AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS

G.R. No. 111230 September 30, 1994

ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., petitioners, 

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MORONG, BATAAN, respondents.

Alfonzo M. Cruz Law Offices for petitioners.

PUNO, J.:

The 1987 Constitution is borne of the conviction that people power can be trusted to check excesses of government.
One of the means by which people power can be exercised is thru initiatives where local ordinances and resolutions
can be enacted or repealed. An effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected.

In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993,   the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan agreed to the
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inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act
No. 7227.

On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition   with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang
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Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The petition states:

I. Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 ng
Sangguniang Bayan para sa pag-anib ng Morong sa SSEZ na walang kondisyon.

II. Palitan ito ng isang Pambayang Kapasiyahan na aanib lamang ang Morong sa SSEZ kung ang
mga sumusunod na kondisyones ay ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa para sa kapakanan at
interes ng Morong at Bataan:

(A). Ibalik sa Bataan ang "Virgin Forests" — isang bundok na hindi nagagalw at
punong-puno ng malalaking punong-kahoy at iba'-ibang halaman.

(B) Ihiwalay ang Grande Island sa SSEZ at ibalik ito sa Bataan.

(K). Isama ang mga lupain ng Bataan na nakapaloob sa SBMA sa pagkukuenta ng

salaping ipinagkakaloob ng pamahalaang national o "Internal Revenue Allotment"
(IRA) sa Morong, Hermosa at sa Lalawigan.

(D). Payagang magtatag rin ng sariling "special economic zones" ang bawat bayan
ng Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan.

(E). Ibase sa laki ng kanya-kanyang lupa ang pamamahagi ng kikitain ng SBMA.

(G). Ibase rin ang alokasyon ng pagbibigay ng trabaho sa laki ng nasabing mga lupa.

(H). Pabayaang bukas ang pinto ng SBMA na nasa Morong ng 24 na oras at bukod
dito sa magbukas pa ng pinto sa hangganan naman ng Morong at Hermosa upang
magkaroon ng pagkakataong umunlad rin ang mga nasabing bayan, pati na rin ng
iba pang bayan ng Bataan.
 (I). Tapusin ang pagkokonkreto ng mga daang Morong-Tala-Orani at Morong-Tasig-
Dinalupihan para sa kabutihan ng mga taga-Bataan at tuloy makatulong sa
pangangalaga ng mga kabundukan.

(J). Magkaroon ng sapat na representasyon sa pamunuan ng SBMA ang Morong,

Hermosa at Bataan.

The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within thirty (30) days after its submission.
Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991.   They started to
3

solicit the required number of signatures   to cause the repeal of said resolution. Unknown to the petitioners,
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however, the Honorable Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng
Morong, wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of " . . . the
petition for a local initiative and/or referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter
productive and futility."   We quote the letter, viz:
5

The Executive Director

COMELEC
Intramuros, Metro Manila

S i r:

In view of the petition filed by a group of proponents headed by Gov. Enrique T. Garcia, relative to
the conduct of a local initiative and/or referendum for the annulment of Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.
10, Serye 1993, may we respectfully request to deny the petition referred thereto considering the
issues raised by the proponents were favorably acted upon and endorsed to Congress and other
government agencies by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong.

For your information and guidance, we are enumerating hereunder the issues raised by the
petitioners with the corresponding actions undertaken by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, to wit:

ISSUES RAISED BY PROPONENTS

I. Pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye ng taong 1993.

II. Palitan ito ng isang Kapasyahang Pag-anib sa SSEZ kung:

a) Ibabalik sa Morong ang pag-aaring Grande Island, kabundukan at Naval

Reservation;

b) Ibase sa aring Lupa ng LGU ang kikitain at mapapasok na manggagawa nila sa

SSEZ;

c) Isama ang nasabing lupa sa pagkukuwenta ng "IRA" ng Morong, Hermosa at

Dinalupihan;

d) Makapagtatag ng sariling "economic zones" ang Morong, Hermosa at

Dinalupihan;

e) Pabayaan bukas ang pinto ng Morong patungong SSEZ at magbukas ng

dalawang (2) pinto pa;

(f) Konkretohin ang daang Morong papunta sa Orani at Dinalupihan;

g) Pumili ng SBMA Chairman na taga-ibang lugar.

ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SB OF MORONG

 1. By virtue of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion Development Act of 1992, all
actions of LGU's correlating on the above issues are merely recommendatory in nature when such
provisions were already embodied in the statute.

2. Corollary to the notion, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong passed and approved Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines to amend certain
provisions of R.A. 7227, wherein it reasserted its position embodied in Pambayan Kapasyahan Blg.
08 and Blg. 12, Serye ng taong 1992, (Attached and marked as Annex "A:) which tackled the same
issues raised by the petitioners particularly items a), b), c), e), and g).

3. Item d) is already acted upon by BCDA Chairman Arsenio Bartolome III in its letter to His
Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos, dated May 7, 1993 (Attached and marked as Annex "B") with
clarifying letter from BCDA Vice-Chairman Rogelio L. Singson regarding lands on Mabayo and
Minanga dated June 3, 1993 that only lands inside the perimeter fence are envisioned to be part of
SBMA.

4. Item f), President Ramos in his marginal note over the letter request of Morong, Bataan Mayor
Bienvenido L. Vicedo, the Sangguniang Bayan and Congressman Payumo, when the Resolution of
Concurrence to SBMA was submitted last April 6, 1993, order the priority implementation of
completion of Morong-Dinalupihan (Tasik-Road) Project, including the Morong-Poblacion-Mabayo
Road to DPWH. (Attached and marked as Annex "C").

Based on the foregoing facts, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong had accommodated the clamor of
the petitioners in accordance with its limited powers over the issues. However, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong cannot afford to wait for amendments by Congress of R.A. 7227 that will perhaps
drag for several months or years, thereby delaying the development of Morong, Bataan.

Henceforth, we respectfully reiterate our request to deny the petition for a local initiative and/or
referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility.

Thank you and more power.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDILBERTO M. DE LEON

Mun. Vice Mayor/Presiding Officer

In its session of July 6, 1993, the COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the
ground that its subject is "merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance."   On July 13,
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1993, the COMELEC en banc further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Benjamin N.
Casiano, to hold action on the authentication of signatures being gathered by petitioners.  7

These COMELEC resolutions are sought to be set aside in the petition at bench. The petition makes the following
submissions:

5. This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus.

5.01 For certiorari, conformably to Sec. 7, Art. IX of the Constitution, to set aside Comelec
Resolution Nos. 93-1676 and 93-1623 (Annexes "E" and "H") insofar as it disallowed the initiation of
a local initiative to annul PAMBAYANG KAPASYAHAN BLG. 10, SERYE 1993 including the
gathering and authentication of the required number of signatures in support thereof.

5.01.1 As an administrative agency, respondent Comelec is bound to observe due

process in the conduct of its proceedings. Here, the subject resolutions, Annexes "E"
and "H", were issued ex parte and without affording petitioners and the other
proponents of the initiative the opportunity to be heard thereon. More importantly,
these resolutions and/or directives were issued with grave abuse of discretion. A
 Sangguniang Bayan resolution being an act of the aforementioned local legislative
assembly is undoubtedly a proper subject of initiative. (Sec. 32, Art. VI, Constitution)

5.02 For mandamus, pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court, to command the respondent
Comelec to schedule forthwith the continuation of the signing of the petition, and should the required
number of signatures be obtained, set a date for the initiative within forty-five (45) days thereof.

5.02.1 Respondent Comelec's authority in the matter of local initiative is merely

ministerial. It is duty-bound to supervise the gathering of signatures in support of the
petition and to set the date of the initiative once the required number of signatures
are obtained.

If the required number of signatures is obtained, the Comelec shall

then set a date for the initiative during which the proposition shall be
submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit
concerned for their approval within sixty (60) days from the date of
certification by the Comelec, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in
case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative
shall then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall
be certified and proclaimed by the Comelec. (Sec. 22, par. (h) R.A.
7160.

Respondent COMELEC opposed the petition. Through the Solicitor General, it contends that under the
Local Government Code of 1991, a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiative. The same stance is
assumed by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan of Morong.  8

We grant the petition.

The case at bench is of transcendental significance because it involves an issue of first impression — delineating
the extent of the all important original power of the people to legislate. Father Bernas explains that "in republican
systems, there are generally two kinds of legislative power, original and derivative. Original legislative power is
possessed by the sovereign people. Derivative legislative power is that which has been delegated by the sovereign
people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the people." 9

Our constitutional odyssey shows that up until 1987, our people have not directly exercised legislative power, both
the constituent power to amend or revise the Constitution or the power to enact ordinary laws. Section 1, Article VI
of the 1935 Constitution delegated legislative power to Congress, thus "the legislative power shall be vested in a
Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." Similarly, section 1,
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, provided that "the Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang
Pambansa."  10

Implicit in the set up was the trust of the people in Congress to enact laws for their benefit. So total was their trust
that the people did not reserve for themselves the same power to make or repeal laws. The omission was to prove
unfortunate. In the 70's and until the EDSA revolution, the legislature failed the expectations of the people especially
when former President Marcos wielded lawmaking powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Laws
which could have bridled the nation's downslide from democracy to authoritarianism to anarchy never saw the light
of day.

In February 1986, the people took a direct hand in the determination of their destiny. They toppled down the
government of former President Marcos in a historic bloodless revolution. The Constitution was rewritten to embody
the lessons of their sad experience. One of the lessons is the folly of completely surrendering the power to make
laws to the legislature. The result, in the perceptive words of Father Bernas, is that the new Constitution became
"less trusting of public officials than the American Constitution." 
11

For the first time in 1987, the system of people's initiative was thus installed in our fundamental law. To be sure, it
was a late awakening. As early as 1898, the state of South Dakota has adopted initiative and referendum in its
constitution   and many states have followed suit.   In any event, the framers of our 1987 Constitution realized the
12 13

value of initiative and referendum as an ultimate weapon of the people to negate government malfeasance and
misfeasance and they put in place an overarching system. Thus, thru an initiative, the people were given the power
to amend the Constitution itself. Sec. 2 of Art. XVII provides: "Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein." Likewise, thru an initiative, the people were also endowed with the power to enact or
reject any act or law by congress or local legislative body. Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI provide:

Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provisions on initiative and referendum.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum,
and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve
or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the
registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters thereto.

The COMELEC was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an initiative and referendum.   Worthwhile noting is the scope of coverage of an initiative or
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referendum as delineated by section 32 Art. VI of the Constitution, supra — any act or law passed by

Congress or local legislative body.

In due time, Congress respondent to the mandate of the Constitution. It enacted laws to put into operation the
constitutionalized concept of initiative and referendum. On August 4, 1989, it approved Republic Act No. 6735
entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Liberally
borrowed from American laws,   R.A. No. 6735, among others, spelled out the requirements   for the exercise of the
15 16

power of initiative and referendum, the conduct of national initiative and referendum;   procedure of local initiative
17

and referendum;   and their limitations.   Then came Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local
18 19

Government Code of 1991. Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Code governed the conduct of local initiative and
referendum.

In light of this legal backdrop, the essential issue to be resolved in the case at bench is whether Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of an initiative.
Respondents take the negative stance as they contend that under the Local Government Code of 1991 only an
ordinance can be the subject of initiative. They rely on section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which provides: "Local Initiative Defined. — Local initiative is the legal process whereby
the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance."

We reject respondents' narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it will collide with the Constitution and
will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 on
initiative and referendum.

The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative.
Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: "The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ."
An act includes a resolution. Black   defines an act as "an expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something
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done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments,resolves,
awards, and determinations . . . ." It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of
the constitution.   In line with this postulate, we held in In Re Guarina that "if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the
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meaning of the legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or
more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though
it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language used."  22
The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented
by Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Thus, its section 3(a) expressly includes resolutions as subjects of
initiatives on local legislations, viz:

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean;

(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution
or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to

the Constitution.

a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national

legislation; and

a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a

regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution, or ordinance.
(Emphasis ours)

Similarly, its section 16 states: "Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies — Any proposition on ordinance
or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be
repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date
therefrom . . . ." On January 16, 1991, the COMELEC also promulgated its Resolution No. 2300 entitled "In
Re Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and
Referendum, on National and Local Laws." It likewise recognized resolutions as proper subjects of
initiatives. Section 5, Article I of its Rules states: "Scope of power of initiative — The power of initiative may
be exercised to amend the Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a regional, provincial, city,
municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance."

There can hardly be any doubt that when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 it intend resolutions to be proper
subjects of local initiatives. The debates confirm this intent. We quote some of the interpellations when the
Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505
were being considered in the House of Representatives, viz:

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman from Camarines Sur is recognized.

MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions between Senate
Bill No. 17 and the consolidated House Bill No. 21505 which refers to the system providing for the
initiative ad referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and the House
versions, so both versions are totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically provided for local
initiative and referendum and the House of Representatives correctly provided for initiative and
referendum on the Constitution and on national legislation.

I move that we approve the consolidated bill.

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the Minority Floor Leader?

MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few questions?

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor say?

 MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman will please proceed.

MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference in the two bills was that in the Senate
version there was a provision for local initiative and referendum, whereas the House version has
none.

MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provided purely for local initiative and referendum, whereas
in the House version, we provided purely for national and constitutional legislation.

MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the two provisions were incorporated.?

MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative and referendum both in the
constitutional amendment and national legislation.

MR. ROCO. That is correct.

MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal resolutions?

MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.

MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance with the provision of the
Constitution whereby it mandates this Congress to enact the enabling law, so that we shall have a
system which can be done every five years. Is it five years in the provision of the Constitution?

MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional amendments to the 1987 Constitution, it
is every five years. 
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Contrary to the submission of the respondents, the subsequent enactment of the local Government Code of 1991
which also dealt with local initiative did not change the scope of its coverage. More specifically, the Code did not
limit the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX Book I of the Code cited by
respondents merely defines the concept of local initiative as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a
local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the
subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local initiative. It is section 124 of the same Code which does. It states:

Sec. 124. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more
than once a year.

(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the
Sanggunians to enact.

x x x           x x x          x x x

This provision clearly does not limit the application of local initiatives to ordinances, but to all "subjects or
matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact," which undoubtedly includes
resolutions. This interpretation is supported by Section 125 of the same Code which provides: "Limitations
upon Sanggunians. — Any proposition or ordinance approved through the system of initiative and
referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended by the sanggunian concerned
within six (6) months from the date of the approval thereof . . . ." Certainly, the inclusion of the
wordproposition is inconsistent with respondents' thesis that only ordinances can be the subject of local
initiatives. The principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, former Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
espouses the same view. In his commentaries on the said law, he wrote, viz:  24
 4. Subject Matter Of Initiative. All sorts of measures may be the subject of direct initiative for as long
as these are within the competence of the Sanggunian to enact. In California, for example, direct
initiatives were proposed to enact a fishing control bill, to regulate the practice of chiropractors, to
levy a special tax to secure a new library, to grant a franchise to a railroad company, and to prevent
discrimination in the sale of housing and similar bills.

Direct initiative on the local lever may, therefore, cover all kinds of measures provided that these are
within the power of the local Sanggunians to enact, subject of course to the other requisites
enumerated in the Section.

5. Form of Initiative. Regarding the form of the measure, the section speaks only of "ordinance,"
although the measure may be contained in a resolution. If the registered voters can propose
ordinances, why are they not allowed to propose resolutions too? Moreover, the wording of Sec.
125, below, which deals not only with ordinances but with "any proposition" implies the inclusion of
resolutions. The discussion hereunder will also show support for the conclusion that resolutions may
indeed be the subject of local initiative.

We note that respondents do not give any reason why resolutions should not be the subject of a local initiative. In
truth, the reason lies in the well known distinction between a resolution and an ordinance — i.e., that a resolution is
used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which is to have only a temporary effect while an
ordinance is intended to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or things in general.   Thus,
25

resolutions are not normally subject to referendum for it may destroy the efficiency necessary to the successful
administration of the business affairs of a city. 
26

In the case at bench, however, it can not be argued that the subject matter of the resolution of the municipality of
Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of conduct or government.
The inclusion of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far reaching implications in the
governance of its people. This is apparent from a reading of section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227 entitled "An Act
Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion
and Development Authority For This Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." to wit:

Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. — Subject to the concurrence by resolution of
the sangguniang panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the sangguniang bayan of the
Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economic and
Free-port Zone consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of
Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced,
covered, and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United
States of America as amended, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong
and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, hereinafter referred to a as the Subic Special Economic Zone
whose metes and bounds shall be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the
Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act, each local government unit shall
submit its resolution of concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone to the Office of the
President. Thereafter, the President of the Philippines shall issue a proclamation defining the metes
and bounds of the zone as provided herein.

The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies:

(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and the
pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be
developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate
employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign
investments;

(b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs
territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into a exported out of the Subic
Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw
material, capital and equipment. However, exportations or removal of goods from the territory of the
 Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs
duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines:

(c) The provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, no taxes,
local and national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone. In lieu of paying taxes,
three percent (3%) of the of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the
Subic Special Economic Zone shall be remitted to the National Government one percent (1%) each
to the local government units affected by the declaration of the zone in proportion to their population
area, and other factors. In addition, there is hereby established a development fund of one percent
(1%) of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special
Economic Zone to be utilized for the development of municipalities outside the City of Olongapo and
the Municipality of Subic, and other municipalities contiguous to the base areas.

In case of conflict between national and local laws with respect to tax exemption privileges in the
Subic Special Economic Zone, the same shall be resolved in favor of the latter;

(d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free markets for foreign exchange, gold,
securities and futures shall be allowed and maintained in the Subic Special Economic Zone;

(e) The Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, shall supervise and regulate the operations of
banks and other financial institutions within the Subic Special Economic Zone;

(f) Banking and finance shall be liberalized with the establishment of foreign currency depository
units of local commercial banks and offshore banking units of foreign banks with minimum Central
Bank regulation;

(g) Any investor within the Subic Special Economic Zone whose continuing investment shall not be
less than Two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), his/her spouse and dependent children
under twenty-one (21) years of age, shall be granted permanent resident status within the Subic
Special Economic Zone. They shall have freedom of ingress and egress to and from the Subic
Special Economic Zone without any need of special authorization from the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority referred to in Section 13 of this Act may also
issue working visas renewable every two (2) years to foreign executives and other aliens possessing
highly-technical skills which no Filipino within the Subic Special Economic Zone possesses, as
certified by the Department of Labor and Employment. The names of aliens granted permanent
residence status and working visas by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority shall be reported to the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation within thirty (30) days after issuance thereof.

(h) The defense of the zone and the security of its perimeters shall be the responsibility of the
National Government in coordination with the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. The Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority shall provide and establish its own internal security and fire fighting forces;
and

(i) Except as herein provided, the local government units comprising the Subic Special Economic
Zone shall retain their basic autonomy and identity. The cities shall be governed by their respective
charters and the municipalities shall operate and function in accordance with Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

In relation thereto, section 14 of the same law provides:

Sec. 14. Relationship with the Conversion Authority and the Local Government Units. —

(a) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, the Subic
Authority shall exercise administrative powers, rule-making and disbursement of funds over the
Subic Special Economic Zone in conformity with the oversight function of the Conversion Authority.
 (b) In case of conflict between the Subic Authority and the local government units concerned on
matters affecting the Subic Special Economic zone other than defense and security, the decision of
the Subic Authority shall prevail.

Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and economic existence of the
people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the Subic Special Economic Zone, it is but logical
to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative. It is not material that the decision of the municipality of
Morong for the inclusion came in the form of a resolution for what matters is its enduring effect on the
welfare of the people of Morong.

Finally, it cannot be gained that petitioners were denied due process. They were not furnished a copy of the letter-
petition of Vice Mayor Edilberto M. de Leon to the respondent COMELEC praying for denial of their petition for a
local initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. Worse, respondent COMELEC granted the petition
without affording petitioners any fair opportunity to oppose it. This procedural lapse is fatal for at stake is not an
ordinary right but the sanctity of the sovereignty of the people, their original power to legislate through the process of
initiative. Ours is the duty to listen and the obligation to obey the voice of the people. It could well be the only force
that could foil the mushrooming abuses in government.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-1623 dated July 6, 1993 and
Resolution 93-1676 dated July 13, 1993 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AMENDMENT AND REVISION

G.R. No. 174153             October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED

VOTERS,Petitioners, 
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x--------------------------------------------------------x

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.

x ------------------------------------------------------ x

ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA,
JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.

x------------------------------------------------------ x 

ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor. 

x--------------------------------------------------------x

BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its
Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary General Joel
Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS
FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion
Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA
WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson
Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay,
JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the
Solidarity of Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human
Rights,Intervenors.

x--------------------------------------------------------x 

LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL,Intervenors.

x--------------------------------------------------------x

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor. 

x ------------------------------------------------------- x 

TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor. 

x---------------------------------------------------------x

LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.

x ------------------------------------------------------- x 
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO,
MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and
AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors. 

x ------------------------------------------------------- x

RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, Intervenors. 

x -------------------------------------------------------- x

PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F.
BALAIS, Intervenors.

x -------------------------------------------------------- x 

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor. 

x ------------------------------------------------------- x

SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.

x ------------------------------------------------------- x

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and
RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.

x -------------------------------------------------------- x 

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors. 

x --------------------------------------------------------x 

SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY
MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors. 

x -----------------------------------------------------x 

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors. 

x -----------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 174299             October 25, 2006

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe,, Respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.

Antecedent Facts

On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino
Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the
1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735"). 

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per
centum(3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. 

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled
"Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their
petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER? 

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in
the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.7

The Ruling of the COMELEC

On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for
lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's
ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.9

In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside
the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative
petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims
that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the
"will of the sovereign people."

In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners
to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for
"entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the
Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners, urging the
Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735
and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative." 

Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's
petition. The supporting intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary view and maintain
that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing
to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere
amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject. 

The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving the parties'
memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.

The Issues

The petitions raise the following issues:

1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and 

3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's
petition. 

The Ruling of the Court

There is no merit to the petition. 

The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a
people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based
alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following
the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections. 

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal
by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x
x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:

MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional
amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people
when they are asked to sign? 
 MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign.
Now, who prepares the draft?

MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and they are
asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional amendment. 

MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment"
should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that
"before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should
sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature." 

The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First,
the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. 

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people
who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains
the full text of the proposed amendments. 

The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so
attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several
millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it
is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the
full text of the proposed amendments before signing. 

The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of people's initiative from the United States where
various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States15 which allow initiative petitions, the
unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before
they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments.16

The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts. Thus,
in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit
Court of Appeals, declared: 

[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first
seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the
subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the
contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the
petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly
misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems
particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition,
who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the
ballot.17 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:

 The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are described in
similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so
that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition."); x x x
(publication of full text of amended constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the elector to
have x x x the section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he
must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would be required to vote in the dark.")
(Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is
proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.19

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the
proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers
intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full text
of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such
full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group
invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories." 

The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in
their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially
explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present
favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or
their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures. 

Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed
as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet20 after the oral
arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with
this Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet attached21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7
September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra. 

The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group's
Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full: 

Province: City/Municipality: No. of  

Legislative District: Barangay:  
Verified

Signatures:

PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE
GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII
AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?" 

I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of
the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.

Precinct Name Address Birthdate Signature Verification

Number
Last Name, First MM/DD/YY
 Name, M.I.
1            
2            
3            
4            
5            
6            
7            
8            
9            
10            
_________________ _________________ __________________
Barangay Official Witness Witness
(Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign)

There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the
signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to
it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006. 

The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to
the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft
of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not
the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution. 

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the
Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition
which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft of
their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they
circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the draft
of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition. 

The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B.
Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:

I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a registered
voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of signatories hereto.
(Emphasis supplied)

The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition. However, the
"Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines"22 has posted the full text of Resolution No.
2006-02, which provides:

RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02

RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF
AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
 WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common
stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's Consultative Commission on Charter
Change;

WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional
Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the House of Representatives in
Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;

WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her Excellency to

recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December
2005;

WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which militates against
the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;

WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to amend the
Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform
agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue
the same;

WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES

OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS
(SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH
PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;

DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century
Park Hotel, Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)

ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or
the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the
porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through people's initiative and
referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of the Consultative
Commission24 are vastly different from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition
or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC. 

For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the existing
Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound impact on
the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's
proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of
the existing Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions. 

The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the filing of the 25
August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together
with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together with
the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the
Lambino Group's proposed changes. 

In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:

After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged in the
Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory
Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition was what
they had shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group
alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments." 

The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the
COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the
Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the
draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the
draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.

It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first claimed that they
circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:

[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not
read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground
that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327,
283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with
the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the
proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied)

The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with the
COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City
Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did not contain
the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated "the
petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally
stated during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30 August
2006. 

The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not read the
measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed
change attachedto the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that
the proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the
people to sign on the petition itself. 

Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or attached
to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were
not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris
Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet. 

It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August 2006 during
the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The
Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that they printed and circulated, together
with the signature sheets, the petition or amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group
circulated the amended petition during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted
circulating only very limited copies of the petition. 

During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft
petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other
supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he could not state with certainty how many additional
copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of 100,000
copies because he himself caused the printing of these 100,000 copies. 

Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits
that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative
x x x."25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino
Group failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed
the signature sheets. 

Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one copy each of
the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy
of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each
signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature
sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000. 

With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3
million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion
is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes.
If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets.

In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed changes, either on
the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such
attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this admission binds the
Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-
compliance with the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of
the Constitution. 

For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the
proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes,
among which are: 

1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of Parliament can be
re-elected indefinitely;26

2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the
present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the
interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office; 27

3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28

These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The
people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These three
proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes
merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets. 

During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people during the
signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local
elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However, the text of the proposed
changes belies this. 

The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:

Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which
shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. x x
x x (Emphasis supplied)

Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007
local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held
simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year. 
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have easily written
the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This would have insured that the
elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections following the ratification of the proposed
changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the
regular Parliament simultaneously with any future local elections. 

Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This allows
incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of office,
and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is
contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire
nation. 

This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had
to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the signature sheets did not contain
the full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to
believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneously with the local elections. 

The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets. The
proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:

Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall
convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of
local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)

During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and the people
should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative. 

Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition
incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can
answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two
propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable. 

Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the unrelated
subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:

Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial
responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment
amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the amendment's
proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the
electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant
case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and
effect and violates the requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis
supplied) 

Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the Supreme Court of Alaska
warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling: 

Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject rule was
enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues
to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth
and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate independently of any
structured or supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining
silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed,
initiative promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers
and eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the election. More importantly,
there is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly
distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be undertaken
by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not have
known that their signatures would be used to propose an amendment mandating the interim Parliament to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. 

Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to amend or
revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007
elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend
or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim
Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the Constitution. 

However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so soon the
Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative
proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or
revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even know the nature
and effect of the proposed changes. 

There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August 2006. The
proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states: 

Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until noon of the
thirtieth day of June 2010.

After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the interim Parliament
does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision
for the present members of the House of Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007,
three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain
members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010. 

The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the powers
of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010,
the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the House of Representatives to the exclusion of
the present Senators. 

The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed
the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate against the
Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the
interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of Representatives.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed
amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the
Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that
the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as
amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from
the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals. 

The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court
trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the
petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed
amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the
petition. 

In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition."

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its
revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the
Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or

(2) A constitutional convention. 

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through
Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The
third mode is through a people's initiative. 

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission: 

MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President. 

May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given
to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the
proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete
committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2: 

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to
this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters. 

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested
on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this
year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section
1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the
Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from
the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x

x x x x 

MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the
Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning
 Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if
it were a self-executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a
total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes
(a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to
amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.

MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.

xxxx

MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he
made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1.
So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."

MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)

There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between
"amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a
people's initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the
Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot
propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments. 

This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v.
Jordan,32the Supreme Court of California ruled: 

The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only to
the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the Constitution' and does
not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution
may be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a
convention called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed
initiative measure (hereinafter termed 'the measure') now before us is so broad that if such measure became
law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not
properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention,
and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33

It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be amended or revised, it
can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one of the
specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference between an amendment and a
revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it is not an amendment
as that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be
based in large part on the revision of the constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision'
authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed
to receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2,
and hence failed of adoption, x x x. 
 While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is,
nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.

To call it an amendment is a misnomer.

Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to the people
through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new
constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1.
xxxx

Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose amendments to the
Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the
constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million
signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself. 

As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:34

It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the manner
prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner other
than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as extra-constitutional and
revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have
power to adopt a constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly
manner and according to the settled principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a
constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change
the fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and
duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution ― that a people's initiative may only amend,
never revise, the Constitution. 

The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the
Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the
scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. 

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the
earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner: 

[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions
contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon
which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and
abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or
change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the
purpose for which it was framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the
substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the
constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without
altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our
Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative
test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial
entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The court examines only
the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. 
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry
is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to
amount to a revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry.
Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or
the fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances."39

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential
to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. 

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches
of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a
revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government. 

The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers
and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters
the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. 

By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is
beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is
readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the
Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes: 

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original
intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new
conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or
of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to
what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary
system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a
switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important
provisions of the Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied)

In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution to shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized
where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several other provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme
Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:

The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral
Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in
the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence in the United States
Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to
visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American
form of government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern of government in this state
and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities
necessary to carry on government.

xxxx

We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the people at the
General Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit further amendments to revise
and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or if after submission of
 appropriate amendments the people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the
government of this State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of
Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too
numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer.

The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many sessions of the
Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to
give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this could disappear
very quickly if we were to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition
here.43(Emphasis supplied)

The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino Group's
initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and
legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the executive department. 

In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would be affected
by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no less than 105
provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo,
Sr.44 There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the structure of
government than the initiative in Adams. 

The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only one of procedure,
not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the
Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of the deliberative body work full-
time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called
"amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an "occupation,
profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.

Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:

99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for both
"amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same
provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the
apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the common people
in general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not
their occupation, profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional
convention delegates are expected to work full-time on the same matter because that is their occupation,
profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain
only to the process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the
constitutional provisions.

100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in
the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied) 

The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed
changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the
Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in the present initiative
constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the changes. However, since the
Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the
Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the land. 

The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's
theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do
not deviate from such categorical intent and language.45 Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent
and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the
form of government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting
inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory
advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a
revision justly deserves rejection. 

The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have attempted to
advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:

Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution proposed by
initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the
legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions
initiated by the people.

Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution that
cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the distinction between amendment and
revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that
revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure
proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound impacts on
existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined group of
citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic principles
of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot
appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.

We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted by
initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the constitution may
not be accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article
XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:

"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of
amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a means of revising the
constitution." x x x x

It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the
constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an individual,
through the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x x x x

Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to constitutional
revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of the framers and the
plain language of the Constitution.

We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the other end
red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there
is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where
revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three
co-equal departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the
Constitution. 

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other
section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a
change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change
reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a
revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an
amendment and not a revision.49

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than
the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system
of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three examples are located at the far green end
of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is located. 

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word
of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the
word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the
entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change
will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the
structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis
of the existing Constitution. 

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body
with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several
provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other
hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded
proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.

In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:

Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception
of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and
Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied) 

The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law
prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of
the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable
inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government." The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which
requires a future separate constitutional amendment. 

Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the
oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to
reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable
inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that. 

The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not between a
provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is
between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary system of government," and the
inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of government." 

Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed changes refer to
― the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among the few countries
with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known
parliamentary forms of government ― the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or
Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize
that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government? 

This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for
amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires
harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's
initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution. 
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus,
the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting
the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this Constitution."

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to
revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not
change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled
that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on
amendments to the Constitution. 

This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be
resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts
will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.51

Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend
the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.

Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an initiative on
the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."

The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006
filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed
the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners."
In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the
signature sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the
COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid. 

The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing
more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the
Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative
embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate.
Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail. 

4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative

In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's ruling
in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For following
this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present
petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the
public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only
complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19,
1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.

5. Conclusion 
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens
of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the
clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself. 

To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and
turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution
outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its
own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur
well for the rule of law in this country. 

An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast 53 − approved our
Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the
people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That approval included the prescribed modes for
amending or revising the Constitution.

No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change
our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they
ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which means subverting the people's
sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the
Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.

Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the specific
modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution ― the
people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society ― becomes easily susceptible to
manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution
ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability. 

The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group unabashedly
states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains
its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional
reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of
the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's
voice" or "sovereign will" in the present initiative. 

This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which
embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the
Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter
basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and
desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre. 

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153. 

SO ORDERED.
AMENDATORY PROCESS: BY PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, 

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their
capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents.

SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF

ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of
initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting of the
1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent  and the main
1

sponsor  of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as
2

"innovative".  Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing
3

amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths
of all its members and (2) by a constitutional convention.  For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we
4

resolved to give due course to this petition.

On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on
Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition)  wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
5

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;

2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;

3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative,  a group of
6

citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the
Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in
proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election
registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other
volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first
fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process
involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed,
be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article
VI, Section 4 of Article VII,  and Section 8 of Article X  of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a
7 8 9
"Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution"   embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion
10

from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:

DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT

OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4
OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least
twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.

Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the
COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order   (a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition,
11

together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal, proposed
constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of
general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12
December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.

At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra;
representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor
Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN).   Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on
12

the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.

After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days.  13

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill
No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative,
which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments.

(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for
in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to
amend the Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this
deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a
single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional
initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.

(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This
indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take
effect only upon ratification and not after publication.

(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative
on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to
provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
 (5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the
people's initiative.

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor
any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.

To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the
COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the
national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the millions
of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the
transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition
be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a
taxpayer's and legislator's suit.   Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
14

course of law.

On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible
period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing
until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private
respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the
Constitution.

On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment   on the petition. They argue
15

therein that:

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR
GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY
RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.

2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE

COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO
THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING
SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID
BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;

3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE

GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY"
PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN
ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;

4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A
DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;

5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO

REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26,
1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET
AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING
GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF
THESE LAWS."
 6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION
DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND
REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT."
(SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);

7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS

PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-
EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT
SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).

Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment   which starts off with an
16

assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . .
which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition,"
which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put the movement to
gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin
maintains as follows:

(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct
of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal,
since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.

(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend
the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as
of the day of the plebiscite.

(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.

(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution
because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only
those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.

As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million as
unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be
simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a priority
government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.

In the Comment   for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor
17

General contends that:

(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on
Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3,
which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines
the same as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5
repeatedly mentions initiative on the Constitution.

(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because,
being national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law
when he claimed that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
 (3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal
with initiative on the Constitution.

(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not
a revision thereof.

(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under
the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of
R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.

On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the
aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private respondents through
Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention
filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20
January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.

On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was
their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend
that:

(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution
because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.,   it would involve a change from a political
18

philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the
change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on
synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities
for public service and prohibiting political dynasties.   A revision cannot be done by initiative which,
19

by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.

(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national
and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to open up the political arena
to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the
concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective
proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the common good"; hence,
to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.

(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest
situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they
are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium for good
performance.  20

(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements
the people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who
may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the
contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the
signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may
oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of
the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC,
(I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such people's initiative.
Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.

(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a
people's initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively
pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the
Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
Intervention.   He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's right to initiate
21

constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-
authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC
was empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he
contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to
order its publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an
initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required number of
registered voters. He also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority
and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's
role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the
call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.

On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.

The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention raising the
following arguments:

(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.

(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the
initiative to amend the Constitution.

(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of
signatures.

(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by
Congress or a constitutional convention.  22

On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and
MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended
Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c)
requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated Comments on the
aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible
period of three days from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five
days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.

At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which the Court
formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing
the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local
Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the
absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft
"Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to,
the Constitution.

4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended
to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal
 election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and
(c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on
the 1987 Constitution.

5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a
pending case before the COMELEC.

After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda
within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No.
21505.

On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and arguments in the
main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a
sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of the House of
Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic
notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms,
of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.

Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention
of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP.   The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda. 
23 24

As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.

For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a
prejudicial procedural question.

THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.

Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it
is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending case before the
COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:

28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent
Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and
under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.

29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction
and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is
an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the
body politic of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and
political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.

30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions
of man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution.  25

It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition.   The COMELEC made no ruling
26

thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12
December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda.  Earlier, or27
specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the
publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of
hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its
insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein.

It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition
because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of registered voters.
LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition,
which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise be
treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.  28

A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure.

II

R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This provision is not self-executory. In his book,   Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
29

Commission, stated:

Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending
the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it
still is dependent on congressional action.

Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed
by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its
Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332).   That section reads as follows:
30

Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:

(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section ___of the
Constitution. 31

After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a new
formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of
the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night,
we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the
proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section
2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I
quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose
amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered
voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7.  32

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:

FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.

First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10

percent, there are no details in the provision on how to carry this out. Do we
understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to the legislature?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the

legislature does not pass the necessary implementing law on this, this will not
operate?

MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing,
especially with respect to the budget appropriations which would have to be
legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We deemed it best that this matter
be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as envisioned, no
amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from the
date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could
be proposed through the exercise of this initiative power would be after five years. It
is reasonably expected that within that five-year period, the National Assembly can
come up with the appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.

FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature — the details on how this is
to be carried out — is it possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people
for ratification is the work of the legislature rather than of the people? Does this
provision exclude that possibility?
 MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature
itself as a body could propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it
fails to muster the three-fourths vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent
assembly and submit that proposal to the people for ratification through the process
of an initiative.

x x x           x x x          x x x

MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is
to vest constituent power in the people to amend the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of
institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the
amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the
draft of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy
of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?

MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal
values, the Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require
a great deal of circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the
Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.

MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we
have a separate article in the constitution that would specifically cover the process
and the modes of amending the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted
now, to again concede to the legislature the process or the requirement of
determining the mechanics of amending the Constitution by people's initiative?

MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the
hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the
mechanics that would adequately cover all the conceivable situations.  33

It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND —
not to REVISE — the Constitution; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year,
has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as
embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative
should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the
operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.  34

x x x           x x x          x x x

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of

initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
 subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as
if it were a self-executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this

process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into
a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense that was conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the
coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision;
whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only
apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.  35

Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
which the Committee accepted. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section
2 with the following:

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after
taking into account the modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the
honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and
Romulo. The modified amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now
read as follows: "SECTION 2. — AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE
UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER
Of REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST
BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED
VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.

MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is

reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report
No. 7, we accept the proposed amendment.  36

The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a
legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:

MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the

legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative. . .?

MR. DAVIDE. It can.

x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the legislature
from asking another body to set the proposition in proper form.
 MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of
this particular right would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot
determine anymore the percentage of the requirement.

MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form
for submission to the people, may be subject to legislation.

MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other
words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish
or impair the right conceded here.

MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have
discussed be legislated?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.  37

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to
— NOT REVISION of — the Constitution. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment

on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be
covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision."  38

Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments through initiative must be
more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved
is an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily
require a proposal by the National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a
constitutional convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit the
issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the National Assembly is
required, the import being that the process of amendment must be made more
rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end
to a law proposed by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree
to reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it
would require another voting by the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on
a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an
amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on the Legislative or on
the National Assembly on plenary sessions.  39

The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version, which the
Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as

follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT
LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED
VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED
BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE
 YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR
OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE

FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.  40

The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July
1986.   Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an
41

amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again
approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986.  42

However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing "percent"
to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second paragraph so that said
paragraph reads: The Congress   shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.   This
43 44

amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2.

The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.

Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the
affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.

There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the
passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the
Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:

The Congress   shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
45

with

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules implementing
the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be carried out."  46

We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by
the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills
referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497,   which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned
47

in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988,   which dealt with the subject
48

matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local
Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17   solely 49

dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral
Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was
subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate   and by the House of Representatives.   This approved bill
50 51

is now R.A. No. 6735.

But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the implementation of the
exercise of the right?"

A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative
on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:

Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
 ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of
this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).

The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane
nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local
laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed
out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not
accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution"
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."

The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill
No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and appropriately used the
phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part."  52

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution
and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the
constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in
the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the
contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or

repealed, as the case may be;

c.2 the proposition;

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).

The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed"
only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.

Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the
latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If
Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of
interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far
more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle
on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative
and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is
not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is
proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if
what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This
classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for
emphasis and clearer understanding:

Sec. 3. Definition of terms —

x x x           x x x          x x x

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;

a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and

a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).

Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments
to the Constitution. 53

A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which
reads:

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election
called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of
the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).

(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local
governments; thus:

Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a
petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. . . .

and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both national and
local initiative and referendum.

Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is
misplaced,   since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
54

Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from
declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution
or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.

Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it
failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative
on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;

(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;

(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval;

(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines; and

(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.  55

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;

(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;

(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of initiative as
a consequence thereof;

(d) The formulation of the proposition;

(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;

(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;

(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit concerned as to
whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;

(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters for their
approval, which must be within the period specified therein;

(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;

(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;

(k) The limitations on local initiative; and

(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.  56

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three
sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and
includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process
by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates
the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date
of effectivity of the approved proposition.

There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of initiative. RA. No.
6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely
paying it a reluctant lip service. 
57

The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this
substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.  58

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata
non delegari potest.   The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
59
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.  60

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and
regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in
itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a
standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform
in the performance of his functions.   A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
61

maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected.  62

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to
satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

III

COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON

THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.

It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does
not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of
the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is
authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.

IV

COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.

Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the
right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate
legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.

Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the
Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district
is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the
required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his
petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the
petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition;   (2) to issue
63

through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each
legislative district;   (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations;   and (4)
64 65
to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and
voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.  66

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it
cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known
that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or
under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said
petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of
paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996,
and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and
resources.

The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective
national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if
not academic.

CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been
validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept
in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in
complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that
system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and
to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on
Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

SO ORDERED.
BY PRESIDENT DURING EMERGENCY

G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976

PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, 

vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976

VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976

RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners, 

vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

MARTIN, J,:

The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the power of the
incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present Constitution in the absence of the
interim National Assembly which has not been convened.

On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national
referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the
issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,
the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present powers.1 

Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No.
1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No.
229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the
national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed
Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below.
2

On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions
to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas"
clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to
have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will
be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

The questions ask, to wit: 

(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to the
Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the
contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:

1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa. Members of the interim
Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall include the
incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who
shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent
President from the members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while
the sectors shall be determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the, manner
of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.

2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the same functions,
responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National
Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not exercise the power provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of
the Constitution.

3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection of the members,
convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall have been elected.
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his
powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise he
shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and
the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution.

4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and discharge the
responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be subject only to such
disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President (Prime Minister) if he so desires
may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers as he may deem necessary.

5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted.

6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable
to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to
meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of
the land.

7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions, powers, and
composition may be altered by law.

Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission on Elections may be called
at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any important matter
whether of national or local interest.

8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue in full force and
effect.

9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they have been
ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite." 

The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National
Referendum-Plebiscite.

On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L-44640 for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting
the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and
1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as
it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite
scheduled on October 16, 1976.

Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to
exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on Elections, The Solicitor
General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond
judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority
to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was
instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to
propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the
interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.3

Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL M.
GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.

These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent President
cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is
untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the proposed amendments in such a short
period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the
people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution,
which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.

We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit. 

Justiciability of question raised.

1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad)
possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033. It is
now an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature Presidential Decrees are of such nature-may be contested by
one who will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for
the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer
of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The
breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective
implementation of its purposes. 5 Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry
out its provisions. 6 The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these
amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees
appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain
the same or not. 7 For the present case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the
authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.

2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the domain of
judicial review. We disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question.
8This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of
the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments o the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory
provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the
regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of the procedure for
amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991,
1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a
justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality
of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be
declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and
statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so
that the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the
controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political.
What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments
to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent
assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore
a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be
a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not. 10

We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of
the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the
proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the
people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when
they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or
not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by
the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to
determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be
done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people. 

Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases underline the preference of the Court's
majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending process as one of non-political impression. In the
Plebiscite Cases,   the contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73
11

"submitting to the Pilipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating fund s therefore "is a political
one, was rejected and the Court unanimously considered the issue as justiciable in nature. Subsequently in the
Ratification Cases  involving the issue of whether or not the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102.
12

announcing the Ratification by the Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question, the affirmative stand of' the Solicitor General was
dismissed, the Court ruled that the question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority
view, said, Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the
question whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification
or rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because,
they claimed, it partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With
Identical unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases, questioning Our
authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in
Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda, insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We,
accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply. For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in
Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito."   The 13

return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor General, was decisively refused by
the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially
the same as those given in support on the political question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite
cases, which were carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally
untenable. As a consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature
and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration."

II

The amending process as laid out

in the new Constitution.

1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains: 

SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention.
(2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention
to the electorate in an election.
 SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment or revision. 

In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred
with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads: 

SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may,
by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments
shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof. 

There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and
period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a
vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention
may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National
Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the
National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister,. 

2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that
prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. Speaking for the
majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the
President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent
with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member
of that Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the
Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the
discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the sponsor,
Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact, the proposal that it be convened 'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel
(V) was rejected. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found
support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973
Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the
referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the
convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question
of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members
of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the I
interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973, the people had
already resolved against it.

3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution,
that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not legislating when engaged in the amending process.16
Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that
power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of
the Transitory Provisions (for the National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to
legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment amending of the Constitution is not legislative in
character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that
of a legislative character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law.  Such being the case, approval of
17

the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer   The prerogative of the President to approve or
18

disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or
adoption of amendments to the Constitution.  19

III

Concentration of Powers

in the President during

crisis government.
1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the Philippines is a crisis government today are more or
less concentrated in the President.   According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of government power in a
20

democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the
separation of powers. In most free states it has generally been regarded as imperative that the total power of the
government be parceled out among three mutually independent branches executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is
believed to be destructive of constitutionalism if any one branch should exercise any two or more types of power,
and certainly a total disregard of the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the very
definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary governmental
action. By this same token, in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency action
in behalf of the state and its independent existence. There are moments in the life of any government when all
powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and action, even if this means the temporary union of executive,
legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one man. The more complete the separation of powers in a
constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more necessary will be their fusion in time of crisis. This is
evident in a comparison of the crisis potentialities of the cabinet and presidential systems of government. In the
former the all-important harmony of legislature and executive is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither
guaranteed nor to be to confidently expected. As a result, cabinet is more easily established and more trustworthy
than presidential dictatorship. The power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded; it must
also be freed from the normal system of constitutional and legal limitations.   John Locke, on the other hand, claims
21

for the executive in its own right a broad discretion capable even of setting aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of
special exigencies for which the legislative power had not provided.   The rationale behind such broad emergency
22

powers of the Executive is the release of the government from "the paralysis of constitutional restrains" so that the
crisis may be ended and normal times restored.

2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a conceded valid at. That sun clear
authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions, thus:23

The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim National Assembly and
shall preside over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall have been elected. He shall continue to
exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the
powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the
interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall
then exercise their respective powers vested by this Constitution.

All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the
incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, binding, and
effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified,
revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of
the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular
National Assembly.

"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, "that the Constitutional
Convention, while giving to the President the discretion when to call the interim National Assembly to session, and
knowing that it may not be convened soon, would create a vacuum in the exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise,
with no one to exercise the lawmaking powers, there would be paralyzation of the entire governmental
machinery."   Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is an extremely important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which
24

extends over a period of time. The separation of executive and legislature ordained in the Constitution presents a
distinct obstruction to efficient crisis government. The steady increase in executive power is not too much a cause
for as the steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the President has been called upon by
the Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and
economic crisis-a crisis greater than war. In short, while conventional constitutional law just confines the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the national forces, yet the facts of our political,
social, and economic disturbances had convincingly shown that in meeting the same, indefinite power should be
attributed to tile President to take emergency measures  25

IV

Authority of the incumbent 

President t to propose 

amendments to the Constitution. 

1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during
the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of
the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body
in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of
the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the
interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to
assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions?
The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim
Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of
course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally
constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and
the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as
agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very
constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional infractions.
For the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the
governmental machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby
impeding the objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times,
that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all,
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of the people .26

2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of January 1973 and February 1975,
the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. The Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the
Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, and the Pambansang Katipunan ng
mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, about the same number of Kabataang Barangay organizations,
Sanggunians in 1,458 municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had informed the President that
the prevailing sentiment of the people is for the abolition of the interim National Assembly. Other issues concerned
the lifting of martial law and amendments to the Constitution .27 The national organizations of Sangguniang Bayan presently proposed to
settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly, its replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of its
present powers in a referendum to be held on October 16 .28 The Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under Presidential Decree 995 of September 10,
1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials with cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the Katipunan ng
mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in session to submit directly to the people in a plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted proposed amendments to the
Constitution, including the issue of martial law .29 Similarly, the "barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of the proposed
amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the President to initiate the proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent
issuance of Presidential Decree No, 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed amendments) to the people in the National Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16. 

The People is Sovereign

1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen. In the Philippines, a
republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them .30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat people as "that particular organized assembly of individuals in which, according to the Constitution, the
highest power exists." 31 This is the concept of popular sovereignty. It means that the constitutional legislator, namely the people, is sovereign 32 In consequence,
the people may thus write into the Constitution their convictions on any subject they choose in the absence of express constitutional prohibition. 33 This is because,
as Holmes said, the Constitution "is an experiment, as all life is all experiment."34 "The necessities of orderly government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that
one generation should be permitted to permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is based, therefore, upon a self-limiting decision of the people when
they adopt it. 35

2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their sovereign power as
constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from the thinking of a single
man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the authority
who can presently exercise the powers of the government. In equal vein, the submission of those proposed
amendments and the question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people
themselves implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it may well be said that the amending
process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be followed reside
somehow in a particular body. 

VI

Referendum-Plebiscite not

rendered nugatory by the 

participation of the 15-year olds.

1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
- is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This was prompted by the desire of the
Government to reach the larger mas of the people so that their true pulse may be felt to guide the President in
pursuing his program for a New Order. For the succeeding question on the proposed amendments, only those of
voting age of 18 years may participate. This is the plebiscite aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the
new Constitution.   On this second question, it would only be the votes of those 18 years old and above which will
36

have valid bearing on the results. The fact that the voting populace are simultaneously asked to answer the
referendum question and the plebiscite question does not infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing
objectionable in consulting the people on a given issue, which is of current one and submitting to them for
ratification of proposed constitutional amendments. The fear of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year olds
above) is readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for every barangay center, one containing the ballots
of voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another containing the ballots of voters eighteen years of age
and above.   The ballots in the ballot box for voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen shall be counted ahead
37

of the ballots of voters eighteen years and above contained in another ballot box. And, the results of the
referendum-plebiscite shall be separately prepared for the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two
boxes. 38

2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A "referendum" is merely consultative in
character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues submitted to the people foe their
consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the President.  It is
39

participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded,
or ex- convicts .  A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines
40

not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the
election Literacy, property or any other substantive requirement is not imposed. It is generally associated with the
amending process of the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect. 

VII

1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies in main the freedom to
dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the observation of Justice Fernando,   is 41

impressed with a mild character recorded no State imposition for a muffled voice. To be sure, there are restraints of
the individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total suppression of that liberty is aimed at. The for the referendum-
plebiscite on October 16 recognizes all the embracing freedoms of expression and assembly The President himself
had announced that he would not countenance any suppression of dissenting views on the issues, as he is not
interested in winning a "yes" or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at hand.  Thus,
42

the dissenters soon found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views on the
proposed amendments and even (in the valid ratification of the 1973 Constitution, which is already a settled
matter.  Even government employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to participate in public
43

discussion and even campaign for their stand on the referendum-plebiscite issues. 44

VIII

Time for deliberation

is not short.
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too short for free debates or
discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They are the issues of the day. The
people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The referendums of 1973
and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for discussion is not
without counterparts in previous plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum
Case, recalls: "Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette of the women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite on April 30,
1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as ordinance the complicated Tydings-
Kocialskowski was published in only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the
scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act 492). For the 1940 Constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral
Congress, the reelection of the President and Vice President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections, 20
days of publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com Act No. 517). And the Parity
Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy as well as the independence of the
Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep.
Act No. 73)."45

2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when the
plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such
amendment or revision." In Coleman v. Miller,   the United States Supreme court held that this matter of submission
46

involves "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic," which "are essentially
political and not justiciable." The constituent body or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time within
which the people may act. This is because proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as
succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated in time;
second, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the
reasonable implication being that when proposed, they are to be considered and disposed of presently, and third,
ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously.   In47

the words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the felt
needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist. it ought to be
regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon, unless a second time proposed by proper body 

IN RESUME

The three issues are 

1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or justiciable? 

2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances now obtaining,
does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required
machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people? 

3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient
and proper submission?

Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando, Claudio
Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G. Martin are of
the view that the question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio and
Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is political. 

Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted in
the negative. Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile
(59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from the proposition that there is concentration of powers in the Executive
during periods of crisis, thus raising serious doubts as to the power of the President to propose amendments. 

Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and
Martin are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed amendments for ratification by
the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar expressed the hope, however that the period of time may be
extended. Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and
therefore beyond the competence and cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his
concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA 774).Associate
Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma hold that prescinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise the
constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair and proper submission with
sufficient information and time to assure intelligent consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in the
controlling cases of Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702). 

Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted
to dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate opinion, Associate Justice Fernando
concurs in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted to grant the petitions. 

ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This decision is
immediately executory. 

SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION

G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING
OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G.
BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA,
LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.

Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf.

Ramon A. Gonzales for respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco and Tomas L. Echivarre for respondent Disbursing Officer of the 1971
Constitutional Convention.

Intervenors in their own behalf.

BARREDO, J.:

Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a
plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by
the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent
implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as they
direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the respondent Commission (COMELEC)
performed and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for being
violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.

As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent only the COMELEC, the Count required that copies
thereof be served on the Solicitor General and the Constitutional Convention, through its President, for such action
as they may deem proper to take. In due time, respondent COMELEC filed its answer joining issues with petitioner.
To further put things in proper order, and considering that the fiscal officers of the Convention are indispensable
parties in a proceeding of this nature, since the acts sought to be enjoined involve the expenditure of funds
appropriated by law for the Convention, the Court also ordered that the Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and
Auditor of the Convention be made respondents. After the petition was so amended, the first appeared thru Senator
Emmanuel Pelaez and the last two thru Delegate Ramon Gonzales. All said respondents, thru counsel, resist
petitioner's action.

For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary duplication of arguments and even possible confusion, and
considering that with the principal parties being duly represented by able counsel, their interests would be
adequately protected already, the Court had to limit the number of intervenors from the ranks of the delegates to the
Convention who, more or less, have legal interest in the success of the respondents, and so, only Delegates Raul S.
Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor de la Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo
Siguion Reyna, Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all distinguished lawyers in their own right, have been allowed to
intervene jointly. The Court feels that with such an array of brilliant and dedicated counsel, all interests involved
should be duly and amply represented and protected. At any rate, notwithstanding that their corresponding motions
for leave to intervene or to appear as amicus curiae 1 have been denied, the pleadings filed by the other delegates
and some private parties, the latter in representation of their minor children allegedly to be affected by the result of
this case with the records and the Court acknowledges that they have not been without value as materials in the
extensive study that has been undertaken in this case. 
The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two
resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the
purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint
sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said
Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof,
Republic Act 6132. The pertinent portions of Resolution No 2 read as follows:

SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines, to be composed of two elective Delegates from each representative district who shall
have the same qualifications as those required of Members of the House of Representatives.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and considered part of the
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at which they are submitted
to the people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.

Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the different cities and provinces fixed
originally in Resolution No 2.

After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1,
1971. Its preliminary labors of election of officers, organization of committees and other preparatory works over, as
its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its session which began on September 27, 1971, or more
accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1
reading thus: .

CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1

A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18 

BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention: 

Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines is amended to as follows:

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the Philippines not

otherwise disqualified by law, who are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and
are able to read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year
and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding
the election.

Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of the Philippines when
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with the local elections in
November 1971.

Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of
suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the
1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the
entire Constitution.

Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the sum of P75,000.00 from its savings or
from its unexpended funds for the expense of the advanced plebiscite; provided, however that
should there be no savings or unexpended sums, the Delegates waive P250.00 each or the
equivalent of 2-1/2 days per diem.

By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal, called upon respondent Comelec "to help
the Convention implement (the above) resolution." The said letter reads:
 September 28, 1971

The Commission on Elections Manila

Thru the Chairman

Gentlemen:

Last night the Constitutional Convention passed Resolution No. 1 quoted as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(see above)

Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No. 6132 otherwise known as the
Constitutional Convention Act of 1971, may we call upon you to help the Convention implement this
resolution:

Sincerely,

(Sgd.) DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL

DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
President

On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the
plebiscite on condition that:

(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the printing of separate official ballots, election
returns and tally sheets for the use of said plebiscite at its expense;

(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own security measures for the printing and shipment
of said ballots and election forms; and

(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be delivered to the Commission in time so that they
could be distributed at the same time that the Commission will distribute its official and sample
ballots to be used in the elections on November 8, 1971.

What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from intervenors' Governors' statement of the genesis of
the above proposal:

The President of the Convention also issued an order forming an Ad Hoc Committee to implement
the Resolution.

This Committee issued implementing guidelines which were approved by the President who then
transmitted them to the Commission on Elections.

The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report on the progress of the implementation of
the plebiscite in the afternoon of October 7,1971, enclosing copies of the order, resolution and letters
of transmittal above referred to (Copy of the report is hereto attached as Annex 8-Memorandum).

RECESS RESOLUTION

In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, the Convention approved a resolution
authored by Delegate Antonio Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a recess of the Convention from
November 1, 1971 to November 9, 1971 to permit the delegates to campaign for the ratification of
 Organic Resolution No. 1. (Copies of the resolution and the transcript of debate thereon are hereto
attached as Annexes 9 and 9-A Memorandum, respectively).

RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION

On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution No. 24 submitted by Delegate Jose
Ozamiz confirming the authority of the President of the Convention to implement Organic Resolution
No. 1, including the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee ratifying all acts performed in connection with
said implementation.

Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing
resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as they
provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the elections of eight senators and all city, provincial and
municipal officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all of Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and tending to
carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the calling
and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress, as a legislative
body, and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the
proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of
the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention. On the other hand, respondents and
intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay down the details of the plebiscite for the
ratification of any amendment the Convention may deem proper to propose is within the authority of the Convention
as a necessary consequence and part of its power to propose amendments and that this power includes that of
submitting such amendments either individually or jointly at such time and manner as the Convention may direct in
discretion. The Court's delicate task now is to decide which of these two poses is really in accord with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution.

As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question of jurisdiction. They contend that the issue
before Us is a political question and that the Convention being legislative body of the highest order is sovereign, and
as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of the Congress and the courts. In this connection, it
is to be noted that none of the respondent has joined intervenors in this posture. In fact, respondents Chief
Accountant and Auditor of the convention expressly concede the jurisdiction of this Court in their answer
acknowledging that the issue herein is a justifiable one.

Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of the decision of this Court in the case of Gonzales
v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774, wherein the members of the Court, despite their being divided in their opinions as to the
other matters therein involved, were precisely unanimous in upholding its jurisdiction. Obviously, distinguished
counsel have either failed to grasp the full impact of the portions of Our decision they have quoted or would
misapply them by taking them out of context.

There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality
of the acts of the Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a constitutional
convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution, which concededly is at par with the
former. A simple reading of Our ruling in that very case of Gonzales relied upon by intervenors should dispel any
lingering misgivings as regards that point. Succinctly but comprehensively, Chief Justice Concepcion held for the
Court thus: .

As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139, 157), this Court — speaking through one
of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional
Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof."

It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto
as a political one declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in
Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution — which was being submitted to the
people for ratification — satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The
force of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate
(81 Phil. 818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851, March 4 & 14, 1949), Tañada v. Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb.
 28, 1957) and Macias v. Commission on Elections, (L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). In the first we held
that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and
control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court
proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for quorum in the Senate; in the third,
we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in
said chamber, purporting to act, on behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes
therein of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress
purporting to apportion the representatives districts for the House of Representatives, upon the
ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to the number of
inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases that the
issues therein raised were political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.

Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in
the general grant of legislative powers to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the
Philippines). It is part of the inherent powers of the people — as the repository sovereignty in a
republican state, such as ours (Section 1, Art. 11, Constitution of the Philippines) — to make, and,
hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the
Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. (Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution
of the Philippines) Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and members of the
House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of
a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from
the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, (Of amending the
Constitution) for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the very
source of all powers of government including the Constitution itself.

Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not
have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise,
they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a
government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed
by the fact that the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, (And, inferentially, to
lower courts.) the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the Constitution),
despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.

In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly —
violates the Constitution is essentially justiciable not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review,
and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,
(supra) the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous
on this point.

No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate authority, the Convention is not supreme. Nowhere
in his petition and in his oral argument and memoranda does petitioner point otherwise. Actually, what respondents
and intervenors are seemingly reluctant to admit is that the Constitutional Convention of 1971, as any other
convention of the same nature, owes its existence and derives all its authority and power from the existing
Constitution of the Philippines. This Convention has not been called by the people directly as in the case of a
revolutionary convention which drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new government born of either a war of
liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against an existing government or of a bloodless seizure of
power a la coup d'etat. As to such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the convention is completely without
restrain and omnipotent all wise, and it is as to such conventions that the remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas of the
Constitutional Convention of 1934 quoted by Senator Pelaez refer. No amount of rationalization can belie the fact
that the current convention came into being only because it was called by a resolution of a joint session of Congress
acting as a constituent assembly by authority of Section 1, Article XV of the present Constitution which provides:

ARTICLE XV — AMENDMENTS

SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members
of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to
 this Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification.

True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed with extra ordinary powers generally beyond the
control of any department of the existing government, but the compass of such powers can be co-extensive only
with the purpose for which the convention was called and as it may propose cannot have any effect as part of the
Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the people, it necessarily follows that the acts of convention, its
officers and members are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds. The present Constitution is in full force
and effect in its entirety and in everyone of its parts the existence of the Convention notwithstanding, and operates
even within the walls of that assembly. While it is indubitable that in its internal operation and the performance of its
task to propose amendments to the Constitution it is not subject to any degree of restraint or control by any other
authority than itself, it is equally beyond cavil that neither the Convention nor any of its officers or members can
rightfully deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, deny to anyone in this country the
equal protection of the laws or the freedom of speech and of the press in disregard of the Bill of Rights of the
existing Constitution. Nor, for that matter, can such Convention validly pass any resolution providing for the taking of
private property without just compensation or for the imposition or exacting of any tax, impost or assessment, or
declare war or call the Congress to a special session, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, pardon a
convict or render judgment in a controversy between private individuals or between such individuals and the state,
in violation of the distribution of powers in the Constitution.

It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may not and cannot validly assert, much less exercise,
in the light of the existing Constitution, the simple question arises, should an act of the Convention be assailed by a
citizen as being among those not granted to or inherent in it, according to the existing Constitution, who can decide
whether such a contention is correct or not? It is of the very essence of the rule of law that somehow somewhere the
Power and duty to resolve such a grave constitutional question must be lodged on some authority, or we would
have to confess that the integrated system of government established by our founding fathers contains a wide
vacuum no intelligent man could ignore, which is naturally unworthy of their learning, experience and craftsmanship
in constitution-making.

We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We have posed. The very decision of Chief Justice
Concepcion in Gonzales, so much invoked by intervenors, reiterates and reinforces the irrefutable logic and wealth
of principle in the opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice Laurel in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil., 134, reading:

... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmark of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as
much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican
government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of check and
balances and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental
powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable
if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of
rights mere expressions of sentiment and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they
should be in any living Constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is
found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its
historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by
clear implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers or government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate
an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power
of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to strike conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its functions is in this manner the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by
the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.

But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it
ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not
"the chief palladium of constitutional liberty ... the people who are authors of this blessing must also
be its guardians ... their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voices to pronounce ... aggression
on the authority of their Constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than
in consultation rooms and court chambers.

In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed
the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission
has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly;
notwithstanding the previous confirmations made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as
contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the
power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935 then the
resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect.
But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating
its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935,
by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.

Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional
nature between the National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the other.
From the very nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of
American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The
Electoral Commission as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created
for a specific purpose, namely, to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not
be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restriction. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government,
and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable
and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional
 government, the framers of our Constitution adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have
declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions
prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a
recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition, courts are
bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921
expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, Chap.
IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose constitution
are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia
and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional
Charter of the Czechoslavak, Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX,
Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the
validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a
final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the
Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the
conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created
in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To
ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our
constitutional system. Upon principle, reason, and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon
the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope
and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." .

As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did in Angara, these postulates just quoted do
not apply only to conflicts of authority between the three existing regular departments of the government but to all
such conflicts between and among these departments, or, between any of them, on the one hand, and any other
constitutionally created independent body, like the electoral tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and the Constituent
assemblies constituted by the House of Congress, on the other. We see no reason of logic or principle whatsoever,
and none has been convincingly shown to Us by any of the respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling
should not apply to the present Convention, even if it is an assembly of delegate elected directly by the people,
since at best, as already demonstrated, it has been convened by authority of and under the terms of the present
Constitution..

Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present case. It goes
without saying that We do this not because the Court is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is subject
to the control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention and the Court are subject to the Constitution
and the rule of law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per Justice Laurel, supra, it is within the power as it
is the solemn duty of the Court, under the existing Constitution to resolve the issues in which petitioner, respondents
and intervenors have joined in this case. 

II

The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of the petition. Is it within the powers of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the
proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1 of Article V of
the Constitution proposed in the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form provided for in said
resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and resolution of the Convention?

At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case demand the most accurate and unequivocal
statement of the real issue which the Court is called upon to resolve. Petitioner has very clearly stated that he is not
against the constitutional extension of the right of suffrage to the eighteen-year-olds, as a matter of fact, he has
advocated or sponsored in Congress such a proposal, and that, in truth, the herein petition is not intended by him to
prevent that the proposed amendment here involved be submitted to the people for ratification, his only purpose in
filing the petition being to comply with his sworn duty to prevent, Whenever he can, any violation of the Constitution
of the Philippines even if it is committed in the course of or in connection with the most laudable undertaking.
Indeed, as the Court sees it, the specific question raised in this case is limited solely and only to the point of whether
or not it is within the power of the Convention to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by the people of the
constitutional amendment proposed in the abovequoted Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and form provided
in said resolution as well as in the subject question implementing actions and resolution of the Convention and its
officers, at this juncture of its proceedings, when as it is a matter of common knowledge and judicial notice, it is not
set to adjourn sine die, and is, in fact, still in the preliminary stages of considering other reforms or amendments
affecting other parts of the existing Constitution; and, indeed, Organic Resolution No. 1 itself expressly provides,
that the amendment therein proposed "shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the
future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended section or on other portions of the
entire Constitution." In other words, nothing that the Court may say or do, in this case should be understood as
reflecting, in any degree or means the individual or collective stand of the members of the Court on the fundamental
issue of whether or not the eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to vote, simply because that issue is not before Us
now. There should be no doubt in the mind of anyone that, once the Court finds it constitutionally permissible, it will
not hesitate to do its part so that the said proposed amendment may be presented to the people for their approval or
rejection.

Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire and enthusiasm of the youth have not blinded them to
the absolute necessity, under the fundamental principles of democracy to which the Filipino people is committed, of
adhering always to the rule of law. Surely, their idealism, sincerity and purity of purpose cannot permit any other line
of conduct or approach in respect of the problem before Us. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 itself was born,
in a great measure, because of the pressure brought to bear upon the Congress of the Philippines by various
elements of the people, the youth in particular, in their incessant search for a peaceful and orderly means of
bringing about meaningful changes in the structure and bases of the existing social and governmental institutions,
including the provisions of the fundamental law related to the well-being and economic security of the
underprivileged classes of our people as well as those concerning the preservation and protection of our natural
resources and the national patrimony, as an alternative to violent and chaotic ways of achieving such lofty ideals. In
brief, leaving aside the excesses of enthusiasm which at times have justifiably or unjustifiably marred the
demonstrations in the streets, plazas and campuses, the youth of the Philippines, in general, like the rest of the
people, do not want confusion and disorder, anarchy and violence; what they really want are law and order, peace
and orderliness, even in the pursuit of what they strongly and urgently feel must be done to change the present
order of things in this Republic of ours. It would be tragic and contrary to the plain compulsion of these perspectives,
if the Court were to allow itself in deciding this case to be carried astray by considerations other than the imperatives
of the rule of law and of the applicable provisions of the Constitution. Needless to say, in a larger measure than
when it binds other departments of the government or any other official or entity, the Constitution imposes upon the
Court the sacred duty to give meaning and vigor to the Constitution, by interpreting and construing its provisions in
appropriate cases with the proper parties, and by striking down any act violative thereof. Here, as in all other cases,
We are resolved to discharge that duty.

During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the urgent need for constitutional reforms, to the point of
being convinced that meaningful change is the only alternative to a violent revolution, this Court would be the last to
put any obstruction or impediment to the work of the Constitutional Convention. If there are respectable sectors
opining that it has not been called to supplant the existing Constitution in its entirety, since its enabling provision,
Article XV, from which the Convention itself draws life expressly speaks only of amendments which shall form part of
it, which opinion is not without persuasive force both in principle and in logic, the seemingly prevailing view is that
only the collective judgment of its members as to what is warranted by the present condition of things, as they see it,
can limit the extent of the constitutional innovations the Convention may propose, hence the complete substitution of
the existing constitution is not beyond the ambit of the Convention's authority. Desirable as it may be to resolve, this
grave divergence of views, the Court does not consider this case to be properly the one in which it should discharge
its constitutional duty in such premises. The issues raised by petitioner, even those among them in which
respondents and intervenors have joined in an apparent wish to have them squarely passed upon by the Court do
not necessarily impose upon Us the imperative obligation to express Our views thereon. The Court considers it to be
of the utmost importance that the Convention should be untrammelled and unrestrained in the performance of its
constitutionally as signed mission in the manner and form it may conceive best, and so the Court may step in to
clear up doubts as to the boundaries set down by the Constitution only when and to the specific extent only that it
would be necessary to do so to avoid a constitutional crisis or a clearly demonstrable violation of the existing
Charter. Withal, it is a very familiar principle of constitutional law that constitutional questions are to be resolved by
the Supreme Court only when there is no alternative but to do it, and this rule is founded precisely on the principle of
respect that the Court must accord to the acts of the other coordinate departments of the government, and certainly,
the Constitutional Convention stands almost in a unique footing in that regard.
In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already made it clear that the Convention came into being by
a call of a joint session of Congress pursuant to Section I of Article XV of the Constitution, already quoted earlier in
this opinion. We reiterate also that as to matters not related to its internal operation and the performance of its
assigned mission to propose amendments to the Constitution, the Convention and its officers and members are all
subject to all the provisions of the existing Constitution. Now We hold that even as to its latter task of proposing
amendments to the Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section I of Article XV. This must be so, because it
is plain to Us that the framers of the Constitution took care that the process of amending the same should not be
undertaken with the same ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the most
valued power, second to none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our founding fathers
have chosen for this nation, and which we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the
Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the people within
the country and those subject to its sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in preparing and drafting it. A
constitution worthy of the people for which it is intended must not be prepared in haste without adequate
deliberation and study. It is obvious that correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no less
importance than the whole Constitution itself, and perforce must be conceived and prepared with as much care and
deliberation. From the very nature of things, the drafters of an original constitution, as already observed earlier,
operate without any limitations, restraints or inhibitions save those that they may impose upon themselves. This is
not necessarily true of subsequent conventions called to amend the original constitution. Generally, the framers of
the latter see to it that their handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily mutilated or changed, not only for reasons
purely personal but more importantly, because written constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last for
some time, if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs and exigencies of the
people, hence, they must be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing
political moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with them limitations and conditions, more
or less stringent, made so by the people themselves, in regard to the process of their amendment. And when such
limitations or conditions are so incorporated in the original constitution, it does not lie in the delegates of any
subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore and disregard such conditions because they are as powerful
and omnipotent as their original counterparts.

Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in any degree the number and nature and the scope
and extent of the amendments the Convention may deem proper to propose. Nor does the Court propose to pass
on the issue extensively and brilliantly discussed by the parties as to whether or not the power or duty to call a
plebiscite for the ratification of the amendments to be proposed by the Convention is exclusively legislative and as
such may be exercised only by the Congress or whether the said power can be exercised concurrently by the
Convention with the Congress. In the view the Court takes of present case, it does not perceive absolute necessity
to resolve that question, grave and important as it may be. Truth to tell, the lack of unanimity or even of a consensus
among the members of the Court in respect to this issue creates the need for more study and deliberation, and as
time is of the essence in this case, for obvious reasons, November 8, 1971, the date set by the Convention for the
plebiscite it is calling, being nigh, We will refrain from making any pronouncement or expressing Our views on this
question until a more appropriate case comes to Us. After all, the basis of this decision is as important and decisive
as any can be.

The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of
the Constitution which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment
contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the
amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or
plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first
amendment the Convention propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same
for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution,
hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void.

We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:

1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly that either Congress
sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this
Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose.
The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution
when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people
for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify
any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the
provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.

(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this provision. As already
stated, amending the Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as constitution making itself. Indeed,
any amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it if only because the Constitution has to be an
integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as the framework of the government it establishes, on the
one hand, and adequately formidable and reliable as the succinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights,
liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic policies and aspirations of the people, on the other. lt
is inconceivable how a constitution worthy of any country or people can have any part which is out of tune with its
other parts..

A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once the original
constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole
constitution is submitted to them, more or less they can assumed its harmony as an integrated whole, and they can
either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before casting their vote and determine
for themselves from a study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the
document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the existing
constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole
existing constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.

This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already from the fact that under Section
3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally
will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be formulated by the
Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations which make it
impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed amendment, although it may already be observed that under Section
3, if a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to eighteen under conditions he feels are needed under the
circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in the ballot nor is there any possible indication whether they
will ever be or not, because Congress has reserved those for future action, what kind of judgment can he render on
the proposal?

But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the
constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of
foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not later on the
Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each level of the political units it may divide the
country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of
introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the existing social and
political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently
determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may
establish and of which presently he is not given any idea?

We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution
may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of
the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to
form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of things, where the Convention has hardly started
considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to
the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement. We are of the opinion that the
present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are
in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present
Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the
sole purpose of the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the
ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be,
in the language of Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper
submission".

III
The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of the Constitutional Convention. Much less
does the Court want to pass judgment on the merits of the proposal to allow these eighteen years old to vote. But
like the Convention, the Court has its own duties to the people under the Constitution which is to decide in
appropriate cases with appropriate parties Whether or not the mandates of the fundamental law are being complied
with. In the best light God has given Us, we are of the conviction that in providing for the questioned plebiscite
before it has finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the
Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same violate
the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite for the ratification of all the
amendments the Convention may propose. We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed
amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same should be submitted
to them not separately from but together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the
holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying
therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer,
Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in
compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares
this decision immediately executory. No costs.
G.R. No. L-35925 January 22, 1973

CHARITO PLANAS, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., respondents.

G.R. No. L-35929 January 22, 1973

PABLO C. SANIDAD, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., respondents.

G.R. No. L-35940 January 22, 1973

GERARDO ROXAS, etc., et al. petitioners, 

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., respondents.

G.R. No. L-35941 January 22, 1973

EDDIE B. MONTECLARO, petitioner, 
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., respondents.

G.R. No. L-35942 January 22, 1973

SEDFREY A. ORDOÑEZ, et al., petitioners, 

vs.
THE NATIONAL TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., respondents.

G.R. No. L-35948 January 22, 1973

VIDAL TAN, et al., petitioners, 

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., respondents.

G.R. No. L-35953 January 22, 1973

JOSE W. DIOKNO, et al., petitioners, 

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35961 January 22, 1973

JACINTO JIMENEZ, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., respondents.

G.R. No. L-35965 January 22, 1973

RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., respondents.

G.R. No. L-35979 January 22, 1973

ERNESTO HIDALGO, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner Charito Planas.

Pablito V. Sanidad and Gerardo L. Catipon for petitioner Pablo C. Sanidad.

Jovito R. Salonga and Associates and Rodrigo Law Office for petitioners Gerardo Roxas, etc., et al.

Quijano and Arroyo for petitioner Eddie B. Monteclaro.

Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Associates for petitioners Sedfrey A. Ordonez, et al.

Lorenzo M. Tañada for petitioners Vidal Tan, et al.

Francis E. Garchitorena for petitioners Jose W. Diokno, et al.

Jacinto Jimenez in his own behalf.

Raul M. Gonzales in his own behalf.

Ernesto Hidalgo in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco, Solicitor
Vicente V. Mendoza and Solicitor Reynato S. Puno for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4
of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August
24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to said Convention was held on November
10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the
Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire
Philippines under Martial Law. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential
Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting
the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.

Soon after, or on December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed, with this Court, Case G. R. No. L-35925, against the
Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or
their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon
the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling ... of such
plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the
question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the
Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress ...," and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed
Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no
sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof."

Substantially identical actions were filed, on December 8, 1972, by Pablo C. Sanidad against the Commission on
Elections (Case G.R. No. L-35929); on December 11, 1972, by Gerardo Roxas, et al., against the Commission on
Elections, the Director of Printing, the National Treasurer and the Auditor General (Case G.R. No. L-35940), by
Eddie B. Monteclaro against the Commission on Elections and the Treasurer of the Philippines (Case G.R. No. L-
35941), and by Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, et al. against the National Treasurer and the Commission on Elections (Case
G.R. No. L-35942); on December 12, 1972, by Vidal Tan, et al., against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer
of the Philippines, the Auditor General and the Director of Printing (Case G.R. No. L-35948), and by Jose W. Diokno
and Benigno S. Aquino against the Commission on Elections (Case G.R. No. L-35953); on December 14, 1972, by
Jacinto Jimenez against the Commission on Elections, the Auditor General, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the
Director of the Bureau of Printing (Case G.R. No. L-35961), and by Raul M. Gonzales against the Commission on
Elections, the Budget Commissioner, the National Treasurer and the Auditor General (Case G. R. No. L-35965); and
on December 16, 1972, by Ernesto C. Hidalgo against the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of Education, the
National Treasurer and the Auditor General (Case G.R. No. L-35979).

In all these cases, except the last (G.R. No. L-35979), the respondents were required to file their answers "not later
than 12: 00 (o'clock) noon of Saturday, December 16, 1972." Said cases were, also, set for hearing and partly heard
on Monday, December 18, 1972, at 9:30 a.m. The hearing was continued on December 19, 1972. By agreement of
the parties, the aforementioned last case - G.R. No. L-35979 — was, also, heard, jointly with the others, on
December 19, 1972. At the conclusion of the hearing, on that date, the parties in all of the aforementioned cases
were given a short period of time within which "to submit their notes on the points they desire to stress." Said notes
were filed on different dates, between December 21, 1972, and January 4, 1973.

Meanwhile, or on December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of
Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23,
the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was
issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1973, be postponed until further notice."
Said General Order No. 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of December 17, 1972, temporarily
suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed
Constitution."

In view of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to
refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under
which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the
1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to
Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and
appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal
postponement of the plebiscite by the President — reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of
Congress and the Commission on Elections — the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these
cases.

In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying that
said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973." It was alleged in said
motion, inter alia:

6. That the President subsequently announced the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 86
organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on certain public questions [Bulletin
Today, January 1, 1973];

7. That thereafter it was later announced that "the Assemblies will be asked if they favor or oppose
— 

"[1] The New Society;

"[2] Reforms instituted under Martial Law;

"[3] The holding of a plebiscite on the proposed new Constitution and when (the
tentative new date given following the postponement of the plebiscite from the
original date of January 15 are February 19 and March 5);
 "[4] The opening of the regular session slated on January 22 in accordance with the
existing Constitution despite Martial Law." [Bulletin Today, January 3, 1973.]

8. That it was later reported that the following are to be the forms of the questions to be asked to the
Citizens Assemblies: — 

"[1] Do you approve of the New Society?

"[2] Do you approve of the reform measures under martial law?

"[3] Do you think that Congress should meet again in regular session?

"[4] How soon would you like the plebiscite on the new Constitution to be held?"
[Bulletin Today, January 5, 1973;

9. That the voting by the so-called Citizens Assemblies was announced to take place during the
period from January 10 to January 15, 1973;

10 That on January 10, 1973, it was reported that one more question would be added to the four (4)
questions previously announced, and that the forms of the questions would be as follows: — 

"[1] Do you like the New Society?

"[2] Do you like the reforms under martial law?

"[3] Do you like Congress again to hold sessions?

"[4] Do you like the plebiscite to be held later?

"[5] Do you like the way President Marcos is running the affairs of the government?"
[Bulletin Today, January 10, 1973; additional question emphasis.]

11. That on January 11, 1973, it was reported that six (6) more questions would be submitted to the
so-called Citizens Assemblies: — 

"[1] Do you approve of the citizens assemblies as the base of popular government to
decide issues of national interests?

"[2] Do you approve of the new Constitution?

"[3] Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?

"[4] Do you want the elections to be held in November, 1973 in accordance with the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution ?

"[5] If the elections would not be held, when do you want the next elections to be
called?

"[6] Do you want martial law to continue?" [Bulletin Today, January 11, 1973;
emphasis supplied.]

12. That according to reports, the returns with respect to the six (6) additional questions quoted
above will be on a form similar or identical to Annex "A" hereof;

13. That attached to page 1 of Annex "A" is another page, which we marked as Annex "A-1", and
which reads: — 
"COMMENTS ON

QUESTION No. 1

In order to broaden the base of citizens' participation in government.

QUESTION No. 2

But we do not want the Ad Interim Assembly to be convoked. Or if it is to be

convened at all, it should not be done so until after at least seven (7) years from the
approval of the New Constitution by the Citizens Assemblies.

QUESTION No. 3

The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should already be considered the plebiscite on
the New Constitution.

If the Citizens Assemblies approve of the New Constitution, then the new
Constitution should be deemed ratified.

QUESTION No. 4

We are sick and tired of too frequent elections. We are fed up with politics, of so
many debates and so much expenses.

QUESTION No. 5

Probably a period of at least seven (7) years moratorium on elections will be enough
for stability to be established in the country, for reforms to take root and normalcy to
return.

QUESTION No. 6

We want President Marcos to continue with Martial Law. We want him to exercise his
powers with more authority. We want him to be strong and firm so that he can
accomplish all his reform programs and establish normalcy in the country. If all other
measures fail, we want President Marcos to declare a revolutionary government
along the lines of the new Constitution without the ad interim Assembly."

Attention is respectfully invited to the comments on "Question No. 3", which reads: — 

"QUESTION No. 3

The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should be considered the plebiscite on the New
Constitution.

If the Citizens Assemblies approve of the New Constitution, then the new
Constitution should be deemed ratified.

This, we are afraid, and therefore allege, is pregnant with ominous possibilities.

14. That, in the meantime, speaking on television and over the radio, on January 7, 1973, the
President announced that the limited freedom of debate on the proposed Constitution was being
withdrawn and that the proclamation of martial law and the orders and decrees issued thereunder
would thenceforth strictly be enforced [Daily Express, January 8, 1973];
 15. That petitioners have reason to fear, and therefore state, that the question added in the last list
of questions to be asked to the Citizens Assemblies, namely: — 

Do you approve of the New Constitution?" — 

in relation to the question following it: — 

"Do you still want a plebiscite to call to ratify the new Constitution?" — 

would be an attempt to by-pass and short-circuit this Honorable Court before which the question of
the validity of the plebiscite on the proposed Constitution is now pending;

16. That petitioners have reason to fear, and therefore allege, that if an affirmative answer to the two
questions just referred to will be reported then this Honorable Court and the entire nation will be
confronted with a fait accompli which has been attained in a highly unconstitutional and
undemocratic manner;

17. That the fait accompli would consist in the supposed expression of the people approving the
proposed Constitution;

18. That, if such event would happen, then the case before this Honorable Court could, to all intents
and purposes, become moot because, petitioners fear, and they therefore allege, that on the basis of
such supposed expression of the will of the people through the Citizens Assemblies, it would be
announced that the proposed Constitution, with all its defects, both congenital and otherwise, has
been ratified;

19. That, in such a situation, the Philippines will be facing a real crisis and there is likelihood of
confusion if not chaos, because then, the people and their officials will not know which Constitution
is in force.

20. That the crisis mentioned above can only be avoided if this Honorable Court will immediately
decide and announce its decision on the present petition;

21. That with the withdrawal by the President of the limited freedom of discussion on the proposed
Constitution which was given to the people pursuant to Sec. 3 of Presidential Decree No. 73, the
opposition of respondents to petitioners' prayer that the proposed plebiscite be prohibited has now
collapsed and that a free plebiscite can no longer be held.

At about the same time, a similar prayer was made in a "manifestation" filed by the petitioners in L-35949, "Gerardo
Roxas, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al.," and 
L-35942, "Sedfrey A. Ordonez, et al. v. The National Treasurer, et al."

The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in
said three (3) cases to comment on said "urgent motion" and "manifestation," "not later than Tuesday noon, January
16, 1973." Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948
filed a "supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents," praying — 

... that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections,
as well as the Department of LocaI Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Rono; the
Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification
Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and
substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting,
certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called
Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met
during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions
quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.
In support of this prayer, it was alleged — 

3. That petitioners are now before this Honorable Court in order to ask further that this Honorable
Court issue a restraining order enjoining herein respondents, particularly respondent Commission on
Elections as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Rono; the
Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification
Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; and their deputies, subordinates
and/or substitutes, from collecting, certifying, announcing and reporting to the President the
supposed Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to
have met during the period between January 10 and January 15, 1973, particularly on the two
questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion;

4. That the proceedings of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies are illegal, null and void particularly
insofar as such proceedings are being made the basis of a supposed consensus for the ratification
of the proposed Constitution because: — 

(a) The elections contemplated in the Constitution, Article XV, at which the proposed
constitutional amendments are to be submitted for ratification, are elections at which
only qualified and duly registered voters are permitted to vote, whereas, the so-called
Citizens' Assemblies were participated in by persons 15 years of age and older,
regardless of qualifications or lack thereof, as prescribed in the Election Code;

(b) Elections or plebiscites for the ratification of constitutional amendments

contemplated in Article XV of the Constitution have provisions for the secrecy of
choice and of vote, which is one of the safeguards of freedom of action, but votes in
the Citizens' Assemblies were open and were cast by raising hands;

(c) The Election Code makes ample provisions for free, orderly and honest elections,
and such provisions are a minimum requirement for elections or plebiscites for the
ratification of constitutional amendments, but there were no similar provisions to
guide and regulate proceedings of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies;

(d) It is seriously to be doubted that, for lack of material time, more than a handful of
the so-called Citizens' Assemblies have been actually formed, because the
mechanics of their organization were still being discussed a day or so before the day
they were supposed to begin functioning: — 

"Provincial governors and city and municipal mayors had been

meeting with barrio captains and community leaders since last
Monday (January 8, 1973) to thresh out the mechanics in the
formation of the Citizens' Assemblies and the topics for discussion,"
(Bulletin Today, January 16, 1973).

It should be recalled that the Citizens' Assemblies were ordered formed only at the beginning of the
year (Daily Express, January 1, 1971), and considering the lack of experience of the local organizers
of said assemblies, as well as the absence of sufficient guidelines for organizations, it is too much to
believe that such assemblies could be organized at such a short notice.

5. That for lack of material time, the appropriate amended petition to include the additional officials
and government agencies mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion could not
be completed because, as noted in the Urgent Motion of January 12, 1973, the submission of the
proposed Constitution to the Citizens' Assemblies was not made known to the public until January
11, 1973. But be that as it may, the said additional officials and agencies may be properly included in
the petition at bar because: — 
 (a) The herein petitioners have prayed in their petition for the annulment not only of
Presidential Decree No. 73, but also of "any similar decree, proclamation, order or
instruction"

so that Presidential Decree No. 86, insofar at least as it attempts to submit the proposed Constitution
to a plebiscite by the so-called Citizens' Assemblies, is properly in issue in this case, and those who
enforce, implement, or carry out the said Presidential Decree No. 86, and the instructions incidental
thereto clearly fall within the scope of this petition;

(b) In their petition, petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining not only the respondents named in the petition but also their "agents"
from implementing not only Presidential Decree No. 73, but also "any other similar
decree, order, instruction, or proclamation in relation to the holding of a plebiscite on
January 15, 1973 for the purpose of submitting to the Filipino people for their
ratification or rejection the 1972 Draft or proposed Constitution approved by the
Constitutional Convention on November 30, 1972'; and finally,

(c) Petitioners prayed for such other relief which may be just and equitable. (p. 39,
Petition).

"Therefore, viewing the case from all angles, the officials and government agencies mentioned in
paragraph 3 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion, can lawfully be reached by the processes of this
Honorable Court by reason of this petition, considering, furthermore, that the Commission on
Elections has under our laws the power, among others, of: — 

"a) Direct and immediate supervision and control over national, provincial, city,
municipal and municipal district officials required by law to perform duties relative to
the conduct of elections on matters pertaining to the enforcement of the provisions of
this Code ... ." (Election Code of 1971, Sec. 3).

6. That unless the petition at bar is decided immediately and the Commission on Elections, together
with the officials and government agencies mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Supplemental Urgent
Motion are restrained or enjoined from collecting, certifying, reporting or announcing to the President
the results of the alleged voting of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies, irreparable damage will be
caused to the Republic of the Philippines, the Filipino people, the cause of freedom and democracy,
and the petitioners herein because:

(a) After the result of the supposed voting on the questions mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof shall
have been announced, a conflict will arise between those who maintain that the 1935 Constitution is
still in force, on the one hand, and those who will maintain that it has been superseded by the
proposed Constitution, on the other, thereby creating confusion, if not chaos;

(b) Even the jurisdiction of this Court will be subject to serious attack because the advocates of the
theory that the proposed Constitution has been ratified by reason of the announcement of the results
of the proceedings of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies will argue that, General Order No. 3, which
shall also be deemed ratified pursuant to the Transitory Provisions of the proposed Constitution, has
placed Presidential Decrees Nos. 73 and 86 beyond the reach and jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court.

On the same date — January 15, 1973 — the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R.
No. L-35948 to "file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973," and setting the
motion for hearing "on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m." While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned,
at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the
President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which
had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the
Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 — inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on — and
the public there present that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice,
signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning. Thereupon, the writer read Proclamation No. 1102 which is
of the following tenor:

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

PROCLAMATION NO. 1102

ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION

PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.

WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional

Convention is subject to ratification by the Filipino people;

WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in

chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all
persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age
or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members
kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary;

WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen
participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express
their views on important national issues;

WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A,
dated January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or
Barangays: Do you approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a pIebiscite to be called to
ratify the new Constitution?

WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561)
members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed
Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who
voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a
plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight
thousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and
that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite;

WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the
members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan
ng Mga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed
ratified by the Filipino people;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution
proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been
ratified by an overwhelming majority of all the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays
(Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the
Philippines to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-three.

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President of the Philippines

By the President:
 ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
Executive Secretary

Such is the background of the cases submitted for Our determination. After admitting some of the allegations made
in the petition in L-35948 and denying the other allegations thereof, respondents therein alleged in their answer
thereto, by way of affirmative defenses: 1) that the "questions raised" in said petition "are political in character"; 2)
that "the Constitutional Convention acted freely and had plenary authority to propose not only amendments but a
Constitution which would supersede the present Constitution"; 3) that "the President's call for a plebiscite and the
appropriation of funds for this purpose are valid"; 4) that "there is not an improper submission" and "there can be a
plebiscite under Martial Law"; and 5) that the "argument that the Proposed Constitution is vague and incomplete,
makes an unconstitutional delegation of power, includes a referendum on the proclamation of Martial Law and
purports to exercise judicial power" is "not relevant and ... without merit." Identical defenses were set up in the other
cases under consideration.

Immediately after the hearing held on January 17, 1973, or since the afternoon of that date, the Members of the
Court have been deliberating on the aforementioned cases and, after extensive discussions on the merits thereof,
have deemed it best that each Member write his own views thereon and that thereafter the Chief Justice should
state the result or the votes thus cast on the points in issue. Hence, the individual views of my brethren in the Court
are set forth in the opinions attached hereto, except that, instead of writing their separate opinions, some Member
have preferred to merely concur in the opinion of one of our colleagues.

What follows is my own view on these cases.

The first question for Our determination is whether We have authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential
Decree No. 73, in view of the Solicitor General's allegation to the effect that said question is a political one. I am of
the opinion — on which the Members of the Court are unanimous — that the contention of the Solicitor General is
untenable and that the issue aforementioned is a justiciable one. Indeed, the contested decree purports to have the
force and effect of a legislation, so that the issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the
authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the Court has passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or
acts of the Executive,  but, also, of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935
1

Constitution,  which expressly provides for the authority of this Court to review cases involving said issue.
2

Petitioners in G.R. No. L-35948 maintain that the 1971 Constitutional Convention had exceeded its authority in
approving Sections 2, 3 (par. 2) and 12 of Article XVII of the proposed Constitution. Regardless of the wisdom and
moral aspects of the contested provisions of the proposed Constitution, it is my considered view that the Convention
was legally free to postulate any amendment it may deem fit to propose — save perhaps what is or may be
inconsistent with what is now known, particularly in international law, as Jus Cogens — not only because the
Convention exercised sovereign powers delegated thereto by the people — although insofar only as the
determination of the proposals to be made and formulated by said body is concerned — but, also, because said
proposals cannot be valid as part of our Fundamental Law unless and until "approved by the majority of the votes
cast at an election at which" " said proposals "are submitted to the people for their ratification," as provided in
Section 1 of Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution.

As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people (on
January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor," I find it unnecessary, for the time being, to pass
upon such question, because the plebiscite ordained in said Decree has been postponed. In any event, should the
plebiscite be scheduled to be held at any time later, the proper parties may then file such action as the
circumstances may justify.

With respect to the question whether or not martial law per se affects the validity of a submission to the people for
ratification of specific proposals for amendment of the Constitution, I consider this matter as one intimately and
necessarily related to the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the President of the Philippines. This question has not
been explicitly raised, however, in any of the cases under consideration, said cases having been filed before the
issuance of such Proclamation, although the petitioners in L-35948 maintain that the issue on the referral of the
Proposed Constitution to the Citizens' Assemblies may be deemed and was raised in their Supplemental Motion of
January 15, 1973. At any rate, said question has not been adequately argued by the parties in any of these cases,
and it would not be proper to resolve such a transcendental question without the most thorough discussion possible
under the circumstances. In fairness to the petitioners in L-35948 and considering the surrounding circumstances, I
believe, therefore, that, instead of dismissing the case as moot and academic, said petitioners should be given a
reasonable period of time within which to move in the premises.

Recapitulating the views expressed by the Members of the Court, the result is this:

1. There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73.

2. On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and myself, or six
(6) Members of the Court, are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and academic, whereas Justices
Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said Decree.

3. On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed Constitution or to incorporate therein
the provisions contested by the petitioners in 
L-35948, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra opine that the issue has become moot and
academic. Justices Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and myself have voted to uphold the authority of the
Convention.

4. Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional Convention had authority to continue
in the performance of its functions despite the proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices Barredo, Makasiar and
Antonio hold the same view.

5. On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law affected the proper submission of the proposed
Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as the freedom essential therefor is concerned, Justice Fernando is of the
opinion that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated under Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution and
the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore, grant the petitions were they not moot and academic. Justices
Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra are of the opinion that that issue involves question of fact which cannot be
predetermined, and that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate
freedom for the purposes contemplated.

6. On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed:

a. Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and myself are of the
opinion that question of validity of said Proclamation has not been properly raised before the Court,
which, accordingly, should not pass upon such question.

b. Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1102 has been
submitted to and should be determined by the Court, and that the "purported ratification of the
Proposed Constitution ... based on the referendum among Citizens' Assemblies falls short of being
in strict conformity with the requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution," but that such
unfortunate drawback notwithstanding, "considering all other related relevant circumstances, ... the
new Constitution is legally recognizable and should be recognized as legitimately in force.

c. Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed Constitution has not been ratified in
accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect
whatsoever.

d. Justice Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent to act" on the issue whether the Proposed
Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of any judicially discoverable and
manageable standards," since the issue "poses a question of fact.

7. On the question whether or not these cases should dismissed, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra voted in the affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their respective opinions. Justices
Fernando, Teehankee and the writer similarly voted, except as regards Case No. L-35948 as to which they voted to
grant to the petitioners therein a reasonable period of time within which to file appropriate pleadings should they
wish to contest the legality of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of said period
to the petitioners in said Case No. 
L-35948 for the aforementioned purpose, but he believes, in effect, that the Court should go farther and decide on
the merits everyone of the cases under Consideration.

WHEREFORE, all of the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 56515 April 3, 1981

UNITED DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION (UNIDO), petitioner, 

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), respondent.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal by the UNIDO, a political organization or aggrupation campaigning for "NO" votes to the amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines of 1973 proposed by the Batasang Pambansa, from the resolutions of the respondent
Commission on Elections dated March 18 and March 22, 1981. 

As alleged in the petition: 

3. Respondent COMELEC issued three (3) Resolutions all dated March 5, 1981, to wit: 

(1) Resolution No. 1467 providing for Rules and Regulations for 'equal opportunity' on public
discussions and debates on the plebiscite questions to be submitted to the people on April 7, 1981;

(2) Resolution No.1468 providing "equal time on the use of the broadcast media (radio and
television) in the plebiscite campaign"; and 

(3) Resolution No.1469 providing for "equal space on the use of the print media in the 1981
plebiscite of April 7, 1981". 

The pertinent portions of said Resolutions Nos. 1467, 1468 and 1469 are attached to this Petition as
Annexes "A", "A- l" and "A-2" respectively; (P. 2, Petition.) 

The questioned resolutions are as follows: 

RESOLUTION NO. 1467 

RULES AND REGULATIONS ON PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS AND 

DEBATES ON THE PLEBISCITE QUESTIONS 

The Commission on Elections, pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the 1978
Election Code and pertinent enactments of the Batasang Pambansa, RESOLVED to promulgate the
following rules and regulations governing free discussions and debates on the plebiscite questions to
be submitted to the people on April 7, 1981. (Annex "A", Petition.) 

xxx xxx xxx

RESOLUTION NO. 1468 

The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, the
1978 Election Code and pertinent enactments of the Batasang Pambansa, RESOLVED to
promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations to govern the use of
broadcast media in the 1981 plebiscite. 

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
SECTION 1. Policy. – (1) These rules and regulations are intended to insure that broadcast time for
campaign purposes equal as to duration and quality shall be available to all supporters or
oppositors, political parties, groups or aggrupations at the same rates or given free of charge. 

(2) Radio and television stations shall not be allowed to schedule any non-political program or permit
any sponsor to manifestly favor or oppose any side of the 1981 plebiscite issues or to unduly or
repeatedly refer to or include in the program or broadcast any supporter or oppositor and/or political
party, group or aggrupation favoring or opposing any side of the 1981 plebiscite issues. 

(3) In all instances, the right of radio and television stations to broadcast accounts of significant or
newsworthy events and views on matters of public interest shall not be unpaired. (Annex "A-1",
Petition.) 

xxx xxx xxx

RESOLUTION NO. 1469 

The Commission on Elections, pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, the 1978 Election
Code, and pertinent enactments of the Batasang Pambansa, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it
hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the use of the print media, the printing
and dissemination of printed political propaganda in the campaign for or against the 1981 plebiscite
questions. 

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS 

SECTION 1. Policy – The policy herein is to enable individual supporters, oppositors, political
parties, groups or aggrupations when they so desire, to purchase or avail of advertising space for
campaign purposes under the following rules and regulations which assure that available advertising
space in the print media shall be, as far as practicable, equitably allocated. 

SECTION 2. Comelec Supervision. – The Commission on Elections shall recognize the principle of
self-regulation in the print media and shall exercise as far as practicable only minimal supervision
over the print media leaving the enforcement of these rules and regulations largely to the Ministry of
Public Information. (Annex "A-2", Petition.) 

4. Petitioner UNIDO addressed a letter dated 10 March 1981 to respondent COMELEC, which
reads: 

Your Resolutions Nos. 1467, 1468 and 1469, all promulgated on March 5, 1981,
provided for equal opportunity "on public discussion and debates on the
plebiscite", equal time "on the use of the broadcast media in the plebiscite campaign"
and equal space "on the use of the print media in the 1981 plebiscite". 

The newspapers this morning have announced that President Marcos will lead
the campaign for "Yes" votes on the proposed constitutional amendments in the April
7 plebiscite in his nationwide "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" radio-television program
on Thursday, March 12, from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M., which will be carried live by 26
television and 248 radio stations throughout the country. 

The undersigned, in behalf of the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), hereby

demand exactly the same number of TV and radio stations all over the country at the
earliest possible date, to campaign for 'No' votes in the forthcoming plebiscite.

Likewise, on 17 March 1981, petitioner thru its undersigned legal counsel addressed its second letter
to respondent Commission on Elections, which reads: 
 Pursuant to the letter of UNIDO dated 10 March 1981 requesting
for equal opportunity, the same prime time and number of TV and radio stations all
over the country which were utilized by President Marcos last March 12 from 9:30 to
11:30 P.M., we wish to state that on Saturday, March 21, the UNIDO will hold
a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, and we hereby request that
the same be covered by radio and television from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M. 

We trust that the radio and. television facilities win be directed to comply with this request.

5. Respondent COMELEC issued its Resolution of March 18, 1981 quoting the above letters of
petitioner UNIDO, but held that they "cannot be granted and the same is hereby denied." Said
COMELEC Resolution appears as Excerpts from the Minutes of the Session of the Commission
Held on March 19, 1981', a copy of which is hereto attached to form an integral part of this Petition
as Annex "B"; (Pp. 2-3, Petition.) Said Annex "B" reads thus: 

EXCERPT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE SESSION OF 

THE COMMISSION HELD ON MARCH 18,1981 

(UNDER THE SAME QUORUM) 

xxx xxx xxx

81-54. In the matter of the letter-request of the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) for free
coverage by "TV and Radio Stations all over the country" of its campaign for "No" votes in the
forthcoming plebiscite. 

Before the Commission is a "demand" of the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) for coverage by
'TV and radio stations all over the country' of its campaign for 'No' votes in the forthcoming
plebiscite. This 'demand' is contained in a letter dated 10 March 1981, received by the Commission
on Elections on March 11, 1981, signed by Gerardo Roxas and J.B. Laurel, Jr., quoted in full as
follows: 

10 March 1981 

The Commission on Elections

Manila 

Gentlemen: 

Your Resolution Nos. 1467, 1468 and 1469, all promulgated on March 5, 1981, provide for equal
opportunity "on public discussion and debate on the plebiscite", equal time on the use of the
broadcast media in the plebiscite campaign and equal space on the use of the print media in the
1981 plebiscite 

The newspapers this morning have announced that President Marcos will lead the campaign for
"Yes" votes on the proposed constitutional amendments in the April 7 plebiscite in his nationwide
"Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" radio television program on Thursday, March 12, from 9:30 to 11:30
P.M., which will be carried five by 26 television and 248 radio stations throughout the country. 

The undersigned, in behalf of the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), hereby demand exactly
the same opportunity, the same prime tune and the same number of TV and radio stations all over
the country at the earliest possible date, to campaign for 'No' votes in the forthcoming plebiscite. 

Very truly yours, 

 (SGD.) GERARDO
ROXAS 

(SGD.) J. B. LAUREL,
JR.

Subsequently, on 17 March 1981, the Legal Counsel of the UNIDO, Ambrosio Padilla, reiterated the
UNIDO desire for coverage by media, "the same prime time and number of TV and radio stations all
over the country which were utilized by President Marcos last March 12 from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M." In
this letter, the legal counsel manifested that the UNIDO wants media coverage for its projected
"public meeting at the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, Manila . . . . from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M." on Saturday,
March 21.

The letter of the UNIDO Legal Counsel reads 

17 March 1981 

The Commission on Elections 

Manila 

Attention: CHAIRMAN VICENTE M. SANTIAGO, JR. 

Gentlemen: 

Pursuant to the letter of UNIDO dated 10 March 1981 requesting for equal opportunity, the same
prime time and number of TV and radio stations all over the country which were utilized by President
Marcos last March 12 from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M., we wish to state that on Saturday, March 21, the
UNIDO will hold a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, and we hereby request that
the same be covered by radio television from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M. 

We trust that the radio and television facilities will be directed to comply with this request. 

Very truly yours, 

(SGD.) AMBROSIO
PADILLA 

Legal
Couns
el,
UNIDO

After due and careful deliberation, this Commission holds, and hereby rules, that the demand of the
UNIDO cannot be granted and the same is hereby denied. 

It is the considered view of this Commission that when President Marcos conducted his 'pulong-
pulong' or consultation with the people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President
Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as the head of any political party. Under the Constitution,
the 'Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible . . . . for the program of government and
shall determine the guidelines of national policy' (Art. IX, Sec. 2 ). 'This Commission takes judicial
notice of the fact that the proposed amendments, subject of the President's remarks in the 'Pulong-
Pulong Pambansa' last March 12, 1981, were initiated under the leadership of Mr. Marcos as
President/Prime Minister in the exercise of his constitutional prerogative aforecited. In fact, it was
President/Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos who issued the special call for the Batasang
Pambansa to convene as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution
(Proclamation No. 2040 dated December 5, 1980). 
It cannot be denied that seeking constitutional changes through the means sanctioned by the
Constitution constitutes a program of government imbued with the nature of highest importance. The
President/Prime Minister initiated this program of constitutional remaking. It is, therefore, his
corrollary prerogative to enlighten the people on the sense, significance, necessity and nuance of
the constitutional amendments which he wanted the people to support. It would be an Idle, if not
absurd proposition, to declare that the President/Prime Minister is 'responsible for the program of
government and the guidelines of policy' and yet deprive him of the right and opportunity to inform
and enlighten the people of the rationale of such initiatives without at the same time granting the
same right to the opposition. 

Under our Constitution the President/Prime Minister has no counter-part, not even the Opposition
still waiting in the uncertain wings of power. 

This, precisely, was what President Marcos sought to accomplish through the "Pulong-Pulong
Pambansa" last March 12, 1981. In the letter dated March 10, 1981 by Messrs. Roxas and Laurel, it
was claimed that the program was the nationwide "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" (Emphasis supplied).
This is an admission that the "Pulong-Pulong" was for the "Pangulo", not as head of a political party
but as President/Prime Minister. 

This program "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" is of long standing and has been used by
President/Prime Minister Marcos to bring to the attention of the people certain matters that need to
be understood by them. For instance, the President used this program once to explain to the people
the increase in the price of gasoline and other petroleum products. The program 'Pulong-Pulong sa
Pangulo' is not a political or partisan vehicle but an innovative system of participatory democracy
where the President as leader of the nation enunciates certain programs or policies and thereafter
subjected to interrogation by panelists (common men and women) in various strategic places. This is
why the title is 'Pulong-Pulong'. It is not a one way arrangements; its format is intended to result in
effective multi-way consultation between the leader of the nation and the people. 

The UNIDO or any of its leaders does not have the same constitutional prerogatives vested in the
President/Prime Minister as above discussed. As such, it has no right to 'demand' equal coverage by
media accorded President Marcos.

The UNIDO, however, is free to enter into appropriate contracts with the TV or radio stations
concerned. This Commission, however, cannot direct these media to grant free use of their facilities.
First of all, the Comelec cannot assume dictatorial powers and secondly, the rule of equal time for
campaigning as to duration and quality is not applicable under the circumstances of this case, for the
reasons above-stated. 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the "demand" of the UNIDO is hereby denied. 

Let the Executive Director cause the implementation of this resolution. 

SO ORDERED. 

xxx xxx xxx

This is to certify that the foregoing is a true and correct excerpt from the minutes of the Session of
the Commission held on March 18, 1981. 

(Sgd). RUPERTO P. EVANGELISTA 

Secretary of the
Commission. 

6. Petitioner UNIDO thru its undersigned counsel addressed its letter dated March 20, 1981 as its
"motion for reconsideration" of the COMELEC Resolution of March 18, 1981 (Annex "B") and
 submitted six (6) reasons why said Resolution should be reconsidered, and the request or demand
of petitioner should be granted for nationwide coverage of its public meeting at Plaza Miranda on
Saturday, March 21, 1981, similar or equal to the nationwide coverage of the "Pulong-Pulong" of
March 12, 1981. A copy of said letter of March 20, 1981 as petitioner's motion for reconsideration is
hereto attached to form an integral part of this Petition as Annex 'C';

Annex "C" follows: 

March
20,
1981 

The Commission on Elections 

Manila 

Gentlemen: 

UNIDO respectfully submits this Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolution of March
18, 1981, which denied the letters of UNIDO dated March 10 and 17, 1981 on the following
considerations: 

1. The Resolution states that the coverage of the "Pulong-Pulong" on March 12, 1981 was extended
to Pres. Marcos "in his capacity as President/Prime Minister and not as head of any political party",
who is "responsible ... for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national
policy". But the radio and television coverage on March 12th, did not deal with any "program of
government" nor any 'guideline of national policy". The subject matter of said "Pulong-Pulong" were
a campaign for the approval of the constitutional amendments proposed by the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, for ratification of the people with their "YES" votes. 

2. As announced by President Marcos himself and as stated in the letter of UNIDO of March 10,
"President Marcos will lead the campaign for "YES" votes on the proposed constitutional
amendments in the April 7 plebiscite". The radio and television facilities throughout the country on
March 12 was used by President Marcos in his capacity as political leader of the KBL political party,
and not in his capacity as President/Prime Minister. 

3. The Resolution states that Mr. Marcos 'initiated the amendments, he convened the Batasang
Pambansa as a constituent assembly, and he initiated this program of constitutional remaking'.
When the proposed amendments were passed by the Batasan under his leadership, his function as
President/Prime Minister was completed. His campaign for the ratification by the people of said
amendments was no longer President/Prime Minister, but as the political leader of KBL as the
dominant political party in the Interim Batasang Pambansa. 

4. The Resolution states that the name "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" is an admission that the
television and radio coverage of said program on March 12, was utilized by Mr. Marcos 'not as head
of a political party but as President/Prime Minister. The nature of said program is not determined by
its name but by the subject matter thereof. In fact, it may be considered as a misuse of said program
as political campaign for the purpose of inducing "YES" votes. 

5. The Resolution states that COMELEC "cannot direct these media to grant free use of their
facilities", but UNIDO "is free to enter into appropriate contracts with the TV or radio stations
concerned". But Pres. Marcos campaigning for "YES" votes did not enter into such contracts, but
had "free use" of said facilities. For the Resolution to require UNIDO to pay for time in a national
radio and TV coverage is to impose an "impossible" financial condition. 

6. The Resolution states that "COMELEC can not assume dictatorial powers". The COMELEC as a
constitutional body has the constitutional right and power to have its Resolutions Nos. 1497, 1498
 and 1499 on equal opportunity, equal space and equal time respected and obeyed by all. Otherwise,
said Resolutions will be only in form without any substance. 

In view of the foregoing, UNIDO respectfully prays that the Resolution of March 19, 1981 denying
the request and demand of UNIDO for equal time, be reconsidered. 

It is likewise prayed that the letter requests of UNIDO be granted for nationwide coverage of its
public meeting at Plaza Miranda on Saturday, March 21, 1981. 

Very truly yours, 

SGD.) AMBROSIO
PADILLA 

Legal
Couns
el,
UNIDO

7. Respondent COMELEC RESOLVED TO DENY for lack of merit' the letter-motion for
reconsideration (Annex "C") in its Resolution of March 22, 1981 as per its "Excerpts from the
Minutes of the Session of the Commission Held on March 21, 1981". A copy of said Excerpt-
Resolution of March 21, 1981 is hereto attached to form an integral part of this Petition as Annex
"D";

Annex "D" reads thus: 

EXCERPT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE SESSION OF THE COMMISSION HELD ON MARCH
21, 1981 

(UNDER THE SAME QUORUM) 

xxx xxx xxx

81.56. Considering the allegations in the letter-motion for reconsideration, dated and filed on March
20, 1981, by the UNIDO thru counsel, and there being no strong or cogent reasons to disturb the
findings and conclusions in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered, the Commission RESOLVED
to DENY the said letter-motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 

Let the Executive Director inform the parties concerned of this resolution. 

SO ORDERED. 

xxx xxx xxx

This is to certify that the foregoing is a true and correct excerpt from the minutes of the session of
the Commission held on March 21, 1981. 

(SGD.) RUPERTO P. EVANGELISTA 

Secretary of the
Commission

The basic grounds of the present appeal are stated in the petition thus: 
 9. Said COMELEC Resolutions. Annexes "B" and "D", are also contrary to the Constitution and the
law, and moreover, are unjust, unfair and inequitable, for said Resolutions violate the basic
principles of equality, good faith and fair play, and they are not conducive to insure free, orderly and
honest elections; 

10. The request and/or demand of petitioner for equal broadcast media of its public meeting or rally
at the Plaza Miranda last Saturday, March 21, 1981 (ante par. 4) was arbitrarily denied by
respondent COMELEC in its Resolutions (Annexes "B" and "D"). As the political campaign of the
Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for "YES" votes used all the radios and televisions in the Pulong
Pulong of its political leader, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the political campaign for "NO" votes of
petitioner UNIDO should and must be granted the same right and equal use of the same facilities for
the remaining days of the political campaign for "NO" votes up to the plebiscite on April 7, 1981; 

These grounds were eloquently expanded by distinguished counsel for petitioner, Senator Ambrosio Padilla, during
the hearing held in the afternoon of Tuesday, March 31, 1981. 

Much as it is indeed desirable and idealistic that the widest and fullest opportunity to be heard and explain their side
should be given to those opposed to the proposed constitutional amendments, there are certain inexorable rules
and principles that govern the situation at hand which, no matter in what direction one's sympathies may be inclined,
have to be observed in the best interests of all concerned as this Court sees them. Indubitably, the proposed
changes of the Charter are of deep and transcendental importance, since they will affect not only the structure of
government and the democratic institutions and ideals vis-a-vis the presidential and parliamentary systems to which
our people have been exposed up to the present, and they could outlast most of us and our children and our
children's children. Quite a number of those Ideals and institutions are fondly cherished and enshrined as sacred by
some respectable elements in the country, admittedly as knowledgeable and patriotic as those who are advocating
their alteration or modification. It is obvious that the proposed constitutional changes are purported to establish
rather drastic innovations in the distribution of at least the executive and legislative powers of the national
government, in an avowedly indigenous manner more responsive and attuned not only to the mores, modes and
idiosyncracies of our people and the prevailing national and international circumstances, which evidently require
unusual means to preserve and defend the state and the territorial integrity of the country, albeit such proposed
reforms maintain fundamentally the republican and democratic character of our system of government. Thus, We
reiterate, that the more the people are adequately informed about the proposed amendments, their exact meaning,
implications and nuances, the better. Herein lies the apparent plausibility of petitioner's pose. 

There are, however, certain norms which even petitioner and those that compose it know very well that this Court,
all the amplitude of its prerogatives notwithstanding cannot disregard. Denial of due process is considered generally
as the first and the most valued right of everyone under the Bill of Rights. For this Court to mandate the Comelec,
assuming We had such power, having in view the constriction of the Supreme Court's authority over the actuations
of the Comelec under the new constitution as discoursed by Us in Aratuc vs. Comelec, G.R. Nos. L-49705-09,
February 8, 1979, 88 SCRA 251, petitioner evidently overlooks the fact that the television and radio stations they
refer to in their petition who will be directly affected by any injunction of the Comelec upon Our orders are not parties
to this case. It is elementary, to state the obvious, that in the premises, We would be over-reaching the bounds of
our constitutional powers if We acceded to petitioner request, absent such indispensable parties. In fact, petitioner
has not shown, for apparently they have not done so, that they have requested any TV or radio station to give them
the same time and style of "pulong-pulong" as that which they afforded the President on March 21, 1981 and that
their request has been denied. No doubt the Constitution and the Election Code provisions as well as the general
Comelec resolution cited by petitioner's counsel may be availed of, but since, We have not been informed of the
circumstances under which the President was accorded the privilege which petitioner wants to be equally granted to
them, We are not even in a position to determine under what definite terms the order prayed for should be issued by
Us, considering there are other groups and aggrupations not to speak of individuals who are similarly situated as
petitioner who would also want to be heard. We are afraid We would be expecting from the TV and radio networks
more than what conceivably the Charter, the law and the Comelec resolutions contemplate, if We granted what
UNIDO wants and did less for those other oppositors to the amendments who may come to Us. 

Anent the equal time, equal space and equal quality of exposure claimed by petitioner, it should be informative to
quote the pertinent constitutional provisions, laws and Comelec resolutions: 

Section 5 of Article XII-C of the Constitution circumscribes the relevant powers of the Comelec this wise: 
 SEC. 5. The enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation
and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, may be supervised or regulated by the
Commission during the election period for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest
elections.

Section 41 of the Election Code of 1978 pertinently reads as follows: 

SEC. 41. Regulation of election propaganda through mass media. – (a) The Commission shall
promulgate rules and regulations regarding the sale of air time for political purposes during the
campaign period to insure that time equal as to duration and quality is available to all candidates for
the same office or political parties, groups or aggrupations at the same rates or given free of charge;
that such rates are reasonable and not higher than those charged other buyers or users of air time
for non-political purposes; that the provisions of this Code regarding the limitation of expenditures by
candidates and contributions by private persons and certain classes of corporations, entities and
institutions are effectively enforced; that said radio broadcasting and television stations shall not be
allowed to schedule any program or permit any sponsor to manifestly favor or oppose any candidate
or political party, group or aggrupation by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including said
candidate and/or political party, group or aggrupation respecting, however in all instances the right
of said stations to broadcast accounts of significant or newsworthy events and views on matters of
public interest. 

Sections 7 and 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 1468 read thus: 

SEC. 7. Free air time. – Any radio broadcasting or television station that grants free of charge the
use of air time to any supporter, oppositors political party, group or aggritpution shall also give
similar air time free of charge to other supporters, oppositors, political party group or aggrupations
except when such use of air -time is part of a news program or coverage involving a newsworthy
event. 

A radio, television station giving air time free of charge to any supporter, oppositor, political
party/group for campaign purposes shall inform the Commission of such fact within two days from
the use of such free time.

SEC. 8. Failure to agree on equal time. – In case the supporter, oppositor, political party group and
the radio-television station, despite mediation by the Ministry of Public Information, cannot agree on
the equal time to be sold or given free, the controversy shall be referred to the Commission whose
decision on the matter shall be final and immediately executory.

To begin with, We cannot agree with the restrictive literal interpretation the Solicitor General would want to give to
the "free orderly and honest elections" clause of Section 5, Article XII- C above-quoted. Government Counsel posits
that the said clause refers exclusively to the manner in which the elections are conducted, that is to say, with the
manner in which the voters are supposed to be allowed to vote. Perhaps, such a theory may hold insofar as
ordinary elections of officials are concerned. But the Court views the provision as applicable also to plebiscites,
particularly one relative to constitutional amendments. Be it borne in mind that it has been one of the most steadfast
rulings of this Court in connection with such plebiscites that it is indispensable that they be properly characterized to
be fair submission – by which is meant that the voters must of necessity have had adequate opportunity, in the light
of conventional wisdom, to cast their votes with sufficient understanding of what they are voting on. We are of the
firm conviction that the charter's reference to honest elections connotes fair submission in a plebiscite. It cannot be
otherwise, for then the importance of suffrage for the election of officials would be more significantly valued than
voting on the ratification of the constitution or any amendment thereof. We cannot yield to such an unorthodox
constitutional concept that relegates the fundamental law of the land which is the source of all powers of the
government to a level less valued than the men who would run the same. When a voter either gives or denies his
assent to a change of the existing charter of his rights and liberties and the existing governmental form as well as
the powers of those who are to govern him, he virtually contributes his little grain of sand to the building of the nation
and renders his share in shaping the future of its people, including himself, his family and those to come after them.
Indeed, nothing can be of more transcerdental importance than to vote in a constitutional plebiscite. 
In consequence of the foregoing considerations, We opine and so hold that the provisions of all election laws
regulating propaganda through the mass media, for example, Section 41 of the Election Code of 1978, must be
deemed applicable to plebiscites. Therefore, it is the duty of the Comelec to see to it that the sale of air time by TV
and radio stations insures that time equal as to duration and quality is available to all candidates for the same office
or political parties, groups or aggrupations at the same rates or given free of charge.

We cannot share the Solicitor General's submission that the above view would subvert or curtail correspondingly the
freedom of speech and of the press to which the TV and radio station owners are entitled. Rather, it is Our
considered opinion and We so hold that if such be the effect of the Comelec regulations, it is because they must
have been contemplated to precisely constitute an exception to freedom of speech and press clause, on account of
considerations more paramount for the general welfare and public interest, which exceptions after all would operate
only during limited periods, that is, during the duration of the election Campaign fixed in the charter itself and/or by
law. 

The Solicitor General points, however, to the explicit proviso in Section 41 to the effect that the equal-time-equal-
space privilege must "respect, – in all instances the right of said stations to broadcast accounts of significant or
newsworthy events and views on matters of public interest", and suggests that the TV and radio stations may not be
blamed for considering the "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" as coming within said proviso. In other words, it is
contended that such choice by them may not then be subjected to the equal time equal space regulations. On the
other hand, counsel for petitioner maintains that it is not fair to deem the President's "Pulong-Pulong" as a
"significant and noteworthy (an) events and views on matters of public interest" just because the President
campaigned for "Yes" votes, while a "Pulong-Pulong" by those who would appeal for "No" votes cannot be similarly
characterized. 

Our holding in respect to such conflicting contentions is that, while it may not be exactly proper to say, as the
Comelec resolution in question puts it, that "(u)nder our Constitution, the President-Prime Minister has no
counterpart, not even the Opposition still waiting in the uncertain wings of power", it is undeniable and but natural
that the head of state of every country in the world must from the very nature of his position, be accorded certain
privileges not equally available to those who are opposed to him in the sense that, since the head of state has the
grave and tremendous responsibility of planning and implementing the plan of government itself, either by virtue of
the popular mandate given to him under the corresponding provisions of the Constitution and the laws or any other
duly recognized grant of power and authority, the opposition cannot be placed at par with him, since logically the
opposition can only fiscalize the administration and punctualize its errors and shortcomings to the end that when the
duly scheduled time for the people to exercise their inalienable power to make a better choice, the opposition may
have the chance to make them accept the alternative they can offer. 

Therefore, when the head of state is afforded the opportunity or when he feels it incumbent upon him to
communicate and dialogue with the people on any matter affecting the plan of government or any other matter of
public interest, no office or entity of the government is obliged to give the opposition the same facilities by which its
contrary views may be ventilated. lf the opposition leaders feel any sense of responsibility in the premises to counter
the administration, it is up to them – and they are free – to avail of their own resources to accomplish their purpose.
But surely, it is not for the administration to hand them on a silver platter the weapon they need. We are not aware
that there is any existing system of government anywhere in the world which is mandated to be so accommodating
and generous to the opponents of the current administrators of the national affairs. 

In instances where the head of state is at the same time the president of the political party that is in power, it does
not necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the governed. Unquestionably, there
are matters of vital public interest wherein partisan considerations could in some degree be involved, but then such
partisan interest would be purely secondary. The President/Prime Minister of the Philippines is the political head of
all the people. His is the sacred responsibility to protect and defend the security of all the people, the stability of the
government and the integrity of the national territory, not only for the tenure to which he has been elected but for all
times. When, as in the instant situation, he deems it warranted by the circumstances to present to them a plan of
government which includes the modification of the existing structure of government together with its concomitant
allocation of governmental powers, it is not only his right but his duty to take the people directly into his confidence
and impart to them to the fullest measure of his capacity and by all available adequate means the reasons therefor
and the corrollarily advantages thereof to their welfare. The opposition, if it opines otherwise, has naturally the
indisputable right to make every effort to thwart his objective. But, surely, this is far from saying that it is the duty of
the administration to generously grant to them the means to wage their campaign against it. 
The long and short of the foregoing is that it is not true that in speaking as he did in the "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo"
on March 21, 1981, he spoke not only as President-Prime Minister but also as head of the KBL, the political party
now in power. It was in the former capacity that he did so. If in any way, what he said would induce the people to
accept the proposed amendments, his exposition of the advantages thereof was not to promote the interest of that
party but to improve the quality of the government thereby to enable him or anyone who may be chosen by the
people to take his place to better serve the welfare not only of the KBL but of all of us, including those who are
minded, for reasons of their own, to oppose the amendments. 

In any event, petitioner has failed to persuade Us that the grant of the prayer in its petition compellingly pertains to it
under the provisions of the Constitution, the Election Code of 1978 and the general resolutions and regulations of
respondent Comelec regarding equal opportunity among contending political parties, groups, aggrupations or
individuals. The Comelec has indeed the power to supervise and regulate the mass media in such respect, but such
authority arises only when there is a showing that any sector or member of the media has denied to any party or
person the right to which it or he is entitled. What is more, there are other political parties similarly situated as
petitioner. To grant to petitioner what it wants, it must necessarily follow that such other parties should also be
granted. As already indicated earlier, that would be too much to expect from the media that has also its own right to
earn its wherewithal. But most importantly, the Comelec is not supposed to dictate to the media when its
prerogatives in the premises is not invoked in the proper manner, that is, after denial to the petitioner by the media
is shown. And then, it is an inalienable right of the sector or member of the media concerned to be duly heard as an
indispensable party. 

Thus, for being beyond what the charter, the laws and pertinent Comelec regulations contemplate, for being more
than what the opposition is duly entitled vis-a-vis the duty, obligation and/or privilege inherent in the head of state to
directly dialogue with the sovereign people when the occasion demands, for being impractical under prevailing
circumstances, and for its failure to join in the instant petition indispensable parties, thereby depriving the Court of
jurisdiction to act, and for these alone among other reasons which there is hardly time to state herein, the prayer in
the instant petition cannot be granted. 

WHEREFORE, the appeal herein is dismissed, without costs.

SELF-EXECUTING AND NON SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS

[G.R. No. 176579 : June 28, 2011] 

WILSON P. GAMBOA, PETITIONER, VS. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES,

FINANCE UNDERSECRETARY JOHN P. SEVILLA, AND COMMISSIONER RICARDO ABCEDE
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) IN THEIR
CAPACITIES AS CHAIR AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE PRIVATIZATION
COUNCIL, CHAIRMAN ANTHONI SALIM OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD. IN HIS CAPACITY
AS DIRECTOR OF METRO PACIFIC ASSET HOLDINGS INC., CHAIRMAN MANUEL V.
PANGILINAN OF PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT) IN HIS
CAPACITY AS MANAGING DIRECTOR OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD., PRESIDENT
NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO OF PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY,
CHAIR FE BARIN OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, AND PRESIDENT
FRANCIS LIM OF THE PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, RESPONDENTS. 

PABLITO V. SANIDAD AND ARNO V. SANIDAD, PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION. 

D E C I S I O N 

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an original petition for prohibition, injunction, declaratory relief and declaration of nullity
of the sale of shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC)
by the government of the Republic of the Philippines to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc.
(MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific).

The Antecedents

The facts, according to petitioner Wilson P. Gamboa, a stockholder of Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT), are as follows:[1]

On 28 November 1928, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 3436 which granted PLDT a
franchise and the right to engage in telecommunications business. In 1969, General Telephone
and Electronics Corporation (GTE), an American company and a major PLDT stockholder, sold 26
percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to PTIC. In 1977, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI)
was incorporated by several persons, including Roland Gapud and Jose Campos, Jr.
Subsequently, PHI became the owner of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC by virtue of three
Deeds of Assignment executed by PTIC stockholders Ramon Cojuangco and Luis Tirso Rivilla. In
1986, the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI were sequestered by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The 111,415 PTIC shares, which represent about
46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, were later declared by this Court to be
owned by the Republic of the Philippines.[2]

In 1999, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered, Hong Kong-based investment firm, acquired the
remaining 54 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC. On 20 November 2006, the Inter-
Agency Privatization Council (IPC) of the Philippine Government announced that it would sell the
111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, through a
public bidding to be conducted on 4 December 2006. Subsequently, the public bidding was reset
to 8 December 2006, and only two bidders, Parallax Venture Fund XXVII (Parallax) and Pan-Asia
Presidio Capital, submitted their bids. Parallax won with a bid of P25.6 billion or US$510 million.

Thereafter, First Pacific announced that it would exercise its right of first refusal as a PTIC
stockholder and buy the 111,415 PTIC shares by matching the bid price of Parallax. However,
First Pacific failed to do so by the 1 February 2007 deadline set by IPC and instead, yielded its
right to PTIC itself which was then given by IPC until 2 March 2007 to buy the PTIC shares. On
14 February 2007, First Pacific, through its subsidiary, MPAH, entered into a Conditional Sale
and Purchase Agreement of the 111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent of the outstanding
capital stock of PTIC, with the Philippine Government for the price of P25,217,556,000 or
US$510,580,189. The sale was completed on 28 February 2007.

Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the Philippine Government of 46.125 percent of
PTIC shares is actually an indirect sale of 12 million shares or about 6.3 percent of the
outstanding common shares of PLDT. With the sale, First Pacific's common shareholdings
in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the common
shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47 percent. This violates Section 11,
Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a
public utility to not more than 40 percent.[3]

On the other hand, public respondents Finance Secretary Margarito B. Teves, Undersecretary
John P. Sevilla, and PCGG Commissioner Ricardo Abcede allege the following relevant facts:

On 9 November 1967, PTIC was incorporated and had since engaged in the business of
investment holdings. PTIC held 26,034,263 PLDT common shares, or 13.847 percent of the total
PLDT outstanding common shares. PHI, on the other hand, was incorporated in 1977, and
became the owner of 111,415 PTIC shares or 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of
PTIC by virtue of three Deeds of Assignment executed by Ramon Cojuangco and Luis Tirso
Rivilla. In 1986, the 111,415 PTIC shares held by PHI were sequestered by the PCGG, and
subsequently declared by this Court as part of the ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand Marcos. The sequestered PTIC shares were reconveyed to the Republic of the
Philippines in accordance with this Court's decision[4] which became final and executory on 8
August 2006.

The Philippine Government decided to sell the 111,415 PTIC shares, which represent 6.4 percent
of the outstanding common shares of stock of PLDT, and designated the Inter-Agency
Privatization Council (IPC), composed of the Department of Finance and the PCGG, as the
disposing entity. An invitation to bid was published in seven different newspapers from 13 to 24
November 2006. On 20 November 2006, a pre-bid conference was held, and the original
deadline for bidding scheduled on 4 December 2006 was reset to 8 December 2006. The
extension was published in nine different newspapers.

During the 8 December 2006 bidding, Parallax Capital Management LP emerged as the highest
bidder with a bid of P25,217,556,000. The government notified First Pacific, the majority owner
of PTIC shares, of the bidding results and gave First Pacific until 1 February 2007 to exercise its
right of first refusal in accordance with PTIC's Articles of Incorporation. First Pacific announced
its intention to match Parallax's bid.

On 31 January 2007, the House of Representatives (HR) Committee on Good Government

conducted a public hearing on the particulars of the then impending sale of the 111,415 PTIC
shares. Respondents Teves and Sevilla were among those who attended the public hearing. The
HR Committee Report No. 2270 concluded that: (a) the auction of the government's 111,415
PTIC shares bore due diligence, transparency and conformity with existing legal procedures; and
(b) First Pacific's intended acquisition of the government's 111,415 PTIC shares
resulting in First Pacific's 100% ownership of PTIC will not violate the 40 percent
constitutional limit on foreign ownership of a public utility since PTIC holds only
13.847 percent of the total outstanding common shares of PLDT.[5] On 28 February 2007,
First Pacific completed the acquisition of the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC.

Respondent Manuel V. Pangilinan admits the following facts: (a) the IPC conducted a public
bidding for the sale of 111,415 PTIC shares or 46 percent of the outstanding capital stock of
PTIC (the remaining 54 percent of PTIC shares was already owned by First Pacific and its
affiliates); (b) Parallax offered the highest bid amounting to P25,217,556,000; (c) pursuant to
the right of first refusal in favor of PTIC and its shareholders granted in PTIC's Articles of
Incorporation, MPAH, a First Pacific affiliate, exercised its right of first refusal by matching the
highest bid offered for PTIC shares on 13 February 2007; and (d) on 28 February 2007, the sale
was consummated when MPAH paid IPC P25,217,556,000 and the government delivered the
certificates for the 111,415 PTIC shares. Respondent Pangilinan denies the other allegations of
facts of petitioner.

On 28 February 2007, petitioner filed the instant petition for prohibition, injunction, declaratory
relief, and declaration of nullity of sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares. Petitioner claims, among
others, that the sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares would result in an increase in First Pacific's
common shareholdings in PLDT from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, and this, combined with
Japanese NTT DoCoMo's common shareholdings in PLDT, would result to a total foreign common
shareholdings in PLDT of 51.56 percent which is over the 40 percent constitutional limit.[6][ ]
Petitioner asserts:

If and when the sale is completed, First Pacific's equity in PLDT will go up from 30.7 percent to
37.0 percent of its common - or voting- stockholdings, x x x. Hence, the consummation of the
sale will put the two largest foreign investors in PLDT - First Pacific and Japan's NTT DoCoMo,
which is the world's largest wireless telecommunications firm, owning 51.56 percent of PLDT
common equity. x x x With the completion of the sale, data culled from the official website of the
New York Stock Exchange (www.nyse.com) showed that those foreign entities, which own at
least five percent of common equity, will collectively own 81.47 percent of PLDT's common
equity. x x x

x x x as the annual disclosure reports, also referred to as Form 20-K reports x x x which PLDT
submitted to the New York Stock Exchange for the period 2003-2005, revealed that First Pacific
and several other foreign entities breached the constitutional limit of 40 percent ownership as
early as 2003. x x x"[7]

Petitioner raises the following issues: (1) whether the consummation of the then impending sale
of 111,415 PTIC shares to First Pacific violates the constitutional limit on foreign ownership of a
public utility; (2) whether public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing
the sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares to First Pacific; and (3) whether the sale of common shares
to foreigners in excess of 40 percent of the entire subscribed common capital stock violates the
constitutional limit on foreign ownership of a public utility.[8]

On 13 August 2007, Pablito V. Sanidad and Arno V. Sanidad filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention. In the Resolution of 28 August 2007, the
Court granted the motion and noted the Petition-in-Intervention.

Petitioners-in-intervention "join petitioner Wilson Gamboa x x x in seeking, among others, to

enjoin and/or nullify the sale by respondents of the 111,415 PTIC shares to First Pacific or
assignee." Petitioners-in-intervention claim that, as PLDT subscribers, they have a "stake in the
outcome of the controversy x x x where the Philippine Government is completing the sale of
government owned assets in [PLDT], unquestionably a public utility, in violation of the
nationality restrictions of the Philippine Constitution."

The Issue

This Court is not a trier of facts. Factual questions such as those raised by petitioner,[9] which
indisputably demand a thorough examination of the evidence of the parties, are generally
beyond this Court's jurisdiction. Adhering to this well-settled principle, the Court shall confine
the resolution of the instant controversy solely on the threshold and purely legal issue of
whether the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to the total
common shares only or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and
non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

Petition for declaratory relief 

treated as petition for mandamus

At the outset, petitioner is faced with a procedural barrier. Among the remedies petitioner seeks,
only the petition for prohibition is within the original jurisdiction of this court, which however is
not exclusive but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The
actions for declaratory relief,[10] injunction, and annulment of sale are not embraced within the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. On this ground alone, the petition could have been
dismissed outright.

While direct resort to this Court may be justified in a petition for prohibition,[11] the Court shall
nevertheless refrain from discussing the grounds in support of the petition for prohibition since
on 28 February 2007, the questioned sale was consummated when MPAH paid IPC
P25,217,556,000 and the government delivered the certificates for the 111,415 PTIC shares.

However, since the threshold and purely legal issue on the definition of the term "capital" in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has far-reaching implications to the national economy,
the Court treats the petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus.[12]

In Salvacion  v. Central Bank of the Philippines,[13] the Court treated the petition for declaratory
relief as one for mandamus considering the grave injustice that would result in the interpretation
of a banking law. In that case, which involved the crime of rape committed by a foreign tourist
against a Filipino minor and the execution of the final judgment in the civil case for damages on
the tourist's dollar deposit with a local bank, the Court declared Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, exempting foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any
other order or process of any court, inapplicable due to the peculiar circumstances of the case.
The Court held that "injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest
like accused x x x" that would "negate Article 10 of the Civil Code which provides that `in case
of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.'" The Court therefore required respondents Central Bank of
the Philippines, the local bank, and the accused to comply with the writ of execution issued in
the civil case for damages and to release the dollar deposit of the accused to satisfy the
judgment.

In Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor,[14] the Court similarly brushed aside the
procedural infirmity of the petition for declaratory relief and treated the same as one for
mandamus. In Alliance, the issue was whether the government unlawfully excluded petitioners,
who were government employees, from the enjoyment of rights to which they were entitled
under the law. Specifically, the question was: "Are the branches, agencies, subdivisions, and
instrumentalities of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporations
included among the four `employers' under Presidential Decree No. 851 which are required to
pay their employees x x x a thirteenth (13th) month pay x x x ?" The Constitutional principle
involved therein affected all government employees, clearly justifying a relaxation of the
technical rules of procedure, and certainly requiring the interpretation of the assailed presidential
decree.

In short, it is well-settled that this Court may treat a petition for declaratory relief as one for
mandamus if the issue involved has far-reaching implications. As this Court held in Salvacion:

The Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory
relief. However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition
has far-reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be
treated as one for mandamus.[15] (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, petitioner seeks primarily the interpretation of the term "capital" in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution. He prays that this Court declare that the term "capital" refers
to common shares only, and that such shares constitute "the sole basis in determining foreign
equity in a public utility." Petitioner further asks this Court to declare any ruling inconsistent with
such interpretation unconstitutional.

The interpretation of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has far-
reaching implications to the national economy. In fact, a resolution of this issue will determine
whether Filipinos are masters, or second class citizens, in their own country. What is at stake
here is whether Filipinos or foreigners will have effective control  of the national economy.
Indeed, if ever there is a legal issue that has far-reaching implications to the entire nation, and
to future generations of Filipinos, it is the threshhold legal issue presented in this case.

The Court first encountered the issue on the definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution in the case of Fernandez v. Cojuangco, docketed as G.R. No. 157360.
[16]
 That case involved the same public utility (PLDT) and substantially the same private
respondents. Despite the importance and novelty of the constitutional issue raised therein and
despite the fact that the petition involved a purely legal question, the Court declined to resolve
the case on the merits, and instead denied the same for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.
[17]
 There, petitioner Fernandez assailed on a pure question of law the Regional Trial Court's
Decision of 21 February 2003 via a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court's Resolution,
denying the petition, became final on 21 December 2004.

The instant petition therefore presents the Court with another opportunity to finally settle
this purely legal issue which is of transcendental importance to the national economy and a
fundamental requirement to a faithful adherence to our Constitution. The Court must forthwith
seize such opportunity, not only for the benefit of the litigants, but more significantly for the
benefit of the entire Filipino people, to ensure, in the words of the Constitution, "a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."[18] Besides, in the light
of vague and confusing positions taken by government agencies on this purely legal issue,
present and future foreign investors in this country deserve, as a matter of basic fairness, a
categorical ruling from this Court on the extent of their participation in the capital of public
utilities and other nationalized businesses.

Despite its far-reaching implications to the national economy, this purely legal issue has
remained unresolved for over 75 years since the 1935 Constitution. There is no reason for this
Court to evade this ever recurring fundamental issue and delay again defining the term "capital,"
which appears not only in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, but also in Section 2, Article
XII on co-production and joint venture agreements for the development of our natural
resources,[19] in Section 7, Article XII on ownership of private lands,[20] in Section 10, Article XII
on the reservation of certain investments to Filipino citizens,[21] in Section 4(2), Article XIV on
the ownership of educational institutions,[22] and in Section 11(2), Article XVI on the ownership
of advertising companies.[23]

Petitioner has locus standi

There is no dispute that petitioner is a stockholder of PLDT. As such, he has the right to question
the subject sale, which he claims to violate the nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution. If the sale indeed violates the Constitution, then there is a
possibility that PLDT's franchise could be revoked, a dire consequence directly affecting
petitioner's interest as a stockholder.

More importantly, there is no question that the instant petition raises matters of transcendental
importance to the public. The fundamental and threshold legal issue in this case, involving the
national economy and the economic welfare of the Filipino people, far outweighs any perceived
impediment in the legal personality of the petitioner to bring this action.

In Chavez v. PCGG,[24] the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a suit on matters of
transcendental importance to the public, thus:

In Tañada  v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and
the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a
citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he
has any legal or special interest in the result of the action. In the aforesaid case, the
petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right then
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws
in order to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the
right they sought to be enforced `is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental
law of the land.'

Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Tañada, further declared that `when a
mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of
personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and,
therefore, part of the general `public' which possesses the right.'

Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been
involved under the questioned contract for the development, management and operation of the
Manila International Container Terminal, `public interest [was] definitely involved
considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic
development of the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.'
We concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would
constitute sufficient authority for upholding the petitioner's standing. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves matters of transcendental public
importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.

Definition of the Term "Capital" in

Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution mandates the
Filipinization of public utilities, to wit:

Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty
per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise,
certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so
requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public.
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall
be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers
of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

The above provision substantially reiterates Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, thus:

Section 5. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty
per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise,
certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly when the public interest
so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general
public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise
shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing provision in the 1973 Constitution reproduced Section 8, Article XIV of the 1935
Constitution, viz:

Section 8. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such
franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty
years. No franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under
the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when
the public interest so requires. (Emphasis supplied)

Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
reminds us that the Filipinization provision in the 1987 Constitution is one of the products of the
spirit of nationalism which gripped the 1935 Constitutional Convention.[25] The 1987 Constitution
"provides for the Filipinization of public utilities by requiring that any form of authorization for
the operation of public utilities should be granted only to `citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum
of whose capital is owned by such citizens.' The provision is [an express] recognition of the
sensitive and vital position of public utilities both in the national economy and for
national security."[26] The evident purpose of the citizenship requirement is to prevent aliens
from assuming control of public utilities, which may be inimical to the national interest.[27] This
specific provision explicitly reserves to Filipino citizens control of public utilities, pursuant to an
overriding economic goal of the 1987 Constitution: to "conserve and develop our
patrimony"[28] and ensure "a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."[29]

Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must therefore meet the
minimum nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Hence,
for a corporation to be granted authority to operate a public utility, at least 60 percent of its
"capital" must be owned by Filipino citizens.

The crux of the controversy is the definition of the term "capital." Does the term "capital" in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to common shares or to the total outstanding
capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares)?

Petitioner submits that the 40 percent foreign equity limitation in domestic public utilities refers
only to common shares because such shares are entitled to vote and it is through voting that
control over a corporation is exercised. Petitioner posits that the term "capital" in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution refers to "the ownership of common capital stock subscribed and
outstanding, which class of shares alone, under the corporate set-up of PLDT, can vote and elect
members of the board of directors." It is undisputed that PLDT's non-voting preferred shares are
held mostly by Filipino citizens.[30] This arose from Presidential Decree No. 217,[31] issued on 16
June 1973 by then President Ferdinand Marcos, requiring every applicant of a PLDT telephone
line to subscribe to non-voting preferred shares to pay for the investment cost of installing the
telephone line.[32]

Petitioners-in-intervention basically reiterate petitioner's arguments and adopt petitioner's

definition of the term "capital."[33] Petitioners-in-intervention allege that "the approximate foreign
ownership of common capital stock of PLDT x x x already amounts to at least 63.54% of the
total outstanding common stock," which means that foreigners exercise significant control over
PLDT, patently violating the 40 percent foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed by
the Constitution.

Respondents, on the other hand, do not offer any definition of the term "capital" in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution. More importantly, private respondents Nazareno and Pangilinan of
PLDT do not dispute that more than 40 percent of the common shares of PLDT are held by
foreigners.

In particular, respondent Nazareno's Memorandum, consisting of 73 pages, harps mainly on the

procedural infirmities of the petition and the supposed violation of the due process rights of the
"affected foreign common shareholders." Respondent Nazareno does not deny petitioner's
allegation of foreigners' dominating the common shareholdings of PLDT. Nazareno stressed
mainly that the petition "seeks to divest foreign common shareholders purportedly
exceeding 40% of the total common shareholdings in PLDT of their ownership over
their shares." Thus, "the foreign natural and juridical PLDT shareholders must be impleaded in
this suit so that they can be heard."[34] Essentially, Nazareno invokes denial of due process on
behalf of the foreign common shareholders.

While Nazareno does not introduce any definition of the term "capital," he states that "among
the factual assertions that need to be established to counter petitioner's allegations is
the uniform interpretation by government agencies (such as the SEC), institutions and
corporations (such as the Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development
Corporation or PNOC-EDC) of including both preferred shares and common shares in
"controlling interest" in view of testing compliance with the 40% constitutional
limitation on foreign ownership in public utilities."[35]

Similarly, respondent Manuel V. Pangilinan does not define the term "capital" in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution. Neither does he refute petitioner's claim of foreigners holding
more than 40 percent of PLDT's common shares. Instead, respondent Pangilinan focuses on the
procedural flaws of the petition and the alleged violation of the due process rights of foreigners.
Respondent Pangilinan emphasizes in his Memorandum (1) the absence of this Court's
jurisdiction over the petition; (2) petitioner's lack of standing; (3) mootness of the petition; (4)
non-availability of declaratory relief; and (5) the denial of due process rights. Moreover,
respondent Pangilinan alleges that the issue should be whether "owners of shares in PLDT as
well as owners of shares in companies holding shares in PLDT may be required to relinquish their
shares in PLDT and in those companies without any law requiring them to surrender their shares
and also without notice and trial."

Respondent Pangilinan further asserts that "Section 11, [Article XII of the Constitution]
imposes no nationality requirement on the shareholders of the utility company as a
condition for keeping their shares in the utility company." According to him, "Section 11
does not authorize taking one person's property (the shareholder's stock in the utility company)
on the basis of another party's alleged failure to satisfy a requirement that is a condition only for
that other party's retention of another piece of property (the utility company being at least 60%
Filipino-owned to keep its franchise)."[36]

The OSG, representing public respondents Secretary Margarito Teves, Undersecretary John P.
Sevilla, Commissioner Ricardo Abcede, and Chairman Fe Barin, is likewise silent on the definition
of the term "capital." In its Memorandum[37] dated 24 September 2007, the OSG also limits its
discussion on the supposed procedural defects of the petition, i.e. lack of standing, lack of
jurisdiction, non-inclusion of interested parties, and lack of basis for injunction. The OSG does
not present any definition or interpretation of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution. The OSG contends that "the petition actually partakes of a collateral attack on
PLDT's franchise as a public utility," which in effect requires a "full-blown trial where all the
parties in interest are given their day in court."[38]

Respondent Francisco Ed Lim, impleaded as President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE), does not also define the term "capital" and seeks the dismissal
of the petition on the following grounds: (1) failure to state a cause of action against Lim; (2)
the PSE allegedly implemented its rules and required all listed companies, including PLDT, to
make proper and timely disclosures; and (3) the reliefs prayed for in the petition would
adversely impact the stock market.

In the earlier case of Fernandez v. Cojuangco, petitioner Fernandez who claimed to be a

stockholder of record of PLDT, contended that the term "capital" in the 1987 Constitution refers
to shares entitled to vote or the common shares. Fernandez explained thus:

The forty percent (40%) foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed by the Constitution
refers to ownership of shares of stock entitled to vote, i.e., common shares, considering that it is
through voting that control is being exercised. x x x

Obviously, the intent of the framers of the Constitution in imposing limitations and restrictions
on fully nationalized and partially nationalized activities is for Filipino nationals to be always in
control of the corporation undertaking said activities. Otherwise, if the Trial Court's ruling
upholding respondents' arguments were to be given credence, it would be possible for the
ownership structure of a public utility corporation to be divided into one percent (1%) common
stocks and ninety-nine percent (99%) preferred stocks. Following the Trial Court's ruling
adopting respondents' arguments, the common shares can be owned entirely by foreigners thus
creating an absurd situation wherein foreigners, who are supposed to be minority shareholders,
control the public utility corporation.
xxxx

Thus, the 40% foreign ownership limitation should be interpreted to apply to both the beneficial
ownership and the controlling interest.

xxxx

Clearly, therefore, the forty percent (40%) foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed
by the Constitution refers to ownership of shares of stock entitled to vote, i.e., common shares.
Furthermore, ownership of record of shares will not suffice but it must be shown that the legal
and beneficial ownership rests in the hands of Filipino citizens. Consequently, in the case of
petitioner PLDT, since it is already admitted that the voting interests of foreigners which would
gain entry to petitioner PLDT by the acquisition of SMART shares through the Questioned
Transactions is equivalent to 82.99%, and the nominee arrangements between the foreign
principals and the Filipino owners is likewise admitted, there is, therefore, a violation of Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution.

Parenthetically, the Opinions dated February 15, 1988 and April 14, 1987 cited by the Trial Court
to support the proposition that the meaning of the word "capital" as used in Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution allegedly refers to the sum total of the shares subscribed and paid-in by
the shareholder and it allegedly is immaterial how the stock is classified, whether as common or
preferred, cannot stand in the face of a clear legislative policy as stated in the FIA which took
effect in 1991 or way after said opinions were rendered, and as clarified by the above-quoted
Amendments. In this regard, suffice it to state that as between the law and an opinion rendered
by an administrative agency, the law indubitably prevails. Moreover, said Opinions are merely
advisory and cannot prevail over the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.

In the same vein, the SEC's construction of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution is at best
merely advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what a law means.[39]

On the other hand, respondents therein, Antonio O. Cojuangco, Manuel V. Pangilinan, Carlos A.
Arellano, Helen Y. Dee, Magdangal B. Elma, Mariles Cacho-Romulo, Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres,
Ray C. Espinosa, Napoleon L. Nazareno, Albert F. Del Rosario, and Orlando B. Vea, argued that
the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution includes preferred shares since
the Constitution does not distinguish among classes of stock, thus:

16. The Constitution applies its foreign ownership limitation on the corporation's "capital,"
without distinction as to classes of shares. x x x

In this connection, the Corporation Code - which was already in force at the time the present
(1987) Constitution was drafted - defined outstanding capital stock as follows:

Section 137. Outstanding capital stock defined. - The term "outstanding capital stock", as used
in this Code, means the total shares of stock issued under binding subscription agreements to
subscribers or stockholders, whether or not fully or partially paid, except treasury shares.

Section 137 of the Corporation Code also does not distinguish between common and preferred
shares, nor exclude either class of shares, in determining the outstanding capital stock (the
"capital") of a corporation. Consequently, petitioner's suggestion to reckon PLDT's foreign equity
only on the basis of PLDT's outstanding common shares is without legal basis. The language of
the Constitution should be understood in the sense it has in common use.

xxxx
17. But even assuming that resort to the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission is
necessary, there is nothing in the Record of the Constitutional Commission (Vol. III) - which
petitioner misleadingly cited in the Petition x x x - which supports petitioner's view that only
common shares should form the basis for computing a public utility's foreign equity.

xxxx

18. In addition, the SEC - the government agency primarily responsible for implementing the
Corporation Code, and which also has the responsibility of ensuring compliance with the
Constitution's foreign equity restrictions as regards nationalized activities x x x - has
categorically ruled that both common and preferred shares are properly considered in
determining outstanding capital stock and the nationality composition thereof.[40]

We agree with petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention. The term "capital" in Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors,
and thus in the present case only to common shares,[41] and not to the total outstanding capital
stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares.

The Corporation Code of the Philippines[42] classifies shares as common or preferred, thus:

Sec. 6. Classification of shares. - The shares of stock of stock corporations may be divided into
classes or series of shares, or both, any of which classes or series of shares may have such
rights, privileges or restrictions as may be stated in the articles of incorporation: Provided, That
no share may be deprived of voting rights except those classified and issued as
"preferred" or "redeemable" shares, unless otherwise provided in this Code: Provided,
further, That there shall always be a class or series of shares which have complete voting rights.
Any or all of the shares or series of shares may have a par value or have no par value as may be
provided for in the articles of incorporation: Provided, however, That banks, trust companies,
insurance companies, public utilities, and building and loan associations shall not be permitted to
issue no-par value shares of stock.

Preferred shares of stock issued by any corporation may be given preference in the distribution
of the assets of the corporation in case of liquidation and in the distribution of dividends, or such
other preferences as may be stated in the articles of incorporation which are not violative of the
provisions of this Code: Provided, That preferred shares of stock may be issued only with a
stated par value. The Board of Directors, where authorized in the articles of incorporation, may
fix the terms and conditions of preferred shares of stock or any series thereof: Provided, That
such terms and conditions shall be effective upon the filing of a certificate thereof with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.

Shares of capital stock issued without par value shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable
and the holder of such shares shall not be liable to the corporation or to its creditors in respect
thereto: Provided; That shares without par value may not be issued for a consideration less than
the value of five (P5.00) pesos per share: Provided, further, That the entire consideration
received by the corporation for its no-par value shares shall be treated as capital and shall not
be available for distribution as dividends.

A corporation may, furthermore, classify its shares for the purpose of insuring compliance with
constitutional or legal requirements.

Except as otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation and stated in the certificate of
stock, each share shall be equal in all respects to every other share.
Where the articles of incorporation provide for non-voting shares in the cases allowed by this
Code, the holders of such shares shall nevertheless be entitled to vote on the following matters:

1. Amendment of the articles of incorporation;

2. Adoption and amendment of by-laws;
3. Sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge or other disposition of all or substantially all of the
corporate property;
4. Incurring, creating or increasing bonded indebtedness;
5. Increase or decrease of capital stock;
6. Merger or consolidation of the corporation with another corporation or other corporations;
7. Investment of corporate funds in another corporation or business in accordance with this
Code; and
8. Dissolution of the corporation.

Except as provided in the immediately preceding paragraph, the vote necessary to approve a
particular corporate act as provided in this Code shall be deemed to refer only to stocks with
voting rights.

Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or
management of the corporation.[43] This is exercised through his vote in the election of directors
because it is the board of directors that controls or manages the corporation.[44] In the absence
of provisions in the articles of incorporation denying voting rights to preferred shares, preferred
shares have the same voting rights as common shares. However, preferred shareholders are
often excluded from any control, that is, deprived of the right to vote in the election of directors
and on other matters, on the theory that the preferred shareholders are merely investors in the
corporation for income in the same manner as bondholders.[45] In fact, under the Corporation
Code only preferred or redeemable shares can be deprived of the right to vote.[46] Common
shares cannot be deprived of the right to vote in any corporate meeting, and any provision in
the articles of incorporation restricting the right of common shareholders to vote is invalid.[47]

Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to
preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the
right to vote in the election of directors, then the term "capital" shall include such preferred
shares because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is
exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term "capital" in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote
in the election of directors. 

This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to place in the
hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities. As revealed in the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, "capital" refers to the voting stock
or controlling interest of a corporation, to wit:

MR. NOLLEDO. In Sections 3, 9 and 15, the Committee stated local or Filipino equity and foreign
equity; namely, 60-40 in Section 3, 60-40 in Section 9 and 2/3-1/3 in Section 15.

MR. VILLEGAS. That is right.

MR. NOLLEDO. In teaching law, we are always faced with this question: "Where do we base the
equity requirement, is it on the authorized capital stock, on the subscribed capital stock, or on
the paid-up capital stock of a corporation"? Will the Committee please enlighten me on this?

MR. VILLEGAS. We have just had a long discussion with the members of the team from the UP
Law Center who provided us a draft. The phrase that is contained here which we adopted
from the UP draft is "60 percent of voting stock."

MR. NOLLEDO. That must be based on the subscribed capital stock, because unless declared
delinquent, unpaid capital stock shall be entitled to vote.

MR. VILLEGAS. That is right.

MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you.

With respect to an investment by one corporation in another corporation, say, a corporation with
60-40 percent equity invests in another corporation which is permitted by the Corporation Code,
does the Committee adopt the grandfather rule?

MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, that is the understanding of the Committee.

MR. NOLLEDO. Therefore, we need additional Filipino capital?

MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.[48]

xxxx

MR. AZCUNA. May I be clarified as to that portion that was accepted by the Committee.

MR. VILLEGAS. The portion accepted by the Committee is the deletion of the phrase "voting
stock or controlling interest."

MR. AZCUNA. Hence, without the Davide amendment, the committee report would read:
"corporations or associations at least sixty percent of whose CAPITAL is owned by such citizens."

MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.

MR. AZCUNA. So if the Davide amendment is lost, we are stuck with 60 percent of the capital to
be owned by citizens.

MR. VILLEGAS. That is right.

MR. AZCUNA. But the control can be with the foreigners even if they are the minority.
Let us say 40 percent of the capital is owned by them, but it is the voting capital,
whereas, the Filipinos own the nonvoting shares. So we can have a situation where
the corporation is controlled by foreigners despite being the minority because they
have the voting capital. That is the anomaly that would result here.

MR. BENGZON. No, the reason we eliminated the word "stock" as stated in the 1973
and 1935 Constitutions is that according to Commissioner Rodrigo, there are
associations that do not have stocks. That is why we say "CAPITAL."

MR. AZCUNA. We should not eliminate the phrase "controlling interest."

MR. BENGZON. In the case of stock corporations, it is assumed. [49] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, 60 percent of the "capital" assumes, or should result in, "controlling interest" in the
corporation. Reinforcing this interpretation of the term "capital," as referring to controlling
interest or shares entitled to vote, is the definition of a "Philippine national" in the Foreign
Investments Act of 1991,[50] to wit:

SEC. 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act:

a. The term "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a domestic

partnership or association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of
the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the
Philippines; or a corporation organized abroad and registered as doing business in the
Philippines under the Corporation Code of which one hundred percent (100%) of the capital
stock outstanding and entitled to vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of funds for
pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine
national and at least sixty percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine
nationals: Provided, That where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registered enterprise, at least sixty percent (60%)
of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of each of both corporations must be owned
and held by citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty percent (60%) of the members of the
Board of Directors of each of both corporations must be citizens of the Philippines, in order that
the corporation, shall be considered a "Philippine national." (Emphasis supplied)

In explaining the definition of a "Philippine national," the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 provide:

b. "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines or a domestic partnership or

association wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under
the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent [60%] of the capital stock
outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a
trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the
trustee is a Philippine national and at least sixty percent [60%] of the fund will accrue to the
benefit of the Philippine nationals; Provided, that where a corporation its non-Filipino
stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] registered enterprise,
at least sixty percent [60%] of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of both
corporations must be owned and held by citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty percent
[60%] of the members of the Board of Directors of each of both corporation must be citizens of
the Philippines, in order that the corporation shall be considered a Philippine national. The
control test shall be applied for this purpose.

Compliance with the required Filipino ownership of a corporation shall be determined

on the basis of outstanding capital stock whether fully paid or not, but only such
stocks which are generally entitled to vote are considered. 

For stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals,
mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial
ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential. Thus,
stocks, the voting rights of which have been assigned or transferred to aliens cannot
be considered held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals. 

Individuals or juridical entities not meeting the aforementioned qualifications are

considered as non-Philippine nationals. (Emphasis supplied)

Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital" required in the
Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled
with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent
of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with
the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is "considered as non-Philippine
national[s]."

Under Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, Congress may "reserve to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments." Thus, in numerous laws Congress has reserved certain areas of investments to
Filipino citizens or to corporations at least sixty percent of the "capital" of which is owned by
Filipino citizens. Some of these laws are: (1) Regulation of Award of Government Contracts or
R.A. No. 5183; (2) Philippine Inventors Incentives Act or R.A. No. 3850; (3) Magna Carta for
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises or R.A. No. 6977; (4) Philippine Overseas Shipping
Development Act or R.A. No. 7471; (5) Domestic Shipping Development Act of 2004 or R.A. No.
9295; (6) Philippine Technology Transfer Act of 2009 or R.A. No. 10055; and (7) Ship Mortgage
Decree or P.D. No. 1521. Hence, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
is also used in the same context in numerous laws reserving certain areas of investments to
Filipino citizens.

To construe broadly the term "capital" as the total outstanding capital stock, including both
common and non-voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the
Constitution that the "State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." A broad definition unjustifiably disregards who
owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily equates to control of the public utility.

We shall illustrate the glaring anomaly in giving a broad definition to the term "capital." Let us
assume that a corporation has 100 common shares owned by foreigners and 1,000,000 non-
voting preferred shares owned by Filipinos, with both classes of share having a par value of one
peso (P1.00) per share. Under the broad definition of the term "capital," such corporation would
be considered compliant with the 40 percent constitutional limit on foreign equity of public
utilities since the overwhelming majority, or more than 99.999 percent, of the total outstanding
capital stock is Filipino owned. This is obviously absurd.

In the example given, only the foreigners holding the common shares have voting rights in the
election of directors, even if they hold only 100 shares. The foreigners, with a minuscule equity
of less than 0.001 percent, exercise control over the public utility. On the other hand, the
Filipinos, holding more than 99.999 percent of the equity, cannot vote in the election of directors
and hence, have no control over the public utility. This starkly circumvents the intent of the
framers of the Constitution, as well as the clear language of the Constitution, to place the control
of public utilities in the hands of Filipinos. It also renders illusory the State policy of an
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

The example given is not theoretical but can be found in the real world, and in fact exists in
the present case.

Holders of PLDT preferred shares are explicitly denied of the right to vote in the election of
directors. PLDT's Articles of Incorporation expressly state that "the holders of Serial
Preferred Stock shall not be entitled to vote at any meeting of the stockholders for the
election of directors or for any other purpose or otherwise participate in any action taken
by the corporation or its stockholders, or to receive notice of any meeting of stockholders."[51]

On the other hand, holders of common shares are granted the exclusive right to vote in the
election of directors. PLDT's Articles of Incorporation[52] state that "each holder of Common
Capital Stock shall have one vote in respect of each share of such stock held by him on all
matters voted upon by the stockholders, and the holders of Common Capital Stock shall
have the exclusive right to vote for the election of directors and for all other
purposes."[53]

In short, only holders of common shares can vote in the election of directors, meaning only
common shareholders exercise control over PLDT. Conversely, holders of preferred shares, who
have no voting rights in the election of directors, do not have any control over PLDT. In fact,
under PLDT's Articles of Incorporation, holders of common shares have voting rights for all
purposes, while holders of preferred shares have no voting right for any purpose whatsoever.

It must be stressed, and respondents do not dispute, that foreigners hold a majority of the
common shares of PLDT. In fact, based on PLDT's 2010 General Information Sheet (GIS),
[54]
 which is a document required to be submitted annually to the Securities and Exchange
Commission,[55] foreigners hold 120,046,690 common shares of PLDT whereas Filipinos hold only
66,750,622 common shares.[56] In other words, foreigners hold 64.27% of the total number of
PLDT's common shares, while Filipinos hold only 35.73%. Since holding a majority of the
common shares equates to control, it is clear that foreigners exercise control over PLDT. Such
amount of control unmistakably exceeds the allowable 40 percent limit on foreign ownership of
public utilities expressly mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.

Moreover, the Dividend Declarations of PLDT for 2009,[57] as submitted to the SEC, shows that
per share the SIP[58] preferred shares earn a pittance in dividends compared to the common
shares. PLDT declared dividends for the common shares at P70.00 per share, while the declared
dividends for the preferred shares amounted to a measly P1.00 per share.[59] So the preferred
shares not only cannot vote in the election of directors, they also have very little and obviously
negligible dividend earning capacity compared to common shares.

As shown in PLDT's 2010 GIS,[60] as submitted to the SEC, the par value of PLDT common shares
is P5.00 per share, whereas the par value of preferred shares is P10.00 per share. In other
words, preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares but cannot elect directors
and have only 1/70 of the dividends of common shares. Moreover, 99.44% of the preferred
shares are owned by Filipinos while foreigners own only a minuscule 0.56% of the preferred
shares.[61]Worse, preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT
while common shares constitute only 22.15%.[62] This undeniably shows that beneficial interest
in PLDT is not with the non-voting preferred shares but with the common shares, blatantly
violating the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial
ownership in a public utility.

The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the
hands of Filipinos in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Full beneficial ownership of 60
percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is
constitutionally required for the State's grant of authority to operate a public utility. The
undisputed fact that the PLDT preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, are non-voting and
earn only 1/70 of the dividends that PLDT common shares earn, grossly violates the
constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership of a
public utility.

In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less than 60
percent of the dividends, of PLDT. This directly contravenes the express command in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution that "[n]o franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to x x x corporations x x
x organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens x x x."
To repeat, (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares
exercises the sole right to vote in the election of directors, and thus exercise control over PLDT;
(2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDT's common shares, constituting a minority of the voting
stock, and thus do not exercise control over PLDT; (3) preferred shares, 99.44% owned by
Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that
common shares earn;[63] (5) preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares; and
(6) preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT and common
shares only 22.15%. This kind of ownership and control of a public utility is a mockery of the
Constitution.

Incidentally, the fact that PLDT common shares with a par value of P5.00 have a current stock
market value of P2,328.00 per share,[64]while PLDT preferred shares with a par value of P10.00
per share have a current stock market value ranging from only P10.92 to P11.06 per share,[65] is
a glaring confirmation by the market that control and beneficial ownership of PLDT rest with the
common shares, not with the preferred shares.

Indisputably, construing the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution to
include both voting and non-voting shares will result in the abject surrender of our
telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to a clear abdication of the State's
constitutional duty to limit control of public utilities to Filipino citizens. Such an interpretation
certainly runs counter to the constitutional provision reserving certain areas of investment to
Filipino citizens, such as the exploitation of natural resources as well as the ownership of land,
educational institutions and advertising businesses. The Court should never open to foreign
control what the Constitution has expressly reserved to Filipinos for that would be a betrayal of
the Constitution and of the national interest. The Court must perform its solemn duty to defend
and uphold the intent and letter of the Constitution to ensure, in the words of the Constitution,
"a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."

Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution expressly
reserving to Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the development of natural resources
and ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising business, is self-executing.
There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions of the Constitution.
The rationale why these constitutional provisions are self-executing was explained in Manila
Prince Hotel v. GSIS,[66] thus:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has
always been, that --

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would
be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless
by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphasis supplied)

In Manila Prince Hotel, even the Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno,
later Chief Justice, agreed that constitutional provisions are presumed to be self-executing.
Justice Puno stated:
Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, rather than as
requiring future legislation for their enforcement. The reason is not difficult to discern. For if
they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by
the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress.Suffused with
wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to
constitutional rights but congressional inaction should not suffocate them.

Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches
and seizures, the rights of a person under custodial investigation, the rights of an accused, and
the privilege against self-incrimination. It is recognized that legislation is unnecessary to enable
courts to effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty
and the protection of property. The same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions
forbidding the taking or damaging of property for public use without just compensation.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in numerous cases,[67] this Court, even in the absence of implementing legislation, applied
directly the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions limiting land ownership to
Filipinos. In Soriano v. Ong Hoo,[68] this Court ruled:

x x x As the Constitution is silent as to the effects or consequences of a sale by a citizen of his

land to an alien, and as both the citizen and the alien have violated the law, none of them should
have a recourse against the other, and it should only be the State that should be allowed to
intervene and determine what is to be done with the property subject of the violation. We have
said that what the State should do or could do in such matters is a matter of public policy,
entirely beyond the scope of judicial authority. (Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al., 6 G. R.
No. L-5996, June 27, 1956.) While the legislature has not definitely decided what policy
should be followed in cases of violations against the constitutional prohibition, courts
of justice cannot go beyond by declaring the disposition to be null and void as violative
of the Constitution. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

To treat Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution as not self-executing would mean that since
the 1935 Constitution, or over the last 75 years, not one of the constitutional provisions
expressly reserving specific areas of investments to corporations, at least 60 percent of the
"capital" of which is owned by Filipinos, was enforceable. In short, the framers of the 1935, 1973
and 1987 Constitutions miserably failed to effectively reserve to Filipinos specific areas of
investment, like the operation by corporations of public utilities, the exploitation by corporations
of mineral resources, the ownership by corporations of real estate, and the ownership of
educational institutions. All the legislatures that convened since 1935 also miserably failed to
enact legislations to implement these vital constitutional provisions that determine who will
effectively control the national economy, Filipinos or foreigners. This Court cannot allow such an
absurd interpretation of the Constitution.

This Court has held that the SEC "has both regulatory and adjudicative functions."[69] Under its
regulatory functions, the SEC can be compelled by mandamus to perform its statutory duty
when it unlawfully neglects to perform the same. Under its adjudicative or quasi-judicial
functions, the SEC can be also be compelled by mandamus to hear and decide a possible
violation of any law it administers or enforces when it is mandated by law to investigate such
violation.

Under Section 17(4)[70] of the Corporation Code, the SEC has the regulatory function to reject or
disapprove the Articles of Incorporation of any corporation where "the required percentage of
ownership of the capital stock to be owned by citizens of the Philippines has not been
complied with as required by existing laws or the Constitution." Thus, the SEC is the
government agency tasked with the statutory duty to enforce the nationality requirement
prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution on the ownership of public utilities. This
Court, in a petition for declaratory relief that is treated as a petition for mandamus as in the
present case, can direct the SEC to perform its statutory duty under the law, a duty that the SEC
has apparently unlawfully neglected to do based on the 2010 GIS that respondent PLDT
submitted to the SEC.

Under Section 5(m) of the Securities Regulation Code,[71] the SEC is vested with the "power and
function" to "suspend or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the franchise or
certificate of registration of corporations, partnerships or associations, upon any of
the grounds provided by law." The SEC is mandated under Section 5(d) of the same Code
with the "power and function" to "investigate x x x the activities of persons to ensure
compliance" with the laws and regulations that SEC administers or enforces. The GIS that all
corporations are required to submit to SEC annually should put the SEC on guard against
violations of the nationality requirement prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws. This
Court can compel the SEC, in a petition for declaratory relief that is treated as a petition for
mandamus as in the present case, to hear and decide a possible violation of Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution in view of the ownership structure of PLDT's voting shares, as admitted
by respondents and as stated in PLDT's 2010 GIS that PLDT submitted to SEC.

WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition and rule that the term "capital" in Section 11,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election
of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total
outstanding capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares). Respondent Chairperson
of the Securities and Exchange Commission is DIRECTED to apply this definition of the term
"capital" in determining the extent of allowable foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, and if there is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law.

SO ORDERED.
RA 8491: FLAG AND HERALDIC CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

A.M. No. P-04-1795               March 25, 2009

[Formerly OCA I.P.I No. 02-1447-P]

ROQUE R. MARTINEZ, MARIA ELENA M. FELIPE, ROBERT R. MIñANO, ROSALINDA G. MACASA and
CIRIACO D. MARIVELES, JR., Complainants, 
vs.
NORVELL R. LIM, Sheriff III, Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This complaint involves two interrelated administrative charges against respondent Norvell R. Lim, Sheriff III of the
Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81.

On March 11, 2002, respondent sent a letter to Arsenio

R.M. Almaddin, officer-in-charge of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) of Romblon stating:

I wish to inform you that today, Monday, March 11, 2002, at 8 a.m., and for the month of March 2002, [it] is the turn
of the [OPP] to lead the flag ceremony.

However, this morning, this was not done because none of the personnel of your office was present.

We hope that we would be able to look forward to seeing all the personnel of [the OPP] in the Hall of Justice,
Romblon, Romblon, participate in [the flag ceremony] every Monday morning and Friday afternoon.1

On May 16, 2002 complainants Roque R. Martinez, Maria Elena M. Felipe, Robert R. Miñano, Rosalinda G. Macasa
and Ciriaco D. Mariveles, Jr., all employees of the OPP, filed an administrative complaint for grave misconduct
against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman.2 They asserted that respondent’s March 11, 2002 letter
portrayed them as unpatriotic Filipinos, tarnished their reputation as public officers and cast dishonor, disrepute and
contempt on their persons.

Respondent explained that, in the absence of the presiding judge, he was the administrative officer-in-charge of the
Hall of Justice. As such, it was his duty to require complainants to attend the flag ceremony. Thus, he wrote
Almaddin to remind him that the OPP had been assigned to lead the flag ceremony for the month of March 2002
and to inform him that no one from his office attended the ceremony that morning. Respondent denied ill-will against
complainants.

Subsequently, complainants filed another complaint against respondent charging him of violation of PD3 264 which
provides:

(1) Judges of the Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Courts, Courts of Agrarian Relations, Court of Industrial Relations, Military Tribunals and City and
Municipal Courts, may transmit in the mail, free of charge, all official communications and papers
directly connected with the conduct of judicial proceedings.

(2) The envelope or wrapper of the privileged mail matter shall bear on the left upper corner the name,
official designation and station of the official sending such mail matter and on the right upper corner, the
words: "Private or unauthorized use to avoid payment of postage is penalized by fine or
imprisonment or both." (emphasis supplied)
Complainants stated that respondent did not pay for postage stamps when he mailed copies of his counter-affidavit
to them. Since the mailed matter neither involved a court process nor was in any way connected to the conduct of
judicial proceedings, he was guilty of violating the said decree.

Respondent asserted that the allegations against him were baseless. In fact, the Ombudsman dismissed for lack of
probable cause the complaint for violation of PD 26.5

But the Ombudsman referred the administrative aspect of the complaints against respondent to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA).6

With regard to the complaint for grave misconduct, the OCA found that respondent bore no malice when he sent the
March 11, 2002 letter. It noted:

There is nothing in the letter that is suggestive of complainants’ lack of patriotism as to impute bad faith on the part
of respondent. Respondent was merely expressing his concern so that any similar incident may not happen again
mindful of everyone’s bounden duty to express and manifest their patriotism and love of country and respect for the
flag.

Thus, it recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.

With regard to the complaint for violation of PD 26, the OCA found that respondent mailed his counter-affidavit in the
previous complaint (for grave misconduct) using envelopes intended for free postage. Inasmuch as the mailed
matter was not an official communication related to the conduct of judicial proceedings, respondent was guilty of
violating the law. Hence, it recommended that complainant be fined ₱1,000.

We adopt the findings of the OCA with a modification of the penalty.

Misconduct implies wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment; an act that is corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.7

Flag ceremonies inspire patriotism and evoke the finest sentiments of love of country and people.8 Section 18 of
RA9 8491 provides:

Section 18. All government offices and educational institutions shall henceforth observe the flag-raising ceremony
every Monday morning and the flag lowering ceremony every Friday afternoon. The ceremony shall be simple and
dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine National Anthem.

Pursuant to this mandate, Supreme Court Circular No. 62-2001 (dated September 21, 2001) provides:

All Executive Judges shall supervise the holding of the flag raising and flag lowering ceremonies in their respective
Hall of Justice buildings or courthouses and shall ensure the attendance of all judges and court personnel in the
rites.

In deference to these mandates, the Chief State Prosecutor directed the personnel of the OPP to attend the flag
ceremony.10 lawphil.net

Consequently, as administrative officer-in-charge of the Hall of Justice of Romblon, respondent was duty-bound to
remind the employees to attend the flag ceremony. Furthermore, the March 11, 2002 letter (quoted above) was
courteously written. Respondent neither used offensive language nor insinuated that complainants were unpatriotic.
Thus, there was no misconduct on the part of respondent.

Nonetheless, we agree that respondent violated PD 26. In Bernadez v. Montejar,11 we held that the franking privilege
granted by PD 26 extended only to judges and referred to official communications and papers directly connected
with the conduct of judicial proceedings.12 Respondent was not a judge nor was the mailed matter related to the
discharge of judicial functions. Thus, respondent violated PD 26 for which a fine of ₱500 should be imposed on him.
Considering that respondent compulsorily retired on September 7, 2003, the fine of ₱500 shall be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for grave misconduct against Sheriff Norvell R. Lim is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit. But he is found guilty of violating Presidential Decree No. 26 and is hereby fined ₱500 which shall be
deducted from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.
AFP

G.R. No. 190793               June 19, 2012

MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO, Petitioner, 

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Rule 37, Section 1 of the Commission of Elections
(COMELEC) Rules of Procedure, in relation to Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Resolutions
1 

dated 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 issued by the COMELEC in SPP Case No. 09-073 (PP). 2 

On 2 July 2009, Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the
COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital
Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. In the Petition, MAGDALO was
3 

represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L.
Acedillo (Acedillo). The Petition was docketed as SPP No. 09-073 (PP) and raffled to the Second Division of the
4 

COMELEC (COMELEC–Second Division). 5 

In its Order dated 24 August 2009, the COMELEC–Second Division directed MAGDALO to cause the publication of
the Petition for Registration and the said Order in three daily newspapers of general circulation, and set the hearing
thereof on 3 September 2009. In compliance therewith, MAGDALO caused the publication of both documents in
6 

HATAW! No. 1 sa Balita, Saksi sa Balita and BOMBA BALITA (Saksi sa Katotohanan). 7 

On 3 September 2009, a hearing was conducted in which MAGDALO (a) established its compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements; (b) presented Acedillo as its witness; and (c) marked its documentary evidence in
support of its Petition for Registration. The following day, MAGDALO filed its Formal Offer of Evidence. 8 

On 26 October 2009, the COMELEC–Second Division issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration
filed by MAGDALO. The relevant portions of the assailed Resolution read:
9 

Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused registration in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the
Constitution. It is common knowledge that the party’s organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and
some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on
July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full
battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to
achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies. x x x

x x x           x x x          x x x

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)

10 

On 3 November 2009, MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En
Banc for resolution. 11 

Meanwhile, on 27 November 2009, MAGDALO filed a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System
of Representation in the 10 May 2010 Elections (Manifestation of Intent), in which it stated that its membership
includes "[f]ormer members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Anti-Corruption Advocates, Reform-
minded citizens." Thereafter, on 30 November 2009, it filed its Amended Manifestation, which bore the following
12 

footnote: 
13 

With all due respect to the Honorable Commission, the MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO ("MAGDALO")
manifests that the instant MANIFESTATION is being filed ex abutanti (sic) cautelam (out of the abundance of
caution) only and subject to the outcome of the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Magdalo in SPP
No. 09-073 (PP) from the Resolution dated 26 October 2009 of the Second Division of the Honorable Commission
denying its Petition for Registration/Accreditation as a Political Party based in the National Capital Region [NCR],
which motion is still pending the (sic) Honorable Commission En Banc. It is not in any way intended to preempt the
ruling of the Honorable Commission but merely to preserve the possibility of pursuing the Party’s participation in the
Party-List System of Representation in the eventuality that their Petition is approved.

Thereafter, MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution dated 23 December 2009, in which it
clarified its intention to participate in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections as a party-list group.
14 

In its assailed Resolution dated 4 January 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by MAGDALO. 15 

In the instant Petition, MAGDALO argues that (a) the COMELEC Resolutions were not based on the record or
evidence presented; (b) the Resolutions preempted the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, in
which several members of the military are being tried for their involvement in the siege of the Oakwood Premier
Apartments (Oakwood); and (c) it has expressly renounced the use of force, violence and other forms of unlawful
means to achieve its goals. Thus, MAGDALO prays for this Court to: (a) reverse and set aside the 26 October 2009
and 4 January 2010 COMELEC Resolutions; (b) grant its Petition for Registration; and (c) direct the COMELEC to
issue a Certificate of Registration. The Petition likewise includes a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
16 

Restraining Order (TRO), Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Injunctive Relief to direct the COMELEC
to allow MAGDALO to participate in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. However, this Court denied the
17 

issuance of a TRO in its Resolution dated 2 February 2010. 18 

To support the grant of reliefs prayed for, MAGDALO puts forward the following arguments:

The findings of the assailed resolutions on the basis of which the Petition was denied are based on pure
speculation. The Resolutions speculated as to the alleged motives and/or intentions of the founders of petitioner
Magdalo, which claims are not based on evidence but on mere conjecture and pure baseless presuppositions;

The assailed Resolutions effectively preempted the court trying the case. The subject Resolutions unfairly jumped to
the conclusion that the founders of the Magdalo "committed mutiny", "held innocent civilian personnel as hostage",
"employed violence" and "use[d] unlawful means" and "in the process defied the laws of organized society"
purportedly during the Oakwood incident when even the court trying their case, [Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Makati City], Branch 148, has not yet decided the case against them;

– and –

The Resolution violates the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of founders of the Magdalo and their
basic right of to [sic] due process of law. 19 

On the other hand, the COMELEC asserts that it had the power to ascertain the eligibility of MAGDALO for
registration and accreditation as a political party. It contends that this determination, as well as that of assessing
20 

whether MAGDALO advocates the use of force, would entail the evaluation of evidence, which cannot be reviewed
by this Court in a petition for certiorari.21 

However, MAGDALO maintains that although it concedes that the COMELEC has the authority to assess whether
parties applying for registration possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the applicable
law, the latter nevertheless committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its determination on pure conjectures
instead of on the evidence on record. 22 
Preliminary to the examination of the substantive issues, it must be discussed whether this case has been rendered
moot and academic by the conduct of the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. Although the subject Petition
for Registration filed by MAGDALO was intended for the elections on even date, it specifically asked for
accreditation as a regional political party for purposes of subsequent elections. 23 

Moreover, even assuming that the registration was only for the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections, this case
nevertheless comes under the exceptions to the rules on mootness, as explained in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo: 24 

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,
so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such
case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.

x x x           x x x          x x x

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when [the]
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (Emphasis supplied.)
25 

The second and fourth exceptions are clearly present in the case at bar. The instant action brings to the fore matters
of public concern, as it challenges the very notion of the use of violence or unlawful means as a ground for
disqualification from party registration. Moreover, considering the expressed intention of MAGDALO to join
subsequent elections, as well as the occurrence of supervening events pertinent to the case at bar, it remains
prudent to examine the issues raised and resolve the arising legal questions once and for all.

Having established that this Court can exercise its power of judicial review, the issue for resolution is whether the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the
ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means. This Court rules in the negative,
but without prejudice to MAGDALO’s filing anew of a Petition for Registration.

The COMELEC has a constitutional and statutory mandate to ascertain the eligibility of parties and organizations to
participate in electoral contests. The relevant portions of the 1987 Constitution read:

ARTICLE VI – LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

x x x           x x x          x x x

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

x x x           x x x          x x x

ARTICLE IX – CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

C. The Commission on Elections

x x x           x x x          x x x

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

x x x           x x x          x x x
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission
on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by
any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

Echoing these constitutional provisions, Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (BP 881), otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code, states:

Sec. 60. Political party. – "Political party" or "party," when used in this Act, means an organized group of persons
pursuing the same ideology, political ideals or platforms of government and includes its branches and divisions. To
acquire juridical personality, qualify it for subsequent accreditation, and to entitle it to the rights and
privileges herein granted to political parties, a political party shall first be duly registered with the
Commission. Any registered political party that, singly or in coalition with others, fails to obtain at least ten percent
of the votes cast in the constituency in which it nominated and supported a candidate or candidates in the election
next following its registration shall, after notice and hearing, be deemed to have forfeited such status as a registered
political party in such constituency.

Sec. 61. Registration. – Any organized group of persons seeking registration as a national or regional political party
may file with the Commission a verified petition attaching thereto its constitution and by-laws, platforms or program
of government and such other relevant information as may be required by the Commission. The Commission shall
after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within ten days from the date it is submitted for decision. No
religious sect shall be registered as a political party and no political party which seeks to achieve its goal
through violence shall be entitled to accreditation. (Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, reads in part:

Section 2. Declaration of policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadcast possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of
a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the
party-list system. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, to join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of registration and
accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal Party v. COMELEC: 26 

x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws; accreditation, on the
other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.

x x x           x x x          x x x

x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition; stated otherwise, a
registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried
out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow. (Emphasis supplied.)
27 

Considering the constitutional and statutory authority of the COMELEC to ascertain the eligibility of parties or
organizations seeking registration and accreditation, the pertinent question now is whether its exercise of this
discretion was so capricious or whimsical as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. In view of the facts available to the
COMELEC at the time it issued its assailed Resolutions, this Court rules that respondent did not commit grave
abuse of discretion.

A. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice of the Oakwood incident.

MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to have denied the Petition for
Registration not on the basis of facts or evidence on record, but on mere speculation and conjectures. This28 

argument cannot be given any merit.

Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of "public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration." Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative
29 

Code, specifically empowers administrative agencies to admit and give probative value to evidence commonly
acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable facts. Thus, in Saludo v.
30 

American Express, this Court explained as follows:

31 

The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those facts that
are "so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known x x x
as to make it indisputable among reasonable men." 32 

This Court has, in a string of cases, already taken judicial notice of the factual circumstances surrounding the
Oakwood standoff.  The incident involved over 300 heavily armed military officers and enlisted men – led by the
33 

founding members of MAGDALO – who surreptitiously took over Oakwood in the wee hours of 27 July 2003. They
disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building and within its vicinity. They aired
their grievances against the administration of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo),
withdrew their support from the government, and called for her resignation, as well as that of her cabinet members
and of the top officials of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). After
the ensuing negotiations for these military agents to lay down their weapons, defuse the explosives and return to the
barracks, the debacle came to a close at 11:00 p.m. on the same day. That the Oakwood incident was widely
34 

known and extensively covered by the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice. Thus, the COMELEC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated these facts as public knowledge, and took cognizance thereof
35 

without requiring the introduction and reception of evidence thereon.

B. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that MAGDALO uses violence or unlawful
means to achieve its goals.

In the instant Petition, MAGDALO claims that it did not resort to violence when it took over Oakwood because (a) no
one, either civilian or military, was held hostage; (b) its members immediately evacuated the guests and staff of the
hotel; and (c) not a single shot was fired during the incident. These arguments present a very narrow interpretation
36 

of the concepts of violence and unlawful means, and downplays the threat of violence displayed by the soldiers
during the takeover.

Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that "seek to achieve
their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in
Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that "no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall
be entitled to accreditation."

Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or
fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed against
37 

common right, against the laws, and against public liberty. On the other hand, an unlawful act is one that is contrary
38 

to law and need not be a crime, considering that the latter must still unite with evil intent for it to exist.
39 

In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence. As publicly announced by the
leaders of MAGDALO during the siege, their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the administration
of former President Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and the supposed sale of arms to
enemies of the state. Ultimately, they wanted the President, her cabinet members, and the top officials of the AFP
40 

and the PNP to resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by civilians, march in
41 
the premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and plant explosives in the building. These brash methods by
which MAGDALO opted to ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its support from the government
constituted clear acts of violence.

The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held hostage or that no shot was fired do not mask its use of
42 

impelling force to take over and sustain the occupation of Oakwood. Neither does its express renunciation of the
use of force, violence and other unlawful means in its Petition for Registration and Program of Government obscure 43 

the actual circumstances surrounding the encounter. The deliberate brandishing of military power, which included
the show of force, use of full battle gear, display of ammunitions, and use of explosive devices, engendered an
alarming security risk to the public. At the very least, the totality of these brazen acts fomented a threat of violence
that preyed on the vulnerability of civilians. The COMELEC did not, therefore, commit grave abuse of discretion
when it treated the Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of the predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to violence or
threats thereof in order to achieve its objectives.

C. The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or unlawful means did not operate as a
prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.

MAGDALO contends that the finding of the COMELEC that the former pursues its goals through violence or
unlawful means was tantamount to an unwarranted verdict of guilt for several crimes, which in effect, preempted the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and violated the right to presumption of innocence. This argument
44 

cannot be sustained.

The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to
register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in
character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking
45 

registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not
necessarily criminal in nature. Although this process does not entail any determination of administrative liability, as it
is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is
46 

nonetheless analogously applicable:

An administrative case is altogether different from a criminal case, such that the disposition in the former does not
necessarily result in the same disposition for the latter, although both may arise from the same set of facts. The
most that we can read from the finding of liability is that the respondents have been found to be administratively
guilty by substantial evidence – the quantum of proof required in an administrative proceeding. The requirement of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure…that the proposed witness should not appear to be the "most guilty" is
obviously in line with the character and purpose of a criminal proceeding, and the much stricter standards observed
in these cases. They are standards entirely different from those applicable in administrative
proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)
47 

Further, there is a well-established distinction between the quantum of proof required for administrative proceedings
and that for criminal actions, to wit:

As an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence at hand is measured is not the
highest quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, requiring moral certainty to support affirmative findings. Instead,
the lowest standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, applies. (Emphasis omitted.)
48 

In the case at bar, the challenged COMELEC Resolutions were issued pursuant to its administrative power to
evaluate the eligibility of groups to join the elections as political parties, for which the evidentiary threshold of
substantial evidence is applicable. In finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfil its
organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to whether the members of petitioner
committed crimes, as respondent was not required to make that determination in the first place. Its evaluation was
limited only to examining whether MAGDALO possessed all the necessary qualifications and none of
disqualifications for registration as a political party. In arriving at its assailed ruling, the COMELEC only had to
assess whether there was substantial evidence adequate to support this conclusion.

On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 is a criminal action charging members of MAGDALO with coup d’état
following the events that took place during the Oakwood siege. As it is a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is necessary. Therefore, although the registration case before the COMELEC and the criminal case before the
trial court may find bases in the same factual circumstances, they nevertheless involve entirely separate and distinct
issues requiring different evidentiary thresholds. The COMELEC correctly ruled thus:

It is at once apparent that that [sic] the proceedings in and the consequent findings of the Commission (Second
Division) in the subject resolution did not pre-empt the trial and decision of the court hearing the cases of the
Magdalo members. These are two different processes. The proceedings in the Commission is [sic] a petition for
registration of Magdalo as a political party and the Commission is empowered to ascertain facts and circumstances
relative to this case. It is not criminal in nature unlike the court case of the Magdalo founders. Thus, the Second
Division did not violate the right of the Magdalo founders to be presumed innocent until proven guilty when it
promulgated the questioned resolution. There is likewise no violation of due process. Accreditation as a political
party is not a right but only a privilege given to groups who have qualified and met the requirements provided by
law.49 

It is unmistakable from the above reasons that the ruling of the COMELEC denying the Petition for Registration filed
by MAGDALO has not, as respondent could not have, preempted Criminal Case No. 03-2784 or violated the right of
petitioner’s members to a presumption of innocence.

Subsequent Grant of Amnesty to the Military Personnel involved in the Oakwood standoff

It must be clarified that the foregoing discussion finding the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC is based on the facts available to it at the time it issued the assailed 26 October 2009 and 4 January
2010 Resolutions. It is crucial to make this qualification, as this Court recognizes the occurrence of supervening
events that could have altered the COMELEC’s evaluation of the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO. The
assessment of the COMELEC could have changed, had these incidents taken place before the opportunity to deny
the Petition arose. In the same manner that this Court takes cognizance of the facts surrounding the Oakwood
incident, it also takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty in favor of the soldiers who figured in this standoff.

This Court, in People v. Patriarca, explained the concept of amnesty, to wit:

50 

Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the
forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of
nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense.

x x x           x x x          x x x

In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty is given:

"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the
person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive
with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. x x x" (Emphasis
51 

supplied.)

Pursuant to Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution, President Benigno S. Aquino III issued on 24 November 2010
52 

Proclamation No. 75, which reads in part:

53 

GRANTING AMNESTY TO ACTIVE AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WHO MAY HAVE COMMITTED
CRIMES PUNISHABLE UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, THE ARTICLES OF WAR AND OTHER LAWS IN
CONNECTION WITH THE OAKWOOD MUTINY, THE MARINES STAND-OFF AND THE PENINSULA MANILA
HOTEL INCIDENT

WHEREAS, it is recognized that certain active and former personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
the Philippine National Police (PNP) and their supporters have or may have committed crimes punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War and other laws in connection with, in relation or incident to the July 27,
2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Manila Pen Incident;

WHEREAS, there is a clamor from certain sectors of society urging the President to extend amnesty to said AFP
personnel and their supporters;

WHEREAS, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution expressly vests the President the power to grant amnesty;

WHEREAS, the grant of amnesty in favor of the said active and former personnel of the AFP and PNP and their
supporters will promote an atmosphere conducive to the attainment of a just, comprehensive and enduring peace
and is in line with the Government’s peace and reconciliation initiatives;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by Section 19, Article VII of the Philippine Constitution, do hereby DECLARE and PROCLAIM:

SECTION 1. Grant of Amnesty. – Amnesty is hereby granted to all active and former personnel of the AFP and PNP
as well as their supporters who have or may have committed crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the
Articles of War or other laws in connection with, in relation or incident to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the
February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Manila Peninsula Incident who shall apply therefor;
Provided that amnesty shall not cover rape, acts of torture, crimes against chastity and other crimes committed for
personal ends.

x x x           x x x          x x x

SECTION 4. Effects. – (a) Amnesty pursuant to this proclamation shall extinguish any criminal liability for acts
committed in connection, incident or related to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines
Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Peninsula Manila Hotel Incident without prejudice to the grantee’s civil liability
for injuries or damages caused to private persons.

(b) Except as provided below, the grant of amnesty shall effect the restoration of civil and political rights or
entitlement of grantees that may have been suspended, lost or adversely affected by virtue of any executive,
administrative or criminal action or proceedings against the grantee in connection with the subject incidents,
including criminal conviction or (sic) any form, if any.

(c) All enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the rank of up to Technical Sergeant
and personnel of the PNP with the rank of up to Senior Police Officer 3, whose applications for amnesty
would be approved shall be entitled to reintegration or reinstatement, subject to existing laws and
regulations. However, they shall not be entitled to back pay during the time they have been discharged or
suspended from service or unable to perform their military or police duties.

(d) Commissioned and Non-commissioned officers of the AFP with the rank of Master Sergeant and
personnel of the PNP with the rank of at least Senior Police Officer 4 whose application for amnesty will be
approved shall not be entitled to remain in the service, reintegration or reinstatement into the service nor
back pay.

(e) All AFP and PNP personnel granted amnesty who are not reintegrated or reinstated shall be entitled to
retirement and separation benefits, if qualified under existing laws and regulation, as of the time [of]
separation, unless they have forfeited such retirement benefits for reasons other than the acts covered by
this Proclamation. Those reintegrated or reinstated shall be entitled to their retirement and separation
benefit[s] upon their actual retirement. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thereafter, the House of Representatives and the Senate adopted Concurrent Resolution No. 4 on 13 and 14
December 2010, respectively. Relevant portions of the Resolution partly read:
54 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION CONCURRING WITH PROCLAMATION NO. 75 OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES DATED 24 NOVEMBER 2010 ENTITLED "GRANTING AMNESTY TO ACTIVE
AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WHO MAY HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES PUNISHABLE UNDER THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, THE ARTICLES OF WAR AND OTHER LAWS IN CONNECTION WITH THE OAKWOOD MUTINY,
THE MARINES STAND-OFF AND THE PENINSULA MANILA HOTEL INCIDENT

WHEREAS, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution provides that the President shall have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of Congress;

x x x           x x x          x x x

WHEREAS, both Houses of Congress share the view of the President that in order to promote an atmosphere
conducive to the attainment of a just, comprehensive and enduing peace and in line with the Government’s peace
and reconciliation initiatives, there is a need to declare amnesty in favor of the said active and former personnel of
the AFP and PNP and their supporters;

WHEREAS, it is the sense of both House of Congress that it is imperative that an amnesty partaking the nature
proclaimed by His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, is necessary for the general interest of the
Philippines; xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

In light of the foregoing, to still sustain the finding, based on the participation of its members in the Oakwood
incident, that MAGDALO employs violence or other harmful means would be inconsistent with the legal effects of
amnesty. Likewise, it would not be in accord with the express intention of both the Executive and the Legislative
branches, in granting the said amnesty, to promote an atmosphere conducive to attaining peace in line with the
government’s peace and reconciliation initiatives.

Nevertheless, this Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions of the COMELEC as regards the use of violence. 1awp+

Thus, should MAGDALO decide to file another Petition for Registration, its officers must individually execute
+i1

affidavits renouncing the use of violence or other harmful means to achieve the objectives of their organization.
Further, it must also be underscored that the membership of MAGDALO cannot include military officers and/or
enlisted personnel in active service, as this act would run counter to the express provisions of the Constitution:

ARTICLE XVI – GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 5. (1) All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this
Constitution.

x x x           x x x          x x x

(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a prime
concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics.

No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote. 1âwphi1

(4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any
capacity to a civilian position in the Government including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of
their subsidiaries. (Emphasis supplied.)

This Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition for Registration
filed by MAGDALO. However, in view of the subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the members of MAGDALO,
the events that transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the
context of the disqualifications from party registration.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the filing anew of a Petition for Registration
by MAGDALO.

SO ORDERED.
POLICE FORCE

G.R. No. 187298               July 03, 2012

JAMAR M. KULAYAN, TEMOGEN S. TULAWIE, HJI. MOH. YUSOP ISMI, JULHAJAN AWADI, and SPO1
SATTAL H. JADJULI, Petitioners, 
vs.
GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu; GEN. JUANCHO SABAN, COL. EUGENIO
CLEMEN PN, P/SUPT. JULASIRIM KASIM and P/SUPT. BIENVENIDO G. LATAG, in their capacity as officers
of the Phil. Marines and Phil. National Police, respectively, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in
the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, a Swiss national and head of the ICRC in
1 

Zamboanga City, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national and ICRC delegate, and Marie Jean Lacaba, a Filipino
engineer, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a
water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later
confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The leader of the alleged kidnappers was identified as
2 

Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail. News reports linked Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known
leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.

On 21 January 2009, a task force was created by the ICRC and the Philippine National Police (PNP), which then
organized a parallel local group known as the Local Crisis Committee. The local group, later renamed Sulu Crisis
3 

Management Committee, convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial
Governor of Sulu. Its armed forces component was headed by respondents General Juancho Saban, and his
deputy, Colonel Eugenio Clemen. The PNP component was headed by respondent Police Superintendent
Bienvenido G. Latag, the Police Deputy Director for Operations of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). 4 

Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians coming from different
municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul. The organization of the CEF was embodied in
5 

a "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into

6 

between three parties: the provincial government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine National Police, represented by P/SUPT. Latag. The
Whereas clauses of the Memorandum alluded to the extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the willingness of civilian
supporters of the municipal mayors to offer their services in order that "the early and safe rescue of the hostages
may be achieved." 7 

This Memorandum, which was labeled ‘secret’ on its all pages, also outlined the responsibilities of each of the party
signatories, as follows:

Responsibilities of the Provincial Government:

1) The Provincial Government shall source the funds and logistics needed for the activation of the CEF;

2) The Provincial Government shall identify the Local Government Units which shall participate in the
operations and to propose them for the approval of the parties to this agreement;

3) The Provincial Government shall ensure that there will be no unilateral action(s) by the CEF without the
knowledge and approval by both parties.

Responsibilities of AFP/PNP/ TF ICRC (Task Force ICRC):

 1) The AFP/PNP shall remain the authority as prescribed by law in military operations and law enforcement;

2) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the orderly deployment of the CEF in the performance of their assigned
task(s);

3) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the safe movements of the CEF in identified areas of operation(s);

4) The AFP/PNP shall provide the necessary support and/or assistance as called for in the course of
operation(s)/movements of the CEF. 8 

Meanwhile, Ronaldo Puno, then Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, announced to the
media that government troops had cornered some one hundred and twenty (120) Abu Sayyaf members along with
the three (3) hostages. However, the ASG made
9 

contact with the authorities and demanded that the military pull its troops back from the jungle area. The
10 

government troops yielded and went back to their barracks; the Philippine Marines withdrew to their camp, while
police and civilian forces pulled back from the terrorists’ stronghold by ten (10) to fifteen (15) kilometers. Threatening
that one of the hostages will be beheaded, the ASG further demanded the evacuation of the military camps and
bases in the different barangays in Jolo. The authorities were given no later than 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 31
11 

March 2009 to comply. 12 

On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state
of emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration,
13 

describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security

Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on
the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and
calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless
violence.

In the same Proclamation, respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and
chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public
safety. The pertinent portion of the proclamation states:

NOW, THEREFORE, BY VIRTUE OF THE POWERS VESTED IN ME BY LAW, I, ABDUSAKUR MAHAIL TAN,
GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF SULU, DO HEREBY DECLARE A STATE OF EMERGENCY IN THE
PROVINCE OF SULU, AND CALL ON THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CIVILIAN EMERGENCY FORCE TO IMPLEMENT THE
FOLLOWING:

1. The setting-up of checkpoints and chokepoints in the province;

2. The imposition of curfew for the entire province subject to such Guidelines as may be issued by proper
authorities;

3. The conduct of General Search and Seizure including arrests in the pursuit of the kidnappers and their
supporters; and

4. To conduct such other actions or police operations as may be necessary to ensure public safety.

DONE AT THE PROVINCIAL CAPITOL, PROVINCE OF SULU THIS

31STDAY OF MARCH 2009. Sgd. Abdusakur M. Tan Governor. 14 

On 1 April 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was instructed by his superior to report to respondent P/SUPT. Julasirim
Kasim. Upon arriving at the police station, he was booked, and interviewed about his relationship to Musin, Jaiton,
15 
and Julamin, who were all his deceased relatives. Upon admitting that he was indeed related to the three, he was
detained. After a few hours, former Punong Barangay Juljahan Awadi, Hadji Hadjirul Bambra, Abdugajir Hadjirul, as
well as PO2 Marcial Hajan, SPO3 Muhilmi Ismula, Punong Barangay Alano Mohammad and jeepney driver
Abduhadi Sabdani, were also arrested. The affidavit of the apprehending officer alleged that they were suspected
16  17 

ASG supporters and were being arrested under Proclamation 1-09. The following day, 2 April 2009, the hostage
Mary Jane Lacaba was released by the ASG.

On 4 April 2009, the office of Governor Tan distributed to civic organizations, copies of the "Guidelines for the
Implementation of Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 Declaring a State of Emergency in the Province of
Sulu." These Guidelines suspended all Permits to Carry
18 

Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFORs) issued by the Chief of the PNP, and allowed civilians to seek exemption
from the gun ban only by applying to the Office of the Governor and obtaining the appropriate identification cards.
The said guidelines also allowed general searches and seizures in designated checkpoints and chokepoints.

On 16 April 2009, Jamar M. Kulayan, Temogen S. Tulawie, Hadji Mohammad Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi, and SPO1
Sattal H. Jadjuli, residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, claiming that
19 

Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it
threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null
and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to
exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief
of the armed forces. Additionally, petitioners claim that the Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to
20 

create civilian armed forces under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own
private army.

In his Comment, Governor Tan contended that petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts when they
filed the instant petition directly in the court of last resort, even if both the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional
Trial Courts (RTC) possessed concurrent jurisdiction with the

Supreme Court under Rule 65. This is the only procedural defense raised by respondent Tan. Respondents Gen.
21 

Juancho Saban, Col. Eugenio Clemen, P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim, and P/SUPT. Bienvenido Latag did not file their
respective Comments. 1âwphi1

On the substantive issues, respondents deny that Proclamation 1-09 was issued ultra vires, as Governor Tan
allegedly acted pursuant to Sections 16 and 465 of the Local Government Code, which empowers the Provincial
Governor to carry out emergency measures during calamities and disasters, and to call upon the appropriate
national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition. Furthermore,
22 

the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sulu authorized the declaration of a state of emergency as evidenced by
Resolution No. 4, Series of 2009 issued on 31 March 2009 during its regular session. 23 

The threshold issue in the present case is whether or not Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local
Government Code authorizes the respondent governor to declare a state of emergency, and exercise the powers
enumerated under Proclamation 1-09, specifically the conduct of general searches and seizures. Subsumed herein
is the secondary question of whether or not the provincial governor is similarly clothed with authority to convene the
CEF under the said provisions.

We grant the petition.

I. Transcendental public Importance warrants a relaxation of the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

We first dispose of respondents’ invocation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts which allegedly prevents judicial
review by this Court in the present case, citing for this specific purpose, Montes v. Court of Appeals and Purok
Bagong Silang Association, Inc. v. Yuipco. Simply put, the
24 
doctrine provides that where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the CA or the
RTC, it is in either of these courts and not in the Supreme Court, that the specific action for the issuance of such writ
must be sought unless special and important laws are clearly and specifically set forth in the petition. The reason for
this is that this Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to perform the functions assigned to it by the
Constitution and immemorial tradition. It cannot be burdened with deciding cases in the first instance. 25 

The said rule, however, is not without exception. In Chavez v. PEA-Amari, the Court stated:
26 

PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the Court. The principle
of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court
cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional questions of
transcendental importance to the public. The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue
related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the
Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant
case.27 

The instant case stems from a petition for certiorari and prohibition, over which the Supreme Court possesses
original jurisdiction. More crucially, this case involves acts of a public official which pertain to restrictive custody,
28 

and is thus impressed with transcendental public importance that would warrant the relaxation of the general rule.
The Court would be remiss in its constitutional duties were it to dismiss the present petition solely due to claims of
judicial hierarchy.

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court highlighted the transcendental public importance involved in cases that
29 

concern restrictive custody, because judicial review in these cases serves as "a manifestation of the crucial defense
of civilians ‘in police power’ cases due to the diminution of their basic liberties under the guise of a state of
emergency." Otherwise, the importance of the high tribunal as the court of last resort would be put to naught,
30 

considering the nature of "emergency" cases, wherein the proclamations and issuances are inherently short-lived. In
finally disposing of the claim that the issue had become moot and academic, the Court also cited transcendental
public importance as an exception, stating:

Sa kabila ng pagiging akademiko na lamang ng mga isyu tungkol sa mahigpit na pangangalaga (restrictive custody)
at pagmonitor ng galaw (monitoring of movements) ng nagpepetisyon, dedesisyunan namin ito (a) dahil sa
nangingibabaw na interes ng madla na nakapaloob dito,

(b) dahil sa posibilidad na maaaring maulit ang pangyayari at (c) dahil kailangang maturuan ang kapulisan tungkol
dito.

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when [the]
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

…There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest, involving as they do the people’s basic
rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the

Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of
the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of
repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.

Evidently, the triple reasons We advanced at the start of Our ruling are justified under the foregoing exceptions.
Every bad, unusual incident where police officers figure in generates public interest and people watch what will be
done or not done to them. Lack of disciplinary steps taken against them erode public confidence in the police
institution. As petitioners themselves assert, the restrictive custody of policemen under investigation is an existing
practice, hence, the issue is bound to crop up every now and then. The matter is capable of repetition or susceptible
of recurrence. It better be resolved now for the education and guidance of all concerned. (Emphasis supplied)
31 
Hence, the instant petition is given due course, impressed as it is with transcendental public importance.

II. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the Republic

i. One executive, one commander-in-chief

As early as Villena v. Secretary of Interior, it has already been established that there is one repository of executive
32 

powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution
speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. As emphasized by Justice Jose P.
33 

Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena:

With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is
readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single, not plural,
Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the
enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means
that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. 34 

Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided
under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under
Section 7, Article VII thereof.

ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they are exercised by one president

Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the notion that there are certain acts
which, by their very nature, may only be performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or
prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion.
The President’s Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by the legislative act of Congress, as
embodied in the second paragraph of Section 23, Article 6 of the Constitution:

Article 6, Sec 23(2). In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. 35 

Article 7, Sec 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene
in accordance with its rules without need of a call. 36 

The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme Court’s authority to review the factual basis
thereof.  By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial
37 

law, is bestowed upon the President alone. As noted in Villena, "(t)here are certain constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of
approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is
his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law x x x. 38 
Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority
39 

is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net
effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII,

Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The
Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as
Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he
would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is
his. As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by
40 

law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual. 41 

In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the Court had occasion to rule that the calling-out powers
42 

belong solely to the President as commander-in-chief:

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers
and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s
wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity
of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally
bereft of factual basis.

There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call
out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. (Emphasis supplied)
43 

Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review
the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out
power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers
and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. 44 

That the power to call upon the armed forces is discretionary on the president is clear from the deliberation of the
Constitutional Commission:

FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as
Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence;
then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated
sequence.

When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his
judgment is subject to review. We are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence
by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it
is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.

x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the
lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the
power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.
x x x Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (Emphasis Supplied)
45 

In the more recent case of Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia, the Court characterized these powers as exclusive to the
46 

President, precisely because they are of exceptional import:

These distinctions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There are certain
presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of
fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-
equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this
special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is
by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and
exceptional import.47 

In addition to being the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President also acts as the leader of the
country’s police forces, under the mandate of Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that, "The
President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed." During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the framing of this provision, Fr.
Bernas defended the retention of the word "control," employing the same rationale of singularity of the office of the
president, as the only Executive under the presidential form of government. 48 

Regarding the country’s police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that: "The State shall establish
and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and
controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction
shall be provided by law."49 

A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the police, and may
50 

exercise control only in day-to-day operations, viz:

Mr. Natividad: By experience, it is not advisable to provide either in our Constitution or by law full control of the
police by the local chief executive and local executives, the mayors. By our experience, this has spawned
warlordism, bossism and sanctuaries for vices and abuses. If the national government does not have a mechanism
to supervise these 1,500 legally, technically separate police forces, plus 61 city police forces, fragmented police
system, we will have a lot of difficulty in presenting a modern professional police force. So that a certain amount of
supervision and control will have to be exercised by the national government.

For example, if a local government, a town cannot handle its peace and order problems or police problems, such as
riots, conflagrations or organized crime, the national government may come in, especially if requested by the local
executives. Under that situation, if they come in under such an extraordinary situation, they will be in control. But if
the day-to-day business of police investigation of crime, crime prevention, activities, traffic control, is all lodged in
the mayors, and if they are in complete operational control of the day-to-day business of police service, what the
national government would control would be the administrative aspect.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Mr. de los Reyes: so the operational control on a day-to-day basis, meaning, the usual duties being performed by
the ordinary policemen, will be under the supervision of the local executives?

Mr. Natividad: Yes, Madam President.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Mr. de los Reyes: But in exceptional cases, even the operational control can be taken over by the National Police
Commission?
Mr. Natividad: If the situation is beyond the capacity of the local governments. (Emphases supplied)
51 

Furthermore according to the framers, it is still the President who is authorized to exercise supervision and control
over the police, through the National Police Commission:

Mr. Rodrigo: Just a few questions. The President of the Philippines is the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed
forces.

Mr. Natividad: Yes, Madam President.

Mr. Rodrigo: Since the national police is not integrated with the armed forces, I do not suppose they come under the
Commander-in-Chief powers of the President of the Philippines.

Mr. Natividad: They do, Madam President. By law, they are under the supervision and control of the President of the
Philippines.

Mr. Rodrigo: Yes, but the President is not the Commander-in-Chief of the national police.

Mr. Natividad: He is the President.

Mr. Rodrigo: Yes, the Executive. But they do not come under that specific provision that the President is the
Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces.

Mr. Natividad: No, not under the Commander-in-Chief provision.

Mr. Rodrigo: There are two other powers of the President. The

President has control over ministries, bureaus and offices, and supervision over local governments. Under which
does the police fall, under control or under supervision?

Mr. Natividad: Both, Madam President.

Mr. Rodrigo: Control and supervision.

Mr. Natividad: Yes, in fact, the National Police Commission is under the Office of the President. 52 

In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the above provision it is clear that the framers never
intended for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency situations. This is
without prejudice to their authority over police units in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and their prerogative to
seek assistance from the police in day to day situations, as contemplated by the Constitutional Commission. But as
a civilian agency of the government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and is subject to,
the exercise by the President of the power of executive control. 53 

iii. The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President

Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at
his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a
state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The
calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official,
even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the
Local Government Code, as will be discussed subsequently.

Respondents, however, justify this stance by stating that nowhere in the seminal case of David v. Arroyo, which
dealt squarely with the issue of the declaration of a state of emergency, does it limit the said authority to the
President alone. Respondents contend that the ruling in David expressly limits the authority to declare a national
emergency, a condition which covers the entire country, and does not include emergency situations in local
government units. This claim is belied by the clear intent of the framers that in all situations involving threats to
54 

security, such as lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, even in localized areas, it is still the President who
possesses the sole authority to exercise calling-out powers. As reflected in the Journal of the Constitutional
Commission:

Thereafter, Mr. Padilla proposed on line 29 to insert the phrase OR PUBLIC DISORDER in lieu of "invasion or
rebellion." Mr. Sumulong stated that the committee could not accept the amendment because under the first section
of Section 15, the President may call out and make use of the armed forces to prevent or suppress not only lawless
violence but even invasion or rebellion without declaring martial law. He observed that by deleting "invasion or
rebellion" and substituting PUBLIC DISORDER, the President would have to declare martial law before he can
make use of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless invasion or rebellion.

Mr. Padilla, in reply thereto, stated that the first sentence contemplates a lighter situation where there is some
lawless violence in a small portion of the country or public disorder in another at which times, the armed forces can
be called to prevent or suppress these incidents. He noted that the Commander-in-Chief can do so in a minor
degree but he can also exercise such powers should the situation worsen. The words "invasion or rebellion" to be
eliminated on line 14 are covered by the following sentence which provides for "invasion or rebellion." He
maintained that the proposed amendment does not mean that under such circumstances, the President cannot call
on the armed forces to prevent or suppress the same. (Emphasis supplied)
55 

III. Section 465 of the Local

Government Code cannot be invoked to justify the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09

Respondent governor characterized the kidnapping of the three ICRC workers as a terroristic act, and used this
incident to justify the exercise of the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09. He invokes Section 465, in
56 

relation to Section 16, of the Local Government Code, which purportedly allows the governor to carry out emergency
measures and call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies for assistance. But a closer look at the
said proclamation shows that there is no provision in the Local Government Code nor in any law on which the broad
and unwarranted powers granted to the Governor may be based.

Petitioners cite the implementation of "General Search and Seizure including arrests in the pursuit of the kidnappers
and their supporters," as being violative of the constitutional proscription on general search warrants and general
57 

seizures. Petitioners rightly assert that this alone would be sufficient to render the proclamation void, as general
searches and seizures are proscribed, for being violative of the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, particularly:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. 58 

In fact, respondent governor has arrogated unto himself powers exceeding even the martial law powers of the
President, because as the Constitution itself declares, "A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
the jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ."59 

We find, and so hold, that there is nothing in the Local Government Code which justifies the acts sanctioned under
the said Proclamation. Not even Section 465 of the said Code, in relation to Section 16, which states:

Section 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions, and Compensation.

x x x           x x x          x x x

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the province
and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the provincial governor shall:
(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the provincial
government, and in this connection, shall:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(vii) Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the aftermath of man-made and
natural disasters and calamities;

(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the province and the exercise of the appropriate
corporate powers provided for under Section 22 of this Code, implement all approved policies, programs, projects,
services and activities of the province and, in addition to the foregoing, shall:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(vi) Call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence,
rebellion or sedition or to apprehend violators of the law when public interest so requires and the police forces of the
component city or municipality where the disorder or violation is happening are inadequate to cope with the situation
or the violators.

Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment
of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain
peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (Emphases supplied)

Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 above, as the said provision expressly
refers to calamities and disasters, whether man-made or natural. The governor, as local chief executive of the
province, is certainly empowered to enact and implement emergency measures during these occurrences. But the
kidnapping incident in the case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster. Respondents cannot find
any legal mooring under this provision to justify their actions.

Paragraph 2, subparagraph (vi) of the same provision is equally inapplicable for two reasons. First, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines does not fall under the category of a "national law enforcement agency," to which the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its departments belong.

Its mandate is to uphold the sovereignty of the Philippines, support the Constitution, and defend the Republic
against all enemies, foreign and domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of the national territory.
60 

Second, there was no evidence or even an allegation on record that the local police forces were inadequate to cope
with the situation or apprehend the violators. If they were inadequate, the recourse of the provincial governor was to
ask the assistance of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, or such other authorized officials, for the
assistance of national law enforcement agencies.

The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently vested in the National
Government, especially not the prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of security
and defense.

The intent behind the powers granted to local government units is fiscal, economic, and administrative in
nature. The Code is concerned only with powers that would make the delivery of basic services more effective to
1âwphi1

the constituents, and should not be unduly stretched to confer calling-out powers on local executives.
61 

In the sponsorship remarks for Republic Act 7160, it was stated that the devolution of powers is a step towards the
autonomy of local government units (LGUs), and is actually an experiment whose success heavily relies on the
power of taxation of the LGUs. The underpinnings of the Code can be found in Section 5, Article II of the 1973
Constitution, which allowed LGUs to create their own sources of revenue. During the interpellation made by Mr.
62 

Tirol addressed to Mr. de Pedro, the latter emphasized that "Decentralization is an administrative concept and the
process of shifting and delegating power from a central point to subordinate levels to promote independence,
responsibility, and quicker decision-making. … (I)t does not involve any transfer of final authority from the national to
field levels, nor diminution of central office powers and responsibilities. Certain government agencies, including the
police force, are exempted from the decentralization process because their functions are not inherent in local
government units." 63 

IV. Provincial governor is not authorized to convene CEF

Pursuant to the national policy to establish one police force, the organization of private citizen armies is proscribed.
Section 24 of Article XVIII of the Constitution mandates that:

Private armies and other armed groups not recognized by duly constituted authority shall be dismantled. All
paramilitary forces including Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) not consistent with the citizen armed force
established in this Constitution, shall be dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force.

Additionally, Section 21of Article XI states that, "The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the
responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in
accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National
Government."

Taken in conjunction with each other, it becomes clear that the Constitution does not authorize the organization of
private armed groups similar to the CEF convened by the respondent Governor. The framers of the Constitution
were themselves wary of armed citizens’ groups, as shown in the following proceedings:

MR. GARCIA: I think it is very clear that the problem we have here is a paramilitary force operating under the cloak,
under the mantle of legality is creating a lot of problems precisely by being able to operate as an independent
private army for many regional warlords. And at the same time, this I think has been the thrust, the intent of many of
the discussions and objections to the paramilitary units and the armed groups.

MR. PADILLA: My proposal covers two parts: the private armies of political warlords and other armed torces not
recognized by constituted authority which shall be dismantled and dissolved. In my trips to the provinces, I heard of
many abuses committed by the CHDF (Civilian Home Defense Forces), specially in Escalante, Negros Occidental.
But I do not know whether a particular CHDF is approved or authorized by competent authority. If it is not
authorized, then the CHDF will have to be dismantled. If some CHDFs, say in other provinces, are authorized by
constituted authority, by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the Chief of Staff or the Minister of National
Defense, if they are recognized and authorized, then they will not be dismantled. But I cannot give a categorical
answer to any specific CHDF unit, only the principle that if they are armed forces which are not authorized, then they
should be dismantled.  (Emphasis supplied)
64 

Thus, with the discussions in the Constitutional Commission as guide, the creation of the Civilian Emergency Force
(CEF) in the present case, is also invalid.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Judgment is rendered commanding respondents to desist from
further proceedings m implementing Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, and its Implementing Guidelines. The said
proclamation and guidelines are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193636               July 24, 2012

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner, 
vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT.
WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos
Norte, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) filed pursuant to Rule 19 of the1 

Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, seeking a review of the 9 September 2010 Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 of
2 

the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13). The questioned Decision denied
3 

petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data.

4 

At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras,
Ilocos Norte. Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-
5 

Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the Provincial
Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office. 6 

On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275),
"Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country." The 7 

body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission, was formed to investigate the existence of
8 

private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and
dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission
9 

released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.:
The Independent Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to the President" (the Report). 10 

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly
11  12 

without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. More
13  14 

specifically, she pointed out the following items reflected therein:

(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status of PAGs in the Philippines. 15 

(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task Group (STG) for each
private armed group (PAG) to monitor and counteract their activities." 16 

(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP and captioned as "Status of
PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010," which classifies PAGs in the country according to region,
indicates their identity, and lists the prominent personalities with whom these groups are associated. The 17 

first entry in the table names a PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked to herein petitioner Gamboa. 18 

(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to wit:

The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in Malacañang on March 24, 2010 at
which time, the Commission was also asked to comment on the PNP report that out of one hundred
seventeen (117) partisan armed groups validated, twenty-four (24) had been dismantled with sixty-seven
(67) members apprehended and more than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.

Commissioner Herman Basbaño qualified that said statistics were based on PNP data but that the more
significant fact from his report is that the PNP has been vigilant in monitoring the activities of these armed
groups and this vigilance is largely due to the existence of the Commission which has continued
 communicating with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP personnel in the field to constantly
provide data on the activities of the PAGs. Commissioner Basbaño stressed that the Commission’s efforts
have preempted the formation of the PAGs because now everyone is aware that there is a body monitoring
the PAGs movement through the PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant General Edilberto Pardo Adan also
clarified that the PAGs are being destabilized so that their ability to threaten and sow fear during the election
has been considerably weakened. 19 

(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:

Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly reflective of the situation in the field, the
PNP complied with the Commission’s recommendation that they revise their validation system to include those
PAGs previously listed as dormant. In the most recent briefing provided by the PNP on April 26, 2010, there are one
hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these groups, the PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have been
reorganized. 20 

On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report naming
Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Gamboa averred that her association with a
21 

PAG also appeared on print media. Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis
22 

of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission. As a 23 

result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as
published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to
harassment and police surveillance operations. 24 

Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a
Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as
officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified
25 

reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c)
rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports
against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless reports. 26 

The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13, which issued the corresponding
writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition meritorious on its face. Thus, the trial court (a) instructed respondents
27 

to submit all information and reports forwarded to and used by the Zeñarosa Commission as basis to include her in
the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed respondents, and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and
desist from forwarding to the Zeñarosa Commission, or to any other government entity, information that they may
have gathered against her without the approval of the court; (c) ordered respondents to make a written return of the
writ together with supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the summary hearing of the case on 23 July 2010. 28 

In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the bounds of their mandate in conducting
the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa. The information stored in their database supposedly pertained to two
29 

criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for murder and frustrated murder docketed as
NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a Complaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a
person in authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple attempted murder, docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-
INV-10-A-00009. 30 

Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the following requisites
under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right to privacy was violated or threatened
with violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions and recourses she
took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the files, registers or databases, the government office,
and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information. They also contended that the
31 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was
not the proper remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa. 32 

RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the Petition. The trial court categorically
33 

ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a
violation of her right to privacy, to wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa’s right
to privacy indubitably has been violated. The violation understandably affects her life, liberty and security
enormously. The untold misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be insurmountable. As she
essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her security that at any time of the day the unlimited powers of
respondents may likely be exercised to further malign and destroy her reputation and to transgress her right to life.

By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed that there was certainly intrusion
into Gamboa’s activities. It cannot be denied that information was gathered as basis therefor. After all, under
Administrative Order No. 275, the Zeñarosa Commission was tasked to investigate the existence of private armies
in the country, with all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987.

x x x           x x x          x x x

By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she accused respondents, who are
public officials, of having gathered and provided information that made the Zeñarosa Commission to include her in
the list. Obviously, it was this gathering and forwarding of information supposedly by respondents that petitioner
barks at as unlawful. x x x.34 

Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to
prove through substantial evidence that the subject information originated from respondents, and that they
forwarded this database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification. The trial court also
35 

ruled that even before respondents assumed their official positions, information on her may have already been
acquired. Finally, it held that the Zeñarosa Commission, as the body tasked to gather information on PAGs and
36 

authorized to disclose information on her, should have been impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party to
the Petition. 37 

Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010, raising the following assignment of
38 

errors:

1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zeñarosa Commission be impleaded as either a necessary or
indispensable party;

2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present sufficient proof to link respondents as the
informant to [sic] the Zeñarosa Commission;

3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;

4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zeñarosa Commission to [sic] the PNP as
alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;

5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an agency. 39 

On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa failed to present substantial
evidence to show that her right to privacy in life, liberty or security was violated, and (b) the trial court correctly
dismissed the Petition on the ground that she had failed to present sufficient proof showing that respondents were
the source of the report naming her as one who maintains a PAG. 40 

Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling the mandate to dismantle PAGs in
the country should be done in accordance with due process, such that the gathering and forwarding of unverified
information on her must be considered unlawful. She also reiterates that she was able to present sufficient
41 

evidence showing that the subject information originated from respondents. 42 

In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data, this Court is called upon
to, first, unpack the concept of the right to privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary
remedy that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally, contextualize the right to privacy vis-à-vis
the state interest involved in the case at bar.
The Right to Privacy

The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional right. This Court,
in Morfe v. Mutuc, thus enunciated:
43 

The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in
disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of
assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice
Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it
must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of
all freedom." As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."

The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique
individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. xxx.

x x x           x x x          x x x

x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for five members of the Court,
stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in
any house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth
Amendment explicitly affirms the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: ‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." After referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, Justice
Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate
one."

x x x           x x x          x x x

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between
absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the
hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards a private sector, which
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this
private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly
important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization,
and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society." (Emphases supplied)
44 

In Ople v. Torres, this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the right to privacy in Philippine
45 

jurisdiction, to wit:

Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several
provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "every person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as
actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public
officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another
person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a
crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling.
Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act
and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy
of certain information.

Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by
the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x. (Emphases supplied)
46 

Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint.
However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, this Court underscored that the right to
47 

privacy is not absolute, viz:

With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that privacy is
not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights
of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to
thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access
information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions.
In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state
interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of
the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to
ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who
invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed
with the assailed legislative investigation.
48 

Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are required to weigh
both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless
succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.

The Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly
49 

in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus
50 

between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:

Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and jurisprudence. Considering that even the
Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the
European tradition of data protection, this Court can be guided by cases on the protection of personal data decided
51 

by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v. Sweden, in which the ECHR
52 

balanced the right of citizens to be free from interference in their private affairs with the right of the state to protect
its national security. In this case, Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen, worked as a temporary replacement
museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent to a restricted military security zone. He was refused
53 

employment when the requisite personnel control resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the basis of information in
the secret police register, which was kept in accordance with the Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was
prevented access. He claimed, among others, that this procedure of security control violated Article 8 of the
54 

European Convention of Human Rights on the right to privacy, as nothing in his personal or political background
55 

would warrant his classification in the register as a security risk. 56 

The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information relating to the private life of Leander,
coupled with the refusal to allow him the opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an interference in his right to
respect for private life. However, the ECHR held that the interference was justified on the following grounds: (a) the
57 

personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which was the protection of national security, and (b) the Personnel
58 

Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indication as to the scope and the manner of exercising discretion in
the collection, recording and release of information by the authorities. The following statements of the ECHR must
59 

be emphasized:

58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in
particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia, the Gillow judgment of 24
November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, § 55).

59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a margin of appreciation, the scope of
which will depend not only on the nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on the particular nature of
the interference involved. In the instant case, the interest of the respondent State in protecting its national
security must be balanced against the seriousness of the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for
his private life.

There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national security, for the Contracting States
to have laws granting the competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to collect and store in registers not
accessible to the public information on persons and, secondly, to use this information when assessing the suitability
of candidates for employment in posts of importance for national security.

Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leander’s legitimate interests through the
consequences it had on his possibilities of access to certain sensitive posts within the public service. On the other
hand, the right of access to public service is not as such enshrined in the Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek
judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, §§ 34-35), and, apart from those consequences, the
interference did not constitute an obstacle to his leading a private life of his own choosing.

In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation available to the respondent State in
assessing the pressing social need in the present case, and in particular in choosing the means for achieving the
legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide one.
 x x x           x x x          x x x

66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by
itself warrant the conclusion that the interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security", as it is the very absence of such communication which, at least partly, ensures the efficacy of the
personnel control procedure (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no.
28, p. 27, § 58).

The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of the Ordinance of 1969, including
the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of communication
to the person concerned, as contained in section 13 of the Ordinance, should be effectively applied in so far as it did
not jeopardise the purpose of the control (see paragraph 31 above).

67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the safeguards contained in the Swedish
personnel control system meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having regard to the wide
margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent State was entitled to consider that in the present case the
interests of national security prevailed over the individual interests of the applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The
interference to which Mr. Leander was subjected cannot therefore be said to have been disproportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)

Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to privacy, may yield
to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of the writ of
habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged
intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.

The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis-à-vis the interest of the state to dismantle private
armies.

The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by
the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and
60 

civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police commission. 61 

Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state
aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.

To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the powers of an investigative
body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and records. A.O. 275 likewise
62 

authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist the commission
in the performance of its functions. 63 

Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the protection of lives and properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to
ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes. 64 

Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions accorded to the
Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs,
monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
65 

This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report listing her as a
PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by
the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life,
liberty or security.

The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically
created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa
Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus
had the power to request assistance from the latter.

Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa
Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same
cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial
component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.  Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a
1âwphi1

validation system, which was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the
data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information
66 

collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.

Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to make any further determination as to
the propriety of sharing information during specific stages of intelligence gathering. To do otherwise would supplant
the discretion of investigative bodies in the accomplishment of their functions, resulting in an undue encroachment
on their competence.

However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law and jurisprudence, this
Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities that information-sharing must observe
strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the
relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of one’s
person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary
sensibilities."
67 

In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential nature.  That it was
1âwphi1

leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that
Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are
other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary
remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.

Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list
of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police
surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in
relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of
regularity, which she failed to overcome.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged
intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information
against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9
September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ
of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
COMMUNICATION STRUCTURES

G.R. No. 168338             February 15, 2008

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

A. Precis

In this jurisdiction, it is established that freedom of the press is crucial and so inextricably woven into
the right to free speech and free expression, that any attempt to restrict it must be met with an
examination so critical that only a danger that is clear and present would be allowed to curtail it.

Indeed, we have not wavered in the duty to uphold this cherished freedom. We have struck down
laws and issuances meant to curtail this right, as in Adiong v. COMELEC,1Burgos v. Chief of
Staff,2Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC,3 and Bayan v. Executive Secretary Ermita.4 When on its
face, it is clear that a governmental act is nothing more than a naked means to prevent the free
exercise of speech, it must be nullified.

B. The Facts

1. The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and local elections.
On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to
destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly
between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire-
tapping.5 Later, in a Malacañang press briefing, Secretary Bunye produced two versions of the tape,
one supposedly the complete version, and the other, a spliced, “doctored” or altered version, which
would suggest that the President had instructed the COMELEC official to manipulate the election
results in the President’s favor. 6 It seems that Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was that of
President Arroyo, but subsequently made a retraction. 7

2. On June 7, 2005, former counsel of deposed President Joseph Estrada, Atty. Alan Paguia,
subsequently released an alleged authentic tape recording of the wiretap. Included in the tapes were
purported conversations of the President, the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo, COMELEC
Commissioner Garcillano, and the late Senator Barbers.8

3. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned
reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing
its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons included Secretary
Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing
a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was
committed or was being committed in their presence.9
4. On June 9, 2005, in another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to go after media organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and
the printing of the contents of a tape” of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President
about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections. Gonzales said that he was going to start
with Inq7.net, a joint venture between the Philippine Daily Inquirer and GMA7 television network,
because by the very nature of the Internet medium, it was able to disseminate the contents of the
tape more widely. He then expressed his intention of inviting the editors and managers of Inq7.net
and GMA7 to a probe, and supposedly declared, “I [have] asked the NBI to conduct a tactical
interrogation of all concerned.” 10

5. On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued this press release: 11

NTC GIVES FAIR WARNING TO RADIO AND TELEVISION OWNERS/OPERATORS TO OBSERVE

ANTI-WIRETAPPING LAW AND PERTINENT CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM STANDARDS

xxx xxx xxx

Taking into consideration the country’s unusual situation, and in order not to unnecessarily aggravate
the same, the NTC warns all radio stations and television network owners/operators that the
conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by Government like the Provisional
Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that said companies shall not use [their]
stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. Relative
thereto, it has come to the attention of the [NTC] that certain personalities are in possession of
alleged taped conversations which they claim involve the President of the Philippines and a
Commissioner of the COMELEC regarding supposed violation of election laws.

These personalities have admitted that the taped conversations are products of illegal wiretapping
operations.

Considering that these taped conversations have not been duly authenticated nor could it be said at
this time that the tapes contain an accurate or truthful representation of what was recorded therein, it
is the position of the [NTC] that the continuous airing or broadcast of the said taped conversations by
radio and television stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions
of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to these radio and television
stations. It has been subsequently established that the said tapes are false and/or fraudulent after a
prosecution or appropriate investigation, the concerned radio and television companies are
hereby warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful
misrepresentation shall be just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of
the licenses or authorizations issued to the said companies.

In addition to the above, the [NTC] reiterates the pertinent NTC circulars on program standards to be
observed by radio and television stations. NTC Memorandum Circular 111-12-85 explicitly states,
among others, that “all radio broadcasting and television stations shall, during any broadcast or
telecast, cut off from the air the speech, play, act or scene or other matters being broadcast or
telecast the tendency thereof is to disseminate false information or such other willful
misrepresentation, or to propose and/or incite treason, rebellion or sedition.” The foregoing directive
had been reiterated by NTC Memorandum Circular No. 22-89, which, in addition thereto, prohibited
radio, broadcasting and television stations from using their stations to broadcast or telecast any
speech, language or scene disseminating false information or willful misrepresentation, or inciting,
encouraging or assisting in subversive or treasonable acts.
The [NTC] will not hesitate, after observing the requirements of due process, to apply with full
force the provisions of said Circulars and their accompanying sanctions on erring radio and
television stations and their owners/operators.

6. On June 14, 2005, NTC held a dialogue with the Board of Directors of the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP). NTC allegedly assured the KBP that the press release did not violate
the constitutional freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, and the right to information.
Accordingly, NTC and KBP issued a Joint Press Statement which states, among others, that: 12

 NTC respects and will not hinder freedom of the press and the right to information on matters
of public concern. KBP & its members have always been committed to the exercise of press
freedom with high sense of responsibility and discerning judgment of fairness and honesty.
 NTC did not issue any MC [Memorandum Circular] or Order constituting a restraint of press
freedom or censorship. The NTC further denies and does not intend to limit or restrict the
interview of members of the opposition or free expression of views.
 What is being asked by NTC is that the exercise of press freedom [be] done responsibly.
 KBP has program standards that KBP members will observe in the treatment of news and
public affairs programs. These include verification of sources, non-airing of materials that
would constitute inciting to sedition and/or rebellion.
 The KBP Codes also require that no false statement or willful misrepresentation is made in the
treatment of news or commentaries.
 The supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly
giving due consideration to the process being undertaken to verify and validate the authenticity
and actual content of the same.”

C. The Petition

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against respondents Secretary
Gonzales and the NTC, “praying for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, as
extraordinary legal remedies, to annul void proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful, unconstitutional
and oppressive exercise of authority by the respondents.”13

Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom on expression and of the press,
and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern,14 petitioner specifically asked
this Court:

[F]or [the] nullification of acts, issuances, and orders of respondents committed or made since June 6,
2005 until the present that curtail the public’s rights to freedom of expression and of the press, and to
information on matters of public concern specifically in relation to information regarding the
controversial taped conversion of President Arroyo and for prohibition of the further commission of
such acts, and making of such issuances, and orders by respondents. 15

Respondents16 denied that the acts transgress the Constitution, and questioned petitioner’s legal
standing to file the petition. Among the arguments they raised as to the validity of the “fair warning”
issued by respondent NTC, is that broadcast media enjoy lesser constitutional guarantees compared
to print media, and the warning was issued pursuant to the NTC’s mandate to regulate the
telecommunications industry. 17 It was also stressed that “most of the [television] and radio stations
continue, even to this date, to air the tapes, but of late within the parameters agreed upon between
the NTC and KBP.” 18

D. The Procedural Threshold: Legal Standing 

To be sure, the circumstances of this case make the constitutional challenge peculiar. Petitioner, who
is not a member of the broadcast media, prays that we strike down the acts and statements made by
respondents as violations of the right to free speech, free expression and a free press. For another,
the recipients of the press statements have not come forward—neither intervening nor joining
petitioner in this action. Indeed, as a group, they issued a joint statement with respondent NTC that
does not complain about restraints on freedom of the press.

It would seem, then, that petitioner has not met the requisite legal standing, having failed to allege
“such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.” 19

But as early as half a century ago, we have already held that where serious constitutional questions
are involved, “the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside if we must, technicalities of
procedure.” 20 Subsequently, this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural
barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on
public interest,21 in keeping with the Court’s duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or
not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the
laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.

Thus, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a case involves an issue of
overarching significance to our society,22 we therefore brush aside technicalities of procedure and
take cognizance of this petition,23 seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all the civil
rights, the freedom of expression. The petition raises other issues like the extent of the right to
information of the public. It is fundamental, however, that we need not address all issues but
only the most decisive one which in the case at bar is whether the acts of the respondents
abridge freedom of speech and of the press.

But aside from the primordial issue of determining whether free speech and freedom of the
press have been infringed, the case at bar also gives this Court the opportunity: (1) to distill
the essence of freedom of speech and of the press now beclouded by the vagaries of
motherhood statements; (2) to clarify the types of speeches and their differing restraints
allowed by law; (3) to discuss the core concepts of prior restraint, content-neutral and
content-based regulations and their constitutional standard of review; (4) to examine the
historical difference in the treatment of restraints between print and broadcast media and
stress the standard of review governing both; and (5) to call attention to the ongoing blurring
of the lines of distinction between print and broadcast media.

E. Re-examining The law on freedom of speech,

of expression and of the press

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. 24

Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of every democratic

government, and given a preferred right that stands on a higher level than substantive economic
freedom or other liberties. The cognate rights codified by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution,
copied almost verbatim from the First Amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights,25 were considered the
necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of free speech. 26 This
preferred status of free speech has also been codified at the international level, its recognition now
enshrined in international law as a customary norm that binds all nations.27
In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental
postulate of our constitutional system. 28 This right was elevated to constitutional status in the 1935,
the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, reflecting our own lesson of history, both political and legal, that
freedom of speech is an indispensable condition for nearly every other form of freedom.29 Moreover,
our history shows that the struggle to protect the freedom of speech, expression and the press was,
at bottom, the struggle for the indispensable preconditions for the exercise of other freedoms.30 For it
is only when the people have unbridled access to information and the press that they will be capable
of rendering enlightened judgments. In the oft-quoted words of Thomas Jefferson, we cannot both be
free and ignorant.

E.1. Abstraction of Free Speech

Surrounding the freedom of speech clause are various concepts that we have adopted as part and
parcel of our own Bill of Rights provision on this basic freedom.31 What is embraced under this
provision was discussed exhaustively by the Court in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 32 in
which it was held:

…At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly
and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and punishment. There is to be no
previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits,
prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and
present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. 33

Gonzales further explained that the vital need of a constitutional democracy for freedom of expression
is undeniable, whether as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment; of attaining the truth; of
assuring participation by the people in social, including political, decision-making; and of maintaining
the balance between stability and change.34 As early as the 1920s, the trend as reflected in Philippine
and American decisions was to recognize the broadest scope and assure the widest latitude for this
constitutional guarantee. The trend represents a profound commitment to the principle that debate on
public issue should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. 35

Freedom of speech and of the press means something more than the right to approve existing
political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, and to take refuge in
the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence.36 When atrophied, the right
becomes meaningless.37 The right belongs as well—if not more—to those who question, who do not
conform, who differ.38 The ideas that may be expressed under this freedom are confined not only to
those that are conventional or acceptable to the majority. To be truly meaningful, freedom of speech
and of the press should allow and even encourage the articulation of the unorthodox view, though it
be hostile to or derided by others; or though such view “induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.” 39 To paraphrase Justice
Holmes, it is freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us. 40

The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly all forms of
communication. It protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as well as political causes,
and is not confined to any particular field of human interest. The protection covers myriad matters of
public interest or concern embracing all issues, about which information is needed or appropriate, so
as to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period. The constitutional
protection assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech and free press for religious, political,
economic, scientific, news, or informational ends, inasmuch as the Constitution’s basic guarantee of
freedom to advocate ideas is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared
by a majority.
The constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas. The protection afforded free
speech extends to speech or publications that are entertaining as well as instructive or informative.
Specifically, in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans,41 this Court stated that all forms of
media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the clause on freedom of
speech and of expression.

While all forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of freedom of expression
clause, the freedom of film, television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope
than the freedom accorded to newspapers and other print media, as will be subsequently
discussed. 

E.2. Differentiation: The Limits & Restraints of Free Speech

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right to free speech
and a free press is not susceptible of any limitation. But the realities of life in a complex society
preclude a literal interpretation of the provision prohibiting the passage of a law that would abridge
such freedom. For freedom of expression is not an absolute, 42 nor is it an “unbridled license that
gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse
this freedom.”

Thus, all speech are not treated the same. Some types of speech may be subjected to some
regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not be injurious to the
equal right of others or those of the community or society.43 The difference in treatment is expected
because the relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g., political speech, may vary from those of
another, e.g.,obscene speech. Distinctions have therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and
evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of speech. 44 We have ruled,
for example, that in our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and obscene speech, as well as “fighting
words” are not entitled to constitutional protection and may be penalized.45

Moreover, the techniques of reviewing alleged restrictions on speech (overbreadth, vagueness, and
so on) have been applied differently to each category, either consciously or unconsciously. 46 A study
of free speech jurisprudence—whether here or abroad—will reveal that courts have developed
different tests as to specific types or categories of speech in concrete situations; i.e., subversive
speech; obscene speech; the speech of the broadcast media and of the traditional print media;
libelous speech; speech affecting associational rights; speech before hostile audiences; symbolic
speech; speech that affects the right to a fair trial; and speech associated with rights of assembly and
petition. 47

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination
of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a
rational connection has been established between the speech restrained and the danger
contemplated; 48 (b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to
balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of situation; 49 and (c)
the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained
because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a
right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, “extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.” 50

As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied either the dangerous tendency

doctrine or clear and present danger test to resolve free speech challenges. More recently, we
have concluded that we have generally adhered to the clear and present danger test. 51
 E.3. In Focus: Freedom of the Press

Much has been written on the philosophical basis of press freedom as part of the larger right of free
discussion and expression. Its practical importance, though, is more easily grasped. It is the chief
source of information on current affairs. It is the most pervasive and perhaps most powerful vehicle of
opinion on public questions. It is the instrument by which citizens keep their government informed of
their needs, their aspirations and their grievances. It is the sharpest weapon in the fight to keep
government responsible and efficient. Without a vigilant press, the mistakes of every administration
would go uncorrected and its abuses unexposed. As Justice Malcolm wrote in United States v.
Bustos:52

The interest of society and
affairs. Complete liberty to
speech. The sharp incision
suffer under a hostile and
conscience.
the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free
of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may
unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of clear

Its contribution to the public weal makes freedom of the press deserving of extra protection. Indeed,
the press benefits from certain ancillary rights. The productions of writers are classified as intellectual
and proprietary. Persons who interfere or defeat the freedom to write for the press or to maintain a
periodical publication are liable for damages, be they private individuals or public officials.

E.4. Anatomy of Restrictions: Prior Restraint, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations

Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized
four aspects of freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from
punishment subsequent to publication; 53 (3) freedom of access to information; 54 and (4) freedom of
circulation.55

Considering that petitioner has argued that respondents’ press statement constitutes a form of
impermissible prior restraint, a closer scrutiny of this principle is in order, as well as its sub-specie of
content-based (as distinguished from content-neutral) regulations.

At this point, it should be noted that respondents in this case deny that their acts constitute prior
restraints. This presents a unique tinge to the present challenge, considering that the cases in our
jurisdiction involving prior restrictions on speech never had any issue of whether the governmental act
or issuance actually constituted prior restraint. Rather, the determinations were always about
whether the restraint was justified by the Constitution.

Be that as it may, the determination in every case of whether there is an impermissible restraint on
the freedom of speech has always been based on the circumstances of each case, including the
nature of the restraint. And in its application in our jurisdiction, the parameters of this principle
have been etched on a case-to-case basis, always tested by scrutinizing the governmental
issuance or act against the circumstances in which they operate, and then determining the
appropriate test with which to evaluate. 

Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication or dissemination. 56 Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from
government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it
is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government. Thus, it precludes
governmental acts that required approval of a proposal to publish; licensing or permits as
prerequisites to publication including the payment of license taxes for the privilege to publish; and
even injunctions against publication. Even the closure of the business and printing offices of certain
newspapers, resulting in the discontinuation of their printing and publication, are deemed as previous
restraint or censorship. 57 Any law or official that requires some form of permission to be had before
publication can be made, commits an infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can be had
at the courts.

Given that deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility against all prior restraints on
speech, and any act that restrains speech is presumed invalid,58 and “any act that restrains speech is
hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows,” 59 it is important
to stress not all prior restraints on speech are invalid. Certain previous restraints may be permitted
by the Constitution, but determined only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act as against
the appropriate test by which it should be measured against.

Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of restraint on
freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content-
neutralregulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls
the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards;60 or (2) a content-based restraint or
censorship, i.e.,the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. 61 The cast of
the restriction determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed with.

When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial
governmental interest is required for its validity.62 Because regulations of this type are not designed to
suppress any particular message, they are not subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but
an intermediate approach—somewhere between the mere rationality that is required of any other
law and the compelling interest standard applied to content-based restrictions.63 The test is
called intermediatebecause the Court will not merely rubberstamp the validity of a law but also
require that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or significant governmental
interest that is unrelated to the suppression of expression. The intermediate approach has been
formulated in this manner:

A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the

Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged
[freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 64

On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on
content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the
challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional
muster,65 with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.

Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will be struck
down.66

With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type of harm the
speech sought to be restrained would bring about—especially the gravity and the imminence of the
threatened harm—otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its
content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, “but only by showing a substantive and imminent evil
that has taken the life of a reality already on ground.” 67 As formulated, “the question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”68
The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an important or substantial
government interest, which is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. 69

Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no greater than what is essential to the furtherance
of that interest. 70 A restriction that is so broad that it encompasses more than what is required to
satisfy the governmental interest will be invalidated. 71 The regulation, therefore, must be reasonable
and narrowly drawn to fit the regulatory purpose, with the least restrictive means undertaken. 72

Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral regulation, it is subjected to an

intermediate review. A content-based regulation,73 however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity
and is measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional
muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor
vague. 74

Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to be subjected to
the clear and present danger rule, as they are content-based restrictions. The acts of
respondents focused solely on but one object—a specific content—fixed as these were on the alleged
taped conversations between the President and a COMELEC official. Undoubtedly these did not
merely provide regulations as to the time, place or manner of the dissemination of speech or
expression.

E.5. Dichotomy of Free Press: Print v. Broadcast Media

Finally, comes respondents’ argument that the challenged act is valid on the ground that broadcast
media enjoys free speech rights that are lesser in scope to that of print media. We next explore and
test the validity of this argument, insofar as it has been invoked to validate a content-based restriction
on broadcast media.

The regimes presently in place for each type of media differ from one other. Contrasted with the
regime in respect of books, newspapers, magazines and traditional printed matter, broadcasting, film
and video have been subjected to regulatory schemes.

The dichotomy between print and broadcast media traces its origins in the United States. There,
broadcast radio and television have been held to have limited First Amendment protection,75 and
U.S. Courts have excluded broadcast media from the application of the “strict scrutiny” standard that
they would otherwise apply to content-based restrictions.76 According to U.S. Courts, the three major
reasons why broadcast media stands apart from print media are: (a) the scarcity of the frequencies
by which the medium operates [i.e., airwaves are physically limited while print medium may be
limitless]; 77(b) its “pervasiveness” as a medium; and (c) its unique accessibility to children.  78 Because
cases involving broadcast media need not follow “precisely the same approach that [U.S. courts]
have applied to other media,” nor go “so far as to demand that such regulations serve ‘compelling’
government interests,”79they are decided on whether the “governmental restriction” is narrowly
tailored to further a substantial governmental interest,” 80 or the intermediate test.

As pointed out by respondents, Philippine jurisprudence has also echoed a differentiation in treatment
between broadcast and print media. Nevertheless, a review of Philippine case law on broadcast
media will show that—as we have deviated with the American conception of the Bill of Rights 81
—we likewise did not adopt en masse the U.S. conception of freespeech as it relates to
broadcast media, particularly as to which test would govern content-based prior restraints. 

Our cases show two distinct features of this dichotomy. First, the difference in treatment, in the main,
is in the regulatory scheme applied to broadcast media that is not imposed on traditional print media,
and narrowly confined to unprotected speech (e.g., obscenity, pornography, seditious and inciting
speech), or is based on a compelling government interest that also has constitutional protection, such
as national security or the electoral process.

Second, regardless of the regulatory schemes that broadcast media is subjected to, the Court has
consistently held that the clear and present danger test applies to content-based restrictions on
media, without making a distinction as to traditional print or broadcast media.

The distinction between broadcast and traditional print media was first enunciated in Eastern
Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans,82 wherein it was held that “[a]ll forms of media, whether
print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression
clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present
danger rule…”83

Dans was a case filed to compel the reopening of a radio station which had been summarily closed
on grounds of national security. Although the issue had become moot and academic because the
owners were no longer interested to reopen, the Court still proceeded to do an analysis of the case
and made formulations to serve as guidelines for all inferior courts and bodies exercising quasi-
judicial functions. Particularly, the Court made a detailed exposition as to what needs be considered
in cases involving broadcast media. Thus:84

xxx xxx xxx

(3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom
of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to
be the clear and present danger rule,that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the
lawmaker has a right to prevent, In his Constitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570) Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions which apply the test. More recently,
the clear and present danger test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition v.
Bagatsing. (4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all
embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.

Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A
broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government
regulation or for the rights of others.

All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause.
Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope
than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.

The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S. 726),

confronted with a patently offensive and indecent regular radio program, explained why radio
broadcasting, more than other forms of communications, receives the most limited protection from the
free expression clause. First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the
lives of all citizens, Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but
in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and
motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children, but the
same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning
in and out.

Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.

The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos.
Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of
municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses
who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs
like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.

On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming
universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of
listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or
television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons
of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons
whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The
impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio
audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject the utterance.

(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast
media into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether by government or through self-
regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.

The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently
overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of
widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television
would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly
entertaining utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating
varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection.

(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative
democracy. In the 1918 case of United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) this Court was already
stressing that.

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public
affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free
speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may
suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official
acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.

(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process
and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. [Citations omitted]

It is interesting to note that the Court in Dans adopted the arguments found in U.S. jurisprudence to
justify differentiation of treatment (i.e., the scarcity, pervasiveness and accessibility to children), but
only after categorically declaring that “the test for limitations on freedom of expression
continues to be the clear and present danger rule,” for all forms of media, whether print or
broadcast. Indeed, a close reading of the above-quoted provisions would show that the
differentiation that the Court in Dansreferred to was narrowly restricted to what is otherwise deemed
as “unprotected speech” (e.g.,obscenity, national security, seditious and inciting speech), or to
validate a licensing or regulatory scheme necessary to allocate the limited broadcast frequencies,
which is absent in print media. Thus, when this Court declared in Dans that the freedom given to
broadcast media was “somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print
media,” it was not as to what test should be applied, but the context by which requirements of
licensing, allocation of airwaves, and application of norms to unprotected speech. 85
In the same year that the Dans case was decided, it was reiterated in Gonzales v. Katigbak,86 that the
test to determine free expression challenges was the clear and present danger, again without
distinguishing the media.87Katigbak, strictly speaking, does not treat of broadcast media but motion
pictures. Although the issue involved obscenity standards as applied to movies,88 the Court concluded
its decision with the following obiter dictum that a less liberal approach would be used to resolve
obscenity issues in television as opposed to motion pictures:

All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to
motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a less liberal
approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to
pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. Children then will likely be among
the avid viewers of the programs therein shown…..It cannot be denied though that the State
as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.

More recently, in resolving a case involving the conduct of exit polls and dissemination of the results
by a broadcast company, we reiterated that the clear and present danger rule is the test we
unquestionably adhere to issues that involve freedoms of speech and of the press.89

This is not to suggest, however, that the clear and present danger rule has been applied to all
cases that involve the broadcast media. The rule applies to all media, including broadcast, but only
when the challenged act is a content-based regulation that infringes on free speech, expression and
the press. Indeed, in Osmena v. COMELEC,90which also involved broadcast media, the Court refused
to apply the clear and present danger rule to a COMELEC regulation of time and manner of
advertising of political advertisements because the challenged restriction was content-neutral.91 And
in a case involving due process and equal protection issues, the Court in Telecommunications and
Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. COMELEC 92 treated a restriction imposed on a broadcast
media as a reasonable condition for the grant of the media’s franchise, without going into which test
would apply.

That broadcast media is subject to a regulatory regime absent in print media is observed also in other
jurisdictions, where the statutory regimes in place over broadcast media include elements of
licensing, regulation by administrative bodies, and censorship. As explained by a British author:

The reasons behind treating broadcast and films differently from the print media differ in a number of
respects, but have a common historical basis. The stricter system of controls seems to have been
adopted in answer to the view that owing to their particularimpact on audiences, films, videos and
broadcasting require a system of prior restraints, whereas it is now accepted that books and other
printed media do not. These media are viewed as beneficial to the public in a number of respects, but
are also seen as possible sources of harm.93

Parenthetically, these justifications are now the subject of debate. Historically, the scarcity of

frequencies was thought to provide a rationale. However, cable and satellite television have
enormously increased the number of actual and potential channels. Digital technology will further
increase the number of channels available. But still, the argument persists that broadcasting is the
most influential means of communication, since it comes into the home, and so much time is spent
watching television. Since it has a unique impact on people and affects children in a way that the print
media normally does not, that regulation is said to be necessary in order to preserve pluralism. It has
been argued further that a significant main threat to free expression—in terms of diversity—comes
not from government, but from private corporate bodies. These developments show a need for a
reexamination of the traditional notions of the scope and extent of broadcast media regulation. 94
The emergence of digital technology—which has led to the convergence of broadcasting,
telecommunications and the computer industry—has likewise led to the question of whether the
regulatory model for broadcasting will continue to be appropriate in the converged
environment.95Internet, for example, remains largely unregulated, yet the Internet and the broadcast
media share similarities, 96 and the rationales used to support broadcast regulation apply equally to
the Internet.97Thus, it has been argued that courts, legislative bodies and the government agencies
regulating media must agree to regulate both, regulate neither or develop a new regulatory framework
and rationale to justify the differential treatment. 98

F. The Case At Bar

Having settled the applicable standard to content-based restrictions on broadcast media, let us go to
its application to the case at bar. To recapitulate, a governmental action that restricts freedom of
speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present
danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.

This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells out the following:
(a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden; and (e)
the quantum of evidence necessary. On the basis of the records of the case at bar, respondents who
have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press failed to
hurdle the clear and present danger test. It appears that the great evil which government wants to
prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of
the case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and respondents’ evidence falls short of
satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary
obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped
conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed
to be a “complete” version and the other, an “altered” version. Thirdly, the evidence of the
respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering
the tape’s different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other
related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled
facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of
speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of them provide
norms of conduct which even if violated have only an adverse effect on a person’s private comfort but
does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself
and without more,cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of
law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain
freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private
and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and
by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a
careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine compliance
with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing
violations of law. By all means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for
they breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot
per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can
lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and
present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press.
There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers
the national security of the State.
This is not all the faultline in the stance of the respondents. We slide to the issue of whether the mere
press statements of the Secretary of Justice and of the NTC in question constitute a form of content-
based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. In resolving this issue, we hold that it is
not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed
up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by
respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales
made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory
body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in
an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an “act” does not
limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non
formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of
the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down
as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.

There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on record. The warnings given to
media came from no less the NTC, a regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate of Authority
of the radio and broadcast media. They also came from the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of the
Executive, who wields the awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be violating the laws of
the land. After the warnings, the KBP inexplicably joined the NTC in issuing an ambivalent Joint
Press Statement. After the warnings, petitioner Chavez was left alone to fight this battle for freedom
of speech and of the press. This silence on the sidelines on the part of some media practitioners is
too deafening to be the subject of misinterpretation.

The constitutional imperative for us to strike down unconstitutional acts should always be exercised
with care and in light of the distinct facts of each case. For there are no hard and fast rules when it
comes to slippery constitutional questions, and the limits and construct of relative freedoms are never
set in stone. Issues revolving on their construct must be decided on a case to case basis, always
based on the peculiar shapes and shadows of each case. But in cases where the challenged acts are
patent invasions of a constitutionally protected right, we should be swift in striking them down as
nullities per se. A blow too soon struck for freedom is preferred than a blow too late.

In VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are hereby
issued, nullifying the official statements made by respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005 warning the
media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and other personalities,
for constituting unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press

SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY

G.R. No. 166471               March 22, 2011

TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE Petitioner, 

vs.
LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition1 challenges the 1 October
2004 Judgment2 and 6 November 2004 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 1, Branch 62, La
Trinidad, Benguet, in Civil Case No. 03-CV-1878.

The Facts

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, registered with the Cooperative Development
Authority, and organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet.

La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as
amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of
La Trinidad, Benguet.

On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of
public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed
TMPC’s application. LTWD claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive.
Section 47 states that:

Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic, industrial or
commercial water service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of
directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall be subject to
review by the Administration.

In its Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002, the NWRB approved TMPC’s application for a CPC. In its 15
August 2002 Decision,4 the NWRB held that LTWD’s franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are
unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks
system. NWRB stated that:

With respect to LTWD’s opposition, this Board observes that:

1. It is a substantial reproduction of its opposition to the application for water permits previously filed by this same
CPC applicant, under WUC No. 98-17 and 98-62 which was decided upon by this Board on April 27, 2000. The
issues being raised by Oppositor had been already resolved when this Board said in pertinent portions of its
decision:

"The authority granted to LTWD by virtue of P.D. 198 is not Exclusive. While Barangay Tawang is within their
territorial jurisdiction, this does not mean that all others are excluded in engaging in such service, especially, if the
district is not capable of supplying water within the area. This Board has time and again ruled that the "Exclusive
Franchise" provision under P.D. 198 has misled most water districts to believe that it likewise extends to be [sic] the
waters within their territorial boundaries. Such ideological adherence collides head on with the constitutional
provision that "ALL WATERS AND NATURAL RESOURCES BELONG TO THE STATE". (Sec. 2, Art. XII) and that
"No franchise, certificate or authorization for the operation of public [sic] shall be exclusive in character".

xxxx

All the foregoing premises all considered, and finding that Applicant is legally and financially qualified to operate and
maintain a waterworks system; that the said operation shall redound to the benefit of the homeowners/residents of
the subdivision, thereby, promoting public service in a proper and suitable manner, the instant application for a
Certificate of Public Convenience is, hereby, GRANTED.5

LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 18 November 2002 Resolution,6 the NWRB denied the motion.

LTWD appealed to the RTC.

The RTC’s Ruling

In its 1 October 2004 Judgment, the RTC set aside the NWRB’s 23 July 2002 Resolution and 15 August 2002
Decision and cancelled TMPC’s CPC. The RTC held that Section 47 is valid. The RTC stated that:

The Constitution uses the term "exclusive in character". To give effect to this provision, a reasonable, practical and
logical interpretation should be adopted without disregard to the ultimate purpose of the Constitution. What is this
ultimate purpose? It is for the state, through its authorized agencies or instrumentalities, to be able to keep and
maintain ultimate control and supervision over the operation of public utilities. Essential part of this control and
supervision is the authority to grant a franchise for the operation of a public utility to any person or entity, and to
amend or repeal an existing franchise to serve the requirements of public interest. Thus, what is repugnant to the
Constitution is a grant of franchise "exclusive in character" so as to preclude the State itself from granting a
franchise to any other person or entity than the present grantee when public interest so requires. In other words, no
franchise of whatever nature can preclude the State, through its duly authorized agencies or instrumentalities, from
granting franchise to any person or entity, or to repeal or amend a franchise already granted. Consequently, the
Constitution does not necessarily prohibit a franchise that is exclusive on its face, meaning, that the grantee shall be
allowed to exercise this present right or privilege to the exclusion of all others. Nonetheless, the grantee cannot set
up its exclusive franchise against the ultimate authority of the State.7

TMPC filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 6 November 2004 Order, the RTC denied the motion. Hence, the
present petition.

Issue

TMPC raises as issue that the RTC erred in holding that Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, is valid.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind, does
not need explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would
be illusory.

In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,8 the Court held that, "What one cannot do directly, he cannot do
indirectly."9In Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino,10 quoting Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals
Co., Inc.,11the Court held that, "This Court has long and consistently adhered to the legal maxim that those that
cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly."12 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas,13 the Court held that, "No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly."14

The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are
exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of
franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 8, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except
to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Empahsis supplied)

Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution states that:

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except
to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except
to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied)

Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are clear — franchises for the
operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and
clearly state that, "nor shall such franchise x x x be exclusive in character." There is no exception.

When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. The duty of the Court is to apply the law
the way it is worded. In Security Bank and Trust Company v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61,15 the Court
held that:

Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no
alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language. As we have held in the case of Quijano v.
Development Bank of the Philippines:

"x x x We cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the
above-quoted provision of law. This Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and
fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for
only when such literal application is impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to
where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit
and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is
obeyed."16(Emphasis supplied)

In Republic of the Philippines v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc.,17 the Court held that, "The Constitution is
quite emphatic that the operation of a public utility shall not be exclusive."18 In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v.
National Telecommunications Commission,19 the Court held that, "Neither Congress nor the NTC can grant an
exclusive ‘franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization’ to operate a public utility."20 In National Power
Corp. v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that, "Exclusivity of any public franchise has not been favored by this
Court such that in most, if not all, grants by the government to private corporations, the interpretation of rights,
privileges or franchises is taken against the grantee."22 In Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. National
Telecommunications Commission,23 the Court held that, "The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be
exclusive in nature."24

Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that are exclusive in character.
What the President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the
President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the
Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create franchises
that are exclusive in character.

In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) created indirectly franchises
that are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are
exclusive in character. Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, allows the BOD and the LWUA to create directly
franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 states:

Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic,
industrial or commercial water service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent
that the board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution,
however, shall be subject to review by the Administration. (Emphasis supplied)

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution
is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to
declare void all laws that do not conform to it.

In Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board,25 the Court held that, "It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution."26 In Sabio v. Gordon,27 the Court held that, "the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is the
‘basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform.’"28 In Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on
Elections,29 the Court held that, "The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being
unconstitutional."30 In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System,31 the Court held that:

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that
law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is
the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract."32 (Emphasis supplied)

To reiterate, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive
in character. They uniformly command that "nor shall such franchise x x x be exclusive in character." This
constitutional prohibition is absolute and accepts no exception. On the other hand, PD No. 198, as amended, allows
the BOD of LTWD and LWUA to create franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 states that, "No
franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency x x x unless and except to the extent that the board of
directors consents thereto x x x subject to review by the Administration." Section 47 creates a glaring
exception to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution. Clearly, it is patently unconstitutional.

Section 47 gives the BOD and the LWUA the authority to make an exception to the absolute prohibition in the
Constitution. In short, the BOD and the LWUA are given the discretion to create franchises that are exclusive in
character. The BOD and the LWUA are not even legislative bodies. The BOD is not a regulatory body but simply a
management board of a water district. Indeed, neither the BOD nor the LWUA can be granted the power to create
any exception to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution, a power that Congress itself cannot exercise.

In Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. Adala,33 the Court categorically declared Section 47 void. The Court held that:

Nonetheless, while the prohibition in Section 47 of P.D. 198 applies to the issuance of CPCs for the reasons
discussed above, the same provision must be deemed void ab initio for being irreconcilable with Article XIV,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which was ratified on January 17, 1973 — the constitution in force when P.D.
198 was issued on May 25, 1973. Thus, Section 5 of Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution reads:

"SECTION 5. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the
Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise,
certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such
franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal
by the Batasang Pambansa when the public interest so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in
public utiltities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility
enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof."
This provision has been substantially reproduced in Article XII Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution, including the
prohibition against exclusive franchises.

xxxx

Since Section 47 of P.D. 198, which vests an "exclusive franchise" upon public utilities, is clearly repugnant
to Article XIV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution, it is unconstitutional and may not, therefore, be relied upon
by petitioner in support of its opposition against respondent’s application for CPC and the subsequent grant thereof
by the NWRB.

WHEREFORE, Section 47 of P.D. 198 is unconstitutional.34 (Emphasis supplied)

The dissenting opinion declares Section 47 valid and constitutional. In effect, the dissenting opinion holds that (1)
President Marcos can create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character; (2) the BOD can create directly
franchises that are exclusive in character; (3) the LWUA can create directly franchises that are exclusive in
character; and (4) the Court should allow the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character.

Stated differently, the dissenting opinion holds that (1) President Marcos can violate indirectly the Constitution; (2)
the BOD can violate directly the Constitution; (3) the LWUA can violate directly the Constitution; and (4) the Court
should allow the violation of the Constitution.

The dissenting opinion states that the BOD and the LWUA can create franchises that are exclusive in character
"based on reasonable and legitimate grounds," and such creation "should not be construed as a violation of the
constitutional mandate on the non-exclusivity of a franchise" because it "merely refers to regulation" which is part of
"the government’s inherent right to exercise police power in regulating public utilities" and that their violation of the
Constitution "would carry with it the legal presumption that public officers regularly perform their official functions."
The dissenting opinion states that:

To begin with, a government agency’s refusal to grant a franchise to another entity, based on reasonable and
legitimate grounds, should not be construed as a violation of the constitutional mandate on the non-exclusivity of a
franchise; this merely refers to regulation, which the Constitution does not prohibit. To say that a legal provision is
unconstitutional simply because it enables a government instrumentality to determine the propriety of granting a
franchise is contrary to the government’s inherent right to exercise police power in regulating public utilities for the
protection of the public and the utilities themselves. The refusal of the local water district or the LWUA to consent to
the grant of other franchises would carry with it the legal presumption that public officers regularly perform their
official functions.

The dissenting opinion states two "reasonable and legitimate grounds" for the creation of exclusive franchise: (1)
protection of "the government’s investment,"35 and (2) avoidance of "a situation where ruinous competition could
compromise the supply of public utilities in poor and remote areas."36

There is no "reasonable and legitimate" ground to violate the Constitution. The Constitution should never be violated
by anyone. Right or wrong, the President, Congress, the Court, the BOD and the LWUA have no choice but to follow
the Constitution. Any act, however noble its intentions, is void if it violates the Constitution. This rule is basic.

In Social Justice Society,37 the Court held that, "In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments
of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits
it imposes must be observed."38 In Sabio,39 the Court held that, "the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is
‘the basic and paramount law to which x x x all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must
defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution.’"40 In Bengzon v.
Drilon,41 the Court held that, "the three branches of government must discharge their respective functions within the
limits of authority conferred by the Constitution."42 In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections,43 the Court held that, "The
three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no
choice but to yield obedience to [the Constitution’s] commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed."44
Police power does not include the power to violate the Constitution. Police power is the plenary power vested in
Congress to make laws not repugnant to the Constitution. This rule is basic.

In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc.,45 the Court held that, "Police power
is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution."46 In Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social
Welfare and Development,47 the Court held that, police power "is ‘the power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances
x x x not repugnant to the constitution.’"48 In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin,49 the Court held
that, "police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature
to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances x x x not
repugnant to the Constitution."50

There is no question that the effect of Section 47 is the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character. Section
47 expressly allows the BOD and the LWUA to create franchises that are exclusive in character.

The dissenting opinion explains why the BOD and the LWUA should be allowed to create franchises that are
exclusive in character — to protect "the government’s investment" and to avoid "a situation where ruinous
competition could compromise the supply of public utilities in poor and remote areas." The dissenting opinion
declares that these are "reasonable and legitimate grounds." The dissenting opinion also states that, "The refusal of
the local water district or the LWUA to consent to the grant of other franchises would carry with it the legal
presumption that public officers regularly perform their official functions."

When the effect of a law is unconstitutional, it is void. In Sabio,51 the Court held that, "A statute may be declared
unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or
forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic
principles."52 The effect of Section 47 violates the Constitution, thus, it is void.

In Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited,53 the Court held that, "This Court
must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution."54 In Bengzon,55 the Court held that, "The Constitution
expressly confers on the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it decrees."56 In Mutuc,57 the Court held that:

The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act
whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government.
That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the
legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted
have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in
the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal,
be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of
applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is
decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the
coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is
paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a
recognition of its being the supreme law.58

Sustaining the RTC’s ruling would make a dangerous precedent. It will allow Congress to do indirectly what it cannot
do directly. In order to circumvent the constitutional prohibition on franchises that are exclusive in character, all
Congress has to do is to create a law allowing the BOD and the LWUA to create franchises that are exclusive in
character, as in the present case.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Section 47 of Presidential Decree No.

198 UNCONSTITUTIONAL. We SET ASIDE the 1 October 2004 Judgment and 6 November 2004 Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 1, Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet, in Civil Case No. 03-CV-1878
and REINSTATE the 23 July 2002 Resolution and 15 August 2002 Decision of the National Water Resources
Board.

SO ORDERED.
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

G.R. No. 160261             November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, 

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS
AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.
TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,

ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention, 
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, 
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN
M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM
BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL
MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO
AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL
ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL
DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO,
ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS,
RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR.,
FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO
BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI
LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO
LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO,
DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG,
GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON,
JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO
MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN
CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES,
ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, 
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS,
RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A.
LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO
PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG,
ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO,
DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA
LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA,
FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU
RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA,
ET AL., respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners, 

vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND
MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE
LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C.
ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO,
DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-
PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA
AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE
THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT
AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, 

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86
SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS
SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners, 

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.,
ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, 

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING
OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY,
DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU,
INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED
MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION
INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO,
PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST
PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners, 
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE
SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it
may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and
extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its
resolution.

Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the
relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature
and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to
vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant
petitions – whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with
the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution
thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was
brought upon by a political crisis of conscience. 

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this
controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-
constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection
of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that
the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by
no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power
assigned to it by the sovereign people. 

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their
indispensable co-equality. 

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that
governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and
coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are
harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the
people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI
 Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes,
or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided
by law, but not by impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.

(5)  No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a

period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without
the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification
to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable
and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.

(8)  The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment
Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th
Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the
following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II RULE V

BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF

 INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating
Impeachment. – Impeachment
shall be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed by
any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement
by any Member thereof or by a
verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment filed by at least one-
third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House.
RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No
impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official
more than once within the period of
one (1) year.
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William
D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Section 16. – Impeachment
Proceedings Deemed
Initiated. – In cases where a
Member of the House files a
verified complaint of impeachment
or a citizen files a verified
complaint that is endorsed by a
Member of the House through a
resolution of endorsement against
an impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against
such official are deemed initiated
on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the case
may be, is sufficient in substance,
or on the date the House votes to
overturn or affirm the finding of
the said Committee that the
verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is
not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed,
as the case may be, by at least
one-third (1/3) of the Members of
the House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the filing
of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with
the Secretary General.
Section 17. Bar Against
Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. – Within a period of
one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as
such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the
original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF)."3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution
which reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in
form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day
after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the
Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix
William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
the Members of the House of Representatives.13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that
the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article
XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year." 

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that
the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that
he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against
then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House
Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that
(1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this
Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX,
Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the
records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3)
this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of
the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ
"perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the
Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and
Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the
event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as
it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment
complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on
said second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus
standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared
unconstitutional. 

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession,
pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting,
adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De
Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. 

In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez,
alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only
constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second
impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against all
forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court,
the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is
instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as
well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the
Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and
issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any
proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint. 

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-
petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition,
which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount
public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment
complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void. 

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar
Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer,
pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the
House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint. 

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections
16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint. 

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the
House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional. 

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and
Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in
behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of
Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and
that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of
Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary. 
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for
Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy,
he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in
discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the
same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.

In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that
respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely
without any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the
alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of
law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a
constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of
Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the
second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the
second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was
spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the
examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action
and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition
that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2)
respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate;
and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any
proceedings thereon. 

In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate
and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the
impeachment trial. 

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were
filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to
prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second
impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the
declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional. 

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003,
sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No.
260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the
second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of
Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have
yet to be forwarded to the Senate. 

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which
were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court
rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate. 
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a)
consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor
General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral
arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In
addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and
others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr.
and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no
jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-
equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to
initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to
Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority
and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one
where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the
Constitution."22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the
earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3,
2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a
Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or
in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its
constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of
Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
proceedings in the House of Representatives. 

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28,
2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and
praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination. 

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion
for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion
for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, 160295, and 160310. 

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and
Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors
Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in
an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit: 

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues
and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time. 

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up: 

a) locus standi of petitioners; 

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness); 
 c) political question/justiciability; 

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment; 

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment; 

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the

Constitution; and 

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the
myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted
and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial
review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for
the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These
matters shall now be discussed in seriatim. 

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity
of the second impeachment complaint.

This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of
our present 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive
1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike
the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power
includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to
be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it
was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to
specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no
uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If
these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had
not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of
sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and
restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United
States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set
 at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does
not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth
all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More
than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the
different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent
in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."26

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its
Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was
first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the
constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which
shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the
principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.28(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of
judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted
political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative
branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil
Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and
the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate
system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the
bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the
people for which it serves.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law,
and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential
for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three
great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of
intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or
instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first
time into its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of
and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former
Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion: 

xxx

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As
a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed
regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the
writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other
matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense
of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass
upon it."  The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions
involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime.  x x x

xxx
 Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction.  This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade
the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction. 

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course
stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential
for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as
much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to
the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the
cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.
A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to
be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that
reason and calculated to effect that purpose. 39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue 40 where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A.
Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De
Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our
Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
 others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with
all other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is

to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon
a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to
be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which
will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis
supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same
case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be
had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing
the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light
as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose
votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face."  The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.46(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the power
of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel
argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review. 

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action
which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the
impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1)
entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to
determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial
review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American
authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers'
decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of
checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a
lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution
to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment. 

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide
impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the
power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably
support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine
constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings. 

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for
these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes,
[this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have
been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace
its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of
Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord." 

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in
the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power
to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the
power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole
power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the
House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the
exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the
manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. 

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead
to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship
on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed
legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."56

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the
power of judicial review. 

The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument that
the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of
petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the
exercise of the power of judicial review. 

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional
action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the
Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the
Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable
controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this
Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section
17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties
as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that
the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject
to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested
exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts
of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, 66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election
of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may
discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly. 

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole
and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it
by the Constitution. 

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature
is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases
and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)

Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist
of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since
only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister
and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past,
accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public
interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and
the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the
U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception
that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of
the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant
petitioners standing. 

There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is
a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth
regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is
meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It
is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very
 different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to
sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an
action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns
relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. 

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties
who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is
whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

xxx

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House
of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice.
On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress;
citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly
violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives. 

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have
been met have been given standing by this Court. 

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained
or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he
must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract.
It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.80

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This
Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the
Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds. 

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate
the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83

While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial
taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although
undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore,
behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently
numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests
involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res
judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly
appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the
numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.

The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance, while
Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing. 

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated
by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other
assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition
by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a
more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is
satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance. 

In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party
should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of
such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege
any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing. 

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to
possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when
the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the
same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as
earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner
Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this
insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the
requisites for intervention had been complied with. 

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and
160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a
"Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the
Constitution. 

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective
motions to intervene were hereby granted.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and
arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's
jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an
impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives.
Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress
against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to
the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a
taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec,93 to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds
by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal
disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere
interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing. 

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and
when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the
constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment
complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and
performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with. 

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former
Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at
this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in
the House and Senate should first be exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take
judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their
signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise
constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the
same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the
Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.

The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not,
by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by
itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of
Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their
injuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming
to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate
is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning
impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted
Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it. 

Justiciability

In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political
question," viz: 
 [T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99 (Italics in the original) 

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated
on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind
the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases,
however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction
whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in
the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973
Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance
thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity. 

The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain
cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political
questions, viz: 

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the
weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the
sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of reason and
appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without
exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee
on the Judiciary.

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a
matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed
regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question.  And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is
political, we have no authority to pass upon it."  The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a
proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights
of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime.  I
am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the
Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in
1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced
on September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in
its publication was that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on
September 21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published
anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our main writers were
already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of
being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971
and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the
Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971
Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague,
Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of
Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been
unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the
President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which
suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much
less public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free
discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If
I may use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft
of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacañang felt the danger of
its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he
would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be
submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the
supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens
assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were
released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because
the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a
motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When
the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a
proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because the
overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the
departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then
informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had
been ratified by the people and is now in force.

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense
put up by the government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the case.

xxx

The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the
draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of
them had been notified of any referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they
participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt
that there had been no referendum.

Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite.  There is a big difference between a referendum
and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political
question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of
"political question" was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.

x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.

xxx
 x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions:
What is judicial power? What is a political question?

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving
conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but
cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling
to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that
she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to
her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by
actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable or enforceable . . . 

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions.  In a presidential system
of government, the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of government
are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of
that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter
evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought
on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of
judicial power, thus: 

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the
Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with
jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a
question as to whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of
lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has
the duty to decide.

xxx
 FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to the
new numerical need for votes.

On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?

MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. BERNAS. It is not.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of
jurisdiction. . .

FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political
question doctrine. 

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the
Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition that
we might make may not cover all possible areas.

FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question
doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond
the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is
not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not
intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." 

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of
powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature. 

As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a
number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present
Constitution. 

In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.106 x x x 

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared: 

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution.
Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to
judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has
been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason
is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still
not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political
questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no
clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some: 

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.112 (Underscoring supplied) 

Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in
that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present. 

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically different
from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in
determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue. 

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the
answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present
controversy. 

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses
under the Constitution.

II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the
Constitution.

III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is
an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no
jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination
of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely,
other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the
1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of
betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both,
without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to
decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article
VIII. 

Lis Mota

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be
avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held: 

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law
to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if
the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course
will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in
which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated
Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it
is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied.
Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the
resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis
supplied]

Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment
complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly
be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed
upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second
impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the
JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a
violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an
assault on the independence of the judiciary.121

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the
issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue
of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's
opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative
inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This
opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition
which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.

En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by
this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
 The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or
unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided
therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It
follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to
due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of
petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was
verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall
under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.

They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned
section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said
Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the
"Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:

"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second
impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin
"forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the
House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment
complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article
XI of the Constitution, viz:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.

Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the
Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment
complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong
likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of
the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution,
such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified
impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the
constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption
as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and
Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second
impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated
petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts
presented by the other petitioners as well.

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases
is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et.
al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this
Court's decision.

In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of
the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2)
whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution. 

Judicial Restraint

Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that
the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. 

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court
to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to
impeachment."125But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws
with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them. 

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be
declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other
tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested
under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to
take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not
just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a
dereliction of duty."

Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and
must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court
had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in
the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his]
appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and
morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in
[his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a
moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."130

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas
v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a
Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET
Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This
would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not
sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal
by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's
competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no
 alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators. 

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a
duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as
evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have
been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom
would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of
the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the
Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of
Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must
simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively. 

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit
or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal
may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.
What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot
legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can
confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short
of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.
Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the
Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the
deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court
itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned
and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original) 

Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.

In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power
of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows: 

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding,
declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by
means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'

2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . .
'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a
decision of the case.' 

3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied.' 

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there
is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied
application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question,
the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals
 from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are
frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground. 

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is
injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of
the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official
interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the
Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment
declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not
entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed
himself of its benefits. 

7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).

The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case 

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case 

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute 

5. that the parties are not in estoppel 

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality. 

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:

1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power 

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement

3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial
review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They
stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario
that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary
countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument
by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its
judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary. 

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility
of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in
all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not
precipitate, a crisis.

Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.

x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until the
Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical
effects but also political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails
to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure
to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at
least quasi-validation, follows." 138

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not enough votes
either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted
which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.

Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government
would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws
of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate
manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of
the land.

Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion,
to wit:141

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of
religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws,
not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under
this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear
or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own
personal beliefs.142

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure

for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of
the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that
the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a
collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly
mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3
ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House.
Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as
the collective body, has yet to act on it. 

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is,
therefore, in order. 

That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who
eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered
and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings,
which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions
held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the
complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the
Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.

"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going.
As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform
or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated
during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a
beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The
middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The
beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella
says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or
when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment
proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation
happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately,
the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:

MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on
impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for
Committee action. 

However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment
proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my
experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took
charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa.  For the information
of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with
initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report,
transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate. 

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the
amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not
really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor.  The procedure, as I have pointed out
earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the
floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by
the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the
initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment
proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the
recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who
approved the resolution.  It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the
resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words
because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of
Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of
Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

xxx
 MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the
Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment. 

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3
(3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and
the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then
capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will
now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded."

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the
United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to
impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of
all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the
substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of
the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
udnerscoring supplied)

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the
Accountability of Public Officers.144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief,
Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once
and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote
of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which
was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the
Constitution."145

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to
file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.

During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the
constitutional provision on impeachment, viz: 

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.

xxx

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year, (Emphasis supplied)

refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding." 

Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence
is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle
of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment
case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the
House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House
has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is
made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must
be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is
a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and
consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of
Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the
processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether
the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for
further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which
either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all
the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared
and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that
an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to
the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding,
namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution
passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House
is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or
begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating
step which triggers the series of steps that follow. 

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the
floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate
impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House
does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and
is not found in the present Constitution.

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on
the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is
ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary
meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because
Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by
equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding." 

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint. 

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period. 

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at
least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give
the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous construction
as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their
personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue
expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of
debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of the
Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may
know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148

Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two members
of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf
Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has
not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has
examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.

Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that
it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the
assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced. 

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase
"to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides
for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz: 

Section 3. (1) x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed. 

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year. 

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress
had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the
meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum. 

In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its
rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v.
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this
Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to
a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v.
De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court,
held that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It
is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the
same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even
more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the
validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I
agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he
case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before
the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the
judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:

"x x x

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as
one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to
make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the
journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced
in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule.  The question, therefore, is as to the validity of
this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence
of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither
do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration.  With the courts the question is only one of power.  The Constitution empowers each
house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints
or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But
within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is
no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time.
The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always
subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal."

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules,
i.e, whether they are constitutional.  Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the
test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3)
its method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the
Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of
powers.154

xxx

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the

political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article
VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our
 courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions.  It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any
foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial
scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine.  Led by the eminent former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis
the Executive and the Legislative departments of government.155

xxx

The Constitution cannot be any clearer.  What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can
decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of
this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials
done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly,
the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government
despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people. 156

xxx

The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional
Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This provision
was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent
judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x

xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave
abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by
initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court
is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what
it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the
present. 

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as
the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of
the House.  We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we
refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding
timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of
government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former
Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In
resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience
of foreigners.157(Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied) 

Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the
violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved. 

Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may
not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed,
the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No
limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold
with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier
enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised. 
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of
the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the
filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of
Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing." 

Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. 

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-
year period. 

Conclusion

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of
our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or
tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For
many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting
experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the
correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the
impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice
on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of
faith – offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches
affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life. 

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was
specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by
the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When
the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference
was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-
restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings. 

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating
the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already
explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally
vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or
interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine
constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance
with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem
that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that
problem head on. 

The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set
up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law. 

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of
whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed
one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately
turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert
judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is
to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the
beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.

It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings
against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the
members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be
farther from the truth. 

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the
judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This
Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom,
unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to
the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the
highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him
but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there
are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to
disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of
all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and
obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in
protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and
ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just
because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is
solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment
case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in
search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a
blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went
through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of
force and aggression upon each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. 

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202242               July 17, 2012

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, 
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS,
JR., Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

The issue at hand has been in hibernation until the unexpected departure of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on
May 29, 2012, and the nomination of former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as his potential
successor, triggered the filing of this case. The issue has constantly been nagging legal minds, yet remained
dormant for lack of constitutional challenge.

As the matter is of extreme urgency considering the constitutional deadline in the process of selecting the nominees
for the vacant seat of the Chief Justice, the Court cannot delay the resolution of the issue a day longer. Relegating it
in the meantime to the back burner is not an option.

Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow more than one (1) member of
Congress to sit in the JBC? Is the practice of having two (2) representatives from each house of Congress with one
(1) vote each sanctioned by the Constitution? These are the pivotal questions to be resolved in this original action
for prohibition and injunction.

Long before the naissance of the present Constitution, the annals of history bear witness to the fact that the
exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and
legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos Constitution and
1 

the 1935 Constitution had vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the President, subject to
2 

confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was during these times that the country became witness to the
deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves
with the members of the legislative body. 3 

Then, with the fusion of executive and legislative power under the 1973 Constitution, the appointment of judges and
4 

justices was no longer subject to the scrutiny of another body. It was absolute, except that the appointees must have
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary from political pressure and partisan
activities, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and
5 

independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the
stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). Its composition,
term and functions are provided under Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution, viz:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed
of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court,
and a representative of the private sector.

(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall
serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of
the private sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its
proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such
other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative to sit
in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. Perhaps in order to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit
6 

in the exclusive body, the House of Representatives and the Senate would send alternate representatives to the
JBC. In other words, Congress had only one (1) representative.

In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth
(8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from
the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, curiously,
7 

the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the
Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
8 

Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition, setting forth the following
9 

GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION

Article VIII, Section 8, Paragraph 1 is clear, definite and needs no interpretation in that the JBC shall have
only one representative from Congress.

II

The framers of the Constitution clearly envisioned, contemplated and decided on a JBC composed of only
seven (7) members.

III

Had the framers of the Constitution intended that the JBC composed of the one member from the Senate
and one member from the House of Representatives, they could have easily said so as they did in the other
provisions of the Constitution.

IV

The composition of the JBC providing for three ex-officio members is purposely designed for a balanced
representation of each of the three branches of the government.

One of the two (2) members of the JBC from Congress has no right (not even ½ right) to sit in the said
constitutional body and perform the duties and functions of a member thereof.

VI

The JBC cannot conduct valid proceedings as its composition is illegal and unconstitutional. 10 

On July 9, 2012, the JBC filed its Comment. It, however, abstained from recommending on how this constitutional
11 

issue should be disposed in gracious deference to the wisdom of the Court. Nonetheless, the JBC was more than
generous enough to offer the insights of various personalities previously connected with it. 12 
Through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondents defended their position as members of the JBC in
their Comment filed on July 12, 2012. According to them, the crux of the controversy is the phrase "a representative
13 

of Congress." Reverting to the basics, they cite Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution to determine the meaning of
14  15 

the term

"Congress." It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and
mandatory components of "Congress," such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning
as expressed under the Constitution. In simplistic terms, the House of Representatives, without the Senate and vice-
versa, is not Congress. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise
16 

their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of "a representative from Congress," it should mean one representative each
from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. 17 

Tracing the subject provision’s history, the respondents claim that when the JBC was established, the Framers
originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating "a representative of the National Assembly" to
the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to

aptly jive with the change to bicameralism, the legislative system finally adopted by the Constitutional Commission
on July 21, 1986. According to respondents, if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having
a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the
representation of Congress in the JBC. 18 

The ambiguity having resulted from a plain case of inadvertence, the respondents urge the Court to look beyond the
letter of the disputed provision because the literal adherence to its language would produce absurdity and
incongruity to the bicameral nature of Congress. In other words, placing either of the respondents in the JBC will
19 

effectively deprive a house of Congress of its representation. In the same vein, the electorate represented by
Members of Congress will lose their only opportunity to participate in the nomination process for the members of the
Judiciary, effectively diminishing the republican nature of the government. 20 

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members of the JBC
does not render the latter’s purpose nugatory. While they admit that the purpose in creating the JBC was to insulate
appointments to the Judiciary from political influence, they likewise cautioned the Court that this constitutional vision
did not intend to entirely preclude political factor in said appointments. Therefore, no evil should be perceived in the
current set-up of the JBC because two (2) members coming from Congress, whose membership to certain political
parties is irrelevant, does not necessarily amplify political partisanship in the JBC. In fact, the presence of two (2)
members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably
presidential appointees. 21 

The Issues

In resolving the procedural and substantive issues arising from the petition, as well as the myriad of counter-
arguments proffered by the respondents, the Court synthesized them into two: 

(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met
in this case; and

(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of
whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its Comment, the JBC submits that petitioner is clothed with locus standi to file the petition, as a citizen and
taxpayer, who has been nominated to the position of Chief Justice. 22 

For the respondents, however, petitioner has no "real interest" in questioning the constitutionality of the JBC’s
current composition. As outlined in jurisprudence, it is well-settled that for locus standi to lie, petitioner must exhibit
23 

that he has been denied, or is about to be denied, of a personal right or privilege to which he is entitled. Here,
petitioner failed to manifest his acceptance of his recommendation to the position of Chief Justice, thereby divesting
him of a substantial interest in the controversy. Without his name in the official list of applicants for the post, the
respondents claim that there is no personal stake on the part of petitioner that would justify his outcry of
unconstitutionality. Moreover, the mere allegation that this case is of transcendental importance does not excuse the
waiver of the rule on locus standi, because, in the first place, the case lacks the requisites therefor. The respondents
also question petitioner’s belated filing of the petition. Being aware that the current composition of the JBC has
24 

been in practice since 1994, petitioner’s silence for eighteen (18) years show that the constitutional issue being
raised before the Court does not comply with the "earliest possible opportunity" requirement.

Before addressing the above issues in seriatim, the Court deems it proper to first ascertain the nature of the petition.
Pursuant to the rule that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations therein and the character of the
relief sought, the Court views the petition as essentially an action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. 25 

The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8 (1), Article VIII as the issue
raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which would result in the adjudication of rights sans the
execution process because the only relief to be granted is the very declaration of the rights under the document
sought to be construed. It being so, the original jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial
Court (RTC). Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for declaratory
relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution.26 

At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes involved but also to the sanctity of the
Constitution, the Court deems it more prudent to take cognizance of it. After all, the petition is also for prohibition
under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin Congress from sending two (2) representatives with one (1) full vote each to the
JBC.

The Courts’ power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are
27 

present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.

Anent locus standi, the question to be answered is this: does the party possess a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that there is real, concrete and legal conflict of rights and duties from the issues
presented before the Court? In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court summarized the rules on locus standi as
28 

culled from jurisprudence. There, it was held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be
accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person, and can be suing
as a "stranger," or as a "citizen" or "taxpayer." Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Of greater import than the damage
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. 29 

In this case, petitioner seeks judicial intervention as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a nominee to the position of
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. As a taxpayer, petitioner invokes his right to demand that the taxes he and the
rest of the citizenry have been paying to the government are spent for lawful purposes. According to petitioner,
"since the JBC derives financial support for its functions, operation and proceedings from taxes paid, petitioner
possesses as taxpayer both right and legal standing to demand that the JBC’s proceedings are not tainted with
illegality and that its composition and actions do not violate the Constitution."30 

Notably, petitioner takes pains in enumerating past actions that he had brought before the Court where his legal
standing was sustained. Although this inventory is unnecessary to establish locus standi because obviously, not
every case before the Court exhibits similar issues and facts, the Court recognizes the petitioner’s right to sue in this
case. Clearly, petitioner has the legal standing to bring the present action because he has a personal stake in the
outcome of this controversy.

The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an
official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a "personal stake" on the case is imperative to have
locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and
question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members
of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the
highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by
the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is
the nucleus of the controversy. The Court considers this a constitutional issue that must be passed upon, lest a
constitutional process be plagued by misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust. Hence, a citizen has a right to bring
this question to the Court, clothed with legal standing and at the same time, armed with issues of transcendental
importance to society. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of
concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention
for rectification of legal blunders.

With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not difficult to perceive from the opposing arguments
of the parties that the determinants established in jurisprudence are attendant in this case: (1) the character of the
funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any
other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. The allegations of constitutional
31 

violations in this case are not empty attacks on the wisdom of the other branches of the government. The allegations
are substantiated by facts and, therefore, deserve an evaluation from the Court. The Court need not elaborate on
the legal and societal ramifications of the issues raised. It cannot be gainsaid that the JBC is a constitutional
innovation crucial in the selection of the magistrates in our judicial system.

The Composition of the JBC

Central to the resolution of the foregoing petition is an understanding of the composition of the JBC as stated in the
first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution. It reads:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed
of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court,
and a representative of the private sector.

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the provision is clear and
unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of the
Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On
the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC
composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and "a representative of
Congress."

As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of Congress" is unequivocal
and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission
had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that
more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain
terms, so provided.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-
32 

settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to
be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there
33 

should be no departure. 34 

The raison d’ être for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the
35 

Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should
ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.  36 

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. This is because a word or phrase in a statute
37 

is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by
the latter. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions,
38 

but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order
to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions
whenever possible. In short, every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the
39 

context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words
or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word "Congress" used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether
the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The foregoing declaration is but sensible, since, as pointed out by
an esteemed former member of the Court and consultant of the JBC in his memorandum, "from the enumeration of
40 

the membership of the JBC, it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single individual only." 41 

Indeed, the spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. Not any of these instances, however, is
42 

present in the case at bench. Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission.

Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional
Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. Thus:

MR. RODRIGO: Let me go to another point then.

On page 2, Section 5, there is a novel provision about the appointments of members of the Supreme Court and
judges of the lower courts. At present it is the President who appoints them. If there is a Commission on
Appointments, then it is the President with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointment. In this proposal, we
would like to establish a new office, a sort of a board composed of seven members called the Judicial and Bar
Council. And while the President will still appoint the member of the judiciary, he will be limited to the
recommendees of this Council.

x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. RODRIGO. Of the seven members of the Judicial and Bar Council, the President appoints four of them who are
regular members.

x x x           x x x          x x x
MR. CONCEPCION. The only purpose of the Committee is to eliminate partisan politics. 43 

x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. RODRIGO. If my amendment is approved, then the provision will be exactly the same as the provision in the
1935 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5.

x x x           x x x          x x x

If we do not remove the proposed amendment on the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council, this will be a
diminution of the appointing power of the highest magistrate of the land, of the

President of the Philippines elected by all the Filipino people. The appointing power will be limited by a group of
seven people who are not elected by the people but only appointed.

Mr. Presiding Officer, if this Council is created, there will be no uniformity in our constitutional provisions on
appointments. The members of the Judiciary will be segregated from the rest of the government. Even a municipal
judge cannot be appointed by the President except upon recommendation or nomination of the three names by this
Committee of seven people, commissioners of the Commission on Elections, the COA and the Commission on Civil
Service…even ambassadors, generals of the Army will not come under this restriction. Why are we going to
segregate the Judiciary from the rest of our government in the appointment of high-ranking officials?

Another reason is that this Council will be ineffective. It will just besmirch the honor of our President without being
effective at all because this Council will be under the influence of the President. Four out of seven are appointees of
the President and they can be reappointed when their term ends. Therefore, they would be kowtow the President. A
fifth member is the Minister of Justice, an alter ego of the President. Another member represents the Legislature. In
all probability, the controlling part in the legislature belongs to the President and, therefore, this representative form
the National Assembly is also under the influence of the President. And may I say, Mr. Presiding Officer, that event
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is an appointee of the President. So it is futile he will be influence anyway by
the President. [Emphases supplied]
44 

At this juncture, it is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that
is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude
that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the
sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually
muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be
rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself created. While it would be
unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they
knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word "Congress" in Section 8(1), Article
VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They
theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially
intended a unicameral form of Congress.

Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through
oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution. On this score, the Court cites the insightful
45 

analysis of another member of the Court and JBC consultant, retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago. Thus: 46 

A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the JBC reflects the
Commission’s desire "to have in the Council a representation for the major elements of the community." xxx The ex-
officio members of the Council consist of representatives from the three main branches of government while the
regular members are composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII,
Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of
government. xxxThus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting members with the three ex-officio members
having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.
 x x x           x x x          x x x

No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by
Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the
Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of government, is constitutionally treated
as another co-equal branch of in the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the exercise of
legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and House of Representatives to coordinate and act as
distinct bodies in furtherance of Congress’ role under our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and, in
fact, necessitates the separateness of the two houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no such
dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the other two co-equal branches of government.

It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign the same
weight to considerations that any of its representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the
judiciary. The representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives act as such for one branch
and should not have any more quantitative influence as the other branches in the exercise of prerogatives
evenly bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the three branches support this
conclusion. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

More than the reasoning provided in the above discussed rules of constitutional construction, the Court finds the
above thesis as the paramount justification of the Court’s conclusion that "Congress," in the context of JBC
representation, should be considered as one body. It is evident that the definition of "Congress" as a bicameral body
refers to its primary function in government - to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the
47 

distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers such
as, inter alia, the power of appropriation, the declaration of an existence of a state of war, canvassing of electoral
48  49 

returns for the President and Vice-President, and impeachment. In the exercise of these powers, the Constitution
50  51 

employs precise language in laying down the roles which a particular house plays, regardless of whether the two
houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. An inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. Verily,
each house is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration
to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and balances, to the
other branches of government.

This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists
in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term "Congress" must be taken to mean
the entirelegislative department. A fortiori, a pretext of oversight cannot prevail over the more pragmatic scheme
which the Constitution laid with firmness, that is, that the JBC has a seat for a single representative of Congress, as
one of the co-equal branches of government.

Doubtless, the Framers of our Constitution intended to create a JBC as an innovative solution in response to the
public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial
52 

independence, they adopted a holistic approach and hoped that, in creating a JBC, the private sector and the three
branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary.

Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice
speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would, as one former congressman and member of
the JBC put it, "negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution."
53 

To quote one former Secretary of Justice:

The present imbalance in voting power between the Legislative and the other sectors represented in the JBC must
be corrected especially when considered vis-à-vis the avowed purpose for its creation, i.e., to insulate the
appointments in the Judiciary against political influence. By allowing both houses of Congress to have a
representative in the JBC and by giving each representative one (1) vote in the Council, Congress, as compared to
the other members of the JBC, is accorded greater and unwarranted influence in the appointment of
judges. [Emphasis supplied]
54 
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus,
any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section
8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in
recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be
countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law
to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer.
Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to
sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the
government and the people who run it. Hence, any act of the government or of a public official or employee which is
55 

contrary to the Constitution is illegal, null and void.

As to the effect of the Court’s finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional, it bears mentioning
that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute.
56 

In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil
Corporation, the Court explained:
57 

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It1âwphi1

nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination
of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put
the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating
it.

Considering the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding
its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless
valid.

At this point, the Court takes the initiative to clarify that it is not in a position to determine as to who should remain as
the sole representative of Congress in the JBC. This is a matter beyond the province of the Court and is best left to
the determination of Congress.

Finally, while the Court finds wisdom in respondents' contention that both the Senate and the House of
Representatives should be equally represented in the JBC, the Court is not in a position to stamp its imprimatur on
such a construction at the risk of expanding the meaning of the Constitution as currently worded. Needless to state,
the remedy lies in the amendment of this constitutional provision. The courts merely give effect to the lawgiver's
intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the power to correct,
by reading into the law what is not written therein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council IS
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only
one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article

VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

This disposition is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
PREAMBLE

G.R. No. L-45459             March 13, 1937

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, 
vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

Vicente Sotto for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.

LAUREL, J.:

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance
from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage
stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage
stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress,
organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty,
requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the
Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the
United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing as follows:

"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown,
cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos."
The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The
further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.

The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant case,
although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an
extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial
functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue
to . . . inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which
are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs. 516 and 226,
Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute are
undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case,
which act because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiorari "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction."
The statutory rule, therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or
tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the
jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in
excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of
justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of
actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)

The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing
and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that
this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of
the Philippines, which provides as follows:

No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the
use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the
necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our
history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both,
for ocassions might arise when the estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the
furtherance of their recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our
constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of December
10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of the Philippines
as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both
religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to
support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is
guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is
not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality,
its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution,
implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve
and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity
the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance
upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects
and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious
purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended
thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher,
minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage or leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction
in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation
to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and
made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to
beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against
religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised
Penal Code).

In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the
provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:

No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE
SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE
APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW
DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature assembled and
by the authority of the same:

SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately available out of any
funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with
new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.

SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is hereby
authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as
often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.

SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.

SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, February 21, 1933.

It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and printing of
postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the
manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of
the postage stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines in a
letter dated September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges
that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the
revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at P1,618,17.10 and states that there still
remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary
power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of
course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does
not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a
particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the
Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money
derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of
Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and
selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned
merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and
its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines,
June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed
(Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines
and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress,
Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines,
as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to
be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman
Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government
should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if
the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose
should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts,
175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete
separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in
the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of
our political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the
Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection,
examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that
there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new
designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these
officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the
petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the
step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming
within a constitutional inhibition.

The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
NATIONAL TERRITORY

G.R No. 187167               August 16, 2011

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C.
ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA
ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR
BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN
MARRI CAÑETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO,
RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE
CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL
MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK
FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE
MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA
ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners, 
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY
VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE
INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED
NATIONS,Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221(RA
9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.

The Antecedents

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines
as an archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea,"
the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of
negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for
nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical
errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was
prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes
the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines7 and sets the
deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522
shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified
adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands"
whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or x
x x legislators,"9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1)
RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in
violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary
treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free
policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.13

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss
of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their argument of
territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included – its failure to reference
either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the
maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.

Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition’s compliance
with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged lack of locus standiand
(2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits,
respondents defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine
territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country’s
security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah.

Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners’ assertion that what Spain
ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries
of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.

We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.

The Issues

The petition raises the following issues:

1. Preliminarily –

1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and

2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522.

2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court

On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the
writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find
no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.

On the Threshold Issues

Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens

Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition
alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and
implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as citizens with constitutionally
sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance
necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find
other litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the
requirements for granting citizenship standing.17

The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition

Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the
offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse
of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting
prejudice on the part of petitioners.18

Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power
of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial
vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of government.20Issues of
constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests
of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to
take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules
notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law.

RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional

RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory

Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory"21 because it discards the pre-
UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded
in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this
constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over
waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the
United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ technical description, Philippine sovereignty over
territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular
area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22

Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among
others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines],
contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long
negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans
and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters
and submarine lands along their coasts.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific
basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic
starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on
archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:

Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and
the continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision
the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-
based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce
customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living
and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the
rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in
accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The
baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of
Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago."24

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim,
diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory
through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of
sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on
general international law.26

RA 9522’s Use of the Framework

of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas

Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and
to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over that
area.27 Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and Scarborough Shoal’s) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines
results in the loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and
the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its
congressional deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines’ obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view. 1avvphi1

The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the
basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of
basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on the maximum
length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the
baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of
petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines’ claim over the KIG, assuming
that baselines are relevant for this purpose.

Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly
unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the
Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by
145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:29

Extent of maritime
area using RA Extent of maritime
3046, as amended, area using RA
taking into account 9522, taking into
 
the Treaty of Paris’ account UNCLOS
delimitation (in III (in square
square nautical nautical miles)
miles)

Internal or
archipelagic
waters 166,858 171,435

Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106

Exclusive
Economic Zone   382,669

TOTAL 440,994 586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way
beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are
overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime
boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.30

Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522
draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines’
continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article
121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)

Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago,
adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of
UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires
that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total
number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.31

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and the Scarborough Shoal for several
decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to
an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."

The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the
foregoing during the Senate deliberations:

What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal
are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating
the provision of international law which states: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable
extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga
islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still
allowed by international law to claim them as our own.

This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line
which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough
Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago
kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na
sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural
configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III’s limits.  The need to shorten this
1avvphi1

baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as
discussed by respondents:

[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its
maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As
defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit:

1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06
nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III],
which states that "The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per
cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum
length of 125 nautical miles."

2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the
baselines system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.

3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey
methods. Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan
 were later found to be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed
by Article 47.35

Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to
classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines
consistent with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta
sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of
"regime of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.37

Statutory Claim Over Sabah under

RA 5446 Retained 

Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah in
North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for
drawing the baselines of Sabah:

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is
without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah,
situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not

Incompatible with the Constitution’s
Delineation of Internal Waters

As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts"
internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes
passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably
expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.38

Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution39 or as "archipelagic waters"
under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:

Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil.
–

1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic

baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth
or distance from the coast.

2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and
subsoil, and the resources contained therein.

xxxx

4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect
the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State
of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources
contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)

The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms
subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of
maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of
freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent
discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to
regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now
pending in Congress.41

In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant
innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and
conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law,43 thus
automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to
absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking
retaliatory measures from the international community.

The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and
sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are subject, in
their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The
imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic
States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the
recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity
prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands generate their own
maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’
territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.47

Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative
guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x."49 Article
II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting
executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced
ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the
claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth
(Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 251 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 752 ), are not violated by RA
9522.

In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving
solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime
delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the
maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to
be bound by it.

UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime
space – the exclusive economic zone – in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to
coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles.53 UNCLOS III,
however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the
territorial sea before UNCLOS III.

RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones

Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA
9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners’ reading plausible.
Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of
choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic
State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its
maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open
invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas
around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine
maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as
embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime
zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its
maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

REGALIAN DOCTRINE

G.R. No. 135385               December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, 

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN,
BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ
T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO
SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE
ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI,
DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO,
BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-
CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR,
MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE
CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT,
ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY
ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T.
DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O.
SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS,
SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G.
SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR
TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG
AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING,
SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING
MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO,
MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA,
represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID,
ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN
BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE,
INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. In compliance, respondents
1 

Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government
agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition,
in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a
consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground
that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr.
Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112
groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in
defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear
as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State
has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous
peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for
the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that
the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective
memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the
ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well
as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn,
defines ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands,
bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of
the indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development
or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and
the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural
resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the
ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."
2 

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral
lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of
private landowners. 3 
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and
making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on
the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. 4 

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains
and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral
domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the
National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be
applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of
land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
indigenous peoples; and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the
indigenous peoples." 5 

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized
as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said
Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution.6 

Petitioners pray for the following:

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of
R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease
and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and
desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources." 7 

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice
Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1,
Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale
exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not
raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.
He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must
await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed
a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices
Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated
upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.
 April 5, 2017

G.R. No. 186603

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR, REGION
VI, ILOILO CITY, Petitioners, 
vs.
VALENTINA REGISTER OF PROVINCE OCCIDENTAL, CALISTON, DIOSCORO ESCARDA, ESPINOSA,
DEEDS OF THE OF NEG ROS LEONILA and & SPOUSES ESTRELLA, Respondents

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari  seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals' (CA) July 25, 2008 Decision  and
1 2

February 4, 2009 Resolution  in CA-G.R. CV No. 00421. The CA modified the May 12, 2004 Decision  of the
3 4

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61 of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, and dismissed the reversion case
filed by the Republic of the Philippines (State) against respondents Valentina Espinosa and her successor-in-
interest, Leonila B. Caliston, to wit: WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 12, 2004 and
Order dated July 16, 2004 are hereby modified upholding the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 191-N and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91117, respectively, issued in the names of Valentina Espinosa and Leonila
Caliston. The award of damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in favor of Leonila Caliston is affirmed.

SO ORDERED. 5

On October 26, 1955, Cadastral Decree No. N-31626 was issued to Valentina Espinosa (Espinosa) in Cadastral
Case No. 39, L.R.C. Cadastral Record No. 980. It covered a 28,880-square meter lot located at Lot No. 3599 of
Cadastral Record No. 980, Poblacion, Sipalay City, Negros Occidental (property). By virtue of the decree, Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 191-N was issued on October 15, 1962 in the name ofEspinosa.  On June 17, 1976,
6

Espinosa sold the property to Leonila B. Caliston (Caliston), who was later issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T- 91117  on June 29, 1976.
7 8

On January 13, 2003, the State, represented by the Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VI, Iloilo City, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Complaint  for annulment of title and/or reversion of land with the RTC, Branch 61 of Kabankalan City, Negros
9

Occidental. The State claimed that the property is inalienable public land because it fell within a timberland area
indicated under Project No. 27-C, Block C per Land Classification (LC) Map No. 2978, as certified by the Director of
Forestry on January 17, 1986. 10

The spouses Dioscoro and Estrella Escarda (spouses Escarda) intervened, 11 alleging that they have been
occupying the property since 1976 on the belief that it belongs to the State.   They prayed that Caliston be ordered
12

to cease and desist from ejecting them.  13

In answer, Caliston countered that the property is not timberland. Invoking laches and prescription, she argued that
her title was issued earlier in 1962, while the map shows that the property was classified only in 1986.  Caliston also
14

claimed that the spouses Escarda lacked the capacity or personality to intervene because only the State may initiate
an action for reversion. She also alleged that the spouses Escarda cannot claim a better right as against her
because she merely tolerated their occupancy of the property until their refusal to vacate it.   As counterclaim,
15

Caliston claimed for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses against the spouses
Escarda for the baseless and malicious complaint.  16

The RTC rendered a Decision  dated May 12, 2004. Relying on LC Map No. 2978, the trial court ruled in favor of the
17

State and ordered the reversion of the property to the mass of the public domain, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment 1s hereby rendered as follows:

 1. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No.191-N in the name of Valentina Espinosa and all its derivative
titles, such as: TCT No. T-91117 in the name of Leonila Caliston, null and void ab initio;

2. Ordering defendants to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. 191-N and TCT N[o]. T-91117 to
defendant Register of Deeds for the Province of Negros Occidental and the latter to cancel said titles and all
their derivative titles, if any;

3. Ordering the reversion of the land covered by the aforesaid patent and title to the mass of the public
domain under the administration and disposition of the Director of Forestry (now Regional Executive
Director, Region VI, Iloilo City);

4. Declaring that defendant Leonila Caliston has better right over the subject lot as against intervenors
Spouses Dioscoro and Estrella Escarda; and

5. Ordering the intervenors to pay defendant Leonila Caliston the following sums:

a) Not less than P20,000.00 for moral damages;

b) Not less than Pl0,000.00 for exemplary damages;

c) Not less than Pl0,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus so much appearance fees of ₱2,000.00 incurred
and/or paid by answering defendant in connection with this case; and

d) Not less than ₱5,000.00 for expenses of litigation.

SO ORDERED.  18

Caliston' s motion for reconsideration   was denied in an Order  dated July 16, 2004. On August 5, 2004, Caliston
19 20

filed a Notice of Appeal  with the RTC. On the other hand, the spouses Escarda did not file a notice of appeal.
21

Records were then forwarded to the CA, where proceedings ensued.

There, Caliston argued that the trial court improperly relied upon LC Map No. 2978, which was prepared long after
the property was alienated and awarded to Espinosa, her predecessor-in-interest. The map, the admissibility and
genuineness of which have yet to be proved, cannot be used to defeat the cadastral proceedings presumed to have
been regularly conducted. Even assuming the map can be considered, Caliston claims that her property is situated
in an area indicated as alienable and disposable. She also reiterated her defenses of laches and prescription.  22

For its part, the State argued that the lower court did not err in relying upon LC Map No. 2978 though it was
prepared only in 1986. According to the State, forest lands are incapable of private appropriation and possession,
however long; prescription does not run against the government.  23

The CA rendered a Decision  dated July 25, 2008 modifying the RTC Decision. It upheld the validity of OCT No.
24

191-N and TCT No. 91117 issued in the names of Espinosa and Caliston, respectively, and affirmed the award of
damages, attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation in favor of Caliston.

The CA found that the State failed to prove fraud or misrepresentation on the part of Espinosa when she was issued
OCT No. 191-N. It further ruled that the State failed to prove that the property is forest land. The lone piece of
evidence consisting of LC Map No. 2978, certified by the Director of Forestry on January 17, 1986, was not
authenticated pursuant to Section 24,   Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It noted that the parties stipulated only as to
25

the existence of the map, but not as to its genuineness or the truthfulness of its content. Assuming that the map is
admitted in evidence, Espinosa's rights over the property, which accrued in 1962; should not be prejudiced by a
subsequent classification by the State done in 1986, or after 24 years.   The CA cited  the case of SAAD Agro-
26 27

Industries, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines. 

28

In a Resolution  dated February 4, 2009, the CA denied the State's Motion for Reconsideration.
29
Hence, this petition.

The lone issue presented is whether the State has sufficiently proved that the property is part of inalienable forest
land at the time Espinosa was granted the cadastral decree and issued a title.

We deny the petition.

The State failed to prove that the property was classified as forest land at the time of the grant of the cadastral
decree and issuance of title to Espinosa.

In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership. It
must establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable
based on a positive act of the government.   Since cadastral proceedings are governed by the usual rules of
30

practice, procedure, and evidence, a cadastral decree and a certificate of title are issued only after the applicant
proves all the requisite jurisdictional facts-that they are entitled to the claimed lot, that all parties are heard, and that
evidence is considered.  As such, the cadastral decree is a judgment which adjudicates ownership after proving
31

these jurisdictional facts. 32

Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was subsequently issued OCT No. 191-N,
the predecessor title of Caliston's TCT No. 91117. Having been granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding,
Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of
the public domain.   This means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that
33

the property is alienable and disposable property in the cadastral proceedings.

This is not to say, however, that the State has no remedy to recover the property if indeed it is part of the inalienable
lands of the public domain. The State may still do so through an action for reversion, as in the present case.

Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the mass
of the public domain.   It is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or
34

corporations.  There are also instances when we granted reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as when a
35

"person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered
under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is of the
public domain." 36

In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor misrepresentation in the cadastral
proceedings and in the issuance of the title in Espinosa's favor. The argument for the State is merely that the
property was unlawfully included in the certificate of title because it is of the public domain.

Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the burden is on the State to prove that the
property was classified as timberland or forest land at the time it was decreed to Espinosa.  To reiterate, there is no
37

burden on Caliston to prove that the property in question is alienable and disposable land.   At this stage, it is
38

reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from whom Caliston derived her title, had already established that the
property is alienable and disposable land considering that she succeeded in obtaining the OCT over it.  In this
39

reversion proceeding, the State must prove that there was an oversight or mistake in the inclusion of the property in
Espinosa' s title because it was of public dominion. This is consistent with the rule that the burden of proof rests on
the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. 40

Here, the State hinges its whole claim on its lone piece of evidence, the land classification map prepared in 1986.

The records show, however, that LC Map No. 2978 was not formally offered in evidence. The rules require that
documentary evidence must be formally offered in evidence after the presentation of testimonial evidence, and it
may be done orally, or if allowed by the court, in writing.  Due process requires a formal offer of evidence for the
41

benefit of the adverse party, the trial court, and the appellate courts.  This gives the adverse party the opportunity to
42

examine and oppose the admissibility of the evidence.  When evidence has not been formally offered, it should not
43

be considered by the court in arriving at its decision.  Not having been offered formally, it was error for the trial court
44
to have considered the survey map. Consequently, it also erred in ordering the reversion of the property to the mass
of the public domain on the basis of the same.

Moreover, even assuming that the survey can be admitted in evidence, this will not help to further the State's
cause.  This is because the only fact proved by the map is one already admitted by the State, that is, that the land
1âwphi1

was reclassified in 1986.  This fact does not address the presumption/conclusion that Espinosa has, at the time of
45

the cadastral proceedings conducted in 1955, proved that the land is alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the
decree issued in his favor in 1962.

II

The reclassification of the area where the property is located in 1986 should not prejudice Espinosa and her
successor-in-interest.  Apropos is the case of Sta. Monica Industrial and Dev't Corp. v. Court of Appeals.   In that
46 47

case, the State offered in evidence a land classification map to prove that at the time the land was decreed to the
original owner, it had not yet been released and still fell within the forest zone. However, the map did not
conclusively state the actual classification of the land at the time it was adjudicated to the original owner. We thus
ruled that the State failed to prove that the titles should be annulled- Finally, we find the need to emphasize that in
an action to annul a judgment, the burden of proving the judgment's nullity rests upon the petitioner. The petitioner
must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the judgment is fatally defective. When the proceedings were
originally filed by the Republic before the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contended that when the decree in favor of
De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were still part of the inalienable public forests.
However, petitioner's case rested solely on land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of the
decree in 1912. These maps fail to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the
years prior to that. Before this Court, petitioner reiterates said contention and refers, for the first time, to a 1908
proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of land are
parts thereof. These, for reasons discussed earlier, are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the
decree's regularity, more so when we consider that notice of the application for registration and the date of hearing
thereof, addressed to the Attorney General, the Director of Lands, the Director of Public Works and the Director of
Forestry, among others, was published in the Official Gazette and that Governor General Smith's Proclamation of
1908 itself recognizes private rights.48

We stress that our ruling is not inconsistent with the doctrine that forest lands are outside the commerce of man and
unsusceptible of private appropriation.  Neither are we changing the rule on imprescriptibility of actions for
1âwphi1

reversion. We are merely deciding on the facts as proved by the record. To allow a reversion based on a
classification made at the time when the property was already declared private property by virtue of a decree would
be akin to expropriation of land without due process of law. 49

At this juncture, we agree with the CA' s application of SAAD AgroIndustries, Inc.,   which involved a complaint for
50

annulment of title and reversion of a lot covered by a free patent and original title. To support its claim that the lot
was part of the timberland and forest reserve, the State submitted as evidence a photocopy of a land classification
map. This map also became the basis of the testimonies of City Environment and Natural Resources Office officers
declaring that the lot falls within the timberland or forest reserve. The State, however, failed to submit either a
certified true copy or an official publication of the map, prompting the trial court to deny its admission in evidence.
After proceedings, the trial court dismissed the complaint due to the State's failure to show that the subject lot
therein is part of the timberland or forest reserve or has been classified as such before the issuance of the free
patent and the original title. The CA, relying on the map, reversed the trial court.

When the case was brought before this court, we reinstated the trial court's decision. We held that the photocopy of
the land classification map cannot be considered in evidence because it is excluded under the best evidence rule.
We emphasized that all parties, including the Government, are bound by the rules of admissibility and must comply
with it- The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly. The same rule holds true when the Government is one
of the parties. The Government, when it comes to court to litigate with one of its citizens, must submit to the rules of
procedure and its rights and privileges at every stage of the proceedings are substantially in every respect the same
as those of its citizens; it cannot have a superior advantage. This is so because when a [sovereign] submits itself to
the jurisdiction of the court and participates therein, its claims and rights are justiciable by every other principle and
rule applicable to the claims and rights of the private parties under similar circumstances. Failure to abide by the
rules on admissibility renders the L.C. Map submitted by respondent inadmissible as proof to show that the subject
lot is part of the forest reserve. 
51
We went on to explain that even if the map was admitted in evidence to prove that the lot was classified as part of
the timberland or forest reserve, the classification was made long after private interests had intervened. Not only
was the lot already occupied and cultivated, a free patent and a certificate of title were also awarded and issued
years ahead of the classification- Even assuming that the L.C. Map submitted by respondent is admissible in
evidence, still the land in question can hardly be considered part of the timberland or forest reserve. L.C. Map No.
2961, which purports to be the "correct map of the areas demarcated as permanent forest pursuant of the provisions
of P.D. No. 705 as amended" was made only in 1980. Thus, the delineation of the areas was made nine (9) years
after Orcullo was awarded the free patent over the subject lot.

xxx

Obviously, private interests have intervened before classification was made pursuant to P.D. No. 705. Not only has
Orcullo by herself and through her predecessors-ininterest cultivated and possessed the subject lot since 1930, a
free patent was also awarded to her and a title issued in her name as early as 1971. In fact, it appears that the
issuance of the free patent and certificate of title was regular and in order. Orcullo complied with the requisites for
the acquisition of free patent provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as certified by the
Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

xxx

The Regalian doctrine is well-enshrined not only in the present Constitution, but also in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions. The Court has always recognized and upheld the Regalian doctrine as the basic foundation of the
State's property regime. Nevertheless, in applying this doctrine, we must not lose sight of the fact that in every claim
or right by the Government against one of its citizens, the paramount considerations of fairness and due process
must be observed. Respondent in this case failed to show that the subject lot is part of timberland or forest reserve it
adverted to. In the face of the uncontroverted status of Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 as valid and
regular issuances, respondent's insistence on the classification of the lot as part of the forest reserve must be
rejected. 
52

These principles laid down in SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. undoubtedly apply here. As part of fair play and due
process, the State is as bound by the rules on formal offer of evidence as much as every private party is. More, the
State's subsequent reclassification of the area where the property is situated cannot be used to defeat the rights of a
private citizen who acquired the land in a valid and regular proceeding conducted 24 years earlier.

The result would have been different had the State proved that the property was already classified as part of forest
land at the time of the cadastral proceedings and when title was decreed to Espinosa in 1962. However, it failed to
discharge this burden; the grant of title which carries with it the presumption that Espinosa had already proved the
alienable character of the property in the cadastral proceedings stands. To grant the reversion based on a
subsequent reclassification, more so on lack of evidence, would amount to taking of private property without just
compensation and due process of law.  This, however, is not what our Constitution envisions; fairness and due
53

process are paramount considerations that must still be observed. 54

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' July 25, 2008 Decision and
February 4, 2009 Resolution are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.