swonaaoo ‘ry USS Seale Canoon Go ural Autaan she feral Mare Auta tn ura te Australian Outlook In this section, ‘Why US-Sino Strategic Competition is Good for Australia 25 Jun 2019 By Professor Benjamin Schreer ‘While Trump's new course on China creates some uncertainty for Australia, on balance Australia should welcome a long-overdue coreetion of US policy Faced with an increasingly authoritarian and assertive China, Austaia’s main ally, the United States under President Donald Trump, has shifted its strategy and poliey towards statepic competition wih Being. A bipartisan consensus has emerged in Washington tet the previous strategy, besed on the assumption thet ‘ver time China would “iberalse” and tum into a “responsible stakeholder.” has failed. The US strategic community has by-and-large accepted the View th ‘Washington — and the West wrt large — bas goten "China wrong” and that a more competitive approach is needed given Beijing's ambition to displace the United States as the leading power in the Westem Pacific. While disagreements exist in the Washington community abou the degree and focus ofthe "push os datratonioarncanralrolievnyorsinoarengosoneidoiegpser sala 1sswonaaoo ry USS Sails Canon Go ural Atala if arson Mar Auta bck,” the Trump administration's shift toward a “more openly competitive US Chine relationship suggests that US strategy may be onthe precipice ofa signifieant and poteatially longer-term, realignment." ‘This article arpucs that on balance the now era of US-China strategic compatition i positive for Australia and that ealls fora major shit in Australia's sceurty alignment and defence postare are premetut. For all is Maws, the United States under President Trump remains by far Austela's best option to balance against fan increasingly authoritarian China, Repeated essertions thet under the Trump presidency the US will vacate its positon inthe Indo-Pacific and abandon its ‘Australian ally stand on very shaky ground. They are based onthe lawed assumption that Washington's decline is structurally preordained. They also overlook (China's many weaknesses and America's residual strengths. China is stil far fom overtaking the United States asthe most powerful state in the intermational system. Indeed, in terms of available espurecs of national power, the US arguably retains a sizeable advantage over China. Moreover, Chinas growing ‘economic influence over some smaller Indo-Pacific nations hss not tanslated int those counties switching their security alignments away from the US towards China, farther limiting Bejing’s ability to foster a Sino~enti security order. Instead, demand fora US-led regional security order hus remained high and most counties, including Australia, have continued to “balance” against China despite closer economic tes with Bejing. ‘Since Trump took office in early 2017, the US has shifted the goalposts ofits China policy towards greater competition with Bejing inthe ideological ‘canomic, technological and military domains, Combining elements of eollestive balancing and comiprenensive pressure, Washington has begun to push back against Being, This trend i ikely to continue int the future a its a diet expression of great power rivalry and the struggle for hegemony in East Asis, and ‘since it has bipartisan support. As John Lee has noted: ‘The deepening tension isn’t a transient phase in USChina relations. China has long treated America a a comprehensive rival .. The US has fally accepted that reality, and that pessimistic conversion is deep and enduring. The administrations turn against China is pethaps the only policy of Teumy that the Democrats overwhelmingly support. or Australi, the shift in US China policy entails both risks and benefits ‘The main risk for Australia stat the Trump administration is conftontational towards China without a comprehensive, sustainable and long-term stategy for ‘competition which includes and reassucs allies. For instance, while the US government has emphasised the ideological component of US-Sino competion, the messaging has been far ftom persuasive. In paceulr, recent suggestions by a senior US State Department offical about a “clash of civilizations” between the US and China have been unhelpful and were rejected by senior Australian government representatives such as Foreign Minister Marise Payne. Much more, “rump Hime a enn he vy conser union of US ender nnd Pac: Res Han spor ut om of Ton cies hve amounted to an “sbcication from what has been 2 positon of leadership in developing the rales and arrangements atthe her of any word order. Tea uneesked thi approach coulda the US onto a path tars becoming an "tnexcena superpower" nun, xpiving Austala of fe tadtonl ‘major ally and indeed vindicating proponents ofa radically new Australian security and defence policy However, on balance the US push back ogainst China is positive for Australia's interests. As made clear in Australia's 2016 defence white paper and the 2017 reign policy whitepaper, the prevention of a Sino-cetrc regional order and continued US leadership inthe Indo-Pacific emain key to safeguarding the nation's interests. Before Trump took office, many inthe Australian stratepc community eticised his predecessor Barack Obama for failing to employ a ‘ougher response against China's assertiveness. Washington has now shifted ts ger inthis direction. Moreover, the US administration's FOIP steyy, shared by like-minded counties such as Aust, Japan and India, provides conceptual framework to work towards maintaining Key clements oF a sable, rules bised Indo-Pacific order, eines oan oninainatniomonton gender mtat 2s“Moreover, the bipartisan consensus in Washington about the need to push back against China is postive from an Australian view, ast provides a level of consistency of US strategic engagement in the region going forward. Indeed, the US Congress and the foreign and security bureaucracy are playing a major role ina more sustained posh-back against China. They have also formed an eiportant conectve for some of Trurp's counterproduetive impulses in dealing with allies and partners Tn particular, congressional drive has been eiieal for initiatives towards a more multidimensional and mulllateral US approach to ‘countering China. Aside fom te aforementioned ARIA and greater support for Tewan, this hus included eongressocaliiiatvesto shoring up bilateral alliances with Japan and South Kores. Congress alko passed the Hetter Usisation of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) Act, signed into law by Trump in October 2018, to create now agency ‘0 lend to developing counties in Asia and Alfie. Seen as a competitor 9 China's “Bst ané Road Iititive™ BRD, the Build Act paved the way for tilteral cooperation with Japan nd Australia, which had aimed atalematve investment schemes to counter BRI, AS @ result, the US, Australia and Japan signed 2 Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding in Novernber 2018 to opeationalise the Trilateral Partnership for Inifasiruciue Investment inthe Indo-Pacific anaounced in July thal year. The Way Ahcad While Trump's new course on China creates some uncertainty for Australia, on balance it should welcome a long-overdue correction of US policy. At present, a radically new Austalian defence policy inform of “armed neutrlty” or true “defence self-reliance” is not required. That sad, the new phase in 'S-Sino stratogic competition will make certain cost avoidance stratgies in Canbotta more difficult as there is "no “waiting this out” for Australia” While Rory Modealf has argued that Australia “should maintain a distinction between its sovereign pushback against PRC interference and the more comprehensive US-China strategic competition that is developing,” it shard to see how this can be achieved given that Australia's competition with China also involves norative, economic and security dimensions which go beyond Chinese interference tactics. Instead, out of ts own national interest Canberra is likely to side with ‘Washington more often against Bejing, ether indiretly though ational polices or dieztly in support of US initiatives, ‘As well n the era of intensified US-Sino competition Australia wil e asked to increase its contribution to US efforts designed to restrain Chinese behaviour, as well as intensity strategic engagements with other regional partners. Just as Australia looks to the US for support against China's increasing strategie reach in ‘he South Paci, the United States expects Australian assistance in contingencies in the SCS or Northeast Asia, for instance ina US-Sino criss over Taiwan. ‘ome analysts have warned agsisl supporting Taiwan since Australia should not become “embroiled” in “any Sino-American war in East Asia” or because in their view Taiwan i lost cause. Yet, as Paul Dib and others have pointed out, not ony is it in Australia's interest to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression, in times of greater US-Sino competition Australian defence planning in general also needs to prepare mote actively fr joint miliary contingencies ‘with th US ally in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Ste, the Kofean Peninsula, the Indian Ocean andthe South Pacific. Australia should thus suppoct the development of a more insltuionalised US alliance in order to siengthen deterence and joint military operations ina more contested Asis. Cantera also needs to further strengthen regional multilateral and bilateral security initiatives. For example, the security dialogue between Australi, the US, India and Japan — the “Quad” — while often cntcised as either an “alliance against China” or an ineffective “talk shop” has already led 1 “unprecedented levels of information and intalligence exchanges, personnel interactions, interoperable equipment and habits of cooperation." Finally, Australia will need 9 ‘engage its US ally on a joint sttatogy for a comprehensive and long-term competition with China, ineluding on how to prepare the Australian pubic for whet ‘could be significant poly changes. I this content, Canberra should also be prepate to end its efusal to partiipate in bilateral or muliateral freedom of suvigation exercises (FONOPS) inthe SCS to challenge Beijing's sovereignty claims. While no panacea against China's ussetiveness in Soueast Asia isl ‘Australia's increased naval presence and purtcipation in FONOPS in the SCS are important to demonstrate resolve as part of collective balancing effort. inthis ‘ew era of prolonged and comprehensive competition wits China, Australia nceds tobe willing to pay a grater premium for America's continued lesdership in ne Indo-Pacifi which sill remains its best option for continued security and prosswznasoo ‘ry USS Seale Canoon Go ural Aaa he feral Mare Auta tn our ate Professor Benjamin Schreers professor of Strategic Studies and head ofthe Department of Security Studies and Criminology (SSC) at Macquarie University, Sues This article isan extract from Sehree article i the Australian Journal of International Afar titled “Why US-Sino Strategie Competition is Good for Australia" 11s republished with permission. Related Articles SEE) Australia and the UN Human Rights Counell: Principles or Opportunism? 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