Salaries
Ligot vs. Mathay
Philconsa vs. Mathay
Facts:
RA 4134 provided for increase of salary of Senate
President, Speaker of the House and members of the
Senate and House of Representatives. This took effect
on 30 June 1966. However, record show that the
increase was implemented on 1964. Philippine
Constitution Association assailed the validity of RA
4134, stating that this is in violation of Section 14
Article 6 of the Constitution, “No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the members of the
Senate and House of Representatives approving such
increase. Thus the petition for writ of prohibition.
Issue:
Whether or not the salary increase was
constitutional?
Decision:
Writ of prohibition granted. Republic Act No. 4134 is
not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full
term of all members of the Senate and House that
approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired.
Consequently, appropriation for such increased
compensation may not be disbursed until December
30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-
1966 Appropriation Act) authorizes the
disbursement of the increased compensation prior to
the date aforesaid, it also violates the Constitution
and must be held null and void.
FACTS:
Ligot served as a member of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for
three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-
year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30,
1969.
During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA
4134 “fixing the salaries of constitutional officials
and certain other officials of the national
government” was enacted into law and under section
7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of
members of Congress (senators and congressman)
were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to
P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly
provided that said increases “shall take effect in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”
Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he
filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth
Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968
which provided for retirement gratuity of any official
or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at
least twenty years of service, the last three years of
which are continuous on the basis therein provided
“in case of employees based on the highest rate
received and in case of elected officials on the
rates of pay as provided by law.” HOR granted his
petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor
refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General
then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of
Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity
computed on the basis of the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress
(which was not applied to him during his incumbency
which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court
held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases
would become operative only for members of
Congress elected to serve therein commencing
December 30, 1969) should not have been
disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the
increased salary for members of Congress “as
provided by law” (under Republic Act 4134) was
already P32,000.00 per annum.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement
benefit.
HELD:
To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed
on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a
subtle way of increasing his compensation during his
term of office and of achieving indirectly what he
could not obtain directly. Ligot’s claim cannot be
sustained as far as he and other members of Congress
similarly situated whose term of office ended on
December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple
reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form
of compensation within the purview of the
Constitutional provision limiting their compensation
and “other emoluments” to their salary as provided
by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of
Congress whose terms expired on December 30,
1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited
by the Constitution from receiving during their term
of office) would be to pay them prohibited
emoluments which in effect increase the salary
beyond that which they were permitted by the
Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As
stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the
similar case of petitioner’s colleague, ex-
Congressman Singson, “(S)uch a scheme would
contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the
same prohibited result by enabling administrative
authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done
directly.”
Freedom from Arrest
People vs. Jalosjos
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-
fledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense.
Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of
sovereign will." He states that the sovereign
electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del
Norte chose him as their representative in Congress.
Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the
duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He
calls this a covenant with his constituents made
possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that
it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural
restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
Jalosjos also invoked the doctrine of condonation
citing Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states, inter alia,
that –
The Court should never remove a public officer
for acts done prior to his present term of office.
To do otherwise would be to deprive the people
of their right to elect their officers. When a
people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with the knowledge
of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct,
if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the
Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to
practically overrule the will of the people.
Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several
motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati
City Jail, for official or medical reasons.
Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First
District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to
be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide
member of the House of Representatives, the latter
urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his
mandate.
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Issue: Doctrine of condonation does not apply to
criminal cases
Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed
to discharge mandate as member of House of The Aguinaldo case involves the administrative
Representatives. removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. It does not apply to
imprisonment arising from the enforcement of
Held:
criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that
preventive suspension is not removal, confinement
NO.
pending appeal is not removal. He remains a
congressman unless expelled by Congress or,
The privilege of arrest has always been granted in
otherwise, disqualified.
a restrictive sense.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending
True, election is the expression of the sovereign
appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense.
power of the people. However, in spite of its
Society must protect itself. It also serves as
importance, the privileges and rights arising from
an example and warning to others.
having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by
law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred
from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners.
rather than exemption.
There is no showing that the above privileges are
Section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution provides:
peculiar to him or to a member of Congress.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. xxx
To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators
will virtually make him a free man
and members of the House of Representatives, arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The history of
When the voters of his district elected the accused-
the provision shows that the privilege has always
appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness
been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot
so with the knowledge that he could achieve only
be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
such legislative results which he could accomplish
terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic
implication or equitable considerations.
illustration, if voters elect a person with full
knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness,
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why
they do so knowing that at any time, he may no
he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11,
longer serve his full term in office.
Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional
the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
sessions and committee meetings for  5 days or more
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
in a week will virtually make him a  free man with all
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is
the privileges appurtenant to his position.  Such
not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
foundations.
appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also
would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system.

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In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils
down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of laws." This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall
be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government
may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to
any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be
displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial
distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which
removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the
same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential
duties by public officers has never been an excuse
to free a person validly in prison.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that
their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties
of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift
him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging
to the same class.
Speech and Debate Clause
Jimenez vs. Cabangbang
Facts:
Defendant Cabangbang was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense. He wrote an open letter to the
President and caused its publication in several
newspapers of general circulation exposing the
allegedly operational plans by some ambitious AFP
officers regarding a massive political build-up of then
Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, to prepare
him to become a candidate for President in 1961.
Issue:
Whether or not the publication in question is a
privileged communication
Held:
The determination of the issue depends on whether or
not the publication falls within the purview of the
phrase “speech or debate in Congress” as used in Art. VI,
Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11). Said expression refers to
utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in
the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as
well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same
is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of
their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform
its functions as such, at the time of the performance of
the acts in question.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to
this category. It was an open letter to the President,
when Congress presumably was not in session, and
defendant caused said letter to be published in several
newspapers of general circulation. In causing the
communication to be so published, he was not
performing his official duty, either as a member of the
Congress or as officer of any committee thereof. Hence,
said communication is not absolutely privileged.
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Disqualification
Adaza vs. Pacana, Jr.
FACTS:
Adaza is the governor of Misamis Oriental and Pacana
is the vice-governor. Their respective term of office
expires on March 3, 1986. Both parties ran in the
Batasang Pambansa (BP) elections in 1984 and
respondent lost to petitioner. On July 23, 1984,
Pacana took his oath of office as the governor.
Petitioner has brought this petition to exclude
respondent therefrom, claiming to be the lawful
occupant of the position.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a provincial governor who
was elected as Mababatas Pambansa (MP)
can exercise the functions of both
simultaneously; and
2. Whether or not a vice-governor who ran for
the position of MP but lost, can continue
serving as vice governor and subsequently
succeed to the office of governor if said office
is vacated.
HELD:
Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution is clear and
unambiguous. A member of the BP may not hold any
other office in the government. A public office is a
public trust. A holder thereof is subject to regulations
and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot
complain of any restrictions on his holding of more
than one office. The contention that Pacana, as a mere
private citizen, runs afoul of BP Blg. 697 which
provides that governors, or members of Sanggunian
or barangay officials, upon filing a certificate of
candidacy be considered on forced leave of absence
from office. When respondent reassumed the
position of vice-governor after the BP elections, he
was acting within the law. Thus, the instant petition
is denied.
Puyat vs. De Guzman
Facts:
On 14 May 1979, Puyat and his group were elected as
directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election
was subsequently questioned by Acero (Puyat’s rival)
claiming that the votes were not properly counted –hence
he filed a quo warranto proceeding before the Securities
and Exchange Commission on 25 May 1979. Prior to
Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a
member of the Interim Batas ang Pambansa purchased ten
shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group. And
during a conference held by SEC Commissioner de Guzman
(from May 25-31 ’79) to have the parties confer with each
other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as
counsel for Acero. Puyat objected arguing that it is
unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel
(to anyone) before any administrative body (such as the
SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from
appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent
Motion for Intervention in this said SEC case for him to
intervene not as a counsel but as a legal owner of IPI
shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the
motion in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
Puyat then moved to question the Commissioner’s action.
Issue:
Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder
of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec.
11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution.
Held:
No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under
the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even
though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing.
He bought the stocks before the litigation took place.
During the conference he presented himself as counsel but
because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the
constitution he instead presented himself as a party of
interest – which is clearly a work around and is clearly an
act after the fact. A mere work around to get himself
involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly
could not likewise be done indirectly.
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Liban vs. Gordon

FACTS:

Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M.

Viari (petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to
Declare Richard J. Gordon as having forfeited his seat in
the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of
Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while
respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.

During respondent’s incumbency as a member of the

Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the
PNRC. Petitioners allege that by accepting the
chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in the
Constitution.

Petitioner filed this instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a

government- owned or controlled corporation.

RULING:

The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned.

The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are
private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC
Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign
of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for
one year. PNRC is, thus, a privately owned, privately
funded, and privately run charitable organization.

The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office

or an office in a government-owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in the 1987
Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void
insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the
PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it
wants to be a private corporation.

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