1.

Title : HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs SECRETARY

MICHAEL DEFENSOR
Citation : G.R. No. 163980
August 3, 2006
Ponente : TINGA, J.:

Facts :
A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207,
authorized the creation and development of what is now known as the National
Government Center (NGC).
On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440
hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC.
On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137,
excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation
No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to
the bona fide residents therein.
In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by
Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel
Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical
development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can
effectively become beneficiaries of the government’s socialized housing program.
On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207.
Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners
association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio F.
Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity and on behalf of the
association. The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the "National
Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003."

Issue :
Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was
not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function and should be declared null and
void for being arbitrary, capricious and whimsical.
Held:
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the
power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within
the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers.
 In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to
court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency
concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the
Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory
that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not
germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is
assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular
courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed
IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial
course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum.

2.
PHIL. ASS. OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, ET AL. G.R. No. 101279
August 6, 1992
Prepared by: Arnel D. Mateo
Facts:

Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for short), is the largest national
organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized
by the POEA, to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino
landbased workers, including domestic helpers.

On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino
housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department
Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private
employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong".
Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series
of 1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and
deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong
recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.
On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37,
Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong
Kong. All Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from the Philippines shall recruit
under the new scheme which requires prior accreditation which the POEA.
On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the
aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation

Issue:
WON the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-
making authority in issuing said circulars.

Ruling:
No. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and
regulate recruitment and placement activities. On the other hand, the scope of the
regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May 1,
1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the
National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of
Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging.
The assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and
deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of
the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the
"administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon
the respondents.
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power
publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2,
Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. The administrative circulars in question may
not be enforced and implemented.

3.
G.R. No. 118712 | October 6, 1995 | LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents. | FRANCISCO, R., J.:
FACTS
The nature of the case is the consolidation of two separate petitions for review filed by
Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines, assailing the Court of
Appeal’s decision, which granted private respondents' petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus.

Pedro Yap, Heirs of Emiliano Santiago, Agricultural Management and Development

Corporation or AMADCOR (private respondents) are landowners whose landholdings were
acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR
and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their
land, private respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition questioning the validity
of DAR Administrative Order No. 6 (1992) and No. 9 (1990), and sought to compel the DAR
to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just
compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the
amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private
respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. The Supreme Court referred the
petition to CA for proper determination and disposition.

The CA found the following facts undisputed:

Respondents argued that Admin. Order No. 9 (1990) was issued in grave abuse of
discretion amounting excess in jurisdiction because it permits the opening of trust
accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank
designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are
cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. DAR and the Landbank merely
"earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as
landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the
compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds.

On the other hand, petitioner DAR contended that Admin Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of
its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. The issuance of the "Certificate of
Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657.
Landbank averred that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits is in consonance with
Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words
"reserved/deposited" were also used.

ISSUES
1. WON CA erred in declaring as null and void DAR Admin Order No. 9 (1990) insofar as it
provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds
2. WON CA erred in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the
immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final
resolution of the cases it has filed for just compensation.
RULING:
1. NO. Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 provides:
Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon
the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or
in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the
land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines.
It is explicit that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does
it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. There is no
ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term
"deposit".
The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is
an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. The function
of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose
of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is
thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that
administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, for
settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions
of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing
rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.
2. YES. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already
deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they
rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of
the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. It
is unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and
final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to
appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same; the landowner
is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and
immediately compensated.
Wherefore, petition is denied for lack of merit. Appealed decision is affirmed.
4.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
R.O.H. AUTO PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INC. and THE HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
respondents. G.R. No. 108358 January 20, 1995
Facts: On 22 August 1986, Executive Order No. 41 was promulgated declaring a one-time
tax amnesty on unpaid income taxes, later amended to include estate and donor's taxes
and taxes on business, for the taxable years 1981 to 1985. Respondent R.O.H. Auto
Products Philippines, Inc., availing of the amnesty, filed in October 1986 and November
1986, its Tax Amnesty Return and Supplemental Tax Amnesty Return No. and paid the
corresponding amnesty taxes due.

Prior to this availment, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in a communication

received by private respondent on August 13, 1986, assessed the latter deficiency income
and business taxes for its fiscal years 1981 and 1982 in an aggregate amount of
P1,410,157.71. Meanwhile, respondent averred that since it had been able to avail itself of
the tax amnesty, the deficiency tax notice should forthwith be cancelled and withdrawn.
This was denied by the CIR Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87, implementing Executive
Order No. 41, had construed the amnesty coverage to include only assessments issued by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue after the promulgation of the executive order on August 22
1986 and not to assessments theretofore made.
On appeal, The Court of Tax appeal upheld for the respondent, which was further upheld
by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the the deficiency assessments were extinguished by reason of
respondent’s availment of the tax amnesty.

HELD: Yes, as the scope of the amnesty covers the unpaid income taxes for the years 1981
to 1985. If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended to
include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed (administratively) prior to August 22,
1986, the law could have simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not. The
conclusion is unavoidable, and it is that the executive order has been designed to be in the
nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by
it.
Further, the law provides that, upon full compliance with the conditions of the tax amnesty
and the rules and regulations issued pursuant to this Executive order, the taxpayer shall be
relieved of any income tax liability on any untaxed income from January 1, 1981 to
December 31, 1985, including increments thereto and penalties on account of the non-
payment of the said tax. Civil, criminal or administrative liability arising from the non-
payment of the said tax, which are actionable under the National Internal Revenue Code,
as amended, are likewise deemed extinguished.
5.
East Shipping Lines (ESL)vs Court of Appeals
1998

Constitutionality of E.O. No. 1088 providing for uniform & adjusted rates for foreign and
coasteise vessels in all Philippine Ports is assailed.

FACTS:
Davao Pilots Association (DPA) filed a compliant against ESL for non-payment of pilotage
services. ESL assailed the constitutionality of EO 1088, upon which DPA bases its
claim,because (1) its interpretation & application are left private respondent, and (2) it
constitutes an undue delegation of powers. It insists that it should pay pilotage fees in
accordance with and on the basis of the PPA’s memorandum circulars. The PPA is the
administrative body vested with the power to regulate & prescribe pilotage fees.

ISSUES:
1. Whether EO 1088 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether the PPA circulars are valid.

HELD:
1.
EO 1088 was upheld as valid & constitutional in Philippine Inter-island Shipping Association
vs CA (78 SCAD 197, 266 SCRA 489 [1997]). It was held that “what determines whether an
act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but its nature…The power to fix the
rates of charges for services…has always been regarded as legislative in character.”
EO 1088 is not meant simply to fix new pilotage rates. Its legislative purpose is the
‘rationalization of pilotage service charges through the imposition if uniform and adjusted
rates for foreign & coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports’.
The PPA is duty-bound to comply with EO 1088. PPA may increase the rates but it may not
decrease them below those mandated by EO 1088.

2.
Since the PPA circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they are void and ineffective.
‘Administrative/Executive acts, orders and regulations are only valid when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution’.
As stated in LBP vs CA (64 SCAD 905, 249 SCRA 149 [1995]), ‘the conclusive effect of
administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be
disturbed/set aside by the judicial department if there is an Error of Law, a Grave Abuse of
Power or Lack or Jurisdiction, or Grave Abuse of Discretion clearly conflicting with either the
letter or spirit of the law.’
An administrative agency has no discretion whether to implement a law or not. If there is
any conflict between the PPA circular and a law, the latter prevails.

6.
BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA,
CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO
VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Facts:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent
the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as
"the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Petitioner
Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds,
viz:
(1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and
(2) it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.

We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger
barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997
and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government
agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with
the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining its implementation.

Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308
Ruling: YES

Rationale:
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the
standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically,
respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing
rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.

These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished
member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to
bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative
power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse
of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.

The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O.
No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the
rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents
themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules.
As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the
publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.
Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from
the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system.

All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308
and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its
constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing
is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional
principle and a fundamental right.

7.
G.R. No. L-34674 | October 26, 1931 | MAURICIO CRUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs.
STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, respondent-
appellee. | OSTRAND, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Mauricio Cruz brought a petition before the Court of First Instance of Manila for
the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent Director of the
Bureau of Animal Industry, Stanton Youngberg, requiring him to issue a permit for the
landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. Cruz
attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of
cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. He also asserted that the sole
purpose of the enactment was to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases in the country.

The respondent asserted that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons: (1) that if Act No. 3155 was declared
unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded
because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the
respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional
and, therefore, valid. The CFI dismissed the complaint because of petitioner’s failure to file
another complaint. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

Youngberg contended that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact
alleged by the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to import
cattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared
unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective.

ISSUES:
1. WON Act No. 3155 is unconstitutional
2. WON the lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to
the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the
act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers
3. WON Act No. 3155 amended the Tariff Law

RULING:
1. No. An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of
laws by implication. The court will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it is
necessary to do so. Aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, Act 3155 is entirely valid. The
latter was passed by the Legislature to protect the cattle industry of the country and to
prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through importation of foreign cattle. It is now
generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the
development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police
power. The Government of the Philippine Islands has the right to the exercise of the
sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. At
the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefore and
it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act.

2. No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. There is no unlawful
delegation of legislative power in the case at bar.
3. No. It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law.
It does not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff
Law. It is not an amendment but merely supplemental to Tariff Law

8.
Walter E. Olsen vs. Vicente Aldanese, as Insular Collector of Customs of the Philippine
Islands, and W. Trinidad, as Collector of Internal Revenue
43 Phil 64 / GR No. L-18740, 28 April 28, 1922, J. Johns

FACTS:

The Philippine Legislature passed on February 4, 1916, Act No. 2613 entitled "an act to
improve the methods of production and the quality of tobacco in the Philippine and to
develop the export trade therein." They empower the Collector of Internal Revenue to
establish certain general and local rules respecting the classification, marking, and parking
of tobacco for domestic sale or for exportation to the United States. Under the provisions
of Act No. 2613, the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine Islands promulgated
Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspections Regulations."

The petitioner applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue for a certificate of origin
covering a consignment of 10,000 machine-made cigars to San Francisco, and represented
that the cigars were made from short-filler tobacco which was not the product of Cagayan,
Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya. The Collector of Internal Revenue did not deem it necessary to
make an actual examination and inspection of said cigars, and stated to the petitioner that
he did not see his way clear to the granting of petitioner's request, in view of the fact that
the cigars which the petitioner was seeking to export were not made with long-filler nor
were they made from tobacco exclusively the product of any of the three provinces, as
provided in Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations," and
the said cigars were neither inspected nor examined by the said officer.

Respondents allege that under section 11 of Act No. 2613 and section 5 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, the Collector of Internal Revenue has discretionary power to
decide whether the manufactured tobacco that the petitioner seeks to export to the United
States fulfills the requisites prescribed by Administrative Order No. 35. That it is not within
the jurisdiction of this court to order the Collector of Internal Revenue to issue a certificate
to the petitioner to the effect that the manufactured tobacco that the petitioner seeks to
export is a product of the Philippine Islands, but it is for the Collector of Internal Revenue
to exercise the power of issuing said certificate if after an inspection of said tobacco, he
should find that "it conforms to the conditions required by Administrative order No. 35
with the exclusion of those conditions which, according to the said decision of the Supreme
Courts, the Collector of Internal Revenue is not authorized to require under Act No. 2613."

ISSUES:

1. Whether the decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue is wrong; and

2. Whether the court has jurisdiction over this case.

RULING:

For the first issue, yes. It appears from the whole purport and tenor of the answer that, in
their refusal, the defendants were acting under, and relying upon, those portions of
Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations," which this court
has held in a former opinion to be null and void.

For the second issue, yes. Although in this class of cases, as a general rule, a demand and
refusal are prerequisites to the granting of a writ, it is not necessary where it appears from
the record that the demand, if made, would have been refused. By the express terms and
provisions of such rules and regulations promulgated by the Collector of Internal Revenue,
it was his duty to refuse petitioner's request, and decline the certificate or origin, because
the cigars tendered were not of the specified kind, and we have a right to assume that he
performed his official duty as the understood it. After such refusal and upon such grounds,
it would indeed, have been a vain and useless thing for the Collector of Internal Revenue to
examine or inspect the cigars. Having refused to issue the certificate of origin for the
reason above assigned, it is very apparent that a request to examine or inspect the cigars
would also have been refused.

Petition is granted.
9.
Public Schools District Supervisors Association v.s. De Jesus

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the “Governance of Basic Education Act 2001,”
became a law on August 11, 2001, in accordance with Section 27(1), Article VI of the
Constitution. Under Section 14 of the law, the DepEd Secretary is mandated to “promulgate
the implementing rules and regulations within ninety (90) days after the approval of the
Act, provided that the principle of shared governance shall be fully implemented within two
(2) years” after such approval.

On March 13, 2003, the PSDSA, the national organization of about 1,800 public school
district supervisors of the DepEd, in behalf of its officers and members, filed the instant
petition for prohibition and mandamus, alleging that:

I. THE ACT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IN REMOVING PETITIONERS’

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS AND ITS PRINCIPALS
(SCHOOL HEADS) WITHIN HIS/HER DISTRICT AND CONVERTING HIS/HER ADMINISTRATIVE
FUNCTION TO THAT OF PERFORMING STAFF FUNCTION FOR THE DIVISION OFFICE PER
SECTION 5.1 RULE V OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT
9155 (DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2003) IS A GROSS VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155
– THE GOVERNANCE OF BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF 2001.

II. THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 AS

PROMULGATED UNDER DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2003 EXPANDED THE LAW AND
INCLUDED PROVISIONS WHICH ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT
OF THE SUBJECT LAW.

III. THE DOWNGRADING OF SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT
SUPERVISOR OR THE NEGLECT OR REFUSAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT TO UPGRADE THE SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF
PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT TO A RESPECTABLE LEVEL OF SALARY GRADE HIGHER THAN
THAT OF THE PRINCIPALS – DESPITE CLEAR INTENTION OF R.A. 9155 TO RETAIN THE
POSITION OF PSDS IN THE HIERARCHY OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGERS AND OFFICERS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION – IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL.

Issues:

1) Whether or not District Supervisor shall not exercise administrative supervision over the
Elementary School Principals (ESPs) and Secondary School Principals (SSPs).

2) Whether or not Rule IV, Section 4.3; Rule V, Sections 5.1 and the second paragraph of
Section 5.2; and Rule VI, Section 6.2, paragraph 11 of Department of Education Order No. 1,
Series of 2003 are constitutional.

Rulings:

1) A plain reading of the law will show that the schools district supervisors have no
administrative supervision over the school heads; their responsibility is limited to those
enumerated in Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, to wit:
(1) Providing professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads and
teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district or cluster thereof;
(2) Curricula supervision; and
(3) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities.

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing,
act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The
rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine
its terms to those expressly mentioned.

2) The court reviewed the IRR and found that Section 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections 5.1 and
5.2 of Rule V are valid. The provisions merely reiterate and implement the related
provisions of R.A. No. 9155. Under the law, a division superintendent has the authority and
responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate all division supervisors and district supervisors as
well as all employees in the division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including
school heads. A school head is a person responsible for the administrative and
instructional supervision of the schools or cluster of schools. The division superintendent,
on the other hand, supervises the operation of all public and private elementary,
secondary, and integrated schools and learning centers.
10.
D. Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Secretary Drilon

Facts:
On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No. 6640 was passed that made for an increase in the
minimum wage. The Secretary of Labor issued the pertinent rules implementing the
provisions of the Republic Act. Section 8 provided in sum that the implementing rules
prohibit the employer from crediting anniversary wage increases under a collective
bargaining agreement against such wage increases mandated by the Republic Act. The
petitioners argue that this provision is null and void on the ground that it unduly expands
the provisions of the said law.

Issue:
Whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement.

Held:
No they cannot.

Rationale:
It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions
of law it is designed to implement. The provisions of the RA do not prohibit the crediting of
CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with RA No. 6640.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress.

11.
ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS ANGELES vs. HOME
DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND
Posted on June 20, 2013 by winnieclaire
G.R. No. 131082 June 19, 2000
Facts: petitioner Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los Angeles (hereafter
PETITIONER), a law firm, was exempted for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995,
from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage by respondent HDMF because of a superior retirement
plan.
The HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board
Resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company
to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage, 3 it must have a plan providing
for both provident/retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the
Pag-IBIG Fund.

PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the Amendments to the Rules
are invalid. In that the amendments are void insofar as they abolished the exemption
granted by Section 19 of P.D. 1752, as amended. The repeal of such exemption involves the
exercise of legislative power, which cannot be delegated to HMDF.
HDMF disapproved PETITIONER’s application on the ground that the requirement that
there should be both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of
the phrase “and/or,” and that the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 7742 did not amend nor
repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely implement the law. The respondent Board
was merely exercising its rule-making power under Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752. It had the
option to use “and” only instead of “or” in the rules on waiver in order to effectively
implement the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. By choosing “and,” the Board has clarified the confusion
brought about by the use of “and/or” in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended.
PETITIONER filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not the board of HDMF exceeded its delegated power.

Held: YES. The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words “and/or.”

It seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752
intended that an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to
that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had intended that the
employee [sic] should have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to
qualify for exemption, it would have used the words “and” instead of “and/or.”
Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of waiver or
suspension, that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the fund or continue to
be so. The law obviously contemplates that the existence of either plan is considered as
sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both
plans is more than sufficient. To require the existence of both plans would radically impose
a more stringent condition for waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law. By
removing the disjunctive word “or” in the implementing rules the respondent Board has
exceeded its authority.
It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 51
17 of R.A. No. 7742 and Section 13 18 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well-settled that rules
and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. 19 It is required that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction
to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.

In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII
of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that
employers should have both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its
employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund, it effectively amended Section
19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished that exemption through
the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and
subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated
power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a
regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances
must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law
they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the law.
12.
Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs Philippine Coconut Authority

FACTS:The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was created by Presidential Decree No. 232
as an independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development and
growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that
coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and
growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law.

PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant operators. In
March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no longer require
those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for
engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise
unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this
caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in congested areas,
underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities. The Association
of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) then filed a petition for mandamus to compel
PCA to revoke B.R. No. 018-93.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.

HELD: Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-
faire as an economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise
as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever
necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the
removal of “protective regulations” for the benefit of the general public. This is so because
under Art. 12, Secs. 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves the power to
intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public
interest so requires.

13.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998

FACTS :

On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s ten
year old daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the
constitutionality of RA 7659 “ The Death Penalty Law”, and the imposition of death penalty
for the crime of rape. The motions were denied with the court finding no reason to declare
it unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant with the requirements for its
imposition.

Act 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The
mode of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of
Justice promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and directed the
Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of
Justice and Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that
RA 8177 and its implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The Executive Judge of
the RTC of Quezon City and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104 were later impleaded to
enjoin them from setting a date of execution.

On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the parties
to mantain status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to
request for TRO until resolution of the petition.

The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in
question is unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR
filed a motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that
the death penalty is cruel and degrading citing applicable provisions and statistics showing
how other countries have abolished the death penalty and how some have become
abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection is cruel,
degrading , inhuman and violative of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.

ISSUE :
WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules are violative of the unconstitutional
proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment, violative of international
treaty and obligations , discriminatory and an undue delegation of legislative powers.

RULING :

I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER

SECTION 19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes the imposition of "cruel,
degrading or inhuman" punishment. This is the challenge thrown at RA 8177 and its
implementing rules and regulations.
The court explains that any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in
carrying out the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional
proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense,
anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports
pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. The
Constitution, however, does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished."
II.REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL
TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Petitioner disputes that the reimposition of the death penalty law violates the International
Covenant on Civil And Political Rights, which was adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on December 16, 1996, signed and ratified by the Philippines on December
19, 1966 and October 23, 1986, respectively.
Although Article 6 of said covenant highlights an individual’s right to life, it also particularly
recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to life, subject to
the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".
The petitioner's assertion of our obligation under the Second Optional Protocol has gone
astray since dates and circumstances related to its adoption prove that the Philippines
neither signed nor ratified said document.
III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION
19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.
The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government and each
department has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. A consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers is
the principle of non-delegation of powers. In Latin maxim, the rule is : potestas delegata
non delegari potest." (what has been delegated, cannot be delegated). There are however
exceptions to this rule and one of the recognized exceptions is “ Delegation to
Administrative Bodies “
The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject
of lethal injection.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing
complexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of
the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in
the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete
in itself – it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate – and (b) fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of
carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job
must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.

RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits,
map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out.

14.
Lupangco VS CA GR NO 77372 April 21 1988 CASE DIGEST

Facts On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission

(PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all
those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy
 No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by,
or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or
university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or
employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days
immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec.
8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year,
filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a
preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the
above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitution.

Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the
lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution

In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the
case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to
Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of
Appeals

Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.

Held: It is not Constitutional.

the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve
the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a
cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the
prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations
conducted by the respondent PRC
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the
examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no
authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the
licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed
to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every
right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be
allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their
personal growth
15.
Tañada vs. Tuvera

FACTS:

Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,

and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern
as recognized by the 1973 constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general

orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders is necessary before its enforcement.

RULING:

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ”
The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day
following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into
effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability”
is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only
to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need
not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

16.
G.R. No. 109023 | August 12, 1998 | RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, EDELWINA DE PARUNGAO,
VENUS M. POZON AND other similarly situated personnel of the LOCAL WATER
UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION (LWUA), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND
LEONARDO L. JAMORALIN in his capacity as COA-LWUA Corporate
Auditor,respondents. |

PURISIMA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). On July 1,
1989, Republic Act No. 6758 "An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position
Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes", took effect. Section 12
of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into
standardized salary rates. Certain additional compensations, however, were exempted
from consolidation. Prior to this, they were receiving honoraria as designated members of
the LWUA Board Secretariat and the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee. To
implement RA 6758, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate
Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing without qualification
effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic
salary.
Pursuant to said Circular, respondent Leonardo Jamoralin, as corporate auditor, disallowed
on post audit, the payment of honoraria to the herein petitioners. Petitioners appealed to
the COA, questioning the validity and enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10. They contend that
the Circular is inconsistent with the provisions of Rep. Act 6758 (the law it is supposed to
implement) and, therefore, void. And it is without force and effect because it was not
published in the Official Gazette.
COA upheld the validity and effectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10. Petitioners elevated the case to
the Supreme Court.
The Solicitor General supported the petitioners, saying that Sec. 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 is a
nullity for being inconsistent with and repugnant to the very law it is intended to
implement. The DBM Secretary asserted that the honoraria in question are considered
included in the basic salary, for the reason that they are not listed as exceptions under Sec.
12 of Rep. Act 6758.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 has legal force or effect despite its lack of publication in
the Official Gazette

RULING:
No. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446), publication in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required
since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is
to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable,
DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
It is clear that DBM-CCC No. 10 is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. Before
the said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the
government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the
publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines — to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice
out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This
approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and
transparency. The ineffectiveness of the Circular makes resolution of the other issues at
bar unnecessary.
Petition is granted.
17.
Philsa International Placement and Service Corp. v. Sec. of Labor and Employment
G.R. No. 103144 April 4, 2001
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

FACTS:
Private respondents, who were recruited by Philsa for employment in Saudi Arabia, were
required to pay placement fees. After the execution of their respective work contracts,
private respondents left for Saudi Arabia. While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were
allegedly made to sign a second contract which changed some of the provisions of their
original contract resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and privileges. Their
foreign employer forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work hours
from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic
monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third contract, the services of private
respondents were terminated and they were repatriated to the Philippines. Upon their
arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from Philsa the return of their
placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their
contract. When Philsa refused, they filed a case before the POEA against Philsa on the
grounds of illegal dismissal, payment of salary differentials, illegal deduction/withholding of
salaries, illegal exactions/refund of placement fees, and contract substitution. Philsa insists,
however, that it cannot be held liable for the POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11 and 2,
Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from
applicants, is void for lack of publication.

HELD:
See the landmark ruling in Tañada case. The assailed issuances upon which private
respondents based their cause of action were not published or filed with the National
Administrative Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987. Hence, Philsa is not
liable.
18.
PEOPLE VS. MACEREN
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be
extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

FACTS:
The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1
which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under
the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court
quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing,
hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI
affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?

HELD:
NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does
not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are
powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a
penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what
acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the
imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated
to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry
out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which
have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not
represent a valid precise of the rule-making power.

1. US VS. PANLILIO

The orders (rules and regulations) of an administrative officers or body issued pursuant
to a statute have the force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such
orders is not an offense punishable by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such
violation.

FACTS:

The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of
animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs of trial. It is alleged that the accused illegally and without being
authorized to do so, and while quarantine against the said carabaos exposed to rinder
pest was still in effect, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral
in which they were quarantined and drove them from one place to another. The
accused contends that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do
not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760

ISSUE:

Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of
Agriculture?

HELD:

NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture
prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of
such orders. Section 8 of Act No. 1760 provides that any person violating any of the
provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be punished. However, the only sections of
the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5.
This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the orders of the Bureau of
Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act.
The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the
force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such
orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation
thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of
the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any
way therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, ¶2 of the Penal Code which
punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic
disease among animals.
2. PEOPLE VS. MACEREN

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular

department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law
itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

FACTS:

The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1
which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The
municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit
electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same.
On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?

HELD:

NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries
Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under
that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish
electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the
old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the
power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance
of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the
legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to
promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative
officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the
authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power.
3. VICTORIAS MILLING VS. SSS

When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new

law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law.

FACTS:

The SSS issued Circular No. 22 which provides that, in computing the premiums due, all
employers will include in the employee’s remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay.
Victorias Milling Company protested the circular as being contradictory to its previous
Circular which expressly excluded overtime pay and bonus in the computation of
premium contributions. Victorias questioned its validity for lack of authority on the part
of the SSS to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of
publication in the OG. SSS argues that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation, but a
mere administrative interpretation in light of the amendments introduced by an
amendatory law. Hence, there is no need for approval of the President and publication
in the OG to be effective.

ISSUE:

Whether Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation?

HELD:

NO, Circular No. 22 is an administrative interpretation. There is a distinction between

an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose
enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency
promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a
valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of
the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of
the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction
provided in the law. A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its
promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the
legislature, On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely
advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. In this case,
Circular No. 22 was issued by the SSS, in view of the amendment of the provisions of
the Social Security Law defining the term “compensation.” While prior to the
amendment, bonuses and overtime pay were expressly exclude, such exemption was
deleted by the amendatory law. Hence, it thus became necessary for the SSS to
interpret the effect of such deletion through Circular No. 22.

4. PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC. VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION,

CULTURE AND SPORTS

If the rates prescribed by an administrative agency is in the exercise of its quasi-

legislative powers, prior notice and hearing is not essential to the validity of its issuance.

FACTS:

The Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS submitted a report
recommending an increase in school fees. DECS took note of the report and issued an
Order authorizing a 15% to 20% increase as recommended. Petitioner sought for
reconsideration on the ground that the increases were too high. Thereafter, the Order
was modified reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%. Petitioner still
protested the increases and filed a petition for prohibition, seeking to declare the
questioned Department Order unconstitutional for it was issued without any legal basis
and for violation of the due process clause for lack of due notice and hearing before
issuance.

ISSUE:

Whether the Department Order is valid?

HELD:

YES. The power of the DECS, as granted by law, to regulate school fees include the
power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the
authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with
the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the
law. As to the issue of due process, there is no such violation. The function of
prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an
adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and
hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates
prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function,
prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules
and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative
character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party,
based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. In this case,
the Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all
private schools in the country for the school year 1987 to 1988. Hence, it applies to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the country and the issuance of the department
order is in the exercise of DEC’s quasi-legislative power. This being so, prior notice and
hearing is not essential to the validity of its issuance.

5. SUNVILLE vs. JUDGE ABAD

The application of the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the
issue raised is a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of
the same question by a court of justice.

FACTS:

Sunville was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA) authorizing it to exploit timber
in Lison Valley, Zamboanga del Sur. Respondents filed a petition with the DENR to annul
the said TLA due to some serious violations of its conditions and provisions of forestry
laws, carried out by petitioner. They likewise filed a complaint for injunction in the RTC,
based on the same causes of action. Sunville filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction of the court and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The motion
was denied by Judge Abad of the RTC. The CA affirmed and held that the the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and pointed to the
several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The
respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the
urgent need for judicial intervention given the petitioner’s operations have caused
heavy siltation in various rivers.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents should first exhaust administrative remedies?

HELD:

YES. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the
appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under
their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review.
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which
enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming
primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. As
correctly suggested by the respondent court, however, there are a number of instances
when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to
immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: (1) when the question raised is purely
legal; (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is
patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the
claim involved is small; (6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (7) when there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (8) when strong public interest is
involved; (9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; and 10) in quo
warranto proceedings. In this case, the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR should
be allowed to rule in the first instance on this controversy coming under its express
powers before the courts of justice may intervene. The respondents have failed to
satisfactorily establish that the extraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from
the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative remedies and immediate resort to the
courts. In fact, Sunville has stopped its operations in compliance with the order of the
DENR.

6. MORCOSO V. CA

As an exception to the general rule, administrative remedies need not be exhausted if

the agency has no longer jurisdiction.

FACTS:

Respondent Tirol filed a complaint against Morcoso for recovery of possession of a

fishpond situated in Ibajay, Aklan. She alleged that the said fishpond is part of the land
she inherited from her father and that she entered into a lease agreement with
Morcoso allowing him to lease a portion and develop it into a fishpond. Morcoso was
later informed by the BFAR that the land Tirol leased to him is within the area of
alienable and disposable public land, thus Morcoso applied for a fishpond permit.
Morcoso refused to surrender possession of the fishpond. Morcoso assailed the
jurisdiction of the trial court because of a pending administrative case before the BFAR
regarding their conflicting claims. The trial court ruled in favor of Tirol. CA affirmed said
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:

YES. As an exception to the general rule, administrative remedies need not be

exhausted if the agency has no longer jurisdiction. The doctrine requiring prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies before recourse to courts is inapplicable
because the fishpond in dispute is private and not public land. The plaintiffs have
sufficiently established that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the land in question under claim of ownership for a very long period of
time. The fishpond not having been part of the public domain, the trial court correctly
adjudged Tirol as the rightful owner thereof.

7. NFA VS. CA
The doctrine of administrative remedies is inapplicable where there is urgency or
irreparable damage.

FACTS:

Earlier, the NFA conducted a public bidding to award security contracts for the
protection of its facilities. Among those awarded were the private respondents. When
David became the new Administrator of the NFA, he caused the review of all security
contracts and created a Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC). When the
time of the bidding came, some bids were disqualified for failure to comply with
documentary requirements including those of Respondents. Respondents Lanting
Security and Watchman Agency filed complaints with the RTC to restrain the
Administrator from proceeding with the public bidding. During the pendency of the writ
of preliminary injunction, David terminated the contracts of the security agencies and
engaged the services of seven new agencies. Respondents filed another complaint to
restrain the NFA from terminating their services. The lower court ruled in favor of
Respondents. On appeal to the SC, the NFA contends that respondents did not exhaust
administrative remedies and hence, their complaint is premature.

ISSUE:

Whether the Respondents should have first exhausted administrative remedies?

HELD:

NO. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to some

limitations and exceptions. In the case at bar, respondent’s contracts were terminated
in the midst of bidding preparations and their replacements hired barely five days after.
An appeal to the NFA Board or Council of Trustees and the Secretary of Agriculture as
mandated by the provisions of the Administrative Code was not a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The urgency of the situation which
necessitated a recourse to the courts is justified.
8. ESPIRITU vs. MELGAR AND JUDGE VIROLA

Absent any of the exceptions to the rule, the doctrine of administrative remedies
cannot be disregarded.

FACTS:

Mayor Melgar allegedly attacked one Ramir Garing and had him arrested and detained
in abuse of his position as Mayor in Oriental Mindoro. Ramir Garing filed a complaint
and asked that Provincial Governor Espiritu to be placed under preventive suspension.
After evaluating the complaint, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro
passed Resolution No. 55 recommending that the Provincial Governor place the Mayor
under preventive suspension pending investigation of the administrative complaint.
This was based on reasonable grounds in the complaint corroborated by several
witnesses. The Provincial Governor concurred. Mayor Melgar resorted to the RTC to
issue a TRO on the Provincial Governor and alleged that the Provincial Governor
committed GADLEJ. Judge Virola granted the TRO. The Governor appealed to the SC,
citing that the judge committed GADLEJ in issuing the TRO.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether the Provincial Governor committed GADLEJ by placing the Mayor under
preventive suspension?

(2) Whether the Judge committed GADLEJ in issuing the TRO

HELD:

NO. There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges against him
are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his innocence. Preventive
suspension is allowed so that the respondent may not hamper the normal course of
the investigation through the use of his influence and authority over possible witnesses.
As a general rule, the office or body that is invested with the power of removal or
suspension should be the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause. The
provincial governor of is authorized by law to preventively suspend the municipal
mayor at anytime after the issues had been joined and any of the following grounds
were shown to exist: (1) When there is reasonable ground to believe that the
respondent has committed the act or acts complained of; (2) When the evidence of
culpability is strong; (3) When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or (4) When the
continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat
to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.

(2) The regional trial court had no jurisdiction over the special civil action and gravely
abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case. If the Mayor thought that
preventive suspension was unjustified and politically motivated, he should have sought
relief first from the Secretary DILG and not from the courts. Mayor Melgar's direct
recourse to the courts without exhausting administrative remedies was premature,

9. INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC VS. CA

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the
courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution
of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

FACTS:

Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the
Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED). It was also granted a
coal operating contract in the so-called “Giporlos Area.” IEI was later advised that in line
with the objective of rationalizing the country’s coal supply-demand balance, the logical
coal operator in the area would be Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation
(MMIC). IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC its rights in the area but later filed an
action for rescission with damages against MMIC for failure of the latter to comply with
its obligations. IEI prayed that the Energy Minister approve the return of the contract
from MMIC to IEI. Strangely enough, Mr. Jesus S. Cabarrus is the President of both IEI
and MMIC. Trial Court ordered the rescission and declared the continued efficacy of the
coal contract in favor of IEI and ordered the BED to issue its written affirmation of the
contract and to give due course to IEI’s application. CA reversed the decision and ruled
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that under PD 1206, it
is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration,
exploitation and development of coal blocks.

ISSUE:

Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should apply in this case?

HELD:
YES. It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative
agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular
case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the
case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate
questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is
within the proper jurisdiction of a court. Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited
and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said
areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in
possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The application of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case
below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of the
BED are threshed out and determined.

10. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, et al vs. LILIA B. ORGANO

G.R. No. 14995, February 26, 2004

COMMISSION OF SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE, VIOLATION OF REVENUE REGULATION NO.

4-93

Facts:

Respondent Lilia B. Organo is a revenue collection officer of the BIR, Revenue

Region 7, Quezon City. On May 13, 1997, then BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinsons-
Chato filed with the BIR a formal administrative charge against petitioner for grave
misconduct and dishonesty. Respondent filed a verified answer, in which she
admitted that she had no specific authority allowing her to receive withholding tax
returns and check payments. She alleged in her counter-affidavit that her duties as
collection officer consisted merely of collecting delinquent accounts and performing
other tasks that her supervisor would assign to her from time to time; and that her
acceptance of the withholding tax returns and check payments for transmittal to
 BIR-authorized banks was a mere assistance extended to taxpayers, without any
consideration.The administrative case against respondent was transferred to the
Office of Ombudsman, which adopted the “proceedings, evidence/exhibits
presented at the administrative proceedings before the BIR.” In due course, it
rendered its decision finding respondent guilty of grave misconduct.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is liable for grave misconduct.

Held:

The Court held that by accommodating and accepting withholding tax returns and
checks payments respondent disregarded as established BIR rule. Revenue
Regulation No. 4-93 requires payments through the banks precisely to avoid,
whenever possible, BIR employee’s direct receipt of tax payments. Yet, respondent
was not deterred from making accommodations that circumvented this provision.
To compound matters, her acts were essential ingredients paving the way for the
commission of fraud against, and consequent damage to, the government. Her
claimed ignorance thereof cannot erase her liability. Obviously, she disregarded the
established practice and rules. In the face of her silence, the fact that the checks
ended up in an unauthorized BIR account eloquently speaks, at the very least, of her
gross negligence in taking care of collections that should not have passed through
her hands in the first place. Because of her complicity in the transgression of the
cited BIR regulation as well as her gross negligence, respondent is administratively
liable for simple misconduct and is suspended for six months.
11. RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 149154, June 10, 2003

POWER OF COA

Facts:

The Board of Directors (BOD) of the Catbalogan Water District granted to

themselves RATA, rice allowance, productivity incentive, anniversary, and year-end
bonus and cash gifts, as authorized by Resolution No. 313 of the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA). The COA disallowed and ordered the refund of
these allowances as they are not allowed by P.D. No. 198, the Provincial Water
 Utilities Act of 1973.

Issue:

Whether COA is vested with authority to disallow release of allowance not

authorized by law even if authorized by the LWUA.

Held:

Art. IX, Sec. 2 D of the Constitution mandates the COA to audit all the government
agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) with
original charters. The COA is vested with authority to disallow illegal or irregular
disbursements of government funds. A Water District is a GOCC with a special
charter since it is created pursuant to special law, PD 198. The COA can disallow
allowances not authorized by law, even if authorized by the LWUA.
Considering that the disallowed allowances were received in good faith, without
knowledge that payment had no legal basis, the allowances need not to be
refunded.

12. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ET AL. V. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION (NTC) G.R. 151908, August 12, 2003

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE & QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS; RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION;WHEN
APPLICABLE
Facts:

The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000 which promulgated rules and regulations
on the billing of telecommunications services. Petitioners filed with the RTC a
petition to declare the circular as unconstitutional. A motion to dismiss was filed by
the NTC on the ground of petitioner’s to exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC
denied the motion to dismiss but on certiorari, the CA reversed RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the Billing circular 13-6-2000 issued by NTC unconstitutional.

Held:

Administrative bodies had (a) quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and (b) quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making
power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated
legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-
delegability and separability of powers. To be valid, such rules and regulations must
conform to, and be consistent with, the provisions of enabling statute. Quasi-judicial
or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions
of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. In
carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh
evidence, and draw conclusions from them for their official action and exercise of
discretion in a judicial. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules
issued by an administrative body contravenes the law or the constitution is within
the judicial power as defined by the Constitution which is “ the duty of the Courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there have been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” The NTC circular was issued pursuant to its
quasi-legislative or rule-making power. Hence, the action must be filed directly with
the regular courts without requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. Where
the act of administrative agency was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial
function, exhaustion of administrative remedy is required, before going to court.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency
exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving
specialized disputes, the same must be referred to an administrative agency of
special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This doctrine of
primary jurisdiction applies where the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body. In such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral
of such issues to the administrative body for its view.
13. RENATO HERRERA v. ELMER BOHOL
G.R. No. 155320. February 5,2004

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770 ( THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1998) PENALTIES WHICH ARE
FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE;

Facts:

Renato F. Herrera, former Director III at DAR Central Office, approved the request
for shift of item number of Plaridel Elmer J. Bohol, a Senior Agrarian Reform officer
at the BARIE. The shift or item number from 577-1 of Fund 108 to 562-3 of Fund 101
resulted to Bohol ontaining his salary under Fund 101. When Bohol was informed
that he could not draw his salary under such item anymore because his item was
recalled and was given to another person, he charged Herrera before the Office of
the Ombudsman, with Grave Misconduct and/or Inefficiency and Incompetence. The
Ombudsman found Renato Herrera guilty of simple misconduct and was suspended
for one month without pay. Such decision was contested by Herrera and he even
appealed to the CA on the ground that he did not fail to take measures to correct
respondent’s recall; but, such petition was just denied by the CA.A petition for
review was raised to the SC stressing that one month suspension, as stated in the
Ombudsman Act of 1998, is appealable considering that it is not among those
enumerated as final and unappealable.

Issue:
 Whether or not the provision in R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1998, providing suspension of not more than one month’s
salary is final and unappealable.

Held:

Sec. 27 of RA No. 6770 states that: “any order, directive or decision imposing the
penalty of public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month’s
salary shall be final and unappealable…” Salary suspension is an effect of work
suspension following the “no work, no pay” principle. It will be the employee
concerned who will be suspended and such suspension without pay, being final,
and unappealable, is clearly expressed the law. RA No. 6770, therefore, is a legal and
clear basis of denying the petitioner’s appeal.

14. ALBERTO V. REYES, ET AL. v. RURAL BANK OF SAN MIGUEL (BULACAN), INC.ET.
AL,.
G.R. No. 154499, February 27, 2004

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY;HEAD OF A DEPARTMENT OR A SUPERIOR OFFICER

SHALL NOT BE CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE WRONGFUL ACTS.OMISSION OF DUTY,
NEGLIGENCE FOR MISFEASANCE OF HIS SUBORDINATE.UNLESS HE HAS ACTUALLY
AUTHORIZE BY WRITTEN ORDER OF THE SPECIFIC ACT OR MISCONDUCT
COMPLAINED OF

Facts:

In a letter dated May 19,1999, addressed to then BSP Governor Singson, RBSMI
charge the petitioner with violation of RA No. 6713 ( code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees). The Monetary Board (MB) of the BSP
created an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the matter. The ensuing investigation
disclosed that sometime in September 1996, RBSMI, which had a history of major
violations/exceptions dating back to 1995, underwent periodic examination by the
BSP. The examination team headed by Principio noted serious 20
exceptions/violations and deficiencies of RBSMI.
Through Resolution No. 96, the MB required RBSMI to submit within 15 days a
written explanation with respect to the findings of the examiner. It also directed the
Department of Rural Banks DRB), to verify, monitor and report to the Deputy
Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector (SES) on the findings noted, until the
same shall have been corrected. Meanwhile on June 13,1997, the MB approved
Resolution No. 724 ordering RBSMI to correct the major exceptions noted within 30
days from receipt of the advice, and to remit to the BSP the amount of
P2,538,483.00 as fines and penalties for incurring deficiencies in reserves against
deposit liabilities. More than a year after, however, the RBSMI asked for a
reconsideration of MB Resolution No. 724 insofar as the imposition of fine
amounting to P P2,538,483.00.On January 21, 1999, the MB adopted Resolution No.
71, authorizing the conditional reversal of sixty of the dispute on the findings on
reserve deficiency. Subsequently, on April 7, 1999, the MB approved the interim
reversal of the entire amount of the penalty “pending the outcome of the study on
the legal and factual basis for the imposition of the penalty.” The above incidents,
particularly the alleged “brokering” by Reyes and the petitioners’ “unsupported”
recommendation to impose a penalty of P2,538,483.00 for legal reserve deficiency,
prompted the respondent to file the letter-complaint charging the petitioners with
“unprofessionalism.” In the Decision if March 14,2003, this Court found Deputy
Governor Reyes and Director Domo-ong liable for violation of the “standards of
professionalism” prescribed by RA 6713in that they used the distressed financial
condition of respondent RBSMI as the subject of a case study in one of the BSP
seminars and did the “brokering” of the sale of RBSMI. The Court modified the
decision of the CA by reducing the penalty imposed from the a fine equivalent to six
months’salary to a fine of 2 months salary for Reyes and one month salary for
Domo-ong.
The court exonerated petitioner Proncipio of the Administrative charges. The
exoneration is subject to RBSMI’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not the Superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts,
omissions of duty, negligence or misfeasance of his subordinate officer.
Held:

The immunity of public officers from liability for nonfeasance, negligence or

omissions of duty of their official subordinate and even for the latter’s misfeasance
or positive wrong rests, according to MECHEM, “upon obvious considerations of
public policy, the necessities of the public service and the perplexities and
embarrassments of a contrary doctrine.” These official subordinates are themselves
public officers though of an inferior grade, and therefore directly liable in the cases
in which any public officer is liable, for their own misdeeds or defaults. Under the
Admin Code of 1987, which provides that head of a department or a superior officer
shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence,
misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has actually authorized by written order
the specific act or misconduct complained of.
15. Zambales Chromite Mining et al v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines Gozon to have them
be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in
Sta. Cruz, Zambales. They are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez
and Pabiloňa. Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM appealed the case
before the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon
was assigned as the Sec of Agri. And Natural Resources. He did not inhibit himself
from deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed his earlier decision when he
was still the director of mines. ZCM then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The
CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that the disqualification of a judge to
review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply to
administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case
which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for
disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from
deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily
and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed the case to the
CA. The CA reversed Gozon’s finding and declared that ZCM had the rights earlier
attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that the
factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA
reconsidered after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA
remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed
urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the CA’s earlier decision to be reaffirmed
while Martinez et al demanded that Gozon’s finding be reinstated. The CA denied
both petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due
process.
 HELD:

The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon had
acted with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a
subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must
perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there
could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision
of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same
view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view
of the case. The SC affirmed the 2nd decision of the CA.

16. Makati Stock Exchange, Inc v Securities and Exchange Commission

14 SCRA 620 (1965)

FACTS:

The SEC in its resolution, denied the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc permission to
operate a stock exchange unless it agreed not to list for trading on its board,
securities already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange.

Objecting to the requirement, Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. Contends that the
Commission has no power to impose it and that anyway, it is illegal, discriminatory
and unjust. The Commission’s order or resolution would make impossible, for all
practical purposes, for the Makati Stock Exchange to operate, such that its
“permission” amounted to “prohibition”.

Issue:

Does the Commission have the authority to promulgate the rule in question?

Held:

None.
 1. Test for determining the existence of authority
“The commission cites no provision of law expressly supporting its rule against
double listing. It suggests that the power is necessary for the execution of the
functions vested in it. It argues that said rule was approved by the Department
Head before the war and it is not in conflict with the provisions of the Securities
Act. The approval of the Department, by itself, adds no weight in judicial
litigation.

The test is not whether the Act forbids Commission from imposing a prohibition
but whether it empowers the Commission to prohibit.

2. Commission without power to impose prohibition

“The Commission possesses no power to impose the condition of the rule which
results in discrimination and violation of constitutional rights. It is fundamental
that an administrative officer has such powers as are expressly granted to him
by statute, and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Accordingly, the
license of Makati Stock Exchange is approved without such condition against
double listing.

17. Weigall v. Shuster

11 Phil 340 (1908)

Facts:

Defendant Collector of Customs officially imposed a fine of $200 upon the plaintiff,
the Captain of the British steamer loonsang, for a violation of the Chinese Exclusion
law, in permitting the escape of an immigrant from his ship, and asserts a lien upon
her, refusing clearance papers unless the master paid the fine.

Instead of paying it, the plaintiff brought this action upon which an injunction was
issued, ordering the defendant to desist and refrain from further proceeding in any
way to levy upon or collect from the plaintiff the fine of $200 mentioned in the
plaintiffs complaint.

Issue:
 Does the Collector of Customs have authority to impose a fine and seize the vessel
in question?

Held:

No. Power to impose fine, when not expressly conferred on administrative body vested in
the courts. – “The fine to be imposed upon the plaintiff and his vessel in the present
instance was not one for administrative action, because it has to be laid and
enforced in accordance with the laws of Congress in which it had authorized no
such action. The error of the defendant had root in the notion, expressed in his
testimony ‘that the act of Congress on April 29 had omitted to provide machinery for
the enforcement of the laws thereby enacted.’ That notion overlooked the fact that
the usual machinery for the enforcement of the laws is found in the regularly
constituted courts.

18. Roxas v. Sayoc

200 Phil 448 (1956)

Facts:

The Collector of Customs declared certain belongings forfeited to the Government.

His decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs. Subsequently, R.A. 650,
otherwise known as Import Control Law, expired. Roxas contend that upon the
expiration of the said law, the Commissioner f Customs lost the jurisdiction over the
case and, therefore, his decision was null and void.

Issue:

Did the expiration of R.A. No. 650 divest the Commissioner of Customs of his
jurisdiction duly acquired while said law was still in force?

Held:

No. Jurisdiction duly acquired is not affected by expiration of governing law. It is a

settled rule that a court, be it judicial or administrative, that has acquired
jurisdiction over a case, retains even after the expiration of the law governing the
case. The case at bar ids concerned with the expiration of the law, not with the
abrogation of the law. The Commissioner of Customs having acquired jurisdiction
over the case, the mere expiration of R.A. 650 did not affect such jurisdiction.
19. Balbuena v. Secretary of Education
110 Phil. 150 (1960)

Facts:

Section 1 of R.A. 1265 requires all educational institutions to observe daily flag
ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or
singing of the Philippine Nation al Anthem. Section 2 thereof authorizes the
Secretary of Education to issue rules and regulations on the proper conduct of flag
ceremony.

Petitioners, member of religious sect “Jehovah’s Witnesses,” challenged the

constitutionality of the Act by virtue of which the Secretary of Education issued
Department Order No. 8 (prescribing compulsory flag ceremony in all schools), as
an undue delegation of legislative power.

Issue:

Do the requirements of simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing
of the national anthem constitute an adequate standard?

Held:

Yes. Statute need not specify in detail, manner of exercise of delegated power. The
requirements constitute an adequate standard especially when contrasted with
other standards heretofore, upheld by the courts as “public interest, public welfare,
interest of law and order, justice and equity and the substantial merits of the case or
adequate and efficient instruction.” That the legislature did not specify the details of
the flag ceremony is no objection to the validity of the statute for all that is required
of it is the laying down of standard and policy that will limit the discretion of the
regulatory agency. To require the statute to establish in detail the manner of
exercise of the delegated power would be to destroy the administrative flexibility
that the delegation is intended to achieve.
20. Blanco v. The Board of Medical Examiners
46 Phil. 190 (1924)

Facts:

The petitioners took the examinations prescribed by law for a physician’s certificate
and apparently passed the same. The Board of Medical Examiners thereupon
submitted the final results of the examinations to the Department Head for
confirmation. But the Secretary of the Interior held the matter in abeyance, pending
the outcome of an investigation conducted by the Undersecretary of the Interior.

The finding of the special investigator was that the questions on the subjects of the
medical examinations had leaked out before said dates. Following the
recommendation of the Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Interior annulled the
results of the examinations.

The last paragraph of section 776 of the Medical law, as found in the Administrative
Code, and as last amended by Section 10 of act No. 3111, provides that the results
of all examinations including the average and grades obtained by each applicant,
shall be submitted for confirmation to the Department Head (secretary of the
Interior) and made known to the respective candidates within one month after the
date of the examinations.

Issue:

Is this duty of the Secretary of the Interior Ministerial in nature?

Held:

No.
1. Duty of Secretary under the law. –
Under the plain terms of the Medical Law, it is the discretionary duty of the
Secretary of the Interior to confirm or as in this instance, to annul the report of
the medical examiners. To hold that the secretary of the Interior must in all
 cases confirm, shutting his eyes to any irregularity, no matter how glaring,
would convert him to an automatic rubber stamp for imprinting the requisite
approval. That the Department Secretary who appoints the members of the
Board Medical Examiners, who has the power of confirmation of the report of
the Board, cannot do more than perform the clerical duty of approving the
results of the examinations, under any and all circumstances, is too specious an
argument to merit serious consideration.
2. Mandamus not available to review exercise of discretion by a public officer. –

It is elementary law that the writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review
the exercise of the discretion of a public officer. Where the law imposes upon a
public officer the right and duty to exercise judgement, in reference to any
matter to which he is called upon to act, it is his judgement that is to be
exercised and not that of court. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer,
and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed,
such duty is discretionary and nor ministerial.

3. Mandamus may issue to correct abuse of discretion. –

It is likewise elementary law that mandamus may issue to correct abuse of
discretion, if the case is otherwise proper. But here, the record discloses that the
Secretary of the Interior did not exercise the power granted to him to manifest
injustice, or with gross abuse.

ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and CTA September

30, 1969 CASTRO, J.

Facts:
Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and milling of centrifugal sugar,
the sugar so produced being placed in containers known as jute bags. In 1957, It made two
importations of jute bags, free from customs duties and special import tax upon the
Petitioner’s filing of re-exportation and special import tax bond, conditioned upon the
exportation of the jute bags within one year from the date of importation.

However, out of the 44,800 jute bags imported first, only 8,647 were exported and only
25,000 were exported out of the 75,200 jute bags imported on the second shipment. In
other words, of the total number of imported jute bags only 33,647 bags were exported
within one year after their importation. The remaining 86,353 bags were exported after the
expiration of the one-year period but within three years from their importation.
Petitioner requested the Commissioner of Customs for a week's extension of Re-
exportation and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6 which was to expire the following day, citing
reasons for its failure to export the remaining jute bags within the period of one year.
However, this request was denied by the Commissioner.

Due to the petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation of the balance of 86,353
jute bags within one year from their importation, the Petitioner was required to pay the
amount of p28,629.42 representing the customs duties and special import tax due thereon,
which the petitioner paid under protest and later on demanded the refund of the amount
it had paid.

Issues:
a.) Whether or not the Commissioner of Customs is vested with discretion to extend the
period of one year provided for in section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909.

b.) Whether or not interpretation or construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statute by

the Executive Department or other Administrative Agencies be given consideration? In the
case at bar, the Bureau of Customs.

Held:
a.) Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act Of 1909 and the superseding sec. 105(x) of the
Tariff and Customs Code, while fixing at one year the period within which the containers
therein mentioned must be exported, are silent as to whether the said period may be
extended. By reason of this silence, the Bureau of Customs Issued Administrative Orders
389 and 66 to eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, and,
more specifically, to make officially known its policy to consider the one-year period
mentioned in the law as non-extendible.

b.) Considering that the statutory provisions in question (Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff
Act of 1909 and Sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code) have not been the subject of
previous judicial interpretation, then the application of the doctrine of "judicial respect for
administrative construction (in the case at bar the Bureau of Customs issued
Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it
shall apply the law, and, more specifically, to make officially known its policy to consider the
one-year period mentioned in the law as non-extendible., " would, initially, be in order.
 Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the statute is the
rule applicable that courts will give consideration to construction by administrative or
executive departments of the state.
The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction of an ambiguous or
uncertain statute or law by the executive department or other agency charged with its
administration or enforcement is entitled to consideration and the highest respect from
the courts, and must be accorded appropriate weight in determining the meaning of the
law, especially when the construction or interpretation is long continued and uniform or is
contemporaneous with the first workings of the statute, or when the enactment of the
statute was suggested by such agency.

Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing
and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by it
thereon should be given controlling weight.

In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for administrative or practical

construction, the courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases of
the principle, as factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in
particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors are the respect
due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their competence,
expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the
drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the legislature must
rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and practical application of
the statute presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for discovering
deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute.

ALICIA E. ASTURIAS v. ATTYS. MANUEL SERRANO AND EMILIANO SAMSON 476 SCRA 97
(2005)

In order for perjury to lie, it must be shown and proved that the defendant willfully and
deliberately made the false statement.

Dr. Alicia E. Asturias filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against
Fedman Development Corporation (FDC) and Fedman Suite Condominium Corporation
(FSCC) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. The RTC ruled in favor of Dr.
Asturias. The sheriff assigned at the RTC served a Notice of Garnishment upon unit owners
including respondents, tenants, and occupants of the FSCC building.
FSCC filed a Petition to Annul Judgment before the Court of Appeals alleging that no motion
for new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment or other appropriate remedies could
have been availed of by Austria because the assailed RTC Decision has attained finality
without their fault when it was discovered in March 2003. Serrano and Samson verified the
same under oath.

Dr. Asturias lodged before the IBP an administrative complaint against Serrano and
Samson, alleging that they committed perjury by knowingly making an untruthful
statement under oath for the petition is false because FSCC had been duly notified of the
assailed RTC Decision citing the Sheriff’s Report showing that copies of the Decision of the
appellate court and the Writ of Execution issued by the trial court were personally served
upon Norma Estella, Administrative Secretary of FSCC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Serrano and Samson are guilty of perjury

HELD:

The burden of proof in administrative complaints against lawyers rests on the complainant
who must establish his charge by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. To hold one
liable for perjury which is the deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any
material matter, before a competent person authorized to administer oath, in cases in
which the law requires such oath, Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the
following requisites must concur: (a) the accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) the statement or affidavit was made
before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oaths; (c) in the statement
or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and (d) the
sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal
purpose. As to the third requisite, good faith or lack of malice is a defense.

This Court finds that complainant failed to prove that respondents deliberately and willfully
made the questioned assertion in the verification vis a vis the allegation in the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment. The Sheriff’s Report merely shows that copy of the appellate
court’s decision was received by one Norma Estella. The Motion to Archive/Suspend
Proceedings in the Petition to Annul the RTC decision, which was filed not by respondents
but by another counsel, merely shows that copy of the trial court’s decision was received by
a certain Atty. Quintin Bautista. And the records do not show that respondents, who were
not parties to the complaint for specific performance filed by complainant, themselves
received a copy of the decision of the RTC or knew about it prior to March 2003.
This Court will not hesitate to mete out proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who
are shown to have failed to live up to their sworn duties, but neither will it hesitate to
extend its protective arm to them when the accusation against them is not indubitably
proven. In fine, since complainant failed to discharge the onus of proving her charges
against respondents by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence, her present petition for
review of the IBP’s dismissal of her complaint must fail.

[G. R. No. 129329. July 31, 2001]

ESTER M. ASUNCION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
Second Division, MABINI MEDICAL CLINIC and DR. WILFRIDO JUCO, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Ester M. Asuncion was employed as an accountant/bookkeeper by the

respondent Mabini Medical Clinic. Sometime in May 1994, certain officials of the NCR-
Industrial Relations Division of the Department of Labor and Employment conducted a
routine inspection of the premises of the respondent company and discovered upon the
disclosure of the petitioner of (documents) violations of the labor standards law such as
the non-coverage from the SSS of the employees. Consequently, respondent Company
was made to correct these violations.

On August 9, 1994, the private respondent, Medical Director Wilfrido Juco, issued a
memorandum to petitioner charging her with the following offenses:

Chronic Absentism (sic) – You have incurred since Aug. 1993 up to the present 35 absences
and 23 half-days.
Habitual tardiness – You have late (sic) for 108 times. As shown on the record book.
LoiteRing and wasting of company time – on several occasions and witnessed by several
employees.
Getting salary of an absent employee without acknowledging or signing for it.
Disobedience and insubordination – continued refusal to sign memos given to you.[1]
Petitioner was required to explain within two (2) days why she should not be terminated
based on the above charges.

Three days later, in the morning of August 12, 1994, petitioner submitted her response to
the memorandum. On the same day, respondent Dr. Juco, through a letter dated August
12, 1994, dismissed the petitioner on the ground of disobedience of lawful orders and for
her failure to submit her reply within the two-day period. This prompted petitioner to file a
case for illegal termination

ISSUES:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WAS VALIDLY DISMISSED

HELD:

The petition is impressed with merit.

Although, it is a legal tenet that factual findings of administrative bodies are entitled to
great weight and respect, we are constrained to take a second look at the facts before us
because of the diversity in the opinions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.[5] A disharmony
between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and those of the NLRC opens the door to
a review thereof by this Court.[6]

It bears stressing that a worker’s employment is property in the constitutional sense. He

cannot be deprived of his work without due process. In order for the dismissal to be valid,
not only must it be based on just cause supported by clear and convincing evidence,[7] the
employee must also be given an opportunity to be heard and defend himself. [8] It is the
employer who has the burden of proving that the dismissal was with just or authorized
cause.[9] The failure of the employer to discharge this burden means that the dismissal is
not justified and that the employee is entitled to reinstatement and backwages.[10]

In the case at bar, there is a paucity of evidence to establish the charges of absenteeism
and tardiness. We note that the employer company submitted mere handwritten listing
and computer print-outs. The handwritten listing was not signed by the one who made the
same. As regards the print-outs, while the listing was computer generated, the entries of
time and other annotations were again handwritten and unsigned.[11]

The record is bereft of any showing that complainant was ever warned of her absences
prior to her dismissal on August 9, 1994. The alleged notices of her absences from August
17, until September 30, 1993, from October until November 27, 1993, from December 1,
1993 up to February 26, 1994 and the notice dated 31 May 1994 reminding complainant of
her five (5) days absences, four (4) half-days and tardiness for 582 minutes (Annex “1” to “1-
D” attached to respondent’ Rejoinder), fail to show that the notices were received by the
complainant. The allegation of the respondents that the complainant refused to received
(sic) the same is self-serving and merits scant consideration

The Court, likewise, takes note of the fact that the two-day period given to petitioner to
explain and answer the charges against her was most unreasonable, considering that she
was charged with several offenses and infractions (35 absences, 23 half-days and 108
tardiness), some of which were allegedly committed almost a year before, not to mention
the fact that the charges leveled against her lacked particularity.

Apart from chronic absenteeism and habitual tardiness, petitioner was also made to
answer for loitering and wasting of company time, getting salary of an absent employee
without acknowledging or signing for it and disobedience and insubordination.[18] Thus,
the Labor Arbiter found that actually petitioner tried to submit her explanation on August
11, 1994 or within the two-day period given her, but private respondents prevented her
from doing so by instructing their staff not to accept complainant’s explanation, which was
the reason why her explanation was submitted a day later.[19]

The law mandates that every opportunity and assistance must be accorded to the
employee by the management to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense.[20] In
Ruffy v. NLRC,[21] the Court held that what would qualify as sufficient or “ample
opportunity,” as required by law, would be “every kind of assistance that management
must accord to the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense.” In the
case at bar, private respondents cannot be gainsaid to have given petitioner the ample
opportunity to answer the charges leveled against her.

From the foregoing, there are serious doubts in the evidence on record as to the factual
basis of the charges against petitioner. These doubts shall be resolved in her favor in line
with the policy under the Labor Code to afford protection to labor and construe doubts in
favor of labor.[22] The consistent rule is that if doubts exist between the evidence
presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor
of the latter. The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the
dismissal was for a justifiable cause.[23] Not having satisfied its burden of proof, we
conclude that the employer dismissed the petitioner without any just cause. Hence, the
termination is illegal.
The SC ruled in favor of petitioner. For a valid dismissal not only must there be
just cause supported by clear and convincing evidence,. There must also be an
opportunity ;to be heard. The employer ;has the burden to prove that the
dismissal was just or authorized cause. Failure to discharge this burden ;means
that the dismissal ;is unjustified. Here ;the evidence submitted was merely
unsigned handwritten records and printouts. This is insufficient ;to justify a
dismissal. The provision for flexibility in administrative procedure does not
justify decisions without basis in evidence having rational probative value. Here
both the handwritten listing and computer print outs being unsigned, so
theauthenticity is suspect and devoid of any rational probative value. Nor was
there due process. There is no showing that there was warning of
theabsences and tardiness. The 2 day period given to answer the allegations is
an unreasonably short period of time. The clinic can’t have given ample
opportunity to answer the charges filed. There are serious doubts as to the
factual basis of the charges against petitioner. There doubts shall be resolved in
her favor in line with the policy rule list that if doubts exist between the
evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice
must be titled in favor of the latter.

U.S. Supreme Court

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471 (1937)
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Scarlett
No. 505
Argued March 3, 1937
Decided March 29, 1937
300 U.S. 471

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

Syllabus

1. A regulation prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission in pursuance of

constitutional statutory authority has the same force as though prescribed in terms by the
statute.

2. In an action under the Federal Safety Appliance Act against a railroad company to
recover damages for personal injuries resulting from an alleged violation of the Act, the
judgment of the trial court and jury cannot be substituted for that of the Interstate
Commerce Commission on the question as to what constitutes compliance with its
regulations.

3. The Federal Safety Appliance Act provides that cars requiring "secure" ladders shall be so
equipped. An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, issued pursuant to the Act,
requires such ladders to have a minimum clearance of treads of "two, preferably two and
one-half inches."

Held:

(1) A side ladder of a freight car complied with the Act though between it and the side of
the car was a diagonal brace rod which the ladder cleared by two and three-quarter inches.

(2) The brace rod was not a part of the ladder.

(3) Long-continued use of brace rods of the type here involved, in the same relation to the
ladder, without change of its order by the Interstate Commerce Commission, is persuasive
that the Act and the order were not violated.

(4) The right of recovery, if any, in this case must be governed not by the Safety Appliance
Act, but by the common law rule of negligence.
7 Cal. 2d 181; 60 P.2d 462, reversed.

Certiorari, 299 U.S. 537, to review a judgment affirming a judgment against the railroad
company in an action under the Federal Safety Appliance Act.

MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an action under the Federal Safety Appliance Act (Act of April 14, 1910, c. 160, §§ 2
and 3) (36 Stat. 298 *), brought by Scarlett against the railway company to recover damages
for a personal injury resulting from an alleged violation of the act. It also was generally
alleged that the injury was due to the negligence of the railway company. Scarlett was
employed as a brakeman. While descending from a box car by means of a ladder attached
to the side of the car, his foot slipped on a round brace rod, also attached to the side of the
car immediately behind the ladder, and he fell to the ground, thereby sustaining the injury
for which damages were sought.

The ladder itself was not defective. In its structure, it complied with the regulations of the
Interstate Commerce Commission made in pursuance of the act. "United States Safety
appliance Standards" -- order of March 13, 1911. It is unnecessary to set forth these
regulations. The only one important here prescribes -- "Minimum clearance of treads, [shall
be] two (2), preferably two and one-half (2 1/2), inches." The round brace rods with which
the car was equipped extended outward from the wall of the car a distance of more than
an inch. These brace rods operated to strengthen the walls of the car. That was their only
purpose, and there is no doubt as to their necessity for that purpose. The brace rod in
question ran down the side of the car at an angle of about 45�. The ladder overlay the
brace rod, and cleared its outermost surface by more than the prescribed 2 1/2 inches.

Scarlett's contention is that the brace rod is a part of the ladder, and by reason of its slant
and rounded shape made the descent of the ladder insecure. At the trial, he abandoned his
claim based upon negligence, and put his case wholly on the ground that the round
diagonal brace rod and the ladder combined to constitute an unsafe appliance within the
meaning of the act, and that, in consequence, the liability of the railway company was
absolute. The case was submitted to the jury by the trial court upon that theory, and a
verdict and judgment against the company resulted. That judgment the court below
affirmed on appeal. 7 Cal.2d 181, 60 P.2d 462.

The record shows that brace rods, generally flat in shape, are in practically universal use on
box cars. The company here formerly used a flat rod, but, finding that such a rod
frequently buckled, sometimes immediately under the ladder, it was abandoned and the
stronger and less elastic round type was adopted in its place. This was in 1924, and the
proof shows that, for many years, cars so equipped have been in general and constant
operation on its lines. The general foreman of the company, having charge of all the car
repairs at one of the principal shops, and who inspected a thousand cars each month,
testified that he had never heard of an accident attributable or claimed to be attributable
to the round brace rod, except in the present case. The record shows nothing to the
contrary.

In the light of the long continued use of brace rods of the type here in question in the same
relation to the ladder as is the case here, we may fairly presume that the Interstate
Commerce Commission, in the performance of its duties, was aware of the situation, and
knowingly permitted its rule in respect of the ladder clearance to remain without change.
Compare Pennell v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry., 231 U. S. 675, 231 U. S. 680. The regulation
having been made by the commission in pursuance of constitutional statutory authority, it
has the same force as though prescribed in terms by the statute. And the railway company
having strictly complied with the regulation has discharged its full duty so far as the ladder
requirement of the Safety Appliance Act is concerned. The judgment of the trial court and
jury cannot be substituted for that of the commission. See Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 231 U. S. 423, 231 U. S. 456-457; Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U. S. 605,
272 U. S. 611-612; Mahutga v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 182 Minn. 362, 366, 234
N.W. 474; Auschwitz v. Wabash Ry. Co., 346 Ill.190, 204, 178 N.E. 403; Ford v. New York, N.H.
& H. R. Co., 54 F.2d 342, 343.

In Illinois Central R. Co. v. Williams, 242 U. S. 462, 242 U. S. 466, we held that § 2 of the act
requiring secure ladders, etc., was operative pending action by the Interstate Commerce
Commission under § 3. In the interim, we said, § 2 had the effect of prescribing an absolute
and imperative duty, of making the ladders and other appliances "secure," but that § 3
contemplated that these appliances "shall ultimately conform to a standard to be
prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission -- that is, that they shall be
standardized."

We do not see how it reasonably can be said that the brace road constitutes a part of the
ladder. In itself, it was a contrivance separate and distinct from the ladder, designed and
used for a purpose entirely apart from the use of that appliance. The right of recovery, if
any, must therefore rest upon the effect of the near proximity of the ladder to the rod,
neither being, in itself, defective. The law to be applied to that situation is the common law
rule of negligence, and not the inflexible rule of the Safety Appliance Act, and the questions
to be answered are whether the two appliances were maintained in such relation to one
another as to constitute negligence on the part of the company and, if so, whether Scarlett
assumed the risk. Ford v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., supra; Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v.
Benson, 352 Ill.195, 199, 185 N.E. 244; Slater v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 146 Minn.
390, 392, 393, 178 N.W. 813. In that view, Scarlett, in abandoning his claim under the
common law rule of negligence, abandoned the only possible ground of recovery.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
* Section 2, so far as pertinent, provides that ". . . all cars requiring secure ladders and
secure running boards shall be equipped with such ladders and running boards, and all
cars having ladders shall also be equipped with secure handholds or grab irons on their
roofs at the tops of such ladders."

Section 3 requires the Interstate Commerce Commission, within a time fixed, to designate
the number, dimensions, location, and manner of application of the appliances provided
for in the foregoing section. And these designations were to "remain as the standards of
equipment to be used on all cars subject to the provisions of this Act, unless changed by an
order of said Interstate Commerce Commission."