Ibn Sīnā and Husserl on Intention and Intentionality

Author(s): Marina Paola Banchetti-Robino

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Jan., 2004), pp. 71-82
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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IBN SINA AND HUSSERL ON INTENTION AND
INTENTIONALITY

MarinaPaola Banchetti-Robino
ofPhilosophy,
Department Florida
Atlantic
University

The conceptsof intention and intentionality have enjoyeda long history within
Westernphilosophy. They were particularly
important notionsintheChristian,Jew-
ish,and Islamicphilosophicaltraditions of the MiddleAges and regainedphilo-
sophicalimportance inthetwentieth century, inthewritings
particularly ofEdmund
Husserl. This essay proposes to confront medieval philosophy with contemporary
phenomenology byconducting a comparative studyoftheconceptsofintention and
intentionalityas theyappearin thephilosophical worksoftheIslamicphilosopher
and physicianIbnSTna(latinizedas Avicenna)and thephenomenological philoso-
pherand mathematician EdmundHusserl.
Thereare profound differences betweenIbn STna'sand Husserl'saccountsof
intention and intentionality,and it is particularlyinterestingto examinethe in-
fluencesand the specificphilosophicalconcernsthathelpedto shape each phi-
losopher'sunique conceptionof intentions and intentional processesand of in-
relationto consciousness.
tentionality's To thisend, I shallfirst
examineIbnSTna's
naturalistic
conception ofintention and how it in
was, manyways,influenced bythe
traditionofthe Baghdadschoolof philosopher-physicians and theirunderstanding
of the 'internalsenses'.After thisI shallexamineHusserl'santi-naturalisticstance
regarding intentionand intentionality and howthisstancewas bothinfluenced by
and, in part,a responseto FranzBrentano's psychologisticaccountof 'intentional
in-existence'.
Lastly,I shallarguethat,intheirapproachtotheconceptofintentional
meaningsand of intentionality, IbnSina and Husserlwere,in manyways,strongly
influenced the
by professional culture towhicheach belonged,thatofthephysician
and the mathematician, After
respectively. thisI shallargueforthesuperiority ofthe
Husserlian transcendentalistviewovertheAvicennian naturalistic
view.

IbnSTna'sAccountofIntention
and Intentionality

Althoughmanyphilosophers today,even thosewho do notconsiderthemselves

phenomenologists, are somewhat familiar
withHusserl'stheoryof intentionality,
theyare less familiar
withIbn STna'sunderstanding
of the conceptof intention,
unless,ofcourse,theyare medievalists
or havea certaindegreeofcompetencein
medieval philosophy.Therefore,I shall begin by examiningthe concept of intention
as itappearsin theworkof IbnSTna,particularly
in hispsychology
and his meta-
physics,as foundin the Kitabal-Najat and the Kitabal-Shiff'.
The theoryof intentionelaborated by Ibn STna in his accounts of psychology,

PhilosophyEast & West Volume 54, Number1 January2004 71-82 71

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of Hawai'i Press

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 epistemology,and metaphysicswas transmitted to Scholasticphilosophythroughthe
workof Thomas Aquinas. In Ibn Sina's discussionof Beingand substance,
Beingis the properand primary objectof metaphysics....Beingper se is substance;
withinthis[IbnSTna]distinguishes separateand material
forms and matter,whichis a
substanceofinferior order.
... [IbnSiTn]reachestheconclusionthatone thingcan legitimately existinthespirit
and be missingfromexternalobjects;he calls thistypeof existenceintentional being
[orintentional existence]....In histheoryofknowledge,[IbnSTnd]uses [theconceptof
intention] to explaintherelation betweenobjectand subject.(Emphasismine)'
In chapter3 of the Najdt,titled"InternalSense," we read the followingaccount
of intention:
Thereare somefaculties of internal
perceptionwhichperceivetheformof thesensed
things,and otherswhichperceivethe'intention'
thereof. Somefaculties,
again,can both
perceiveand act whileothersonlyperceiveand do notact. Somepossessprimary per-
ception,otherssecondaryperception.Thedistinctionbetweentheperception oftheform
and thatoftheintentionis thattheformis whatis perceivedbothbytheinnersouland
theexternalsense;buttheexternalsenseperceivesitfirst ittothesoul,
andthentransmits
as forexample,whenthesheepperceivestheformofthewolf,i.e.,itsshape,form, and
colour.Thisformis certainlyperceivedbytheinnersoulofthesheep,butitis first per-
ceivedby itsexternalsense.As fortheintention,itis a thingwhichthesoul perceives
fromthe sensedobjectwithoutitspreviously havingbeen perceivedby the external
sense,justas thesheepperceives ofharminthewolf,whichcausesittofear
theintention
thewolfand to fleefromit,without harmhavingbeen perceivedat all bytheexternal
sense.Now,whatis firstperceivedbythesenseand thenbytheinternal faculties is the
form, whilewhatonlytheinternal faculties
perceivewithout the sense
external is the in-
tention.2

Why does the sheep, throughits internalsense, perceive hostilityin the wolf?
Accordingto one readingof thistext,the intentionin itselfis not perceived by the
externalsenses, and one cannot pointto anythingspecificallyperceived by the ex-
ternalsenses that displays the intention.There is, however,somethingabout the
form(sura)thatis perceived by the externalsenses and which, in turn,leads to the
perceptionof intentionby the internalsenses:
Sensibleforms are... corporealqualitiesthataffect
thesensory organsinsucha waythat
they are received by virtueof theirsimilitude.This is the reason forwhichtheyare
receivedfirstby the externalsensesand are thentransmitted to the senses.But
internal
the 'meanings'thattheseobjectssignify are notsuch corporealqualitiesbut,rather,
qualitiesor valuesthatare latentin the sensibleforms, such as the qualityof being
agreeable or disagreeable,good or bad, sympathetic or non-sympathetic, etc.... For
example,theanimal,seeinga yellowliquidthatis honey,judgesthatit is sweetand
proceedsto tasteit.The sweetnessthatis seized by thisjudgmentis notsensible,al-
is sensible,becauseithas notyetactuallybeentastedbythe
thoughthisqualityin itself
animal.... Thesheep,perceiving thefigure,thehowlsandthescentofa wolf,judgesthat
and dangerous,
he is ferocious and runsawayfromitimmediately. Itis notmerelythatit
seizesthelivingobjectbysimplyacceptingcertainof itsvitalqualities,butalso [thatit
seizestheobject]bytheattribution ofthesequalitiestotheobject.3

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 According to IbnSTna,thefaculty ofestimation is responsible fortheperception
of intentions and, thus,forintentionality. Thisfacultyis partof Ibn Sina's rather
complexschemeofthe'internal senses'thathe inherited, in part,fromtheBaghdad
of
school philosopher-physicians. According to this scheme,thereare twotypesof
sensibleobjectsthatcan be perceivedbytheinternal senses,and therearetwotypes
offaculties, withintheinternal senses,thatperceivethesesensibleobjects.Thetwo
typesoffaculties ofinternal sensearethereceptive faculty and theretentive faculty.
Ibn Sina explainsthatthesetwo facultiesare distinct fromthefactthatreception
requiresa malleablesubstrate since,when receivinga form,a changemusttake
place inthe substrate.On the other hand,retention requiresa stablesubstrate since
retaining a formrequiresa changelesssubstrate.
The two typesof sensibleobjectsare sensibleformsand intentions. We must
understand that,in thiscontext,'sensible'does notmean 'sensuous',thatis, per-
ceivablebytheexternal senses,butmerely perceivable bytheinternal senses.Thisis
whyIbnSinacan refer to intentions as 'sensibleobjects'eventhough, as established
in the Najat,intentions are neverperceivedor perceivablebytheexternalsenses.
Intentions, accordingto IbnSTna,arewhatsensibleform'means'or 'signifies' to the
percipient subject.Thus,to return totheexampleusedbyIbnSTnd, thesensibleform
ofthewolf'signifies' hostility tothe the
sheep.Although sheep does notliterally
'see'
hostilityin the wolf's eyes, the sensible form of the expression in the wolf'seyes
'means',to thesheep,thatthewolfis hostile.Theferociousness ofthewolfis latent
in itsappearanceand comportment. However,because an intention is notitselfa
sensuousqualityof the object,althoughit may be conveyedto the percipient
through a sensory faculty, itdoes notaffect anysenseorganatthetimeduring which
thejudgment is beingmade.
In theschemeof internal senses,thereis a faculty ofthereceptive typeand a
facultyof the retentive type that handle each type of sensible object. Common sense
is thefaculty thatreceives(or perceives)sensibleforms, whereastheformative (or
retentive) imagination is the faculty that retainssensible forms. The estimativefaculty
(wahm)is thefaculty thatreceives(orperceives)intentions, whereasthememorative
faculty retains intentions. The properobjects of the estimative facultyare, then,
ma'nanor intentions. In nonhumananimals,the estimative facultyis somewhat
limited.Theycan, as the exampleof the sheep illustrates, perceivenon-sensual
aspects of the environment "that exceed the perceptual capacitiesofthe [external]
sensesand the imagination."4 However,in humananimals,theestimative faculty
also has cognitivefunctions thatitdoes nothave in nonhumananimals.Thus,in
humananimalstheestimative faculty and theintellective facultyare co-present.5
UnlikeAlexander ofAphrodisias and Plotinus, who understood theidea ofper-
ceptionnon-physiologically, IbnSina rematerializes perception, and, in doingthis,
he also indirectlymaterializeshis account of intention.As has already been estab-
lishedabove, forIbn STnma intentionsare closely connected to sense perceptionsbe-
cause theyare dependenton themand, forhim,sense perceptioncontainsa clearly
physiologicaland materialisticelement: "althoughthe estimativefacultyhas non-
when they
sensible intentionsas itsproperobjects, itonly possesses those intentions

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 are conjoinedwithparticular sensibleforms represented intheimagination, thereby
compelling estimation to 'impede theexistence of things which cannot be imagined
and are notimprinted in [theimagination], and to refuseto assentto them.'"'6As
we have seen above, however,thereis nothing in the imagination thatis notfirst
receivedthrough theperception ofsensibleforms.
Now, perception, forIbn STna,occurswhencommonsense receivessensible
forms, thatis,formwithoutmatter. Thisaccountof perception is directly inherited
fromAristotle, forwhomthe reception of formwithoutmatter was interpreted by
theScholastics as 'intentional in-existence'.Once theformwithout matter has been
receivedby commonsense,the imaginative facultyretainsthesesensibleforms.
Thus,theestimative faculty receivesintentions on thebasisofthesensibleforms, or
form withoutmatter, thatare receivedbycommonsenseand thatare retained bythe
imagination. This,then,establishes thedependenceofthefaculty ofestimation, orof
intentionality,on sense perception."[F]orall fivesenses,the receptionof form
withoutmatter is interpreted as makingtheperceiverbecome liketheformofthe
thingperceived....Although theformis receivedstripped ofitsoriginalmatter, the
abstractionfrommatter in sense-perception is notso completeas in theestimative
facultyor intheintellect."7 Therefore, sinceitcan be shownthat,forIbnSTna,there
is a physiological elementto the reception and retention of thesensibleformsof
externalobjects,one would have to concludethatintentionality has, ultimately,
physiological origins.
Atthispoint,I wouldliketo examinetheculturalinfluences thathelpedshape
IbnSTna'saccountofperception, and
cognition, intentionality. However,rather than
I
focuson ethnicculture,shallfocuson the professional culturethathelpedtoshape
IbnSina's understanding of theseconcepts.Although thereare Neoplatonicinflu-
ences in IbnSTna'sconceptionoftheintellect, hisaccountofothermentalfaculties,
suchas perception, is notNeoplatonic.However,one shouldnotextract fromthis
thatIbnSTna'saccountofperception isentirelyAristotelian. Notwithstanding thefact
thathisaccountof perception was, in someways,inherited fromAristotle and the
Peripateticphilosophical tradition, theevidencesuggests thatIbnSTna'snaturalistic,
psychologistic, and quasi-physiological accountof perceptionand othermental
facultieswas, in manyways,influenced by hisown training as a physician and by
hisattempt to respondto and mediatebetweenthephysicians' accountof mental
facultiesand thephilosophers' account.
Greatlyinfluential in Ibn STna'smedicaltraining and in his understanding of
the mentalfaculties,especiallythatof perception, was the Baghdadschool of
philosopher-physicians. Thismedicalcirclerepresented the'afterlife'oftheBaghdad
and
Peripatetics, they were "a constant feature of the intellectual lifeof medieval
Islam."8Theywerenotonlyprominent physicians butalso translators and students
oftheworkofAristotle, Galen,and Hippocrates, and itis outofthiscultural tradition
of the philosopher-physician
thatIbn STnaemerged.
The physicians'account of the mentalfacultieswas much more physiological
than the account to be found in the Aristotelian
tradition.We findforexample, in
Ibn Luka,the followingpurelyphysiologicalconceptionof the spirit."The spirit...

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is a subtlesubstancethatemanatesthroughout thebody.Arising fromtheheart,it
directsitselfinthearteries and givesbirth to life,to breath,
and to arterial
pulsation
and,arisingfrom thebrain,itpassesthrough thenervesand producessensationand
movement."'IbnLakaviewsthespirit as an intermediary betweenthebodyand the
soul. It is through the spiritthatthe soul communicates lifeand sensationto the
body.Thus,although he does not endorse a materialistconceptionofthesoul,Ibn
LOkadoes endorsea materialist conceptionofthespirit as theintermediary between
soul and body.10One could speculatethatIbn LOikmightbe trying to avoid the
obviousphilosophical and physicalproblems associatedwiththenotionof interac-
tionbetweena material and an immaterial substance.The problem, however,is not
successfully avoidedby addinga thirdand materialsubstanceas an intermediary,
since thismaterialsubstancecalled 'spirit'mustalso interact withthe immaterial
soul,thereby the
resurrecting problem of interaction.
According to thephysicians oftheBaghdadschool,

ofthesoulareregarded
thefaculties onlywithreferencetothebodily organs inwhich
theyresideand notwith referenceto the of
variety functionwhich theyperform, for
...
physicians concernthemselveswith of
faculties thesoulonlyinso far
as a hindrance
inthefunctioning can be tracedto an injuryinthebodilyorgansinwhichtheyare
located.Consequently,iftwofunctionally different ofthesoulresideinone
faculties
then
bodilyorgan, physicians regard itas one inasmuch
faculty, as anyinjury inthat
organwillaffectthetwofaculties
alike."1

Thus,thephysicians made no distinction, forexample,betweenthereceptive and

theretentive of
types faculty ofinternalsense. Ibn Sina seems to wantto balance the
accountgivenby the medicalcircleand thatgivenby the philosophers, such as
al-Kindiand al-Farabi.Itis clearthatin hisschemeoffaculties oftheinternalsenses
Ibn Sina triesto breakaway fromthestrictphysiological accountof the Baghdad
schoolofphilosopher-physicians. He does thisbyconsidering thereceptive faculties
as distinct
from theretentive facultiesbyfocusing on theirfunctionaldifferences.He
to
appeals syllogistic logic to make his argument. Only a malleablesubstratecan
acquirethenonmaterial sensibleformthatis receivedin perception. Onlya stable
substratecan retaintheformafterithas been acquired.A substrate cannotbe both
malleableand stable.Therefore, thereceptive facultyand theretentive facultymust
be distinctin kind,one malleableand theotherstable.QED. Furthermore, hisac-
countof intentions is thattheyare 'meanings'or 'significations', abstractand non-
sensoryaspects of the external environment that,althoughtheyaccompanysense
perception, are not themselves perceivedby the externalsenses.
However, there is also evidence in severalof Ibn Sina'swritings, especiallyin
hismedicalmagnumopus,theCanon,butalso in ShifX' and Kafet,thathe does not
completelybreakaway fromthe physician'saccount. In theseworks,Ibn STnaplaces
wahm,or the estimativeor intentionalfaculty,in a specificbodily location,at the
end ofthe middlehollow ofthe brain.12 Thus,to followthe reasoningofthe medical
circle,any injuryto thispartof the bodilyorganwould affectthe animal's abilityto
receive intentions.Therefore,a sheep whose middle hollow of the brain had been

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 somehowinjuredto thepointofaffectingtheestimativefaculty,butwithoutanyin-
to
jury any other of
part the would
brain, conceivablybe able to perceive wolf
the
butwouldbe unableto detecthostilityin theanimal.Thiswouldthenlead to the
conclusion,unacceptableto someonelikeEdmundHusserl,thattherecould be an
almostperfectly
functioningconsciousnesswithout
intentionsor intentionality.

Husserl'sAccount of Intentionand Intentionality

Husserl'sdoctrine ofintentionality isa highly sophisticatedand developedversionof

thefrequently heldepistemological position that"thehuman mindmakessubstantial
contributions to thespecific structure of whatappears before it,so thatexperience
is construed to be a complexof data givenexternally and organizational princi-
ples suppliedinternally."13 Once one has all
suspended ontological commitments,
assumptions, and presuppositions and once contingencies are bracketed, thestruc-
tureofconsciousness is revealedin itsessenceas beingintentional. Husserltellsus
thatall consciousness is necessarily actionally toward
'directed' an 'object'.Inother
words, all consciousness is necessarily consciousness of something. Itis thispecu-
of
liarity mental processes that is known as intentionality.
Husserlalso refers to intentionality as 'egologicalconstitution' forthereasonthat
theintentional act is one in whichsubjectiveconsciousness synthesizes thesensu-
ous datathatis givento itand bestowssenseor meaningupon it.The act through
whichtheego bestowsmeaningupon itsobject is called the noeticact, and the
meaningful objector 'meaning'thatis constituted through thisact is calleda noema.
for
Thus, Husserl, the intentional object and the noema are one and thesame. In
Ideas I,forexample,Husserltellsus:

Likeperception,
everyintentive
mental process-justthismakesupthefundamental part
its"intentional
ofintentionality-has i.e.,
Object," its sense.Or,insomeother
objective
words:to havesenseor"tointend to"something [etwas"imSinnezu haben"], is the
fundamental ofall consciousness
characteristic which, is notjustanymental
therefore,
[Erlebnis]
living whatever,butisrathera (mental
living> sense,whichis"noetic."
having
in
(Emphasisoriginal)14
ThisactionalEgo-advertence is nottobe foundineverymentalevent;thatis,not
every mental event is directed
or 'Pain',forexample,is a mentalevent
intentional.
thatis not itselfintentional.
But,every mental processcan, withinitself,include
Husserlcalls thosementaleventsthatare notintentional
intentionality. appercep-
tions,whereasthosementaleventsthatare intentional are called inneror outer
perceptions.Thus,apperceptions are states,whereasperception and all actionally
directedmentaleventsare notstatesbutmobileactivities. The essentialdynamicof
an intentionaleventis thatitprojectsitselftowardsomething, itsintendedobject.
Although Husserldistinguishesbetweenapperception and perception,he claimsthat
all mentalprocesses,even those which are not themselvesintentive,are ultimately
This is due to the factthatEgo unificationitself
born in and borne by intentionality.
occurs throughan intentionalact, the mostfundamentalof all intentionalacts, for

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withoutittherewouldbe no unifiedstreamofconsciousness. Meaningmust,then,
be bestowedupon the Ego beforemeaningcan be bestowedupon the worldof
experience.Thus,an apperception like'pain',althoughitis notitself a mentalevent
characterized is
by intentionality,experiencedby an Ego that is unified and is,
the
therefore, product of an intentional act.
Consciousness, forHusserl,is thusimmersed in intentionality. Consciousnessis
intentionality.For there to be mental events, there must be an Ego servingas the
subject of these mental events,and, in order forthere to be an Ego,theremustan
intentional, constitutive act of and
capable synthesizing unifying thestreamofcon-
sciousness.Thus,it is absurdto speak of any consciousstateor mentaleventas
being,in no mannerwhatsoever, foundedon intentional acts,fortheempiricalor
psychological self is itselfthe product of the transcendental Ego'sact ofconstitutive
synthesis.
FollowingHusserl,we can drawthefollowing conclusions.Becausewe are not
speaking of the empiricalEgo but of the transcendental Ego,and becausewe have
bracketedall ontologicalcommitments to or assumptions abouta materialworld
external totheEgo,we realizethatintentionality cannotbe reducedtobrainstatesor
locatedin a particular brainor partof the brain.Intentionality does notpresup-
pose the existence of a physical, material brain. Intentionality only presupposes
consciousness, and consciousnesspresupposesintentionality. The two are, in es-
sence,one and thesame. Foras longas thereis consciousness, thereis intention-
ality.And, when there is no longerintentionality, there is no longerconsciousness.
Although we understand that,as a matter offact,onlybeingswitha nervoussystem
and a brainhaveconsciousness, theessentialcharacteristic ofconsciousness, thatis,
intentionality,is not reducible to the brain itself
or to anyparticular part ofthe brain.
no
Thus, damage can be done to the brain thatcould lead to non-intentional con-
scious states.A non-intentional consciousstate,forHusserl,is a contradiction in
terms.The onlypossibledamageto the brainthatcould destroyintentionality is
damage that destroys consciousness altogether.
Itis clearthatHusserl'sconceptofintentionality was notbornina voidbutwas
inherited, rather, fromthe longtradition thatprecededhim.The tradition through
whichtheconceptof intentionality was transmitted fromAristotle to thetwentieth
centuryis a longand complexone. IbnSTndis butone ofthe manyphilosophers
throughwhich this concept passed fromits originsin Aristotelian psychology
through Scholasticism on its to
way contemporary philosophy. Itis notthe purpose
ofthisessaytotracethislonghistory, whichhasalreadybeensuccessfully addressed
byotherauthors.15 Suffice itto saythat,after theScholasticperiodinmedievalphi-
the of
losophy, concept intentionality existed in semi-obscurity until1874 when
FranzBrentano, in his Psychologievomempirischen Standpunkt, "[re]introduced
intothephilosophy of mindtheseminalidea ofan intentional object."''16Brentano
tellus:

Everymentalphenomenon is characterized
bywhattheScholasticsoftheMiddleAges
(or mental)inexistence
called the intentional of an object,and whatwe mightcall,

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 though notwholly unambiguously,reference to a content,
directiontowardan object
(which isnottobe understoodhereas meaning a thing),
orimmanent Every
objectivity.
mental phenomenon includessomething as objectwithinitself
althoughtheydo notall
do so inthesameway.Inpresentation something injudgement
ispresented, something
or denied,in loveloved,in hatehated,in desiredesired
is affirmed andso on. This
intentional
in-existence
ischaracteristic
exclusivelyofmental phenomena. No physical
phenomenon exhibits
anything likeit.We can,therefore,define mentalphenomena
bysaying thattheyarethosephenomena whichcontain an objectintentionally
within
themselves.'7
In Brentano,the definition of intentional inexistenceremainsvirtually un-
changedfromthedefinition foundin the Scholastics.Accordingto Brentano, the
feature thatdistinguishes mentalphenomenafromphysicalphenomenais thatthey
are directedtowardobjectsthathave intentional inexistence.18It is thisaspectof
Brentano's theorythatgreatlyinfluenced Husserl,forHusserlalso concludesthat
mentaleventsand consciousnessas a wholeare essentially distinguished bytheir
intentional character, thatis,their directedness toward intentionalobjects.
The conceptofan intentional objectthatwe findin Brentano's work,however,
is verydifferent fromthatto be foundin Husserl.Afterinheriting the conceptof
intentionalityfrom Brentano, Husserl clearlybroke away from Brentano's account.
Although Brentano's account is not naturalisticin the same way IbnSTna's,Bren-
as
tano'sconceptionofintentional inexistence is a theory aboutthenatureofthepsy-
chologicalEgo,thatis,ofempiricalconsciousness and,therefore, remainspsycho-
logisticand naturalistic.
Husserl, as a mathematician who embraces theBolzanian
for a
requirement purelogic,is, on the other hand, concerned with developingan
accountof consciousnessand intentionality thatis nonpsychologistic, nonnatural-
istic,and non-reductionistic. Only such a nonnaturalistic account could, according
to Husserl,provideus witha phenomenology thatcouldserveas thetruly scientific
foundation forlogic,mathematics, and the empiricalsciences.Logic,as Husserl
claims,is notconcernedwiththevaguelawsofempirical psychology butwithpre-
cise and universal laws.19Understanding thattheselawsare notmerely descriptive
and contingent featuresof the empiricalworldbut are, rather, theoretical laws
holdingforthedomainofidealmeanings, Husserlseekstoovercomethenaturalism,
empiricism, and reductionism that, he believes, wereresponsible fortheemergence
oflogicalpsychologism. According logicalpsychologism, is nothing
to there a priori,
objective,ornecessary aboutlogic,mathematics, and meanings. To embracelogical
psychologism istoembracea viewoflogicaland mathematical lawsas contingently
truedescriptions of how empiricalsubjectshappento think.Psychological facts
serveas thefoundation oflogicallaws.Logicalpsychologism, to
according Husserl,
inevitably leads to relativism and skepticism, and logicalpsychologism emerges
fromnaturalism. "Naturalism, inthesenseinwhichHusserlunderstands it,seems...
to be nothingmore than one of those many residualtendencies all of which con-
verge in the overlookingof the act in favorof the object."20
It is withinthe frameworkof his reflectiveand 'transcendental'phenomeno-
logical methodand of the variouslystatedtheoryof intentionality
thatHusserloffers

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hisown solutionto theproblems ofthetheory ofevidence,truth,
and ontology.To
discussfurtherhowthephenomenological methodand itsdiscovery ofintentionality
putthenailinthecoffin ofpsychologism is beyondthescope ofthisessay.Suffice
it
tosaythatsincethelawsoflogicand mathematics aretheproduct ofintentional
acts
ofthetranscendental Egoand sincetheyare notdescriptive and contingent,
inten-
and
tionality intentional
acts couldnever be conceivedin naturalistic,
reductionistic,
or physiologicalterms.To conceiveit in thosetermswould undermine Husserl's
entireanti-psychologistic
foundational
project.

ComparativeDiscussionoftheAvicennian
and Husserlian ofIntention
Conceptions
and Intentionality

Itis clearthatthemedicalculture ofwhichIbnSTnawas a partgreatly influenced his

philosophical work,particularly his viewson the natureof mind,perception, and
intentionality. Although in Ibn Sina we find an attempt to mediate between the
strictly physicalistic account of mental activity found in the medical circle and the
nonphysicalistic accountfoundin the philosophicalcircles,certainremnants of
physicalism, reductionism, and naturalism stilllingerin manyof hiswritings, even
thosethatare philosophical rather thanmedical.
It is also clearthatHusserl'sbackground as a mathematician and hisdesireto
groundmathematics and theempiricalsciencesin a trulyscientific philosophy led
himto the rejectionof psychologism and naturalism and to thedevelopment of a
conceptof intentionality as notreducibleto physiological states,since physicality
itself,and all other assumptions of the naturalattitude, are bracketedpriorto the
discovery ofintentionality.
I wishto arguethatHusserl'saccountof intentionality is farsuperiorto Ibn
Sina's,althoughIbn Sina's contribution to the of
theory intentionality is certainly
important bothin itself and foritsinfluence on theScholasticnotionof'intentional
inexistence'. As we haveseen,itis fromthisScholasticnotionthatBrentano resur-
rectstheconceptofintentionality thatwilllaterallow Husserlto giveus a newway
of understanding consciousness.Althoughin bothIbn STnaand Husserlintention
refers to the'meaning'oftheperceivedobject,Husserltakesthisnotionmuchfur-
therthanIbnSTnaprecisely because he de-materializes and de-naturalizes thecon-
cepts of intention and intentionality and moves away from a substantive theoryof
consciousness.ForHusserl,consciousness(ormind,soul) is no longera substance
butan activity, andthisactivity is intentional.
Consciousness bestowsmeaningupon
theworldrather thanfinding meaningalready in the world.Thus,the intentional
is a
object product ofthe constitutive activities
of consciousness and ofitsdirectness.
ForIbnSTna,on theotherhand,themeaningsignified bytheobject,althoughnot
a corporealqualityoftheobject,is latentin thesensibleformoftheobject.Thus,
althoughforHusserlthe sheep constitutesthe wolf-as-perceived, and this includes
the wolf's ferociousness,forIbn STnathe wolf's ferociousnessis latentin itsappear-
ance and comportment.
Ibn STna's account is naturalisticfor two reasons. Firstof all, his account of

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 intentions is dependent on hisaccountofperception, and hisaccountofperception
suffers froma materialism thatis inherited fromthemedicaltradition to whichIbn
Sina himself contributed greatly. Second, his account of intentions focuseson the
objectrather thanon theact. Intentions or 'meanings'are latentin theobjectper-
ceived,although they are not themselves sensuousqualitiesoftheobject.Theyare
intheobject,rather thanbeingtheproduct ofthesubject'sactions.Thisisone ofthe
of to
aspects naturalism whichHusserlhimself objected.As was recently statedby
Ronald McIntyrein his critiqueof Fred Dretske's'representational naturalism',
"sensesare notproperties oftheobjectswe intend.... [T]hesense belongsto the
contentoftheexperience, whiletheproperties belongto theobject.An act is in-
tentional byvirtueofhavinga senseor content, even ifthereis no objectthat'sat-
isfies'thissense."21 ItseemsthatDretske, at leastinthisrespect, isguiltyofthinking
of intentions or 'senses'in a way similarto IbnSTna.Thus,thesame criticism that
McIntyre raisesagainstDretskecould also be raisedagainstIbn STna.For both
Dretskeand IbnSina,"sensesare properties ofthesortthatphysicalobjectshave.
ForHusserl,theyare abstract'contents'of intentional thoughts or experiences,"22
intentional thoughts being the actsthat constitute these very senses.
Husserldoes notmakeeitherofthenaturalistic mistakes thatwe findinIbnSTna.
First ofall, Husserlavoidsphysicalistic reductions ofintentionality,perception, cog-
nition,and othermentalfacultiesby suspending the naturalattitude in whichthe
existenceof the materialworldand thepsychological empiricalselfare takenfor
granted. Second, Husserl focuses on intentional acts of the subjectratherthan
objects. Husserl is able to arriveat his of
conception intentionality preciselyby
bracketing or suspending all assumptions abouta materialworld,a physiological
self,and a psychological empirical self.Indoingthis,Husserlisolatesconsciousness
as suchand disclosesitsactivities. Fromthis,Husserlunderstands that,even ifone
suspends belief in an extramental reality, has
experience-as-such meaning. Although
Husserlis notembracing a conceptionofconsciousness as disembodied, he never-
thelessrealizesthatmeaningmustnotcome fromoutsideconsciousness.It is not
latentinsomeextramental Itis notgivento a passiveconsciousness.
reality. Rather,
itis constituted byan activeconsciousness. Husserlis,thus,able to divorcehimself
frombothBrentano's and hisown earlypsychologism and naturalism, a psycholo-
gism and naturalism that,unfortunately, clearlypermeate IbnSTna's understanding of
intentional meaning and of intentionality.
Itis intheseand manyotherrespectsthattranscendental phenomenology pro-
videsan accountofmentalevents-and particularly ofintentionality-that is supe-
riortothatprovidedbynaturalistic theories. Itis clearthatbothHusserland IbnSina,
in theirdevelopment of an accountof mentaleventsand intentions, weregreatly
influenced by theirtraining, respectively,as a mathematician and a physician.The
physicianwas drawntowardnaturalism because of a need to locatementalfunc-
tions in a particularpartof the brain in orderto explain injuriesto those functions.
The riskof this,however,is to fall intoa reductionistic programthatis not able to
explain the qualityand meaningfulness of our mentallife.The mathematicianHus-
serl,on the otherhand, was drawntowarda transcendentalaccount because of his

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desire to escape psychologism.In doing so, Husserlwas successfulin providingus
withan account of experience and mentallifethatis much richerthanthe natural-
isticaccount foundin Ibn SiTn.

Notes

1 - Avicenna,Sobre Metafisica(Antologia),trans.fromthe Arabic,withan introd.

and notes,by Miguel Cruz Hernandez (Madrid: Revistade Occidente, 1950),
p. 37. The originaltextreads as follows:
El seres el objetoprimario y propriode la metaffsica....El serperse es la sustancia;
dentrode estadistingue las formas separaday materialy la materia, que es la sustancia
de ordeninferior.
... IlegaAvicenaa la conclusi6nde que una cosa puedeexistir legitimamente en el
espirituy en
faltar los a
objetosexteriores; estaexistenciale llama ser intencional....
En
su teorfadel conocimiento la usa paraexplicarla relaci6nentre los el
objetosy sujeto.
-
2 Avicenna, "Concerningthe Soul," in F. Rahman,Avicenna's Psychology:An
of KitabAl-Najat,Book II, ChapterVI withHistorico-
EnglishTranslation
Notes
Philosophical and TextualImprovements to the Cairo Edition(Oxford
Westport,Connecticut:HyperionPress,1981),
UniversityPress,1952; reprint,
p. 30.
3 - NorikoUshida,EtudeComparative
de la Psychologie d'Avicenneet
d'Aristote,
de St. Thomasd'Aquin (Tokyo: Keio Institute of Culturaland LinguisticStudies,
1968), p. 158. The originaltextreads as follows:
Lesformes sensiblessont... des qualitescorporelles qui affectentlesorganessensoriels
en sortequ'ellessont en vertude leursimilitude. C'estpourquoiellessont
revues revues
en premier lieuparles sensexternes, et ensuiteellessonttransmises aux sensinternes.
Mais les sensque lesobjetssignifient ne sontpas tellesqualitescorporelles, maisplutot
des qualitesou des valeursqui sontlatentesdans les formessensibles,tellesque les
qualitesagreablesou desagreables, bonneou mauvaise,sympathique ou antipathique,
etc.... Parexemple,I'animal,en voyentun liquidejaune qui estdu miel,jugequ'il est
douxetva le gouiter.La douceursaisieparce jugement n'estpas sensible,quoiquecette
en soit
qualite elle-meme sensible, car elle n'estpas encore gout~eactuellement par
La en
I'animal.... brebis, percevant la figure,les criset I'odeurd'un loup,jugequ'il est
f6roceet dangereux, et le fuittoutde suite.Ce n'estpas seulement qu'elle saisitI'objet
vivantparla simpleacceptation de certaines de ses qualitesvitales,maisaussipar I'at-
tributionde ces qualites'a I'objet.
4 - Deborah L. Black, "Imaginationand Estimation: Arabic Paradigmsand Western
Transformations," Topoi 19 (1) (2000): 60.
5 - Ibid.
6 - Ibid., p. 61. Black is here quoting Avicenna, Al-Shiff':AI-Nafs(Healing: De
anima),in Avicenna's"De Anima,"BeingthePsychological
PartofKitabal-
Shifa',ed. F. Rahman(Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press,1959), 4.1, p. 166.

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 7 - Richard Sorabji,"FromAristotleto Brentano:The Development oftheConcept
of Intentionality,"in Aristotle
and theLaterTradition, ed. HenryBlumenthal
and HowardRobinson, OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy, Supplementary
volume(Oxford: ClarendonPress,1991),p. 236.
8 - F. E. Peters,Aristotleand theArabs:TheAristotelian Tradition in Islam(New
York:NewYorkUniversity Press,1968),p. 163.
9 - Abderrahman a I'Etudede la psychologiea travers
Tlili,Contribution la phi-
losophieavicennienne, de
preface Roger Deladriere (Tunis: Universitede
TunisI, 1995),p. 78. The originaltextreadsas follows:
... estunesubstance
L'esprit subtile
repanduedanslecorps.S'elevant
ducoeur,ellese
dirigedans les artereset donnenaissancea la vie, a la respiration
et a la pulsation
arterielle du cerveau,
et,partant ellepassedanslesnerfs
etproduit
la sensation
et le
mouvement.
10- Ibid.,pp. 79-80.
11 - Harry AustinWolfson, StudiesintheHistory
ofPhilosophy
and Religion,
vol. 1,
ed. IsadoreTwersky and GeorgeH. Williams(Cambridge:
HarvardUniversity
Press,1973),p. 283.
12 - Ibid.,p. 284.
13 - EdmundHusserl,TheParisLectures, trans.PeterKoestenbaum, withan intro-
essay
ductory (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff 1964),p. xxvii.
Publishers,
14 - EdmundHusserl,Ideas Pertaining to a PurePhenomenology and to a Phe-
nomenological First
Philosophy, Book, trans.
F. Kersten
(The Hague:Martinus
1982),? 90, p. 217.
Publishers,
Nijhoff
-
15 Forone excellentaccountofthishistory, I refer
thereaderto Sorabji's"From
Aristotle
to Brentano."
16 - Ibid.,p. 247.
17 - FranzBrentano, Psychologyfrom an EmpiricalStandpoint,ed. LindaMcAlister,
and D. Terrell
trans.A. Rancurello (London:Routledge and KeganPaul,1972),
pp. 88-89.
18- Ibid.
19 - EdmundHusserl,"Prolegomena," LogicalInvestigations,trans.J.N. Findlay
fromthesecondGermaneditionof LogischeUntersuchungen (London:Rout-
ledgeand KeganPaul,1970),vol. 1, chap. 5, ?25, p. 114.
20 - NatalieDepraz,"WhenTranscendental GenesisEncounters theNaturalization
in
Project," Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issuesin Contemporary Phenome-
nology and Science,
Cognitive ed. JeanPetitot,Francisco J.Varela,Bernard
Pachou, and Jean-Michel Roy (Stanford:Stanford University Press,1999),
p. 484.
21 - Ronald Mclntyre,"Dretskeon Qualia," in Petitotet al., NaturalizingPhenome-
nology,p. 433.
-
22 Ibid.

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