (2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood
control and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter
services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety.

• The implementation of the MMDA’s plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the local
government units, national government agencies, accredited people’s organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this purpose,
the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other cooperative
arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the required services within Metro Manila

• It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installation of a system and administration. 

• There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the
legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers
the MMDA or its Council to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare” of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
“development authority.” It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with the various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature. It is thus beyond
doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative
power. It is not even a “special metropolitan political subdivision” as contemplated in Section 11,
Article X of the Constitution.

• Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. A.
No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community.

7. MMDA v. Dante O. Garin, G.R. No. 130230, April 15, 2005)

Facts:  

Respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and
his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on August
1995.

Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA
Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference
for his case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary
injunction, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of
Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses,
pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due
process clause of the Constitution.

The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against
undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified
— and therefore unlimited — fines and other penalties on erring motorists.  

The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein respondent.

Issue:

WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police power.

RULING: 

No, MMDA may not validly exercise police power. Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the
National Legislature, cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing
legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government
units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on
them by the national lawmaking body.  

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. 15 A local
government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs." 16 Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays, which exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the
passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development
and administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region
placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus: The MMDA is, as termed in
the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself

Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila
Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and
administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of
violations of traffic rules and regulations is just an enumeration of the administrative powers of
MMDA, not police powers contemplated under the law.

TAN vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government Code

Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province
in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of
Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,
Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986.
Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional
and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
• The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of
the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
• The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56
sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.

Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which
states that — “Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit
or units affected”? NO.

Held:
-Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the
boundaries, “the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first
be obtained.
- when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more
municipalities if there be a merger.”
-The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of
the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer,
eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.”
-SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and
alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the
parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other
affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to
constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent.
Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more
municipalities if there be a merger.”
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of
the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer,
eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.”
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

ummary: A plebiscite for a newly created municipality was conducted and the voters rejected its
creation. The governor questioned the result and challenged the inclusion of the voters of the mother
municipality in the plebiscite.

Rule of Law: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected—Section 10, Article X, 1987 Constitution.

Facts: Republic Act No. 7155 created the new municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of
Camarines Norte and pursuant to this law, the COMELEC (D) conducted a plebiscite for its approval. In
its resolution for the conduct of the plebiscite, the COMELEC (D) included all the voters of the
Municipality of Labo—the parent unit of the new municipality.

The result of the plebiscite showed that the majority rejected the creation of the new Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa. The governor, Hon. Roy Padilla, Jr. (P), petitioned the court to set aside the result arguing
that the phrase "political units directly affected" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution does
not include the parent political unit—the Municipality of Labo.

Issues: Is the result of the plebiscite valid?

Ruling: Yes. When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly
affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the
separation thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. What is contemplated by the phrase "political
units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite.
Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the proposed Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.