G.R. No.

199113, March 18, 2015

RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner, v. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the Order1 dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition for certiorari filed by Renato M. David
(petitioner). Petitioner assailed the Order2 dated March 22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Socorro,
Oriental Mindoro denying his motion for redetermination of probable cause.

The factual antecedents:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their
retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-square
meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house.
However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their house is public land and part
of the salvage zone.

On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application3 (MLA) over the subject land with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is
disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,4 (R.A.
9225) as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines
(Toronto) on October 11, 2007.

In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He further
alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled
land and they have the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil
and criminal suits between him and private respondent’s family.

On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict
petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding information in
court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the Department of Justice
(DOJ).

On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab
initio.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was denied by the DOJ which held that
the presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to warrant indictment of the
petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or intended to injure a third person in committing
the act of falsification.9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC
(Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner.

On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for
Re-Determination of Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the law relied upon by petitioner,
the said court denied the motion, holding that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who became foreign
citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine citizenship before its enactment when the
governing law was Commonwealth Act No. 6311 (CA 63). Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was
alleged and admitted to have been committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC
ordered:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and for lack of merit, the motion is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing order denying him relief on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction and insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He argued that since his application had yet to
receive final evaluation and action by the DENR Region IV-B office in Manila, it is academic to ask the citizenship of
the applicant (petitioner) who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six months after he applied for lease of public
land. The MTC denied the motion for reconsideration.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an accused cannot
be a pre-condition for the re-determination of probable cause by the court that issues a warrant of arrest;
and second, the March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who
had been naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus
deemed not to have been lost on account of said naturalization.

In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the act of falsification was already consummated
as petitioner has not yet re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent oath to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship will only affect his citizenship status and not his criminal act which was long consummated prior to said
oath of allegiance.

On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition for certiorari after finding no grave
abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is not left without any remedy or recourse
because he can proceed to trial where he can make use of his claim to be a Filipino citizen as his defense to be
adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction.

SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that –

A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification, the lower court has disregarded the
undisputed fact that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same status
under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction “deemed not to have lost” it at the time of his naturalization in
Canada and through the time when he was said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.

B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence in Canada and to surrender or allow himself
to be arrested under a warrant for his alleged false claim to Philippine citizenship, the lower court has pre-
empted the right of petitioner through his wife and counsel to question the validity of the said warrant of
arrest against him before the same is implemented, which is tantamount to a denial of due process.18

In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s argument regarding the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is
without merit. It is contended that this Court’s rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections19 and Altarejos v.
Commission on Elections20 on the retroactivity of one’s re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship to the date of filing his
application therefor cannot be applied to the case of herein petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of argument that
such doctrine applies in the present situation, it will still not work for petitioner’s cause for the simple reason that he
had not alleged, much less proved, that he had already applied for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he
made the declaration in the Public Land Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in falsification
of public document, it is not necessary that the idea of gain or intent to injure a third person be present. As to
petitioner’s defense of good faith, such remains to be a defense which may be properly raised and proved in a full-
blown trial.

On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the Solicitor General opines that in seeking an
affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause, petitioner
is deemed to have submitted his person to the said court’s jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless,
the RTC correctly ruled that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner’s
motion after a judicious, thorough and personal evaluation of the parties’ arguments contained in their respective
pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the court.

In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself
as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC properly denied petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable cause
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused (petitioner).

R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,” was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions
of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
“I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of
the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.”
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another country shall be
deemed “not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified by the phrase “under the conditions of this
Act.” Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and
second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The
taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a
foreign country, but the terminology used is different, “re-acquired” for the first group, and “retain” for the second
group.

The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after
the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is “Retention of Philippine Citizenship”, the authors of
the law intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire” and “retain” to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law using both re-acquisition
and retention.

In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-acquired their
Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the
ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with
the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become
naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-
acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took
effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath
of allegiance under the new law.

Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in
criminal cases, that interpretation of the law which favors the accused is preferred because it is consistent with the
constitutional presumption of innocence, and in this case it becomes more relevant when a seemingly difficult
question of law is expected to have been understood by the accused, who is a non-lawyer, at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense. He further cites the letter-reply dated January 31, 201122 of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) to his query, stating that his status as a natural-born Filipino will be governed by Section 2 of R.A.
9225.

These contentions have no merit.

That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship was made clear in the
discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and
Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18, 2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon was responding to the query of
Representative Exequiel Javier:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section 3 of the Senate version, “Any provision of
law on the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
shall… and so forth, ano, shall retain their Philippine citizenship.

Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their citizenship by reason of their naturalization
after the effectivity of this Act are deemed to have reacquired…

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.

REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here. Natural-born citizens who acquired foreign
citizenship after the effectivity of this act are considered to have retained their citizenship. But natural-born citizens
who lost their Filipino citizenship before the effectivity of this act are considered to have reacquired. May I know the
distinction? Do you mean to say that natural-born citizens who became, let’s say, American citizens after the
effectivity of this act are considered natural-born?

Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their citizenship before the effectivity of this act
are no longer natural born citizens because they have just reacquired their citizenship. I just want to know this
distinction, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely retention and reacquisition. The
reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act
63. Upon the effectivity -- assuming that we can agree on this, upon the effectivity of this new measure amending
Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their citizenship is deemed to have reacquired their Philippine
citizenship upon the effectivity of the act.
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future instances. So that’s the
distinction.

REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we are here making distinctions between natural-born
citizens. Because this is very important for certain government positions, ‘no, because natural-born citizens are only
qualified for a specific…

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.

REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. It’s one of the provisions, yes. But just for
purposes of the explanation, Congressman Javier, that is our conceptualization. Reacquired for those who
previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the
future. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to
the first category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine
citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.

For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to
discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats
those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos
who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that
considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read
together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new
law’s effectivity.

As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without any reference to Section 3 on the
particular application of reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the
effectivity of R.A. 9225.

Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the accused is likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an
interpretation more favorable to the accused following the time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed
strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.23 R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.

Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation to Article 17125 of the RPC refers to
falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position,
of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article
172 of the RPC are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position;
(2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and
(3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.26
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of
the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at
the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by
which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect
insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for
falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.

The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground for denying petitioner’s
motion for re-determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest. However, custody of the
law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which
involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person, and held that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he
files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court
by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the above
Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v.
Vasquez:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished
either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of
the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail,
since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted
before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.cralawred
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest
or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the
warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the
custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody
of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to
become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It
includes, but is not limited to, detention.

xxxx

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule,
one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held
in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

xxxx

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused
is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases
when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even
though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-determination of probable cause, the
MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such erroneous ground
stated in the MTC’s order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the MTC in
denying the said motion for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is hereby AFFIRMED and
UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 195002               January 25, 2012

HECTOR TREÑAS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing
them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and render judgment thereon.1

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to
annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9 July 20102 and Resolution dated 4 January 2011.

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:

Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by
TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the
appellant Hector Treñas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece of Margarita,
for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latter’s name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the
property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses would be incurred:

P20,000.00- Attorney’s fees,

P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,

P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,

P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.

Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999
and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue
Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with
the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts
were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the
money.

To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check No. 0042856 dated
November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that the
account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the
instant case of Estafa was filed against him.3

On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), both of Makati City. The Information reads as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the
amount of P150,000.00 which money was given to her by her aunt Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation on
the part of the accused to use the said amount for expenses and fees in connection with the purchase of a parcel of
land covered by TCT No. T-109266, but the said accused, once in possession of the said amount, with the intent to
gain and abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of P130,000.00 less attorney’s fees and the said accused
failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja
and Margarita Alocilja in the aforementioned amount of P130,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea of "Not Guilty." Allegedly
due to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial
and trial of the case.
On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa under section 1,
paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), with the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding accused Hector Trenas guilty of the crime of
Estafa with abuse of confidence as penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and which offense was
committed in the manner described in the aforementioned information. As a consequence of this judgment,
accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to
Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify private
complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum,
reckoned from the date this case was filed until the amount is fully paid.

SO ORDERED.6

We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treñas and Trenas in the pleadings and court
issuances, but for consistency, we use the name "Treñas", under which he was accused in the Information.

On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 which was denied by the RTC in a Resolution
dated 2 July 2008.8

On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC.9 The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered a Decision10 affirming that of the RTC. On 4 August 2010,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.11

On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari12 before
this Court. He asked for a period of 15 days within which to file a petition for review, and the Court granted his
motion in a Resolution dated 9 February 2011.

On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, with the following
assignment of errors:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION
APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION;

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE BY A PERSON OTHER THAN
THE AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE
OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;13

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that ₱
150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued
by petitioner for the money was dated 22 December 1999, without any indication of the place where it was issued.
Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo
City, also on 22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually
delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any
direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that things happened according
to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The only time Makati City was mentioned was with
respect to the time when the check provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-
Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts material
to the crime of estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of jurisdiction, when such
lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence.

As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 actually belongs to Margarita. Assuming
there was misappropriation, it was actually she – not Elizabeth – who was the offended party. Thus, the latter’s
demand does not satisfy the requirement of prior demand by the offended party in the offense of estafa. Even
assuming that the demand could have been properly made by Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount of
P120,000, instead of P150,000. Finally, there is no showing that the demand was actually received by petitioner.
The signature on the Registry Return Receipt was not proven to be that of petitioner’s.

On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file the latter’s
Comment on the Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, praying for an additional period of
60 days within which to submit its Comment. This motion was granted in a Resolution dated 12 September 2011.
On 23 September 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Special Extension, requesting an additional period of five days.
On 29 September 2011, it filed its Comment on the Petition.

In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting petitioner as charged. The OSG notes that
petitioner does not dispute the factual findings of the trial court with respect to the delivery of ₱150,000 to him, and
that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between him and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the
Complaint should have been filed in Iloilo City, his claim was not supported by any piece of evidence, as he did not
present any. Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to weigh the credibility of the prosecution witness,
Elizabeth. However, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, unless
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance, which is not the case here.

With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of "no valid demand" was not raised in the
lower court. Nevertheless, the demand letter sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also one of the complainants
alleged in the Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no proof was adduced as to the genuineness of
petitioner’s signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the demand letter.

The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for executive clemency, in view of his
advanced age and failing health.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

Review of Factual Findings

While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition requires a review of the factual findings of
the lower courts and the evidence upon which they are based.

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In many
instances, however, this Court has laid down exceptions to this general rule, as follows:

(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;

(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;

(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible;

(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts;

(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion;

(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are
based; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such
findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.14

In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the place of commission of the offense
are conclusions without any citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; they are grounded on
conclusions and conjectures.

The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any finding as to where it was
committed:

Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is
convinced that accused Trenas had committed the offense of Estafa by taking advantage of her trust so that he
could misappropriate for his own personal benefit the amount entrusted to him for payment of the capital gains tax
and documentary stamp tax.

As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had obtained the amount of P150,000.00
from her, he gave her two receipts purportedly issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent
purpose of fooling her and making her believe that he had complied with his duty to pay the aforementioned taxes.
Eventually, private complainant Luciaja discovered that said receipts were fabricated documents.15
In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged. The trial court denied the motion, without citing any specific evidence upon which its findings were
based, and by relying on conjecture, thus:

That the said amount was given to [Treñas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly established by the prosecution.
Accused Treñas, on the other hand, never appeared in Court to present countervailing evidence. It is only now that
he is suggesting another possible scenario, not based on the evidence, but on mere "what ifs". x x x

Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would still not warrant a reversal of the
assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was executed on 22 December 999 in
Iloilo City, it cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was delivered to him by private complainant Luciaja in
Makati City the following day. His reasoning the money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it
was to be used for paying the taxes with the BIR office in that city does not inspire concurrence. The records show
that he did not even pay the taxes because the BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake documents.
Thus, his argumentation in this regard is too specious to consider favorably.16

For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction in this wise:

It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it is offered in evidence. It bears
emphasis that Hector did not comment on the formal offer of prosecution’s evidence nor present any evidence on
his behalf. He failed to substantiate his allegations that he had received the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City.
Hence, Hector’s allegations cannot be given evidentiary weight.

Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have been overlooked
and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a
witness made by the trial court remain binding on appellate tribunal. They are entitled to great weight and respect
and will not be disturbed on review.17

The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings of the lower courts.

Jurisdiction of the Trial Court

The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court
cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. In Isip v.
People,18 this Court explained:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element
of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of
a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows
that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
(Emphasis supplied.)

In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must also prove the
identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court.

In Fukuzume v. People,19 this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa, wherein the prosecution failed to prove that
the essential elements of the offense took place within the trial court’s jurisdiction. The Court ruled:

More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to
Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the
premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is
an essential element of jurisdiction. x x x

In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He
was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of
which are as follows: x x x

The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn
statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or
documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the
offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent
payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00
on October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show
that the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and
that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the
contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged had been committed in
Parañaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque; that with the intention of
selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is
authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject
aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered
damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter's house in Parañaque and, by
falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money.

xxx

From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in
Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the
trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice,
however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315
of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City.

That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the
amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)20

Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati. However, the Affidavit
of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was committed. It
provides in part:

4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS the sum of
P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy
of which is hereto attached as Annex "B",

5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS, the latter failed to transfer the title of
aforesaid property to MRS. MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay the capital gains tax,
documentary stamps and BIR-related expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS accomplished was only
the preparation of the Deed of Sale covering aforesaid property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto
attached as Annex "C",

6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS issued to me a check for refund of
the sum given to him less the attorney’s fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR
or in the net sum of P120,000.00. x x x

7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela Rosa-Rada Branch at Makati City,
the same was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x21

Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that
the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City.

Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended
party to the offender.22

There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution23 that points to where the offense, or any
of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows that there was no mention of the
place where the offense was allegedly committed:

Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treñas to you, what happened next?

A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to… and she will work for the Deed
of Sale.

Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?
 A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.

Q What was the amount quoted to you?

A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.

Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorney’s fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for the capital gain tax TWENTY
FOUR THOUSAND is intended for documentary sum (sic) and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for other
expenses for BIR.

Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did he issue a receipt?

A Yes, sir.

Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treñas for this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, will you be
able to identify it?

A Yes, sir.

Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified during the pre-trial as exhibit "B".
This appears to be a receipt dated December 22, 1999. Will you please go over this document and inform
this court what relation has this to the receipt which you said Atty. Treñas issued to you?

A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treñas.

Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given to Atty. Treñas by you, what
happened next?

A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.24

Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such
dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.

Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution evidence which even
mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an objection
may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be
considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.25 Moreover, jurisdiction over the
subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or
otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred

by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by
law.26

It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal
and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper
venue.27 Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to
existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the
offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is to ensure
that the defendant is not compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the
crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in
another place.28 This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints, coupled with
his advanced age and failing health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges against him.

There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over
the case.29

As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner.
At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility strongly militates against
the petitioner’s conduct in handling the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides:

Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.1âwphi1

Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those others kept
by him.

When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees,
registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client how the money was
spent.30 If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure
either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize)
constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.31

Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due or upon demand.32 His
failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.33 It is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.34

In Cuizon v. Macalino,35 this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows
lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes
a ground for disciplinary action.

This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings
against petitioner. In any case, should there be a finding that petitioner has failed to account for the funds received
by him in trust, the recommendation should include an order to immediately return the amount of ₱ 130,000 to his
client, with the appropriate rate of interest from the time of demand until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010 and the Resolution dated 4 January
2011 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City. Criminal Case No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED without
prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and recommendation pursuant
to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169004               September 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's resolution is a petition1 dated September 2, 2005 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that seeks to
reverse and set aside the Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division), dated July 20, 2005, dismissing
Criminal Case No. 27988, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rolando Plaza for lack of jurisdiction.

The facts follow.

Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at the time relevant
to this case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash
advances he received on December 19, 1995 in the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (₱33,000.00) . The
Information reads:

That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROLANDO
PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and
committing the offense, in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in
the total amount of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (₱33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by
reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with
deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash
advances of ₱33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in
the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss3 dated April 7, 2005 with the Sandiganbayan, to which the
latter issued an Order4 dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to submit its comment. Petitioner filed its
Opposition5 to the Motion to Dismiss on April 19, 2005. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its
Resolution6 on July 20, 2005 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the
proper court. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without
prejudice to its filing in the proper court.

SO ORDERED.

Thus, the present petition.

Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases involving public officials and
employees enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended by Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and
8249), whether or not occupying a position classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not only
for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to office. Furthermore, petitioner questioned the
Sandiganbayan’s appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan,7 claiming that the Inding case
did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section
4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A.
3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration
in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249, which was made applicable to cases
concerning violations of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,
equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.

In his Comment8 dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza argued that, as phrased in Section 4 of P.D. 1606,
as amended, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, while the exceptions to the
general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan
was right in ruling that it has original jurisdiction only over the following cases: (a) where the accused is a public
official with salary grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases where the accused is a public official below grade 27 but his
position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to (g) of P. D. 1606, as amended and
his offense involves a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code; and (c) if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the
general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the
Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply.

In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The
Auditing Code of the Philippines.

This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante9 is a
case with uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in the earlier case, Victoria Amante and
herein respondent Plaza were both members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time
pertinent to this case. The only difference is that, respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One
Thousand Ninety-Five Pesos (₱71,095.00) while respondent Plaza failed to liquidate the amount of Thirty-Three
Thousand Pesos (₱33,000.00).

In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary
grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines, this Court cited the case
of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.10 as a background on the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:

x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.11

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No.
1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.12

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which
was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x .

Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again
amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be applied in the present case, the offense
having been allegedly committed on or about December 19, 1995 and the Information having been filed on March
25, 2004. As extensively explained in the earlier mentioned case,

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.13 The exception contained in R. A. 7975, as well as
R. A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases
involving violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of
The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two
provisions states:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: x x x.14

Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses and felonies
committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved where the said provision, contains
no exception. Therefore, what applies in the present case is the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a
criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the
offense. The present case having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern. P.D.
1606, as amended by R.A. 8249 states that:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
 (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:

The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 (a),
the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction
over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as
Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the
positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors,
vice-govenors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or
felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office
also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.15

Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent provisions of the law, respondent
Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission of an offense in relation to his
office, necessarily falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding16 case wherein it was ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
regardless of salary grade and which the Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed Resolution, this Court
enunciated, still in the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,17 that the Inding case did not
categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a
violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. As thoroughly
discussed:
x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary
Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over
the said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4 (b)
where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4 (b) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, provides that:

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this
section in relation to their office.

A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials enumerated in
Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of
R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other
offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are
limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled
that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged
to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his
official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have
committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense
committed in relation" to his office.18 Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al..,19 where the
crime involved was murder, this Court held that:

The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in
relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender – that is, whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x

Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,20 where the public official was charged with grave threats, this Court
ruled:

x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took
advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of
grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a
municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to
kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner’s
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of
petitioner’s official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein
it held that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing"
and that "accused’s violent act was precipitated by complainant’s criticism of his administration as the mayor or
chief executive of the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his response to private complainant’s
attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private
complainant might have said during said privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the
Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.1avvphi1

Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against respondent Amante
for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her
office, making her fall under Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.

According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend the
application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there
would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials
and employees in relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction
apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as
an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4 (b),
it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or
employees' office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office,
this Court held:

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offense
committed in relation to [an accused’s] office" by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49
(1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The
principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accused’s
office if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x
x." In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show that
x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused’s] respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the
accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their
aforesaid offices. x x x"21

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of Section 4 (b) does not mention any qualification as to the
public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same
section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically
enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,22 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words.23 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. (Italics
supplied.)24

With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,25 the issue as
to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now attained clarity.

WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the

Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated July 20, 2005 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Let the case
be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and Victoria Amante
G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009
FACTS:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu. On January 14,
1994, she obtained a cash advance for the defrayal of seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and
Environmental Protection, which she headed but as of December 19, 1995 no liquidation was made. The
investigation report of the Commission on Audit submitted to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas
(OMB-Visayas) recommended for further investigation to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed
against her. On May 21, 2004, an Information for Malversation of Public Funds was filed against her. However, the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with Salary Grade
26 who is charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
Violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls under Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 which states that “Other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office“. An offense is said to have been
committed in relation to the office if the offense is “intimately connected” with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.
Public officials below Salary Grade 27 may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they
hold the positions particularly and exclusively enumerated under Section 4(a) such as provincial governors, vice-
governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers , and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as
consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief
superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations.
Applying the above provisions, respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of
the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
 G.R. No. 227146, November 14, 2016

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. ROMEO T. NOLASCO AND REYNALDO T.

NOLASCO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Amended
Order2 dated July 21, 2016 and Order3 dated September 1, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo,
Rizal, Branch 75, in Civil Case No. 2806-15 SM, on pure questions of law.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Factual Antecedents

Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. (petitioner) is a domestic financing corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines, with principal address at 7th Floor, DMG Center, Domingo M. Guevara Street,
Mandaluyong City. On the other hand, Romeo Nolasco and Reynaldo Nolasco (respondents) are obligors of the
petitioner who both maintain residence in Mandaluyong City.4

On March 31, 2014, the respondents secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P1,908,360.00, payable in
installments within a period of 36 months, as evidenced by a Promissory Note5 executed on the same day. To
secure the payment of the loan, the respondents constituted a Chattel Mortgage6 over a Fuso Super Great
Dropside Truck, 2001 Model.7

Unfortunately, the respondents defaulted in the payment of the installments which caused the entire amount to
become due and demandable. The petitioner repeatedly demanded from the respondents the payment of the
balance of the loan, but they would not take heed and even refused to surrender the possession of the motor
vehicle which stood as security for the loan. Thus, on September 30, 2015, the petitioner filed a complaint8 for Sum
of Money and Damages with Application for Writ of Replevin with the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal, praying that the
respondents be ordered to pay their balance of P1,600,153.02 or, in the alternative, surrender the possession of
the motor vehicle subject of the Chattel Mortgage dated March 31, 2014 so that the same may be put up on sale to
answer for the obligation and the deficiency, if any, may be determined.

After an ex parte hearing, the RTC issued an Order9 dated March 28, 2016, directing the issuance of the Writ of
Replevin. Subsequently, however, the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal issued an Amended Order10 dated July 21, 2016,
dismissing motu proprio the case for lack of jurisdiction. Citing Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, it ruled that since neither the petitioner nor the respondents reside within the jurisdiction of the trial
court, that is, either in San Mateo or Rodriguez, Rizal, the case must be dismissed.11

On August 16, 2016, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration12 arguing that the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal
has jurisdiction over the case. It pointed out that the sum of money involved amounting to P1,600,153.02 is well
within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Further, the venue is also proper, considering that there is a provision in the
promissory note which states that any action to enforce payment of any sums due shall exclusively be brought in
the proper court within the National Capital Judicial Region or in any place where the petitioner has a branch or
office at its sole option.

In an Order13 dated September 1, 2016, the RTC reiterated its earlier ruling and denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

The petitioner now comes before this Court, challenging the order of the RTC on pure questions of law. It contends
that the RTC erred in concluding that it had no jurisdiction over the case and in motu proprio dismissing the same
on the ground of improper venue.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

A reading of the questioned orders shows that the RTC confused the terms jurisdiction and venue, which are
completely different concepts. There is no question that the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the
petitioner considering the nature of the case and the amount involved.

It bears noting that "'[j]urisdiction' is the court's authority to hear and determine a case. The court's jurisdiction over
the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by law."14 Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,15 as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
 xxxx
 
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned
items, exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
This had been amended by Section 5 of R.A. No. 7691 which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4),
and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to
Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the
abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The amount of P1,600,153.02 involved in the instant case is undoubtedly within the jurisdiction of the RTC, as all
money claims exceeding P400,000.00 are within its authority to hear and decide. It is an error, therefore, for the
RTC to claim lack of jurisdiction over the case.

At one point, the RTC anchored its ruling of dismissal on the fact that the complaint should have been filed in
Mandaluyong City where the petitioner holds its main office and where the respondents both reside, and not in San
Mateo, Rizal.

Apparently, the RTC mistook jurisdiction for the more lenient concept of venue. To clarify, jurisdiction and venue
are not synonymous concepts. Primarily, jurisdiction is conferred by law and not subject to stipulation of the parties.
It relates to the nature of the case. On the contrary, venue pertains to the place where the case may be filed. Unlike
jurisdiction, venue may be waived and subjected to the agreement of the parties provided that it does not cause
them inconvenience.

Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which was relied upon by the RTC to support its ruling of
dismissal, reads as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. (Emphasis
ours)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The foregoing provision is not restrictive. A plain reading of the provision shows that it is merely permissive as
manifested by the use of the term "may." Moreover, the clear language of the ensuing provision of Section 4
expressly allows the venue of personal actions to be subjected to the stipulation of the parties. It reads, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 4. When rule not applicable. - This Rule shall not apply.

(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise;

  or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue
thereof. (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, stipulation on venue is permitted and must be recognized for as long as it does not defeat the purpose of
the Rules which primarily aims for the convenience of the parties to the dispute. In Unimasters Conglomeration,
Inc. v. CA,16 the Court emphasized:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Parties may by stipulation waive the legal venue and such waiver is valid and effective being merely a personal
privilege, which is not contrary to public policy or prejudicial to third persons. It is a general principle that a person
may renounce any right which the law gives unless such renunciation would be against public policy.

xxxx

Since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules of venue, it is easy to accept the proposition that normally, venue
stipulations should be deemed permissive merely, and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves the
parties' convenience. In other words, stipulations designating venues other than those assigned by Rule 4 should
be interpreted as designed to make it more convenient for the parties to institute actions arising from or in relation
to their agreements; that is to say, as simply adding to or expanding the venues indicated in said Rule
4.17 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
There is, therefore, nothing that prohibits the parties to decide on a different venue for any dispute or action that
may arise from their agreement. In this case, in the promissory note executed and signed by the parties, there is a
provision which states that "[a]ny action to enforce payment of any sums due under this Note shall exclusively be
brought in the proper court within the National Capital Judicial Region or in any place where [the petitioner] has a
branch/office, at its sole option."18 Thus, the petitioner's filing of the case in San Mateo, Rizal, where it maintains a
branch is proper and should have been respected by the RTC especially when there appears no objection on the
part of the respondents.

Moreover, the Court has emphasized in several cases that the RTC may not motu proprio dismiss the case on the
ground of improper venue. It is a matter personal to the parties and without their objection at the earliest
opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, it is deemed waived.

The discussion m Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 is squarely in point, viz.:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this
stage of the proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the Courts of First Instance (now
RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to
dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be
rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong venue, which is
deemed waived.

Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to
have been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be
acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-
empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the
case.20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the present case, the RTC carelessly interfered with the parties' agreement on the venue of their dispute and
interrupted what could have been an expeditious flow of the proceeding. To reiterate, the choice of venue is a
matter addressed to the sound judgment of the parties based on considerations personal to them, i.e. convenience.
It is only the parties who may raise objection on the same. Absent such protest, it is an error for the RTC to decide
that the venue was improperly laid as it is tantamount to needlessly interfering to a mutually agreed term.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Order dated July 21, 2016 and Order dated September 1,
2016 of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Civil Case
No. 2806-15 SM is hereby ordered REINSTATED. The RTC is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the disposition
of the mentioned case.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

G.R. No. 195834, November 09, 2016

 GUILLERMO SALVADOR, REMEDIOS CASTRO, REPRESENTED BY PAZ "CHIT" CASTRO, LEONILA
GUEVARRA, FELIPE MARIANO, RICARDO DE GUZMAN, VIRGILIO JIMENEZ, REPRESENTED BY JOSIE
JIMENEZ, ASUNCION JUAMIZ, ROLANDO BATANG, CARMENCITA SAMSON, AUGUSTO TORTOSA,
REPRESENTED BY FERNANDO TORTOSA, SUSANA MORANTE, LUZVIMINDA BULARAN, LUZ OROZCO,
JOSE SAPICO, LEONARDO PALAD, ABEL BAKING, REPRESENTED BY ABELINA BAKING, GRACIANO
ARNALDO, REPRESENTED BY LUDY ARNALDO, JUDITH HIDALGO, AND IGMIDIO JUSTINIANO, CIRIACO
MIJARES, REPRESENTED BY FREDEZWINDA MIJARES, JENNIFER MORANTE, TERESITA DIALA, AND
ANITA P. SALAR, Petitioners, v. PATRICIA, INC., RESPONDENT. THE CITY OF MANILA AND CIRIACO C.
MIJARES, Intervenors-Appellees.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Jurisdiction over a real action is determined based on the allegations in the complaint of the assessed value of the
property involved. The silence of the complaint on such value is ground to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction
because the trial court is not given the basis for making the determination.

The Case

For review is the decision promulgated on June 25, 20101 and the resolution promulgated on February 16, 2011 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 86735,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No.
96-81167, thereby respectively reversing and setting aside the decision rendered on May 30, 2005 by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, in Manila,3 and denying their motion for reconsideration.

Antecedents

The CA adopted the summary by the RTC of the relevant factual and procedural antecedents, as follows:

This is an action for injunction and quieting of title to determine who owns the property occupied by the plaintiffs
and intervenor, Ciriano C. Mijares.

Additionally, to prevent the defendant Patricia Inc., from evicting the plaintiffs from their respective improvements
along Juan Luna Street, plaintiffs applied for a preliminary injunction in their Complaint pending the quieting of title
on the merits.

The complaint was amended to include different branches of the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Manila. A Complaint-
in-Intervention was filed by the City of Manila as owner of the land occupied by the plaintiffs. Another Complaint-in-
Intervention by Ciriano Mijares was also filed alleging that he was similarly situated as the other plaintiffs.

A preliminary injunction was granted and served on all the defendants.

Based on the allegations of the parties involved, the main issue to be resolved is whether the improvements of the
plaintiffs stand on land that belongs to Patricia Inc., or the City of Manila. Who owns the same? Is it covered by a
Certificate of Title?

All parties agreed and admitted in evidence by stipulation as to the authenticity of the following documents:

(1) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44247 in the name of the City of Manila;

(2) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35727 in the name of Patricia Inc.;

(3) Approved Plan PSD-38540; and

(4) Approved Subdivision Plan PCS-3290 for Ricardo Manotok.

The issue as to whether TCT 35727 should be cancelled as prayed for by the plaintiffs and intervenor, Ciriano C.
Mijares is laid to rest by agreement of the parties that this particular document is genuine and duly executed.
Nonetheless, the cancellation of a Transfer Certificate of Title should be in a separate action before another forum.

Since the Transfer Certificates of Title of both Patricia Inc. and the City of Manila are admitted as genuine, the
question now is: Where are the boundaries based on the description in the respective titles?4

To resolve the question about the boundaries of the properties of the City of Manila and respondent Patricia, Inc.,
the RTC appointed, with the concurrence of the parties, three geodetic engineers as commissioners, namely: Engr.
Rosario Mercado, Engr. Ernesto Pamular and Engr. Delfin Bumanlag.5 These commissioners ultimately submitted
their reports.
On May 30, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and against Patricia, Inc., permanently
enjoining the latter from doing any act that would evict the former from their respective premises, and from
collecting any rentals from them. The RTC deemed it more sound to side with two of the commissioners who had
found that the land belonged to the City of Manila, and disposed:

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. Defendant Patricia Inc. and other person/s claiming under it, are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED to
REFRAIN and DESIST from any act of EVICTION OR EJECTMENT of the PLAINTIFFS in the
premises they occupy;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

2. Defendant Patricia Inc. STOP COLLECTING any rentals from the plaintiffs who may seek
reimbursement of previous payments in a separate action subject to the ownership of the City of
Manila and;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

3. Attorney's fees of P10,000.00 to each plaintiff and intervenor, Ciriano Mijares; P20,000.00 to the City
of Manila. (emphasis ours)

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.6

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 86735, reversed the RTC's judgment,7 and dismissed the complaint. The
CA declared that the petitioners were without the necessary interest, either legal or equitable title, to maintain a suit
for quieting of title; castigated the RTC for acting like a mere rubber stamp of the majority of the commissioners;
opined that the RTC should have conducted hearings on the reports of the commissioners; ruled as highly improper
the adjudication of the boundary dispute in an action for quieting of title; and decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision dated May 30, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32. Civil Case No. 96-81167 is hereby DISMISSED for utter want of
merit. Accordingly, the questioned order enjoining Patricia and all other person/s acting on its stead (sic) to refrain
and desist from evicting or ejecting plaintiffs/appellees in Patricia's own land and from collecting rentals
is LIFTED effective immediately.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.8

The CA denied the motions for reconsideration of the petitioners and intervenor Mijares through the assailed
resolution of February 16, 2011.9

Hence, this appeal by the petitioners.

Issues

The petitioners maintain that the CA erred in dismissing the complaint, arguing that the parties had openly raised
and litigated the boundary issue in the RTC, and had thereby amended the complaint to conform to the evidence
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court; that they had the sufficient interest to bring the suit for quieting
of title because they had built their improvements on the property; and that the RTC correctly relied on the reports
of the majority of the commissioners.

On its part, the City of Manila urges the Court to reinstate the decision of the RTC. It reprises the grounds relied
upon by the petitioners, particularly the application of Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.10

In response, Patricia, Inc. counters that the boundary dispute, which the allegations of the complaint eventually
boiled down to, was not proper in the action for quieting of title under Rule 63, Rules of Court; and that Section 5,
Rule 10 of the Rules of Court did not apply to vest the authority to resolve the boundary dispute in the RTCC.11

In other words, did the CA err m dismissing the petitioners' complaint?

Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

 1.
Jurisdiction over a real action depends on
the assessed value of the property involved
as alleged in the complaint

The complaint was ostensibly for the separate causes of action for injunction and for quieting of title. As such, the
allegations that would support both causes of action must be properly stated in the complaint. One of the important
allegations would be those vesting jurisdiction in the trial court.

The power of a court to hear and decide a controversy is called its jurisdiction, which includes the power to
determine whether or not it has the authority to hear and determine the controversy presented, and the right to
decide whether or not the statement of facts that confer jurisdiction exists, as well as all other matters that arise in
the case legitimately before the court. Jurisdiction imports the power and authority to declare the law, to expound or
to apply the laws exclusive of the idea of the power to make the laws, to hear and determine issues of law and of
fact, the power to hear, determine, and pronounce judgment on the issues before the court, and the power to
inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and to pronounce the judgment.12

But judicial power is to be distinguished from jurisdiction in that the former cannot exist without the latter and must
of necessity be exercised within the scope of the latter, not beyond it.13

Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law because it is conferred only by law, as distinguished from venue, which is
a purely procedural matter. The conferring law may be the Constitution, or the statute organizing the court or
tribunal, or the special or general statute defining the jurisdiction of an existing court or tribunal, but it must be in
force at the time of the commencement of the action.14 Jurisdiction cannot be presumed or implied, but must appear
clearly from the law or it will not be held to exist,15 but it may be conferred on a court or tribunal by necessary
implication as well as by express terms.16 It cannot be conferred by the agreement of the parties;17 or by the court's
acquiescence;18 or by the erroneous belief of the court that it had jurisdiction;19 or by the waiver of objections;20 or
by the silence of the parties.21

The three essential elements of jurisdiction are: one, that the court must have cognizance of the class of cases to
which the one to be adjudged belongs; two, that the proper parties must be present; and, three, that the point
decided must be, in substance and effect, within the issue. The test for determining jurisdiction is ordinarily the
nature of the case as made by the complaint and the relief sought; and the primary and essential nature of the suit,
not its incidental character, determines the jurisdiction of the court relative to it.22

Jurisdiction may be classified into original and appellate, the former being the power to take judicial cognizance of a
case instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions provided by law, and the latter being the authority
of a court higher in rank to re-examine the final order or judgment of a lower court that tried the case elevated for
judicial review. Considering that the two classes of jurisdiction are exclusive of each other, one must be expressly
conferred by law. One does not flow, nor is inferred, from the other.23

Jurisdiction is to be distinguished from its exercise.24 When there is jurisdiction over the person and subject matter,
the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.25 Considering that
jurisdiction over the subject matter determines the power of a court or tribunal to hear and determine a particular
case, its existence does not depend upon the regularity of its exercise by the court or tribunal.26 The test of
jurisdiction is whether or not the court or tribunal had the power to enter on the inquiry, not whether or not its
conclusions in the course thereof were correct, for the power to decide necessarily carries with it the power to
decide wrongly as well as rightly. In a manner of speaking, the lack of the power to act at all results in a judgment
that is void; while the lack of the power to render an erroneous decision results in a judgment that is valid until set
aside.27 That the decision is erroneous does not divest the court or tribunal that rendered it of the jurisdiction
conferred by law to try the case.28 Hence, if the court or tribunal has jurisdiction over the civil action, whatever error
may be attributed to it is simply one of judgment, not of jurisdiction; appeal, not certiorari, lies to correct the error.29

The exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases is conferred and provided for in Section 19 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), viz.:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he demand or claim exceeds twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00);

(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions;

(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and costs or the value of the property in
controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).

For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, the trial court must interpret and apply the law on jurisdiction in relation
to the averments or allegations of ultimate facts in the complaint regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.30 Based on the foregoing provision of law, therefore, the
RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action for injunction because it was one in which the subject of the litigation
was incapable of pecuniary estimation. But the same was not true in the case of the cause of action for the quieting
of title, which had the nature of a real action — that is, an action that involves the issue of ownership or possession
of real property, or any interest in real property31 — in view of the expansion of the jurisdiction of the first level
courts under Republic Act No. 7691, which amended Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 effective on April
15, 1994,32 to now pertinently provide as follows:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil Cases. -

Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property, or
any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceeds (sic) Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys
fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x

As such, the determination of which trial court had the exclusive original jurisdiction over the real action is
dependent on the assessed value of the property in dispute.

An action to quiet title is to be brought as a special civil action under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Although
Section 1 of Rule 63 specifies the forum to be "the appropriate Regional Trial Court,"33 the specification does not
override the statutory provision on jurisdiction. This the Court has pointed out in Malana v. Tappa,34 to wit:

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63
of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
as amended.

It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to
quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may"- that an action for quieting of title "may be
brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory
relief "may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute
denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.

In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word shall
and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title
to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, thus:

xxxx

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only
P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.35

The complaint of the petitioners did not contain any averment of the assessed value of the property. Such failure
left the trial court bereft of any basis to determine which court could validly take cognizance of the cause of action
for quieting of title. Thus, the RTC could not proceed with the case and render judgment for lack of jurisdiction.
Although neither the parties nor the lower courts raised jurisdiction of the trial court in the proceedings, the issue did
not simply vanish because the Court can hereby motu proprio consider and resolve it now by virtue of jurisdiction
being conferred only by law, and could not be vested by any act or omission of any party.36

2.
The joinder of the action for injunction
and the action to quiet title
was disallowed by the Rules of Court

Another noticeable area of stumble for the petitioners related to their having joined two causes of action, i.e.,
injunction and quieting of title, despite the first being an ordinary suit and the latter a special civil action under Rule
63. Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court disallowed the joinder, viz.:

Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as
many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;

(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;

(c) Where the causes of action arc between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the
joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction
of said court and the venue lies therein; and

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action arc principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount
claimed shall he the test of jurisdiction.

Consequently, the RTC should have severed the causes of action, either upon motion or motu proprio, and tried
them separately, assuming it had jurisdiction over both. Such severance was pursuant to Section 6, Rule 2 of
the Rules of Court, which expressly provides:

Section 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. -- Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action.
A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded
with separately. (n)

The refusal of the petitioners to accept the severance would have led to the dismissal of the case conformably with
the mandate of Section, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. - If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the
presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time,
or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (3a)

3.
The petitioners did not show that they were
real parties in interest to demand
either injunction or quieting of title

Even assuming that the RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action for quieting of title, the petitioners failed to
allege and prove their interest to maintain the suit. Hence, the dismissal of this cause of action was warranted.

An action to quiet title or remove the clouds over the title is a special civil action governed by the second paragraph
of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, an action for quieting of title is essentially a common law
remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant
and other claimants, not only to put things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said
immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see
every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements
he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best. But "for an action to quiet title to prosper,
two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to
or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed
to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy.37

The first requisite is based on Article 477 of the Civil Code which requires that the plaintiff must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Legal title denotes
registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership,38 meaning a title derived through a valid
contract or relation, and based on recognized equitable principles; the right in the party, to whom it belongs, to have
the legal title transferred to him.39

To determine whether the petitioners as plaintiffs had the requisite interest to bring the suit, a resort to the
allegations of the complaint is necessary. In that regard, the complaint pertinently alleged as follows:

THE CAUSE OF ACTION

5. Plaintiffs are occupants of a parcel of land situated at Juan Luna Street, Gagalangin, Tondo (hereinafter "subject
property");

6. Plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open and notorious possession of the subject property
for more than thirty (30) years;

7. Plaintiffs have constructed in good faith their houses and other improvements on the subject property;

8. The subject property is declared an Area for Priority Development (APD) under Presidential Decree No. 1967, as
amended;

9. Defendant is claiming ownership of the subject property by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 35727
of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Manila. x x x

10. Defendant's claim of ownership over the subject property is without any legal or factual basis because,
assuming but not conceding that the TCT No. 35727 covers the subject property, the parcel of land covered by and
embraced in TCT No. 35727 has already been sold and conveyed by defendant and, under the law, TCT No.
35727 should have been cancelled;

11. By virtue of TCT No. 35727, defendant is evicting, is about to evict or threatening to evict the plaintiffs from the
said parcel of land;

12. Because of the prior sales and conveyances, even assuming but not conceding that the subject property is
covered by and embraced in Transfer Certificate of title No. 35727, defendant cannot lawfully evict the plaintiffs
from the subject property since it no longer owns the subject property;

13. Any attempted eviction of the plaintiffs from the subject property would be without legal basis and consequently,
would only be acts of harassment which are contrary to morals, good customs and public policy and therefore,
plaintiffs are entitled to enjoin the defendant from further harassing them;

14. Plaintiffs recently discovered that the subject property is owned by the City of Manila and covered by and
embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44247, a copy of which is attached hereto as Annex "B", of the
Registry of Deeds for the City of Manila;

15. TCT No. 35727 which is apparently valid and effective is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or
unenforceable, and constitutes a cloud on the rights and interests of the plaintiffs over the subject property;

16. Plaintiffs are entitled to the removal of such cloud on their rights and interests over the subject property;

17. Even assuming, but not admitting, that defendant owns the subject property, it cannot evict the plaintiffs from
the subject property because plaintiffs' right to possess the subject property is protected by Presidential Decree No.
2016.

18. Even assuming, but not admitting, that defendant owns the subject property, it cannot evict the plaintiffs from
the subject property without reimbursing the plaintiffs for the cost of the improvements made upon the subject
property;

19. Because of defendant's unwarranted claim of ownership over the subject property and its attempt to evict or
disposses the plaintiffs from the subject property, plaintiffs experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, social
humiliation, sleepless nights and loss of appetite for which defendant should be ordered to pay each plaintiff the
amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages;

20. Because of defendant's unwarranted claim of ownership over the subject property and its attempt to evict or
disposses the plaintiffs from the subject property, plaintiffs were constrained to litigate to protect their rights and
interests, and hire services of a lawyer, for which they should each be awarded the amount of P10,000.00.

21. The plaintiffs and the defendants are not required to undergo conciliation proceeding before the Katarungan
Pambarangay prior to the filing of this action.40
The petitioners did not claim ownership of the land itself, and did not show their authority or other legal basis on
which they had anchored their alleged lawful occupation and superior possession of the property. On the contrary,
they only contended that their continued possession of the property had been for more than 30 years; that they had
built their houses in good faith; and that the area had been declared an Area for Priority Development (APD) under
Presidential Decree No. 1967, as amended. Yet, none of such reasons validly clothed them with the necessary
interest to maintain the action for quieting of title. For one, the authenticity of the title of the City of Manila and
Patricia, Inc. was not disputed but was even admitted by them during trial. As such, they could not expect to have
any right in the property other than that of occupants whose possession was only tolerated by the owners and
rightful possessors. This was because land covered by a Torrens title cannot b e acquired by prescription or by
adverse possession.41 Moreover, they would not be builders entitled to the protection of the Civil Code as builders
in good faith. Worse for them, as alleged in the respondent's comments,42 which they did not deny, they had been
lessees of Patricia, Inc. Such circumstances indicated that they had no claim to possession in good faith, their
occupation not being in the concept of owners.

At this juncture, the Court observes that the fact that the area was declared an area for priority development (APD)
under Presidential Decree No. 1967, as amended, did not provide sufficient interest to the petitioners. When an
area is declared as an APD, the occupants would enjoy the benefits provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1517
(Proclaiming Urban land Reform in the Philippines and Providing for the Implementing Machinery Thereof).
In Frilles v. Yambao,43 the Court has summarized the salient features of Presidential Decree No. 1517, thus:

P. D. No. 1517, which took effect on June 11, 1978, seeks to protect the rights of bona-fide tenants in urban lands
by prohibiting their ejectment therefrom under certain conditions, and by according them preferential right to
purchase the land occupied by them. The law covers all urban and urbanizable lands which have been proclaimed
as urban land reform zones by the President of the Philippines. If a particular property is within a declared Area for
Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zone, the qualified lessee of the said property in that area can
avail of the right of first refusal to purchase the same in accordance with Section 6 of the same law. Only
legitimate tenants who have resided for ten years or more on specific parcels of land situated in declared
Urban Land Reform Zones or Urban Zones, and who have built their homes thereon, have the right not to be
dispossessed therefrom and the right of first refusal to purchase the property under reasonable terms and
conditions to be determined by the appropriate government agency. [Bold emphasis supplied]

Presidential Decree No. 1517 only granted to the occupants of APDs the right of first refusal, but such grant was
true only if and when the owner of the property decided to sell the property. Only then would the right of first refusal
accrue. Consequently, the right of first refusal remained contingent, and was for that reason insufficient to vest any
title, legal or equitable, in the petitioners.

Moreover, the CA's adverse judgment dismissing their complaint as far as the action to quiet title was concerned
was correct. The main requirement for the action to be brought is that there is a deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding casting cloud on the plaintiffs' title that is alleged and shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy, the eliminates the existence of the requirement. Their
admission of the genuineness and authenticity of Patricia, Inc.'s title negated the existence of such deed,
instrument, encumbrance or proceeding that was invalid, and thus the action must necessarily fail.

4.
The petitioners did not have
a cause of action for injunction

The petitioners did not also make out a case for injunction in their favor.

The nature of the remedy of injunction and the requirements for the issuance of the injunctive writ have been
expounded in Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Carantes,44 as follows:

Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a particular act, in which
case it is called a mandatory injunction or to refrain from doing a particular act, in which case it is called a
prohibitory injunction. As a main action, injunction seeks to permanently enjoin the defendant through a final
injunction issued by the court and contained in the judgment. Section 9, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, provides,

SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. If after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have
the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining
the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary
mandatory injunction.

Two (2) requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected and (2) the acts
against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. Particularly, in actions involving realty,
preliminary injunction will lie only after the plaintiff has fully established his title or right thereto by a proper action for
the purpose. [Emphasis Supplied]
Accordingly, the petitioners must prove the existence of a right to be protected. The records show, however, that
they did not have any right to be protected because they had established only the existence of the boundary
dispute between Patricia, Inc. and the City of Manila. Any violation of the boundary by Patricia, Inc., if any, would
give rise to the right of action in favor of the City of Manila only. The dispute did not concern the petitioners at all.

5.
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
did not save the day for the petitioners

The invocation of Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court in order to enable the raising of the boundary dispute
was unwarranted. First of all, a boundary dispute should not be litigated in an action for the quieting of title due to
the limited scope of the action. The action for the quieting of title is a tool specifically used to remove of any cloud
upon, doubt, or unce1iainty affecting title to real property;45 it should not be used for any other purpose. And,
secondly, the boundary dispute would essentially seek to alter or modify either the Torrens title of the City of Manila
or that of Patricia, Inc., but any alteration or modification either way should be initiated only by direct proceedings,
not as an issue incidentally raised by the parties herein. To allow the boundary dispute to be litigated in the action
for quieting of title would violate Section 4846 of the Property Registration Decree by virtue of its prohibition against
collateral attacks on Torrens titles. A collateral attack takes place when, in another action to obtain a different relief,
the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said action.47 This is exactly what the petitioners sought to do
herein, seeking to modify or otherwise cancel Patricia, Inc.'s title.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 25, 2010 by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 86735; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014

 RICARDO L. ATIENZA AND ALFREDO A. CASTRO, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS–BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 is the Decision2 dated November 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA–G.R. CR. No. 30650 which affirmed the Decision3 dated June 8, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 21 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 01–197425 and 01–197426, finding petitioners Ricardo L. Atienza
(Atienza) and Alfredo A. Castro (Castro) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Robbery and Falsification
of Public Document.

The Facts

Atienza and Castro (petitioners) are employees of the CA, particularly assigned to its Budget Division and holding
the positions of Budget Officer I and Utility Worker I,4 respectively, at the time material to this case.

On March 20, 1995, at about past noon,5 Juanito Atibula (Atibula), Records Officer I and Custodian of the CA
Original Decisions in the CA Reporter’s Division, was invited by Castro to attend Atienza’s birthday party
somewhere along Bocobo Street, Ermita, Manila. At the party, Atienza introduced Atibula to a certain Dario and
asked him to assist the latter in searching for the CA decision6 in the case entitled “Mateo Fernando v. Heirs of D.
Tuason, Inc.”7 (Fernando), docketed as CA–G.R. No. 36808–R.8cralawlawlibrary

Thereafter, Atibula returned to the office – followed a few minutes later by Dario – and searched for the
aforementioned decision which was found compiled in Volume 260 of the CA Original Decisions. As Dario was
scanning through the said volume, Atibula observed that he was comparing its pages9 to the discolored papers he
was holding.10 Dario likewise scanned Volumes 265 and 267,11 and placed check marks on the papers he was
holding.12

On March 24, 1995, after office hours, Atibula saw Dario outside the CA compound along Maria Orosa Street.13 As
they walked side by side towards the jeepney stop, Dario requested Atibula to insert a Decision dated September
26, 1968 in one of the volumes of the CA Original Decisions. However, Atibula refused and immediately left.14

On April 21, 1995, Atienza offered Atibula the amount of P50,000.00 in exchange for Volume 260,15 which the latter
turned down. Atienza then ridiculed him saying, “duwag ka, pera na nga ito ayaw mo pa,” to which Atibula retorted,
“ikaw ang duwag dahil nagpapakita ka ng kabuktutan.” Disturbed by the situation, Atibula reported the incident to
Atty. Arnel Macapagal16 (Atty. Macapagal), the Assistant Chief of the CA Reporter’s Division, who then instructed
him (Atibula) to hide Volumes 260, 265 and 26717 in a safe place.18

On May 9, 1995, Atibula discovered that Volume 26619 covering the period from January 28 to February 12, 1969
was missing20 and, hence, immediately reported the same to Atty. Macapagal. Two days after the discovery of the
loss, Atibula encountered Atienza near the canteen,21 shouting “[p]utang ina mo, Juaning, pinahirapan mo kami!”22

On May 18, 1995, a certain Nelson de Castro, Clerk IV detailed at the CA Reporter’s Division,23 handed to Atibula a
bag containing a gift–wrapped package which turned out to be the missing Volume 266. He claimed that it was
Castro who asked him to deliver the said package to Atibula.24

Having been notified of Volume 266’s return, Atty. Macapagal then directed Atibula to ascertain who borrowed the
volume. Records, however, disclosed no one.25 Separately, Atibula compared the contents of Volume 266 with the
index of the decisions and noticed that there were two new documents inserted therein,26 namely: (a) a
Resolution27 dated February 11, 1969 (subject resolution), ostensibly penned by Associate Justice Juan P.
Enriquez (Justice Enriquez) and concurred in by Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan and Edilberto Soriano,
recalling and setting aside the Entry of Judgment earlier issued in the Fernando case; and (b) a Decision28 dated
April 16, 1970 (subject decision), also ostensibly penned by Justice Enriquez and concurred in by Associate
Justices Jesus Y. Perez and Jose M. Mendoza, amending the original decision dated September 26, 1968 in the
aforementioned case. Consequently, Atibula reported his findings to Atty. Macapagal who, in turn, informed Atty.
Gemma Leticia F. Tablate (Atty. Tablate), then Chief of the CA Reporter’s Division, of the same. They tried to verify
the genuineness, authenticity and existence of the subject resolution and decision, and found that the compilation
of the duplicate original decisions/resolutions of Justice Enriquez did not bear the said promulgations. Atty. Tablate
reported the incident to then CA Presiding Justice Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr.29 who immediately requested the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation on the matter.30

Laboratory analysis and comparative examination of the subject resolution and decision31 as well as of a decision in
another case found in pages 906 to 922 of Volume 266 of the CA Original Decisions were conducted by the
NBI.32 As a result, it issued its Questioned Documents Report No. 937–1295,33 finding that: (a) Volume 266 had
indeed been altered;34 and (b) the signatures of the CA Justices in the subject resolution and decision (questioned
signatures) and their standard/sample signatures “were not written by one and the same person,”35 leading to the
conclusion that the questioned signatures were forgeries.36
Meanwhile, sometime in the second week of July 1995, an inspection of the air–conditioning units at the office of
the CA Reporter’s Division was conducted, whereby it was discovered that the improvised angle bar supporting the
air conditioning unit at the right most end from the main door was corroded with rust and the portion of the wall
holding the same was broken (“may bak–bak na”).37 NBI Agents, Atty. Daniel D. Daganzo38 (Atty. Daganzo) and
Norman R. Decampong39 then conducted an ocular inspection of the premises, and, in the course thereof,
interviewed several personnel of the CA Maintenance Division. Said investigation yielded the following findings: (a)
there were no signs of forcible entry;40 (b) the perpetrators gained entry to the office of the CA Reporter’s Division
“by passing through the hole on the concrete wall after removing the air conditioning unit”41 located on the right
most [sic] end from the main door;42 (c) there was conspiracy to commit the crime of Falsification of Public
Document between Atienza and Dario in view of their “concerted efforts through previous or simultaneous acts and
deeds;”43 and (d) Castro assisted Atienza and Dario “to profit from the effects of the crime by returning safely the
missing volume to the [CA Reporter’s Division].”44 Consequently, a criminal complaint was filed by the NBI and the
Fact–Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman against Atienza, Castro, and Dario before
the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the OMB, docketed as OMB–0–97–2054,45 charging them
for the following crimes: (a) Falsification of Public Document; (b) violation of Section 3(a)46 of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019,47 as amended; and (c) violation of Section 848 of RA 6713.49

After investigation, the charges involving the pertinent provisions of RAs 3019 and 6713 were dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence,50 but it was contrarily determined that there existed probable cause to charge Atienza,
Castro, and Dario51 for the crimes of Robbery under Article 299(a)(1)52 of the Revised Penal Code53 (RPC), as
amended, and of Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1)54 in relation to Article 171(6)55 of the same
code. Thus, the corresponding Informations,56 respectively docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 01–197425 and 01–
197426, were filed before the RTC. Petitioners posted bail57 and, thereafter, pleaded “not guilty”58 to the charges
during their arraignment, while Dario remained at large.

In his defense, Atienza denied having anything to do with the questioned incidents59 as he was not even summoned
by the CA Clerk of Court or the Chief of the Reporter’s Division,60 and became aware of the incident only when he
and Castro were subpoenaed by the NBI Special Investigators.61 Further, he gave the alibi that he was out of the
office 4 days a week during the months of April to June 1995,62 reporting only on Fridays,63 since he had to perform
his duties as Budget Officer I of the CA Budget Division and Liaison Officer to the Department of Budget and
Management, the Committee on Appropriation of the Congress, Committee on Appropriation of the lower house,
and the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the GSIS.

On the other hand, Castro did not endeavor to refute the allegations in the Informations filed against him and the
other accused.64

The RTC Ruling

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision65 on June 8, 2006, finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of Robbery under Article 299(a)(1) of the RPC and Falsification of Public Document
under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(6) of the RPC, and sentenced them to each suffer: (a) the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months
of prision correccional, as maximum, for the first crime; and (b) the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day, as
minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and a fine of P5,000.00 for the second crime.

In convicting petitioners, the RTC found that “the evidence x x x of the prosecution is replete with situations and/or
events to prove [petitioners’] guilt,”66 namely: (a) Atienza requested Atibula to take out Volumes 260, 265 and 267 of
the CA Original Decisions from the CA Reporter’s Division, which the latter rejected despite offer of remuneration;
(b) Volume 266 was subsequently discovered to be missing; (c) access to the missing volume appears to have
been acquired by entering through an opening in the premises of the CA’s Reporter’s Division because the air
conditioning unit occupying the space thereat was taken out for repair earlier; (d) Castro returned Volume 266 after
its loss;67 (e) Volume 266 bore badges of tampering evidenced by the “non–continuity of the front and the back
cover flaps x x x and the pages of the book/volume differences in the cutting marks on the sides of the volume and
the presence of artificial aging on [its] sides”;68 and (f) two (2) new documents which materially amended the
original decision and resolution in the Fernando case were inserted in the said volume.69 The RTC further added
that the manner by which petitioners committed the felonious acts reveals a community of criminal design, and
thereby held that conspiracy exists.70

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed their conviction to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision71 dated November 28, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC’s judgment of conviction in toto. It held that
while there is no direct evidence showing that the petitioners committed the crimes charged, the testimonies of
Atibula and NBI Agent Atty. Daganzo with respect to what had transpired before and after Volume 266 was taken
from its shelf, when viewed together with the other circumstances in the case, constitute circumstantial evidence
which sufficiently point to the guilt of petitioners.72 In addition, it found that Atienza’s defenses were self–serving
negative evidence which cannot outweigh the circumstantial evidence clearly establishing his participation,73 adding
too that while there was no proof of previous agreement between petitioners to unlawfully take Volume 266 out of
the office of the CA Reporter’s Division and falsify the subject documents, their conspiracy may be inferred from the
fact that Castro was in possession of the missing Volume 266 which was eventually discovered to have been
falsified.74

Undaunted, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration75 which was, however, denied in a Resolution76 dated July
7, 2009, hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not petitioners’ conviction for the crimes of Robbery and
Falsification of Public Document should be upheld on account of the circumstantial evidence in this case proving
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main fact in issue
may be inferred based on reason and common experience.77 It is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken
chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others,
as the guilty person. Stated differently, the test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is
sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proven must be consistent with each other
and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused’s guilt and inconsistent with his
innocence.78

Applying these principles to the facts that appear on record, the Court finds that no sufficient circumstantial
evidence was presented in this case to establish the elements of Robbery under Article 299(a)(1)79 of the RPC and
Falsification of Public Documents under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(6)80 of the same code, or of
petitioners’ supposed conspiracy therefor. To this end, the Court examines the participation of and evidence
against each petitioner and forthwith explains its reasons for reaching the foregoing conclusions.

A. The Participation of and Evidence Against Castro

Notwithstanding Castro’s failure to refute the charges against him, the Court finds no evidence to link him to the
commission of the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document, contrary to the conclusions reached by
the RTC and concurred in by the CA. To begin with, it is essential to note that Castro’s purported possession and
eventual return of Volume 266 was only premised upon the statement of one Nelson de Castro (Nelson), i.e., the
Sinumpaang Salaysay81 dated August 9, 1995, who averred that on May 18, 1995, at around 11:50 in the morning,
Castro told him to pass by his office and there handed him a bag which, as it turned out, contained the missing
Volume 266, viz.:82
Noong Mayo 18, 1995 bandang 11:50 ng tanghali ay tumawag sa telepono si ALFREDO CASTRO, ng Budget
Division, at sinabihan ako na dumaan sa kanyang opisina dahil mayroon daw siyang ibibigay para sa opisina
namin. Pumunta po naman ako kaagad kay ALFREDO CASTRO sa opisina at iniabot sa akin ang isang bag na
malaki kulay parang pink at may laman at sinabihan pa niya ako na buksan ko na lang daw ang bag pagdating sa
opisina. Pagdating ko sa opisina ay tinawag ko si Mr. ATIBULA at doon ay binuksan naming dalawa ang bag.
Nakita ko sa loob ang isang bagay na nakabalot sa isang gift wrap at ng buksan namin o alisin ang gift wrap ay ang
Original Decisions, Volume 266 na nawawala mga ilang linggo na ang nakakaraan.
Nelson was not, however, presented before the RTC during trial, hence, was not subjected to any in–court
examination. It is settled that while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are acknowledged
before a notary public (here, a public officer authorized to administer oaths), they are still classified as hearsay
evidence unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon and the adverse party is
accorded the opportunity to cross–examine them.83 With the prosecution’s failure to present Nelson to affirm his
statement that Castro caused the return of Volume 266,84 the prosecution’s evidence on the matter should be
treated as hearsay and, thus, inadmissible to establish the truth or falsity of the relevant claims. Consequently,
there exists no sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove Castro’s guilt.

B. The Participation of and Evidence Against Atienza

In similar regard, the prosecution’s evidence on the circumstances in this case do not sufficiently establish
Atienza’s guilt for the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document.

While records show that Atienza was positively identified by Atibula as having attempted to bribe him to take
out Volume 260 of the CA Original Decisions from the Reporter’s Division,85 the fact is that the alleged intercalation
actually occurred in a different document, that is Volume 266. The discrepancy of accounts on the very subject
matter of the crimes charged dilutes the strength of the evidence required to produce a conviction. At best, the
bribery attempt may be deemed as a demonstration of interest on the part of Atienza over said subject matter and
in this regard, constitutes proof of motive. However, it is well–established that mere proof of motive, no matter how
strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction, most especially if there is no other reliable evidence from which it
may reasonably be deduced that the accused was the malefactor.86

In fact, even if Atienza’s bribery attempt is taken together with the other circumstance couched as a relevant link by
the prosecution in this case – i.e., his averred encounter with Atibula, on May 11, 1995, or two (2) days after the
discovery of the loss of Volume 266, wherein the latter uttered “[p]utang ina mo, Juaning, pinahirapan mo kami”87 –
the Court still finds the evidence to be lacking. This allegation, even if proven as true, does not indicate that Atienza
howsoever affirmed the taking or even the falsification of Volume 266. Clearly, the utterance was made by Atibula
who did not bother to state Atienza’s response thereto or any other subsequent action connected therewith so as to
bolster a finding of guilt. Neither can this circumstance be properly linked to the act of Castro inviting Atibula to
Atienza’s party. It would be a stretch to conclude that this mere invitation, without any other proof of Castro’s
participation, was instrumental or, at the very least, reasonably connected to Atienza and his own alleged
participation in the above–stated crimes.

In this relation, it may not be amiss to debunk the claim that petitioners conspired in this case. While direct proof is
not essential to establish conspiracy as it may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused before, during and
after the commission of the crime which point to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of
interests,88 records are, however, bereft of any showing as to how the particular acts of petitioners figured into the
common design of taking out the subject volume and inserting the falsified documents therein. Hence, the
prosecution’s theory of conspiracy does not deserve any merit.

All told, the prosecution has failed to show that the circumstances invoked constitute an unbroken chain of events
which lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioners are, to the exclusion of the others, indeed the
culprits. As such, their conviction, tested under the threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt, was not warranted.
To be sure, proof beyond reasonable doubt is the degree of proof that, after investigation of the whole record,
produces moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind of the accused’s culpability.89 Such moral certainty is, however,
lacking in this case due to the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented.

C. Jurisdictional Defect: Falsification Case

Also, it bears mentioning that the RTC did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of Criminal Case No. 01–197426
(i.e., the falsification case) since Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1)90 of the RPC, which is
punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and
1 day to 6 years91 ) and a fine of not more than P5,000.00, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts pursuant to Section 32(2)92 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129,93 otherwise known as the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,” as amended by RA
7691.94 While petitioners raised this jurisdictional defect95 for the first time in the present petition, they are not
precluded from questioning the same. Indeed, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law and cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or
conferred by the acquiescence of the court. The rule is well–settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Hence, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even
if raised for the first time on appeal.96

D. A Final Word

The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence, failing which,
the presumption of innocence prevails and the accused should be acquitted.97 This, despite the fact that his
innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and
not on the weakness or even absence of defense. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction, as in
this case. Courts should be guided by the principle that it would be better to set free ten men who might be
probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.98 Accordingly,
there being no circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a conviction, the Court hereby acquits petitioners,
without prejudice, however, to any subsequent finding on their administrative liability in connection with the
incidents in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA–
G.R. CR. No. 30650 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Ricardo L. Atienza and Alfredo A. Castro are
hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document on the ground of reasonable
doubt, without prejudice to any subsequent finding on their administrative liability in connection with the incidents in
this case. The bail bonds posted for their provisional liberty are consequently cancelled and
released.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibr

[G.R. NO. 158763 : March 31, 2006]

 JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners, v. VIRGILIO M.
TULIAO, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18 December 2002
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:

1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October
16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by
public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001
and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;

2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal
cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; andcralawlibrary

3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the
apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and
accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524.2

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later
identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is
now under the witness protection program.

Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B.
Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Santiago City.

The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and
sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that
time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001,
acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession
and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet
dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.

Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and
submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan
issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.

On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to
recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.

In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a
Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of
State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.

On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order
reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest
issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order
dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of
the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied in
a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October
2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this Court, with
prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case,
and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16
October 2001, and 22 October 2001.

On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining
order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution,
Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against
petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondent's cash bond evidenced by O.R. No.
15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the
Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.

Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge
Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order
dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion
to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondent's petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus .

On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the
reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was
denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.

Hence, this petition.

The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following assignments of error:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of
Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14,
2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating
the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an
accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases
No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of
Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein
petitioners.

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional
trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against
herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having become final and executory.

Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
nor custody of law over the body of the accused.

The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals' ruling that:

[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of
arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only
when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the
court (Pete M. Pico v. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must
first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3

Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek
any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their
"Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."4

Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their
person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction
over their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.

In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners
quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:

Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado v. Diokno (232 SCRA
192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having
been arrested. In Paul Roberts v. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of
a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson v. Executive Secretary
(301 SCRA 1025 ), the Court ordered the case transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually
ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.6

In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the above
Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v.
Vasquez7 :

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished
either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of
the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail,
since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted
before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest
or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance.10 One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the
warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the
custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced.11 Being in the
custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him
to become obedient to the will of the law.12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It
includes, but is not limited to, detention.

The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been separated
from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the
law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:

A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A
person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that
court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed
had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the application for bail.13

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule,
one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.15 As we held in the
aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings,
constitutes voluntary appearance.

Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant being in the custody
of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, 'bail is the security required and given for the release of a person
who is in the custody of law.' " The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents
resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail,
without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the
requirements therefor.17

There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary
appearance, and the consequent submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of
pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special
appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, motions to
quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a
warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the
court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a
warrant of arrest.

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he
invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow
cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is
neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of
the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.

In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to
have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is
no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we
granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their
persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a
motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:

1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable
cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the
respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.

2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accused's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in
Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of
Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case
and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused.

3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to
the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.

We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are not present in
motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is
foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer
for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants
of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty
would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide
whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the
motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case.

Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues in force and effect
until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time of the day and
night.22 Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of
probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.

In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to
surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than
property rights,23 demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.

Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed Petition for Review with the Secretary of Justice and
based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a
little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of
arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because
of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary
of Justice affirmed the prosecutor's resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this
Court in another case with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order against further proceeding with the case.

After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant
prosecutor's resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the
warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and
because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper."24

Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in
prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the
petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutor's resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if
the Petition for Review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of
a petition for the review of the prosecutor's resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.

In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of the information in
court against them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to
the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have
been quashed as premature on the same ground.

The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of
the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:

In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional proscription,
which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited
decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its]
regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26

Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated by Judge
Tumaliuan:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.27

However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to the resolution of
the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.

According to petitioners:

In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the face of
the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable cause was based on the certification, under
oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate determination personally made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity
could be drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscal's
certification.28

Petitioners' claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan's Joint Order contains no such indication that he relied solely on the
prosecutor's certification. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:

Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine the existence of
a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]

The records of the case show that the prosecutor's certification was accompanied by supporting documents,
following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The supporting documents are the
following:

1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;

2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;

3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;

4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz;

5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;

6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;

7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;

8. Information dated 22 June 2001;

9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; andcralawlibrary

10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III,
Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the
existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2
Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the custody of the National
Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five
years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was given
during the election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted against
each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and
allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."32

We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the findings of probable
cause of Judge Tumaliuan.

It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the province of the
determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb33 :

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands
more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner.
Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.

Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that there was a Petition for
Review of the assistant prosecutor's resolution before the Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of
Justice affirmed the prosecutor's resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the
petitioners on the basis of the following explanation:

Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People v. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based
from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda - the mastermind and with him and the other police
officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of
murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of the decision
acquitting said officers "who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is
now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same
is without probable value." This Court agrees with the defense's views. Indeed, of what use is Maderal's statements
when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecution's evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-
160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court
decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements is practically nil.

xxx

This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying for the
summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of
the Philippines v. Wilfredo Leaño, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding
all the evidence presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed
against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.34

This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision and interpret it to the
discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leaño case was
presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the
dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more
pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leaño that
the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein,
since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in
the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused
in Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao's son, whereas petitioners herein had been
implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.

It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leaño, "it is now beyond doubt
that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable
value."35 On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leaño, an acquittal on the ground of
reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecution's version of the facts therein. Such probability
of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.

We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad's dismissal of the informations two days after we resolved to issue,
upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case. The
bond was filed the day after the informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the
effectivity date of the temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Court's
resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.

Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified
proceeding.

In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or reinstate the
warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new
warrants of arrest.36 According to the petitioners, it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a
personal determination of probable cause.

We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the
reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the
slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case
where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had
reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court
of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity
of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified
proceedings. Judge Anghad's order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of
arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.

Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based on a
determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them to do so. The records of the
preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals, and are also available to this Court, allowing
both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the
certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the
determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to
overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same
vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion.

There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment

In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering
the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued
therein had become final and executory. According to petitioners:

It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT
ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent Tuliao's Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of
the assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent,
to wit:

1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;

2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;

3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; andcralawlibrary

4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.

Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases
Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of
Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38

Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed
not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case because we referred the
same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three
weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent
Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge
Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order
dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion
to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliao's petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus .

Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November
2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad
committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge
Anghad an act much more serious than grave abuse of discretion.

Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001,
antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution,
we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the
criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliao's filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had
filed the bond on 15 November 2005.

While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a
court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be
heard on the part of respondent,39 the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001
Order.

In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double
jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his
express motion that the case was dismissed.40

As to respondent Tuliao's prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for
contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of instances
of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We
further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1 Leaño,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-
3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June
2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and
No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,

1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is
directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;

2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to report to this Court
compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases;

3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the
transfer;

4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance with the order to
raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance; andcralawlibrary

5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.

6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of
petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably
with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against
Petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Miranda et al. v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006
Crim Pro - Jurisdiction

Facts:
On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as the bodies of
Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness
protection program.
            Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police officers including SPO2 Maderal in the RTC of
Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila. The RTC convicted the accused and
sentenced them two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time
being at large. Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.
            In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the petitioners as the
ones responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners.
Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
            Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to
recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
the petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.

Issues: Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the
court.

Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Held. No, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the Jurisdiction of the Court. Adjudication
of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of
law over the body of the accused.
            Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the law and jurisdiction over the
person. Custody of the law is required before the Court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for
the adjudication of other relief sought by the dependant where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of
the defence of lack of jurisdiction over the person accused.
G.R. No. 208001

P/C SUPT. EDWIN A. PFLEIDER, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated July 23, 2013, of
petitioner P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider (Ret.) assailing the Decision dated October 23, 2012 and Resolution dated
June 26, 2013, both of the Court of Appeals (CA).

The facts follow.

An Information for Murder against petitioner and Ryan Bautista was filed on April 18, 2011 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of September 2010 or prior thereto, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and by offering a price,
reward or consideration to Ryan O. Bautista (Crim. Case No. 2010-09-497) and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, evident premeditation, while Ryan 0. Bautista was
armed with an unlicensed firearm, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
one Manuel Granados with the use of said unlicensed firearm and inflicting upon the said victim fatal wounds on
different parts of his body, which resulted to his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The RTC dismissed the case for lack of probable cause against petitioner in a Resolution dated September 5,
2011.

The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration on September 26, 2011 praying for the reinstatement of the
case, but the Court denied the said motion on October 26, 2011.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was therefore filed with the CA. The petition was
grounded on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, since (a) the questioned
resolution and order: (i) discarded and ignored vital evidence and the authority of the public prosecutor in
determining the existence of probable cause; (ii) excluded the extra-judicial confession executed by petitioner's co-
accused, Ryan Bautista, despite the presumed voluntariness and due execution thereof; and (iii) failed to give
weight and consideration to other vital pieces of evidence evincing trustworthiness of Bautista's extrajudicial
confession and establishing petitioner's complicity; and (b) the manifest presence of probable cause supports the
charge of murder as against petitioner.

On March 19, 2012, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition and, on April 23, 2012, respondent filed its Reply to
which petitioner filed a Rejoinder dated May 23, 2012.

The CA, in its Decision dated October 24, 2012, set aside the September 5, 2011 Resolution and October 26, 2011
Order of the trial court, and directed the reinstatement of the Information for Murder against petitioner.

Petitioner, on November 26, 2012, filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the CA's decision. Respondent, on the
other hand, filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest on November 29, 2012. Petitioner
responded by filing an Opposition dated December 8, 2012, and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated
January 24, 2013. In a Resolution dated February 4, 2013, the CA resolved, among others, to Note the Office of the
Solicitor General's (OSG) Motion for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest.

On March 7, 2013, respondent filed its Comment to petitioner's motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion and, in response, petitioner filed his Reply dated March 21, 2013.

The CA, in a Resolution dated June 26, 2013, denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit, there being
no legal and factual basis for the Court to depart from its earlier ruling reinstating Criminal Case No. 2011-04-286
for Murder against petitioner.

Hence, the present Petition.

This Court, in a Resolution dated September 2, 2013, resolved "to DENY the petition and AFFIRM the ruling of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on October 23, 2012 for failure to show any reversible error committed by it when it
held that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9 of Tacloban City committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
case against Edwin A. Pfleider despite the presence of probable cause linking him as one of the perpetrators of the
crime charged against him."1 Thus, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated October 8, 2013. 2

In a Resolution dated December 11, 2013, this Court resolved to "GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration and SET
ASIDE the Resolution dated September 2, 2013, REINSTATE the petition and to require the Office of the Solicitor
General to COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice."3

A Motion for Extension4 dated February 4, 2014 was filed by the OSG which was granted by this Court in its
Resolution5 dated March 24, 2014.

The OSG filed its Comment6 dated April 2, 2014, while the petitioner filed his Reply7 dated May 15, 2014.

Petitioner raises the following Assignment of Errors:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE AND NOT DISMISSING
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS THE SAME IS
NOT THE PROPER REMEDY, AND CANNOT BE AVAILED OF AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE LOST REMEDY
OF AN APPEAL;

II.

ASSUMING THAT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI CAN BE AVAILED IN LIEU OF A LOST APPEAL, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT HONORABLE JUDGE ROGELIO
SESCON OF BRANCH 9, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TACLOBAN CITY, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN HE DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR MURDER WITH NO. 2011-04-268 AGAINST
HEREIN PETITIONER FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE;

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT HONORABLE JUDGE ROGELIO
SESCON ARROGATED UPON HIMSELF THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE,
AND ALLEGEDLY ASSUMED THE POWER TO PROSECUTE VESTED IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT;
AND

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS,
AND THAT PROSECUTION WAS ALLEGEDLY ABLE TO PROFFER SUFFICIENT BASIS TO ESTABLISH,
MORE LIKELY THAN NOT, A LINK BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RYAN BAUTISTA WITH RESPECT TO THE
KILLING OF MANUEL GRANADOS.

The OSG, in its Comment, posited the following arguments:

I.

A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS THE PROPER REMEDY TO CORRECT
ERRORS OF JURISDICTION WHICH, IN THIS CASE, ARE DEMONSTRATED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN:

A. EXERCISING THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF DETERMINING THE EXISTENSE OF

PROBABLE CAUSE IN SUPPORT OF THE MURDER CHARGE;

B. IGNORING AND DISREGARDING THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF PETITIONER'S

COACCUSED, RYAN BAUTISTA; AND

c. REJECTING THE SAID EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION DESPITE ITS PRESUMED AND

MANIFEST VOLUNTARINESS AND DUE EXECUTION;

II.

WELL ENTRENCHED IS THE RULE THAT MINOR AND TRIVIAL INCONSISTENCIES IN THE STATEMENTS OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES DO NOT WEAKEN, BUT RATHER STRENGTHEN THEIR CREDIBILITY;

III.
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWS THAT, MORE LIKELY THAN NOT, CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN
COMMITTED AND THAT RESPONDENT IS PROBABLY GUILTY OF THE SAME, THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT
DISMISS THE CASE;

IV.

THE CIDG IS PRESUMED TO HAVE PERFORMED ITS OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS REGULARLY AND IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

Basically, what the petitioner and the respondent want from this Court is for it to review the facts and to finally
determine whether a probable cause really exists in the case against petitioner for murder.

Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is
confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was
done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.8 This is
consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary
or final.9 There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Among the exceptions are enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile.  10

However, a close examination of the arguments presented by both parties· would show that the present case does
not fall under any of the above-cited exceptions.1âwphi1 Furthermore, in this case, this Court is once again
confronted with the often raised issue of the difference between the determination of probable cause by the
prosecutor on one hand and the determination of probable cause by the judge on the other. To have a clearer view
on the matter, see the case of Mendoza v. People of the Philippines, et az.11

It must be emphasized that this Court is not a trier of facts. The determination of probable cause is and will always
entail a ·review of the facts of the case. The CA, in finding probable cause, did not exactly delve into the facts of the
case but raised questions that would entail a more exhaustive review of the said facts. It ruled that, "Questions
remain as to why, among all people, Ryan would implicate Pfelider as the inducer and why the other witnesses
would associate Pfleider to the crime."  12 From this query, the CA has raised doubt. Under the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure,

Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing
of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused
has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or
when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice
and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information. 13

In this case, the judge of the RTC, not finding the existence of probable cause, outrightly dismissed the case. The
contrasting findings of the CA and the RTC is well noted and from the very provision of the Rules of Court, 14 the
remedy, in case of doubt, is for the judge to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence. Therefore, in the
interest of justice, this Court finds it appropriate to remand the case to the trial court for its proper disposition, or for
a proper determination of probable cause based on the evidence presented by the prosecution. This is not the first
time that this Court has remanded a case to the trial court for it to make a ruling on whether certain Informations
should be dismissed or not. 15

Thus, it is my view that the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated July 23,
2013, of petitioner P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider (Ret.), should have been granted in so far as his prayer to set aside
the Decision dated October 23, 2012 and Resolution dated June 26, 2013, both of the Court of Appeals; and for
this Court to order that this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City for the judicial
determination of probable cause and the proper disposition of the same case. However, in view of the demise of
P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider on April 15, 2017, which effectively extinguished his criminal liability, this case had
been rendered moot and academic. Thus, the criminal action against him should just be dismissed, and deemed
closed and terminated inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated July 23, 2013 of
petitioner P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider (Ret.) is hereby GRANTED-insofar as his prayer to SET ASIDE the Decision
dated October 23; 2012 and Resolution dated June 26, 2013, both of the Court of Appeals. However, considering
the demise of P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider, instead of remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban
city for the determination of probable cause, the criminal action is DISMISSED, there being no defendant to stand
as accused. 16

SO ORDERED