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Batch 1

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6120             June 30, 1953
CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, petitioner,
vs.
FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Judge-at-large presiding over Branch C of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and EUGENIO ANGELES, as City Fiscal of Manila, representing the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory
offenses, namely, (1) with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606, which was docketed as
criminal case No. 18374, in that he knowingly chartered a vessel of Philippine registry to an
alien without the approval of the President of the Philippines and (2) with a violation of section
129 in relation to section 2713 of the Revised Administrative Code, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 18375, in that he failed to submit to the Collector of Customs the manifests
and certain authenticated documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed to obtain the necessary
clearance from the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said vessel for a foreign port.
Petitioner filed a motion praying that assessors be appointed to assist the court in considering the
questions of fact involved in said cases as authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409,
otherwise known as Revised Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that "the aid of
assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the Court of First
Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure." This motion was opposed by the City Fiscal who appeared for the People of the
Philippines.

The court issued an order denying the motion holding in effect that with the promulgation
of the Rules of Court by the Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1, 1940, all rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines previously existing
were not only superseded but expressly repealed, that the Supreme Court, having been vested
with the rule-making power, expressly omitted the portions of the Code of Civil Procedure
regarding assessors in said Rules of Court, and that the reference to said statute by section 49 of
Republic Act No. 409 on the provisions regarding assessors should be deemed as a mere
surplusage. Believing that this order is erroneous, petitioner now comes to this court imputing
abuse of discretion to the respondent Judge.

ISSUE:

WON the right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is a substantive right.

RULING:
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YES.
The right to a trial by assessors is substantive in the sense that it must be created and
defined by express enactment as opposed to a mere remedy devised to enforce such right or
obtain redress therefor. The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code
of Civil Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and
as such are not embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. This is so because in
said section 154 this matter is referred to as a right given by law to a party litigant. Section 1477
of the Administrative Code of 1917 is couched in such a manner that a similar right is implied
when invoked by a party litigant. It says that the aid may be invoked in the manner provided in
the Code of Civil Procedure. And this right has been declared absolute and substantial by the
Supreme Court in several cases where the aid of assessors had been invoked (Berbari v.
Concepcion Et. Al., 40 Phil., 320; Colegio de San Jose v. Sison, 56 Phil., 344). 

The promulgation of the Rules of Court did not have the effect of repealing the
provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure. These provisions have not
been incorporated by the Supreme Court in the present Rules of Court because they are
substantive in nature. This remedy may be invoked not only in Manila but in all other places
where it existed prior to the promulgation of the Rules of Court. The provisions on assessors
embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure are still in force and the same may still be invoked in
the light of the provisions of section 49 of Republic Act No. 409.

Wherefore, petition is hereby granted, without pronouncement as to costs.

NOTE:

A substantive law creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property,
or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs, whereas
rules of procedure are provisions prescribing the method by which substantive rights may be
enforced in courts of justice. (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p. 4; Bustos
v. Lucero, 46 Off. Gaz., Jan. supp., pp. 445, 448.) 

BUSTOS VS. LUCERO

81 Phil. 640
October 20, 1948
Tuason, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner appeared at the preliminary investigation before the Justice of the Peace of
Masantol, Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal charges against him he pleaded
not guilty. His counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that her witnesses
could be examined and cross-examined. The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected to
petitioner's motion invoking section 11, Rule 108, and the objection was sustained. Thus the
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accused refused to present his evidence, and the case was forwarded to the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga.

Petitioner filed a motion with the Court of First Instance praying that the record of the
case be remanded to the justice of the peace of Masantol, in order that the petitioner might cross-
examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony but it was denied.
Hence this petition

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners
motion.

HELD:

No. Section 11 of Rule 108 is an adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive
right which prescribes the method of enforcing rights and obtain redress for their invasion.
Preliminary investigation is not an essential part of the due process. While Section 11 of Rule
108 denies the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his
right to present witnesses remains unaffected and his constitutional right to be informed of the
charges against him both in such investigation and trial is unaffected.

Petition denied.

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner, 
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
PUNO, J.:; EN BANC; G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999

Doctrine:The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction.

Facts:

Petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s ten year old daughter
and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the constitutionality of RA 7659 “ The
Death Penalty Law”, and the imposition of death penalty for the crime of rape. The motions were
denied with the court finding no reason to declare it unconstitutional. However, the Court
granted a temporary restraining order to temporarily suspend the execution of judgment. After
the expiration of the TRO, petitioner in this instant case prays to extend it. On the other hand,
public respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration to lift temporary restraining order
of the execution and Supplemental Motion to Grant Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. Hence,
this case.
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Issue:

Whether or not the Court loses its jurisdiction after entry of judgment

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the power to control the execution of its decision is an
essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our
Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that
courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and
orders to make them conformable to law and justice.  For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135
provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary
writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court
or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding
may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules.

In this case, however, while the Court affirms the contention of the petitioner that
jurisdiction does not end up to entry of judgment, the Court cannot extend further the TRO
previously granted. Hence, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the
Temporary Restraining Order.

The Supreme Court denied the petition.

Neypes vs. CA

G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005

Ponente: Corona, J.

Facts: Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction against the respondents.

In an order dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint on the
ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order
of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a
motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the
motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July
27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
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On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight
days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of
appeal before the Court of Appeals. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had
seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of
the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on
July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for
appeal.

On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-
day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint.

Issue: Whether or not CA’s decision is correct.

Held: NO.

If the motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant has a “fresh period” of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the notice of the order denying or dismissing the motion for reconsideration
within which to file the notice of appeal.

ESTIPONA vs. LOBRIGO

G.R. No. 226679
August 15, 2017
Peralta J.

FACTS: Estipona was charged for violation of Sec 11 of R.A. No. 9165. He filed a Motion to
Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement. He argued that Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 violates: xxx (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section
5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among
the three equal branches of the government. This was denied. Hence, this petition challenging the
constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, "which provides, "Any person charged under any provision of
this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on
plea-bargaining."

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the direct invocation of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is proper
2. Whether or not the provision violates the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court
and the principle of separation of powers
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RULING:
1. YES.
In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not
shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-
reaching implications. Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat
when issues of substantial and transcendental importance are present.

2. YES.
The rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it
operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. As such, plea bargaining is a rule of procedure.

Under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 19871 Constitution, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is now the Supreme Court's exclusive domain and no longer
shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. It belongs exclusively to this Court.

GRANTED.

G.R. No. 141407. September 9, 2002

LAPULAPU DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION,, Petitioner, v. GROUP

MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner LLDHC filed a complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure with Writ of

Mandatory Injunction against GSIS with the RTC Manila. On the other case, Respondent GMC
filed a complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against GSIS with RTC Lapu Lapu
whereby it seeks to compel GSIS to execute a Final Deed of Sale in favor of GMC covering the
Marigondon lots, the purchase price thereof having been paid in full by GMC to GSIS. The RTC
Lapu lapu rendered decision in favor of GMC on February 1992. While RTC Manila rendered
decision in favor of LLDHC on May 1994. As a result, LLDHC filed a Complaint with this
Court seeking the annulment of the RTC Lapu lapu decision. Petitioner argues that the Decision
of the Manila RTC is superior to that of the Lapulapu RTC and must therefore prevail. It alleges
that the former was executed and fully implemented as early as September 15, 1997, but that the
latter is yet to attain finality.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the final and fully implemented decision of the Manila RTC could be
declared and rendered ineffectual and nugatory by the judgment of the Lapu-Lapu City RTC.
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HELD: NO.

The doctrine of non-interference holds that the courts of equal and coordinate jurisdiction
cannot interfere with each other’s order.

The records of the case clearly show that the Lapulapu Decision has become final and
executory and is thus valid and binding upon the parties. Obviously, petitioner is again trying
another backdoor attempt to annul the final and executory Decision of the Lapulapu RTC.

[G.R. No. 123050. January 20, 1999]

SUICO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, SPS. ESMERALDO and ELIZABETH

SUICO, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and PDCP DEVELOPMENT BANK,
INC., Respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Suico Industrial Corporation, secured a its first loan amounting to
P2,500,000.00 and a second loan amounting to P2,000,000.00 payable in five (5) years. As
security thereof, petitioner spouses mortgaged their two (2) real estate properties situated at
Mandaue City.

For failure to pay the balance of the loan amounting to P3,900,000.00 as of 1993, respondent
PDCP Bank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. It was adjudge as
the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale, the ownership was consolidated to the bank for
failure to redeem.

Respondent PDCP Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC of Mandaue City, Branch 28
an Ex parte Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession was granted. However, the writ could
not be enforced; petitioners filed a Complaint for Specific Performance, Injunction and Damages
(with Prayer for Restraining Order) and the same was granted.

Issue:

1. Whether or not RTC Branch 56 can enjoin the enforcement of writ of possession issued
by RTC Branch 28.

Held: No. RTC Branch 56 acted with grave abuse of discretion for having issued the writ of
injunction which prevented the implementation of the writ of possession issued by RTC Branch
28. The issuance of the writ of injunction was not proper in the absence of any legal right on the
part of petitioners to enjoin the enforcement of the writ of possession in favor of respondent
PDCP Bank.

For the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the
invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of
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complainant is clear and unmistakable and there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage.

Here, When petitioners failed to pay the balance of the loan and thereafter failed to redeem the
properties, title to the property had already been transferred to respondent PDCP Bank.
Respondent PDCP Banks right to possess the property is clear and is based on its right of
ownership as a purchaser of the properties in the foreclosure sale to whom title has been
conveyed.17 Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 and Section 35 of Rule 39, the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of the property. 18 Respondent PDCP Bank has a better
right to possess the subject property because of its title over the same.

PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION and PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY

vs. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER and LIGHT CO., INC.

G.R. No. 127371, April 25, 2002

FACTS:

On January 21, 1987, Pursuant to President Corazon C. Aquino’s approval of the Cabinet
Memorandum, respondent Cagayan Electric Power and Light, Co. (CEPALCO), grantee of a
legislative franchise to distribute electric power to some of the municipalities in the province of
Misamis Oriental, filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition. The petition sought
the "discontinuation of all existing direct supply of power by the National Power Corporation
(NPC, now NAPOCOR) within CEPALCO's franchise area."

After hearing, the ERB rendered a decision granting the petition.

On October 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that the motion for
reconsideration filed by NAPOCOR with the ERB was out of time and therefore, the assailed
decision became final and executory and could no longer be subject of a petition for review.

On a petition for review on certiorari, this Court affirmed the Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Judgment was entered on September 22, 1993, thus rendering final the decision of the ERB.

To restrain the execution of the ERB Decision, PSC and PIA filed a complaint for injunction
against CEPALCO with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City.

On April 11, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of PSC and PIA. CEPALCO filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied by the trial.

Aggrieved, CEPALCO appealed to the Court of Appeals. On July 23, 1996, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued is DISSOLVED.
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PSC and PIA filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution16 dated
December 2, 1996. Hence the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of non-interference apply to administrative bodies?

HELD:

Yes. Corollarily, Section 10 of Executive Order No. 172 (the law creating the ERB) provides that
a review of its decisions or orders is lodged in the Supreme Court. Settled is the rule that where
the law provides for an appeal from the decisions of administrative bodies to the Supreme Court
or the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in
terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. Hence, the trial court,
being co-equal with the ERB, cannot interfere with the decision of the latter. It bears stressing
that this doctrine of non-interference of trial courts with co-equal administrative bodies is
intended to ensure judicial stability in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of
concurrent jurisdiction.

BARITUA VS. MERCADER

G.R. No. 136048. January 23, 2001.

PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:

The original complaint in this case was filed in 1984.

Dominador Mercader, a businessman, allegedly rode the bus owned by Baritua or the JB Line
transportation. Mercader died due to an accident and now his heirs went after Baritua, the bus
owner. Baritua, allege that since the respondents in this case failed to “specifically allege” the
amount of damages incurred therein the proper amount of docket fees were not accounted
correctly. This contention is pursuant to the Manchester case which was decided by the Supreme
Court in 1987. In consequence of this averment, respondents have not yet paid the correct docket
fee, for which reason, respondents’ case may be dismissed on that ground alone. The main
reason is that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

ISSUE:
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Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

No, the CA did not err in its decision that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Generally, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the commencement
of the action, unless such statute provides for its retroactive application. Once the jurisdiction
of a court attaches, it continues until the case is finally terminated. The trial court cannot
be ousted therefrom by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character that
would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.

EDITHA PADLAN, Petitioner, v.ELENITA DINGLASAN and FELICISIMO DINGLASAN,

G.R. NO. 180321 : March 20, 2013

PERALTA, J.:

Facts:

Elenita Dinglasan was the registered owner of a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 625 of the
Limay Cadastre which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-105602, with an
aggregate area of 82,972 square meters. While on board a jeepney, Elenita's mother, Lilia
Baluyot (Lilia), had a conversation with one Maura Passion (Maura) regarding the sale of the
said property. Believing that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owner's copy of
the TCT from Elenita and gave it to Maura. Then by means of a falsified Deed of Sale Maura
was able to subdivide and sell the lots to different buyers. On April 26, 1990, Maura sold Lot No.
625-K to one Lorna Ong , who later caused the transfer of title to her name. A few months later,
Lorna sold the lot to petitioner Editha Padlan for P4,000.00. Thus, TCT No. 134932 was
cancelled and TCT No. 137466 was issued in the name of petitioner.

After learning what had happened, respondents demanded petitioner to surrender possession of
Lot No. 625-K, but the latter refused. Respondents were then forced to file a case before the
RTCof Balanga, Bataan for the Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of title. Summons was,
thereafter, served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan. The respondents Sps.
Dinglasan, move to declare petitioner in default, to which the latter opposed on the ground that
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the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person, she being in Japan, thus there is invalid
service of summons.

The RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner to be a buyer in good faith and, consequently,
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA reverses the trial court's decision and orders the
cancellation of title. Hence, present case.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.

Ruling:

No, Case falls within the jurisdiction of MTC's (assessed value doest not exceed 20k in other
municipalities and 50k in MM)

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the
plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein.

In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in the
complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax
declaration was even presented that would show the valuation of the subject property.

Dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 86983, dated June 29, 2007, and its Resolution dated October 23, 2007, are REVERSED
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and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, dated July I, 2005, is declared
NULL and VOID. The complaint in Civil Case No. 438-ML is dismissed without prejudice.

Continental Micronesia Inc. vs Basso

G.R. Nos. 178382-83, September 23, 2015

Topic: Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and decide
cases.

Facts: Petitioner Continental Micronesia, Inc. (CMI) is a foreign corporation organized and
existing under the laws of and domiciled in the United States of America (US) licensed to do
business in the Philippines, while Basso is a US citizen residing in the Philippines. Basso filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. The LA dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction since the employment contract was allegedly executed in the US, hence the
doctrine of lex loci celebrationis applies. The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and ruled
that the LA acquired jurisdiction over the case when CMI voluntarily submitted to his office's
jurisdiction by presenting evidence, advancing arguments in support of the legality of its acts,
and praying for reliefs on the merits of the case. The CA affirmed the ruling of NLRC.

Issue: Whether or not the LA acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling: YES. The labor tribunals had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the
case.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and decide
cases.
That the employment contract of Basso was replete with references to US laws, and that
it originated from and was returned to the US, do not automatically preclude our labor tribunals
from exercising jurisdiction to hear and try this case.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the person of Basso, notwithstanding his citizenship,
when he filed his complaint against CMI. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of CMI
was acquired through the coercive process of service of summons. We note that CMI never
denied that it was served with summons. CMI has, in fact, voluntarily appeared and participated
in the proceedings before the courts. Though a foreign corporation, CMI is licensed to do
business in the Philippines and has a local business address here. The purpose of the law in
requiring that foreign corporations doing business in the country be licensed to do so, is to
subject the foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of our courts.

BARANGAY MAYAMOT, ANTIPOLO CITY v. ANTIPOLO CITY

Facts: In 1984, Batas Pambansa Bilang 787 to 794 were passed creating eight (8) new
barangays in the then Municipality of Antipolo. Because of this measure, Antipolo became
composed of sixteen (16) barangays. Thus, in order to integrate the territorial jurisdiction of the
sixteen barangays into the map of Antipolo, the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo passed
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Resolution No. 97-80, commissioning the City Assessor to plot and delineate the territorial
boundaries of the sixteen (16) barangays pursuant to the Bureau of Lands Cadastral Survey No.
29-047 and the provisions of BP Blg. 787 to794.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo passed Resolution No. 97-89, however, Barangay Mayamot
filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of Resolution No. 97-89 and
Injunction against Antipolo City, before the RTC of Antipolo City.

Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

Ruling: No, jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and
decide cases. The nature of an action and its subject matter, as well as which court or agency of
the government has jurisdiction over the same, are determined by the material allegations of the
complaint in relation to the law involved and the character of the reliefs prayed for, whether or
not the complainant/plaintiff is entitled to any or all of such reliefs. The designation or caption is
not controlling more than the allegations in the complaint. It is not even an indispensable part of
the complaint. Also, jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
court.

FELIXBERTO CUBERO, NERISSA C. NATIVIDAD, JUDY U. LIM, MANUEL R. LAHOZ,

SOTERO DIOLA and BELLE CORPORATION, petitioners
vs.
LAGUNA WEST MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC., and ATTY. ABRAHAM
BERMUDEZ, respondents

G.R. No. 166833

December 5, 2006

FACTS: Petitioners are the registered owners of various parcels of land in Tanauan Batangas.
Petitioners entered into a Joint Venture Development Agreement with co-petitioner Belle Corp.
The project was then in full swing that the respondent filed an ex-parte petition with RTC of
Tanauan City claiming that it entered into separate Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with
petitioners predecessors-in-interest, also that the petition were filed to rectify the omission or
error and to protect its vested and valid rights. Petitioners then asserted that the JVA’s between
the respondent and individual predecessor-in-interest are void ab initio under management
contract prohibited under RA No. 6657 (CARL). RTC dismissed the complaint. MR denied
hence petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter?
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HELD: No. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, with exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. Original jurisdiction means jurisdiction to take cognizance of a cause at its
inception, try it and pass judgment upon the law and facts, while exclusive jurisdiction precludes
the idea of co-existence and refers to jurisdiction possessed to the exclusion of others.

G.R. No. 190004              August 8, 2017

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EUGENIO DALAUTA,

MENDOZA, J.:

Facts: Respondent Eugenio Dalauta (Dalauta) was the registered owner of an agricultural land
in Florida, Butuan City. The land was placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
under compulsory acquisition of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered P192,782.59 as compensation for the land,
but Dalauta rejected such valuation for being too low. The case was referred to the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) through the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of
Butuan City. A summary administrative proceeding was conducted to determine the appropriate
just compensation for the subject property. Dalauta filed a petition for determination of just
compensation with the RTC, sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC). He alleged that LBP's
valuation of the land was inconsistent with the rules and regulations prescribed in DAR
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 06, series of 1992, for determining the just compensation of
lands covered by CARP's compulsory acquisition scheme. The SAC ruled in favor of respondent.
The assailed decision was affirmed partially by the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court had properly taken jurisdiction over the case despite
the finality of the PARAD Resolution.

Ruling: Yes, the court had properly taken jurisdiction over the case.

Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. The courts,
as well as administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions, have their respective
15 | P a g e

jurisdiction as may be granted by law. In connection with the court’s jurisdiction of

administrative bodies, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction takes into play.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction states that courts cannot, and will not, resolve a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact. On the other hand, the SACs are the Regional Trial Courts expressly
granted by law with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination
of just compensation to landowners.

In agrarian reform cases, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR. However, the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative
officials the original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the SAC an appellate court for
the review of administrative decisions. The determination of just compensation is a judicial
function.

Begnaen vs. Sps. Caligtan

G.R. No. 189852. August 17, 2016
C. J. Sereno
Facts:
Petitioner, Thomas Begnaen, filed a Complaint with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
against respondents for “Land Dispute and Enforcement of Rights” before the RHO of the NCIP
it thereafter, issued an order dismissing the complaint based on the argument that the case should
have gone to the council of elders and not through the Brgy. Lupon as mandated by the IPRA.
However, instead of abiding by the Order of the RHO Begnaen filed against Sps. Caligtan a
complaint for forcible entry alleging, that, on two occasions, respondents — by using force,
intimidation, stealth, and threat — entered a portion of the subject property, hurriedly put up a
chicken wire fence, and started building a shack thereon without Begnaen’s knowledge and
consent. Respondents averred that they owned the area in question as part of the land.

MCTC dismissed the complaint. RTC reversed the decision, it reasoned that the
provisions of the IPRA pertaining to jurisdiction do not espouse exclusivity and thus cannot
divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases as provided
by B.P. Blg. 129. CA reversed the RTC ruling and stated that the passage of the IPRA has
divested regular courts of their jurisdiction when the parties involved are members of ICCs/IPs
and the disputed property forms part of their ancestral land/domain. MR was filed but it was
denied. Hence, this petition.
16 | P a g e

Issue: Whether or not the CA in upholding the jurisdiction of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) committed a reversible error.

Ruling:
No. The NCIP-RHO, being the agency that first took cognizance of petitioner-
appellant’s complaint, has jurisdiction over the same to the exclusion of the MCTC. To allow
the same complaint to be filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would
promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent who
would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or body where the same
complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead
their cause or defense.

While the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the
same subject matter, the Court have consistently upheld the settled rule that the body or agency
that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
others. It is a hornbook rule that jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not
lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.

De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corporation

G.R. No. 194751. November 26, 2014.
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This case originated from separate complaints for nullification of free patent and original
certificates of title, filed against several defendants. One of the defendants is petitioner Aurora
De Pedro (De Pedro). The complaints were filed by respondent Romasan Development
Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. Attempts to personally serve
summons on De Pedro failed. Respondent filed a motion to serve summons and the complaint by
publication. The RTC granted the motion and the summons and the complaint were published in
People’s Balita.

[RTC: Issued an order declaring as nullity the titles and free patents issued to all defendants in
respondent’s complaint, including the free patent issued to De Pedro.

De Pedro: Filed a motion for new trial; alleged that RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person because of improper and defective service of summons.

RTC: denied the MNT

CA: dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit, and affirmed the denial of De Pedro’s
motion for new trial.]

ISSUE:
17 | P a g e

Whether or not the trial court decision was void for failure of the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner Aurora N. De Pedro.

RULING:
The petition was denied by the Court. In this case, summons was served by publication. The
return shows no detail of the sheriff’s efforts to serve the summons personally upon petitioner.
The return did not show that the sheriff attempted to locate petitioner’s whereabouts. Failure to
state the facts and circumstances that rendered service of summons impossible renders service of
summons and the return ineffective. In that case, no substituted service or service by publication
can be valid.

The lack of any demonstration of effort on the part of the sheriff to serve the summons
personally upon petitioner is a deviation from this court’s previous rulings that personal service
is the preferred mode of service, and that the sheriff must narrate in his or her return the efforts
made to effect personal service. Thus, the sheriff’s return in this case was defective. No
substituted service or service by publication will be allowed based on such defective return.

The issuance of a judgment without proper service of summons is a violation of due process
rights. The judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional defect. The case would have been
dismissible had petitioner learned about the case while trial was pending. At that time, a
motion to dismiss would have been proper. After the trial, the case would have been the
proper subject of an action for annulment of judgment.

However, when petitioner erroneously filed her motion for new trial and petition for certiorari
instead of an action for annulment of judgment, she was deemed to have voluntarily participated
in the proceedings against her title. The actions and remedies she chose to avail bound her.
Petitioner’s failure to file an action for annulment of judgment at this time was fatal to her cause.
We cannot conclude now that she was denied due process.

Petitioner is already barred from filing a petition for annulment of judgment. An action for
annulment of judgment “may not be invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the
remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where
he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or negligence.”

Applying the above rules, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying
petitioner’s petition for annulment of the Regional Trial Court’s judgment. Petitioner had
already filed a motion for new trial and petition for certiorari invoking lack of jurisdiction
as ground.

Bureau of Customsv. Hon. Agnes Devanadera

G.R. No. 193253, 08 September 2015,
EN BANC (Peralta, J.)

FACTS:
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The Bureau of Customs (BOC) informed OILINK that it will be conducting a compliance
audit. UNIOIL Petroleum Philippines, Inc. (UNIOIL) request for permission to withdraw base
oils from OILINK’s temporarily closed terminal, citing its existing Agreement with OILINK for
the storage of UNIOIL’s aromatic process oil and industrial lubricating oils was granted.
A Warrant of Seizure and Detention to seal and padlock the oil tanks/depots of OILINK
located in Bataan. Despite said Warrant, UNIOIL was allowed to withdraw oil according to its
earlier request.
A complaint-affidavit was filed against OILINK and UNIOIL, esaccusing both
companies of unlawful importation and fraudulent practice against customs revenue. The State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the dismissal of the complaint-
affidavit for lack of probable cause.
The BOC filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the
petition outright due to procedural defects, namely: (a) it contained no explanation why service
thereof was not done personally; (b) it had no proper verification and certification against forum
shopping; and (c) docket and other lawful fees were not fully paid.Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case?

HELD:
No, it is the Court of Tax Appeals that has jurisdiction over this case. Although the
question of jurisdiction over the subject matter was not raised by either of the parties, the Court
deemed it proper to address such question before delving into the procedural and substantive
issues of the instant petition.
The CA's original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution in
a preliminary investigation involving tax and tariff offenses was necessarily transferred to the
CTA pursuant to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9282, and such petition shall be governed by Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, as amended.

Case Title: INOCENCIA TAGALOG v. MARIA LIM VDA. DE GONZALEZ

Facts:

Respondents Maria Lim Vda. de Gonzalez, et al., filed with the RTC Toledo City, Cebu,
a Complaint for Recovery of Possession against petitioner Inocencia Tagalog (Tagalog). In the
Complaint, they alleged that Tagalog occupied a portion of the land as lessee and paid rent on a
month to month basis by virtue of a verbal contract. Sometime before December 2002,
respondents notified Tagalog of their intention to use the land, and informed latter to vacate the
premises asserting that the verbal contract of lease was deemed terminated upon the expiration of
the monthly contract. However, Tagalog refused to vacate claiming that she was still a lessee.
19 | P a g e

Respondents alleged that Tagalog constructed aresidential house without their consent. Tagalog
alleged that the lease contract was still valid and subsisting and had never been terminated by the
parties. She added that she had not abandoned her possession over the land and has continuously
paid the rent on a month to month basis. As a defense, Tagalog prayed for the dismissal of the
case on the ground that the action was for ejectment and unlawful detainer which was beyond the
jurisdiction of the RTC.

In a Decision, the RTC decided the case in favor of respondents. Tagalog then filed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals, to which the CA dismissed the case.

Issue:

 Whether or not the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action

Ruling:

The jurisdiction of a particular court is determined by the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint.

Based on the allegations in respondents' complaint, it is clear that the case involves only
the issue of physical possession or unlawful detainer as defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. In De Leon v. CA, we held that unlawful detainer is the withholding by a person
from another of the possession of a land or building to which the latter is entitled after the
expiration or termination of the former's right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express
or implied. An ejectment suit is brought before the MTC to recover not possession de jure but
physical possession only or possession de facto, where dispossession has lasted for not more than
one year.

Jurisdiction is conferred by law and any judgment, order or resolution issued

without it is void and cannot be given any effect. Since respondents' complaint should have
been filed with the MTC, the RTC seriously erred in proceeding with the case. The
proceedings before a court without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void.

Ga Jr. v. Sps. Tubungan

G.R. No. 182185. September 18, 2009

FACTS:
20 | P a g e

Joaquin Ga filed a complaint for Recovery of Property and Ownership of a parcel of land.
The complaint is directed to Norberto Ga and file before the Commission on the Settlement of
Land Problems (COSLAP).

COSLAP rendered a decision favoring Joaquin Ga and heirs the rightful owner of the
contested lot. With the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the respondents sought a Petition
for Certiorari, Preliminary Injunction, Quieting of Title and Damages with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order with the RTC.

The RTC dismissed the case enunciating that it has no jurisdiction to negate a decision of
correlative body. This decision was assailed in a petition before the Court of Appeals which was
consequently granted for reasons that the petition was erroneously filed with the trial court,
where it must be filed with the Court of Appeals and COSLAP's jurisdiction is over land disputes
clothed with "public land" classification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision to set aside COSLAP's ruling.

HELD:

Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-
judicial agencies are appealable with the Court of Appeals, except for orders issued under the
Labor Code. This was the ruling in the case of Sy v. COSLAP.

The petition was not appropriately filed to appeal the decision of COSLAP.

Executive Order No. 561 which created COSLAP in 1979, specifically made mention of
the jurisdiction of the agency, to resolve land disputes of public domain between
occupants/squatters and public land claimants/government or applicants.

In National Housing Authority v. COSLAP, the court held that “a judgment rendered by a
body or tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is no judgment at all”.
Thus, the decision of COSLAP is ineffectual as the subject lot was not considered as part of the
public domain and had always been a private land.

G.R. No. 168973               August 24, 2011

CITY OF DUMAGUETE vs. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
21 | P a g e

Facts: On October 14, 1998, petitioner City of Dumaguete, through Mayor Felipe Antonio B.
Remollo (Remollo), filed before the RTC an Application for Original Registration of Title over a
parcel of land with improvements, located at Barangay Looc, City of Dumaguete (subject
property), under the Property Registration Decree. Petitioner alleged in support of its application:
that the applicant is the owner of the land subject of the petition; xxx that the land was acquired
by possessory title in open, continuous, adverse occupation and possession in the concept of
owner for more than thirty years since 1960.

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking the dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 on the
ground that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Respondent argued that
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, refers only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership. The subject property in LRC Case No. N-201 is not alienable and
disposable, since it is a foreshore land, as explicitly testified to by petitioner’s own witness,
Engr. Dorado. A foreshore land is not registerable.

The RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss of respondent, it having been shown
by petitioner’s own evidence that the lot subject of the application for original registration is a
foreshore land, and therefore not registerable (Dizon, et al. vs. Bayona, et al., 98 SCRA 942,
944), the application must be denied.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing LRC Case No. N-201 for lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling: The dismissal by the RTC of LRC Case No. N-201 for lack of jurisdiction is patently
erroneous.

Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature
of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the
allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

G.R. No. 171624               December 6, 2010

BF HOMES, INC. and the PHILIPPINE WATERWORKS AND CONSTRUCTION

CORP., Petitioners, 
22 | P a g e

vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS

Petitioners BF Homes and PWCC are owners and operators of waterworks systems delivering
water to over 12,000 households and commercial buildings in certain areas of Metro Manila
through their water pumps which use the electric power supplied by respondent MERALCO. In
the course of their respective operations, MERALCO disconnected supplies of electricity to
some of the petitioners’ pumps stations with threat of further cutting off supply to all the
remaining pump stations unless their arrears in electricity bill amounting to P4.7M is paid.
Petitioners requested MERALCO, that in view of the previous Supreme Court decision ordering
MERALCO to refund to all of its customers overcharged electricity bills to which MERALCO
owes petitioners refund of P11.8M, to just offset the arrears from the refund to which
MERALCO refused arguing that Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), the body tasked by the
Court to formulate the schedule and details of the refund pursuant to the Court decision has not
yet finalized the required mechanism to implement the refund.

With MERALCO’s denial, petitioner filed an action for damages against respondent with prayer
for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order to enjoin respondent
from cutting off the electricity supply to the remaining pump stations of the petitioners.
Respondent sought to dismiss the action of the petitioners alleging that RTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter which is clearly lodged with the ERC. After hearing, RTC granted the
Writ of Injunction prayed ruling that RTC has jurisdiction over the case holding that while
MERALCO has a right to collect from the petitioners such must succumb to the paramount
substantial and constitutional rights of the public to the usage and enjoyment of waters in their
community. Citing the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals declared that the
RTC is bereft of jurisdiction and has erred in issuing the Writ of Injuction. The CA agreed with
respondent that ERC has the exclusive and original jurisdiction over the controversy as can be
gleaned from Section 43(u) of Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the "Electric Power
Industry Reform Act," (RA 9136) and that the Injunction has given preferential treatment to the
petitioners in prejudice of other customers of the respondent equally entitled to the ordered
refund.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Court of Appeals ERRED in saying that the ERC under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction has the original and EXCLUSIVE jurisdiction over the case?

RULING

The Petition has no merit.

23 | P a g e

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. 21 Republic v.
Court of Appeals22also enunciated that only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and
administrative agencies. A careful review of the material allegations of BF Homes and PWCC in
their Petition before the RTC reveals that the very subject matter thereof is the off-setting of the
amount of refund they are supposed to receive from MERALCO against the electric bills they
are to pay to the same company. This is squarely within the primary jurisdiction of the ERC.

Presently, the ERC has original and exclusive jurisdiction under Rule 43(u) of the EPIRA over
all cases contesting rates, fees, fines, and penalties imposed by the ERC in the exercise of its
powers, functions and responsibilities, and over all cases involving disputes between and among
participants or players in the energy sector. Section 4(o) of the EPIRA Implementing Rules and
Regulation provides that the ERC "shall also be empowered to issue such other rules that are
essential in the discharge of its functions as in independent quasi-judicial body."

Administrative agencies, like the ERC, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as such, could
wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. In relation thereto is
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction involving matters that demand the special competence of
administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in nature. Courts cannot and
will not resolve a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal, especially when the question demands the sound exercise of administrative discretion
requiring special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact. The court cannot arrogate into itself the authority to
resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction of which is initially lodged with the administrative body of
special competence.27

Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the Petition of BF Homes and PWCC, then it was also
devoid of any authority to act on the application of BF Homes and PWCC for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction contained in the same Petition. The ancillary and provisional
remedy of preliminary injunction cannot exist except only as an incident of an independent
action or proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Regional Trial Court is
ORDERED to dismiss the Petition [With Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and for the Immediate Issuance of Restraining Order] of BF Homes, Inc. and
Philippine Waterworks and Construction Corporation.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
PILAR ESTIPULAR
(AQUIESCENCE OF THE COURT)

FACTS:
24 | P a g e

This case stemmed when Petitioner, Pilar Estipular, filed a Petition for Reconstitution before the
Regional Trial Court of La Union. The RTC ordered that a Notice of Hearing be published for
two successive issues of the Official Gazette and be posted at the main entrance of the Municipal
Building of Caba, La Union at least thirty (30) days from the initial hearing. The petitioner
complied and since the evidence is complete and there is no oppositor the RTC rendered decision
in favor of Estipular.

OSG appealed the case to CA, contending that the petitioner failed to post the notice of hearing
to the main entrance of the provincial building as required in 10 Republic Act No. 26 11 thus
the court did not acquire jurisdiction. The CA still affirmed to the RTC on the ground that
substantial compliance with the Law thus the court still acquired jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not supposed substantial compliance with the requirements of Republic Act No. 26 is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial court over the case.

RULING:

No.Requirements for Reconstitution of Title Are Mandatory and Jurisdictional.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by the Constitution
or by law. It cannot be (1) granted by the agreement of the parties; (2) acquired, waived, enlarged
or diminished by any act or omission of the parties; or (3) conferred by the acquiescence of the
courts. Republic Act No. 26 11 lays down the special requirements and procedure that must be
followed before jurisdiction may be acquired over a petition for reconstitution of title.

It is true, that the root of this failure may be traced when trial court failed to include a directive
that the Notice of Hearing be posted at the main entrance of the provincial building. However,
this oversight cannot excuse noncompliance with the requirements of RA No. 26. Under the
circumstances, it is clear that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because of
its own lapse, which respondent failed to cure.

DE JESUS VS GARCIA
GR No. L-26816
February 28, 1967
Sanchez, J.

FACTS: Petitioners and private respondent, Maxima de Jesus (Maxima), are co-owners of 6
parcels of land in Manila. Maxima, the named administratix, is authorized to receive the rentals
25 | P a g e

and, in turn, distribute the shares of her co-owners. The parcels of land were leased to Shell
Company which was allegedly instructed by the petitioners to pay the P3,500 monthly rentals
directly to them and not through Maxima. To prevent the petitioners to unjustly deprive her of
her compensation of 10% of the monthly rentals, Maxima filed a complaint before the City Court
of Manila to instruct Shell to pay the rentals directly to her. Public respondent Judge Garcia
issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Shell to deliver the P3,500 monthly rentals to
Maxima. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the City Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter. However, it was denied. Thus, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition directly before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the City Court of Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

RULING: NO. Petition granted.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law. It cannot
be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or
diminished by, any act or omission of the parties. Neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the
court. Congress cannot delegate its power to apportion the jurisdiction of the courts.

The averments of the complaint, taken as a whole, are what determine the nature of the
action, and therefore, the court’s jurisdiction. An action for specific performance of the
stipulation of a contract is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.

CRUZ, Erica D. Batch 1 No. 24 Arranza vs. BF Homes

Case Title: Arranza vs. BF Homes

G.R. No.: G.R. No. 131683

Date: June 19, 2000

Ponente: Davide, Jr. C.J.

Facts:

Respondent BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI) was placed under receivership when Banco Filipino
was ordered closed by the Central Bank. On July 1995, petitioners filed with the HLURB a class
suit “for and in behalf of the more than 7,000 homeowners in the subdivision against respondent
26 | P a g e

BFHI, BF Citiland Corporation, PWCC and AC Aguirre Management Corporation raising issues
on the basic needs of the homeowners.

In its answer, respondent BFHI claimed that petitioners were precluded from instituting
the instant action on account of Section 6(c) of PD No. 902-A providing for the suspension of all
actions for claims against a corporation under receivership.

HLURB: issued a TRO and subsequently granted petitioner’s prayer for preliminary injunction.

CA: Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition, contending that the
HLURB acted “completely without jurisdiction” as the subject matter is one exclusively with in
the jurisdiction of the SEC as respondent is under receivership. CA granted the petition and
ruled that petitioner’s action against respondent, which is under receivership, should be
suspended.

Issue: Which body has jurisdiction over petitioner’s claims, the HLURB or the Securities and
Exchange Commission?

RULING:

Housing and Land Use and Regulatory Board (HLURB) has jurisdiction over complaints
arising from contracts between subdivision development and lot buyer or those aimed at
compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause – the right to act in a case. It is
conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any court or tribunal. It is determined
by the averments of the complaint and not by the defense contained in the answer. Hence, the
jurisdictional issue involved here shall be determined upon an examination of the applicable laws
and the allegations of petitioner’s complaint before the HLURB.

In the case at bar, petitioner’s complaint is for specific performance to enforce their rights
as purchasers of subdivision lots as regards right of way, water, open spaces, road and perimeter
wall repairs and security. Indisputably then, the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint.
27 | P a g e

GERONIMO VS CALDERON

G.R. No. 201781

December 10, 2014

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Respondents spouses Estela and Rodolfo Calderon filed a verified complaint before the HLURB
Regional Office against Silverland Realty & Development Corporation, Silverland Village I
Homeowners Association, Silverland Alliance Christian Church (SACC), Joel Geronimo, Annie
Geronimo, Jonas Geronimo and Susan Geronimo, for specific performance and for the issuance
of cease and desist order and damages alleging that a building was erected beside the house of
Spouses Joel and Annie which when respondents were asked about the building, the respondents
told them that it was an extension house built by the son of Jonas and Susan Geronimo. When
the construction was finished, the building turned out to be the church of petitioner SACC which
was used for different religious activities. The noise allegedly affected respondents’ health and
caused inconvenience to respondents because they were forced to leave their house if they want
peace and tranquility. Petitioners averred that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over the case
which primarily involves abatement of nuisance, primarily lodged with the regular courts.

HLURB Arbiter rendered a decision and ordered petitioners not to use the property at #46
Silverlane Street for religious purposes and as a location of a church. First Division of the Board
of Commissioners of the HLURB denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the HLURB
Regional Office. CA ruled that cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots against the owner or developer of a subdivision
project fall under the jurisdiction of the HLURB.

ISSUE:

Whether HLURB has jurisdiction over the case

RULING:

Yes. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint as well
as by the character of the relief sought.
28 | P a g e

HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the
subdivision developer and the lot buyer, or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer
to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations tomake the subdivision a better place to
live in.

CABILING vs DANGCALAN
GR. 187696
June 15, 2016
SERENO, CJ.

FACTS:

Petitioner Filomena Cabling filed a complaint for recovery of possession against respondent
Roberto Dangcalan over an alleged encroachment on petitioner’s property before the MCTC.
Said court ruled in favor of Cabling and ordered Dangcalan to surrender the lot to the former.
Upon appeal, the RTC reversed the lower court’s decision on the ground of acquisitive
prescription, the complaint having been filed beyond the 10-year prescriptive period. The case
was elevated to the CA which annulled the decisions of both the MCTC and RTC for lack of
jurisdiction, the case being one of accion publiciana. Hence, this petition for review on Certiorari
before the SC.

ISSUE:

WON the CA erred in nullifying the RTC and MCTC’s decisions on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

RULING:

YES. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint, as well as by the character of the reliefs sought. Once it is vested by
the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction remains vested in the trial court irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
As the CA has correctly held, the allegations in the Complaint filed by petitioner sufficiently
made out a case for recovery of possession or accion publiciana. The same cannot be said,
however, of the ultimate outcome of her appeal from the RTC Decision. The MCTC correctly
exercised its exclusive and original jurisdiction in finding for petitioner as the plaintiff. On the
other hand, the appeal of respondent, as the defendant, properly fell under the appellate
jurisdiction of the RTC, under Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended. Hence, neither decision
can be struck down for being a total nullity.
29 | P a g e

BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. and PHILIPPINE BAPTIST S.B.C., INC.,
petitioners, vs. FAITH IN CHRIST JESUS BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. and REYNALDO
GALVAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 191527. August 22, 2016.

PERALTA, J.

FACTS:

Balibago Faith Baptist Church (BFBC) and Philippine Baptist S.B.C. (PBSBC) filed a
case for unlawful detainer against Faith in Christ Jesus Baptist Church (FCJBC) and Reynaldo
Galvan before the MTC of Angeles City. A contract of loan was entered into between PBSBC
and BFBC where the latter borrowed money from the former to enable it to purchase the subject
property. Thereafter, respondent BFBC took possession of the subject property and held therein
their religious activities.

While BFBC was still in possession of the subject property, Galvan and his companions
began attending BFBC’s religious activities at the subject property. BFBC alleged that Galvan
apparently was interested on the property because after some time Galvan formed and
incorporated FCJBC and took control of the subject property.

Galvan’s actuations came to the attention of the Luzon Convention of Southern Baptist
Churches, Inc. (LCSBC). Thus, in a Letter dated September 5, 2001, LCSBC upheld BFBC’s
right over the subject property and recognized BFBC’s pastor, Rev. Rolando T. Santos, as its
legitimate pastor.

However, FCJBC continued to occupy the subject property, thus, in a Demand Letter
dated September 4, 2002, BFBC demanded that FCJBC vacate the property within five (5) days
from notice and to pay the amount of P10,000.00 per month beginning October 2001 as
reasonable compensation for its use.

Due to noncompliance with its demand, on September 24, 2003, BFBC and PBSBC filed
a Complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against FCJBC and Galvan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the complaint must be dismissed.

RULING:

Yes. A perusal of the allegations in the complaint would show that it contradicts the
requirements for unlawful detainer. In an unlawful detainer action, the possession of the
30 | P a g e

defendant was originally legal and its possession was tolerated or permitted by the owner
through an express or implied contract. The allegations make it clear that FCJBC’s occupancy
was unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual or legal basis. There was also no
indication that BFBC tolerated FCJBC’s possession of the property.

The rule is that the allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action
and the jurisdiction of the court. The cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of
the complaint states, but what the allegations in the body of the complaint define and describe.
The designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint
themselves are, for it is not even an indispensable part of the complaint.

The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer or forcible
entry if the complaint filed was for unlawful detainer, or forcible entry, respectively. It cannot be
made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties, jurisdiction
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a
motion for reconsideration.

To vest the court of jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that
the complaint should embody such a statement of facts which brings the party clearly within the
class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in
nature. The complaint must show enough on its face the court’s jurisdiction without resort to
parol testimony.

The bare allegation of BFBC that “[i]t turned out that defendants have an interest in the
subject premises and defendant Reynaldo Galvan formed and incorporated the defendant
FCJBC and took control of the subject premises,” would not suffice since it only shows that
FCJBC entered the land and occupied the house thereon without BFBC and PBSBC’s consent or
permission which are constitutive of forcible entry. Unfortunately, BFBC and PB SBC’s failure
to allege when the dispossession took place and how it was effected leaves the complaint
wanting in jurisdictional ground.

Dela Cruz vs Court of Appeals and Melba Tan

GR No. 139442, December 6,2006

Third Division

Velasco, Jr., J:
31 | P a g e

FACTS:

Petitioner Lourdes Dela Cruz was one of the lessees of the Reyes family and had paid
rent over a portion of the lot for over 40 years. The Reyes family demanded petitioner to vacate
the lot but the latter did not comply, even after the receipt of written demand letters. On 1996,
the disputed lot was sold by the Reyeses to respondent Melba Tan who, on January 14, 1997,
sent a written demand to petitioner to relinquish said premises to which the latter ignored. On
September 8, 1997, Tan filed an ejectment complaint with damages before the Manila MeTC.
Petitioner argued that MeTC has no jurisdiction and that she was a rent-paying tenant protected
by PD 20.

The MeTC rendered a judgment in favor of Tan and ordered the petitioner to vacate the
premises. Unconvinced, petitioner appealed said decision and the RTC reversed the ruling on the
ground that the suit became an accion publiciana cognizable by RTC for being filed after the
one-year prescriptive period from the knowledge of intrusion to the lot. Respondent Tan
appealed the adverse decision to which the CA ruled in her favor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the MeTC has jurisdiction over the complaint.

HELD: Yes, the MeTC has jurisdiction over the complaint.

Jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the initiatory pleading and the defenses in the
answer are deemed irrelevant and immaterial in its determination. However, said rule is relaxed
upon the presence of special and unique circumstances. In Ignacio v. CFI of Bulacan, it was held
"that while the allegations in the complaint make out a case for forcible entry, where tenancy is
averred by way of defense and is proved to be the real issue, the case should be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction as the case should properly be filed with the then Court of Agrarian
Relations."

Based on the complaint and the answer, it is apparent that respondent’s ejectment
complaint is a complaint for unlawful detainer. The defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised in
the answer wherein there was an admission that petitioner Dela Cruz was a lessee of the former
owners of the lot prior to the sale to respondent.
32 | P a g e

JESUS VELASQUEZ, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES PATERNO C. CRUZ and ROSARIO

CRUZ, respondents.

G.R. No. 191479. September 21, 2015.

FIRST DIVISION

PEREZ, J.:

DOCTRINE:

A court does not lose its jurisdiction over a case by the simple expedient of a party
raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.

FACTS:

Respondents filed with the RTC of Malolos a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with
Accounting and Damages against petitioner Velasquez who, allegedly, without respondent’s
knowledge and consent and without paying any single centavo to the respondent as rent for the
use of the land from 1985 up to the time of the filing of the complaint, entered to respondent’s
farmland and refuse to vacate the said property.

In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, petitioner contended that he was identified as a
farmer-beneficiary and has since been paying amortizations to Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) and further contend that jurisdiction pertains to the DARAB because the instant
controversy is an agrarian dispute.

The RTC dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, resulting to the filing of a Petition
for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which found merit the petition and ruled that Vasquez
failed to establish tenancy relationship between the parties since the elements of consent and
sharing of harvest are lacking and that he was unqualified to be a successor-tenant by virtue of
hereditary succession because he is not among those listed under Section 9 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3844, he being only a relative by affinity. However, unknown to the court, the
33 | P a g e

petitioner became the registered owner of the subject land during the pendency of the petition
before the CA.

Petitioner filed a MR claiming absolute ownership over the disputed land by virtue of the
issuance of an emancipation patent in his favor and the corresponding registration of the same
With the Register of Deeds of Bulacan but it still stands futile.

ISSUE:

WON the RTC, not the DARAB, has the jurisdiction to hear and try the case.

RULING:

The RTC retains jurisdiction over the instant action for recovery of possession.

The jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter on the existence of the action is
determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. In the
case at bar, it is concluded that the case was for recovery of possession or an accion publiciana, a
plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper Regional
Trial Court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other
words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since
defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant's possession had become illegal, the
action will be an accion publiciana.

The averments of respondents' complaint establish the nature of the action which the
court has jurisdiction to determine, precisely, whether or not tenancy exist between the parties.
Jurisdiction pertains to the RTC where an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right
of possession of realty independently of title takes place.
34 | P a g e

CALIMLIM VS RAMIREZ, 118 SCRA 399

G.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982 

MODESTA CALIMLIM AND LAMBERTO MAGALI IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF DOMINGO MAGALI, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, BRANCH I, and FRANCISCO
RAMOS, respondents.

VASQUEZ, J.:

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed directly to the SC, which seeks to annul the
dismissal of Civil Case No. SCC-180.

Petitioners were owners of a parcel of land under TCT No. 9138 registered in their names. In
satisfaction of a previous final judgment against petitioners’ son, Manuel Magali, in an action for
sum of money filed by Independent Mercantile Corporation, said TCT No. 9138 was ordered
cancelled and was erroneously transferred to the name of said corporation under TCT No. 68568.
Consequently, Petitioners filed an action for cancellation of TCT No. 68568 before respondent
court, sitting as cadastral court with special and limited jurisdiction, docketed as LRC Record
No. 39492, but was dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioners opted not to appeal the decision and
filed a subsequent complaint anew before the same respondent court, sitting as court of general
jurisdiction, docketed as Civil Case No. SCC-180 praying for the cancellation of conveyances,
among others. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
Respondent court dismissed the case on the ground of estoppel by prior judgement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent court is correct in dismissing the case on the ground of
“estoppel by prior judgement”.

HELD:

No.

The respondent court sitting as a cadastral court with special and limited jurisdiction, has no
jurisdiction to determine issues of ownership, among others, which is the province of the court
35 | P a g e

sitting as court of general jurisdiction. Hence, the ruling in LRC Record No. 39492 did not
operate as an adjudication of the controversy that is the subject matter of Civil Case No. SCC-
180. In order to avail of the defense of res judicata,  it must be shown, among others, that the
judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If there is
lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order
cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. 

WHEREFORE, the Orders appealed from are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 

MILA G. PANGILINAN, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS 321 SCRA 51

RelatedTopic: Effect of estoppels on objection to jurisdiction

Facts: Mila Pangilinan was charged and convicted of the Crime of Estafa before the RTC, a
crime cognizable by MTC. He brought the case to Court of Appeal for new trial but the same
was denied. In her Petition for Review on Certiorari to the Supreme Court, she alleged that the
Decision of the trial court is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the crime charged.
Relying in the land mark case of Tijam vs. Sibanghanoy, the Office of the Solicitor General
contends that the appellant is barred from raising the issue of jurisdiction, estoppels having
already set in.

Issue: Whether or not Mila G. Pangilinan is barred for raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, having estoppels already set in?

Held: No. The Office of the Solicitor General's reliance on the said ruling (Tijam vs.
Sibanghanoy) is misplaced. The doctrine laid down in the Tijam case is an exception to and not
the general rule. Estoppel attached to the party assailing the jurisdiction of the court as it was the
same party who sought recourse in the said forum. In the case at bar, appellant cannot in anyway
be said to have invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Batch 2:

Case #1
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 205966, March 02, 2016
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner, v. FELICIANO P. LEGASPI,
Respondent. PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
36 | P a g e

Petitioner BSP filed a Complaint for annulment of title, revocation of certificate and
damages (with application for TRO/writ of preliminary injunction) against Secretary Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., Luningning G. De Leon, Engr. Ramon C. Angelo, Jr., Ex-Mayor Matilde A. Legaspi
and respondent Feliciano P. Legaspi before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. Herein respondent
Legaspi filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner BSP because the suit is unauthorized by petitioner BSP itself and that the
counsel representing petitioner BSP is not authorized and thus cannot bind the same petitioner.
Respondent Legaspi also alleged that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action because the complaint is prima facie void and that an illegal representation
produces no legal effect. In opposing the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner BSP argued that the
complaint was filed pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution No. 8865.

The RTC ruled that it had acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner when the
latter filed with the court the Complaint. Furthermore, the RTC adjudged that in suits involving
the BSP, the Monetary Board may authorize the Governor to represent it personally or through
counsel, even a private counsel, and the authority to represent the BSP may be delegated to any
other officer thereof.

Respondent Legaspi filed a motion for reconsideration, adding as its argument that the
RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the action because the complaint, a real action, failed to
allege the assessed value of the subject property. The RTC, in its Order, denied respondent
Legaspi's motion for reconsideration. Hence, respondent Legaspi elevated the case to the CA.
The CA, granted respondent Legaspi's petition. Petitioner BSP moved for reconsideration, but
the CA denied the same motion. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action as the complaint
failed to allege the assessed value of the subject property.

RULING:

YES.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, the RTC has
exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions which involve title to possession of real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). Petitioner BSP insists that the property involved has an
assessed value of more than P20,000.00, as shown in a Tax Declaration attached to the
complaint. Incidentally, the complaint, on its face, is devoid of any amount that would confer
jurisdiction over the RTC.

The non-inclusion on the face of the complaint of the amount of the property, however, is
not fatal because attached in the complaint is a tax declaration (Annex “N” in the complaint) of
the property in question showing that it has an assessed value of P215,320.00. It must be
emphasized that annexes to a complaint are deemed part of, and should be considered together
37 | P a g e

with the complaint. In Fluor Daniel, Inc.-Philippines v. E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd., 528
SCRA 321 (2007), this Court ruled that in determining the sufficiency of a cause of action, the
courts should also consider the attachments to the complaint, thus: We have ruled that a
complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency of cause of action if it appears clearly from
the complaint and its attachments that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. The converse is also true.
The complaint may be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is obvious from the complaint
and its annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. Hence, being an annex to BSP’s
complaint, the tax declaration showing the assessed value of the property is deemed a part of the
complaint and should be considered together with it in determining that the RTC has exclusive
original jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 dated March 13, 2013
of petitioner Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas is GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision dated
August 15, 2012 and Resolution dated February 18, 2013 of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Orders dated January 20, 2009 and April 3, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Malolos City, Bulacan, are AFFIRMED.

CITY OF LAPU-LAPU vs. PEZA

G.R. No. 184203
November 26, 2014
Leonen, J.

FACTS:

City of Lapu-Lapu demanded from the PEZA a payment for real property taxes from 1992 to
1998 on the PEZA’s properties located in the Mactan Economic Zone. PEZA filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC of Pasay City, praying that the trial court declare it exempt from
payment of real property taxes. The City insists that the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear the
PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief since the case involves real property located in the City of
Lapu-Lapu, hence the petition for declaratory relief should have been filed before the RTC of the
City of Lapu-Lapu and not to RTC of Pasay.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC of Pasay is the correct venue in the petition for declaratory
relief.

HELD:

The City of Lapu- Lapu is estopped in questioning the venue of the petition for
declaratory relief since it was not brought out at the earliest opportunity.
38 | P a g e

In this case, the City confused the concepts of jurisdiction and venue in contending that
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay had no jurisdiction because the real properties involved in this
case are located in the City of Lapu-Lapu.

Jurisdiction is “the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong.” Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law. Thus, an action may
be filed only with the court or tribunal where the Constitution or a statute says it can be brought.
On the other hand, venue is the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or
proceeding should be brought.” Venue is a matter of procedural law and must be brought at the
earliest opportunity.

DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. (DANGWA BUS COMPANY), and JAMES

G. GAYOT, petitioners, 
vs. HON. MALCOLM G. SARMIENTO, Judge, Court of First Instance of Pampanga, and
LAWRENCE HELLER, respondents.

SECOND DIVISION; ANTONIO, J.:; G.R. No. L-22795 January 31, 1977

Doctrine: The term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on personal means the place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from
"domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning.

Facts:

Private respondent, an American citizen residing in Pampanga and assigned in Clark Air Base, as
a consequence of the injuries sustained by him when his motorcycle was bumped by a bus of the
Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc., filed an action with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
against petitioners for damages. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
venue was improperly laid with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga under Section 1(c) of
Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, for private respondent, an American citizen, is not a
resident of Clark Air Base, Pampanga and is merely and temporarily assigned thereat. The RTC
ruled in favor of private respondent. Hence, this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Pampanga gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on
personal actions filed with courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent
39 | P a g e

or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.It is
fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs
for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules. It is likewise undeniable that
the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for
it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the permanent abode of a
person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. Respondent court
having found that private respondent Lawrence Heller had his actual residence at Clark Air Base,
Angeles (now a City), Pampanga, at the time he filed his personal action against the petitioners,
it did not, therefore, gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case. The Supreme
Court dismissed the petition.

Cohen vs. Benguet Commercial Inc

G.R. No. 10493 March 1, 1916
Ponente: Moreland, J.
Facts:

An action was brought by a foreign commercial partnership located and doing business in the
city of London, England, known as "Harris, Cohen & Sons." This company was not registered
under the Corporation Law and has no office in the Philippine Islands in or through which its
business is transacted. While the defendant is a domestic corporation located and doing business
in Baguio, Province of Benguet, with its main and indeed, its only office located at that place.

The action was one for the recovery of damages for breach of contract for the sale of
merchandise. Two summons were served on the defendant. In both the venue was laid in the city
of Manila. The first was served on the president of the defendant company in the city of Baguio.
The second summons was served on the defendant by delivering it to the president thereof in the
city of Manila. It appears by this service to have been the intention of the plaintiff to abandon the
previous service and to begin a new action.

Issue: Whether or not the venue was properly laid.

Held: Venue must be laid in the province where one of the parties resides. If the plaintiff is a
nonresident the venue must be laid in the province of the defendant’s residence. The venue can
be laid in the province where the defendant is found only when the defendant has no residence in
the Philippine Islands at the time the action is commenced.

Hence, residence of a domestic corporation is the place within the Philippines, is where its
principal office is located

Gochan vs. Gochan

40 | P a g e

G.R. No. 146089

December 13, 2001
Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for specific performance and
damages with the RTC of Cebu City. Respondents claimed that they are entitled to the
conveyance of properties located in Mabolo and Mactan, Cebu. Petitioners filed their answer
raising the issue lack of jurisdiction by the trial court for non-payment of the correct docket fees.
The motion for a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses of petitioners was denied. The
Court of Appeals denied the subsequent petition for certiorari holding that the complaint was one
for specific performance and incapable of pecuniary estimation. Petitioners, on the other hand,
contend that the complaint is in the nature of a real action which affects title to real properties;
hence, respondents should have alleged therein the value of the real properties which shall be the
basis for the assessment of the correct docket fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint was one for specific performance and incapable of
pecuniary estimation

RULING: NO.

Where a complaint is entitled as one for specific performance but nonetheless prays for the
issuance of a deed of sale for a parcel of land, its primary objective and nature is one to recover
the parcel of land itself and, thus, is deemed a real action. In such a case, the action must be filed
in the proper court where the property is located.

The caption of the complaint below was denominated as one for "specific performance and
damages." The relief sought, however, is the conveyance or transfer of real property, or
ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated
in the provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the case below was
actually a real action, affecting as it does title to or possession of real property.

GRANTED.

G.R. No. 182970, July 23, 2014

EMILIANO S. SAMSON, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOSE AND GUILLERMINA GABOR,

TANAY RURAL BANK, INC., AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MORONG,
RIZAL, Respondents.

PERALTA, J.

FACTS:

Respondent SPS. Jose and Guillermina Gabor are the registered owners of a parcel of
land, the latter executed a Deed of Assignment transferring square meters of the undivided said
41 | P a g e

portion of the parcel of land in favor of petitioner Emiliano S. Samson but petitioner Samson
then executed a Deed of Assignment transferring the same undivided portion in favor of Ma.
Remedios P. Ramos. Upon learning of the sale, respondent spouses filed an action for legal
redemption with the RTC of Tanay, Rizal.  Immediately thereafter, petitioner Samson and
Ramos executed an Agreement of Rescission revoking the transfer of the undivided portion. The
RTC dismissed the suit for legal redemption. But on appeal, it was reversed by the CA. During
the pendency of CA’s reversal,  petitioner Samson filed an action for Partition of Real Property
and Damages against  respondent spouses with the RTC of Morong, Rizal, which dismissed the
same on the ground that the finality effectively barred the action for partition.

On April 4, 2006, petitioner Samson filed a Complaint before the RTC of Pasig City for
Recovery of Property or its Value against respondent spouses, Tanay Rural Bank, Inc., and the
Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal, claiming that he had been paying his one-third (1/3) share
of realty taxes covering the subject portion of land for the years 2002 to 2004. The RTC of Pasig
City dismissed the complaint on the grounds of improper venue, res judicata, and that the
complaint states no cause of action. It held that the suit is a real action which should be filed in
the RTC of Morong, Rizal, where the property subject of the case is situated. It was likewise
dismissed on appeal by CA due to the issue at hand is one of question of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC Pasig is correct.

HELD: YES.

In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that the nature of an action is determined
by the allegations in the Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading. It is also a settled
rule that what determines the venue of a case is the primary objective for the filing of the case.

While the complaint of the petitioner was denominated as one for “Recovery of Property
or its Value,” all of his claims are actually anchored on his claim of ownership over the one-third
(1/3) portion of the subject property. In his complaint, petitioner sought the return of the portion
of the subject property or its value on the basis of his co-ownership thereof. Necessarily, his
alternative claim for the value of the property is still dependent on the determination of
ownership, which is an action affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest
therein. Clearly, petitioner’s claim is a real action which should have been filed in the court
where the property lies, which in this case, is the RTC of Morong, Rizal.

G.R. No. 175796               July 22, 2015

BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. vs. SPOUSES BENEDICTO & TERESITA
YUJUICO
42 | P a g e

Facts: On August 22, 1996, the City of Manila filed a complaint against the respondents for the
expropriation of five parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of
respondent Teresita Yujuico. Two of the parcels of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 261331 and TCT No. 261332, were previously mortgaged to Citytrust Banking
Corporation, the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, under a First Real Estate Mortgage
Contract. On June 30, 2000, the Regional Trial Court in Manila (Manila RTC) rendered its
judgment declaring the five parcels of land expropriated for public use. The judgment became
final and executory on January 28, 2001 and was entered in the book of entries of judgment on
March 23, 2001. The petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to Intervene in Execution with
Partial Opposition to Defendant’s Request to Release, but the RTC denied the motion for having
been “filed out of time.” Hence, the petitioner decided to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage
constituted on the two parcels of land subject of the respondents’ loan. After holding the public
auction, the sheriff awarded the two lots to the petitioner as the highest bidder at ₱10, 000,
000.00. Claiming a deficiency amounting to P18, 522155.42, the petitioner sued the respondents
to recover such deficiency in the Makati RTC (Civil Case No. 03-450). The respondents moved
to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, namely: that the suit was barred by res judicata; that
the complaint stated no cause of action; and that the plaintiffs claim had been waived,
abandoned, or extinguished. In the reply, respondents objected and alleged that the venue is
improper.

Issues:

 Whether or not improper venue as a ground for objection maybe raised at anytime.

Whether or not a claim for deficiency in an extrajudicial foreclosure is a real action.

Held: 

No. We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be
waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer.
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates that defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. As it relates to the
place of trial, indeed, venue is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than to restrict
their access to the courts. In other words, unless the defendant seasonably objects, any action
may be tried by a court despite its being the improper venue. 

No. It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. The
determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the Rules
of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real
action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an
action for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real
43 | P a g e

action. The real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over
the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why
the action is also referred to as a local action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other
actions as personal actions. Such actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal
property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for
the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. The venue of
a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the action is
considered a transitory one. 

Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency
after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does
not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION vs. ALBERT LIM, doing business under the
name and style "New H-R Grocery" G.R. No. 154338 October 5, 2007

FACTS:

On May 31, 1999, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 227, Quezon City, a
complaint against respondent for a sum of money.

On June 22, 1999, the trial court dismissed the complaint motu proprio on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and improper venue due to the case was misplaced with respect to jurisdiction and
venue. As there is not even a remote connection by the parties to Quezon City, where this
Regional Trial Court sits, the plaintiff corporation has principal office at Pasig City and the
defendant is, as provided in the complaint, from Laoag City.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and the trial court granted the motion and admitted
petitioner’s amended complaint.

For defendant’s failure to file an answer seasonably and upon motion of petitioner, the trial court
declared him in default and allowing petitioner to present its evidence ex parte. However, on
April 17, 2001, the trial court, still unsure whether venue was properly laid, issued an Order
directing petitioner to file a memorandum of authorities on whether it can file a complaint in
Quezon City and again issued an Order dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper
venue.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner then filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for review. But it was dismissed. Hence, this petition.
44 | P a g e

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court may dismiss motu proprio petitioner’s complaint on the ground of
improper venue?

HELD:

No. Sections 2 and 4, Rule 4 of the same Rules provide:

Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.

Sec. 4. When Rule not applicable. – This Rule shall not apply –

(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or

(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the
exclusive venue thereof.

Clearly, in personal actions, the plaintiff may commence an action either in the place of his or
her residence or the place where the defendant resides. However, the parties may agree to a
specific venue which could be in a place where neither of them resides.

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

MAUNLAD HOMES, INC.
G.R. No. 190071. August 15, 2012.
BRION, J.

FACTS:

Union Bank through a contract to sell entered into an agreement with the Maunlad Homes to sell
the Maunlad Shopping Mall located in Malolos City, Bulacan. It was stipulated that upon failure
of payment of the whole purchase price of the property, all payments made will be applied as
rentals for the use and possession of the land. Maunlad Homes eventually defaulted in payment
which resulted to an ejectment case filed against Maunlad Homes before the MeTC of Makati
City as stipulated in their contract to sell.

MeTC dismissed the ejectment complaint.

When the case was appealed to the RTC Branch in Makati, it affirmed the decision of MeTC
further noting that the venue of the action is improperly laid since the property which is the
45 | P a g e

subject matter of the case is located in Malolos City, Bulacan. The RTC gave emphasis on
section 1 rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the venue is improperly laid.

RULING:

NO, it is not.

While Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court states that ejectment actions shall be filed in “the
municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved x x x is
situated,” Section 4 of the same Rule provides that the rule shall not apply “where the parties
have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.”
Precisely, in this case, the parties provided for a different venue. Since the unlawful detainer
action is connected with the contract, Union Bank rightfully filed the complaint with the MeTC
of Makati City.

POLYTRADE CORP. vs. VICTORIANO BLANCO

GR no. L-27033, Oct. 31, 1969

Sanchez, J.:

Facts:

Plaintiff Polytrade Co., brought 4 causes of action to recover the purchase price of rawhide
against Defendant in the Court of first Instance of Bulacan. Plaintiff's main office is located in
Makati, while defendant is a resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Prior to the case, both parties
made a stipulation, a part thereof provides " that the parties agree to sue and be sued in the Court
of Manila." Defendant move to dismiss the cases on the ground of improper venue, invoking
Sec. 3, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which states that " venue may be stipulated by written
agreement." Defendant said that because of this covenant he can only be sued in the courts of
Manila. The Bulacan court overruled him, hence present case.

Issue:

Whether or not Venue is properly laid?

Ruling :
46 | P a g e

Yes, Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4 provides that Venue on personal action is triable by CFI's, and provides
that such "actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant resides or may be found or
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff." The Court
applied the said provision in the instant case, as a general rule, with regard to the claim of written
stipulation that defendant may only be sued in the courts of Manila, no such stipulation was
found in the first 2 causes of action, and is only found I I the 3rd and 4th causes of action.

In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, venue stipulation is merely permissive and not
exclusive which means that the stipulated venue is in addition to the venue provided for in the
Rules.

Dispositive portion

For the reason given, the appealed judgement is hereby affirmed, except that interest is granted,
in reference to the fourth cause of action, should start from March 24, 1965

Unimasters Conglomeration Inc. vs CA

G.R. No. 119657. February 7, 1997

Topic: Stipulations on Venue

Facts: Petitioner Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. and respondent Kubota Agri-Machinery

Philippines, Inc. entered into a "Dealership Agreement for Sales and Services" of the Kubota’s
products in Samar and Leyte Provinces. The contract contained, among others a stipulation
reading: ". . . All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed within the proper Courts of
Quezon City.” Years later, petitioner filed an action for damages in the RTC of Tacloban City
against Kubota. Kubota filed a motion praying for dismissal of the case on the ground of
improper venue. The court denied the motion. On petition for certiorari before the CA, the CA
reversed the trial court’s ruling and held that the stipulation respecting venue in its agreement did
in truth limit the venue of all suits arising thereunder only and exclusively to "the proper courts
of Quezon City.”

Issue: Whether or not the agreement on venue limited to the proper courts of Quezon City the
venue of any complaint filed arising from the said agreement.

Ruling: NO. Absent additional words and expressions definitely and unmistakably
denoting the parties' desire and intention that actions between them should be ventilated only at
the place selected by them, Quezon City — or other contractual provisions clearly evincing the
same desire and intention — the stipulation should be construed, not as confining suits between
the parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in Quezon City or
Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff.

ANITA MANGILA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

47 | P a g e

Facts: Sometime in January 1988, petitioner contracted the freight forwarding services of
private respondent for shipment of petitioner’s products, such as crabs, prawns and assorted
fishes, to Guam (USA) where petitioner maintains an outlet. Petitioner agreed to pay private
respondent cash on delivery. Private respondent’s invoice stipulates a charge of 18 percent
interest per annum on all overdue accounts. In case of suit, the same invoice stipulates attorney’s
fees equivalent to 25 percent of the amount due plus costs of suit. On the first shipment,
petitioner requested for seven days within which to pay private respondent. However, for the
next three shipments, March 17, 24 and 31, 1988, petitioner failed to pay private respondent
shipping charges amounting to P109, 376.95. Despite several demands, petitioner never paid
private respondent. Thus, on June 10, 1988, private respondent filed Civil Case No. 5875 before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for collection of sums of money. Petitioner filed her
Answer maintaining her contention that the venue was improperly laid. Petitioner assails the
filing of this case in the RTC of Pasay and points to a provision in private respondent’s invoice
which contains the following: "If court litigation becomes necessary to enforce collection, an
additional equivalent (sic) to 25% of the principal amount will be charged. The agreed venue for
such action is Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines."

Issue: WON the case is restrictive to be filed in Makati only.

Ruling: No, the Rules of Court provide that parties to an action may agree in writing on the
venue on which an action should be brought. However, a mere stipulation on the venue of an
action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be
able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. Thus, absent words that show the parties’
intention to restrict the filing of a suit in a particular place, courts will allow the filing of a case
in any venue, as long as jurisdictional requirements are followed. Venue stipulations in a
contract, while considered valid and enforceable, do not as a rule supersede the general rule set
forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words,
they should be considered merely as an agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to
the specified place. In the instant case, the stipulation does not limit the venue exclusively to
Makati. There are no qualifying or restrictive words in the invoice that would evince the
intention of the parties that Makati is the "only or exclusive" venue where the action could be
instituted. We therefore agree with private respondent that Makati is not the only venue where
this case could be filed.

PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. and JENS PETER

HENRICHSEN, Petitioners,
v.
KLAUS K. SCHONFELD, Respondent.

G.R. NO. 166920

February 19, 2007

FACTS: PaciCon Philippines, Inc. (PPI), petitioner is also a subsidiary of Pacific Consultants
International of Japan (PCIJ). Jens Peter Henrichsen, director of PCIJ, is based in Tokyo, Japan.
Schonfeld is employed by PCIJ through Henrichsen, His salary is to be paid partly by PPI and
48 | P a g e

PCIJ. Schonfeld however received a letter from Henrichsen informing him that his employment
has been terminated. Schonfeld then eventually filed money claims. PPI partially settled the
money claims but refused to pay the rest. This prompted Schonfeld to file a complaint for illegal
dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. PPI moved to dismiss and was granted. On appeal, the NLRC
affirmed the decision. On the issue of venue, while there was, indeed, an agreement that issues
between the parties were to be resolved in the London Court of Arbitration, the venue is not
exclusive, since there is no stipulation that the complaint cannot be filed in any other forum other
than in the Philippines. Hence, petition.

ISSUE: Whether the proper venue for the present complaint is the Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC and not the Court of Arbitration in London?

HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as
held by this Court in the vintage case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, is that
while they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule,
supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional
forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but rather permissive.
If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language
clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be
litigated only at the place named by them.

In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively in this court,"
"in no other court save —," "particularly," "nowhere else but/except —," or words of equal
import were stated in the contract. It cannot be said that the court of arbitration in London is an
exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of the employment contract.

G.R. No. 204444              January 14, 2015

Virgilio C. Briones vs. Court of Appeals

Perlas - Bernabe, J.:

Facts: Virgilio Briones filed a complaint before the RTC Manila, for nullity of contracts and
damages against Cash Asia, alleging that he is the owner of the subject property, and that his
sister informed him that his property had been foreclosed and a writ of possession had already
been issued in favor of Cash Asia. Briones claimed that he never contracted any loan from Cash
Asia, and assailed the validity of the contracts claiming to be his as forged.

Cash Asia filed a Motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. It pointed out the venue
stipulation in the subject contract that all legal action arising out in connection with Real Estate
49 | P a g e

Mortgage shall only be brought in or submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper court of Makati
City.

The RTC denied Cash Asia’s Motion to dismiss but on appeal, it was annulled by the Court of
Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in ordering the outright dismissal of
Briones’s complaint on the ground of improper venue.

Ruling: Yes, the CA gravely abused its discretion.

Rule 4 of the Rules of Court governs the rules on venue of civil actions, which stated that actions
affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried
in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated; while in venue of personal action, it may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found,
at the election of the plaintiff.

As an exception, the parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce another venue where
actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain
exclusive venue.

In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in nature,
considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of
Makati City. However, it must be emphasized that Briones’s complaint directly assails the
validity of the subject contracts, claiming forgery in their execution. Given this circumstance,
Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as his compliance
therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Hence, pursuant to the general
rules on venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a court in the City of Manila where
the subject property is located.

RP vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc.

G.R. No. 170281. January 18, 2008
J. Corona
Facts:
Republic filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila for civil forfeiture of assets against the
bank deposits maintained by Glasgow in Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. (CSBI). The RTC issued a
50 | P a g e

72-hour TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction followed. Meanwhile, summons to the
respondent was returned "unserved" as it could no longer be found at its last known address. RP
filed a verified omnibus motion for (a) issuance of alias summons and (b) leave of court to serve
summons by publication. For failure of the RP to serve the alias summons, the trial court
archived the case. Sometime in 2004, the trial court ordered the reinstatement of the case
directing the petitioner to serve the alias summons to the respondent within 15 days. A month
later, the petitioner received a copy of the sheriff's return stating that the alias summons was
returned "unserved". In 2005, the petitioner filed a manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve
its motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.

The TC dismissed the case. Hence, this petition, raising questions of law.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint for civil forfeiture was correctly dismissed based on
improper venue.

Ruling:
No. Glasgow never questioned the venue of the Republic’s complaint for civil forfeiture
against it. In Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court (reiterated in Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc.
v. Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City), the Court ruled:
“The motu proprio dismissal of
petitioner’s complaint by [the] trial
court on the ground of improper
venue is plain error….”

At any rate, the trial court was a proper venue. Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture:
“A petition for civil forfeiture shall
be filed in any regional trial court of
the judicial region where the
monetary instrument, property or
proceeds representing, involving or
relating to an unlawful activity or to
a money laundering offense are
located xxx”

In this case, RTC Manila, as one of the RTCs of the NCR Judicial Region was a proper
venue of the Republic’s complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgow’s account since the account
sought to be forfeited was in Pasig City, which is likewise situated within the NCR Judicial
Region.

The petition is granted.

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Tamano vs. Ortiz

G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998
BELLOSILLO, J.

FACTS:
Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent Haja Putri Zorayda
A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano
(Estrellita) in civil rites. After Tamano’s death, Zorayda filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous.

Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction alleging that since
Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and
try the instant case was vested in the shari’a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws.

[RTC: The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case was properly
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were married
in accordance with the Civil Code.

CA: The Court of Appeals ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction
of shari’a courts only when filed in places where there are shari’a courts. But in places where
there are no shari’a courts, like Quezon City, the instant case could properly be filed before the
Regional Trial Court.]

ISSUE:
Whether or not the shari’a court has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:
The RTC has jurisdiction over the case. Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and
marital relations. Personal actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the
plaintiff. In the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents
herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were married under
Muslim laws or P.D. No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that
she and Tamano were married under Muslim laws.

As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil
Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant
case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws,
the same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
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Siasoco vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 132753. February 15, 1999
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners offer the subject properties for sale to Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), but the parties
failed to agree on the terms of the purchase. In their letter, petitioners claimed that the INC had
not really accepted the offer, adding that, prior to their receipt of the reply they had already
“contracted” with Carissa Homes and Development & Properties, Inc. for the sale of the said
properties “due to the absence of any response to their offer from INC.”
INC filed a civil suit for specific performance and damages against petitioners and
Carissa Homes and Development & Properties, Inc. Petitioners filed therein a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of improper venue and lack of capacity to sue then Carissa Homes filed its answer
to the complaint. INC filed an Amended Complaint, dropping Carissa Homes as one of the
defendants and changing the nature of the case to a mere case for damages.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Strike Out Amended Complaint, contending that the
complaint cannot be amended without leave of court, since a responsive pleading has been filed.
An order denying petitioners’ Motion to Strike Out Amended Complaint was rendered by the
trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not admission of INC’s Amended Complaint was proper.

HELD:
It is clear that plaintiff (herein private respondent) can amend its complaint once, as a
matter of right, before a responsive pleading is filed. Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the
fact that Carissa had already filed its Answer did not bar private respondent from amending its
original Complaint once, as a matter of right, against herein petitioners. Indeed, where some but
not all the defendants have answered, plaintiffs may amend their Complaint once, as a matter of
right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering defendants, but not as to
claims asserted against the other defendants.
After a responsive pleading has been filed, an amendment may be rejected when the
defense is substantially altered since such amendment does not only prejudice the rights of the
defendant but also delays the action; Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should
53 | P a g e

be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice. In the present case, petitioners failed to prove that
they were prejudiced by private respondent’s Amended Complaint. True, Carissa had already
filed its own Answer. Petitioners, however, have not yet filed any.

Case Title: EMERGENCY LOAN PAWNSHOP, INC. V CA

FACTS:

Traders Royal Bank (TRB for brevity) sold in favor of petitioner Emergency Loan
Pawnshop Incorporated (ELPI for brevity) a parcel of land located at Baguio City. At the time of
the sale, TRB misrepresented to ELPI that the subject property was a vacant residential lot
valued at P600.00 to P800.00 per square meters, with a usable land area of 1,143.75 square
meters when it truth the subject property was dominantly a public road with only 140 square
meters usable area.

ELPI, after fully ascertaining the actual condition of the property, demanded from TRB the
rescission and cancellation of the sale of the property. TRB refused, and ELPI filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Davao, a complaint for annulment of sale and damages against the former.

TRB filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue to which the trial
court denied. TRB filed a motion for reconsideration and the trial court denied the motion.

TRB elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, where it promulgated that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying its motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of improper venue.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Regional Trial Court erred in not
dismissing the complaint for improper venue

RULING:

No. The general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is an
interlocutory order and, hence, cannot be appealed or questioned via a special civil action
of certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered.

In the case at bar, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred grievously
amounting to ousting itself of jurisdiction. The motion of respondent TRB was well founded
54 | P a g e

because venue was clearly improperly laid. The action in the Regional Trial Court was for
annulment of sale involving a parcel of land located at Baguio City. The venue of such
action is unquestionably within the territorial jurisdiction of the proper court where the
real property or part thereof lies. An action affecting title to real property, or for recovery
of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, shall be commenced and tried in the
proper court having jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part thereof
lies.

Hernandez vs Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc.

G.R. No. L-29791 January 10, 1978

FACTS:

Spouses Hernandez obtained from the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. a loan of P6,000,
payable in a year. The loan was secured by a mortgage on their two lots situated in Cubao,
Quezon City. About three months after that loan was obtained, the Lucena bank became a
distressed bank. It then received directives from the Central Bank which it construed as a
directive to suspend operations.

Before the expiration of the one year term of the loan, Hernandez offered to pay the loan
by means of a check which was drawn against the bank by a depositor, the San Pablo Colleges,
and which was payable to Hernandez. The payment was never consummated. Despite several
attempts, Hernandez’s check was refused, Lucena bank being no longer in a position to honor
withdrawals.

In the meantime, the Monetary Board had decided to liquidate the Lucena bank. A
petition was filed with CFI of Manila for assistance and supervision in the liquidation of the
Lucena bank.

Hernandez made a judicial deposit of the check with the CFI of Lipa City. He then filed
with the same court an action to compel the Rural Bank and Central Bank as liquidator to accept
the check and to execute the cancellation of the real estate mortgage. The lower court rendered
an amended decision ordering the Lucena bank or the Central Bank, as liquidator, to accept and
honor the check, to cancel the mortgage, and to pay the Hernandez spouses damages.

The Lucena bank, the Central Bank and its employee, the receiver, appealed to this Court.

The Central Bank contends that the trial court erred (1) in not holding that the venue was
improperly laid; (2) in not holding that it had no jurisdiction because the Hernandez spouses
55 | P a g e

should have ventilated their claim in the liquidation proceeding pending in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, instead of filing a separate action in the Court of First Instance at Lipa City.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the venue was properly laid.

HELD:

On the issue of venue, defendants-appellants contend that the action of the Hernandez
spouses to compel them to honor the check in question and to cancel the mortgage on their two
lots is a real action affecting title to real property which should have been filed in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City where the mortgaged lots are situated.

Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that "actions affecting title to, or for
recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real
property, shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof
lies".

Note that the rule mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage but does
not mention an action for the cancellation of a real mortgage.  In the instant case, the action is
primarily to compel the mortgagee to accept payment of the mortgage debt and to release the
mortgage.

That action, which is not expressly included in the enumeration found in section 2(a) of
Rule 4, does not involve the title to the mortgaged lots.  It is a personal action and not a real
action.  The mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage.  Plaintiffs' title is not in question.  They
are in possession of the mortgaged lots.

Hence, the venue of plaintiffs' personal action is the place where the defendant or any of
the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at
the election of the plaintiff (Sec. 2[b], Rule 4).

The plaintiffs in their brief confound a real action with an action in rem and a personal
action with an action in personam.  They argue that their action is not an action in rem and,
therefore, it could be brought in a place other than the place where the mortgaged lots are
located.

A real action is not the same as an action in rem and a personal action is not the same as
an action in personam.

In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the
enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages.  In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the
56 | P a g e

recovery of real property, or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action
affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation
of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on, real property.

An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability,

while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person (1 C. J. S.
943-4).  Hence, a real action may at the same time be an action in personam and not necessarily
an action in rem.

In this case, the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that they were residents of San
Juan, Batangas, which in their brief they characterize as their legal residence and which appears
to be their domicile of origin.

On the other hand, it is indicated in the promissory note and mortgage signed by them
and in the Torrens title covering the mortgaged lots that their residence is at 11 Chicago
Street, Cubao, Quezon City, which apparently is the place where the said lots are located.  The
plaintiffs did not testify during the trial.  So, they have no testimony in the record as to their
actual residence.

We hold that the trial court should have dismissed the action because the venue thereof
was improperly laid in Batangas.  The term "resides" in section 2[b] of Rule 4 refers to the place
of actual residence or the place of abode and not necessarily to the legal residence or domicile
(Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Sarmiento, L-22795, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 124,
128).  (Of course, the actual residence may also in some cases be the legal residence or
domicile.)

San Juan, Batangas might be the place where the plaintiffs have their domicile or legal
residence but there is no question that 11 Chicago Street, Cubao, Quezon City is their place of
abode or the place where they actually reside.  So, the action in this case, which is a personal
action to compel the defendants to honor the check in question and to cancel the mortgage,
should have been filed in Quezon City if the plaintiffs intended to use their residence as the basis
for their choice of venue.

G.R. No. 152808 September 30, 2005

ANTONIO T. CHUA vs. TOTAL OFFICE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (TOPROS),

INC.,

QUISUMBING, J.:
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Facts: On December 28, 1999, respondent TOPROS lodged a complaint for annulment of
contracts of loan and real estate mortgage against herein petitioner Antonio T. Chua before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. He contended that the
action filed by TOPROS affects title to or possession of the parcels of land subject of the real
estate mortgage. He argued that it should thus have been filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City where the encumbered real properties are located, instead of Pasig City where the
parties reside.

RTC denied the motion to dismiss. She reasoned that the action to annul the loan and mortgage
contracts is a personal action and thus, the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Pasig City
where the parties reside. The appellate court sustained the lower court’s finding that the instant
complaint for annulment of loan and real estate mortgage contracts is a personal action.

Issue: Whether or not an action to annul a contract of loan and its accessory real estate mortgage
is a personal action.

Ruling: Well-settled is the rule that an action to annul a contract of loan and its accessory
real estate mortgage is a personal action. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery
of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages. In contrast, in a
real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in Section 2 (a), Rule
4 of the then Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to real property or for
the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on,
real property.

G.R. No. 212472, January 11, 2018

SPECIFIED CONTRACTORS & DEVELOPMENT, INC., AND SPOUSES ARCHITECT

ENRIQUE O. OLONAN AND CECILIA R. OLONAN, Petitioners 
vs.
JOSE A. POBOCAN , Respondent

TIJAM, J.:

FACTS

Respondent was the President of the petitioner company until his retirement in March 2011.
Pobocan alleged that to entice him to stay with the company, sometime in 1994, Architect
Olonan, the chairman of petitioner company, allegedly orally agreed to give respondent one (1)
unit for every building the company were able to construct as part of respondent's compensation
58 | P a g e

package. Two building projects were then subjsequently completed namely Xavierville Square
Condominium in Quezon City and the Sunrise 1-foliday Mansion Bldg. I in Alfonso, Cavite.
Pursuant to the alleged oral agreement, SpeCified Contractors supposedly ceded, assigned and
transferred Unit 708 of Xavlerville Square Condominium and Unit 208 of Sunrise Holiday
Mansion Bldg. I (subject units) in favor of respondent.

In preparation for his retirement in 2011, respondent wrote a letter to Olonan requesting for the
execution of Deeds of Assignment or Deeds of Sale over the subject units in his favor, along
with various other benefits. The demand was unheeded hence the filing of the formal complaint
before RTC praying that petitioners be ordered to execute and deliver the appropriate deeds of
conveyance and to pay moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. Petitioners
interposed a Motion to Dismiss9 denying the existence of the alleged oral agreement arguing that
even if said agreement existed, same is unenforceable for being in violation of the statute of
frauds and that such action is barred by prescription. RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that
the action is in the nature of real action prescribing in 30 years which must be put in writing. On
appeal, CA reversed RTC reasoning that the dismissal of respondent's complaint, anchored on
the violation of the statute of frauds, is unwarranted since the rule applies only to executory and
not to completed or partially consummated contracts which is the case herein considering the
prior actual possession by the respondent of the condominium units in question. Hence this
appeal.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction instead of Labor Arbiter considering the claim arose
out of an employer-employee relationship?
2. Whether or not the respondent's cause of action had already Prescribed?

RULING

1. Yes, RTC has jurisdiction. What determines the nature of the action and which court has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.18 In his complaint, respondent claimed that petitioners promised to convey to him
the subject units to entice him to stay with their company. From this, respondent prayed
that petitioners be compelled to perform their part of the alleged oral agreement. The
objective of the suit is to compel petitioners to perform a specific act, specifically, to
execute written instruments pursuant to a previous oral contract. Notably, the respondent
does not claim ownership of, nor title to, the subject properties. Although the end result
of the respondent's claim was the transfer of the subject property to his name, the suit was
still essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because it sought Olonan’s
execution of a deed of absolute sale or assignment based on a contract which he had
previously made and well within the jurisdiction of the RTC being one that is not capable
of pecuniary estimation.
2. Yes. As the Court has ascertained that the present suit is essentially for specific
performance - a personal action - based upon an oral contract, Article 1145 providing a
prescriptive period of six years applies in this case instead. The shorter period provided
by law to institute an action based on an oral contract is due to the frailty of human
59 | P a g e

memory. Nothing prevented the parties from reducing the alleged oral agreement into
writing, stipulating the same in a contract of employment or partnership, or even
mentioning the same in an office memorandum early on.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' Decision and
Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. We sustain the dismissal of Civil Case but on the
ground that the action for specific performance had already prescribed.

PACIFIC REHOUSE CORP. VS NGO

FACTS:

This case stemmed when Pacific Rehouse Corporation (petitioner) filed a civil case for specific
performance and damages against Bautista. After the parties had filed their respective responsive
pleadings, the case was set for pre-trial. However, before the same could proceed, Bautista's
counsel filed a Manifestation and Notice of Death.

RTC directed Bautista's counsel to substitute the latter's heirs and/or representatives in the action
unfortunately, said counsel failed to comply due to lack of personal knowledge of the identities
of the heirs of Bautista and their respective residences. Petitioner manifested that it had located
Bautista's surviving spouse, Rosita Bautista, and as a result, was directed to amend the complaint
to implead her as such but they failed to comply. Thus, RTC held in abeyance the proceedings in
said case until petitioner procures the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate
of Bautista pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

CA- concluded that the dismissal of the complaint because it for is specific performance and
damages and it was an action in personam or action that was founded on a personal obligation, it
did not survive Bautista's death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA is correct in dismissing the case in view of Bautista's death.

RULING:

NO. In the instant case, although the CA correctly pointed out that the involves a complaint for
specific performance and damages, a closer perusal of petitioner's complaint reveals that it
actually prays for the delivery of ownership of the subject land through Bautista's execution of a
deed of sale and the turnover of TCT No. T-800 in its favor. In the case at bar, therefore, the
complaint filed with the trial court was in the nature of a real action, although ostensibly
denominated as one for specific performance.
60 | P a g e

Evidently, Civil Case No. 2031-08 is a real action affecting property and property rights over the
subject land. Therefore, the death of a party-litigant (Bautista) did not render the case dismissible
on such ground, but rather, calls for the proper application of Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court on substitution of party-litigants.

MUÑOZ VS YABUT
GR No. 142676
June 6, 2011
Leonardo-de Castro, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Munoz acquired the subject property from her sister, Emilia Ching, by virtue
of Deed of Absolute Sale. Later, in another Deed of Absolute Sale, Munoz purportedly sold back
to Emilia the property, and eventually, the latter sold the said property to spouses Go. Munoz
then filed a complaint against Emila for the annulment of deeds of absolute sale and the
cancellation of TCT in the spouses Go’s name. Meanwhile, spouses Go obtained a loan from BPI
Family Savings Bank, and to secure the same, they constituted a mortgage on the subject
property. When the spouses Go defaulted on the payment of their loan, BPI Family foreclosed
the mortgage. As the highest bidder, BPI Family executed in favor of the spouses Chan a Deed
of Absolute Sale covering the subject property. Consequently, a new TCT was issued in the
spouses Chan's names.

RTC: Annulled the deed of sale, and cancelled the TCT under spouses Go’s name.
CA: Affirmed the RTC’s decision

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC decision is binding on BPI Family and spouses Chan.

RULING: NO, petition denied.

The civil case is an action for reconveyance of real property. An action for declaration of
nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it
is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to
a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.

Since they were not impleaded as parties and given the opportunity to participate in the
said case, the final judgment in said case cannot bind BPI Family and the spouses Chan. No man
shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not
bound by any judgment rendered by the court.

CRUZ, Erica D. Batch 3 No. 24 Gomez vs. CA

61 | P a g e

Case Title: Gomez vs. CA

G.R. No.: G.R. No.127692

Date: March 10, 2004

Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.

Facts:

Petitioners, spouses Gomez, filed an action for specific performance and/or rescission in
the RTC-Cebu City against the heirs of Jesus J. Trocino, Sr. Summons was issued and served by
the Process Server who, in his return of service stated that the heirs Jacob, Jesus Jr., Adolfo,
Mariano, Consolacion, Alice, Racheal and Caridad Trocino were duly served with summons thru
Caridad at her address as evidenced by Caridad’s signature.

Defendant heirs filed their answer thru their counsel Bugarin, the answer was verified by
Caridad.

RTC: Rendered judgment in favor of petitioners.

CA: Respondents Adolfo and Mariano filed in the CA a Petition to Annul Judgment on the
ground that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons as they were not validly
served with summons and complaint. Adolfo resides in Ohio, USA while Mariano resides in
Bohol. The CA ruled in favor of Adolfo and Mariano.

Issue: Whether or not summons was effectively served on respondents.

Ruling:

No. To resolve whether there was valid service of summons on respondents, the nature of
the action filed against them must first be determined. As the Court explained in Asiavest
Limited vs. Court of Appeals it will be helpful to determine first whether the action is in
62 | P a g e

personam, in rem, or quasi in rem because the rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court of the Philippines apply according to the nature of the action.

In the present case, petitioners’ action for specific performance is an action in personam
because it is an action against persons on the basis of their personal liability. As such, personal
service of summons upon the defendants is essential in order for the court to acquire of
jurisdiction over their persons.

PANTALEON VS ASUNCION

105 Phil 761, 765

May 22, 1959

CONCEPCION, J.:

FACTS:

Vicenta Pantaleon instituted an action against Honorato Asuncion for recovery of a sum of
money. Summons was issued but was returned since according to reliable information, Asuncion
is residing in B-24 Tala Estate, Caloocan, Rizal. An alias summons was issued but such
summons was returned unserved since the Sheriff found out that Asuncion was no longer
residing in that address and despite diligent effort to locate him proved to no avail. Upon
Pantaleon’s motion, the court declared that Asuncion shall be summoned by publication. Having
failed to appear, the court declared him in default and rendered a decision against him. It was
only 46 days after rendition of the decision that Asuncion learned of the complaint as well as of
the adverse decision. Aggrieved, Asuncion filed a petition for relief alleging that he had not been
summoned or notified of the hearing, no copy of the summons and publication were sent since he
had not received any and his nonappearance is excusable it being due to the mistake of the
authorities.

ISSUE:

Whether the the court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant

63 | P a g e

RULING:

No. Summons by publication, as a general rule will not enable the court to acquire jurisidiction
over the person of the defendant.

It is a well-settled principle of Constitutional Law that, in an action strictly in personam, like the
one at bar, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot consistently with the due
process clause in the Bill of Rights confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendant.

CITIZENS SURETY & INSURANCE vs. JUDGE MELENCIO-HERRERA and

DACANAY
GR. L-32170
March 31, 1971
REYES, J.

FACTS:

Petitioners Citizens Surety & Insurance, at the request of respondent Dacanay, issued surety
bonds to Gregorio Fajardo and Manufacturer’s Bank to guarantee payment in the total amount of
P12,941.69 which was secured by a mortgage. Upon default of Dacanay, the property was
foreclosed. However, a deficiency in the proceeds of the sale prompted petitioner to file a
complaint against private respondent. At petitioner’s request, respondent Judge Melencio-
Herrera caused summons to be made by publication but Dacanay did not appear. Petitioner asked
that the private respondent be declared in default, but instead, the Judge asked it to show cause
why the action should not be dismissed. Respondent Judge ultimately dismissed the case, despite
the argument that the service of summons by publication was sufficient under Rule 14 Sec. 16 of
the Rules.

ISSUE:

WON the Judge erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant.

RULING:

NO. Summons by publication, as a general rule, will not enable the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant. The action of the plaintiff-petitioner, being in personam, the
Court could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a non-appearing defendant, absent a personal
service of summons within the forum. In other words, summons by publication cannot —
consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights — confer upon the court
jurisdiction over said defendants.
64 | P a g e

MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC., plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENE NIETO and HELEN GARCIA,
defendants-appellants.

No. L-54242. November 25, 1983.

RELOVA, J.

FACTS:

Nieto and Garcia bought from Magdalena Estate a parcel of land located at New Manila
Subdivision, Quezon City. Even if defendants had not fully paid the consideration for the said
lot, by special arrangement with the plaintiff, the former were able to have the title to said lot
transferred in their names. They had made partial payments only and the balance of their account
in the amount of P12,000.00 was secured by a promissory note which they executed on
November 3, 1960, under several terms and conditions. When the respondents defaulted in the
payment, plaintiff sent several demands, which were left unanswered and uncompiled with, and
so a case for sum of money was filed.

There was an ex-parte reception of evidence because the defendants-appellants had been
declared in default, plaintiff having complied with the court’s order allowing service of summons
and copy of the complaint upon the defendants-appellants through publication of the same in a
newspaper of general circulation (Daily Mirror), pursuant to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.

Plaintiff claims that summons could not be served personally upon the defendants
because they concealed themselves to avoid service upon them; and, that when the sheriff went
to the Jai-Alai Corporation of the Philippines at Cebu City where defendant-appellant Rene
Nieto holds office, as manager, he could not be found thereat but, when the decision was served
at the same address, the defendants-appellants were able to receive it. Subsequently, the court
rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff ordering the defendants to pay the said plaintiff.
Thus, the defendants appealed citing that jurisdiction was not acquired over their persons due to
improper service of summons.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants.

RULING:

No. In an action strictly in personam, like the one at bar, personal service of summons,
within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. In other words, summons
65 | P a g e

by publication cannot—consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights—confer
upon the court jurisdiction over said defendant.

The proper recourse for a creditor in the same situation as petitioner is to locate
properties, real or personal, of the resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause
them to be attached under Rule 57, Section 1(f), in which case, the attachment converts the
action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may then
accordingly be deemed valid and effective.

Sea-land Services, Inc. vs Court of Appeals, et al.

GR No. 126212, March 2, 2000

First Division

Ynares-Santiago, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent A.P. Moller/Maersk Line (AMML) entered into a
contract of vessel-sharing agreement. Pursuant to the same, respondent AMML loaded a cargo
on a vessel owned by the petitioner. However, due to alleged delay of the delivery thereof, the
consignee Florex Inc. refused to pay for the cargo and filed a complaint against AMML.
Respondent AMML filed its Answer alleging that it is petitioner who should be liable for such
delay.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause
of action and lack of jurisdiction. The lower court dismissed the Motion to Dismiss as well as the
Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed by petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
which the CA dismissed on the ground that the failure to state a cause of action may be remedied
by reference to its attachments.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct in not dismissing the case for failure to state a cause of
action.
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RULING: Yes, the CA did not err in reading the Complaint of Florex and respondent AMML’s
Answer together with the Third Party Complaint to determine whether a cause of action is
properly alleged.

In Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled
that in the determination of whether or not the complaint states a cause of action, the annexes
attached to the complaint may be considered, they being parts of the complaint.

Alberto vs Court of Appeals

GR No. 119088, June 30, 2000

First Division

Ynares-Santiago, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent spouses Epifanio and Cecilia Alano retained the legal services of petitioner
Atty. Zaldy Ruby S. Alberto to represent them before the SEC in an action against Natalia
Realty, Inc. The retainer agreement includes, among others, the payment on the basis of the
equivalent in kind of ten percent (10%) of whatever real estate may be awarded, and the sum of
P200,000.00. The said case was dismissed through settlement; hence, petitioner demanded the
payment of the fees but respondent spouses refused to pay despite repeated demands. This
prompted petitioner to file a complaint for collection of sum of money with damages.

The RTC ruled in petitioner’s favor and adjudged her to be entitled to 10% of the 35
hectares awarded to the spouses in the SEC case. Upon knowledge of a sudden sale by Natalia
Realty Inc. of 23 hectares of the subject lot to the spouses’ daughter Yolanda P. Alano, petitioner
filed an amended complaint to declare the deed null and void. The trial court dismissed the
complaint for insufficiency of cause of action. The CA affirmed said dismissal on the bases of
the rule that in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action,
only the averments of the complaint, and no other, are to be consulted because extraneous
matters are irrelevant.
67 | P a g e

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s amended complaint states a sufficient cause of action.

RULING: Yes, the petitioner’s amended complaint constitutes a sufficient cause of action.

The rule that in resolving an action based only on the averments in the complaint admits
exceptions, like in this case, as the annexed documents to the complaint may be considered
because they are part of the complaint. Strictly limiting the evaluation of the merits of the
complaint to its averments or allegations would be too constricting an interpretation of the rule.

A reading of the amended complaint plus the attached documents and pleadings show
that petitioner is entitled to relief, thus, it validly constitutes a sufficient cause of action due to
the prejudice against the petitioner.

Progressive Development Corp. vs CA, 301 SCRA 367

G.R. No. 123555 January 22, 1999

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC., petitioner, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and WESTIN SEAFOOD MARKET, INC. respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, seeking to annul the decision of the CA,
affirming the decision of the RTC, finding no litis pendencia and forum-shopping.

Respondent-lessee Westin Seafood Market, Inc. instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court an
action for forcible entry with damages against its Petitioner-Lessor. Subsequently, the
Respondent-Lessee filed a separate suit with the Regional Trial Court against the same lessor for
moral and exemplary damages plus actual and compensatory damages based on the same issues
and cause of action for forcible entry. Hence, Petitioner-lessee filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of litis pendencia and forum-shopping. RTC Denied. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA is correct?

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HELD:

No.

Sec. 1, par. (e), of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which states that the pendency of another action
between the same parties for the same cause is a ground for dismissal of an action. Res
adjudicata requires that there must be between the action sought to be dismissed and the other
action the following elements: (a) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same
interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two (2) preceding particulars should be
such that any judgment which may be rendered on the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration. Further, Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that a party
may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule,
if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the other or
others. A claim cannot be divided in such a way that a part of the amount of damages may be
recovered in one case and the rest, in another.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. 

CGR CORP vs Treyes GR No. 170916, April 27, 2007

Facts: CGR Corporation, owned by Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto, leased
several hectares of public land, mostly consisting of fishponds, in Negros Occidental. Ernesto L.
Treyes, Jr., with his men, forcibly entered the leased properties and barricaded the entrance to the
fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the road going to CRG Corporation‘s fishponds, and
harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings. CGR filed with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) in Sagay City separate complaints for Forcible Entry with Temporary Restraining Order
with Preliminary Injunction and Damages and reserved a separate civil action.

Issue: Whether a complainant in a forcible entry case can file an independent action for damages
arising after the act of dispossession had occurred.

Held: Yes. The Court held that the ―rents‖ or the ―reasonable compensation for the use of the
premises or the fair rental value of the property and attorney‘s fees may be recovered through a
separate action while the forcible entry case is pending

Batch 3:
69 | P a g e

Case #1

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21450             April 15, 1968
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO,
defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding company and
defendant-appellant. DIZON, J.:

FACTS:

On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 — the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog
commenced Civil Case in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover a sum of money. As prayed for in the complaint, a
writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same was soon
dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity
Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety.

After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the
Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The Surety filed a written opposition
upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the
Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment. The Court denied this motion on
the ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the satisfaction of
the judgment.

Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued
without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of
Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals.Not one of
the assignment of errors — it is obvious — raises the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither
directly nor indirectly. Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on
December 11, 1962, decided the case affirming the orders appealed from.

On January 8, 1963 — five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a
motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court
of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year. Two days later
the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees
action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the
sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as
the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-
70 | P a g e

matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs;
that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Upon
these premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to
dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court of Appeals required the appellees
to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, the Court resolved to set
aside its decision and certify the case to before this court.

ISSUE:

WON appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING:

NO.
The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively
by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case,
the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and
circumstances of the present case, a party may be barred by laches from invoking this plea for
the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active
participation of said party invoking the plea.

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.

It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00
only — an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with
the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the
date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very
authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case — which
shall forthwith be set forth — We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from
invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the
case with its active participation.

It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to
escape penalty. Upon this same principle is what we said in the three cases mentioned in the
resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963, supra, to the effect that we frown upon the
“undesirable practice” of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
71 | P a g e

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

Sps. ERORITA VS Sps. DUMLAO

G.r. No. 195477
January 25, 2016
Brion, J.

FACTS:

Spouses Dumlao are the registered owners of a parcel of land subject in this case which
was bought in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale since Sps. Erorita failed to redeem it. Sps.
Dumlao agreed to allow the petitioners to continue to operate their school on the property. Sps.
Dumalao alleged that Sps. Erorita agreed on the monthly rental but the latter failed. Sps. Dumalo
filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the RTC against the defendants

The RTC decided in favor of Sps. Dumlao and it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence this petition questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC since the complaint is patently show a
case for unlawful detainer.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

HELD:

No, MTC had jurisdiction over the case. The allegations in the complaint determine the
nature of an action and jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction does not depend on the
complaint’s caption. Nor is jurisdiction changed by the defences in the answer; otherwise, the
defendant may easily delay a case by raising other issues, then claim of lack of jurisdiction.

To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege its elements. Thus
although the case bears the caption “recovery of possession”, its allegations contain the
jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under Republic Act No. 7691, an action for
unlawful detainer is within the MTC’s exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the property’s
assessed value.

Norma Mangaliag and Narciso Solano, Petitioners, v. Hon. Edelwina Catubig-Pastoral,

Judge of the Regional Trial Court, 1st Judicial Region, San Carlos City, (Pangasinan),
Branch 56 and Apolinario Serquina, Jr., Respondents.

SECOND DIVISION; [G.R. NO. 143951 October 25, 2005]; AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

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Doctrine: Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint.

Facts:

Private respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioners
Norma Mangaliag and Narciso Solano due to a road accident that sideswiped their tricycle,
causing them injuries. Petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim denying that private
respondent has a cause of action against them. They attributed fault or negligence in the
vehicular accident on the tricycle driver who was allegedly driving without license. Also,
petitioners maintain that the court's jurisdiction should be based exclusively on the amount of
actual damages, excluding therefrom the amounts claimed as moral, exemplary, nominal
damages and attorney's fees as provided under Administrative Circular No. 09-94. The RTC
ruled in favor of the respondents. MR was filed but was denied. Raising clarification on the
interpretation of A.C 09-94, petitioners raised this case directly to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the amount of actual damages prayed for in the complaint provide the
sole test for determining the court's jurisdiction in an action for recovery of damages

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or
some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. In the present case, the allegations in the complaint
plainly show that private respondent seeks to recover not only his medical expenses, lost income
but also damages for physical suffering and mental anguish due to permanent facial deformity
from injuries sustained in the vehicular accident. Viewed as an action for quasi-delict, the present
case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219 (2), which provides for the payment of
moral damages in cases of quasi-delict causing physical injuries.If the rule were otherwise, or to
say that the court's jurisdiction in a case of quasi-delict causing physical injuries would only be
based on the claim for actual damages and the complaint is filed in the MTC, it can only award
moral damages in an amount within its jurisdictional limitations, a situation not intended by the
framers of the law.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

GUY vs. GACOTT

G.R. No. 206147
January 13, 2016
Mendoza J.

FACTS: Gacott filed a complaint for damages against Quantech Systems Corporation.
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Summons was served upon QSC and Medestomas, one of the latter's employee. After trial, the
RTC ruled in favor of Gacott. The decision became final. During the execution stage, Gacott
learned that QSC was not a corporation, but was in fact a general partnership. Gacott instructed
the sheriff to proceed with the attachment of one of the motor vehicles of Guy, the general
manager of QSC.

RTC: in favor of Gacott

CA: Dismissed Guy's appeal

ISSUE: Whether or not the court has acquired jurisdiction over QSC

RULING: YES.
The court acquires jurisdiction over the defendant either by the proper service of the summons,
or by his voluntary appearance in the action. Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, when the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association
organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, the service of summons
may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel. Such provision provides an exclusive enumeration of the persons
authorized to receive summons for juridical entities.

QSC was never shown to have been served with the summons through any of the enumerated
authorized persons to receive such. Service of summons upon persons other than those officers
enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of
summons.

Nevertheless, it is not disputed that QSC filed its Answer despite the defective summons. Thus,
jurisdiction over its person was acquired through voluntary appearance.

In the case of Guy, it is settled that a decision rendered on a complaint in a civil action or
proceeding does not bind or prejudice a person not impleaded therein, for no person shall be
adversely affected by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in which he is not a party.

GRANTED.

G.R. No. 128803. September 25, 1998

ASIAVEST LIMITED, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ANTONIO

HERAS, Respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.

FACTS:
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The Respondent was sued on the basis of his personal guarantee of the obligations of
Compania Hermanos de Navegacion S.A.. There is no writ of summons or copy of a statement of
claim of Petitioner Asiavest Limited was ever served in the office of the Navegante Shipping
Agency Limited and/or for Mr. Antonio Heras, and that no service of the writ of summons was
either served on the defendant at his residence. Thus, there is no record that a writ of summons
was served on the person of the defendant in Hong Kong, or that any such attempt at service was
made. Likewise, there is no record that a copy of the judgment of the High Court was furnished
or served on the defendant

ISSUE:

Whether or not jurisdiction over the person of Heras was obtained.

HELD: NO.

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for
the court to validly try and decide the case. An action in personam is an action against a person
on the basis of his personal liability. Also, in an action in personam  wherein the defendant is
a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal
service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person.

HERAS, who was also an absentee, should have been served with summons in the same
manner as a non-resident not found in Hong Kong. Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
providing for extraterritorial service will not apply because the suit against him was in personam.
Neither can we apply Section 18, which allows extraterritorial service on a resident defendant
who is temporarily absent from the country, because even if HERAS be considered as a resident
of Hong Kong, the undisputed fact remains that he left Hong Kong not only temporarily but for
good.

G.R. No. 161417             February 8, 2007

MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO vs. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK

Facts: Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco, Ernesto obtained
several loans from the respondent bank. As security for the payment of the said loans, Ernesto
executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank covering the parcel of land described in
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-14423. The real estate mortgages bore the signatures of
the spouses Biaco.
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When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans and written demand, however, proved
futile.

Respondent bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and
Teresa Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco
through Ernesto at his office (Export and Industry Bank) located at Jofelmor Bldg., Mortola
Street, Cagayan de Oro City. Ernesto received the summons but for unknown reasons, he failed
to file an answer. Hence, the spouses Biaco were declared in default upon motion of the
respondent bank.

The sheriff served a copy of the writ of execution to the spouses Biaco at their residence in #92
9th Street, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City. The writ of execution was personally received by
Ernesto.

Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision contending that extrinsic
fraud prevented her from participating in the judicial foreclosure proceedings. She moreover
asserted that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her
through her husband without any explanation as to why personal service could not be made.

Issue: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.

Held: No, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB undoubtedly vested
the trial court with jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi
in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that
the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

The Court explained, citing El Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca that foreclosure and

attachment proceedings are both actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the
(non-resident) defendant is not essential. Service of summons on a non-resident defendant who is
not found in the country is required, not for purposes of physically acquiring jurisdiction over his
person but simply in pursuance of the requirements of fair play, so that he may be informed of
the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property belonging to him or in
which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of a resident, and that he may
thereby be accorded an opportunity to defend in the action, should he be so minded.

EMILIO V. REYES vs. APOLONIO R. DIAZ G.R. No. L-48754 November 26, 1941

FACTS:

This case is certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the ground that the jurisdiction
of the trial court is in issue. The supposed questions of jurisdiction are, first, whether or not there
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is sufficient to show that the protestant has duly filed his certificate of candidacy, and second,
whether the trial court has or has no authority to pass upon the validity of the ballots adjudicated
to the protestant which have not been challenged by the protestee in his counter-protest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the said issues?

HELD:

Yes. Jurisdiction over the issues is the power of the court to try and decide the issues raised in
the pleadings of the parties (Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil.484).

It is well-settled rule that the institution of suffrage is of public, not private, interest, and the
court may examine all the ballots after the ballot boxes are opened in order to determine which
are legal and which are illegal, even though neither of the parties raised any question as to their
illegality.

EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff and appellee, vs. VICENTE PALANCA,

administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, defendant and appellant.
No. 11390. March 26, 1918

STREET, J

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca owns a real property in the Philippines but subsequently, after obtaining a loan
from the petitioners he went to China which appears to be his native country and there he died.
Due to the nonpayment of the loan, petitioner foreclosed the property of Engracio Palanca.
Publication was made pursuant to the court order. The court further directed its clerk to deposit
before the post office in a stamped envelope containing the summons and complaint directed to
the last known address of the defendant. Whether the clerk complied with this order does not
affirmatively appear. The case proceeded as usual and the non-appearance of the defendant
caused the case to be taken against him by default. Comes now the administrator of the estate,
Vicente Palanca, after 7 years from the confirmation of the sale. Here he argued that the order of
default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not jurisdiction over the res is properly acquired.

RULING:
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Yes, because the action of foreclosure of mortgage is by nature quasi in rem.

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made
appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however,
does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in
rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in
rem.

Here, the property itself is in fact the sole thing which is impleaded and is the responsible object
which is the subject of the exercise of judicial power. It follows that the jurisdiction of the court
in such case is based exclusively on the power which, under the law, it possesses over the
property; and any discussion relative to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant is entirely apart from the case. The jurisdiction of the court over the property,
considered as the exclusive object of such an action, is evidently based upon the following
conditions and considerations, namely: (1) that the property is located within the district; (2) that
the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the
mortgage; and (3) that the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the property into its
custody, if necessary, and exposes it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. An
obvious corollary is that no other relief can be granted in this proceeding than such as can be
enforced against the property.

BANCO DO BRASIL, petitioner,

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, and CESAR S. URBINO, SR.,
respondents.

G.R. Nos. 121576-78 June 16, 2000

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Facts:

Poro Point Shipping,a Panamanian Company, requested permission for its vessel M/V Star Ace,
which had engine trouble, to unload its cargo and to store it at the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA) compound in San Fernando, La Union while awaiting transhipment to Hongkong. The
request was approved by the Bureau of Customs. Despite the approval, the customs personnel
boarded the vessel when it docked on January 7, 1989, on suspicion that it was the hijacked M/V
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Silver Med owned by Med Line Philippines Co., and that its cargo would be smuggled into the
country. The district customs collector seized said vessel and its cargo pursuant to Section 2301,
Tariff and Customs Code. A notice of hearing of SFLU Seizure Identification No. 3-89 was
served on its consignee.

While seizure proceedings were ongoing, La Union was hit by three typhoons, and the vessel ran
aground and was abandoned. On June 8, 1989, its authorized representative, Frank Cadacio,
entered into salvage agreement with private respondent to secure and repair the vessel at the
agreed consideration of $1 million and "fifty percent (50%)

of the cargo after all expenses, cost and taxes."

To enforce its preferred salvor's lien, herein Private Respondent Duraproof Services filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing
the actions of Commissioner Mison and District Collector Sy. Also impleaded in the amended
complaint as respondents were PPA Representative Mangaoang and Med Line Philippines, Inc,
the petitioner bank and others. Which upon motion of respondent, some were declared in default
and was ordered to pay the respondent.

On April 10, 1991, petitioner Banco do Brasil filed, by special appearance, an Urgent Motion to
Vacate Judgement and to Dismiss Case on the ground that the February 18, 1991 Decision of the
trial court is void with respect to it for having been rendered without validly acquiring
jurisdiction over the person of Banco do Brasil (summon being served to the ambassador of
Brazil). Hence, present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the bank.

Ruling:

No,

In the instant case, private respondent's suit against petitioner is premised on petitioner's being
one of the claimants of the subject vessel M/V Star Ace. Thus, it can be said that private
respondent initially sought only to exclude petitioner from claiming interest over the subject
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vessel M/V Star Ace. However, private respondent testified during the presentation of evidence
that, for being a nuisance defendant, petitioner caused irreparable damage to private respondent
in the amount of $300,000.00. Therefore, while the action is in rem, by claiming damages, the
relief demanded went beyond the res and sought a relief totally alien to the action.

It must be stressed that any relief granted in rem or quasi in rem actions must be confined to the
res, and the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment against the defendant. Clearly, the
publication of summons effected by private respondent is invalid and ineffective for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, since by seeking to recover damages
from petitioner for the alleged commission of an injury to his person or property caused by
petitioner's being a nuisance defendant, private respondent's action became in personam. Bearing
in mind the in personam nature of the action, personal or, if not possible, substituted service of
summons on petitioner, and not extraterritorial service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction over
the person of petitioner and validly hold it liable to private respondent for damages. Thus, the
trial court had no jurisdiction to award damages amounting to $300,000.00 in favor of private
respondent and as against herein petitioner.

Dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the subject petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated July 19, 1993 and August 15, 1995, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
24669, 28387 and 29317 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they affect
petitioner Banco do Brasil. The Order dated May 20, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 8 in Civil Case No. 89-51451 is REINSTATED.

St. Martin Funeral Home vs NLRC

G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998

Topic: Concurrent Original Jurisdiction

Facts: Private respondent (Bienvenido Aricayos) filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioner (St. Martin) before the Labor Arbiter. The LA ruled in favor of petitioner and declared
that no Er-Ee relationship existed. On appeal to the NLRC, the ruling of the LA was reversed. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner, and the same was denied. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court is the proper mode of
judicial review with respect to the decisions of the NLRC.
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Ruling: NO.
The special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
All references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed
in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.

HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG vs. HON. ACHILLES MELICOR

Facts: On May 21, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint for "Recovery of Ownership and
Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages" against Bertuldo Hinog. They alleged that
they own a 1,399- square meter parcel of land situated in Bohol, and that they allowed Bertuldo
to use a portion of the said property for a period of ten years and construct thereon a small house
of light materials at a nominal annual rental of ₱100.00 only, considering the close relations of
the parties. However, after the expiration of the ten-year period, they demanded the return of the
occupied portion and removal of the house constructed thereon but Bertuldo refused and instead
claimed ownership of the entire property.

Immediately after dismissal of complaint by the RTC, petitioners immediately filed before the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition. They allege that the public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the case to be reinstated after private
respondents paid the docket fee deficiency since the trial court had earlier expunged the
complaint from the record and nullified all proceedings of the case and such ruling was not
contested by the private respondents.

Issue: WON the petitioner can directly file the abovementioned petition to the Supreme Court

Ruling: No, the petitioner cannot directly file the abovementioned petition to the Supreme
Court. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals.
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any
of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor
will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.

THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL, petitioner,

vs.
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THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL
OF MANILA, respondents.

G.R. No. 154599

January 21, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines
which pursuant to the Local Govt Code, constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-
urbanized cities, provincial chapters, Metro Manila chapter, and metropolitan political
subdivision chapters. Respondent City Council of Manila enacted an ordinance providing among
other things, for the election of representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of
Manila and setting the elections for both chapters 30 days after the barangay elections. Upon
being informed that the ordinance had been forwarded to Mayor Atienza for his approval, the
Liga sent him a letter requesting that said ordinance be vetoed considering that it encroached
upon or even assumed the functions of the Liga through legislation. However, Atienza still
approved and signed the ordinance, and issued an executive order for its implementation. This
prompted the Liga to file a petition for certiorari with the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not SC can take cognizance of the filed petition?

HELD: No. There is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. We have held that this
Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent with the Regional
Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases.

This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties

seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

G.R. No. 202664              November 20, 2015

Manuel Luis Gonzales and Francis Martin Gonzales vs. GJH Land, Inc

Perlas - Bernabe, J.:
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Facts: Petitioners filed a Complaint for Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Status Quo Order,
Temporary Restraining Orders, and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Damages against
respondents before the RTC of Muntinlupa City seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J. Land, Inc.'s
shares which they purportedly bought from S.J. Global, Inc.. Essentially, petitioners alleged that
the subscriptions for the said shares were already paid by them, but were nonetheless offered for
sale to the corporation's stockholders.

The case was raffled to Branch 276, which is not a Special Commercial Court.  Respondents
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, pointing
out that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute and should, thus, be heard by the designated
Special Commercial Court of Muntinlupa City. Branch 276 granted the motion to dismiss filed
by respondents.

Issue: whether or not Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City erred in dismissing the case for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Ruling: Yes, the Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City erred in dismissing the case for lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter

Applying the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test, the suit between the parties
is clearly rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship and pertains to the
enforcement of their correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the
internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation, hence, intra-corporate, which
should be heard by the designated Special Commercial Court as provided under A.M. No. 03-03-
03-SC in relation to Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799.

Nevertheless, the designation of a special court was merely intended as a procedural tool to
expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line with the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction.

Hence, the Order of RTC Muntinlupa Branch 276 dismissing the case is reversed and set aside.
The Executive Judge shall assign said case to Branch 256, the sole designated Special
Commercial Court in RTC of Muntinlupa City.

Russell vs. Vestil

G.R. No. 119347. March 17, 1999
J. Kapunan
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Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity and partition against respondents
before the RTC of Mandaue, alleging that the document, which is a declaration of heirs and deed
of confirmation of a previous oral agreement of partition, was false and perjurious. The
complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void.

Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the subject land is P5,000.00
which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MCTC. An Opposition to the motion was
filed saying that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one
which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Motion to Dismiss was granted. MR was filed,
alleging that the same is contrary to law because their action is not one for recovery of title to or
possession of the land but an action to annul a document or declare it null and void, hence, one
incapable of pecuniary estimation falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC but was denied.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the nature of the civil case.

Ruling:
Yes. An action incapable of pecuniary estimation is one whose principal purpose or
remedy sought is not to recover a certain sum of money. Further, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or the money claim is merely
incidental to the principal relief, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The main purpose of the petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the
document t in question. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is
just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document. It is
axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined
by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether
the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.

The petition is granted.

Barangay San Roque, Talisay, Cebu vs. Heirs of Francisco Pastor

G.R. No. 138896. June 20, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:
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Petitioner filed before the MTC a Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents. The
MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent
domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would
determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the
action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less
than P20,000.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over an expropriation suit.

RULING:
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property.

The subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter
that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. True, the value of the property to be expropriated is
estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for
it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is
determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.

Barangay Piapi vs. Talip

G.R. No. 138248. September 7, 2005
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS:
On August 28, 1998, Barangay Piapi, herein petitioners, filed with the RTC Branch 18,
Digos, Davao del Sur, a complaint for Reconveyance and Damages for a parcel of land
consisting of 3.2 hectares situated in Piapi, Davaol del Sur, in the name of Juan Jayag and has a
market value of P15,000. They alleged that they have openly possessed such land for thirty (30)
years in the concept of owner, and that respondent, Talip, fraudulently obtained from the said
Registry of Deeds a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) under his name. 

Instead of filing an answer, Talip moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the case considering that the assessed value of the land is only
₱6,030.00. Citing Section 33 (3) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, He maintains
that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur.

Petitioners alleged that jurisdiction is vested in the RTC as the total assessed value of the
property is P41,890.

The trial court issued an Order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners then filed an MR but was denied. Hence, petitioners directly filed with the SC the
85 | P a g e

instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the trial court’s Order dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that under Section 19 (1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended, the RTC has
jurisdiction over the complaint for reconveyance since it is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction.

HELD:
NO. Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs, like petitioners herein, is to obtain title
to real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value
of the property subject thereof. The nature of an action as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the
plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein.
Petitioners’ complaint is for reconveyance of a parcel of land. Considering that their
action involves the title to or interest in real property, they should have alleged therein its
assessed value. However, they only specified the market value or estimated value, which is
P15,000.00. Pursuant to the provision of Section 33 (3) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No.
7691, it is the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, not the RTC,
which has jurisdiction over the case.

Case Title: POLOMOLOK WATER DISTRICT v. POLOMOLOK GENERAL

CONSUMERS ASSOCIATION, INC., 

Facts:

Polomolok Water District (PWD), petitioner, is a government-owned and controlled

corporation engaged in producing and supplying potable water to the residents of the
Municipality of Polomolok, South Cotabato. Polomolok General Consumers Association, Inc.,
respondent, is a non-stock, non-profit corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws.

Petitioner passed PWD Resolution No. 94-023, S. 1994 imposing new and higher water rates
upon its customers. Respondent and its members opposed petitioner's Resolution, hence, filed an
administrative complaint with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) but dismissed the
complaint for having been filed out of time.

Respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato, a class suit for
declaration of nullity of PWD Resolution No. 94-023 along with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, alleging that the Resolution was passed without due
notice and hearing as required by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, as amended.
86 | P a g e

The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner from disconnecting the
water supply of respondent's members. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was
denied by the trial court. Thereupon, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The
Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and affirmed the trial court's
questioned Order. The Court of Appeals held that the issue before the trial court was the validity
of PWD Resolution No. 94-023, S. 1994 which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition was properly filed before the RTC

RULING:

Yes. It is well settled that jurisdiction of the court is determined on the basis of the
material allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief prayed for.

From respondent's allegations and relief prayed for in its complaint, the issue raised is whether
PWD Resolution No. 94-023, S. 1994 is valid. Respondent alleged that petitioner did not comply
with the requisites of notice, publication and public hearing. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not
err in holding that the subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation."

Sps. Saraza vs Francisco

G.R. No. 198718. November 27, 2013

FACTS:

The case stems from an amended complaint filed by William Francisco against Fernando
and Spouses Teodoro and Rosario Saraza (Spouses Saraza). The respondent alleged in his
complaint that on September 1, 1999, he and Fernando executed an Agreement that provided for
the latter’s sale of his 100-square meter share in a lot situated in Bangkal, Makati City, which at
that time was still registered in the name of one Emilia Serafico for a total consideration of
87 | P a g e

₱3,200,000.00. The amount of ₱1,200,000.00 was paid upon the Agreement’s execution, while
the balance of ₱2,000,000.00 was to be paid on installments to the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), to cover a loan of Spouses Saraza, Fernando’s parents, with the bank. A final deed of sale
conveying the property was to be executed by Fernando upon full payment of the PNB loan.

It was also agreed upon that should the parties fail for any reason to transfer the subject
property to the respondent’s name, Rosario and Fernando’s 136-sq m property covered by TCT
No. 156126 and encumbered to PNB to secure the loan that was to be paid by the respondent
shall be considered a collateral in favor of the respondent. Spouses Saraza signified their
conformity to the Agreement. The respondent was also allowed to take immediate possession of
the property covered by TCT No. 156126 through a contract of lease. The petitioners likewise
furnished PNB with an Authority, allowing the respondent to pay their obligations to the PNB, to
negotiate for a loan restructuring, to receive the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 156126
upon full payment of the loan secured by its mortgage, and to perform such other acts as may be
necessary in connection with the settlement of the loan.

When the remaining balance of the PNB loan reached ₱226,582.13, the respondent asked
for the petitioners’ issuance of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) that would authorize him to
receive from PNB the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 156126 upon full payment of the loan.
The petitioners denied the request. Upon inquiry from PNB, the respondent found out that the
petitioners had instead executed an Amended Authority, which provided that the owner’s copy of
TCT No. 156126 should be returned to the mortgagors upon full payment of the loan. Spouses
Saraza also caused the eviction of the respondent from the property covered by TCT No. 156126.
These prompted the respondent to institute the civil case for specific performance, sum of money
and damages with the RTC of Imus, Cavite on December 7, 2004.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC of Imus lacked jurisdiction over the case, as it involved an
adjudication of ownership of a property situated in Makati City.

HELD:

As to the issue of venue, the petitioners’ argument that the action should have been
instituted with the RTC of Makati City, and not the RTC of Imus, Cavite, is misplaced. Although
the end result of the respondent’s claim was the transfer of the subject property to his name, the
suit was still essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because it sought Fernando’s
execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract which he had previously made.

In Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, private respondent filed a case for specific performance
with damages before the RTC of Quezon City. It alleged that after it accepted the offer of
petitioners, they sold to a third person several parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal. The
Supreme Court sustained the trial court’s order allowing an amendment of the original
88 | P a g e

Complaint for specific performance with damages. Contrary to petitioners’ position that the RTC
of Quezon City had no jurisdiction over the case, as the subject lots were located in Montalban,
Rizal, the said RTC had jurisdiction over the original Complaint. The Court reiterated the rule
that a case for specific performance with damages is a personal action which may be filed in a
court where any of the parties reside.

Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the respondent’s
action. It provides that personal actions "may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff." Considering the respondent’s statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus,
Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper.

G.R. No. 208232               March 10, 2014

SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA vs. LINDO

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts: Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista) subdivided the subject property and sold it to several
vendees, herein respondents, via a notarized deed of absolute sale dated May 30, 1991.

On August 5, 1994, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents before the
RTC, Branch 32, Lupon, Davao Oriental, anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 141. Bautista died during the pendency of the case and was
substituted by petitioner Epifania G. Bautista (Epifania).

Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss dated February 4, 2013, alleging that the complaint failed
to state the value of the property sought to be recovered. They asserted that the total selling price
of all the properties is only sixteen thousand five hundred pesos (PhP 16,500), and the selling
price or market value of a property is always higher than its assessed value.

The RTC issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court found
that Bautista failed to allege in his complaint that the value of the subject property exceeds 20
thousand pesos. Furthermore, what was only stated therein was that the total and full refund of
the purchase price of the property is PhP 16,500. This omission was considered by the RTC as
fatal to the case considering that in real actions, jurisdictional amount is determinative of
whether it is the municipal trial court or the RTC that has jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: Whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession of real
property or any interest therein or one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
89 | P a g e

Ruling: The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil
action incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The facts are clear that Bautista sold to respondents his lots which were covered by a free patent.
While the deeds of sale do not explicitly contain the stipulation that the sale is subject to
repurchase by the applicant within a period of five (5) years from the date of conveyance
pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141, still, such legal provision is deemed integrated and made part of
the deed of sale as prescribed by law. It is basic that the law is deemed written into every
contract. Xxx Thus, it is a binding prestation in favor of Bautista which he may seek to enforce.
Xxx it is clear that his action is for specific performance, or if not strictly such action, then it is
akin or analogous to one of specific performance. Such being the case, his action for specific
performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.

G.R. No. 198426, September 02, 2015

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE PHILIPPINE

OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), Petitioner, v. PRINCIPALIA
MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL CONSULTANTS, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS

Principalia Management and Personnel Consultants, Inc. (Principalia), a recruitment agency, was
found by the POEA to have collected from complainant an excessive placement fee in violation
of POEA Rules and Regulations (POEA Rules), a serious offense which carries the penalty of
cancellation of license for the first offense. Accordingly, POEA ordered the cancellation of the
respondent’s license. Two days later, Principalia sought to stay the implementation of the POEA
Order by filing with the RTC a Complaint for Injunction with Application for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory
Injunction contending that the immediate cancellation of its license not only deprived it of due
process but also jeopardized the deployment of hundreds of overseas Filipino workers. That
same day, the Executive Judge of RTC issued a 72-hour TRO. In the meantime, Principalia
appealed the POEA Order with the Office of DOLE Secretary.

POEA filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss 12 based on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction,
failure to exhaust administrative remedies and forum-shopping invoking DOLE Secretary’s
jurisdiction over cases assailing POEA Orders which direct the cancellation of license of a
recruitment agency and for forum-shopping when respondent also later appealed the POEA
Order with the DOLE. RTC rejected POEA's arguments in its Motion to Dismiss. On appeal,
CA debunked the argument of the Republic that the injunction case is in reality an action for the
90 | P a g e

reversal of the POEA's order of cancellation of license over which the DOLE Secretary has
jurisdiction. It explained that contrary to the Republic's contention, the injunction case is only
meant to determine the legality or propriety of the immediate cancellation of Principalia's
license. This is pursuant to Principalia's claim that under the 2002 POEA Rules, it has the right to
be protected from an unwarranted immediate execution of a cancellation order. Thus, pursuant to
BP 129 which confers upon the RTC jurisdiction over actions for injunction, the trial court
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the injunction case.

ISSUE
1. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the injunction case?.
2. Whether or not respondent committed forum shopping?

RULING

1. YES.

In stressing that the RTC is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the injunction case, the Republic
avers that it is the POEA which has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all pre-
employment cases which are administrative in character involving or arising out of violations of
recruitment regulations, or violations of conditions for the issuance of license to recruit workers,
under Section 3(d) of Executive Order No. 24728 (EO 247) and as reiterated in Section 1, Rule I,
Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules.29 On the other hand, the remedy of an appeal/petition for
review of an Order issued by the POEA in the exercise of such exclusive jurisdiction is lodged
exclusively with the DOLE Secretary as provided under Section 1, Rule V, Part VI of the 2002
POEA Rules.30 Notably, however, nothing in EO 247 and the 2002 POEA Rules relied upon by
the Republic provides for the grant to a recruitment agency of an injunctive relief from the
immediate execution of penalties for serious offenses (e.g., cancellation to operate, suspension
of license for a maximum period of 12 months). Conversely, they do not deprive the courts of
the power to entertain injunction petitions to stay the execution of a POEA order imposing
such penalties.

The Court thus agrees with the CA in holding that the RTC can take cognizance of the injunction
complaint, which "is a suit which has for its purpose the enjoinment of the defendant, perpetually
or for a particular time, from the commission or continuance of a specific act, or his compulsion
to continue performance of a particular act."31 Actions for injunction and damages lie within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 1932 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by RA
7691.33cralawrednad

2. NO

What Principalia questioned before the DOLE Secretary was the merits of the case which
brought about the POEA's issuance of its order cancelling Principalia's license. Whereas before
the RTC, the relief sought by Principalia is limited to enjoining the POEA from immediately
enforcing such cancellation. Clearly, the reliefs sought by Principalia from the two fora were
different and this negates forum-shopping.37 Neither would the RTC, in resolving the injunction
suit, encroach upon the DOLE Secretary's authority since Principalia was not asking the said
91 | P a g e

court to prohibit the DOLE Secretary from resolving the appeal before it or for Principalia to be
allowed to continue operating its business regardless of the judgment in the appeal.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SPS. TRAYVILLA VS SEJAS

FACTS:

This case started when the SPS. TRAYVILLA instituted a civil case for specific performance
and damages against SEJAS. Later on, the spouses filed an amended complaint this time for
specific performance, reconveyance, and damages. However, the additional docket fees for the
moral damages prayed for in the Amended Complaint were not paid. Likewise, for the additional
causes of action, no docket fees were charged and paid.

Respondents moved for the dismissal of the case claiming lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter arguing that petitioners' case was not for specific performance but was in reality a real
action or one involving title to and possession of real property, in which case the value of the
property should be alleged in the complaint in order that the proper filing fee may be computed
and paid. RTC denied the motion, stating among others that petitioners' case is not a real action
but indeed one for specific performance and thus one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

CA reversed the decision of the RTC favoring the respondent that the RTC did not acquired
jurisdiction over the case. The consistent rule is that 'a case is deemed filed only upon payment
of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court,' and that jurisdiction over any
case is acquired only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and
jurisdictional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Caption of the Complaint should be the basis of determining Jurisdiction
(specific performance-incapable of pecuniary estimation) thus, the RTC has jurisdiction over the
case despite of non-payment of required fees.

RULING:
NO, the RTC erred in taking cognizance of the case despite private respondents' non-payment of
the correct docket fees which must be computed in accordance with Section 7(1), Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, as amended.

While petitioners' Amended Complaint was denominated as one mainly for specific
performance, they additionally prayed for reconveyance of the property, as well as the
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cancellation of TCT. In other words, petitioners' aim in filing Civil Case was to secure their
claimed ownership and title to the subject property, which qualifies their case as a real action.
Since it is a real action made so by the Amended Complaint later filed, petitioners should have
observed the requirement under A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC relative to declaring the fair market value
of the property which should be the basis for determining jurisdiction and the amount of docket
fees to be paid.

CRUZ, Erica D. Batch 2 No. 24 Sante vs. Claravall

Case Title: Sante vs. Claravall

G.R. No.: G.R. No.173195

Date: February 22, 2010

Ponente: Villarama, Jr., J.

Facts:

Private Respondent Kalashian filed before the RTC-Baguio City a complaint for
damages against petitioners Irene and Reynaldo Sante and prayed that petitioners be held liable
to pay moral damages in the amount of ₱300,000.00; ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
₱50,000.00 attorney’s fees; ₱20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of suit.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it was the MTCC and not the
RTC of Baguio, that had jurisdiction over the case. They argued that the amount of the claim for
moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount of ₱300,000.00, because the claim
for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total claim.

RTC: Denied the motion to dismiss and held that the total claim of respondent amounted to
₱420,000.00 which was above the jurisdictional amount for MTCCs outside Metro Manila.

CA: Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA.
Meanwhile respondent and her husband filed an Amended Complaint increasing the claim for
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moral damages to ₱1,000,000.00. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss which was denied.
Hence, petitioners again filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before CA, claiming that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of the complaint to
increase the amount of moral damages from ₱300,000.00 to ₱1,000,000.00. CA ruled in favor of
petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not RTC acquired jurisdiction of the case.

Ruling:

Yes. In cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the
causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of
the court.

Considering that the total amount of damages being claimed by respondent herein (moral
damages in the amount of P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00
attorney’s fees; P20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of suit) for the alleged shame and
injury suffered by reason of petitioners’ utterance while they were at a police station in
Pangasinan was P420,000.00, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pangasinan.

GOMEZ VS MONTALBAN

548 SCRA 693

March 14, 2008

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:

Ma. Lita Montalban obtained a loan from Elmer Gomez in the sum of ₱40,000 with a voluntary
proposal on her part to pay 15% interest per month. Upon receipt of the proceeds of the loan,
Montalban issued in favor of Gomez, as security, a postdated check in the sum of ₱46,000,
covering the ₱40,000 principal loan amount and ₱6,000 interest charges for one month. When
the check became due, respondent Montalban failed to pay the loan despite several demands.
94 | P a g e

Gomez filed a Complaint with the RTC for a sum of money, damages and payment of attorney's
fees against Montalban praying for the payment of ₱238,000, representing the principal loan and
interest charges, plus 25% of the amount to be awarded as attorney's fees, as well as the cost of
suit. Montalban contends that the RTC has no jurisdiction because the principal amount of the
loan is only P40,000.

ISSUE:

Whether RTC has jurisdiction of the case

RULING:

Yes. Since the interest on the loan is a primary and inseparable component of the cause of action,
not merely incidental thereto, and already determinable at the time of filing of the Complaint, it
must be included in the determination of which court has the jurisdiction over petitioner’s case.

In that loan agreement, respondent expressly agreed to pay the principal amount of the loan, plus
15% monthly interest. Consequently, petitioner is claiming and praying for in his Complaint the
total amount of ₱238,000.00, already inclusive of the interest on the loan which had accrued
from 1998. Using as basis the ₱238,000.00 amount being claimed by petitioner from respondent
for payment of the principal loan and interest, this Court finds that it is well within the
jurisdictional amount fixed by law for RTCs.

HEIRS OF CONCHA v. LUMOCSO

GR. 158121
December 12, 2007
PUNO, CJ.

FACTS:

Petitioners, all heirs of spouses Concha, filed three separate complaints for reconveyance and
annulment of title covering different lots against respondent spouses Lumocso before the RTC of
Dipolog City. In a motion to dismiss, the respondent claimed that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the case pursuant to BP 129, as amended by RA 7691, as in each case, the assessed values
are less than P20,000. Petitioners opposed, stating that an action for reconveyance is one
incapable of pecuniary estimation, therefore cognizable by the RTC. The RTC denied the motion
to dismiss, prompting the respondents to bring the case to the CA which reversed the lower
court’s ruling. Hence, this petition.
95 | P a g e

ISSUE:

WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the three complaints for reconveyance.

RULING:

NO. A case for reconveyance or cancellation of title or to quiet title over real property are actions
that fall under the classification of cases that involve “title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein.” Pursuant to BP 129, as amended by RA 7691, the RTC shall have
jurisdiction over such cases if the assessed value exceeds P20,000 outside Metro Manila or
P50,000 within Metro Manila. The three properties are valued at P1,030, P4,500, and P4,340.
Clearly, the jurisdiction is within the MTC.

JUDGE GITO: Before the amendment of BP 129, there is no distinction between real action and
action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Both actions are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
With the amendment of BP 129, there is now need to distinguish the two actions considering that
not all real actions are cognizable by the RTC. The assessed value of the real property has to be
determined in order to know which court has jurisdiction.

WILFREDO DE VERA, EUFEMIO DE VERA, ROMEO MAPANAO, JR., ROBERTO

VALDEZ, HIROHITO ALBERTO, APARICIO RAMIREZ, SR., ARMANDO DE VERA,
MARIO DE VERA, RAMIL DE VERA, EVER ALMOGELA ALDA, JUANITO RIBERAL,
represented by PACITA PASENA CONDE, ANACLETO PASCUA, ISIDRO RAMIREZ,
represented by MARIANO BAINA, SPOUSES TRUDENCIO RAMIREZ and ESTARLITA
HONRADA, ARNEL DE VERA, ISABELO MIRETTE, and ROLANDO DE VERA,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES EUGENIO SANTIAGO, SR., and ESPERANZA H. SANTIAGO,
SPOUSES RAMON CAMPOS and WARLITA SANTIAGO, SPOUSES ELIZABETH
SANTIAGO and ALARIO MARQUEZ, SPOUSES EFRAEM SANTIAGO and GLORIA
SANTIAGO, SPOUSES EUGENIO SANTIAGO, JR. and ALMA CAASI, JUPITER
SANTIAGO, and JON-JON CAMOS, respondents.

G.R. No. 179457. June 22, 2015.

PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
96 | P a g e

On February 14, 2000, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance of ownership or

possession with damages against respondents before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Bolinao, Pangasinan. Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of certain portions of a
subdivided land located at Barangay Patar, Bolinao, Pangasinan. Along with their predecessors-
in-interest, petitioners have allegedly been in actual and continuous possession and occupation of
their respective portions of the land since 1967, without disturbance from any third person. Later
on, however, they discovered that their respective lots covered by Lot 7303 were already covered
by Free Patent Titles in the names of respondents, except Eugenio Santiago, Sr., which were
acquired through manipulation, misrepresentation, fraud and deceit.

As part of their affirmative defenses, respondents alleged that the MTC has no
jurisdiction over the case. As the combined assessed value of the disputed land is more than
P20,000.00, the case is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section
19, paragraph 2 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (B.P. Blg. 129), known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. They also alleged that titles
over the land denominated as Lot No. 7303 has already acquired the status of indefeasibility as
they were issued as early as 1996, and they were also issued tax declarations over their titled
properties. They claimed to have acquired the land from Eugenio Santiago, Sr., as shown in the
Deeds of Sale which were all duly registered with the Register of Deeds, Alaminos, Pangasinan
in 1991 and 1992.  They noted that the only documents of petitioners are tax declarations which
were issued as “new” in 1990 without any proof of acquisition, hence, inferior to the Original
Certificate of Titles and Tax Declarations issued to respondents. By way of counterclaim,
respondents prayed for the award of attorney’s fees, appearance fees, litigation expenses, and
moral and exemplary damages. They also prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, and to be
declared lawful owners and possessors of the disputed land.

The MTC ruled in favor of the respondents. Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the
RTC, which reversed and set aside the MTC decision. The respondents appealed to the CA,
which annulled and set aside both the RTC and MTC decisions on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Wheteher or not CA erred in annulling the decision of the RTC for lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:

Yes. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by
the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or
body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of
the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought
97 | P a g e

are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also
remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some
of the claims asserted therein.

A careful perusal of the allegations in their complaint for reconveyance of ownership and
possession with damages, would show that petitioners failed to indicate the assessed value of the
subject real property. At any rate, based on the Tax Declarations14 attached to their complaint,
the disputed land located in Bolinao, Pangasinan, has a total assessed value of P54,370.00. In
line with the above quoted statutory provisions, therefore, the RTC has jurisdiction over
petitioners’ civil action involving title to a real property outside Metro Manila with a total
assessed value in excess of P20,000.00.

Thus, while the CA is correct in ruling that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case for
reconveyance and recovery of ownership and possession of a land with an assessed value over
P20,000.00, the same cannot be said of its ruling with respect to the RTC. Under Section 8, Rule
40 of the Rules of Court, if the MTC tried a case on the merits despite having no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, its decision may be reviewed on appeal by the RTC. Under Sec. 8, Rule
40:

If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction
thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to
the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.

Maslag vs Monzon, et al.

GR No. 174908, June 17, 2013

Second Division

Del Castillo, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Darma Maslag filed a complaint before the MTC of La Trinidad, Benguet for
reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of original certificate of title against
respondents Elizabeth Monzon (Monzon) and William Geston. Due to proven fraud, the MTC
ordered the reconveyance of the said property to Maslag. Monzon appealed the case to the RTC
(Acting Presiding Judge Fernando P. Cabato) which declared that the MTC was without
jurisdiction over the petitioner’s cause of action based on the supposition that the same is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Neither of the parties presented any additional evidence
98 | P a g e

before the new judge (Edgardo B. Diaz De Rivera, Jr.), which resulted to the reversal of the
judgment.

The petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. Respondent moved for its dismissal for being the
improper remedy and asserted that the proper mode of appeal is a Petition for Review because
the questioned resolution was issued by the RTC in its appellate jurisdiction. The CA dismissed
the appeal and held that the proper remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule 42 and not an
ordinary appeal. Petitioner sought reconsideration which the CA denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the appeal.

HELD: No. The CA was correct in dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner.

Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should
be filed with the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject
thereof.

As provided in the Complaint, the disputed property has an assessed value of ₱12,400
only. Such assessed value of the property is well within the jurisdiction of the MTC. In fine, the
RTC, thru Judge Cabato, erred in pronouncing that the MTC is divested of original and exclusive
jurisdiction. Court issuances cannot seize or appropriate jurisdiction. Thus, in fact and in law,
the RTC Resolution was in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Hence, the CA is correct in
holding that the proper mode of appeal should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 42.

HEIRS OF GENEROSO SEBE AURELIA CENSERO SEBE and LYDIA

SEBE, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF VERONICO SEVILLA and TECHNOLOGY AND
LIVELIHOOD RESOURCE CENTER, Respondents.

G.R. NO. 174497: October 12, 2009

SECOND DIVISION

ABAD, J.:
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DOCTRINE:

An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiff's cause of action is
based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive
control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same. Title is the "legal link between (1) a
person who owns property and (2) the property itself."

FACTS:

The Sebes filed with the RTC of Dipolog City a complaint against defendants for
Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of two lots, which had a
total assessed value of P9,910.00, plus damages, claiming that they owned the subject lots but,
through fraud, defendant Sevilla got them to sign documents conveying the lots to him. In his
Answer, Sevilla insisted that he bought the lots from the Sebes in a regular manner.

The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter considering
that the ultimate relief that the Sebes sought was the reconveyance of title and possession over
two lots that had a total assessed value of less than P20,000.00, to which, under the law,
jurisdiction shall be with the first level courts.

The Sebes filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out that the RTC mistakenly
classified their action as one involving title to or possession of real property when, in fact, it was
a case for the annulment of the documents and titles that defendant Sevilla got and since such an
action for annulment was incapable of pecuniary estimation, it squarely fell within the
jurisdiction of the RTC as provided in Section 19 of Batas Pambansa 129, as amended, but RTC
denied the Sebes's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
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WON the Sebes's action involving the two lots valued at less than P20,000.00 falls within
the jurisdiction of the RTC.

RULING:

No. Based on the pleadings, the ultimate issue is whether or not defendant Sevilla
defrauded the Sebes of their property by making them sign documents of conveyance rather than
just a deed of real mortgage to secure their debt to him. The present action is not about the
declaration of the nullity of the documents or the reconveyance to the Sebes of the certificates of
title covering the two lots. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of these parties is
the lawful owner of the subject lots, jurisdiction over which is determined by the assessed value
of such lots, which in this case is P9,910.00 and clearly does not exceed the jurisdictional
threshold value of P20,000.00 fixed by law. The other damages that the Sebes claim are merely
incidental to their main action and, therefore, are excluded in the computation of the
jurisdictional amount.

Petition is dismissed.

Geonzon Vde de Barrera vs. Heirs of Vicente Legaspi, 565 SCRA 192

G.R. NO. 174346 : September 12, 2008

FERNANDA GEONZON VDA. DE BARRERA AND JOHNNY OCO,

JR., Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF VICENTE LEGASPI, REPRESENTED BY PEDRO
LEGASPI, Respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Johnny Oco Jr., and several others, forced his way into respondents' irrigated
farmland. After dispossessing respondents of the property, Oco and company used a tractor to
destroy the planted crops, took possession of the land, and had since tended it.

Respondents thus filed on February 7, 1997 a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
Tangub City for Reconveyance of Possession with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and
Damages against petitioners. RTC granted. CA affirmed.
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ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction.

HELD:

No.

With the modifications introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, the jurisdiction of the first level
courts has been expanded to include jurisdiction over other real actions where the assessed value
does not exceed P20,000, P50,000 where the action is filed in Metro Manila. The first level
courts thus have exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accion
reivindicatoria where the assessed value of the real property does not exceed the aforestated
amounts.

Accordingly, the jurisdictional element is the assessed value of the property.

Assessed value is understood to be "the worth or value of property established by taxing
authorities on the basis of which the tax rate is applied. Commonly, however, it does not
represent the true or market value of the property”.

The subject land has an assessed value of P11,160 as reflected in the Tax Declaration. The bare
claim of respondents that it has a value of P50,000 thus fails. The case, therefore, falls within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. It was error then for the RTC to take
cognizance of the complaint based on the allegation that "the present estimated value of the land
is P50,000.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. 

Quinagoran vs CA 531 SCRA 104, 113-114

Facts: The heirs of Juan dela Cruz filed a complaint for recovery of a parcel of land with
damages before RTC of Cagayan against Quinagoran. Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss
claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case under R.A. No. 7691. He argued that
since the 346 sq m lot which he owns adjacent to the contested property has an assessed value of
P1,730, the assessed value of the lot under controversy would not be more than the said amount.
The complaint does not alleged that the assessed value of the land in question is more than
P20,000.00.

The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the action is accion publicciana
and therefore, its jurisdiction lies in the RTC, regardless of the value of the property. The CA
affirmed decision of the RTC.
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Issues: Whether the complaint must allege the assessed value of the property?

Held: Yes. In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the
assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine
which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is because the nature of the action and which
court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect
when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the
claims asserted therein.

Batch 4:

Case #1
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 120465 September 9, 1999
WILLIAM UY and RODEL ROXAS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROBERT BALAO and NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY, respondents. KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners William Uy and Rodel Roxas are agents authorized to sell eight parcels of
land by the owners thereof. By virtue of such authority, petitioners offered to sell the lands,
located in Tuba, Tadiangan, Benguet to respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) to be
utilized and developed as a housing project.

The NHA Board passed Resolution approving the acquisition of said lands, with an area
of 31.8231 hectares, pursuant to which the parties executed a series of Deeds of Absolute Sale
covering the subject lands. Of the eight parcels of land, however, only five were paid for by the
NHA because of the report 1 it received from the Land Geosciences Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that the remaining area is located at an active
landslide area and therefore, not suitable for development into a housing project.

The NHA issued another Resolution cancelling the sale over the three parcels of land.
The NHA, through this Resolution, it subsequently offered the amount of P1.225 million to the
landowners as daños perjuicios.

Petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Complaint for
Damages against NHA and its General Manager Robert Balao. The RTC rendered a decision
declaring the cancellation of the contract to be justified. The trial court nevertheless awarded
damages to plaintiffs, the same amount initially offered by NHA to petitioners as damages.
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Upon appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
and entered a new one dismissing the complaint. It held that since there was "sufficient
justifiable basis" in cancelling the sale, "it saw no reason" for the award of damages. The Court
of Appeals also noted that petitioners were mere attorneys-in-fact and, therefore, not the real
parties-in-interest in the action before the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed but
was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON petitioners are real parties-in-interest in the action for damages.

RULING:

NO.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. The real party-in-interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
“Interest,” within the meaning of the rule, means material interest, an interest in the issue and to
be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. Cases construing the real party-in-interest provision can be more easily
understood if it is borne in mind that the true meaning of real party-in-interest may be
summarized as follows: An action shall be prosecuted in the name of the party who, by the
substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced.

Petitioners are not parties to the contract of sale between their principals and NHA. They
are mere agents of the owners of the land subject of the sale. As agents, they only render some
service or do something in representation or on behalf of their principals. The rendering of such
service did not make them parties to the contracts of sale executed in behalf of the latter. Since a
contract may be violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, the real parties-in-
interest, either as plaintiff or defendant, in an action upon that contract must, generally, either be
parties to said contract.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

V-GENT INC. vs. MOPRNING TRAVEL AND TOURS

G.R. No. 186305
July 22, 2015
Brion, J.

FACTS:
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Petitioner filed a money claim against respondent for failure of the latter to refund the unused
plane tickets. Respondent questioned the personality of the petitioner to file a suit; they allege
that passengers, whose name appears in the tickets, are the real party-in-interest.

The MTC dismissed the case for lack of cause action but declared petitioner a real party-in-
interest citing Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. The METC decision was reversed by
RTC. RTC decision was reversed by Court of Appeals declaring the petitioner not a real part-in-
interest since they only acted as an agent of the passengers. Hence this petition

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is real party-in-interest

HELD:

No. Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party –in-
interest – the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. Section 3,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides the exception when an agent may sue or be sued without
joining the principal. However, such exception must be coupled with special power of attorney.

Here, no such power was given to petitioner. An agent’s authority to file suit cannot be
inferred from his authority to collect or receive payments; the grant of special powers cannot be
presumed from the grant of general powers.

Petition denied.

PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

and SIMEON POLICARPIO SHIPYARD AND SHIPBUILDING
COMPANY, Respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:; [G.R. No. 124658. December 15, 1999.]

Doctrine: When there is no identity of the subject matter, res judicata will not apply.

Facts:

Iluminada "Lumen" Policarpio, obtained a loan from Philippine Trust Company

(Philtrust, for short). As security for the loan, she executed a deed of mortgage to the bank over
some parcels of land. Upon failure of Lumen Policarpio to pay the loan when it fell due, Philtrust
initiated foreclosure proceedings before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila.
Philtrust purchased the properties at the auction sale. The sale was confirmed by the trial court
and that same year, the bank was able to consolidate ownership over the property. After almost
20 years, disputed in this case is the validity of foreclosure on one parcel of land, particularly the
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land where the ancestral house of the Policarpios where built. Petitioner invoked res judicata.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, ruled against the petitioner by holding that res judicata is
inapplicable in the case. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not res judicata is applicable in the case

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that while the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not
err in declaring that res judicata is applicable as to the complaint for damages based on the
improper implementation of the writ of possession involving TCT 24182 included in TCT
234088 because all the elements of res judicata are present, to wit: (a) the former judgment is
final; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it
was a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action; such is not the case for the land disputed
in this case.
With regard to the parcel of land covered by OCT-R-165 (the land disputed herein), however,
there is no showing, and there is nothing on the records, to indicate that it has ever been
mortgaged by the Policarpios or their successors in interest to petitioner Bank. Hence, res
judicata is not applicable as regards OCT-R-165 because there is no identity of the subject
matter.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

Sps. Laus vs. Optimum Security Services

G.R. No, 208343 Feb. 3, 2016
Ponente: Perlas-Bernarbe, J.
Facts:

Petitioners filed a complaint, denominated as one for "Damages with Application for a
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunctionagainst respondent, several
security guards employed by it. Petitioners alleged that on three (3) separate occasions they were
prevented by armed security guards working for respondent and TIPCO from entering the eight
(8) parcels of land in Mabalacat, Pampanga belonging to them. Respondents and Marivalles
countered that petitioners are not entitled to the TRO and WPI prayed for because they do not
own the subject properties.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. But CA reversed RTC’s decision and ruled the respondent was
not a real party in interest as it was merely contracted to secure the subject properties under the
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Security Service Contract, which had since lapsed without being renewed. In this relation, it
opined that the alleged real owners of the subject properties are the real parties in interest,
without whom there can be no final determination of the issues involved.

Issue: Whether or not CA’s decision is correct

Held: NO.

A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. If a suit is not brought in the name of or against
the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states
no cause of action.

Applying herein, respondent and the other defendants are real parties in interest. Clearly, they
stand to be directly injured by an adverse judgment. They are the parties against whom the
prayed for injunction is directed and are also alleged to be liable for the resultant damage.

PLASABAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 166519
March 31, 2009
NACHURA, J:

FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with damages against
respondents. Respondents interposed that the subject land was inherited by all the parties from
their common ancestor, Francisco Plasabas. After resting their case, respondents raised in their
memorandum the argument that the case should have been terminated at inception for
petitioners’ failure to implead indispensable parties, the other co-owners. The trial court, without
ruling on the merits, dismissed the case without prejudice
CA: Affirmed

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the case is proper

RULING: NO.
The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal
of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be
added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party
despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
plaintiff’s/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.

GRANTED.
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G.R. No. 174909, January 20, 2016

MARCELINO M. FLORETE, JR., MARIA ELENA F. MUYCO AND RAUL A.

MUYCO, Petitioners, v. ROGELIO M. FLORETE, IMELDA C. FLORETE, DIAMEL
CORPORATION, ROGELIO C. FLORETE JR., AND MARGARET RUTH C.
FLORETE, Respondents. 

G.R. NO. 177275

ROGELIO M. FLORETE SR., Petitioner, v. MARCELINO M. FLORETE, JR., MARIA

ELENA F. MUYCO AND RAUL A. MUYCO, Respondents.

LEONEN, J.

FACTS:

This resolves consolidated cases involving a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

Issuances, Transfers and Sale of Shares in People's Broadcasting Service, Inc. and All Posterior
Subscriptions and Increases thereto with Damages. The Complaint did not implead as parties the
concerned corporation, some of the transferees, transferors and other parties involved in the
assailed transactions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the inclusion of the Corporation is jurisdictional in this case.

HELD: YES.

Any decision rendered by a court without first obtaining the required jurisdiction over
indispensable parties is null and void for want of jurisdiction. An indispensable party is defined
as one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication
cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest.

Here, being a derivative suit, not only is the corporation an indispensible party, but it is
also the present rule that it must be served with process. The reason given is that the judgment
must be made binding upon the corporation in order that the corporation may get the benefit of
the suit and may not bring a subsequent suit against the same defendants for the same cause of
action. In other words the corporation must be joined as party because it is its cause of action that
is being litigated and because judgment must be a res judicata against it. The failure to implead
the corporation in issue as indispensable party amounts to judgment rendered void for lack of
jurisdiction. 

G.R. No. 168539               March 25, 2014

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HENRY T. GO

Facts: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution  of the
Third Division  of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information
filed against herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019
(R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Herein respondent was indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was
likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because
he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.

Thus, in Information, respondent was charged before the Sandiganbayan.

Respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him on the ground that the
operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

It appears that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-
conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the SB granted the Motion to Quash and the
Information filed was ordered quashed and dismissed.

Issue: whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Held: Yes, Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919,
he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for
Consolidation in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that
private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with
jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in
filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.

Thus, it has been held that:

When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant
of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court
he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the
merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person.

FELICIDAD GARCIA DE LARA vs. JOSE GONZALEZ DE LA RAMA, ET AL G.R. No.

1111 May 16, 1903
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FACTS:

The suit filed was an action for the partition of a tract of land, being the undivided half of the
hacienda de Angono, situated in the Province of Rizal, and which the plaintiff and defendants in
the suit has inherited from their deceased father, Don Eugenio Gonzalez de Lara.

Eugenio Gonzalez de Lara had acquired this undivided half interest by purchase from Doña
Dominga Santa Ana.

The court refused to partition the land because the tract sought to be partitioned was itself an
undivided interest, the other being owned by the parties the names of whom are not disclosed in
the record.

The court declined to make the partition on the ground that the demarcation and boundaries of
the land sought to be partitioned had not been set forth in the partition, and by reason of the
interest which is sought to be partitioned being an undivided interest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court’s act of declining to partition the property is valid?

HELD:

Yes. In an action for partition of land, all co-owners are indispensable parties.

All persons interested in the land sought to be partitioned must be made a party to the suit. If the
land sought to be partitioned was an undivided interest held by the father of the plaintiffs and
defendants, in order to comply with the requirements of statute those who were interested in the
other half interest should have been made parties to the suit.

This is not according to the requirements of the Code, but the very nature of a partition suit
renders it necessary; otherwise the proceedings in the suit may become wholly ineffectual.

MIGUEL CARAM and FERMIN G. CARAM, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and ROSARIO MONTILLA, respondents.
No. L-7820. April 30, 1957

BENGZON, J.

FACTS:

Petitioners wanted to repurchase the property sold to Rosario Montilla by their sisters Elena and
Salud. Here, Salud transacted to Rosario for the purchase of a portion of lot she inherited from
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her parents, before the partition, as embodied in exhibits P and Q of the case. However, Rosario
and Salud annulled their previous agreement and replaced the contract after the extra-judicial
partition was agreed upon by all the heirs of the Spouses Caram. The Caram brothers argued
that the partition was null and void because they had affixed their signature thereto without
having been previously informed of the executed sales contracts by their co-heir Salud.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the partition is null and void by the aforementioned reason.

RULING:

No, the partition cannot be considered as null and void.

The court clearly stated that annulment of the partition cannot be decreed unless the other heirs,
namely Magdalena, Elena and Salud Caram are made parties defendant herein—which they are
not. Since the case was only between Montilla and the two Caram brothers, the court ruled that it
is improper to seek the nullity of the partition made without the involvement of all co-heirs or
co-owners of the property. In a case of partition all of them are deemed as indispensable parties.

GR No. L-7830 April 30, 1955

JOSE MANZA, recursive,

vs.
HONORABLE VICENTE SANTIAGO and OTHER appeals.
PAUL, J .:

Facts:

On September 9, 1950, Quirina Rios and Benito Uy filed a lawsuit against Juan Manza, brother
of the Complainant, to collect a plot of land described in said lawsuit, case No. 5130 of the Court
of First Instance of Quezon. The Honorable Judge appealed the judgment declaring the plaintiffs
exclusive owners of the land described in the lawsuit and ordered the defendant Juan Manza to
evict him and pay the plaintiffs the sum of P350 and costs.

On April 9 of the same year, Jose Manza, filed a motion asking that he be allowed to intervene,
alledging that since 1934 he was the owner of the land described in said lawsuit. The request for
intervention was dismissed.

In his order of May 5, 1954, the Judge ordered the sheriff to execute the execution order against
anyone who was in possession of the land in question and who would deliver it to the plaintiffs,
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without prejudice to any action that Jose Manza wanted to bring against the plaintiffs, and
acquitted Juan and Jose Manza of the contempt.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court acted in grave abuse of discretion in executing the land of the
complainant, considering that he was not allowed to intervene.

Ruling:

Yes, there is no doubt that the Honorable Judge appealed exceeded his jurisdiction by ordering
the sheriff on his order of May 5 to cut the land to Jose Manza, who claims to own it since 1934.
The launch of Jose Manza of the land it is a true deprivation of his property without due process
of law, because when he wanted to intervene in civil case No. 5130,he was denied and now
deprived of the possession and ownership of said land through the sheriff.

If Juan Manza owns the land and Jose Manza is a simple tenant, the decision against Juan would
affect Jose because his right derives from that of Juan,but Jose is the owner of the land or, at
least, he claims to own it and that Juan is his sharecropper; therefore, it is not privy of Juan. The
sentence against this does not harm Jose.

Dispositive portion:

The order of May 5 of the Judge appealed is declared void as soon as the launch by the Quezon
sheriff of Jose Manza of the land occupied by him. Quirina Rios and Benito Uy will pay the
costs.

Cagatao vs Almonte
GR No. 174004 October 9,2013

Topic: Indispensable Party

Facts: Petitioner Virgilio Cagatao filed an action for annulment of deeds of sale, cancellation of
title and damages against respondents Almonte, Aguilar, Spouses Fernandez and the Fernandez
Siblings before the RTC. During the course of the proceeding, it appeared that the transfer
certificate of title in the name of spouses Fernandez was derived from a reconstituted title of one
Emmaculada Carlos. Hence, petitioner likewise assailed the validity of the title of Carlos over
the land in question. His entire petition revolves around the assertion that the said reconstituted
112 | P a g e

title in the name of Carlos was a fake and should be declared void. However, Cagatao’s original
complaint before the RTC was for the cancellation of title in the name of the Fernandez Siblings
and the nullification of the deeds of sale between the Fernandez Siblings and Spouses Fernandez,
and the earlier one between the latter and Almonte and Aguilar.

Issue: Whether or not Carlos is an indispensable party.

Ruling: YES.
Carlos, as the registered owner of the lot whose title Cagatao seeks to nullify, should
have been impleaded as an indispensable party. Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure defines indispensable parties to be "parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action." It is clear in this case that Cagatao failed to include
Carlos in his action for the annulment of title.
Basic is the rule in procedural law that no man can be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger and strangers to a case cannot be bound by a judgment rendered by the
court.

SANTIAGO LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Norberto J. Quisumbing brought an action against the Philippine National Bank to
enforce an alleged right to redeem certain real properties foreclosed by the Philippine National
Bank. Quisumbing brought the suit as assignee of the mortgagor, Komatsu Industries (Phils.),
Incorporated. On November 21, 1989, with notice of the pending civil action, petitioner Santiago
Land Development Corporation purchased from PNB one of the properties subject of the
litigation, situated along Pasong Tamo Extension in Makati, for P90 Million. On December 11,
1989, petitioner SLDC filed a motion to intervene, with its answer in intervention attached,
alleging that it was the transferee pendente lite of the property and that any adverse ruling or
decision which might be rendered against PNB would necessarily affect it (petitioner).
Quisumbing opposed SLDC's motion for intervention. He argued that SLDC's interest in the
subject property was a mere contingency or expectancy, which was dependent on any judgment
which might be rendered for or against PNB as transferor. He further argued that the allowance
of SLDC's motion would only make the proceedings complicated, expensive and interminable.

Issue: WON SLDC is an indispensable party to the case at hand

Ruling: No, SLDC is not an indispensable party. It has been consistently held that a
transferee pendente lite stands in exactly the same position as its predecessor-in-interest, that is,
the original defendant. However, should the transferee pendente lite  choose to participate in the
proceedings, it can only do so as a substituted defendant or as a joint party-defendant. The
transferee pendente lite  is a proper but not an indispensable party as it would in any event be
bound by the judgment against his predecessor-in-interest. This would be true even if respondent
SLDC is not formally included as a party-defendant through an amendment of the complaint.
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Since petitioner is a transferee pendente lite with notice of the pending litigation between

Quisumbing and PNB, petitioner stands exactly in the shoes of defendant PNB and is bound by
any judgment or decree which may be rendered for or against PNB.  Under Rule 3, §20, the
action may be continued against PNB, the original defendant. In the alternative — although it
was not essential that the transferee be substituted and the latter insist on such substitution - the
trial court could have directed that petitioner be either substituted as party-defendant or joined
with defendant PNB.

G.R. No. 222740              September 28, 2016

St. Luke’s College of Medicine vs. spouses Manuel and Esmeralda Perez

Perez, J.:

Facts: In February 2010, St. Luke's sent four (4) of its 4th year medical students to a community
clinic in Cabiao, Nueva Ecija to complete a four-week clerkship rotation. While they were
sleeping on the residential space for the medical staff in the second floor, an accidental fire broke
out, resulting in the death of the female medical students. Believing that the there is negligence
on the part of the respondents, a complaint was filed against them by the parents of the deceased.
The RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit and held that held that the Clinic is owned by the
Municipality of Cabiao, and that the latter and/or its responsible officials should have been
impleaded as indispensable parties. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision.

Issue: whether or not the CA committed reversible error when it held that the Municipality of
Cabiao was not an indispensable party to the case.

Ruling: Yes, the Municipality of Cabiao is not an indispensable party to the case

An indispensable party is defined by the Rules of Court as a party-in-interest without whom no

final determination can be had of an action. In the present case, respondents premise petitioners'
liability on their contractual obligation to their students and, certainly, complete relief and a final
judgment can be arrived at by weighing the claims and defenses of petitioners and respondents,
without need of evaluating the claims and defenses of the Municipality of Cabiao. If at all, the
Municipality of Cabiao is a necessary party whose non-inclusion in the case at bar shall not
prevent the court from proceeding with the action.

Institutions of learning have the "built-in" obligation of providing a conducive atmosphere for
learning, an atmosphere where there are no constant threats to life and limb, and one where peace
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and order are maintained. In the case at bar, the Cabiao Community Clinic is to be considered as
part of the campus premises of St. Luke's. In the course description of the clerkship program in
preventive and community medicine, it is stated that the Cabiao Community Clinic serves as the
base operation of the clerkship program. As such, petitioner had the same obligation to their
students, even though they were stationed in the Cabiao Community Clinic, and it was
incumbent upon petitioners to ensure that said Clinic was conducive for learning, that it had no
constant threats to life and limb, and that peace and order was maintained thereat. After all,
although away from the main campus of St. Luke's, the students were still under the same
protective and supervisory custody of petitioners as the ones detailed in the main campus

Vaño vs. Alo

No. L-7220. July 30, 1954
J. Labrador
Facts:
Respondents, purporting to be the President general manager, respectively, of an
unregistered corporation or association denominated APBA Cinematographic Shows, Inc.,leased
certain theatrical equipments from the late Jose Vaño. Having died, his administrator, the present
petitioner, filed an action in the CFI of Bohol for the return of the theatrical equipments and the
payment of the agreed rentals. Upon the filing of the complaint, the association was dissolved.
Plaintiff did not include the members of the unregistered corporation as party defendants, and so
they were not summoned.

The court a quo ordered that, as a legal requirement, any legal action should be brought
against the real party in interest, as a legal requirement. Hence, the other members of the
association shall be included in the amended complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed an error when it demanded the inclusion of the
other members of the association.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that, where the complaint specifically alleged that the defendants,
purporting to be the president and general manager of an unregistered corporation, entered into
the contract by themselves, the presence of the members of the association is not essential to the
final determination of the issue presented, the evident intent of the complaint being to make the
officers directly responsible. (Article 287, Code of Commerce, supra). The alleged responsibility
of the members for the contract to the officers, who acted as their agents, is not in issue and need
not be determined in the action to fix the responsibility of the officers to plaintiff's intestate,
hence said members are not indispensable in the action instituted.
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Somes vs. Government of the Philippine Islands

G.R. No. L-42754. October 30, 1935
Imperial, J.

FACTS:
Plaintiff instituted a civil case against his son Vicente Somes praying in his complaint for the
annulment of the deed of sale of the property and the improvements thereon described in original
certificate of title No. 5069 and also for the cancellation of transfer certificate of title No. 25909
obtained his son in question. He amended his complaint by joining the Director of Lands as
defendant, in representation of the Government of the Philippine Islands and prayed,
furthermore, for the annulment of the mortgage constituted by his son in favor of the
Government on May 4, 1926, and the cancellation of the notation thereof made by the registry of
deeds in his books on July 21st of said year. The mortgage was constituted to secure the loan of
P8,000 granted by the Government to Vicente Somes. Nieves Chofre intervened in the case,
Manuel Pellicer was appointed receiver of the property and the intervenor prayed that judgment
be rendered in her favor for her credit for pensions against her husband and that the money be
taken by the receiver from the rentals of the property. [After trial, the court rendered judgment
upholding the validity of the sale as well as the mortgage and absolving the defendants and the
intervenor. The plaintiff appealed and the case was docketed in this court as No.
38552. Sometime later, this court rendered judgment affirming the appealed judgment in toto.]
law library
Pending the case G.R. No. 38552, and before this court rendered its judgment, the Government
of the Philippine Islands, represented by the Director of Lands, brought action against Vicente
Somes to foreclosure the mortgage executed by the latter, which action was docketed in the
Court of First Instance of Manila as No. 38999. Neither the receiver Manuel Pellicer, nor the
plaintiff Enrique Somes, nor the intervenor Nieves Chofre were joined therein as defendants.
Hearing was held by default of Vicente Somes after which the court rendered judgment against
him in favor of the Government for the sum of P8,000, with interest thereon, and ordered that,
upon failure to pay the judgment, the mortgaged property be sold in accordance with law. The
judgment so rendered was not appealed and it became final.

ISSUE:
Whether or not that the failure to implead the plaintiff, the intervenor and the receiver as
defendants constitutes a sufficient cause to prevent the execution of the judgment rendered in the
foreclosure suit.

RULING:
No. While section 255 requires the joinder as defendants of persons claiming an interest
subordinate to the mortgage sought to be foreclosed, failure to comply therewith does not
invalidate the foreclosure proceeding had because the jurisdiction of the court was not in the
least affected thereby. If the attention of the court which had cognizance of the foreclosure of the
mortgage had been directed to the necessity of joining the plaintiff, the intervenor and the
receiver as defendants, the court would have been obliged to require such joinder, but the
absence of said parties at the hearing in no way detracted from its jurisdiction nor had the effect
of invalidating the proceeding or the judgment rendered therein. Such judgment, however,
cannot effect any tenable right of the parties who had not appeared or were not impleaded
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therein. We hold, therefore, that the failure to implead the plaintiff, the intervenor and the
receiver as defendants did not constitute sufficient cause to prevent the execution of the
judgment rendered in the foreclosure suit. l

REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN
173 SCRAA 72
Facts:
The petitioner charges the Sandiganbayan with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying its motion to drop Jose D. Campos, Jr. as defendant in
its complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages filed against Jose
D. Campos, Jr. and the other defendants in Civil Case No. 0010. The original petition was
against the Sandiganbayan and six private respondents who opposed the motion to drop Campos,
Jr. from the complaint. Upon motion, Campos, Jr. was allowed to file a petition in intervention.
In a resolution, a TRO was issued ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from
proceeding with Civil Case No. 0010.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly drop Jose D. Campos, Jr. as party defendant in
Civil Case No. 0010?
Held:
As discussed earlier, the PCGG's motion to drop Campos, Jr. as defendant in Civil Case
No. 0010 has legal basis under Executive Order No. 14. The fact that Campos, Jr. and all the
other defendants were charged solidarily in the complaint does not make him an indispensable
party. The SC ruled in the case of Operators Incorporated v. American Biscuit Co., Inc., [154
SCRA 738 (1987)] that "Solidarity does not make a solidary obligor an indispensable party in a
suit filed by the creditor. Article 1216 of the Civil Code says that the creditor 'may proceed
against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously." There is no
showing that the dropping of Jose Campos, Jr. as in defendant would be unjust to the other
defendants in the civil case because, the other defendants can still pursue the case and put up
their defenses.

MATHAY V. CONSOLIDATED BANK & TRUST CO.

58 SCRA 559
Facts:
The complaint filed contained 6 causes of action. The first cause of action consisted of: 1)
the rights of appellants as well as of the other CMI stockholders to subscribe in proportion to
their equities established under their respective “Pre-Incorporated Agreements to Subscribe”, to
that portion of the capital stock which was unsubscribed because of failure of the CMI
stockholders to exercise their right to subscribe thereto; 2)the legal duty of the appellant to have
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said portion of the capital stock to be subscribed by appellants and other CMI stockholders; and
3) the violation or breach of said right of appellants and other CMI stockholders by the appellees.
Defendants-appelles filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of
action. The trial granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the class suit could not be
maintained because of the absence of a showing in the complaint that the plaintiffs-appellants
were sufficiently numerous and representative, and that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint stated a cause of action?
Held:
A class suit does not require a commonality of interest in the questions involved in the
suit. What is required by the Rules is a common or general interest in the subject matter of the
litigation. The “subject matter” of the litigation meant the physical, the things real or personal,
the money, lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to the suit which is prosecuted and not the
delict or wrong committed by the defendant.
It having been shown that the complaint failed to state ultimate facts to constitute a cause
of action, it becomes unnecessary to discuss the other assignments of errors.

JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC., V. FIL-ESTATE LAND

INC.,
G.R. NO. 152272, MARCH 5, 2012
Facts:
Petitioners filed this class suit in representation of commuters and motorists who regularly
use the La Paz Road. They filed an action for damages against Fil-Estate, who excavated and
rendered impassable the said public road, which the petitioners and those who are similarly
situated, have been using for more than 10 years already. On the other hand, Fil-Estate questions
the propriety of filing the complaint as a class suit.
Issue: Whether or not the class suit was proper?
Held:
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class
suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of
all concerned. In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who
use La Paz Road. They have common interest on the subject matter of the controversy which is
the closure of road.