G.R. No.

133000           October 2, 2001

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO – LETICIA DEL
ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO – MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA,
RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL
ROSARIO, respondent..

BUENA, J.:

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for
reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made
by the decedent to any of the heirs?

Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision1 of
public respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:

"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed

and set aside and another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano
Del Rosario in favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the Register of
Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443 without prejudice to
the filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario
in a proper court. No costs.

"So ordered."

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of
land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children,
namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Graciana's estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among
themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano
received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said property.
Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in
the name of Graciano and the Six children.1âwphi1.nêt

Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-
Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves
the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his
children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38
square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name, as
covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further
subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meter was
registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters
was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot2 to a third person
but retained ownership over the second lot.3

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,
Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT
No. 1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his
second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.

In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
55, herein private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through
the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making
it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein petitioner
resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the
name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as
a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.

1
In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally
married to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a
compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano
already distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents
may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January
1996 holding:8

"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia
Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a
separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has
been decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the spouses are prohibited
from entering (into) a contract of sale;

"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally
prohibited by law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;

"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may
however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a
compulsory heir of the deceased."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision
ratiocinating, inter alia:

"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution
of the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of
title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX

"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance
inheritance. What the court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the)
sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding
instituted for that purpose. XXX"

Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate court's decision "for being contrary to
law and the facts of the case."

We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special
proceedings, in this wise:

"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for
ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

"XXX

"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right
or a particular fact."

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a
special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the
manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an
application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually,
in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so

2
provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or
motion."9

Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:

"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are
instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to
actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings
which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some
special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and
prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX
A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent
proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending
action, by petition or motion upon notice."10

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a
civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding,
which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of
Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within
the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or
alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by
the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same
provision11 contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings".

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is
devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real
property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila,
Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the
question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein
petitioner Natcher.

At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:

"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must
first settle the estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at
hand, the court a quo determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and
assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-
appellee without observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of Court.
From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action
cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject to
specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property
as an advance inheritance."12

In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs.
Borromeo13 and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the
Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its
limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In
essence, it is procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived".15

3
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch
as the six children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court, acting in its
general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to
petitioner.

Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing
principle that although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and
the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership.16

Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:

"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking
appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of
estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate
court.17 (emphasis supplied)

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory
heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.18 The net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value
of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the
compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether
or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.19

A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case,
reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the
settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction
the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing
circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum
to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters involving the
settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's estate.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is

hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174975               January 20, 2009

LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-

BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY,
LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Shari’a District
Court, Fourth Shari’a Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 20061 and September 21,
2006.2

On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro
Montañer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.3 Petitioners
Alejandro Montañer, Jr., Lillibeth Montañer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montañer-Dalupan
are their children.4 On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died.5

4
On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen
Liling S. Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before
the Shari’a District Court.6 The said complaint was entitled "Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and
Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., Luisa Kho
Montañer, Lillibeth K. Montañer, Alejandro Kho Montañer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K.
Montañer," and docketed as "Special Civil Action No. 7-05."7 In the said complaint, private
respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died; (2)
the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent;
(4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montañer is the
daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising
the estate of the decedent.8 Private respondents prayed for the Shari’a District Court to order,
among others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the
appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent.9

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the
Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr.,
because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of
docket fees; and (3) private respondents’ complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to
establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and the decedent, pursuant to Article
175 of the Family Code.10

On November 22, 2005, the Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint.
The district court held that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction
extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims.11

On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration.12 On December
28, 2005, petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the
motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing.13 On January 17, 2006, the Shari’a District
Court denied petitioners’ opposition.14 Despite finding that the said motion for reconsideration
"lacked notice of hearing," the district court held that such defect was cured as petitioners "were
notified of the existence of the pleading," and it took cognizance of the said motion.15 The
Shari’a District Court also reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration. 16

In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Shari’a District Court reconsidered its order
of dismissal dated November 22, 2005.17 The district court allowed private respondents to
adduce further evidence.18 In its second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Shari’a
District Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further
evidence, and pre-trial conference.19

Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:

I.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT – MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION OVER

PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.

II.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT – MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE

JURISDICTION OVER "THE ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO
MONTAÑER, SR." WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY
TO BE SUED.

III.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-
PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING FEES.

IV.

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 RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT—MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE
OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS
FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A "NOTICE OF HEARING."

V.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT—MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL
ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT
RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM
ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION PRESCRIBED UPON THE
DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.

In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Shari’a District
Court must be given the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the decedent is
a Muslim in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction.20

Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims

Petitioners’ first argument, regarding the Shari’a District Court’s jurisdiction, is dependent on a
question of fact, whether the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this argument
is the premise that there has already been a determination resolving such a question of fact. It
bears emphasis, however, that the assailed orders did not determine whether the decedent is a
Muslim. The assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for the purpose of resolving this issue.

Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Shari’a District Courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims:

ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. — (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over:

xxxx

(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators
or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property.

The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and
character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition.21 The designation given by parties to
their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the said
designation. Rather than rely on "a falsa descriptio or defective caption," courts are "guided by
the substantive averments of the pleadings."22

Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court as a
"Complaint" for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim,23 such as the
fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said
petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the
private respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the
very properties sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for
reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate
of the decedent.24 These include the following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the
decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate.

We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have
jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that
Montañer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject

6
matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer25 or a motion to
dismiss.26 Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant27 or result in
having "a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple
stratagem.28 Indeed, the "defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact
does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction."29

The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss.30 In the case at bar, the
Shari’a District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a
defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District Court has the
authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires
an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District
Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Special Proceedings

The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second argument, that the proceeding before the
Shari’a District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an
erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be
attributed to the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court, where the parties were designated
either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We
reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special
proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." This Court has
applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate
of a deceased Muslim.31 In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement,
and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and
later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which would allow them to exercise
their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent.32 Here,
the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and,
subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among
his heirs, if such is the case in fact.

Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party
defendant in a civil action33 applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate
of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special
proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special
proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong"34 necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant.35 On
the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a
particular fact,"36 has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status,
right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that
the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding,
the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the
estate,37 pay its liabilities,38 and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.39

Docket Fees

Petitioners’ third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of docket
fees, is untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents’ petition in the proceeding before the
court a quo, which contains an allegation estimating the decedent’s estate as the basis for the
conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners’
argument essentially involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the
docket fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the correct assessment of the docket
fees.

Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.40 If the party filing the case paid less than the
correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court,

7
the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court.41 In such
a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a party’s
reliance on the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment of the docket fees.42 As "every citizen has
the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his
duties and performs them in accordance with law," the party filing the case cannot be penalized
with the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment.43 However, the party concerned will be required
to pay the deficiency.44

In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of court’s assessment of the docket fees.
Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination of
whether private respondents correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of court’s
assessment.

Exception to Notice of Hearing

Petitioners’ fourth argument, that private respondents’ motion for reconsideration before the
Shari’a District Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique
circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules
require every written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice of
hearing to all parties concerned.45 The Rules also provide that "no written motion set for hearing
shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof."46 However, the Rules allow a
liberal construction of its provisions "in order to promote [the] objective of securing a just,
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."47 Moreover, this Court has
upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases where "a rigid
application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party
successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not
apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein."48 In these exceptional cases, the
Court considers that "no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities," and for this
reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits rather than on
technicalities.49

The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Shari’a District Court of an opportunity to
determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a
decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its
process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply
because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice.

In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing,
because the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to
the rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not
affected.50 The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process,51 for the
court to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do
not fix any period within which to file a reply or opposition.52 In probate proceedings, "what the
law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of
opportunity to be heard."53 In the case at bar, as evident from the Shari’a District Court’s order
dated January 17, 2006, petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration
in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the
said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Shari’a District Court reset the
hearing for the motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the
opportunity to object to the said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show
that the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.

Prescription and Filiation

Petitioners’ fifth argument is premature. Again, the Shari’a District Court has not yet determined
whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding
heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and
settled in the said proceeding.54 The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to
declare who are the heirs of the decedent.55 In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs of

8
the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Shari’a District
Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Shari’a District Court, dated
August 22, 2006 and September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 230751

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner
vs
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal1 assailing the Decision2 dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution3 dated

March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467.

The facts are as follows:

On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed before the Regional Trail Court (RTC)
of Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wifredo N.
Matias (Wilfredo).4 The allegations of the petition read:

1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a residnet of 106
Molave street, Zone B. San Miguel Tarlac City;

2. [Wifredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in
Araya, Pampanga since August 24, 1967[;]

3. The[p]etitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968 in Imbo,
Anda, Pangasinan x x x;

4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their conjugal home at 106
Molave street, Zone B. San Miguel, Tarlac City;

5. [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set out from
their conjugal home to again serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary;

6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he
never made contact or communicated with the [p]etitioner nor to his relatives;

7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the National Police Commission,
[Wilfredo] was already declared missing since 1979 x x x;

8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding [her]
beloved husband [Wilfredo], but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts,
[neither] did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a
place frequented by the New People's Army;

9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never gave up hope,
and after more than three (3) decades of awaiting, the [p]etitioner is still hopeful, but the times
had been tough on her, specially with a meager source of income coupled with her age, it is
now necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive;

9
10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or at least
declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court;

11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit
under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.

The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65 of the Tarlac
City RTC. A copy of the petition was then furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG)_.

Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein respondent Republic
of the Philippines (Republic).5

On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision6 in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the petition.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:7

WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing the Court hereby declared (sic) WILFREDO N. MATIAS
absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for
purpose of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military officer.

xxxx

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiotrari.8

On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition of the

Republic and setting aside the decision of the RTC. It accordingly disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision

dated January 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, branch 65, Tarlac City, in Special
Proceeding no. 4850 is ANNULED and SET ASIDE, and the petition is DISMISSED.

The CA premised its decision on the following ratiocinations:

1. The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Article 41 of the
Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was
invoking the presumption of death established under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and
not that provided for under Article 41 of the FC.

2. Be that it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead should have been
dismissed by the RTC. The RTC is without authority to take cognizance of a petition whose sole
purpose is to have a person declared presumptively dead under either Article 390 or Article 391
of the Civil Code. As been held by jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely
express rules of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead-which
presumption may be invoked in any action or proceeding, but itself cannot be the subject of an
independent action or proceeding.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence,this appeal.

Our Ruling

We deny the appeal

The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner
is not an authorized suit and should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's decision
must, therefore, be set aside.

10
RTC Erred I Declaring the
Presumptive Death of Wilfredo under
Article 41 of the FC; Petitioner's
Petition for the Declaration of
Presumptive Death is Not Based on
Article 41 of the FC, but on the Civil
Code

A conspicuous error in the decision of the RTC must first be addressed.

It can be recalled that the RTC, in fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision, granted the petitioner's
petition by declaring Wilfredo presumptively dead "under Article 41 of the FC." By doing so,
RTC gave the impression that the petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by
petitioner was likewise filed pursuant to Article 41 of the FC.9 This is wrong.

The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that
would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of
death established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage under the said law. Thus:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.

Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death
Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive
death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any other purpose but
solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a amended.10

Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of
remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article
390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code11 as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code express the general rule regarding presumption s of death for any civil purpose, to
wit:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absence still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who
has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four
years;

(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has
not been known for four years.

11
Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death of
Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper.The petition for the declaration of
presumptive death filed by the petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article
41 of the FC.

Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of

Presumptive Death Ought to Have Been
Dismissed; A Petition Whose Sole Objective is
To Declare a Person Presumptively Dead Under
the CivilCode, Like that Filed by the Petitioner
Before the RTC, Is Not a Viable Suit in Our
Jurisdiction

The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its misleading fallo. The
decision itself is objectionable.

Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of
Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is
because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any
authority to take cognizance of the same.

The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re: Petition for the Presumption
of Death of Nicolai Szatraw.12 In the said case, we held that a rule creating a presumption of
death13 is merely one of the evidence that-while may be invoked in any action or proceeding-
cannot be the lone subject of an independent action or proceeding. Szatraw explained:

The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of the evidence which permits the court to presume
that a person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption
may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding,
which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of
such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor
can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no
right ti be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent
husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the
ascertainment of particular fact, for the petition does not pray for the declaration that the
petitioner 's husband us dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead
because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a
declaration that the petitioner's husband os dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because
it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration, even if judicially made, would not
improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already established by
law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would be
a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be
the subject of judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is tha only question or matter
involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide
finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or
establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise;
and once such controversy is decided by a final decree, then the judgement on the subject of
the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a
particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare
instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that judicial declaration that a person
is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or
become final. (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

The above ruling in Szatraw has since been ussed by the subsequent cases of Lukban v.
Republic14 and Gue v. Republic15 in disallowing petitions for declaration of presumptive death
based on Article 390 of the Civil Code (and, implicity, also those based on the Civil based on
Article 391 of the Civil Code).

12
Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are able to ascertain the
considerations why a petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code was
disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz:16

1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that only allow a
court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain facts.

2. Since Articles 390 an d 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action
brought exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said
articles actually presents

no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action, there would be no actual
rights to be enforces, no wrong to be remedied nor any status to be established.

3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or Article
391 of the Civil Code, in an action exclusively based thereon, would never really become
"final" as the same only confirms tha existence of a prima facie or disputable presumption. The
function of a court to render decisions that is supposed to be final and binding between litigants
is thereby compromised.

4. Moreove, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390 and 391
of the Civil Code would be unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is already
established by law.

Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a
petition that-like the one filed by the petitioner in the case at bench-only seeks to have a person
declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Such a petition is not authorized by
law.17 Hence, by acting upon and eventually granting the petitioner's petition for the declaration
of presumptive death, the RTC violated prevailing jurisprudence and thereby committed grave
abuse of discretion. The CA, therefore, was only correct in setting aside the RTC's decision.

II

Before bringing this case to its logical conclusion, however, there are a few points the Court is
minded to make.

It is not lost on this Court that much of the present controversy stemmed from the misconception
that a court declaration is required in order to establish a person is presumptively dead for
purposes of claiming his death benefits as a military serviceman under pertinent laws.18 This
misconception is what moved petitioner to file her misguided petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of Wilfredo and what ultimately exposed her to unnecessary difficulties in
prosecuting an otherwise simple claim for death benefits either before the Philippine Veterans'
Affair Office (PVAO) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

What the Court finds deeply disconnecting, however, is the possibility that such misconception
may have been peddles by no less than the PVAO and the AFP themselves; that such
agencies, as a matter of practice, had been requiring claimants, such as the petitioner, to first
secure a court declaration of presumptive death before processing the death before processing
the death benefits of missing serviceman.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it necessary to issue the following
guidelines-culled from relevant law and jurisprudential pronouncements-to aid the public, PVAO
and the AFP in making or dealing with claims of death benefits which are similar to that of the
petitioner:

1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier
without requiring the claimant to first produce a court declaration of the presumptive
death of such soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make their own
determination, on the basis of the evidence presented by the claimant, whether the presumption
of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code may be applied or not.

13
It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code
arises by operation of law, without need of a court declaration, once the factual conditions
mentioned in the said articles are established.19 Hence, requiring the claimant to further secure
a court declaration in order to establish the presumptive death of a missing soldier is not proper
and contravenes established jurisprudence on the matter.20

2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before the
PVAO or the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case may be, any "evidence"21 which shows
that the concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and or under the
circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously,
the "evidence" referred to here excludes a court declaration of presumptive death.

3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence submitted by the
claimant and determine their sufficiency to establish the requisite factual conditions specified
under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order for the presumption of death to arise. If the
PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is sufficient,
they should not hesitate to apply the presumption of death and pay the latter's claim.

4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is not
sufficient to invoke the presumption of death under the Civil Code and denies the latter's claim
by reason thereof, the claimant may file an appeal with the Office of the President (OP)
pursuant to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition for review with
the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Court.1avvphi1 And finally, shold such recourse still
fail, the claimant may file an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.

While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Court is hopeful that, by
the foregoing guidelines, the unfortunate experience of the petitioner would no longer be
replicated in the future.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2016 and
Resolution dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467
are AFFIRMED. The Court declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a person is
presumptively dead is not requirement before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines for their consideration.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198680               July 8, 2013

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO

YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59
(RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a
pure question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the July 27, 20112 and August 31,
20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.

The Facts

On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a complaint for
Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent
Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No.

14
T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and
childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole
heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the
cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his
name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s
collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.8

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his
certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy
of his passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no
cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is
not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have
been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.10

The RTC Ruling

On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that the subject
complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs
therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for
the issuance of letters of administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be
considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily
established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the
documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between
Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February
19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August
31, 2011 due to the counsel’s failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.14

Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246,15 sought direct
recourse to the Court through the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC’s
dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action
was proper.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.16 It
is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting
what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed
for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred
by the defendants.19

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged
that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer
certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if
admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the
rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding
special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and
reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the
Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent’s

15
lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must
be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property.1âwphi1 This must take precedence over the action for
recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court
cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration
can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then
decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must
be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was
reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling
that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate
court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights.
Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who
claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action
which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of
heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case
had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or
when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and
hence, cannot be re-opened.24

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence,
there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship
of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to
state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of
the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination
of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession,
the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out
that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be
threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing
pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is hereby
AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the
late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant therewith.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150206               March 13, 2009

Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN,

PEREGRINO GABATAN, REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA GABATAN AND JESUS JABINIS,
RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA and FREIRA GABATAN, Petitioners,
vs.
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA, Respondents.

16
 DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the
Decision1 dated April 28, 2000, and Resolution2 dated September 12, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 52273. The challenged Decision affirmed the decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, dated October 20, 1995 in Civil
Case No. 89-092, an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession, thereat
commenced by respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan,
Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado.

Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as Lot 3095 C-5
and situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for taxation in
the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC, respondent alleged that she is the
sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena
Gabatan Evero (Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the
only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the
death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo),
and Teofilo’s wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death
Hermogena demanded for the return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogena’s death,
respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to
surrender the subject property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died,
petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite
respondent’s demands for them to vacate the same.

In their answer, petitioners denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the daughter of
Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of
Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any
issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the
subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse,
continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty
(50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole
world including respondent. Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have
no interest in the subject land; the former is merely the husband of Teofilo’s daughter while the
latter is just a caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by
respondent against Teofilo’s wife, Rita Vda. de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978, docketed as
Civil Case No. 5840 but the case was dismissed on May 3, 1983 for lack of interest. Finally,
petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states no cause of action or, if there was any,
the same has long prescribed and/or has been barred by laches.

On June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo were individually
named, to wit: Lolita Gabatan, Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan, Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila
Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis, Riorita Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan.

On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended answer, additionally alleging that the disputed
land was already covered by OCT No. P-3316 in the name of the heirs of Juan Gabatan
represented by petitioner Riorita Gabatan (Teofilo’s daughter).

On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants,
declaring the plaintiff the owner of Lot No. 3095 C-5 situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan
de Oro City; and ordering the defendants represented by Riorita Gabatan Tumala to
RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No. P-3316 in favor of plaintiff Lourdes Evero Pacana,
free of any encumbrance; ordering the defendants to pay ₱10,000.00 by way of moral damages;
₱10,000.00 as Attorney’s fees; and ₱2,000.00 for litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.4

17
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 52273.

On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming that of the RTC.
Dispositively, the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision of the lower court dated October
20, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Discounting petitioners’ argument that respondent is not related to Juan Gabatan, the CA
declared that respondent’s claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established
during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long line of jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial
court are entitled to great weight and are not disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as when
the findings of fact are not supported by evidence.

The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale5 executed by Macaria Gabatan de
Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was identified as
an heir of Juan Gabatan:

x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and presently residing at
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, as Heir of the deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x x.

To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration which was
signed by Teofilo and the latter’s nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they
acknowledged Hermogena’s status as the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Applying Section 38, Rule
1306 of the Rules of Court on the declaration against interest, the CA ruled that petitioners could
not deny that even their very own father, Teofilo formally recognized Hermogena’s right to
heirship from Juan Gabatan which ultimately passed on to respondent.

As to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that petitioners’ possession of the disputed property
could not ripen into acquisitive prescription because their predecessor-in-interest, Teofilo, never
held the property in the concept of an owner.lawphil.net

Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse principally contending
that the CA committed the following reversible errors:

FIRST ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that Juan Gabatan died single
and without issue;

SECOND ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff-appellee (respondent)
as the sole and surviving heir of Juan Gabatan, the only child of a certain Hermogena
Clareto "GABATAN";

THIRD ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring that a certain Hermogena Clareto
"GABATAN" is the child and sole heir of Juan Gabatan;

FOURTH ERROR: The lower court erred in failing to appreciate by preponderance of

evidence in favor of the defendants-appellants (petitioners) claim that they and the heirs
of Justa and Macaria both surnamed Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs of Juan
Gabatan and, therefore, entitled to inherit the land subject matter hereof;

FIFTH ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that the cause of action of
plaintiff-appellee (respondent) if any, has been barred by laches and/or prescription.7

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we must pass upon certain preliminary matters.

In general, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. Questions of fact cannot be the subject of this particular mode of

18
appeal, for this Court is not a trier of facts.8 It is not our function to examine and evaluate the
probative value of the evidence presented before the concerned tribunal upon which its
impugned decision or resolution is based.91avvphi1

However, there are established exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of the findings of fact
by the lower courts, such as (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.10

Moreover, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the
lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. Thus, the Court is
clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the
appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical
errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the
case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not
specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record
having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower
court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error
assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of
a question properly assigned, is dependent. 11

In the light of the foregoing established doctrines, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the
case.

The respondent’s main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and
possession of property. It is undisputed that the subject property, Lot 3095 C-5, was owned by
the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his lifetime.12 Before us are two contending parties, both
insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent.

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must
be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery
of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make
a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be
made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a
civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners
here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.13

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,14 this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must
be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was
reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals15 where the Court held:

xxx where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they
claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese
woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during
his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-

19
appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal
properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this
Court, we ruled that ‘such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent)
is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in
Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in
issue until the presentation of the project of partition.

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,16 the Court reiterated its ruling
that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate
court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights.
Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang,17 this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who
claimed to be an heir to a decedent’s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action
which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.

However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,18 where the Court
relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the
status of the party therein as heirs, to wit:

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of
Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to
a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the
parties to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented
evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’
status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners (Vide Pereira v. Court of
Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 [1989]; Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 [1955]),
the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial
and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis
supplied)

Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the
contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to
dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent
as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No.
89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the
same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.

We GRANT the petition.

After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient and questionable the
basis of the RTC in conferring upon respondent the status of sole heir of Juan Gabatan.

Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property, pinned her
claim entirely on her alleged status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to
present preponderant evidence in support of her complaint.

Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the
Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be
proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.

20
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession
of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.

Here, two conflicting birth certificates19 of respondent were presented at the RTC. Respondent,
during her direct testimony, presented and identified a purported certified true copy of her
typewritten birth certificate which indicated that her mother’s maiden name was "Hermogena
Clarito Gabatan." Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a certified true copy of respondent’s
handwritten birth certificate which differed from the copy presented by respondent. Among the
differences was respondent’s mother’s full maiden name which was indicated as "Hermogena
Calarito" in the handwritten birth certificate.

In resolving this particular issue, the trial court ruled in this wise:

The parties are trying to outdo with (sic) each other by presenting two conflicting Certificate (sic)
of Live Birth of plaintiff herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana, which are Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff and
Exhibit "1" for the defendants. Which of this (sic) is genuine, and which is falsified. These (sic)
issue is crucial and requires serious scrutiny. The Court is of the observation that Exhibit "A" for
the plaintiff which is a certified true copy is in due form and bears the "as is and where is" rule. It
has the impression of the original certificate. The forms (sic) is an old one used in the 1950’s.
Her mother’s maiden name appearing thereof is Hermogina (sic) Clarito Gabatan. While Exhibit
"1", the entries found thereof (sic) is handwritten which is very unusual and of dubious source.
The form used is of latest vintage. The entry on the space for mother’s maiden name is
Hermogena Calarito. There seems to be an apparent attempt to thwart plaintiff’s mother filiation
with the omission of the surname Gabatan. Considering these circumstances alone the Court is
inclined to believe that Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff is far more genuine and authentic certificate of
live birth.20

Having carefully examined the questioned birth certificates, we simply cannot agree with the
above-quoted findings of the trial court. To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial court noted, was an
original typewritten document, not a mere photocopy or facsimile. It uses a form of 1950’s
vintage21 but this Court is unable to concur in the trial court’s finding that Exhibit 122 was of a
later vintage than Exhibit A which was one of the trial court’s bases for doubting the authenticity
of Exhibit 1. On the contrary, the printed notation on the upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1
states "Municipal Form No. 102 – (Revised, January 1945)" which makes it an older form than
Exhibit A. Thus, the trial court’s finding regarding which form was of more recent vintage was
manifestly contradicted by the evidence on record. No actual signature appears on Exhibit A
except that of a certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly certified on July 6, 1977 that Exhibit A
was a true copy of respondent’s birth certificate. The names of the attendant at birth (Petra
Sambaan) and the local civil registrar (J.L. Rivera) in 1950 were typewritten with the notation
"(Sgd.)" also merely typewritten beside their names. The words "A certified true copy: July 6,
1977" above the signature of Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be inscribed by the same
typewriter as the very entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit A and the information
stated therein were prepared and entered only in 1977. Significantly, Maximo P. Noriga was
never presented as a witness to identify Exhibit A. Said document and the signature of Maximo
P. Noriga therein were identified by respondent herself whose self-serving testimony cannot be
deemed sufficient authentication of her birth certificate.

We cannot subscribe to the trial court’s view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were handwritten,
Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the handwritten
birth certificate of respondent (petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly authenticated by two
competent witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms. Vidal), Assistant Registration Officer of the
Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho),
Archivist of the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa, Manila. Both witnesses testified
that: (a) as part of their official duties they have custody of birth records in their respective
offices,23 and (b) the certified true copy of respondent’s handwritten birth certificate is a faithful
reproduction of the original birth certificate registered in their respective offices.24 Ms. Vidal,
during her testimony, even brought the original of the handwritten birth certificate before the trial
court and respondent’s counsel confirmed that the certified true copy (which was eventually
marked as Exhibit 1) was a faithful reproduction of the original.25 Ms. Vidal likewise categorically
testified that no other copy of respondent’s birth certificate exists in their records except the

21
handwritten birth certificate.26 Ms. Cacho, in turn, testified that the original of respondent’s
handwritten birth certificate found in the records of the NSO Manila (from which Exhibit 8 was
photocopied) was the one officially transmitted to their office by the Local Civil Registry Office of
Cagayan de Oro.27 Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho testified and brought their respective offices’
copies of respondent’s birth certificate in compliance with subpoenas issued by the trial court
and there is no showing that they were motivated by ill will or bias in giving their testimonies.
Thus, between respondent’s Exhibit A and petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8, the latter documents
deserve to be given greater probative weight.

Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate presented by
respondent (Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the same on its face is insufficient to prove
respondent’s filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been
credible and authentic, would have proven was that respondent’s mother was a certain
"Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." It does not prove that same "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan" is the
daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even the CA held that the conflicting certificates of live birth of
respondent submitted by the parties only proved the filiation of respondent to Hermogena.28

It was absolutely crucial to respondent’s cause of action that she convincingly proves the
filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondent’s
mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the
record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In
the absence of these, respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two
classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules
of Court of her mother’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.

However, respondent’s mother’s (Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which would have been the
best evidence of Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at
the RTC. Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final judgment categorically
evidencing Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.

Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac Pacana
and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified that they personally knew Hermogena (respondent’s
mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married to Laureana Clarito
and that Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana. However, none of these witnesses
had personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of
Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They were not yet born or were very young when Juan
supposedly married Laureana or when Hermogena was born and they all admitted that none of
them were present at Juan and Laureana’s wedding or Hermogena’s birth. These witnesses
based their testimony on what they had been told by, or heard from, others as young children.
Their testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.

Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to respondent’s witnesses’ testimonies.
The records would show that they cannot be said to be credible and impartial witnesses. Frisco
Lawan testified that he was the son of Laureana by a man other than Juan Gabatan and was
admittedly not at all related to Juan Gabatan.29 His testimony regarding the relationships within
the Gabatan family is hardly reliable. As for Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac
Villareal who are children of Justa Gabatan Nagac,30 this Court is wary of according probative
weight to their testimonies since respondent admitted during her cross-examination that her
(respondent’s) husband is the son of Felicisima Nagac Pacana.31 In other words, although these
witnesses are indeed blood relatives of petitioners, they are also the mother and the aunt of
respondent’s husband. They cannot be said to be entirely disinterested in the outcome of the
case.

Aside from the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily
on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale32 (Exhibit H) presented by respondent and which
appeared to be signed by the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this
document involving the sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5, "Hermogena Gabatan as heir of
the deceased Juan Gabatan" was indicated as one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the
statement therein as an affirmation or recognition by Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners’ predecessor

22
in interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan.33 The CA considered the
same statement as a declaration against interest on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.34

However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the signatures
therein, as competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners’
counsel for being a mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated.35 After a close
scrutiny of the said photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court cannot uphold the
admissibility of the same.

Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.36 Although the best
evidence rule admits of exceptions and there are instances where the presentation of secondary
evidence would be allowed, such as when the original is lost or the original is a public record,
the basis for the presentation of secondary evidence must still be established. Thus, in
Department of Education Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario,37 we held that a party must first
satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary
evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation
for non-production of the original instrument.

In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana (who
identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she gave no testimony
regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or whether it was recorded in any
public office.

There is an ostensible attempt to pass off Exhibit H as an admissible public document. For this,
respondent relied on the stamped notation on the photocopy of the deed that it is a certified true
xerox copy and said notation was signed by a certain Honesto P. Velez, Sr., Assessment
Officer, who seems to be an officer in the local assessor’s office. Regarding the authentication
of public documents, the Rules of Court38 provide that the record of public documents, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy.39 The attestation of
the certifying officer must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be.40

To begin with, no proof whatsoever was presented by respondent that an original of Exhibit H
was registered or exists in the records of the local assessor’s office. Furthermore, the stamped
certification of Honesto P. Velez is insufficient authentication of Exhibit H since Velez’s
certification did not state that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Even worse, Velez
was not presented as a witness to attest that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original.
Indeed, it is highly doubtful that Velez could have made such an attestation since the assessor’s
office is not the official repository of original notarized deeds of sale and could not have been
the legal custodian contemplated in the rules.

It is the notary public who is mandated by law to keep an original of the Deed of Absolute Sale
in his notarial register and to forward the same to the proper court. It is the notary public or the
proper court that has custody of his notarial register that could have produced the original or a
certified true copy thereof. Instead, the Deed of Absolute Sale was identified by Felicisima
Nagac Pacana who, despite appearing to be a signatory thereto, is not a disinterested witness
and as can be gleaned from her testimony, she had no personal knowledge of the preparation
of the alleged certified true copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale. She did not even know who
secured a copy of Exhibit H from the assessor’s office.41 To be sure, the roundabout and
defective manner of authentication of Exhibit H renders it inadmissible for the purpose it was
offered, i.e. as proof that Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or admitted the status of Hermogena
Gabatan as heir of Juan Gabatan.

Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H and consider the same
admissible, it still nonetheless would have only provided proof that a certain Hermogena
Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H does not show the filiation of respondent to
either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan. As discussed above, the only document that
respondent produced to demonstrate her filiation to "Hermogena Gabatan" (respondent’s
Exhibit A) was successfully put in doubt by contrary evidence presented by petitioners.

23
As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to likewise rule against respondent. According to
respondent’s own testimony,42 Juan Gabatan died sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of
action of the heirs of Juan Gabatan to recover the decedent’s property from third parties or to
quiet title to their inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, respondent and/or her mother Hermogena, if
they were truly the legal heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their rights as such. It is only in
1978 that respondent filed her first complaint to recover the subject property, docketed as Civil
Case No. 5840, against Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo Gabatan.43 However, that case was
dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute.44 Again, respondent waited until 1989 to
refile her cause of action, i.e. the present case.45 She claimed that she waited until the death of
Rita Gabatan to refile her case out of respect because Rita was then already old.46

We cannot accept respondent’s flimsy reason. It is precisely because Rita Gabatan and her
contemporaries (who might have personal knowledge of the matters litigated in this case) were
advancing in age and might soon expire that respondent should have exerted every effort to
preserve valuable evidence and speedily litigate her claim. As we held in Republic of the
Philippines v. Agunoy: "Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids the
vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights…[O]ne may not sleep on a right while expecting to
preserve it in its pristine purity."47

All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing,
credible and independently verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan
Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her
evidence were the circumstances that (a) she did not come to court with clean hands for she
presented a tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth and (b)
she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action. If the Court cannot now
affirm her claim, respondent has her own self to blame.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
52273, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 89-092, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint and amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89-092
are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157912               December 13, 2007

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner,

vs.
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus
Order dated April 9, 2003.

The undisputed facts are as follows.

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an
order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him
amounting to approximately ₱206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate, and the amount of ₱275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses
incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said
money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in
Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a

24
certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation
why the money claim was not filed and served personally.

On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the
money claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied per Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following questions:

(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against
non-forum shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?

(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed
for failing to pay the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its
failure to contain a written explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?2

Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules
requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and
the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the
Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only
in a suppletory manner.

The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with this
Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.3

The petition is imbued with merit.

However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are
only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special
proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the
Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as
practicable.

The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into
practice, done or accomplished.4 This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in
ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing
so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it
categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special
proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for
complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing,
and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct
probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.

Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's
contingent money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion
a certification against non-forum shopping?

The Court rules in the affirmative.

25
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a
decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was
initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections
1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration,
all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court
and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred,
subject to certain exceptions.5

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors'
claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties
of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,6 the Court explained thus:

x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but
incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion
is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of
a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and
is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.7 (Emphasis supplied)

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the
decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a
separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money
claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum
shopping.

On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,8 that the trial court
has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered
by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without
payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment
of such filing fees within a reasonable time.9 After all, the trial court had already assumed
jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing
fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money
claim against the estate.

With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de

Macatangay10 is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus:

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of
the Rules of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not
filed if said rule is not complied with.

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite
action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not
eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the
inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of
some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices:
(1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter
with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon
receiving notice from the post office that the registered mail containing the pleading of or other
paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel,
or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading
or other papers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules
requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court
the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing
were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not
done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of
personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause "whenever practicable".

26
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service
and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the
light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing
is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes
be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or
filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court
shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved
therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section
11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its
discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:

"As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be
done personally whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal
service would not be practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals and
Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would
have entailed considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service was not
done personally might have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with the
use of "may", signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court discretion
whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that procedural rules are
necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid application of
Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice. (Emphasis
and italics supplied)1âwphi1

In the case at bar, the address of respondent’s counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner
Sonia’s counsel’s is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such
distance makes personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why
service was not done personally "might have been superfluous."

As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure has
been allowed where, among other cases, "the injustice to the adverse party is not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed."11 (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for
respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower
court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized
that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus,
following Medina v. Court of Appeals,12 the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation
why service has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC
should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim
of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.

The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for
the benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the
debts and expenses of administration have been paid.13 The ultimate purpose for the rule on
money claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibañez,14 thus:

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. As
we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:

x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by
informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The
plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and
the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly
requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's
estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and
distribute the residue.15 (Emphasis supplied)

27
The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of
a written explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003, respectively,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, is
hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money claim
in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 164108               May 8, 2009

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING

CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS
BENEDICTO, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was
survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto),
and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of his death, there were two
pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-
9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with
petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was
then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar
Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.2

On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78
of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent
Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be
₱5 Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing
private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters
of administration in her favor.4 In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of
the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased
husband.5 In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as
among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before the
Bacolod City courts.6 Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the
two cases as ₱136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and ₱35,198,697.40 for Civil Case
No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and
updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex

Abundanti Cautela,9 praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion,
disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband.
Even before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus
motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of
the required inventory of the decedent’s estate.10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings or
motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her
administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as
unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

28
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the
ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court
to intervene in the intestate proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition
argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of
Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod
RTC.

On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12 dismissing the petition and
declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to
intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene,
according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of
Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent
or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.

Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying
them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto.
Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on
intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.13

To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo.
First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished "copies of all processes and orders issued"
by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said
court.14 Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by
administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon
submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same.15 Third, petitioners moved that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator of her verified annual
account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect
thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and
disposition of the estate.16

The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on
intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude
petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the
legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and
not simply contingent and expectant."17

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased
persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court,18 not the Rules on
Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions,
the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special
proceedings."

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth
under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent
claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent
claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC,
and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it
were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would
not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the
right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.

29
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our
focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.

In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or "any
persons interested in the estate" to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate
proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which
recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary
and to file a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of
notice of hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to
any other persons believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a
"person interested in the estate" to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87,
which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of
the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of
the decedent’s title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the
time and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons
interested;" (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons
interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of
the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in
the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the
decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.

Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or
implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice
to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and
published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice.19 However, it
appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in
connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict
do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule
86.20 These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be
commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records
indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was
successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case21 was already
pending review before this Court at the time of Benedicto’s death.

Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases
where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for
damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against
the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate
proceedings?

Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,22 and it does provide us
with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had
filed an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the
case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to
whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to
implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified
claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-administrator
be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not
be closed until the civil case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of
the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the
intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial
partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the
termination of the civil case, and the Court affirmed such action.

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to
their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said
proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of administration and
distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the
unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a
far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking
cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case

30
but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and
cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.

Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate
proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no
rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the separate
action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section
1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal
property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or
administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the action against the
administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close
the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule
is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property
alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a
separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be
closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x23 (Emphasis supplied) [Citations
omitted]

It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-

intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such
pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of
this court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are
allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action."24

Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable
interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just
creditors, but also "any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various specified
capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim
based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned
that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have
already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be
enforced against it.

In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any
person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate
proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act
in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their
interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests
can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by
petitioners.

The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in
connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of
the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would
be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the
assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate
remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to
complain to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently
conveyed.

At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and contingent
counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of
respondent’s submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes
and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent
or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of
merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all

31
court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent
claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately
offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.

Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court,
with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners to be
apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the Court
heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge,
praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the
respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision
stating that "the records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available
for the inspection of any interested person x x x." The Court ruled that petitioners were
"interested persons" entitled to access the court records in the intestate proceedings. We said:

Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor prompt compliance with
the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the
completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual
accounting—appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against
Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate.
They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is
an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings
upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being
preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging
their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or
pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the
intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means
by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.1awphi1

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or
all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The
instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85
in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or
administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or
administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates;
and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of
the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted
inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.

We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the
submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the
estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual
account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect
thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and
disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from
appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his
administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration.
We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either
duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do
so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of
dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88
to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy
is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the

32
provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not
doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief.
After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to
answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary
to fulfill such purpose.

All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as
we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on
Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons
interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as
provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased
Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189121               July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER

QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto.2

The Facts

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon
(Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The
petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was
married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer
Quiazon (Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma.
Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims
that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her
parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and
Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it
was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with
one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others,
attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by
Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth
₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of
Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix
of her late father’s estate.

33
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his
death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement
of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In
addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and
legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.

In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration
to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition
was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that
Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision
reads:

Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or
incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the
decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after
the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her.9

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings
of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived
together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld
the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.

The Issues

The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution
on the following grounds:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO

QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS
PIÑAS;

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA

GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO
PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON
HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.12

The Court’s Ruling

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at
the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any

34
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(Emphasis supplied).

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even
where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the
same meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means
nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency.19

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming
the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid
in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s
Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be
settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s
residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes,
deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This
finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of
properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their
marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud
with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the
final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports
petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of
the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court,
must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.21

Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has
taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties
to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of
Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the
ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no
uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their
father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing
void from voidable marriages, to wit:

Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.24

35
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot
be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.25

Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even
after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action
attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise,
as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not
extinguish such cause of action.

Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to
determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between
Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued
by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de
Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage
and the certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage
exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the
fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a
record of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is
not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had
been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown
any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are
entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.

Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration
must be filed by an interested person, thus:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

36
 (b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the
creditors, of the decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate
proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest
in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a
compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are
satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural
children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES
CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO
CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioner.

Jalandoni and Jamir for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July
1964 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:

On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital,
Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons,
Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal
St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents
herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen
Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing
in Cebu.

37
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator)1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco
filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No.
2433-R), alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25
February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and
personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an
order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all
the heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA,
a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.

The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one
released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II
instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the same date, a third order was further issued
stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special administrator
dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons
the following:

It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly
acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice
of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the petition
have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition for the
issuance of letters of administration.2

In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition)
herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal
(Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance
of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and
testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.

Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco
filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as
an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10
April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's
motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the
petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the
deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco."3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to
the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by
respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the same
by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.

Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss,
dated 10 April 1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said
Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix
in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the
Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.

In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a
principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding."4 The
said court further found in said order that the residence of the late senator at the time of his
death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said
order follows:

On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and

motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus
Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his death, the aforesaid
petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the
proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of
the New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted allegation, the Court is made
to understand that the oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent being a
resident of Cebu City when he died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City
should prevail over the probate proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated

38
 above the probate of the will should take precedence, but that the probate
proceedings should be filed in the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last
proposition is the desire of the oppositors as understood by this Court, that could
not also be entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the
probate of the will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his
death was a resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and
Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition for probate of the will shows
that the decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that
he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also of
the City of Cebu. He made the former as his first choice and the latter as his
second choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the one will be
deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself selects or considers to be
his home or which appears to be the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus
filing the instant petition before this Court, follows the first choice of residence of
the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding
it is to the exclusion of all others.5

Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order
of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to
by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration
dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied.

On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the last
will of the decedent was called three times at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due
notification none of the oppositors appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m.
with the hearing in their absence.

As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that
respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on
the following grounds:

(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;

(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on
the part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit;

(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator
acted by mistake and did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his
will at the time he affixed his signature thereto.6

The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing
had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and
after receiving the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will,
namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the
notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the documentary
evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport,
deed of donation) all indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon
City, as also affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May
1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and
voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-
widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as
probated.

Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and
naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action
of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals
(docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No.
Q-7898.

On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents

(petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding that:

39
 Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp.
Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whose
jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is that court which can
properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the
decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent
was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.

Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI
(Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said court must exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate was
filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898).
The said respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the
proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.

The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge
Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the
petition for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready for the
consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act
thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... .
" It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge was certainly not
referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is
acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of
jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events, jurisdiction is
conferred and determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements
of a trial judge.

The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the
respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the
respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from proceeding and
taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said
respondent court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by
said respondent court and respondent Judge, therein and connected therewith,
are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made
permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of

Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for review on certiorari.

The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in law in
issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from
proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
actions, particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's
express wish in his testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate
court, to wit, whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964
expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings that
it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the petition for probate of the document purporting
to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of
the Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition
or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed without any
impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the
probate proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, to proceed with the
hearing of the petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due
execution and authenticity.

40
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the
writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings
and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of
the deceased's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish, for the following considerations:
—

1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance

over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73,
section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule
indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may
properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule provides:

Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an

inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of the province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence, of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (Rule 73)8

It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by
the late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa vs. Co Ho9 as follows:

We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the
place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of jurisdiction over
the subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view because of its mischievous
consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in good faith to
the Court of First Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided. All
the parties, however, including all the creditors, have submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein completely finished except for
a claim of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from
an adverse decision raises for the first time in this Court the question of
jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province.
If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the
trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole
proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in
court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced
anew before another court of the same rank in another province. That this is
of mischievous effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to
require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206,
December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, 10 providing that
the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had
last resided, could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the
probate court over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is contained
in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have
said time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject
matter is another. (Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.)
The law of jurisdiction — Act No. 136, 11 Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon
Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the
place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of
First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600,
fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place
of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject-

41
 matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of
Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is
properly called "venue".

It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or
intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.

The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts."

A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and
co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must
also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it
to the exclusion of all other courts.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will
has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile
and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of
the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false,
may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and
instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's
alleged last will.

2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss
Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal
motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition
for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly
admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take
cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and
improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all
other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to
resolve the question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his
death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as
claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance
of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter
would make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of the decedent
within its territory and venue.

3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring
to the Quezon City court.

Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the
Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise
jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is
undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had
at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.

Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed

jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City
court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts.

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court
their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due
notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted
without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.

42
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 12 with
facts analogous to the present case 13 is authority against respondent appellate court's
questioned decision.

In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate
proceedings in this wise:

It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution
of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on
intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in
accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly
that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first
instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the
probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state
an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render
final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor
subsequently appointed. This however, is understood to be without prejudice that
should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall
continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that
proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 14

The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the Quezon
City court) although opining that certain considerations therein "would seem to support the view
that [therein respondent] should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this
case, the Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for
said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344," 15 thus:

But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court,
Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not
accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider
said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely

a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in
the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived
the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is
enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a
will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio
Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No.
6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence)
of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its
probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte
Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All
these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila
Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to
intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein
up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an
administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more
than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him
now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila
Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396
would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that
this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even
if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have
the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more
so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is
raised too late. 16

43
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the
decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and
finding that Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal
home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court —
could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The last paragraph
of said Rule expressly provides:

... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of

residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested
in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)

The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could
probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon
City court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court
had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.

6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the
appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs.
Tan  17 that.

... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is
considered to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First
Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that the question
of the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring both factual and
legal resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary
course of procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of the fact that the
deceased was better known as the Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to
be his also gives Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that
this matter requires airing in the proper court, as so indicated in the leading and
controlling case of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27,
1955.

In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition
first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in
effect asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence of the decedent and whether he
did leave a last will and testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate
proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for
both courts — at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court —
that Quezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore
the proper venue, the Borja ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the
practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable
and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for itself the actual residence of the
decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual
residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this
factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine
Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to
allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding
proceedings in Quezon City.

7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into
consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will must show:
"(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the
Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of
his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, his having left his estate in such province."

This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will
is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is
a constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court
is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a court having

44
jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City court
acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not
the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting
the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the
Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of
jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in
line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the
Manila court's action admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in
accordance therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this
Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was
not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated
in some other court of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra,
"the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of considering the question
of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings
only to start all over again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in
another province "is too obvious to require comment."

8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent's

relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement of the decedent's estate, then the established
jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to
preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so and creating
conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue
is waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to
eye, it would be converted into a race as to who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her
choice regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the
decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and testament and the right of his
surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were certainly not
intended by the Rule nor would they be in consonance with public policy and the orderly
administration of justice.

9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable
rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had
filed an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March
1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12,
1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and
petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the administration
of her husband's estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the
way to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding
or by asking that the intestate proceedings be converted into a testate proceeding — when
under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as
already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-
widow had their conjugal domicile.

It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of
the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her
rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more
time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an
important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.

It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section
2, 21 since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the death of her husband, their
community property and conjugal estate have to be administered and liquidated in the estate
proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that
petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in
Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive
jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of
jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to continually leave her residence in
Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community property and
conjugal estate with the decedent.

10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of

45
the intestate petition and instead deferring to the testate proceedings filed just a week later by
petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the
record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the
allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that
respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of
10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving
the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and
admit the decedent's will to probate.

For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and
appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of
the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of
jurisdiction.

Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15,
1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court
concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become
final and can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.

11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority
over all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar,
that venue was properly assumed by and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the
interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of the
Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of
petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and
all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized
rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same
proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the
Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the
strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal
residence of the decedent.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered
dismissed. No costs.

Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Fernando and Castro, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. 187524               August 5, 2015

SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES MARIA FRANCISCO
substituted by VILLAFRIA, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA ALARAS, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution, 2 dated March 13, 2009 and
April 23, 2009·, respectively, of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107347, Which
affirmed the Judgment 3 dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nasugbu,
Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

46
On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his_
children with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as
several properties including a resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 51354
and No. 51355, each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family home, the land on which
it stands is covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas. 4

In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Possession 5 dated September 15, 1993, respondents alleged that sometime in March 1991,
they discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro’s second wife, Benita"Tenorio and other children, had
sold the subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who
are now deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge
and consent. When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing
respondents a document she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which,
however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtoiined by Pedro and Benita
from a bank. 6 The document actually evidenced receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount of
₱87, 352.62 releasing her and her late husband’s indebtedness therefrom. 7 Upon inquiry, the
Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record of any transaction
involving the subject properties, giving them certified true copies of the titles to the same. When
respondents went to the subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the
resort had been demolished. They were not, however, able to enter as the premises were
padlocked.

Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an extra-judicial

settlement of estate of their late father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this,
They caused the annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties before the
Register of Deeds of Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the
annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and certificates
of title issued pursuant thereto. 8

In their Answer, 9 petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the groun_d of lack of
personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring the subject properties. In the course of his
testimony during trial, petitioner Francisco further contended that what they purchased was only
the resort. 10 He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations
and Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides, among others, that respondents' co-heirs sold
the family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for Pl million as well as a
Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for ₱650, 000.00. 11

On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject Properties to petitioners
and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the Documents of conveyance offered by
petitioner’s .as well as the circumstances Surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically,
the Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a notary public that was not duly commissioned
as such on the date it was executed. 12 The Deed of Sale was Undated, the date of the
acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the Typewritten name "Pedro Rifioza, Husband" on
the left side of the document Was not signed. 13 The trial court also observed that both
documents were Never presented to the Office of the Register of Deeds for registration and
That the titles to the subject properties were still in the names of Pedro and His second wife
Benita. In addition, the supposed notaries and buyers of the Subject properties were not even
presented as witnesses whom supposedly witnessed the signing and execution of the
documents of conveyance. 14 On The basis thereof, the triaI court ruled in favor of respondents,
in its Judgment, the pertinent portions of its fallo provide:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is Hereby rendered as follows:

xxxx

4. A) Declaring as a nullity the ~'Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiation and

Waiver of Rights and Sale" (Ex. "l ", Villafria) notarized on December 23, 1991 by Notary Public
Antonio G. Malonzo of Manila, Doc. No. 190, Page No. 20, Book No. IXII, Series of 1991. .

b) Declaring as a nullity the Deed of Absolute Sale (Ex. "2", Villafria), purportedly
executed by Benita T. Rifioza in favor of spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong,

47
 purportedly notarized by one Alfredo de Guzman marked Doc. No. 1136, Page No. 141,
and Book. No. XXX, Series of 1991.

c) Ordering the forfeiture of any and all improvements introduced By defendants

Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong in the properties Covered by TCT No. 40807,
40808, 51354 and 51355 of the Register of Deeds for Nasugbu, Batangas. .

5. Ordering defendant Francisco Villafria and all persons, whose Occupancy within the premises
of the four- (4) parcels of land described in Par. 4-c above is derived from the rights and interest
of defendant Villafria, to vacate its premises and to deliver possession thereof, and all
improvements existing thereon to plaintiffs, for and in behalf of the estate of decedent Pedro L.
Rifioza.

6. Declaring the plaintiffs and the defendants-heirs in the Amended Complaint to be the
legitimate heirs of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza, each in the capacity and degree established, as
well as their direct successors-in interest, and ordering the defendant Registrar of Deeds to
issue the co1Tesponding titles in their names in the proportion established by law, pro in
division, in TCT Nos. 40807, 40808, 51354, 51355 and 40353 (after restoration) within ten (10)
days from finality of this Decision, 4pon payment of lawful fees, except TCT No. 40353, which
shall be exempt from all expenses for its restoration.

With no costs.

SO ORDERED. 15

On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial ‘court’s Judgment in its Decision 16 dated October 31, 2006
in the following wise:

The person before whom the resort deed was acknowledged, Alfredo de Guzman, was not
commissioned as a notary public from 1989 to July 3, 1991, the date the certification was
issued. Such being the case, the resort deed is not a public document and the presumption of
regularity accorded to public documents will not apply to the same. As laid down in Tigno, et al.
v. Aquino, et al.:

The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the authority of the notarial officer.
If the notary public docs net have the capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway,
then the document should be treated as A. Unnotarized. The rule may strike as rather harsh,
and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties in good faith relying on the proferred
authority of the notary public or the person pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would
render merely officious the elaborate process devised by this Court in order that a lawyer may
receive a notarial commission. Without such a rule,

The notarization of a document by a duly appointed notary public will have the same legal effect
as one accomplished by a non-lawyer engaged in pretense. The notarization of a document
carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private document converts such document
into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Thus,
notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial
degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or
authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and
administrative offices generally.

Parenthetically, the settlement/family home deed cannot be considered a public document. This
is because the following cast doubt on the document's authenticity, to wit: J.

1.) The date of its execution was not indicated;

2.) The amount of consideration was superimposed;

3.) It was not presented to the Registry of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas for annotation; and

48
4.) Not even the supposed notary public," Alfredo de Guzman, or the purported buyer, the
Spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc, were presented as witnesses. · Concededly, the
absence of notarization in the resort deed and/or the lacking details in the settlement/family
home deed did not necessarily invalidate the transactions evidenced by the said documents.
However, since the said deeds are private documents, perforce, their due execution and
authenticity becomes subject to the requirement of proof under the Rules on Evidence, Section
20, Rule 132 of which provides: Sec. 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private.
Document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution a"Q.d. authenticity
must be proved either:

(a). By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

The Complaining Heirs insist that the settlement/family home and the resort deed are void, as
their signatures thereon are forgeries as opposed to the Villafrias who profess the deeds'
enforceability. After the Complaining Heirs presented proofs in support of their claim that their
signatures were forged, the burden then fell upon the Villafrias to disprove the ~ame2 or
conversely, to prove the authenticity and due execution of the said deeds. The Villafrias failed in
this regard.

As forestalled, the Villafrias did not present as witnesses (a) the notary public who purportedly
notarized the questioned instrument, (b) the witnesses who appear [Ed] in the instruments as
eyewitnesses to the signing, or (c) an expert to prove the authenticity and genuineness of all the
signatures appearing on the said instruments. Verily, the rule that, proper foundation must be
laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the
document must be reasonably established as a pre requisite to its admission, was prudently
observed by the lower court when it refused to admit the settlement/family home and the resort
deeds as their veracity are doubtful. 17

Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son Ruel Villafria, filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated November 24, 2006 raising the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. It was alleged that when
the Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession was
filed, there was yet no settlement of Pedro's estate, determination as to the nature thereof, nor
was there an identification of the number of legitimate heirs. As such, the trial court ruled on the
settlement of the intestate estate of Pedro in its ordinary· jurisdiction when the action filed was
for Judidal Partition. Considering that the instant action is really one for settlement of intestate
estate, the trial court, sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction when it
ruled upon the issues of forgery and ownership. Thus, petitioner argued that. Said ruling is void
and has no effect for having been rendered without jurisdiction. The Motion for Reconsideration
was, however, denied by the appellate court on February 26, 2007.

On appeal, this Court denied on June 20, 2007, petitioner's Petition for Review on Certiorari for
submitting a verification of the petition, a certificate of non-forum shopping and an affidavit of
service that failed to comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice regarding competent
evidence of affiant' s identities. 18 In its Resolution 19 dated September 26, 2007, this Court also
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in the absence of any compelling reason to
warrant a modification of the previous denial. Thus, the June 20, 2007 Resolution became final
and executors on October 31, 2007 as certified by the Entry of Judgment issued by the
Court. 20 On January 16, 2008, the Court further denied petitioner' s motion for leave to admit a
second motion for reconsideration of its September 26, 2007 Resolution, considering that the
same is a prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52, in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Furthennore, petitioner's letter dated December 18,
2007 pleading the Court to take a second. Look at his petition for review on certiorari and that a
decision thereon be rendered based purely on its merits was noted without action. 21

Unsatisfied, petitioner wrote a letter dated March 24, 2008 addressed to then Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno praying that a decision on the case be rendered based on the. Merits and not
on formal requirements "as he stands to lose everything his parents had left him just because
the verification against non-forum shopping is formally defective." However, in view of the Entry

49
of Judgment having been made on October 31, 2007, the Court likewise noted said letter
without action. 22

On November 27, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, issuing a Part Writ of Execution of its
October 1, 2001 Decision with respect to the portions disposing of petitioner's claims as
affirmed by the CA.

The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed, on February 11, 200 a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment and· Order before the CA assailing October 1, 2001 Decision as well as the
November 27, 2008 Order of the RTC on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
In Decision dated March 13, 2009, however, the CA dismissed the petition a affirmed the rulings
of the trial court in the following wise: Although the assailed Decision of the Court a quo has
already become final and executory and in fact entry of judgment was issued on 31 October
2007, supra, nevertheless, to put the issues to rest,·We deem it apropos to tackle the same.

The Petitioner argues that the assailed Decision and Order of the Court a quo, supra, should be
annulled and set aside on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

We are not persuaded.

xxxx

Section 2 of the Rules as stated above provides that the annulment of a judgment may "be
based only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction." In RP v. The Heirs of Sancho
Magdato, the High Tribunal stressed that: There is extrinsic fraud when "the unsuccessful party
had been ·prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent, as by keeping him away from court, ... or where the defendant never had knowledge
of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; ... "

Otherwise put, extrinsic or collateral fraud pertains to such fraud, which prevents the aggrieved
party ·from having a trial or presenting his case to the court, or is used to procure the judgment
without fair submission of the controversy. This refers to acts intended to keep the unsuccessful
party away from the courts as when there is a false promise of compromise or when one is kept
in ignorance of the suit. The pivotal issues before us are (1) whether. There was a time during
the proceedings below that the Petitioners ever prevented from exhibiting fully their case, by
fraud or deception, practiced on them by Respondents, and (2) whether the Petitioners were
kept away from the court or kept in ignorance by the acts of the Respondent?

We find nothing of that sort. Instead, what we deduced as We carefully delved. Into the
evidentiary facts surrounding the instant case as well as the proceedings below as shown in the
36-page Decision of the Court a quo, is that the Petitioners were given ample time to rebut the
allegations of the Respondents and had in fact addressed every detail of. Respondent's cause
of action against them. Thus, Petitioners' allegation of the Court a quo ‘s lack of jurisdiction is
misplaced.

Our pronouncement on the matter finds support in the explicit ruling of the Supreme Court in
Sps. Santos, et al. v. Sps. Lumbao, thus: It is elementary that' the active participation of a party
in a case pending against him before a court is tantamount to recognition of that court's
jurisdiction and willingness to abide by the resolution of the case which will bar said party from
later on impugning the court’s jurisdiction. ' In fine, under the circumstances obtaining in this
case the Petitioners are stopped from assailing the Court a quo 's lack of jurisdiction. Too, We
do not find merit in the Petitioners' second issue, supra. As mentioned earlier, entry of judgment
had already been made on the assailed Decision and Order as early as 31 October 2007.

xxxx

It maybe that the doctrine of finality of judgments permits certain equitable remedies such as a
petition for annulment. But the I. Rules are clear. The annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of the Regional Trial Courts is resorted
to only where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, supra.

50
If Petitioners lost their chance to avail themselves of the appropriate remedies or appeal before
the Supreme Court, that is their own look out. The High Tribunal has emphatically pointed out in
Mercado, et al. v. Security Bank Corporation, thus:

A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is
not a substitute for the lost remedy of·appeal." A party must have first availed of appeal, a
motion for new trial or a petition for relief before an action for annulment can prosper. Its
obvious rationale is to prevent the party from benefiting from his inaction or negligence. Also,
the action for annulment of judgment must be based either on (a) extrinsic fraud or (b) lack of
jurisdiction or denial of due process. Having failed to avail of the remedies and there being 'a
Clear showing that neither of the grounds was present, the petition must be dismissed. Only a
disgruntled litigant would find such legal disposition unacceptable. 23 When the appellate court
denied Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated April 23, 2009, petitioner
filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari on June 10, 2009, invoking the following
ground:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, NASUGBU, BATANGAS, ACTED WITHOUT
JURISDCITION IN ENTERTAINING THE SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE SETTLEMENT
OF ESTATE OF PEDRO RINOZA AND THE CIVIL ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE OF
THE HEIRS AND THIRD PERSONS IN ONE PROCEEDING. 24

Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was captioned as "Judicial
Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession," the allegations therein show that
the cause of action is actually one for settlement of estate of decedent Pedro. Considering that
settlement of estate is a special proceeding cognizable by a probate court of limited jurisdiction
while judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession are ordinary civil
actions cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in
entertaining the latter while it was sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction. This is in view of the
prohibition found in the Rules on the joiner of special civil actions and ordinary civil
actions. 25 Thus, petitioner argued that the ruling of the trial court is void and has no effect for
having been rendered in without jurisdiction.

Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the appellate court that since the finding
of forgery relates only to the signature of respondents and not to their co-heirs, who assented to
the conveyance, the transaction should be considered valid as to them. Petitioner also denies
the indings of the courts below that his parents are builders in bad faith for they only took
possession of the subject properties after the execution of the transfer documents and after they
paid the consideration on the sale.

The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioner maintains that since. Respondents’ complaint alleged
the following causes of action, the same is actually one for settlement of estate and not of
judicial partition: FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

1. That Pedro L. Rifi.oza, Filipino and resident of Nasugbu, Batangas at the time of his
death, died intestate on November 16, 1989. Copy of his death certificate is hereto
attached as Annex "A";

2. That Plaintiffs together with the Defendants enumerated from paragraph 2-A to 2-J
are the only known heirs of the above-mentioned decedent. The plaintiffs and the
Defendants Rolando, Rafael, Antonio, Angelita, Loma all surnamed Rifioza, and Myrna
R. Limon or Myrna R. Rogador, Epifania Belo and Ma. Theresa R. Demafelix are the
decedent’s legitimate children with his first wife, while Benita Tenorio Rifioza, is the
decedent’s widow and Bernadette Rifioza, the decedent's daughter with said widow. As
such, said parties are co-owners by virtue of an intestate inheritance from the decedent,
of the properties enumerated in the succeeding paragraph; ‘

3. That the decedent left the following real properties all located in Nasugbu, Batangas:

51
 xxxx

16. That the estate of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza has no known legal indebtedness;

17. That said estate remains undivided up to this date and it will be to the best interest of
all heirs that it be partitioned judicially. 26.

Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action pertaining to the
properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their
interests thereon may fall under an action for settlement of estate. However, a complete reading
of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the llegations therein,
and the relief’s prayed for, the action, is clearly one for udicial partition with annulment of title
and recovery of possession.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court proyides:

RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate

Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and
no debts and the heirs are all of age5 or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so
in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire
estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an
Extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for
partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit
shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument,
or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a
bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal
property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the
payment of any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that
the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2)
years after the death of the decedent.

The fact of the Extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be Published in a newspaper of

general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no Extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof. 27

In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. - A person having the right to compel
the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the
nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is
demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property. 28

As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of respondents in their
complaint are but customary, in fact, mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real estate.
Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that respondents, together
with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is represented by a judicial
representative duly authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known
heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5)
that Pedro's estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful heirs to
the decedent’s estate, pray for the partition of the same in accordance with the laws of
intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for
judicial partition. That the complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the
decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not perforce make it an action
for settlement of estate.

52
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed
to name an executor in his will or the executor o named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or.
Fails to furnish the bond equipped by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be
judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator the order
established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. 29 An exception to this rule, however,
is found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 4 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will
and no debts due from is estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary
action or partition without submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the
appointment of an administrator by the court. 30 The reasons that where the deceased dies
without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to
administer the. Estate for hem and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they
are immediately entitled. 31

In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not isputed, that Pedro died
without a will, leaving his estate without any ending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s
contention, respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the
estate of a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to
have the same partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially, by ereira v. Court of Appeals: 32

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no· debts or obligations, if they do
not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows
the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, qr. to resort to an ordinary
action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons
to take a different course of action. It should be noted that recourse to an administration
proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for
not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the
estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons.

Thus, it has been repeatedly 4eld that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations
to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings. 33

Thus, respondents committed no error in. filing an action for judicial partition instead of a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate as law expressly permits the same.1avvphi1 That the
complaint contained allegations inherent in an action for settlement of estate does not. Mean
that there was a prohibited joined of causes of action for questions as to the estate's properties
as well as a determination of the heirs, their status as such, and the nature and extent of their
titles to the estate, may also be properly ventilated in partition proceedings alone.34 In fact, a
complete inventory of the estate may likewise be done during the partition proceedings,
especially since the estate has no debts.~5 Indeed, where the more expeditious remedy 9f
partition is available to the heirs, then they may not be compelled to submit to administration
proceedings, dispensing of the risks of delay and of the properties being dissipated. 36

Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint also prayed for the annulment of title and
recovery of possession does not strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case. Asking for the annulment of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved in an
action for partition, 37 as can be seen in cases where 1-ourts determine the parties' rights arising
from complaints asking not only for the partition of estates but also for the annulment of titles
and recovery of ownership and possession of property. 38 In fact, in Bagayas v.
Bagayas, 39 ·wherein a complaint for annulment of sale and partition was dismissed by the trial
court due to the impropriety of an action for annulment as it constituted a collateral attack on the
certificates of title of the respondents therein, this Court found the dismissal to be improper in
the following manner:

In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action. For partition premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties, the Court categorically

53
pronounced that a resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued
over the disputed realties 'to a collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that what cannot be
collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. As pronounced in Lacbayan:

There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule
is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title
and not the title itself. The' certificate referred to is that -document issued by the Register of
Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership, which is,
more often than not, represented by that document. Petitioner c.pparently confuses title with the
certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of
title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. (Emphases
supplied)

Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner's petition for annulment of sale on the ground
that it constituted a collateral attack since she was actually assailing Rogelio and Orlando's title
to the subject lands and not any Torrens certificate oftitle over the same.

Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of the issue of ownership. In
fact, the determination as to the existence of the same is necessary in the resolution of an
action for partition, as held in Municipality of Bifzan·v. Garcia: 40

The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of
whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally
proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the
property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition
either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is_ legally prohibited. It may end, on
the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in
the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real
estate in question is in order. x x x

The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition" directed by the court. In that event [,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]
ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well
also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c] ourt after the.
Parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard Thereon, and an award for the recovery by
the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in
question. xx x. 41 ·

An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership

between the parties. 42 Unless and until the issue of co-ownership is definitively resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of an estate. 43

In view of the foregoing, petitioner' s argument that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in
entertaining the action of settlement of estate and annulment of title in a single proceeding is
clearly erroneous for the instant complaint is precisely one for judicial partition with annulment of
title and recovery of possession, filed within the confines of applicable law and jurisprudence.
Under Section 144 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),45 amending Batas Pambansa Big. 129,
the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of
the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the action herein was not merely for
partition and recovery of ownership but also for annulment of title and documents, the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence, considering that the
trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its decision, the instant petition for annulment of
judgment must necessarily fail.

Note that even if the instant action was one for annulment of title alone, without the prayer for
judicial partition, the requirement of instituting a separate special proceeding for the
determination of the status and rights of the respondents as putative heirs may be dispensed
with, in light of the fact that the parties had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and
had already presented evidence regarding the issue of heirship. 46 In Portugal v. Portugal-
Beltran, 47 the Court explained:

54
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to
Portugal's estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under
the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an
exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to
name an executor therein.

xxxx

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of
Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to
a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the
parties to the evil case - subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented
evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject · Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’
status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should
proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision
thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x. 48

Thus, in view of the clarity of respondents' complaint and the causes of action alleged therein,
as well as the fact that the trial court, in arriving at its decision, gave petitioner more than ample
opportunity to advance his claims, petitioner cannot now be permitted to allege lack of
jurisdiction just because the judgment rendered was adverse to them. To repeat, the action filed
herein is one for judicial partition and not for settlement of intestate estate. Consequently, that
respondents also prayed for the annulment of title and recovery of possession in the same
proceeding does not strip the court off of its jurisdiction for asking for 'the annulment of certain
transfers of property could very well be achieved in an action for partition.

As for petitioner's contention that the sale must be considered valid as to the heirs who
assented to the conveyance as well as their allegation of good faith, this Court does not find any
compelling reason to deviate from the ruling of the appellate court. As sufficiently found by both
courts below, the authenticity and due execution of the documents on which petitioner’s claims
are based were inadequately proven. They were undated, forged, and acknowledged before a
notary public who was not commissioned as such on the date they were executed. They were
never presented to the Register of Deeds for registration. Neither were the supposed notaries
and buyers of the subject properties presented as witnesses.

While it may be argued that Benita, one of the co-heirs to the estate, actually acknowledged the
sale of the resort, the circumstances surrounding the same militate against the fact of its
occurrence. Not only was the Deed of Sale supposedly executed by Benita undated and
unsigned by Pedro, but the document she presented purportedly evidencing her receipt of her
share in the sale, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and
Benita from a bank.

Moreover, credence must be given on the appellate court’s observations as to petitioners'

actuations insofar as the transactions alleged herein are concerned. First, they were seemingly
uncertain as to the number and/or identity of the properties bought by them. 49 In their Answer,
they gave the impression 'that· they bought both the resort and the family home and yet, during
trial, Francisco Villafria claimed they only bought the resort. In fact, it was only then that they
presented the subject Extra Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale. 50 Second, they never
presented any other document which w0uld evidence their actual payment of consideration to
the selling heirs. 51 Third, in spite of the. Blatant legal infirmities of the subject documents of
conveyance, petitioners still took possession of the properties, demolished several cottages,
and introduced permanent improvements thereon.

55
In all, the Court agrees with the appellate court: that petitioners failed to adequately
substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently verifiable proof, their claim that they
had, in fact, purchased the subject properties. The circumstances surrounding the purported
transfers cast doubt on whether they actually took place. In substantiating their claim, petitioners
relied solely on the Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale, who utterly failed to prove their
authenticity and due execution. They cannot, therefore, be permitted to claim. Absolute
ownership of the subject lands based on the same.

Neither can they be considered as innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith.
Good faith consists in the belief of title builder that the land the latter is building on is one's own
without knowledge of any defect or flaw in one's. Title. 52 However, in view of .the manifest
defects in the instruments conveying their titles, petitioners should have been placed on guard.
Yet, they still demolished several cottages and constructed improvement on the properties.
Thus, their claim of. Good faith cannot be given credence.

Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence,
may no longer be modified in any respect except to correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the
issues between the parties being deemed resolved and. laid to rest. 53 it is a fundamental
principle in our judicial system and essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice
that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge,
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. 54 Exceptions to the immutability of final judgment is allowed
only under the most extraordinary of circumstances. 55 Yet, when petitioner is given more than •
ample opportunity to be heard, unbridled access to the appellate courts, as well as unbiased
judgments rendered after a consideration of evidence presented by the parties, as in the case at
hand, the Court shall refrain from reversing the rulings of the courts below in the absence of any
showing that the same were rendered with fraud or lack of jurisdiction. ·

WHEREFORE, premises considered, .the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution, dated March 13, 2009 and April 23, 2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals for CA-
G.R. SP No. 107347, which affirmed the Judgment dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217, insofar as it conce1ns the resort
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 513 54 and No. 51355, and family home covered by
TCT No. 40807 and 40808, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161220               July 30, 2008

SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO substituted by

their heirs, namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro,
and SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and ROSIE M. BENATIRO, Respondents,
vs.
HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares,
Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud
Cuyos, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioners seeking to annul the Decision1 dated July 18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and
its Resolution2 dated November 13, 2003 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration issued
in CA-G.R. SP No. 65630.3

Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine children,
namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and
Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon,
Daanbantayan, Cebu covered by Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730,
000731, 000732, all under the name of Agatona Arrogante.

56
On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria) represented by Atty.
Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) now Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition4 for Letters of Administration, docketed as Special
Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos,
Gloria Cuyos-Talian, petitioner." The petition was opposed by Gloria’s brother, Francisco, who
was represented by Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).

In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective counsels
appeared. Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their
case. The trial court on even date issued an Order5 appointing Gloria as administratrix of the
estate. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos and including
the undivided half accruing to his spouse Agatona Arrogante who recently died is hereby issued
in favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian who may qualify as such administratrix after posting a
nominal bond of ₱1,000.00.6

Subsequently, in the Order7 dated December 12, 1975, the CFI stated that when the Intestate
Estate hearing was called on that date, respondent Gloria and her brother, oppositor Francisco,
together with their respective counsels, appeared; that Atty. Yray, Francisco’s counsel,
manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle the case amicably; that both
counsels suggested that the Clerk of Court, Atty. Andres C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be appointed
to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of
partition for the approval of the court. In the same Order, the Court of First Instance (CFI)
appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered him to make a project of partition within 30 days from
December 12, 1975 for submission and approval of the court.

In his Commissioner's Report8 dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he issued
subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause their appearance on February
28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a
conference or meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents
Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend; that per return of the service, these three heirs
could not be located in their respective given addresses; that since some of the heirs present
resided outside the province of Cebu, they decided to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.

Atty. Taneo declared in his Report that the heirs who were present:

1. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the time that
Francisco Cuyos, one of the heirs, was administering the properties of the estate
(without appointment from the Court) as having been properly and duly accounted for.

2. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the administration
of Gloria Cuyos Talian, (duly appointed by the Court) also one of the heirs as having
been properly and duly accounted for.

3. Agreed to consider all motions filed in this proceedings demanding an accounting

from Francisco Cuyos and Gloria Cuyos Talian, as having been withdrawn.

4. Agreed not to partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to first sell it for
the sum of ₱40,000.00 subject to the condition that should any of the heirs would be in a
position to buy the properties of the estate, the rest of the eight (8) heirs will just receive
only Four Thousand Pesos (₱4,000.00) each.

5. Agreed to equally divide the administration expenses to be deducted from their

respective share of ₱4,000.00.9

The Report further stated that Columba Cuyos-Benatiro (Columba), one of the heirs, informed
all those present in the conference of her desire to buy the properties of the estate, to which
everybody present agreed, and considered her the buyer. Atty. Taneo explained that the delay
in the submission of the Report was due to the request of respondent Gloria that she be given
enough time to make some consultations on what was already agreed upon by the majority of

57
the heirs; that it was only on July 11, 1976 that the letter of respondent Gloria was handed to
Atty. Taneo, with the information that respondent Gloria was amenable to what had been
agreed upon, provided she be given the sum of ₱5,570.00 as her share of the estate, since one
of properties of the estate was mortgaged to her in order to defray their father's hospitalization.

Quoting the Commissioner’s Report, the CFI issued the assailed Order10 dated December 16,
1976, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the terms and conditions agreed upon by the heirs to be in order, the
same being not contrary to law, said compromise agreement as embodied in the report of the
commissioner is hereby approved. The Court hereby orders the Administratrix to execute the
deed of sale covering all the properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos Benatiro after
the payment to her of the sum of ₱36,000.00. The said sum of money shall remain in custodia
legis, but after all the claims and administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been
paid for, the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs. 11

The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for the sum of ₱5,570.00, as the same had
been allegedly disregarded by the heirs present during the conference.

In an Order12 dated January 11, 1978, the CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new
administrator of the estate, purportedly on the basis of the motion to relieve respondent Gloria,
as it appeared that she was already residing in Central Luzon and her absence was detrimental
to the early termination of the proceedings.

On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale13 over the six parcels
of land constituting the intestate estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos in favor of Columba for a
consideration of the sum of ₱36,000.00.

Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian,
Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-
in-fact, Salud Cuyos (respondents), allegedly learned that Tax Declaration Nos. 000725,
000728, 000729, 000730, 000731 and 000732, which were all in the name of their late mother
Agatona Arrogante, were canceled and new Tax Declaration Nos., namely, 20-14129, 20-
14130, 20-141131, 20-14132, 2014133 and 20-14134, were issued in Columba’s name; and
that later on, Original Certificates of Titles covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos were issued in
favor of Columba; that some of these parcels of land were subsequently transferred to the
names of spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro, son and daughter-in-law,
respectively, of petitioners Gorgonio and Columba, for which transfer certificates of title were
subsequently issued; that they subsequently discovered the existence of the assailed CFI Order
dated December 16, 1976 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 25, 1979.

Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio Benatiro before the Commission on
the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) of the Department of Justice, which on June 13,
2000 dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.14

Salud Cuyos brought the matter for conciliation and mediation at the barangay level, but was
unsuccessful.15

On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation16 of the other heirs of Evaristo
Cuyos, namely: Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano,17 and Enrique, filed with the CA a petition for
annulment of the Order dated December 16, 1976 of the CFI of Cebu, Branch XI, in SP No. 24-
BN under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They alleged that the CFI Order dated December 16,
1976 was null and void and of no effect, the same being based on a Commissioner's Report,
which was patently false and irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due process
in claiming their share of their father's estate; that Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares executed an
affidavit, as well as the unnotarized statement of Gloria stating that no meeting ever took place
for the purpose of discussing how to dispose of the estate of their parents and that they never
received any payment from the supposed sale of their share in the inheritance; that the report
was done in close confederacy with their co-heir Columba, who stood to be benefited by the
Commissioner's recommendation, should the same be approved by the probate court; that
since the report was a falsity, any order proceeding therefrom was invalid; that the issuance of

58
the certificates of titles in favor of respondents were tainted with fraud and irregularity, since the
CFI which issued the assailed order did not appear to have been furnished a copy of the Deed
of Absolute Sale; that the CFI was not in custodia legis of the consideration of the sale, as
directed in its Order so that it could divide the remainder of the consideration equally among the
heirs after paying all the administration expenses and estate taxes; that the intestate case had
not yet been terminated as the last order found relative to the case was the appointment of Lope
as administrator vice Gloria; that they never received their corresponding share in the
inheritance; and that the act of petitioners in manifest connivance with administrator Lope
amounted to a denial of their right to the property without due process of law, thus, clearly
showing that extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of their property.

Herein petitioners contend that respondents' allegation that they discovered the assailed order
dated December 16, 1976 only in February 1998 was preposterous, as respondents were
represented by counsel in the intestate proceedings; thus, notice of Order to counsel was notice
to client; that this was only a ploy so that they could claim that they filed the petition for
annulment within the statutory period of four (4) years; that they have been in possession of the
six parcels of land since May 25, 1979 when the same was sold to them pursuant to the
assailed Order in the intestate proceedings; that no extrinsic fraud attended the issuance of the
assailed order; that Numeriano executed an affidavit in which he attested to having received his
share of the sale proceeds on May 18, 1988; that respondents were estopped from assailing the
Order dated December 16, 1976, as it had already attained the status of finality.

On July 18, 2003, the CA granted the petition and annulled the CFI order, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Order issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu Branch XI dated December 16, 1976 as
well as the Certificates of Title issued in the name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro and the
subsequent transfer of these Titles in the name of spouses Renato and Rosie Benatiro are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Further, SP Proc. Case No. 24-BN is hereby ordered
reopened and proceedings thereon be continued.18

The CA declared that the ultimate fact that was needed to be established was the veracity and
truthfulness of the Commissioner’s Report, which was used by the trial court as its basis for
issuing the assailed Order. The CA held that to arrive at an agreement, there was a need for all
the concerned parties to be present in the conference; however, such was not the scenario
since in their separate sworn statements, the compulsory heirs of the decedent attested to the
fact that no meeting or conference ever happened among them; that although under Section
3(m), Rule 133 on the Rules of Evidence, there is a presumption of regularity in the
performance of an official duty, the same may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence
to prove the contrary.

The CA noted some particulars that led it to conclude that the conference was not held
accordingly, to wit: (1) the Commissioner’s Report never mentioned the names of the heirs who
were present in the alleged conference but only the names of those who were absent, when the
names of those who were present were equally essential, if not even more important, than the
names of those who were absent; (2) the Report also failed to include any proof of conformity to
the agreement from the attendees, such as letting them sign the report to signify their consent
as regards the agreed mechanisms for the estate’s settlement; (3) there was lack or absence of
physical evidence attached to the report indicating that the respondents were indeed properly
notified about the scheduled conference. The CA then concluded that due to the absence of the
respondents' consent, the legal existence of the compromise agreement did not stand on a firm
ground.

The CA further observed that although it appeared that notice of the report was given to Atty.
Lepiten and Atty. Yray, lawyers of Gloria and Francisco Cuyos, respectively, the same cannot
be taken as notice to the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos; that a lawyer’s authority to compromise
cannot be simply presumed, since what was required was the special authority to compromise
on behalf of his client; that a compromise agreement entered into by a person not duly
authorized to do so by the principal is void and has no legal effect, citing Quiban v.
Butalid;19 that being a void compromise agreement, the assailed Order had no legal effect.

59
Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained by herein petitioners were procured
fraudulently; that the initial transfer of the properties to Columba Cuyos-Benatiro by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Lope Cuyos was clearly defective, since the compromise
agreement which served as the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale was void and had no legal
effect.

The CA elaborated that there was no showing that Columba paid the sum of ₱36,000.00 to the
administrator as consideration for the sale, except for the testimony of Numeriano Cuyos
admitting that he received his share of the proceeds but without indicating the exact amount that
he received; that even so, such alleged payment was incomplete and was not in compliance
with the trial court’s order for the administratix to execute the deed of sale covering all properties
of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro after the payment to the administratrix of the
sum of ₱36,000.00; that said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the
claims and administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the
remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs.

Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed of Sale was not even furnished the trial court
nor was said money placed under custodia legis as agreed upon; that the Certification dated
December 9, 1998 issued by the Clerk of Court of Cebu indicated that the case had not yet
been terminated and that the last Order in the special proceeding was the appointment of Lope
Cuyos as the new administrator of the estate; thus, the transfer of the parcels of land, which
included the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, cancellation of Tax Declarations and the
issuance of new Tax Declarations and Transfer Certificates of Title, all in favor of petitioners,
were tainted with fraud. Consequently, the CA concluded that the compromise agreement, the
certificates of title and the transfers made by petitioners through fraud cannot be made a legal
basis of their ownership over the properties, since to do so would result in enriching them at the
expense of the respondents; and that it was also evident that the fraud attendant in this case
was one of extrinsic fraud, since respondents were denied the opportunity to fully litigate their
case because of the scheme utilized by petitioners to assert their claim.

Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:

Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was a proper remedy
where the aggrieved party had other appropriate remedies, such as new trial, appeal, or petition
for relief, which they failed to take through their own fault.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts when it annulled the 24 year old
Commissioner's Report of the Clerk of Court - an official act which enjoys a strong presumption
of regularity - based merely on belated allegations of irregularities in the performance of said
official act.

Whether or not upon the facts as found by the Court of Appeals in this case, extrinsic fraud
existed which is a sufficient ground to annul the lower court's order under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court. 20

Subsequent to the filing of their petition, petitioners filed a Manifestation that they were in
possession of affidavits of waiver and desistance executed by the heirs of Lope Cuyos21 and
respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares22 on February 17, 2004 and December 17, 2004,
respectively. In both affidavits, the affiants stated that they had no more interest in
prosecuting/defending the case involving the settlement of the estate, since the subject estate
properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and they had already received their
share of the purchase price. Another heir, respondent Numeriano Cuyos, had also earlier
executed an Affidavit23 dated December 13, 2001, stating that the subject estate was sold to
Columba and that she had already received her share of the purchase price on May 18, 1988.
In addition, Numeriano had issued a certification24 dated May 18, 1988, which was not refuted
by any of the parties, that he had already received ₱4,000.00 in payment of his share, which
could be the reason why he refused to sign the Special Power of Attorney supposedly in favor of
Salud Cuyos for the filing of the petition with the CA.

The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed a reversible error in annulling the CFI
Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved the Commissioner’s Report embodying the

60
alleged compromise agreement entered into by the heirs of Evaristo and Agatona Arrogante
Cuyos.

We rule in the negative.

The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character25 and will not so easily and
readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47
impose strict conditions for recourse to it, viz.:

Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

Section 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief.

Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment of a final judgment
or order of an RTC may be based "only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction," jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional .ground therefor.26

An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or
collateral in character.27 Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the
prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from
presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing
party.28 Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the
judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when
extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party
from having his day in court. 29

While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, we find
that it should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence
to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is
void for lack of due process.

Clerk of Court Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the heirs
and to prepare the project of partition for submission and approval of the court. Thus, it was
incumbent upon Atty. Taneo to set a time and place for the first meeting of the heirs. In his
Commissioner’s Report, Atty. Taneo stated that he caused the appearance of all the heirs of
Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos in the place, where the subject properties were
located for settlement, by sending them subpoenae supplemented by telegrams for them to
attend the conference scheduled on February 28 to 29, 1976. It was also alleged that out of the
nine heirs, only six attended the conference; however, as the CA aptly found, the Commissioner
did not state the names of those present, but only those heirs who failed to attend the
conference, namely: respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique who, as stated in the Report, based
on the return of service, could not be located in their respective given addresses.

However, there is nothing in the records that would establish that the alleged subpoenae,
supplemented by telegrams, for the heirs to appear in the scheduled conference were indeed
sent to the heirs. In fact, respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one of the heirs, who was
presumably present in the conference, as she was not mentioned as among those absent, had
executed an affidavit30 dated December 8, 1998 attesting, to the fact that she was not called to a
meeting nor was there any telegram or notice of any meeting received by her. While Patrocenia
had executed on December 17, 2004 an Affidavit of Waiver and Desistance31 regarding this
case, it was only for the reason that the subject estate properties had been bought by their late
sister Columba, and that she had already received her corresponding share of the purchase
price, but there was nothing in the affidavit that retracted her previous statement that she was

61
not called to a meeting. Respondent Gloria also made an unnotarized statement32 that there
was no meeting held. Thus, the veracity of Atty. Taneo’s holding of a conference with the heirs
was doubtful.

Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of
arriving at an agreement regarding the estate properties, since they were not even required to
sign anything to show their attendance of the alleged meeting. In fact, the Commissioner's
Report, which embodied the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the
alleged attendees to show their consent and conformity thereto.

It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was for the heirs to arrive at a compromise
agreement over the estate of Evaristo Cuyos. Thus, it was imperative that all the heirs must be
present in the conference and be heard to afford them the opportunity to protect their interests.
Considering that no separate instrument of conveyance was executed among the heirs
embodying their alleged agreement, it was necessary that the Report be signed by the heirs to
prove that a conference among the heirs was indeed held, and that they conformed to the
agreement stated in the Report.

Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an officer of the court and a disinterested party
and that, under Rule 133, Section 3(m) of the Rules on Evidence, there is a presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.

While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that everything done by an officer in
connection with the performance of an official act in the line of his duty was legally done, such
presumption may be overcome by evidence to the contrary. We find the instances mentioned by
the CA, such as absence of the names of the persons present in the conference, absence of the
signatures of the heirs in the Commissioner's Report, as well as absence of evidence showing
that respondents were notified of the conference, to be competent proofs of irregularity that
rebut the presumption.

Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that the conference was not held
accordingly and in annulling the assailed order of the CFI.

Petitioners attached a Certification33 dated August 7, 2003 issued by the Officer In Charge

(OIC), Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch 11, to show that copies of the Commissioner’s
Report were sent to all the heirs, except Salud and Enrique, as well as to Attys. Lepiten and
Yray as enumerated in the Notice found at the lower portion of the Report with the
accompanying registry receipts.34

In Cua v. Vargas,35 in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed constructively notified of
and bound by an extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to
participate therein, when the extra-judicial settlement and partition has been duly published, we
held:

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly
states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial
settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or
issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling
all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened
in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among
heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no
knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to
deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records
of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents,
having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint.
Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition

62
made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned36 (Emphasis
supplied)

Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the heirs were indeed
notified before the compromise agreement was arrived at, which was not established, and not
whether they were notified of the Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement
afterwards.

We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to
validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the
signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite the
statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the conference, thus, effectively
depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a
violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law. We find that the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a
void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.

We are not persuaded by petitioners’ contentions that all the parties in the intestate estate
proceedings in the trial court were duly represented by respective counsels, namely, Atty.
Lepiten for petitioners-heirs and Atty. Yray for the oppositors-heirs; that when the heirs agreed
to settle the case amicably, they manifested such intention through their lawyers, as stated in
the Order dated January 30, 1973; that an heir in the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person need not hire his own lawyer, because his interest in the estate is represented by the
judicial administrator who retains the services of a counsel; that a judicial administrator is the
legal representative not only of the estate but also of the heirs, legatees, and creditors whose
interest he represents; that when the trial court issued the assailed Order dated December 16,
1976 approving the Commissioner's Report, the parties’ lawyers were duly served said copies of
the Order on December 21, 1976 as shown by the Certification37 dated August 7, 2003 of the
RTC OIC, Clerk of Court; that notices to lawyers should be considered notices to the clients,
since, if a party is represented by counsel, service of notices of orders and pleadings shall be
made upon the lawyer; that upon receipt of such order by counsels, any one of the respondents
could have taken the appropriate remedy such as a motion for reconsideration, a motion for new
trial or a petition for relief under Rule 38 at the proper time, but they failed to do so without
giving any cogent reason for such failure.

While the trial court's order approving the Commissioner’s Report was received by Attys. Yray
and Lepiten, they were the lawyers of Gloria and Francisco, respectively, but not the lawyers of
the other heirs. As can be seen from the pleadings filed before the probate court, Atty. Lepiten
was Gloria’s counsel when she filed her Petition for letters of administration, while Atty. Yray
was Francisco’s lawyer when he filed his opposition to the petition for letters of administration
and his Motion to Order administrarix Gloria to render an accounting and for the partition of the
estate. Thus, the other heirs who were not represented by counsel were not given any notice of
the judgment approving the compromise. It was only sometime in February 1998 that
respondents learned that the tax declarations covering the parcels of land, which were all in the
name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled; and new Tax Declarations were
issued in Columba’s name, and Original Certificates of Titles were subsequently issued in favor
of Columba. Thus, they could not have taken an appeal or other remedies.

Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of due process of law, it is no
judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or of any obligation. 38

In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,39 we stated the consequences of a void judgment, thus:

A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner in the case at
bar failed to appeal timely the aforementioned decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic,
Cavite, it cannot be deemed to have become final and executory. In contemplation of law, that
void decision is deemed non-existent. Thus, there was no effective or operative judgment to
appeal from. In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Sison, this Court held that:

x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be
entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given

63
to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or
binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights.
It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All
proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words,
a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there
were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same position they were in
before the trial.

Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be
said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."40 (Emphasis supplied)

The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed anytime, collaterally or in a direct action
or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,
unless barred by laches.41 Consequently, the compromise agreement and the Order approving it
must be declared null and void and set aside.

We find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents are barred from assailing the judgment
after the lapse of 24 years from its finality on ground of laches and estoppel.

Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an action for annulment of judgment
based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from its discovery and, if based on lack
of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could
or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.42

There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to
be determined according to its particular circumstances.43 The question of laches is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled
by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice.
It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly
by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice
would result.44

In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only sometime in February 1998 and
filed the petition for annulment of judgment in 2001. Moreover, we find that respondents' right to
due process is the paramount consideration in annulling the assailed order. It bears stressing
that an action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe.45

Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void, it has no legal and binding effect,
force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Hence, the
execution of the Deed of Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the
issuance of titles pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are void ab initio.
No reversible error was thus committed by the CA in annulling the judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 18, 2003 and Resolution
dated November 13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch XI, Cebu and the Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos are DIRECTED to proceed with SP
Proceedings Case No. 24-BN for the settlement of the Estate of Evaristo Cuyos.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

64
G.R. No. 156536             October 31, 2006

JOSEPH CUA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS,
EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS, respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
decision1 dated March 26, 2002, and the resolution2 dated December 17, 2002, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59869 entitled "Gloria A. Vargas, Aurora Vargas, Ramon Vargas,
Marites Vargas, Edelina Vargas and Gemma Vargas v. Joseph Cua."

The facts are as follows:

A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San Juan, Virac,
Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a notarized
Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina Vargas' heirs,
namely Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo, Rosario V.
Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and Florentino Vargas, partitioning
and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question, each one of them getting a share of 11
square meters. Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the document.
Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks.3

On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale4 was again
executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same
sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the document
and their respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner
herein.

According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas and one of respondents herein, she
came to know of the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale dated November 16, 1994
only when the original house built on the lot was being demolished sometime in May 1995.5 She
likewise claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs dated
February 4, 1994 involving the same property had been published in the Catanduanes Tribune.6

After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to petitioner, Gloria Vargas tried to redeem
the property, with the following letter7 sent to petitioner on her behalf:

29th June 1995

Mr. Joseph Cua

Capilihan, Virac, Catanduanes

Sir:

This is in behalf of my client, Ms. Aurora Vargas,8 (c/o Atty. Prospero V. Tablizo) one of
the lawful heirs of the late Paulina Vargas, original owner of Lot No. 214 of Virac,
Poblacion covered by ARP No. 031-0031 in her name.

65
 I understand that a document "Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale" was
executed by some of my client's co-heirs and alleged representatives of other co-heirs,
by virtue of which document you acquired by purchase from the signatories to the said
document, five (5) shares with a total area of fifty-five square meters of the above-
described land.

This is to serve you notice that my client shall exercise her right of legal redemption of
said five (5) shares as well as other shares which you may likewise have acquired by
purchase. And you are hereby given an option to agree to legal redemption within a
period of fifteen (15) days from your receipt hereof.

Should you fail to convey to me your agreement within said 15-day-period, proper legal
action shall be taken by my client to redeem said shares.

Thank you.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)
JUAN G. ATENCIA

When the offer to redeem was refused and after having failed to reach an amicable settlement
at the barangay level,9 Gloria Vargas filed a case for annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and
Legal Redemption of the lot with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Virac, Catanduanes against
petitioner and consigned the amount of P100,000 which is the amount of the purchase with the
Clerk of Court on May 20, 1996.10 Joining her in the action were her children with Santiago,
namely, Aurora, Ramon, Marites, Edelina and Gemma, all surnamed Vargas.

Subsequently, Carlos Gianan, Jr. and Gloria Arcilla, heirs of the alleged primitive owner of the
lot in question, Pedro Lakandula, intervened in the case.11

Respondents claimed that as co-owners of the property, they may be subrogated to the rights of
the purchaser by reimbursing him the price of the sale. They likewise alleged that the 30-day
period following a written notice by the vendors to their co-owners for them to exercise the right
of redemption of the property had not yet set in as no written notice was sent to them. In effect,
they claimed that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs with Sale were null and void and had no legal and binding effect on them.12

After trial on the merits, the MTC rendered a decision13 in favor of petitioner, dismissing the
complaint as well as the complaint-in-intervention for lack of merit, and declaring the Deed of
Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale valid and binding. The MTC upheld the sale to
petitioner because the transaction purportedly occurred after the partition of the property among
the co-owner heirs. The MTC opined that the other heirs could validly dispose of their respective
shares. Moreover, the MTC found that although there was a failure to strictly comply with the
requirements under Article 1088 of the Civil Code14 for a written notice of sale to be served upon
respondents by the vendors prior to the exercise of the former's right of redemption, this
deficiency was cured by respondents' actual knowledge of the sale, which was more than 30
days before the filing of their complaint, and their consignation of the purchase price with the
Clerk of Court, so that the latter action came too late. Finally, the MTC ruled that respondents
failed to establish by competent proof petitioner's bad faith in purchasing the portion of the
property owned by respondents' co-heirs.15

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42, of Virac, Catanduanes affirmed the MTC
decision in a judgment dated November 25, 1999. The matter was thereafter raised to the Court
of Appeals (CA).

The CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts in the assailed decision dated March 26, 2002,
declaring that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs with Sale, dated February 4, 1994 and November 15, 1994, respectively, were
void and without any legal effect. The CA held that, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court, 16 the extrajudicial settlement made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon

66
respondents considering the latter never participated in it nor did they ever signify their consent
to the same.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition for
review.

The issues are:

Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their failure
to participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when the
extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly published; and,

Assuming a published extrajudicial settlement and partition does not bind persons who
did not participate therein, whether the written notice required to be served by an heir to
his co-heirs in connection with the sale of hereditary rights to a stranger before partition
under Article 1088 of the Civil Code17 can be dispensed with when such co-heirs have
actual knowledge of the sale such that the 30-day period within which a co-heir can
exercise the right to be subrogated to the rights of a purchaser shall commence from the
date of actual knowledge of the sale.

Petitioner argues, as follows:

Firstly, the acquisition by petitioner of the subject property subsequent to the extrajudicial
partition was valid because the partition was duly published. The publication of the same
constitutes due notice to respondents and signifies their implied acquiescence thereon.
Respondents are therefore estopped from denying the validity of the partition and sale at this
late stage. Considering that the partition was valid, respondents no longer have the right to
redeem the property.

Secondly, petitioner is a possessor and builder in good faith.

Thirdly, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint because its subject matter was
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The complaint should have been filed with the RTC.

Fourthly, there was a non-joinder of indispensable parties, the co-heirs who sold their interest in
the subject property not having been impleaded by respondents.

Fifthly, the appeal to the CA should have been dismissed as it was not properly verified by
respondents. Gloria Vargas failed to indicate that she was authorized to represent the other
respondents (petitioners therein) to initiate the petition. Moreover, the verification was
inadequate because it did not state the basis of the alleged truth and/or correctness of the
material allegations in the petition.

The petition lacks merit.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly
states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial
settlement will not be bound thereby.18 It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or
issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all
interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and
not after such an agreement has already been executed19 as what happened in the instant case
with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no
knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to
deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records
of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents,
having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint.
Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition
made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.

67
This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary rights to
third persons even before the partition of the estate. The heirs who actually participated in the
execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of their pro
indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the same. Nevertheless, respondents are
given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to Article 1088 of the Civil Code. The right to
redeem was never lost because respondents were never notified in writing of the actual sale by
their co-heirs. Based on the provision, there is a need for written notice to start the period of
redemption, thus:

Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or
all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him
for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from
the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. (Emphasis
supplied.)

It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from the time that a co-heir is
notified in writing by the vendor of the actual sale. Written notice is indispensable and
mandatory,20 actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner
notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the time advance notice is given of an impending or
contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir thirty days from the time written notice of the
actual sale within which to make up his or her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the
redemption.21

Though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive
method for written notification of redemption, the method of notification remains exclusive, there
being no alternative provided by law.22 This proceeds from the very purpose of Article 1088,
which is to keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership, if, as is often the case, the
presence of outsiders be undesirable and the other heir or heirs be willing and in a position to
repurchase the share sold.23

It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written notice devolves upon the vendor co-
heirs because the latter are in the best position to know the other co-owners who, under the law,
must be notified of the sale.24 This will remove all uncertainty as to the fact of the sale, its terms
and its perfection and validity, and quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive.25 As a
result, the party notified need not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the
alienation. 26

Considering, therefore, that respondents' co-heirs failed to comply with this requirement, there is
no legal impediment to allowing respondents to redeem the shares sold to petitioner given the
former's obvious willingness and capacity to do so.

Likewise untenable is petitioner's contention that he is a builder in good faith. Good faith
consists in the belief of the builder that the land the latter is building on is one's own without
knowledge of any defect or flaw in one's title.27 Petitioner derived his title from the Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs With Sale dated November 15, 1994. He was very much aware that
not all of the heirs participated therein as it was evident on the face of the document itself.
Because the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no
particular portion of the property could have been identified as yet and delineated as the object
of the sale. This is because the alienation made by respondents' co-heirs was limited to the
portion which may be allotted to them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Despite this glaring fact, and over the protests of respondents, petitioner still constructed
improvements on the property. For this reason, his claim of good faith lacks credence.

As to the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner is estopped from raising the same for the first
time on appeal. Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings below and sought affirmative
ruling from the lower courts to uphold the validity of the sale to him of a portion of the subject
property embodied in the extrajudicial settlement among heirs. Having failed to seasonably raise
this defense, he cannot, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, be permitted to
challenge the jurisdiction of the lower court at this late stage. While it is a rule that a
jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, an exception arises where estoppel has
already supervened.

68
Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before challenging the
jurisdiction of the lower court. One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after
voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against one's opponent or
after failing to obtain such relief. The Court has, time and again, frowned upon the undesirable
practice of a party submitting a case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.28

Petitioner's fourth argument, that there is a non-joinder of indispensable parties, similarly lacks
merit. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom there can be no final
determination of an action and who is required to be joined as either plaintiff or defendant.29 The
party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is so inextricably
intertwined with the other parties that the former's legal presence as a party to the proceeding is
an absolute necessity. Hence, an indispensable party is one whose interest will be directly
affected by the court's action in the litigation. In the absence of such indispensable party, there
cannot be a resolution of the controversy before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable.30

In relation to this, it must be kept in mind that the complaint filed by respondents ultimately
prayed that they be allowed to redeem the shares in the property sold by their co-heirs.
Significantly, the right of the other heirs to sell their undivided share in the property to petitioner
is not in dispute. Respondents concede that the other heirs acted within their hereditary rights in
doing so to the effect that the latter completely and effectively relinquished their interests in the
property in favor of petitioner. Petitioner thus stepped into the shoes of the other heirs to
become a co-owner of the property with respondents. As a result, only petitioner's presence is
absolutely required for a complete and final determination of the controversy because what
respondents seek is to be subrogated to his rights as a purchaser.

Finally, petitioner contends that the petition filed by respondents with the CA should have been
dismissed because the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping appended to it were
defective, citing specifically the failure of respondent Gloria Vargas to: (1) indicate that she was
authorized to represent her co-respondents in the petition, and (2) state the basis of the alleged
truth of the allegations.

The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs
or petitioners in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient.31 Nevertheless, the
rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert
their own ultimate and legitimate objective. Strict compliance with the provisions regarding the
certificate of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded.32 Under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the
submission of such certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.33

Thus, when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the rules.34 The co-respondents of respondent Gloria Vargas in this
case were her children. In order not to defeat the ends of justice, the Court deems it sufficient
that she signed the petition on their behalf and as their representative.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

69
G.R. No. 147468            April 9, 2003

SPOUSES EDUARDO ARENAS DOMINGO & JOSEFINA CHAVEZ DOMINGO, petitioners,

vs.
LILIA MONTINOLA ROCES, CESAR ROBERTO M. ROCES, ANA INES MAGDALENA
ROCES TOLENTINO, LUIS MIGUEL M. ROCES, JOSE ANTONIO M. ROCES and MARIA
VIDA PRESENTACION ROCES, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November
22, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62473,1 as well as the resolution dated March 15, 2001, denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.2

The facts are not in dispute.

The spouses Cesar and Lilia Roces were the owners of two contiguous parcels of land located
on Arayat Street, Mandaluyong, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 57217 and
57218.3 On November 13, 1962, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) caused the
annotation of an affidavit of adverse claim on the titles alleging that the spouses have
mortgaged the same to it.4

Subsequently, GSIS wrote a letter to Cesar Roces demanding the surrender of the owner's
duplicates of titles. When Roces failed to comply, GSIS filed a petition with the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. R-1359, praying that the owner's duplicates
in Roces' possession be declared null and void and that the Register of Deeds of Pasig be
directed to issue new owner's duplicates to GSIS.5 On September 5, 1977, the Court of First
Instance issued an order granting the petition.6 The order became final and executory, and TCT
Nos. 57217 (11663) and 57218 (11664) were issued in the name of GSIS.7

Cesar Roces died intestate on January 26, 1980.8 He was survived by his widow, Lilia Roces,
and their children: Cesar Roberto Roces, Ana Ines Magdalena Roces Tolentino, Luis Miguel M.
Roces, Jose Antonio Roces and Maria Vida Presentacion Roces, all of whom are the
respondents in this case.

On July 22, 1992, Reynaldo L. Montinola, a nephew of Lilia Roces, executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication over the Arayat properties. He alleged that the properties were owned by the
spouses Cesar and Lilia Roces, both of whom died intestate, on September 13, 1987 and June
27, 1989, respectively; that the properties were acquired during the existence of their marriage;
that the spouses left no heirs except the brother of Lilia Roces, who was his father; that neither
of the spouses left any will nor any debts; and that he was the sole heir of the Roces spouses.9

On January 5, 1993, Montinola filed a petition against GSIS with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, docketed as Civil Case No. R-4743, praying for the cancellation of TCT Nos. 57217
(11663) and 57218 (11664).10 During the trial, GSIS failed to produce any document evidencing
the alleged real estate mortgage by Roces of the properties. Hence, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of Montinola, declaring the owner's duplicates of TCT No. 57217 (11663) and
57218 (11664) as null and void and ordering the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong to issue
new owner's duplicates of the said titles.11

GSIS did not appeal the aforesaid judgment; thus, the same became final and executory.
Accordingly, the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong issued TCT No. 7299 in the name of
Montinola in lieu of TCT No. 57218 (11664).12

Sometime in July 1993, Montinola executed a deed of absolute sale of the property covered by
TCT No. 7299 in favor of petitioner spouses Eduardo and Josefina Domingo.13 Thereafter, TCT
No. 7673 was issued in the names of petitioners.

Both TCT Nos. 7299 and 7673 contained the following annotation:

70
 Subject to the provision of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court with respect to the
inheritance left by the deceased SPS. CESAR ROCES & LILIA MONTINOLA.14

When respondents learned of the sale of the property to petitioners, they filed a complaint
against Montinola and petitioners with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. They argued that the
affidavit of self-adjudication was fraudulent because Montinola was not an heir of the Roces
spouses and it was not true that Lilia Roces was dead. Therefore, the affidavit of self-
adjudication, as well as the deed of absolute sale, TCT No. 7299, and TCT No. 7673, all
covering the subject property, were null and void.15

In their answer, petitioners alleged that they were buyers in good faith and that their action was
barred by estoppel and laches.16

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the

defendant Reynaldo L. Montinola who is hereby ordered to pay to the plaintiffs the
following sums:

a) P1,200,000.00 as actual damages, with interest thereon at the legal rate of six
(6) per centum per annum until fully paid;

b) Moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00;

c) Exemplary damages in the sum of P50,000.00;

d) Attorney's fees in the reasonable amount of P30,000.00; and costs.

The counterclaim of defendant spouses Eduardo and Josefina Domingo is dismissed

and the complaint against the Register of Deeds is likewise dismissed without costs.

SO ORDERED.17

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, reiterating the reliefs prayed for in their
complaint below.18 On November 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court a quo appealed from is SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. Another Decision is
hereby rendered in favor of the Appellants as follows:

1. The "Affidavit of Self-Adjudication" (Exhibit "G"), Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7299
(Exhibits "N" and "22", Domingo), the "Deed of Absolute Sale" (Exhibit "20") and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7673 (Exhibit "21") are hereby declared null and void.

2. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57218 (11664), under the names of Cesar P. Roces
and Lilia Montinola, is hereby reinstated.

3. The Appellees are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the Appellants the
amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees.

4. Appellants' claims for actual, moral and exemplary damages are dismissed.

5. The Appellee Reynaldo Montinola is hereby ordered to pay to the Appellees Spouses
Domingo the amount of P1,800,000.00, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum from the date of the Decision of this Court until the said amount is paid in full by
the said Appellee, the other cross-claims of the Appellees, inter se, are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.19

71
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,20 which was denied in a Resolution dated March
15, 2000.21 Hence this petition, raising the following errors:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ANNOTATION IN THE

TITLE REGARDING SEC. 4, RULE 74 IS AN ENCUMBRANCE WHICH DISQUALIFIES
PETITIONERS FROM BEING INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE;

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT WAS

RESPONDENTS WHO MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR REYNALDO MONTINOLA TO
PERPETUATE THE FRAUD AND, THEREFORE, THEY SHOULD BE THE ONE TO
BEAR RESULTING DAMAGE;

3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS

HAVE NO EXISTING INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY SINCE IT WAS PREVIOUSLY
MORTGAGED AND FORECLOSED BY THE G.S.I.S.; AND

4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONERS LIABLE TO

RESPONDENTS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES, THEREBY ADDING MORE INJURY TO
THEIR MISFORTUNE.22

The petition lacks merit.

It is true that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go
beyond the same, but only has to rely on the title. He is charged with notice only of such
burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. However, this principle does not apply when
the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack
of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the
status of the title of the property in litigation. One who falls within the exception can neither be
denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith.23

As stated above, the titles, namely, TCT Nos. 7299 and 7673, contained annotations which
made reference to the provisions of Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, viz:

SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at any time within two (2)
years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions
of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly
deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may
compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for
the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time of two (2)
years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not
been paid, or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful
participation payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order
for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation and
order how much and in what manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment
thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in
the preceding section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both.
Such bond and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to creditors, heirs,
or other persons for the full period of two (2) years after such
distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have been made.24

The foregoing rule clearly covers transfers of real property to any person, as long as the
deprived heir or creditor vindicates his rights within two years from the date of the settlement
and distribution of estate. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the effects of this provision are not
limited to the heirs or original distributees of the estate properties, but shall affect any transferee
of the properties.

In David v. Malay,25 it was held that the buyer of real property the title of which contain an
annotation pursuant to Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court cannot be considered innocent
purchasers for value. In the same vein, the annotation at the back of TCT No. 7299 in this case
referring to Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court was sufficient notice to petitioners of the

72
limitation on Montinola's right to dispose of the property. The presence of an irregularity which
excites or arouses suspicion should prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face thereof.26 Purchasers of registered land
are bound by the annotations found at the back of the certificate of title.27

Hence, petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith and cannot now avoid the
consequences brought about by the application of Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner's claim that respondents were guilty of laches and estoppel is likewise untenable.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The essential
elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of defendant or one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation complained of; (2) delay in asserting complainant's right after he had
knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue; (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on
which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant.28

On the other hand, estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.29

In the case at bar, only four months elapsed from the time respondents discovered Montinola's
fraudulent acts, sometime in May 1993, to the time they filed their complaint on September 6,
1993. This relatively short span of time can hardly be called unreasonable, especially
considering that respondents used this period of time to investigate the transfers of the
property.30 Delay is an indispensable requisite for a finding of estoppel by laches, but to be
barred from bringing suit on grounds of estoppel and laches, the delay must be lengthy and
unreasonable.31 No unreasonable delay can be attributed to respondents in this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 62473 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 38050           September 22, 1933

In the matter of the will of Donata Manahan. TIBURCIA MANAHAN, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ENGRACIA MANAHAN, opponent-appellant.

J. Fernando Rodrigo for appellant.

Heraclio H. del Pilar for appellee.

IMPERIAL, J.:

This is an appeal taken by the appellant herein, Engracia Manahan, from the order of the Court
of the First Instance of Bulacan dated July 1, 1932, in the matter of the will of the deceased
Donata Manahan, special proceedings No. 4162, denying her motion for reconsideration and
new trial filed on May 11, 1932.

The fact in the case are as follows:

On August 29, 1930, Tiburcia Manahan instituted special proceedings No. 4162, for the probate
of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan, who died in Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, on
August 3, 1930. The petitioner herein, niece of the testatrix, was named the executrix in said
will. The court set the date for the hearing and the necessary notice required by law was
accordingly published. On the day of the hearing of the petition, no opposition thereto was filed
and, after the evidence was presented, the court entered the decree admitting the will to probate
as prayed for. The will was probated on September 22, 1930. The trial court appointed the
herein petitioner executrix with a bond of P1,000, and likewise appointed the committed on

73
claims and appraisal, whereupon the testamentary proceedings followed the usual course. One
year and seven months later, that is, on My 11, 1932, to be exact, the appellant herein filed a
motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order admitting the will to probate be
vacated and the authenticated will declared null and void ab initio. The appellee herein, naturally
filed her opposition to the petition and, after the corresponding hearing thereof, the trial court
erred its over of denial on July 1, 1932. Engracia Manahan, under the pretext of appealing from
this last order, likewise appealed from the judgment admitting the will to probate.

In this instance, the appellant assigns seven (7) alleged errors as committed by the trial court.
Instead of discussing them one by one, we believe that, essentially, her claim narrows down to
the following: (1) That she was an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and, as
such, was entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of the will; (2) that the court,
in its order of September 22, 1930, did not really probate the will but limited itself to decreeing
its authentication; and (3) that the will is null and void ab initio on the ground that the external
formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in the
execution thereof.

The appellant's first contention is obviously unfounded and untenable. She was not entitled to
notification of the probate of the will and neither had she the right to expect it, inasmuch as she
was not an interested party, not having filed an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof.
Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the deceased's sister, did not confer on
her the right to be notified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the
appellant has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire
any successional right.

The second contention is puerile. The court really decreed the authentication and probate of the
will in question, which is the only pronouncement required of the trial court by the law in order
that the will may be considered valid and duly executed in accordance with the law. In the
phraseology of the procedural law, there is no essential difference between the authentication of
a will and the probate thereof. The words authentication and probate are synonymous in this
case. All the law requires is that the competent court declared that in the execution of the will
the essential external formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the
document, as a will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the law.

The last contention of the appellant may be refuted merely by stating that, once a will has been
authenticated and admitted to probate, questions relative to the validity thereof can no more be
raised on appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof
and it cannot impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any
separate or independent action or proceedings (sec. 625, Code of Civil Procedure;
Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil., 436; Sahagun vs. De
Gorostiza, 7 Phil., 347; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil., 393; Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil.,
676; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil., 105; Austria vs.
Ventenilla, 21 Phil., 180; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855; and Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vaño, 8
Phil., 119).

But there is another reason which prevents the appellant herein from successfully maintaining
the present action and it is that inasmuch as the proceedings followed in a testamentary case
are in rem, the trial court's decree admitting the will to probate was effective and conclusive
against her, in accordance with the provisions of section 306 of the said Code of Civil Procedure
which reads as follows:

SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. — . . . .

1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of

a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the
personal, political, or legal condition or relation of a particular person the judgment or
order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition
or relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of
administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
....

74
On the other hand, we are at a loss to understand how it was possible for the herein appellant to
appeal from the order of the trial court denying her motion for reconsideration and a new trial,
which is interlocutory in character. In view of this erroneous interpretation, she succeeded in
appealing indirectly from the order admitting the will to probate which was entered one year and
seven months ago.

Before closing, we wish to state that it is not timely to discuss herein the validity and sufficiency
of the execution of the will in question. As we have already said, this question can no more be
raised in this case on appeal. After due hearing, the court found that the will in question was
valid and effective and the order admitting it to probate, thus promulgated, should be accepted
and respected by all. The probate of the will in question now constitutes res judicata.

Wherefore, the appeal taken herein is hereby dismissed, with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, and Hull, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-23445             June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.

Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant.

Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid
and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico,
Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.

On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years
before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her.

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and
mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will.
Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal
heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct
ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.

On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto,
oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.

On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to

dismiss.1äwphï1.ñët

The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and
will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the
petition without costs.

A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal.

1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the
probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution on,
the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity,
and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the
questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of

75
the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions
of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.1

A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or
not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of
the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated.2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled
on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the
record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will
come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will.
Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the
validity of the provisions of the will in question.3 After all, there exists a justiciable controversy
crying for solution.

2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that
the will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the applicable
statute.

Reproduced hereunder is the will:

Nov. 17, 1951

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a
certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may
have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga,
Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen
hundred and fifty-one.

(Sgd.) Illegible

T/ ROSARIO NUGUID

The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious. ...

Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of
the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus —

Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void
the institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they
are not inofficious. ...

A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a

necessity. On this point Manresa comments:

La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra

siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se le
deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando privado
de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.

76
 Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento
omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su muerte corresponda la
herencia forzosa.

Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision

sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.

It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem
before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul:

To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343,
204 Pa. 484.6

The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of
divorce decree upon wife's remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate;
obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 — 38
(now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132.7

ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to

nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771,
774.8

And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now
oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them:
They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither
were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words
of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este
ordenamiento referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code.9 The one-
sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific
legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is
complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:

En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo

o en parte? No se añade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se
expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del
deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este
articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al 817. 10

The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman: —

La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion

de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion
intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la pretericion,
hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de herencia en favor de los
herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del
precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que
"anulara la institucion de heredero." ... 11

Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the

conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally
abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir — without any
other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was
written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential
interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute.
On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme,
correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:

... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de
heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el
sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos

77
 equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el
hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o
supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado
llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de otra
clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo
tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos,
sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta que sea
conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las
condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria
una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un
heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor
a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la
ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que
informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del
Derecho constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion,
desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer. 12

3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding,
"the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and
devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in
Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will — void because of
preterition — would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is
inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him
bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman,
speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the
institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and
bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren a la
institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud
de legado, mejora o donacion. 14

As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner
as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.

4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one
of preterition". 15 From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to
the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention and
disinheritance.

Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In
Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima constituye la desheredacion. La
privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the
distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other
hand, is presumed to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must
be supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits
their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one
in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the
institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition,
testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under
Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put
only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the
case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the
estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive

78
language, in commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the
one hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a
todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso. 23

5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive
their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the
heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24

This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri case
heretofore cited, viz:

But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the
children by the second marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and,
accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if adopted,
will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every
case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and
betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and
851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely meaningless
and will never have any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said
article concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a
surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing,
we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.

The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to
distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from a
special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only provision material to the
disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt
with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are separate
and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but
because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal
title of property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a
particular or special title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a
legacy. 25

The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of
the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will
before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the
result is the same. The entire will is null.

Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby
affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.

79
G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI;
AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.

Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioner.

Jose B. Guyo for private respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao
dated February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the will of his mother, Leodegaria Julian,
converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and ordering the issuance of the
corresponding notice to creditors (Special Case No. 1808). The antecedents of the appeal are
as follows:

Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at
the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six
legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B.
Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the probate of
his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In that will
Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots
(par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her
father (par. III), and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among
her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the
fruits of her properties (Par. IV).

Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was eighty-two
years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as "my
properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She
devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in
the will her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets. *

Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack
of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper
partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate
certain properties which he had received from the testatrix.

Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix Balanay,
Sr. dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and
affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an
instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights"
wherein he manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced' his
hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children. In that same instrument he confirmed
the agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal
properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.

Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and "conformation"
of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its order of June 18, 1973 "denied" the
opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave effect to the affidavit and
conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28, 1973 it appointed its branch clerk
of court as special administrator of the decedent's estate.

80
Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of June 18, 1973 on the
grounds (a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of the southern half of the
conjugal lots and (b) that she could not partition the conjugal estate by allocating portions of the
nine lots to her children. Felix Balanay, Jr., through his counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros,
opposed that motion. The lower court denied it in its order of October 15, 1973.

In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be
the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty. Cabreros), filed a
motion dated September 25, 1973 for "leave of court to withdraw probate of alleged will of
Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding." In that
motion Montaña claimed to be the lawyer not only of the petitioner but also of Felix Balanay, Sr.,
Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Montaña in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal assets or
allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed that the probate of the will be
withdrawn and that the proceeding be converted into an intestate proceeding. In another motion
of the same date he asked that the corresponding notice to creditors be issued.

Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their comments dated
October 15, 1973 manifested their conformity with the motion for the issuance of a notice to
creditors. They prayed that the will be declared void for being contrary to law and that an
intestacy be declared.

The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance of a notice
to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted the view of Attys.
Montaña and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order of February 28, 1974 it dismissed the
petition for the probate, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered
the issuance of a notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding for hearing on April 1 and
2, 1974. The lower court did not abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973. The
notice to creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao
Star in spite of petitioner's motion of April 17, 1974 that its publication be held in abeyance.

Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion dated April
15, 1974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of February 28, 1974 on the
ground that Atty. Montaña had no authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will.
Attached to the motion was a copy of a letter dated March 27, 1974 addressed to Atty. Montaña
and signed by Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B.
Pabaonon, wherein they terminated Montaña's services and informed him that his withdrawal of
the petition for the probate of the will was without their consent and was contrary to their
repeated reminder to him that their mother's will was "very sacred" to them.

Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. The lower
court denied the motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it declared the will void on
the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty.
Montaña's arguments.

The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the
will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious
legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court
assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The
probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527,
17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA
1369; Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).1äwphï1.ñët

But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will was void
and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact

81
that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will
and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of
the conjugal estate.

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in
the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not
have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792,
Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts
will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the
testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the
beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).

The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary
to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate
and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion, 38
Phil. 414). But That illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.

The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her
heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be
paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code which reads:

ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter

vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice
the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any agricultural,
industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right
granted him in this article, by ordering that the legitime of the other children to
whom the property is not assigned be paid in cash. (1056a)

The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six children (her
husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did not
assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she had
no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate may remain
undivided only for a period of twenty years. So, the provision that the estate should not be
divided during her husband's lifetime would at most be effective only for twenty years from the
date of her death unless there are compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art.
1083, Civil Code).

Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the
conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said renunciation
partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate (Art.
1060[1] Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of
the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and
maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.

Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid and
the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the
legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay,
Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the
surviving spouse.

It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will and
his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his
deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in
paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the
legitimes of the compulsory heirs.

Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of a will shall only
pass thereby, as if the testator had it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by
the will that such was his intention". Under article 930 of the Civil Code "the legacy or devise of

82
a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing
pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he
made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."

In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the
conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could
dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the
husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary
partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be
probated.

The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix instituted as heir
her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it preterited her
compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that "the preterition or
omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time
of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir; but the devises and legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the
preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were no
legacies and devises, total intestacy resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil Code).1äwphï1.ñët

In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce
intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary
rights. .

It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as
contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where the will
on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon the formal validity
of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; Guevara vs.
Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, L-23638, October 12, 1967,
21 SCRA 428).

As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament is in
itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should be distributed
in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such
desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby" (Resolution,
Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 538, 565).

To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law in the
matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554, 561).
Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a testamentary disposition
operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788
and 791, Civil Code).

Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So compelling is
the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail
that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect (Austria
vs. Reyes, L-23079, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754, 762).

As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and the
dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque vs. Estorque, L-19573, June
30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).

The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will because any
disposition therein is better than that which the law can make (Castro vs. Bustos, L-25913,
February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).

Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a notice to creditors
although no executor or regular administrator has been appointed. The record reveals that it
appointed a special administrator. A notice to creditors is not in order if only a special
administrator has been appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, in providing that

83
"immediately after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, the court shall issue a
notice requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent to file them in the office
of the clerk of said court" clearly contemplates the appointment of an executor or regular
administrator and not that of a special administrator.

It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims against the
estate and to pay such claims when duly allowed (See. 10, Rule 86 and sec. 1, Rule 88, Rules
of Court).

We also take this occasion to point out that the probate court's appointment of its branch clerk
of court as special administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice because it might
engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court are in cahoots in milking
the decedent's estate. Should the branch clerk of court commit any abuse or devastavit in the
course of his administration, the probate Judge might find it difficult to hold him to a strict
accountability. A court employee should devote his official time to his official duties and should
not have as a sideline the administration of a decedent's estate.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set aside and its
order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed. The lower court is
directed to conduct further proceedings in Special Case No. 1808 in consonance with this
opinion. Costs, against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985

SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG,
CARMELITA JUGO, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals (now intermediate Appellate Court) dated June 3, 1982, as amended by the resolution
dated August 10, 1982, declaring as null and void the devise in favor of the petitioner and the
resolution dated December 28, 1982 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament duly
signed by him at the end of the Will on page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4
thereof in the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro Leano, who in
turn, affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2
and 4 of the Will in the presence of the testator and of each other and the Notary Public. The
Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo Escareal by the testator and his three
attesting witnesses.

In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his
sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally
married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and
Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been
living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin
Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the
Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina
Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to
herein petitioner. The Will reads in part:

Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my aforementioned legal
wife, Rufina Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and daughter Carmelita, both
surnamed Jugo, whom I declare and admit to be legally and properly entitled to

84
 inherit from me; that while I have been estranged from my above-named wife for
so many years, I cannot deny that I was legally married to her or that we have
been separated up to the present for reasons and justifications known fully well
by them:

Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man and wife with one Sofia J.
Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love and affection,
for all the things which she has done for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia
J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent, did comport and
represent myself as her own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes
of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of
my aforementioned previous marriage;

On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament
of the deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan
City and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary.

On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an
opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper
influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator
was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the
testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters testamentary should not be issued to her.

On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the
testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death
on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of
the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.

The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.

On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except
that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with
Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set aside, the will in question
declared valid except the devise in favor of the appellant which is declared null
and void. The properties so devised are instead passed on in intestacy to the
appellant in equal shares, without pronouncement as to cost.

On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion for Correction of
Clerical Error" praying that the word "appellant" in the last sentence of the dispositive portion of
the decision be changed to "appellees" so as to read: "The properties so devised are instead
passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal shares, without pronouncement as to costs." The
motion was granted by the respondent court on August 10, 1982.

On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by the
respondent court in a resolution dated December 28, 1982.

The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in excess
of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo
validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor
of herein petitioner.

The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be
passed upon and decided in the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings because
the only purpose of the probate of a Will is to establish conclusively as against everyone that a
Will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator has the mental
capacity to execute the same. The petitioner further contends that even if the provisions of
paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were applicable, the declaration of
its nullity could only be made by the proper court in a separate action brought by the legal wife

85
for the specific purpose of obtaining a declaration of the nullity of the testamentary provision in
the Will in favor of the person with whom the testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or
concubinage.

The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will and Testament itself
expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and
the petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her
alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present
contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid,
et al. (17 SCRA 449) and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et al. (G.R. No. L- 39247,
June 27, 1975). Respondents also submit that the admission of the testator of the illicit
relationship between him and the petitioner put in issue the legality of the devise. We agree with
the respondents.

The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly
drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of
the petitioner null and void.

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed thus:

xxx xxx xxx

... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all
questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and
witnessing of his last Will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions
are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428)

The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of inquiry is
limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testators testamentary capacity and
the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the
only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into
the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any
devise or legacy is premature.

xxx xxx xxx

True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for
probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is
another. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary
capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution (Sumilang
v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369)

xxx xxx xxx

To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a
will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in
a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new
code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The judgment in such proceedings
determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to
pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for
example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. ... (Castaneda v.
Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)

The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate
court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the Will.

In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner
as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no
matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter

86
proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be
superfluous.

Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez (64
SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of its intrinsic provisions.

Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:

The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in
declaring it void.

We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which
are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for
probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's
authorization) the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic
validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will
might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid
v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa
L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-19996, April 30,
1965, 13 SCRA 693).

There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both
parties are agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by
law and that the testator had the mental capacity to execute his Will. The petitioner states that
she completely agrees with the respondent court when in resolving the question of whether or
not the probate court correctly denied the probate of Martin Jugo's last Will and Testament, it
ruled:

This being so, the will is declared validly drawn. (Page 4, Decision, Annex A of
Petition.)

On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals' decision in
toto.

The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentary
provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void.

We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will,
nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for
aught that appears in the record, in the record, in the event of probate or if the
court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again
before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result,
waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the
issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. (Section 2, Rule 1,
Rules of Court. Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there
exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the
proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the
court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.

Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:

The following donations shall be void:

87
 (1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at
the time of the donation;

(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in
consideration thereof;

(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by
reason of his office.

In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be
brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and
donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.

Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:

The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall

apply to testamentary provisions.

In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or almost six years before the
testator's death on July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez was his
legal wife from whom he had been estranged "for so many years." He also declared that
respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate children. In Article IV, he stated
that he had been living as man and wife with the petitioner since 1952. Testator Jugo declared
that the petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. He stated that Nepomuceno
represented Jugo as her own husband but "in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law,
I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned
previous marriage.

There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin
Jugo executed his Will. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together
in an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his death.

It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno contracted a
marriage before the Justice of the Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old
while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years
in the belief that she was legally married to the testator.

The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private
respondents:

First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the
meretricious relationship between the testator and petitioner, the devisee.

Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged

ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to
present contrary evidence.

In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given
in the will to petitioner by the deceased testator at the start of the proceedings.

Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived
with as man and wife, as already married, was an important and specific issue
brought by the parties before the trial court, and passed upon by the Court of
Appeals.

Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was
petitioner who opted to present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying
the testator. (Testimony of Petitioner, TSN of August 1, 1982, pp. 56-57 and pp.
62-64).

88
 Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence that would refute the
testimony of petitioner on the point.

Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased testator, testified at length on

the meretricious relationship of his brother and petitioner. (TSN of August
18,1975).

Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a decisive
issue right at the inception of the case.

Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling on the question.

When the court a quo held that the testator Martin Jugo and petitioner 'were
deemed guilty of adultery or concubinage', it was a finding that petitioner was not
the innocent woman she pretended to be.

xxx xxx xxx

3. If a review of the evidence must be made nonetheless, then private

respondents respectfully offer the following analysis:

FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased testator in a
town in Tarlac where neither she nor the testator ever resided. If there was
nothing to hide from, why the concealment' ? Of course, it maybe argued that the
marriage of the deceased with private respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise
done in secrecy. But it should be remembered that Rufina Gomez was already in
the family way at that time and it would seem that the parents of Martin Jugo
were not in favor of the marriage so much so that an action in court was brought
concerning the marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of August 18,
1975, pp. 29-30)

SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when they were
still both single. That would be in 1922 as Martin Jugo married respondent Rufina
Gomez on November 29, 1923 (Exh. 3). Petitioner married the testator only on
December 5, 1952. There was a space of about 30 years in between. During
those 30 years, could it be believed that she did not even wonder why Martin
Jugo did not marry her nor contact her anymore after November, 1923 - facts
that should impel her to ask her groom before she married him in secrecy,
especially so when she was already about 50 years old at the time of marriage.

THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in 1923 is by itself
conclusive demonstration that she new that the man she had openly lived for 22
years as man and wife was a married man with already two children.

FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of respondent Rufina
Gomez, is it possible that she would not have asked Martin Jugo whether or not
they were his illegitimate or legitimate children and by whom? That is un-Filipino.

FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents of the
deceased testator, is it possible that she would not have known that the mother
of private respondent Oscar Jugo and Carmelita Jugo was respondent Rufina
Gomez, considering that the houses of the parents of Martin Jugo (where he had
lived for many years) and that of respondent Rufina Gomez were just a few
meters away?

Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are unbelievable. They are, to

say the least, inherently improbable, for they are against the experience in
common life and the ordinary instincts and promptings of human nature that a
woman would not bother at all to ask the man she was going to marry whether or
not he was already married to another, knowing that her groom had children. It
would be a story that would strain human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not

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 know that Martin Jugo was already a married man in view of the irrefutable fact
that it was precisely his marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that led petitioner
to break off with the deceased during their younger years.

Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation
between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes
void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of
the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a
person with whom he had been living in concubinage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 126950 July 2, 1999

NELSON NUFABLE, SILMOR NUFABLE and AQUILINA NUFABLE, petitioners,

vs.
GENEROSA NUFABLE, VILFOR NUFABLE, MARCELO NUFABLE, and the COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision dated
November 25, 1995 of the Fifth Division1 of the Court of Appeals for allegedly being contrary to
law.

The following facts as found by the Court of Appeals are undisputed:

Edras Nufable owned at Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, consisting of 948

square meters, more or less. He died on August 9, 1965 and was survived by his
children, namely: Angel Custodio, Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed
Nufable. Upon petition for probate filed by said heirs and after due publication
and hearing, the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch II)
issued an Order dated March 30, 1966 admitting to probate the last will and
testament executed by the deceased Edras Nufable (Exhs. B, C and C-1).

On June 6, 1966 the same court issued an Order approving the Settlement of
Estate submitted by the heirs of the late ESdras Nufable, portions of which read:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

We, ANGEL CUSTODIO NUFABLE, GENEROSA NUFABLE,

VILFOR NUFABLE and MARCELO NUFABLE, all of legal ages
(sic), Filipinos, and with residence and postal address at
Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, Philippines,

— HEREBY DECLARE AND MAKE MANIFEST —

1. That on August 9, 1965, Rev. Fr. Esdras Nufable died leaving

(a) Last Will and Testament (marked Exh. G) disposing (of) his
properties or estate in favor of his four legitimate children, namely:
Angel Custodio Nufable, Generosa Nufable, Vilfor Nufable and
Marcelo Nufable;

2. That on March 30, 1966 the said Last Will and Testament was
probated by the Honorable Court, Court of First Instance of

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 Negros Oriental, and is embodied in the same order appointing an
Administratrix, Generosa Nufable, but to qualify only if she put up
a necessary bond of P1,000.00;

3. That herein legitimate children prefer not to appoint an

Administratrix, as agreed upon (by) all the heirs, because they
have no objection as to the manner of disposition of their share
made by the testator, the expenses of the proceedings and that
they have already taken possession of their respective shares in
accordance with the will;

4. That the herein heirs agreed, as they hereby agree to settle the
estate in accordance with the terms and condition of the will in the
following manner, to wit:

a) That the parcel of land situated in Poblacion Manjuyod, Negros

Oriental remains undivided for community ownership but
respecting conditions imposed therein (sic) in the will;

xxx xxx xxx

(Exhs. "E" and "E-1")

Two months earlier, or on March 15, 1966, spouses Angel Custodio and Aquilina
Nufable mortgaged the entire property located at Manjuyod to the Development
Bank of the Philippines [DBP] (Pre-trial Order, dated January 7, 1992, p. 103,
Original Records). Said mortgagors became delinquent for which reason the
mortgaged property was foreclosed by DBP on February 26, 1973 (id.).

On January 11, 1980, Nelson Nufable, the son of Angel Custodio Nufable (who
died on August 29, 1978 [TSN, Testimony of Nelson Nufable, Hearing of August
18, 1992, p. 17]), purchased said property from DBP (Exh. "1").

Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable filed with the lower court a
complaint dated July 25, 1985 "To Annul Fraudulent Transactions, to Quiet Title
and To Recover Damages' against Nelson Nufable, and wife, Silmor Nufable and
his mother Aquilina Nufable. Plaintiffs pray:

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray this Honorable Court that after trial

judgment be rendered ordering:

(a) That the said Deed of Sale (Annex "C") executed by the
Development Bank of the Philippines in favor of the defendants be
declared null and void as far as the three fourths (3/4) rights which
belongs (sic) to the plaintiffs are concerned;

(b) That the said three fourths (3/4) rights over the above parcel in
question be declared as belonging to the plaintiffs at one fourth
right to each of them;

(c) To order the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the

plaintiffs by way of actual and moral damages the amount of
P10,000.00 and another P5,000.00 as Attorney's fees, and to pay
the costs.

(d) Plus any other amount which this Court may deem just and
equitable. (p. 6, Original Records)

In their Answer, defendants contend:

91
 4. Paragraph 4 is denied, the truth being that the late Angel
Nufable was the exclusive owner of said property, that as such
owner he mortgaged the same to the Development Bank of the
Philippines on March 15, 1966, that said mortgage was foreclosed
and the DBP became the successful bidder at the auction sale,
that ownership was consolidated in the name of the DBP, and that
defendant Nelson Nufable bought said property from the DBP
thereafter. During this period, the plaintiffs never questioned the
transactions which were public, never filed any third party claim
nor attempted to redeem said property as redemptioners, and that
said Deed of Sale, Annex "B" to the complaint, is fictitious, not
being supported by any consideration; (pp. 20-21, id.)

The Deed of Sale (Annex "B"), referred to by the parties is a notarized Deed of
Sale, dated July 12, 1966 (marked as Exhibit "H") by virtue of which, spouses
Angel and Aquilina Nufable, as vendors, sold 3/4 portion of the subject property
to herein plaintiffs for and in consideration of P1,000.00 (Exh. "5").2

On November 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, the dispositive portion3 of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered declaring plaintiffs-appellants as the
rightful co-owners of the subject property and entitled to possession of 3/4
southern portion thereof; and defendant-appellee Nelson Nufable to 1/4 portion.

No award on damages.

No costs.

Defendants-appellees' Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution
of the Court of Appeals4 dated October 2, 1996.

Hence, the present petition. Petitioners raise the following grounds for the petition:

1. Honorable Court of Appeals erred in considering as controlling the probate of

the Last Will and Testament of Esdras Nufable, the probate thereof not being an
issue in this case;

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not considering the fact that the
Development Bank of the Philippines became absolute, exclusive, legal and
rightful owner of the land in question, from whom petitioner Nelson Nufable
acquired the same by purchase and that, therefore, no award can be made in
favor of private respondent unless and until the Development Bank of the
Philippines' title thereto is first declared null and void by the court.

The Court of Appeals, in its decision, stated that the trial court failed to take into consideration
the probated will of the late Esdras Nufable bequeathing the subject property to all his four
children.5 In the present petition, petitioner present the issue of whether or not the Last Will and
Testament of Esdras Nufable and its subsequent probate are pertinent and material to the
question of the right of ownership of petitioner Nelson Nufable who purchased the land in
question from, and as acquired property of, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP, for
short). They contend that the probate of the Last Will Testament and of Esdras Nufable did not
determine the ownership of the land in question as against third parties.1âwphi1.nêt

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only to passing upon the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribes by law. Said court at
this stage of the proceedings is not called to rule on the rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of
the will.6 The question of the intrinsic validity of a will normally comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated.

92
The records show that upon petition for probate filed by the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable, an
Order dated March 30, 1966 was issued by then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental,
Branch II, admitting to probate the last will and testament executed by the
decedent.7 Thereafter, on June 6, 1966, the same court approved the Settlement of Estate
submitted by the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable wherein they agreed "(T)hat the parcel land
situated in Poblacion Manjuyod, Negros Oriental remains undivided for community ownership
but respecting conditions imposed therein (sic) in the will."8 In paragraph 3 thereof, they stated
that "they have no objection as to the manner of disposition of their share made by the testator,
the expenses of the proceeding and that they have already taken possession of their respective
shares in accordance with the will." Verily, it was the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable who
agreed among themselves on the disposition of their shares. The probate court simply approved
the agreement among the heirs which approval was necessary for the validity of any disposition
of the decedent's estate.9

It should likewise be noted that the late Esdras Nufable died on August 9, 1965. When the entire
property located at Manjuyod was mortgaged on March 15, 1966 by his son Angel Custodio with
DBP, the other heirs of Esdras — namely: Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo — had already
acquired successional rights over the said property. This is so because of the principle
contained in Article 777 of the Civil Code to the effect that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, for the purpose of
transmission of rights, it does not matter whether the Last Will and Testament of the late Esdras
Nufable was admitted on March 30, 1966 or thereafter or that the Settlement of Estate was
approved on June 6, 1966 or months later. It is to be noted that the probated will of the late
Esdras Nufable specifically referred to the subject property in stating that "the land situated in
the Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, should not be divided because this must remain in
common for them, but it is necessary to allow anyone of them brothers and sisters to construct a
house therein."10 It was therefor the will of the decedent that the subject property should
undivided, although the restriction should not exceed twenty (20) years pursuant to Article
870 11 of the Civil Code.

Thus, when Angel Nufable and his spouses mortgaged the subject property to DBP on March
15, 1966, they had no right to mortgage the entire property. Angel's right over the subject
property was limited only to 1/4 pro indiviso share. As co-owner of the subject property, Angel's
right to sell, assign or mortgage is limited to that portion that may be allotted to him upon
termination of the co-ownership. Well-entrenched is the rule that a co-owner can only alienate
his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property. 12

The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Angel Custodio Nufable "had no right to mortgage
the subject property in its entirety. His right to encumber said property was limited only to
1/4 pro indiviso share of the property in question." 13 Article 493 of the Civil Code spells out the
rights or co-owners over a co-owned property. Pursuant to said Article, a co-owner shall have
full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto. He has the right to
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment. As a mere
part owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners. The prohibition is premised
on the elementary rule that "no one can give what he does not have." 14

Moreover, respondents stipulated that they were not aware of the mortgage by petitioners of the
subject property. 15 This being the case, a co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-
owned property when his share is mortgaged by another co-owner without the former's
knowledge and consent 16 as in the case at bar. It has likewise been ruled that the mortgage of
the inherited property is not binding against co-heirs who never benefitted. 17

Furthermore, the Deed of Sale dated June 17, 1966 marked as Exhibit "H" executed by spouses
Angel and Aquilina Nufable in favor of respondents Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo wherein the
former sold, ceded and transferred back to the latter the 3/4 portion of the subject property
bolsters respondents' claim that there was co-ownership. Petitioner Nelson himself claimed that
he was aware of the aforesaid Deed of Sale. 18

Anent the second ground of the petition, petitioners allege that the Development Bank of the
Philippines acquired ownership of the land in question through foreclosure, purchase and
consolidation of ownership. Petitioners argue that if petitioner Nelson Nufable had not bought

93
said land from the DBP, private respondents, in order to acquire said property, must sue said
bank for the recovery thereof, and in so doing, must allege grounds for the annulment of
documents evidencing the bank's ownership thereof. Petitioners contend that since petitioner
Nelson Nufable simply bought the whole land from the bank, they cannot be deprived of the
ownership of 3/4 without making any pronouncement as to the legality or illegality of the bank's
ownership of said land. It is argued that there was no evidence to warrant declaration of nullity
of the bank's acquisition of said land; and that neither was there a finding by the court that the
bank illegally acquired the said property.

As adverted to above, when the subject property was mortgaged by Angel Custodio, he had no
right to mortgage the entire property but only with respect to his 1/4 pro indiviso share as the
property was subject to the successional rights of the other heirs of the late Esdras. Moreover,
in case of foreclosure; a sale would result in the transmission of title to the buyer which is
feasible only if the seller can be in a position to convey ownership of the things sold. 19 And in
one case, 20 it was held that a foreclosure would be ineffective unless the mortgagor has title to
the property to be foreclosed. Therefore, as regards the remaining 3/4 pro indiviso share, the
same was held in trust for the party rightfully entitled thereto, 21 who are the private respondents
herein.

Pursuant to Article 1451 of the Civil Code, when land passes by succession to any person and
he causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by implication of
law for the benefit of the true owner. Likewise, under Article 1456 of the same Code, if property
is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. In the
case of Noel vs. Court of Appeals, 22 this Court held that "a buyer of a parcel of land at a public
auction to satisfy a judgment against a widow acquired only one-half interest on the land
corresponding to the share of the widow and the other half belonging to the heirs of her
husband became impressed with a constructive trust in behalf of said heirs."

Neither does the fact that DBP succeeded in consolidating ownership over the subject property
in its name terminate the existing co-ownership. Registration of property is not a means of
acquiring ownership. 23 When the subject property was sold to and consolidated in the name of
DBP, it being the winning bidder in the public auction, DBP merely held the 3/4 portion in trust
for the private respondents. When petitioner Nelson purchased the said property, he merely
stepped into the shoes of DBP and acquired whatever rights and obligations appertain thereto.

This brings us to the issue of whether or not the DBP should have been impleaded as party-
defendant in the case at bar. Petitioners contend that DBP was never impleaded and that due
process requires that DBP be impleaded so that it can defend its sale to petitioner Nelson
Nufable; and that it was the duty of private respondents, and not of petitioner Nelson, to implead
the bank and ask for the annulment of documents evidencing the bank's ownership of the
disputed land.

In the Rejoinder to the Reply, private respondents that the non-inclusion of DBP as a
"necessary party" was not questioned by petitioners from the time the Complaint was filed until
the case was "finished." It was only after the adverse decision by the respondent Court of
Appeals that petitioners raised the issue.

At the outset, it should be stated petitioners never raised this issue in their Answers and
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.

Nonetheless, the rule is that indispensable parties, i.e., parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action, shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants; the
inclusion as a party, i.e., persons who are not indispensable but ought to be parties if complete
relief is to be accorded as between those already parties, the court may, in its discretion,
proceed in the action without making such persons parties, and the judgment rendered therein
shall be without prejudice to the rights of such persons. 25 Proper parties, therefore, have been
described as parties whose presence in necessary in order to adjudicate the whole controversy,
but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in their absence

94
without affecting them. 26 Any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with
separately. 27

The pivotal issue to be determined is whether DBP is an indispensable party in this case.

Private respondents do not question the legality of the foreclosure of the mortgaged property
and the subsequent sale of the same to DBP. The subject property was already purchased by
petitioner Nelson from DBP and latter, by such sale, transferred its rights and obligations to the
former. Clearly, petitioners' interest in the controversy is distinct and separable from the interest
of DBP and a final determination can be had of the action despite the non-inclusion of DBP as
party-defendant. Hence, DBP, not being an indispensable party, did not have to be impleaded in
this case.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the petition for
review on certiorari is hereby DENIED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

95