Analyzing Theories in The Frame Model

Erkenntnis
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0078-5
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ORIGINAL RESEARCH
Analyzing Theories in the Frame Model
Stephan Kornmesser1 • Gerhard Schurz2
Received: 28 August 2017 / Accepted: 15 October 2018

Springer Nature B.V. 2018
Abstract
The frame model was developed in cognitive psychology and imported into the
philosophy of science in order to provide representations of scientific concepts and
conceptual taxonomies. The aim of this article is to show that beside the repre-
sentation of scientific concepts the frame model is an efficient instrument to rep-
resent and analyze scientific theories. That is, we aim to establish the frame model
as a representation tool for the structure of theories within the philosophy of science.
For this, we will develop the notion of a theory frame and distinguish between
theory frames for qualitative theories in which scientific measurement is based on
nominal scales and theory frames for quantitative theories in which measurement is
based on ratio scales. In three case studies, we will apply frames to a psychological,
a linguistic, and a physical theory, thereby showing that the frame model is a
powerful and intuitively accessible instrument to analyze the laws of scientific
theories, the determination of theoretical concepts, the explanatory role of theo-
retical concepts, the abductive introduction of a new theoretical concept, the dis-
tinction between the core and the periphery of a theory, the diachronic development
of a theory, and the distinction between qualitative and quantitative scientific
concepts. Finally, we will provide a comparison to the structuralist view of theories,
one of the most elaborated and applied models of theory representation.
Keywords Frame Theory Theoretical concept Qualitative and quantitative

measurement Structuralist view of theories
& Stephan Kornmesser

stephan.kornmesser@uni-oldenburg.de
Gerhard Schurz
schurz@phil.uni-duesseldorf.de
1
Institute of Philosophy, Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg, 26111 Oldenburg, Germany
2
Department of Philosophy, Heinrich Heine University Duesseldorf, Universitaetsstrasse 1, Geb.
24.52, 40225 Duesseldorf, Germany
123
S. Kornmesser, G. Schurz
1 Introduction
The aims of this article are to develop an instrument for the representation of
qualitative and quantitative theories within the frame model and to apply it to three
scientific theories. First, we will argue that the frame model—due to its inherent
functional structure—is ideally suited for the representation of scientific concepts
and scientific laws containing those concepts. Second, we will show by means of
three case studies that the graphical character of frames allows for representing
complex information in an intuitive and clearly arranged way. Third, we will
compare the frame model to the structuralist view of theories (also called
structuralism or non-statement view of theories), one of the most elaborated and
applied models of theory representation in the philosophy of science. We will argue
that due to its graphical character the frame model is much easier to handle for the
analysis of theories than the structuralist model.
The frame model was developed in cognitive psychology in order to provide
graphical representations of concepts and conceptual taxonomies (Barsalou 1992;
Barsalou and Hale 1993). A frame is an attribute-value-matrix representing that
some features (values) are instances of other features or feature spaces (attributes).
The hierarchical relation between features assumed by the frame model contrasts
with the feature list model, which is up to now the common approach for concept
representation. According to the feature list model, a concept is determined by a list
of binary features that are independent of each other. However, evidence from
cognitive studies on categorization tasks supports the assumption that there is a
hierarchical relation between features (Barsalou 1992, p. 26; Andersen et al. 2006,
pp. 47–49 for an overview). Therefore, Barsalou (1992) as well as Andersen et al.
(2006) assume the frame model to be a cognitively more adequate model for
concept representation than the feature list model.
The frame model is successfully applied in several disciplines (Gamerschlag
et al. 2014; Busse 2012).1 In the philosophy of science frames were adopted as a
tool for analyzing scientific concept formation, conceptual change, and incommen-
surable conceptual taxonomies, primarily with respect to Thomas Kuhn’s theory of
concepts and revolutionary concept change.2 However, in this article we will argue
that the frame model is far from being fully exploited: Beside the representation of
scientific concepts frames will prove to be an promising instrument to represent and
analyze scientific theories. That is, we aim to establish frames as a representation
tool for the structure of theories within the philosophy of science.
In order to do so, in Sect. 2, we will briefly introduce the frame model and
develop the notion of theory frames as an extension of it. Further, we will
distinguish between theory frames for qualitative theories, in which scientific
measurement is based on nominal scales, and theory frames for quantitative
theories, in which measurement is based on ratio scales.
1
For further recent work on frames see the DFG Collaborative Research Centre 991—The Structure of
Representations in Language, Cognition, and Science: http://www.sfb991.uni-duesseldorf.de/en/the-
structure-of-representations-in-language-cognition-and-science/.
2
See Andersen et al. (1996, 2000, 2006), Chen et al. (1998), Chen and Barker (2000), Chen (2003),
Barker et al. (2003), Votsis and Schurz (2012, 2014), Kornmesser (2016, 2017, 2018).
123
In Sect. 3, we will apply theory frames to two qualitative theories, providing a

synchronic analysis of the vertical dimension of the prototype theory of cognitive
psychology and a diachronic analysis of the pro drop theory of generative
linguistics. Within these case studies, we will introduce a frame-based represen-
tation of the distinction between the core and the periphery of a theory. Further, we
will reconstruct the abductive inference of a new theoretical concept with theory
frames.
Section 4 contains a frame-based representation of electrostatics, the laws of
which contain quantitative theoretical concepts. In the philosophy of science, the
representation of quantitative concepts by means of frames is up to now an unsolved
problem because the frames developed so far have only finite value sets.3 In Sect. 4,
we will take on that star challenge.
The application of theory frames to qualitative and quantitative theories will
prove the frame model to be a powerful instrument for analyzing scientific theories
that might be an alternative to other methods of theory representation in the
philosophy of science. In Sect. 5, we will summarize our results and discuss
important relations to the structuralist view of theories. However, developing the
frame model for the analysis of theories being the main aim of this article, we
cannot provide a full and detailed comparison but will limit ourselves to some
indications about relevant connections between both models.
2 The Frame Model: Taxonomy Frames and Theory Frames
In Sect. 2.1, we will introduce the frame model as it has been used up to now in the
philosophy of science. With reference to a standard example for frame-based
conceptual analysis, we will explain the logical structure of a frame representing a
conceptual taxonomy. In the following, frames of this kind will be referred to as
taxonomy frames.
In Sect. 2.2, we will show that in addition to conceptual analysis, the frame
model can be used to analyze scientific theories. In order to do so, we will develop
the notion of a theory frame for qualitative and quantitative theories.
2.1 Taxonomy Frames
In the following, we will introduce taxonomy frames by means of a standard

example often used in the philosophy of science. The frame of Fig. 1 represents a
seventeenth century astronomical taxonomy (Andersen et al. 1996, p. 357, 2006,
p. 114).4 The graphical structure of a frame consists of nodes and edges connecting
the nodes. Representing a conceptual taxonomy, the node at the left end of the frame
(celestial object) represents a superordinate concept that is sub-classified into
different subordinate concepts represented by the nodes at the right end of the frame
3
However, see Petersen (2007) for a definition of frames without a restriction to finite value sets used for
linguistic applications.
4
The frame corresponds to what Barsalou and Hale (1993, Ch. 2) call a simple frame, i.e. it has no
recursive structure.
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star
orbit center planet star
none
elliptic
orbit shape parabolic planet
other
celestial
object
self-luminous
luminance moon
reflective
large
size returning
medium
comet
small
Fig. 1 Taxonomy frame sub-classifying celestial objects (Andersen et al. 1996, p. 357, 2006)
(star, planet, moon, returning comet). The nodes of the second column (orbit center,
orbit shape, luminance and size) are the attributes of the frame. Each attribute has a
specific set of values represented by the nodes of the third column. For example, the
values self-luminous and reflective are values of the attribute luminance.
The attributes are functions that map elements of the extension of the
superordinate concept onto values. For instance, the attribute orbit shape maps a
celestial object onto the value elliptic if it has an elliptic orbit shape, onto the value
parabolic if it moves on a parabolic orbit, and onto the value other if it moves
otherwise. For taxonomy frames, the extension of a value is a subset of the
extension of the superordinate concept. For example, the extension of the value
elliptic contains those celestial objects that have an elliptic orbit shape, i.e. it is a
subset of the celestial objects.
Logically speaking the difference between attributes and concepts is the
following: Attributes are feature functions; they represent feature spaces and map
given objects to values representing specific features. Concepts are predicative
functions; they represent features and map given objects into propositions having
truth values. For example, ‘‘color’’ (c) is an attribute mapping a given object a into
the value c(a) representing the color of a, which may be brown. ‘‘Brown’’ (B) is a
concept mapping the object a into the proposition ‘‘a is brown’’ (Ba).
The subordinate concepts are determined by the values connected to them by an
edge. For example, according to the frame of Fig. 1, a moon has a planet as its orbit
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center, has an elliptic orbit shape, is not self-luminous but reflective, and is
(comparatively) small. We call the edges connecting values and subordinate
concepts determination links.
A further element of frames are constraints. A constraint is a relation between
values of a frame. Constraints express empirical correlations of the elements of the
extension of the superordinate concept. For instance, the constraint of Fig. 1 means
that all and only celestial objects that do not have an orbit center are self-luminous.
That is, the constraint states that the value none of the attribute orbit center and the
value self-luminous of the attribute luminance are co-extensional. Constraints might
turn out to be wrong for empirical reasons. Assume that non-returning comets are
discovered that do not have an orbit center but are reflective. In this case, the
constraint of Fig. 1 has to be abandoned. Hence, constraints add empirical
information to the semantic information contained in a frame about how the
subordinate concepts are determined.
Taxonomy frames are insensible to the kinds of subordinate concepts that are
represented, that is, the frame does not per se contain any information about how the
subordinate concepts are determined (Kornmesser 2016, 2017, 2018). In frame-
based representations developed so far, frames are used to represent defined
concepts, prototype concepts, or family resemblance concepts. For example, assume
that the frame of Fig. 1 is understood to represent defined concepts, then the values
connected to a subordinate concept represent necessary and jointly sufficient
properties of the elements in the extension of that concept. For instance, a celestial
object x is a planet if and only if x has a star as its orbit center, has an elliptic orbit
shape, is small and reflective. I.e. the extension of the subordinate concept planet is
the intersection of the extensions of the values star, elliptic, small, and reflective.
However, up to now the frame model has only been used in order to represent
concepts and conceptual taxonomies by means of taxonomy frames. In the
following we will show that—due to its functional attribute-value structure—the
frame model is a highly useful instrument to analyze scientific theories.
2.2 Theory Frames
We call a frame representing a scientific theory a theory frame. A theory frame

adopts the attribute-value structure of the frame model. The left node for the
superordinate concept of the taxonomy frame represents the theory applications
represented by the frame. That is, the node theory applications refers to the set of
entities to which the laws of a theory T are applied. We call the extension of the
theory applications the application domain. The nodes for subordinate concepts in
taxonomy frames represent theoretical concepts of T, i.e. concepts whose meanings
are determined by T. The attributes of a theory frame work the same way as in
taxonomy frames. That is, the attributes are functions f : X ! Y with X being the
domain of f (Dom(f)) and Y being the range of f (Range(f)) (see Fig. 2). The range of
f is a set of values v0 , v00 , …, vn linked to the attribute in question. The elements of Y
are designated by f(x) with x 2 X. Of course, each function can be an n-ary function
with a domain X ¼ X1 X2 Xm for any natural number m. In this case,
f maps tupels hx1, x2, …, xmi with xi 2 Xi (with 1 B i B m) onto the elements
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theoretical
f1
concept 1
(a) theory applications
f2 theoretical
concept 2
f3 ( )=
(b) theory applications Law

theoretical
concept
f4 ( )=
Fig. 2 Theory frames representing a qualitative theory (a) and a quantitative theory (b)
f(x1, x2, …, xm) of its range Y. The application domain of a theory frame is the
unification Dom(f1) [ Dom(f2) [ … [ Dom(fn) for a theory frame with n attributes
(functions). A theory frame can contain two kinds of attributes:
• theoretical attributes presupposing the theory they are part of, or
• non-theoretical attributes not presupposing the theory they are part of.
For example, the charge of an object is a theoretical attribute of electrostatics

because determining the charge of an object is dependent upon the theory of
electrostatics. That is, in order to determine the charge of an object one has to
presuppose the laws of electrostatics. In contrast, the position of an object is a non-
theoretical attribute of electrostatics. Determining the position of an object is not
depending on the theory of electrostatics since the position function is given by a
measurement theory for lengths, which electrostatics can presuppose.
In the following, we will distinguish between qualitative and quantitative theories
with respect to measurement scales (Stevens 1946; Hand 2004). If measurement in a
theory T is based on functions each of which has a finite range without an ordering
(qualitative measurement on nominal scales), T is a qualitative theory. Hence, a
theory frame representing a qualitative theory has attributes with finite sets of
values. The theory frame of Fig. 2a is an example for a frame representing a
qualitative theory. The frame has two attributes (functions) f1 and f2 each of which
has a range consisting of two values. Let the range of f1 be the set {v10 , v100 } and the
range of f2 the set {v20 , v200 }. f1 and f2 are functions if Dom(f1) = Dom(f2) =
application domain, and partial functions if they are subsets of the application
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domain. In a theory frame for a qualitative theory, each value node represents an
element of the range of the attribute it is linked to.
If measurement in a theory T is based on functions each of which has an
(uncountably) infinite set with an ordering (e.g. the set of real numbers) and with a
non-arbitrary zero value (quantitative measurement on ratio scales), T is a
quantitative theory. Hence, for a theory frame representing a quantitative theory
each attribute has an (uncountably) infinite set as its range. As opposed to a theory
frame representing a qualitative theory, for a quantitative theory the values of an
attribute cannot be listed separately, since each attribute has an (uncountably)
infinite number of values. Hence, as exemplified in Fig. 2b, the range of each of the
attributes f3 and f4 is represented by single value node. For example, the attribute
charge of electrostatics has the value set R as its range.
In Sect. 3, we will analyze two qualitative theories that contain multiply
operationalized theoretical concepts. In both theory frames, the determination links
represent equivalence relations expressed by double arrows in Fig. 2. Hence, each
theoretical concept in the frame of Fig. 2a is dually operationalized. The multiple
operationalization of a theoretical concept entails certain consequences. For
instance, from the equivalences between the theoretical concept 1 and the values
v10 and v20 follows the correlation that every element of the application domain has
the property v10 if and only if it has the property v20 . Hence, in a qualitative theory
like that of Fig. 2a each operationalization of a theoretical concept is a law of the
theory. The conjunction of the laws entails correlations between values. In the frame
model, correlations between the values of a frame are expressed by constraints.
Thus, Fig. 2a contains two constraints linking the values v10 and v20 as well as v100
and v200 .5 Both constraints express logical equivalence relations. We distinguish
between two kinds of constraints:
• non-theoretical constraints that contain only values of non-theoretical attributes,
and
• theoretical constraints that contain at least one value of a theoretical attribute.
Non-theoretical constrains express empirical correlations that can be determined

independent of the theory they are consequences of. Theoretical constraints express
non-empirical correlations that cannot be determined independent of the theory they
are consequences of.
In the case studies of qualitative theories discussed in this article, the extensions
of the values of a function are subsets of its application domain. Thus, as in a
taxonomy frame, the constraints of Fig. 2a express the empirical propositions that
the values linked by a constraint are co-extensional.
In Sect. 4, we will analyze a quantitative theory by means of a theory frame with
the structure of Fig. 2b. The value node of Fig. 2b represents an (uncountably)
infinite set with an ordering and with a non-arbitrary zero value.
5
The theory frame of Fig. 2a can be understood as a representation of a set of bilateral reduction
sentences operationalizing a scientific concept in the sense of Carnap (1936, also see Schurz 2013;
Kornmesser 2016, 2017, 2018). The constraints represent the empirical consequences of the conjunction
of bilateral reduction sentences operationalizing one and the same concept.
123
In quantitative theories, the values of the attributes are connected by the laws of
the theory represented by the dashed rectangles integrated in the constraint of
Fig. 2b. Hence, each constraint represents a law mathematically relating the values
of the theoretical and/or non-theoretical attributes of the theory. The theoretical
concepts are determined by the laws of the theory expressed by constraints. Hence,
in a quantitative theory frame a determination link connects a particular theoretical
concept with the constraint representing the law that determines the theoretical
concept. For example, the theoretical concept electric field of a point charge is
1
determined by Coulomb’s Law Eðx; pÞ ¼ Q(x) 4pe0 Sðx0 Þ2 mathematically
relating the values of the attributes Eðx; pÞ (electric field strength), Qðx) (electric
charge) and Sðx0 Þ (position in space) of the theory frame of electrostatics (see
Sect. 4).
3 Analyzing Qualitative Theories by Frames
In this section, we will provide frame-based analyses of two qualitative theories

containing measurement on nominal scales. Both theories consist of laws multiply
operationalizing their theoretical concepts as introduced in Sect. 2.
In Sect. 3.1, we analyze the vertical dimension of the prototype theory of
cognitive psychology (Rosch et al. 1976) that, in the following, we will call vertical
prototype theory (VPT). The core of VPT is a set of operationalizations—or, as
Rosch et al. (1976) call them, operational definitions—of the theoretical concepts of
the theory.
In Sect. 3.2, we provide a diachronic investigation of the theory of pro drop
languages as part of the principles and parameters approach of generative grammar
(Chomsky 1981, 1986). In the following, we will call it pro drop theory (PDT). PDT
contains one theoretical concept that is multiply operationalized by the laws of the
theory.6
3.1 A Synchronic Analysis of the Vertical Prototype Theory
In the following, we will provide a frame-based analysis of VPT of Rosch et al.

(1976). The vertical dimension is concerned with the categorization of concrete
objects in a taxonomy at different levels of abstraction—a superordinate level, a
basic level, and a subordinate level. The corresponding categories are related to one
another by class inclusion. That is, a superordinate category includes different basic
level categories and a basic level category includes different subordinate categories.
6
Speaking of operationalizations or operational definitions may lead to the false assumption that VPT or
PDT only consists of sets of definitions introducing new concepts. In this case, it would be misleading to
speak of theories since definitions are analytic and do not contain any empirical content. However, as
already pointed out in Sect. 2, the following case studies will show that, as opposed to definitions,
operationalizations entail empirical consequences and, hence, cannot be analytic (Kornmesser
2016, 2017, 2018). Therefore, we take operationalizations to be laws of nature the conjunction of
which has empirical content. This is why the operationalizations of both theories, i.e. the laws of VPT as
well as of PDT, can be confirmed or disconfirmed by experience.
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For example, the superordinate category furniture includes the basic level categories
table, lamp, chair etc. and the basic level category chair includes the subordinate
categories kitchen chair and dining room chair (Rosch et al. 1976, p. 388). To
express the hierarchical relation of the categories with respect to class inclusion,
usually they are written one below the other—which is why this part of the theory is
called the vertical dimension of the prototype theory.7
Note that VPT must not be confused with a taxonomy frame sub-classifying
concepts. VPT is a psychological theory concerned with human categorization, but a
taxonomy frame is a certain schema to represent conceptual taxonomies. In the
following, we will apply our notion of a theory frame to VPT, that is, the laws of
VPT will be reconstructed by means of a theory frame.
The article Basic Objects in Natural Categories (Rosch et al. 1976) is divided
into two parts. The first part provides three operationalizations for the concepts
basic level category, superordinate category, and subordinate category, the
theoretical concepts of VPT.8 The operationalizations of the first part constitute
the theory core containing the core laws of VPT.
The second part augments the theory core with special laws constituting the
theory periphery of VPT.9 As we will see below, the special laws logically
strengthen the theory since the conjunction of core laws and special laws entail a
higher number of constraints than the theory core by itself. Hence, the conjunction
of theory core and periphery entails a higher number of analytically independent
correlations.
VPT is applied to 90 natural language categories listed in Rosch et al. (1976,
p. 388), consisting of 9 superordinate categories each of which has 3 basic level
categories and 6 subordinate categories. Thus, the set of the 90 natural language
categories is the application domain of the theory. In the following, we will
successively introduce the theory core of VPT operationalizing the theoretical
concepts of the theory. In a nutshell, VPT claims that the basic level plays a special
role in human categorization. It is assumed to be the most inclusive level at which
categories can delineate the structure of the environment.
The first core law states that basic level categories are the most inclusive
categories of which the elements share a significant high number of features. The
elements of a superordinate category share only few features, and that the elements
of a subordinate category have only little more common features than the elements
of a basic level category, but a low level of inclusion. For example, the elements of
the basic level category table are hypothesized to have more features in common
7
The horizontal dimension is concerned with the demarcation of categories in the specific levels of
abstraction which is explained by the prototypicality structure of the categories—the prototype of a
certain category has those attributes that are very representative for this category and not representative
for adjoining categories at the same level of abstraction. The vertical and the horizontal dimension of the
prototype theory are connected by the notion of cue validity (Rosch 1978).
8
Actually, Rosch et al. introduce four operationalizations for the theoretical concepts of VPT. However,
for the sake of brevity, we subsume two operationalizations concerning the shape of objects (Rosch et al.
1976, pp. 398–405) under the third operationalization of our reconstruction of Rosch’s theory.
9
The idea of special laws traces back to the inter-theoretical relation of specialization of the semantic
view of theories. A specialization T‘ of a theory T is a strengthening of the logical content of T by adding
further special laws to T (Balzer and Sneed 1977, pp. 201–202; Balzer et al. 1987, pp. 168–171).
123
than the elements of the superordinate category furniture. Furthermore, the elements
of the subordinate category kitchen table have only little more features in common,
but the category is much less inclusive.
Experimentally, test subjects rate the common features of the categories of the
application domain—for example, test subjects list attributes for the categories
vehicle, car, and limousine. The results of the experiment determine whether a
certain category of a taxonomy is a basic level category (car), a superordinate
category (vehicle) or a subordinate category (limousine).
Logically, the law has the following structure: If common features of a category
are rated by test subjects, then the category is a basic level category (theoretical
concept) if and only if it has a high level of inclusion (i.e. it is not the lowest level in
a hierarchy of three levels) with many common features (i.e. it has significantly
more common features than the category of the highest level of the hierarchy).10
The first core law operationalizing the concepts basic level category as well as
the concepts superordinate category and subordinate category is represented by the
frame of Fig. 3. The attributes map theory applications (i.e. categories) that are
rated by the test subjects onto the values representing the test results. Depending on
the test result, each category of the application domain is subsumed under one of the
theoretical concepts related to the values by equivalence relations.
The second core law states that basic level categories are the most inclusive
categories for which there are significant high numbers of similar sequences of
motor movements made in interaction with the elements of a category. For the
elements of a superordinate category there are only few similar sequences of motor
movements, and the elements of a subordinate category have only little more similar
sequences of motor movements than the elements of a basic level category, but a
low level of inclusion.
For example, there are more similar motor movements reported by test subjects
that are made in interaction with a table (basic level category) than with furniture
(superordinate category) and the number of similar motor movements for a kitchen
table (subordinate category) does not differ significantly from the corresponding
basic level category. The second core law is represented by the frame of Fig. 4.
The third core law states that basic level categories are the most inclusive
categories the elements of which are significantly similar in shape. The elements of
superordinate categories have only a low similarity of shape, and the elements of
subordinate categories are not significantly more similar to each other than the
elements of the corresponding basic level category, and have a low level of
inclusion. For instance, test subjects can hardly recognize overlapped shapes of
vehicles (shape of a bus overlapped by the shapes of an airplane, of a train, of a
bicycle, etc.) to be a vehicle (superordinate), but they can recognize overlapped
shapes of cars to be a car (basic level) and overlapped shapes of limousines to be a
limousine (subordinate level). The third core law is represented by the frame of
Fig. 5.
10
This sentence only explicates the structure of the law containing the theoretical concept basic level
category. Of course, there are corresponding laws for the concepts superordinate category and
subordinate category. We take the first core law to be the conjunction of these three laws.
123
superordinate
category
high level of inclusion with few
theory common features
applications
=
common high level of inclusion with many basic level
categories
features common features category
designated
by concrete
nouns low level of inclusion with many
common features
subordinate
category
Fig. 3 Theory frame representing the first core law of VPT operationalizing the theoretical concepts
superordinate category, basic level category, and subordinate category by means of common features
superordinate
category
theory common motor movements
applications
= common
motor high level of inclusion with many basic level
categories
movements common motor movements category
designated
by concrete
common motor movements
subordinate
category
Fig. 4 Theory frame representing the second core law of VPT operationalizing the theoretical concepts
superordinate category, basic level category, and subordinate category by means of common motor
movements
superordinate
category
high level of inclusion with low
theory similarity of shape
applications
=
similarity high level of inclusion with high basic level
categories
of shape similarity of shape category
designated
by concrete
nouns low level of inclusion with high
similarity of shape
subordinate
category
Fig. 5 Theory frame representing the third core law of VPT operationalizing the theoretical concepts
superordinate category, basic level category, and subordinate category by means of similarity of shape
The combination of the frames of Figs. 3, 4, and 5 in the frame of Fig. 6

represents the theory core of VPT. The attributes common features, common motor
movements, and similarity of shape map elements of the application domain, i.e. the
extension of the node theory applications, onto values determining the theoretical
123

common features
common high level of inclusion with many superordinate

features common features category
low level of inclusion with many

common features

theory common motor movements
applications
= common
categories high level of inclusion with many basic level
motor
designated movements common motor movements category
by concrete
high level of inclusion with low

similarity of shape
similarity high level of inclusion with high subordinate

of shape similarity of shape category
low level of inclusion with high

similarity of shape
Fig. 6 Theory frame representing the core of the vertical dimension of the prototype theory. The
constraints between the first values of each attribute and between the third values of each attribute are
neglected
concepts of the theory. The attributes are functions (and not partial functions)
because they have the same domains. Each attribute represents an empirical test
condition and, thus, is non-theoretical with respect to VPT. Each value represents a
necessary and sufficient condition for the theoretical concept that the value is linked
to by a determination link.
Since each value is sufficient and necessary for a certain theoretical concept, the
conjunction of the core laws entails consequences of the following form: If and only
if an element x of the application domain is mapped by an attribute of the frame
onto a value linked to a theoretical concept b, x is mapped by the other attributes of
the frame onto all other values linked to b. For example, if a category with a high
level of inclusion—for instance the category chair—is rated by test subjects to have
many common motor movements, then chair is a basic level category since the
value high level of inclusion with many common motor movements is sufficient for
the theoretical concept basic level category. Furthermore, the theoretical concept
basic level category is sufficient for each value linked to it by a determination link.
Hence, we can derive that the category chair has many common features and a high
similarity of shape. Consequences of this kind can be expressed by means of
123
constraints between values. Each pair of arrows connected by a dashed line is a

constraint. Thus, Fig. 6 contains three constraints. From all attributes of the frame
being non-theoretical attributes, it follows that all constraints are non-theoretical
and, hence, express empirical correlations. Rosch et al. (1976) experimentally
confirm the constraints with respect to the natural language categories of the
application domain. Hence, the laws operationalizing the theoretical concepts are
not analytic definitions, but laws of nature the conjunction of which contains
empirical information—if the operationalizations were analytic definitions, they
could not have been empirically confirmed.
We limit the constraints in the representation of VPT (Fig. 6) to the empirical
consequences following from the laws operationalizing the concept basic level
category (the dashed lines of Fig. 6). The constraint expresses that each value is
empirically equivalent (coextensive) to each other value connected by the
constraint. Strictly speaking, the constraint of Fig. 6 is an abbreviation for three
constraints each connecting two of the middle values of the attributes of the frame.
However, in the following, we will talk of a constraint (singular) connecting two or
more values instead of constraints (plural) each connecting exactly two values.
In the second part of Basic Objects in Natural Categories eight further
psychological hypotheses about basic level categories are added to the theory core.
The hypotheses are experimentally confirmed. Exemplarily, we will add one of the
eight hypotheses as a special law to the theory core of Fig. 6 as an element of the
periphery of VPT. We will show that the augmentation of a theory core by special
laws results in a strengthening of the logical content of the theory.
The special law in question is confirmed by the fifth experiment of Rosch et al.
(1976). In this experiment Rosch et al. (1976, p. 407) hypothesize that in a
taxonomy, basic level categories are the most inclusive categories the elements of
which are cognitively represented as pictures of the elements, i.e. it is hypothesized
that ‘‘basic objects are the most inclusive class at which it is possible to have a
representation which is isomorphic to the physical appearance of objects of the
class’’ (Rosch et al. 1976, p. 407). Because of this, hearing the name of an object of
a basic level category should aid the detection of a picture of that object from visual
noise.
Logically, the special law has the following structure: If test subjects detect the
picture of an object from visual noise primed by the name for that kind of object that
refers to a category x, then x is a basic level category, if and only if x has a high
level of inclusion and the detection rate is significantly higher than for non-primed
detection.
The detection should not be aided by the superordinate name of that object and
the subordinate name should not lead to better results than the basic level name.
The theory frame of Fig. 7 contains the augmented theory. In order to express the
distinction between the theory core and the periphery, the nodes of the attributes and
values of the theory core have bold lines and the lines of the nodes of the periphery
are thin. For the sake of clarity, we restrict the theoretical concepts to the concept
basic level category.
The logical structure of the extended theory frame of Fig. 7 entails further
constraints connecting the new value that is linked to the concept basic level
123

common features
common high level of inclusion with many

features common features
low level of inclusion with many

common features

common
high level of inclusion with many
motor
movements common motor movements
theory low level of inclusion with many

applications common motor movements
=
categories basic level
designated category
by concrete high level of inclusion with low
nouns similarity of shape
similarity high level of inclusion with high

of shape similarity of shape
low level of inclusion with high

similarity of shape
high level of inclusion with primed

detection equal to non-primed
detection
primed
high level of inclusion with primed
picture de-
detection significantly higher than
tection from
non-primed detection
visual noise
low level of inclusion with primed

detection as high as for basic level
Fig. 7 Theory frame representing the core of the vertical dimension of the prototype theory extended by
a special law constituting the theory periphery. The concepts superordinate category and subordinate
category are neglected
category to all other values linked to this concept. The fourth attribute again being a
non-theoretical attribute, all constraints are non-theoretical and hence expressing
empirical correlations. The theory frame makes immediately clear that the
additional special law logically strengthens the theory because the number of
empirical consequences increases. That is, the theory frame of Fig. 7 excludes more
empirical constellations than the theory frame of Fig. 6.
123
From a logical point of view there is no difference between the core laws and the
special laws of VPT because they all have the same logical structure. However, in
constructing their theory, Rosch et al. (1976) make a clear distinction between a set
of operationalizations determining the theoretical concepts of the theory (the core
laws) and additional laws that are confirmed in further experiments (the special
laws). Therefore, the distinction between core and periphery has pragmatic reasons.
That is, Rosch et al. (1976) give a higher priority to the laws of the theory core for
determining the theoretical concepts than to the special laws of the second part. This
means that if one of the additional laws of the second part is not confirmed for a
category x that was determined to be a basic level category by means of the core
laws of the first part, the conclusion would not be that x is not a basic level category,
but that the special law is wrong. This is an important distinction between two levels
in the structure of a theory that can be directly visualized in the frame model.
To sum up, theory frames can provide a clear analysis of the logical structure of
qualitative theories. The determination of theoretical concepts, the empirical
consequences entailed by the laws of a theory and the distinction between core and
periphery of a theory can be represented in a graphical and intuitive way.
3.2 A Diachronic Analysis of the Pro Drop Theory
In this section, we will provide a diachronic analysis of the pro drop theory (PDT)
from Perlmutter (1971) to Gilligan (1987) in the frame model.
The pro drop theory is part of Noam Chomsky’s (1981, 1986) principles and
parameters approach of universal grammar. According to Chomsky (1981, 1986) an
innate universal grammar contains grammatical principles that, prior to any
linguistic experience, are part of the biologically built-in language faculty of the
human mind and, thus, are implemented in all of the world’s languages. However, it
is obvious that there is a lot of cross-linguistic variation in the grammars of different
languages that the conception of an innate and therefore universal linguistic
knowledge has to account for. Due to the tension of innate linguistic knowledge on
the one hand and cross-linguistic variation on the other hand, Chomsky (1981)
introduces the notion of parameters that are postulated to be innate binary variables
corresponding to certain grammatical properties that are turned on or off depending
on the language that a child acquires.
The assumption of parameters initiated a considerable amount of linguistic
research in order to explain systematic grammatical differences between languages
by certain parameters. That is, it can be distinguished between languages in which a
certain parameter is turned on and languages in which it is turned off.
The pro drop parameter (also called null subject parameter) can be considered
the prototypical parameter of generative grammar. It is assumed to be the common
cause for a set of correlated but analytically independent grammatical phenomena—
this is what Chomsky (1981, p. 241) calls a clustering of properties. In the
Sects. 3.2.1–3.2.3, we will analyze the development of PDT with respect to
fundamental steps in its development beginning in the 1970s (Perlmutter 1971;
Kayne 1980; Rizzi 1982; van der Auwera 1984; Gilligan 1987).
123
Perlmutter (1971, pp. 99–122) noticed that for some languages a certain class of
grammatical properties correlate. That is, each language either has all of these
properties or it has none of them. In the following, we will briefly introduce the
grammatical properties null thematic subjects, null non-thematic subjects, and
subordinate subject extraction, the correlation of which is assumed to be caused by
the pro-drop-parameter:
Null thematic subjects (NTS): In English sentences it is impossible to omit the
thematic (i.e. referring) subject pronoun, but it is possible in the corresponding
Spanish sentences as exemplified in (1) to (3).11
(1) We have worked all day.
(2) *Have worked all day.12
(3) Hemos trabajado todo el dı́a.
((We) *have worked all day.)
Null non-thematic subjects (NNTS): The same difference between English and
Spanish appears with respect to non-thematic (i.e. non-referring expletive) subjects.
For an example, consider (4)–(6).
(4) It’s raining.
(5) *raining.
(6) Llueve.
((It’s) *raining.)
Subordinate subject extraction (SSE)13: In English it is possible to question the

object of a subordinate clause introduced by ‘‘that’’ (7), but it is not possible to
question the subject of a subordinate clause introduced by ‘‘that’’ (8). However, in
Spanish, it is possible to question the subject of a subordinate clause introduced by
the Spanish word ‘‘que’’ that corresponds to the English word ‘‘that’’ (9). Hence,
subordinate subject extractions are grammatical in Spanish, but not in English.
(7) What did you say that Laura bought?
(8) *What did you say that happened?
(9) Qué dijiste que pasó?
(What did you say (*that) happened?)
Perlmutter (1971, pp. 99–122) found out that each of the languages French,
Spanish, English, Italian, Arabic, Hebrew, Hausa, Walbiri, Basque and Serbo-
Croatian has either all or none of the grammatical properties NTS, NNTS, and SSE.
Reconstructing Perlmutter (1971) by means of a theory frame, the languages
11
In the following, we will always refer to standard English and standard Spanish. However, some of the
examples that are unacceptable in standard English might be acceptable in some idiolects.
12
The symbol ‘‘*’’ designates the unacceptability of the clause that follows the symbol.
13
Since the publication of Chomsky and Lasnik (1977), constructions of this kind have usually been
referred to as that-t filter violations. However, in this paper we use the original notion of Perlmutter
(1971) that, in accordance with Gilligan (1987, p. 105), is assumed to address the same grammatical
phenomena.
123
grammatical
NTS
ungrammatical
theory grammatical
applications
= NNTS
natural
languages ungrammatical
grammatical
SSE
ungrammatical
Fig. 8 Frame-based representation of the grammatical correlations found by Perlmutter (1971). The
correlations are represented as constraints. The constraint correlating the values ‘‘ungrammatical’’ is
neglected
investigated by Perlmutter are the theory applications, i.e. the elements of the
application domain. NTS, NNTS, and SSE are empirical, and, hence, non-
theoretical attributes. They map the theory applications onto the values grammatical
or ungrammatical depending on whether sentences of a language x with null
thematic subjects, null non-thematic subjects, or subordinate subject extraction are
grammatical or not in x (Fig. 8).
The constraints of the theory frame of Fig. 8 represent the correlations found by
Perlmutter (1971). However, one would hesitate to call the structure represented in
Fig. 8 a theory because as all attributes are non-theoretical, it only represents a set
of empirical generalizations completely expressed in a non-theoretical vocabulary.14
Instead, a theory should explain the empirical correlations represented in the frame
of Fig. 8.
In the principles and parameters approach, grammatical correlations that hold for
a wide range of languages are explained by certain parameters causing the
correlations. The constraint of Fig. 8 depends on the pro drop parameter dividing
the world’s languages into pro drop languages and non-pro drop languages. Hence,
being a pro drop language is the common cause for the grammatical properties NTS,
NNTS, and SSE within the language. That is, pro drop language and non-pro drop
language are the new theoretical concepts introduced in order to explain the
correlations of Fig. 8.
14
By a non-theoretical vocabulary we mean an antecedently available vocabulary (Hempel 1973, p. 372)
containing terms that either refer to observable entities or that are commonly used in science and
independent of the theory in question.
123
on
pro drop
parameter
off
grammatical pro drop

language
NTS
theory ungrammatical
applications
=
natural
languages grammatical
NNTS
non-pro drop
ungrammatical language
grammatical
SSE
ungrammatical
Fig. 9 Theory-frame of PDT by Perlmutter (1971) (PDTPerlmutter). The constraint between the values
ungrammatical is neglected
The theory frame of Fig. 9 represents PDT that theoretically extends the
constraint given in Fig. 8. First, the frame of Fig. 8 is augmented by the attribute
pro drop parameter with the values on and off. Parameters are theoretical entities
presupposed by Chomsky’s principles and parameters approach. Hence, the attribute
pro drop parameter is a theoretical attribute referring to a cognitive entity that is
related to certain grammatical properties. Second, the concepts pro drop language
and its negation non-pro drop language are introduced as theoretical concepts
multiply operationalized by the laws of PDT represented by the theory frame of
Fig. 9.
As pointed out in Sect. 2.2, in the theory frame of Fig. 9 the constraints are
entailed by the logical structure of the frame and, hence, explained by the laws of
PDT. As the attribute pro drop parameter is theoretical and all other attributes are
non-theoretical, the frame contains theoretical and non-theoretical constraints. All
pairs of arrows connected by a dashed line with one of the arrows pointing to the
values on or off of the theoretical attribute pro drop parameter are theoretical
constraints. That is, the correlations expressed by the theoretical constraints cannot
be determined independently of PDT. This result is quite intuitive: Determining
whether the pro drop parameter is switched on for a certain language if and only if,
say, NTS-constructions are grammatical in that language, depends on whether this
language is categorized as a pro drop language. In contrast, the non-theoretical
constraints connecting two values of non-theoretical attributes can be determined
123
independently of PDT. One does not need to presuppose PDT in order to

(dis)confirm whether, for example, NTS-constructions are grammatical in a
language x if and only if SSE-constructions are grammatical in x. Hence, all
constraints connecting two values of two non-theoretical attributes are non-
theoretical and express purely empirical correlations derived from the laws of PDT.
Epistemologically, the theoretical concept pro drop language is abductively
introduced as a common cause for the empirical correlations represented by the
constraint of the frame. More specifically, we classify the introduction of a new
theoretical concept as a common cause abduction, according to Schurz
(2008, 2016). Assuming a new theoretical entity by abductively introducing a
new theoretical concept is epistemologically justified if it is the common cause for
several empirical phenomena. Otherwise it would be a mere ad hoc increase of
ontology. In the case of PDT, the explanandum of the abducted theoretical common
cause is the set of empirical correlations of the constraints of Fig. 9 that, with
respect to the theory of principles and parameters, are considered to be best
explained by a certain parameter. Hence, the transition from the frame of Fig. 8 to
the frame of Fig. 9 represents an epistemologically justified abduction of a new
theoretical concept.
The theory frame of Fig. 9 represents the initialization of PDT by Perlmutter
(1971), although Perlmutter did not use the notion parameter.15 In the following, we
will analyze the fundamental steps in the development of PDT until 1987 by a
sequence of theory frames explicating the modifications in the logical structure of
the theory. We indicate the developmental steps by the names of the researchers
who introduced the modification of the theory. Hence, we call the frame of Fig. 9
PDTPerlmutter.
We say that a developmental step is operationally progressive if the successor
theory is logically strengthened by adding more laws operationalizing a theoretical
concept, and operationally regressive if the successor theory is logically weakened
by reducing the number of laws operationalizing a theoretical concept and/or
weakening a law by replacing the equivalence relation between a value and a
theoretical concept by an implication.
We call a developmental step applicationally progressive if elements are added
to the application domain of the predecessor theory, and applicationally regressive
if elements are omitted from the application domain of the predecessor theory.
Ceteris paribus, an operationally progressive (regressive) successor theory has an
increased (decreased) set of empirical consequences, and the same is true for an
applicationally progressive (regressive) successor theory.
15
Perlmutter (1971) is considered to be the first analysis that correlates the three grammatical
phenomena SSE, NTS and NNTS and explains the typological differences with a single principle.
Although Perlmutter (1971) did not call the explaining principle a parameter, in the generative literature
he is stated to be one of the initiators of parameter research, especially the research on the pro drop
parameter, since ‘‘the data Perlmutter noted is the first cross-linguistic generalization, i.e., parameter, in
generative grammar. For better or worse, it has served as the basis for all subsequent work on Pro-drop
phenomena’’ (Gilligan 1987, p. 76).
123
3.2.1 Operationally Progressive and Applicationally Regressive Development of PDT
Kayne (1980) adds a fourth operationalization of the theoretical concept pro drop
language to the laws of PDT. He noticed that in pro drop languages constructions
with subject inversion (SI) are grammatical. In a subject inversion construction, the
subject of a clause is moved to the right end into a post-verbal position. For
example, for English sentences (10) subject inversion leads to ungrammatical
structures (11). However, corresponding Italian sentences are fully grammatical
(12).
(10) Many friends have arrived.
(11) *Have arrived many friends.
(12) Sono arrivati molti amici.
The theory frame of PDTKayne is given in Fig. 10. The development from
PDTPerlmutter to PDTKayne is operationally progressive since the theory is strength-
ened by a fourth law operationalizing the theoretical concept pro drop language
(and non-pro drop language, respectively). Therefore, the number of constraints
increases because the determination link of each value grammatical is an
equivalence relation (and the same for the values ungrammatical) and, thus, each
value grammatical is connected to all other values grammatical by the constraints
(and the same for the values ungrammatical). However, the theory evolution is
applicationally regressive, since Kayne (1980) applies the theory only to the
languages English, French, and Italian reducing the application domain of the
theory.
3.2.2 Operationally Regressive and Applicationally Progressive Development of PDT
According to Rizzi’s (1982, pp. 142–144) analysis of the Northern Italian dialect
Paduan, the grammaticality of NTS-constructions is not derivable from the
grammaticality of NNTS-constructions since Paduan permits NNTS-constructions,
but rejects NTS-constructions. However, the grammaticality of NNTS-constructions
is still considered to be correlated to the grammaticality of SI-constructions as well
as SSE-constructions. In order to adapt PDT to the new empirical data, the
equivalence relation of the determination link between the value grammatical of the
attribute NTS and the theoretical concept pro drop language has to be replaced by
an implication with the value being the antecedent. Hence, we obtain the theory
frame of PDTRizzi in Fig. 11.
The frames of Figs. 10 and 11 show that the developmental step from PDTKayne
to PDTRizzi is operationally regressive since the theory is weakened logically. This
implies a reduction of the empirical consequences, i.e. a reduction of the content of
the constraints following from the laws of the theory. As the theory frame of
PDTRizzi shows, the connections of the constraints to the NTS-value grammatical
are one way implications stating the empirical generalizations that if in a language
123
on
pro drop
parameter
off

language
NTS
ungrammatical
theory grammatical
applications
= NNTS
natural non-pro drop
languages ungrammatical language
grammatical
SSE
ungrammatical
grammatical
SI
ungrammatical
Fig. 10 Theory-frame of PDTKayne. The development of PDT is operationally progressive and

applicationally regressive. The constraint between the values ungrammatical is neglected
NTS-constructions are grammatical, then the pro drop parameter is switched on and
the other three types of constructions are also grammatical, but not the other way
round.
However, the evolutionary step from PDTKayne to PDTRizzi is applicationally
progressive since the language Paduan is added to the application domain.
3.2.3 Radical Operationally Regressive and Applicationally Progressive

Development of PDT
In a comprehensive cross-linguistic survey, van der Auwera (1984) argues for the
independence of SSE-constructions from the other grammatical properties of pro
drop languages. Furthermore, Gilligan (1987) presents a survey that includes one
hundred languages that are balanced against the distribution of the world’s language
123
on
pro drop
parameter
off

language
NTS
ungrammatical
theory grammatical
applications
= NNTS
natural non-pro drop
languages ungrammatical language
grammatical
SSE
ungrammatical
grammatical
SI
ungrammatical
Fig. 11 Theory-frame of PDTRizzi. The development of PDT is operationally regressive and

apllicationally progressive. The constraint between the values ungrammatical is neglected
families and the number of languages they contain. That is to say, the more
languages a language family contains, the more languages of this family are
included in the sample with respect to the sample limit of one hundred languages.
However, the survey includes at least one language per family. For the sake of
brevity, we combine the theories developed by van der Auwera (1984) and Gilligan
(1987) to PDTAuwera/Gilligan. For the application domain we refer to Gilligan (1987,
pp. 102–104) and van der Auwera (1984). As they comprehensively extend the
theory applications of PDTRizzi the developmental step to PDTAuwera/Gilligan is
applicationally progressive.
The empirical evidence from both the samples of van der Auwera (1984) and
Gilligan (1987) falsifies all connections to the values of the attributes SI and SSE of
PDTRizzi. Therefore, the theory must be logically weakened in a way that the
123
on
pro drop
parameter
off
pro drop
language
theory grammatical
applications
= NTS
natural
languages ungrammatical
non-pro drop
language
grammatical
NNTS
ungrammatical
Fig. 12 Theory-frame of PDTAuwera/Gilligan. The development of PDT is operationally regressive and

applicationally progressive. The constraint between the values ungrammatical is neglected
connections mentioned are not entailed by the laws of the theory anymore—as it is
shown in the theory frame of Fig. 12 representing PDTAuwera/Gilligan.
The frames of Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 show that the developmental step from
PDTRizzi to PDTAuwera/Gillign is operationally regressive—there is a considerable
regression of the laws of PDT leaving only the theoretical attribute pro drop
parameter and the non-theoretical attributes NTS and NNTS in the operationaliza-
tion of the theoretical concept pro drop language. Therefore, the content of the
constraint connecting the values grammatical of the non-theoretical attributes is
strongly reduced.
To sum up, the frame model and particularly the notion of theory frames enables
a detailed, visualized and intuitive analysis of diachronic theory change. Sequences
of theory frames can explicate progressive and regressive developmental steps
including the increase or decrease of the empirical consequences entailed by the
laws of a theory.
4 Analyzing Quantitative Theories: A Theory Frame of Electrostatics
In this section, we will provide a frame-based analysis of a quantitative theory. This

analysis is of particular importance for the following reason: Up to now in the
philosophy of science, frames were only used to represent functions with a finite
range. If frames were restricted to attributes expressing functions with a finite range,
this would rule out frames as a model for analyzing theories because theories with
quantitative measurement could not be represented by frames.
123
In the literature on frames, so far there is only one attempt to represent

quantitative theoretical concepts determined by theoretical laws. Andersen et al.
(2000) tried to represent fundamental laws of electrostatics by means of a frame-like
schema in order to integrate T. Kuhn’s (2010, p. 316) notion of nomic concepts (i.e.
concepts that are determined by scientific laws and that do not allow for exceptions)
into the frame model. To this end, Andersen et al. (2000, pp. 232–237) propose a
combination of a partial frame representing problem situations that electrostatic
laws are applied to, and a meaning schema, representing certain properties of the
theoretical concepts of electrostatics. However, that schema is not a frame
determining theoretical concepts but a graphical illustration of certain properties of
concepts of electrostatics, which looks similar to a frame but has a basically
different logical structure. Hence, providing a representation of electrostatics or any
other theory containing quantitative theoretical concepts is still an unsolved problem
in the frame model as it is used in the philosophy of science.
As developed in Sect. 2.2, only a marginal extension of the frame model is
needed in order to represent functions with an infinite range and, hence, quantitative
theories with measurement on ratio scales. Taking up the example of Andersen et al.
(2000), in the following we will develop a theory frame representing basic laws of
electrostatics (Fig. 13).
The theoretical concepts of Fig. 13 referring to different kinds of electric fields
are determined by means of Coulomb’s Law.16 According to Coulomb’s Law, the
magnitude of the electrostatic force, Fðx1 ; x2 Þ that two charged particles x1 and x2
exert on each other is determined by Eq. (1):
jQðx1 ÞjjQðx2 Þj
Fðx1 ; x2 Þ ¼ ð1Þ
4 p e0 jSðx1 Þ S(x2 Þj2
Here, Q(x1) is the charge of particle x1 and Q(x2) is the charge of particle x2, e0 is
the permittivity constant, S(x) is the position of particle x, and jSðx1 Þ S(x2 Þj is the
distance between the particles x1 and x2. The magnitude Eðx; pÞ of the electric field
of a charged object x at some point p = S(x0) is determined by
Fðx; x0 Þ
Eðx; pÞ ¼ ð2Þ
Qðx0 Þ
with x0 being a particle placed at p and carrying a positive test charge Qðx0 Þ. On the
basis of Eq. (2), different electrostatic laws can be derived determining different
kinds of electric fields with respect to the charged object causing the fields. The
theory frame of Fig. 13 determines the electric fields of a point charge Q, of an
(infinite) line charge with a (uniform) linear charge density k, of an (infinite) sheet
of charge with a (uniform) surface charge density r, and of a parallel-plate
capacitor with two (infinite) plates each having a uniform surface charge density r.
16
For our representation of electrostatics, we refer to Halliday et al. (2008, pp. 561–627). However, the
presentation of electrostatics can also be found in almost all other introductory textbooks of physics. The
electrostatic force ~
F is a vector and the electric field ~
E is a vector field. In order to keep the mathematical
description as simple as possible, we will refer to the magnitude F of the electrostatic force ~ F and to the
magnitude E of the electric field ~ E.
123
E(x,p)
Q(x) electric field of a

E(x,p) = point charge
4 ( )
Q(x)
(x) electric field of a

E(x,p) = line charge
2 ( )
theory
applications
= (x)
electrostatic
objects x

E(x,p) = charged sheet
2 0
(x)

E(x,p) = parallel-plate
0 capacitor
S(x0)
Fig. 13 Theory frame determining different kinds of electric fields by means of Coulomb’s Law with
p = S(x0)
The magnitude of the electric field at any point p = S(x0) of a point charge Q(x)
with x being at the coordinate origin is directly given by (2). The electric field of an
(infinite) line charge with a uniform linear charge density k (charge per unit length)
is given by dividing the line into differential elements of charge each being a point
charge setting up a differential electric field dE~ at point p. The magnitude E of the
electric field at p is given by integrating the contributions to E of all the differential
elements of the line charge. The same idea holds for an (infinite) sheet of charge as
well as for a parallel-plate capacitor with two (infinite) plates except that k is
123
replaced by r (charge per unit area) and that the contributions of differential areas
to E are integrated. Hence, the electric field of a point charge is given by:
1
Eðx; pÞ ¼ Q(x) 4pe0 Sðx0 Þ2 ð3Þ
Likewise, the electric field of a line charge is given by

Eðx; pÞ ¼ kðx) ð2pe0 Sðx0 ÞÞ1 ; ð4Þ
the electric field of a sheet of charge is given by
Eðx; pÞ ¼ rðx) ð2e0 Þ1 ; ð5Þ

and the electric field of a parallel-plate capacitor is given by
Eðx; pÞ ¼ rðx) e1

0 : ð6Þ
The theory frame of Fig. 13 represents the laws of electrostatics introduced

above. The frame shows how different kinds of electric fields are determined by
different versions of Coulomb’s Law. The application domain contains charged
objects. The attributes of the frame map the charged objects onto real numbers with
E(x,p) and Q(x) being theoretical attributes depending on the theory of electrostatics
and S(x0) being a non-theoretical attribute the values of which can be determined
independently of the theory of electrostatics. The squares of the constraints of
Fig. 13 contain different versions of Coulomb’s Law relating the values of the
attributes to each other with respect to the geometry of the charged objects. Each
law containing values of at least one theoretical attribute, it follows that
electrostatics contains only theoretical constraints expressing theoretical laws.
The theoretical concepts of the theory frame, i.e. the right column whose nodes refer
to different kinds of electric fields, are determined by the laws of the constraint. For
instance, E(x,p) is the electric field of a line charge if and only if E(x,p) is
determined by Eq. (4).
To sum up, by means of theory frames for quantitative theories developed in
Sect. 2 it is possible to provide frame-based representations of theories with
measurement on ratio scales. As opposed to Andersen et al. (2000), the laws of
electrostatics are integrated in, but not appended to the frame structure. By its
functional character, the frame model naturally represents quantitative attributes
with real numbers as their values and scientific laws connecting the values and
determining the quantitative theoretical concepts contained in these laws. By means
of the distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical attributes as well as the
distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical constraints, it has been shown
that even a very basic theory of physics like electrostatics only contains theoretical
constraints presupposing the theory they are part of. In contrast, the non-theoretical
constraints of PDT or VPT can be (dis)confirmed independently of the respective
theories.
123
5 Comparison with the Structuralist View of Theories

and Conclusions
In the following, we will summarize our results and point out some important
relations to the structuralist view of theories, a common and very detailed model of
theory analysis. We argue that the rather complicated structuralist reconstruction of
scientific theories by means of set theory can be carried out within the frame model
in an intuitive and visual way that is highly practicable and easy to understand. For
the sake of brevity, we cannot provide a complete introduction to the structuralist
view of theories at this point.17 However, in order to indicate how structuralism
works, we provide an example of the basic elements of a structuralist reconstruction
of the pro drop theory PDT.
In structuralism, a theory T is represented extensionally by a set of models
M(T) containing those structures that satisfy the conditions of a set theoretic
predicate S(T) determining the concepts and the laws of a theory. Eliminating the
laws from S(T) generates the set theoretical predicate Sp(T) which defines the set
of potential models Mp(T) that contains those structures that satisfy the conceptual
conditions of T. Hence, Mp(T) is a superset of M(T). By additionally eliminating
the theoretical concepts from S(T), one obtains the set theoretical predicate
Spp(T) which defines the set of partial potential models Mpp(T), the elements of
which satisfy the conditions of the non-theoretical concepts of T. Applied to PDT,
the potential models Mp(PDT) are be defined by the following set theoretical
predicate:
Sp(PDT): x is a potential model of PDT (x 2 Mp(PDT)) if and only if there exist L,

{on, off}, {grammatical, ungrammatical}, PDL, NPDL, NTS, NNTS, SSE and PD,
such that
(1) x = \ L, {on, off}, {grammatical, ungrammatical}, PDL, NPDL, NTS, NNTS,
SSE, PD[
(2) L is a set of natural languages
(3) NTS: L 7! {grammatical, ungrammatical} is a function
(4) NNTS: L 7! {grammatical, ungrammatical} is a function
(5) SSE: L 7! {grammatical, ungrammatical} is a function
(6) PDL is a set of pro drop languages
(7) NPDL is a set of non-pro drop languages
(8) PD: L 7! {on, off} is a function
According to Sp(PDT), the potential models of PDT are structures given by

Sp(PDT)-(1). The italic terms refer to functions and the non-italic terms to sets.
Sp(PDT)-(2-5) represent the concepts that can be determined independently of PDT
17
To readers who are not familiar with structuralism, we recommend Balzer et al. (1987) for a
comprehensive or Moulines (2002) for a short introduction.
123
and are hence non-theoretical.18 Sp(PDT)-(6-8) represent the concepts that depend
on PDT and thus are theoretical with respect to PDT. The models of PDT are those
potential models that additionally satisfy the laws of PDT. The models are defined
by the set theoretical predicate S(PDT).
S(PDT): x is a model of PDT (x 2 M(PDT)) if and only if there exist L, {on, off},
{grammatical, ungrammatical}, PDL, NPDL, NTS, NNTS, SSE and PD, such that
SSE, PD[
(2) x 2 Mp(PDT)
(3) 8yðððPDðyÞ ¼ onÞ $ PDLðyÞÞ ^ ððPDðyÞ ¼ off Þ $ NPDLðyÞÞÞ
(4) 8yðððNTSðyÞ ¼ grammaticalÞ $ PDLðyÞÞ ^ ððNTSðyÞ
¼ ungrammaticalÞ $ NPDLðyÞÞÞ
(5) 8yðððNNTSðyÞ ¼ grammaticalÞ $ PDLðyÞÞÞ ^ ððNNTSðyÞ
(6) 8yððSSEðyÞ ¼ grammaticalÞ $ PDLðyÞÞ ^ ððSSEðyÞ
S(PDT) corresponds to the theory frame of Fig. 9. The laws represented by

S(PDT)-(3-6) correspond to the vertical paths of Fig. 9. In order to represent the
empirical level of PDT, the theoretical terms and the laws containing the theoretical
terms are cut off. The remaining set theoretical predicate defines the partial potential
models of PDT.
Spp(PDT): x is a partial potential model of PDT (x 2 Mpp(PDT)) if and only if there

exist L, {on, off}, {grammatical, ungrammatical}, PDL, NPDL, NTS, NNTS, SSE
and PD, such that
(1) x = \ L, {grammatical, ungrammatical}, NTS, NNTS, SSE[
(2) L is a set of natural languages
(3) NTS: L 7! {grammatical, ungrammatical} is a function
(4) NNTS: L 7! {grammatical, ungrammatical} is a function
(5) SSE: L 7! {grammatical, ungrammatical} is a function
In structuralism, the applications of a theory are an essential part of the theory

called intended applications. The set of intended applications I(T) contains those
non-theoretical structures of the theory that can be augmented by the theory’s
18
In structuralism the distinction between theoretical and empirical concepts is replaced by the
distinction between T-theoretical and T-non-theoretical concepts. The two distinctions are not equivalent.
In structuralism, concepts are always theoretical with respect to a certain theory T (and could be non-
theoretical with respect to another theory). However, the difference between the two distinctions not
being the point of this paper, we take ‘‘T-theoretical’’ to be synonymous to ‘‘theoretical’’ and ‘‘T-non-
theoretical’’ to ‘‘empirical’’ and ‘‘non-theoretical’’.
123
theoretical functions and satisfy the laws of the theory. Hence, we get I(T) (
Mpp(T). Finally, a theory T consists of a theory core K(T) containing the sets Mp(T),
M(T) and Mpp(T)19 and of the set of intended applications I(T) (Balzer et al. 1987,
pp. 36–40). Thus, a theory T is given by T = \ K,I [ .
Having pointed out the basic notions of the structuralist view of theories, in the
following we will summarize our results and indicate important relations to
structuralism.
In Sect. 2, we developed the notion of theory frames and contrasted it with
taxonomy frames used to analyze hierarchies of scientific concepts. We distin-
guished between theory frames for qualitative theories on the one hand and
quantitative theory frames on the other hand. Theory frames for qualitative theories
contain classificatory theoretical concepts that are multiply operationalized by the
laws of a theory. Theory frames for quantitative theories contain quantitative
theoretical concepts that allow for exact measurement of ratio scales.
We pointed out that the functional attribute-value structure of theory frames is
well equipped for the representation of the structure of scientific laws and of the
theoretical concepts determined by these laws. The entities to which a theory is
applied are represented by the concept theory applications the extension of which is
called the application domain. The application domain is the unification of the
domains of the attributes of the theory frame. We applied theory frames to two
qualitative and one quantitative theory in the Sects. 3 and 4. The application domain
of theory frames corresponds to the set of intended applications in structuralism.
Subsuming the applications of a theory under the notion of a theory is an important
novelty of the structuralist view of theories. As this article’s frames show, theory
representation in the frame model also contains the applications of a theory in the
application domain.
In Sect. 3.1, the theory frame of VPT represents the structure of the laws of VPT
as well as the determination of the theoretical concepts of the theory. The constraint
of the frame represents the empirical consequences entailed by the laws of the
theory determining the theoretical concepts.20 Hence, theory frames enable an
explication of the explanatory role of theoretical concepts as a common cause for
analytically independent empirical phenomena. Further, the theory frame of Fig. 7
represents the distinction between the core and the periphery of VPT that is based on
the pragmatic distinction between laws determining the theoretical concepts and
laws concerning the entities to which the theoretical concepts refer.21 In structuralist
terms, the theory frame of Fig. 7 is a specialization of the theory frame of Fig. 6,
adding a new law to VPT and, hence, strengthening the theoretical content of VPT
(ibid., pp. 168–170). The set of models, satisfying the theory of Fig. 7 would be a
subset of the set of models satisfying the theory of Fig. 6. In structuralism, the
19
Actually, the theory core contains as further elements a global link and a global constraint not
discussed in this paper for the sake of brevity. Note that the expression ‘‘constraint’’ has a different
meaning in structuralism and in our frame model.
20
Note that in structuralism the notion constraint has another meaning than in the frame model (Balzer
et al. 1987, pp. 40–47).
21
Note that the expression ‘‘theory core’’ has a different meaning in structuralism and in our frame
model.
123
theory frame of Fig. 7 would be called a theory net, which is a theory that is
augmented by one or more special laws (ibid., pp. 172–177).
The succession of the theory frames from Fig. 9 to Fig. 12 demonstrates the
operational and applicational strengthening or weakening of PDT in its historical
development. In structuralism, diachronic theory change is called a theory evolution
consisting of a succession of theory nets in a certain time interval (ibid., ch. 5).
Stegmüller (1986, p. 114f.) calls a theory evolution theoretically progressive if the
successor theory is a specialization of the predecessor theory and theoretically
regressive if laws of the predecessor theory are omitted in the successor theory, for
example because of a conflict with experience. Hence, the diachronic theory change
of PDT from the theory frame of Fig. 9 to the theory frame of Fig. 10 is
theoretically progressive in the sense of Stegmüller, and the changes from the theory
frame of Fig. 10 to the theory frame of Fig. 12 are theoretically regressive.
Further, a theory evolution is empirically progressive if the number of intended
applications increases and empirically regressive if it decreases. Thus, the theory
change from Figs. 9 to 10 is empirically regressive and the changes from Figs. 10 to
12 are empirically progressive in the structuralist sense. In sum, our notions
operationally progressive/regressive are a special case of the structuralist notions
theoretically progressive/regressive restricted to laws expressing multiple opera-
tionalizations and our notions applicationally progressive/regressive fully conform
to the structuralist notions empirically progressive/regressive.22
Section 4 provides a frame-based representation of a quantitative theory. The
theory frame contains Coulomb’s Law for different kinds of charged entities. The
attribute-value structure of the frame in addition with the constraints connecting the
values show how the theoretical concepts, that refer to different kinds of electric
fields, are determined by the laws of electrostatics. The distinction between
qualitative and quantitative measurement depends on the range of the functions used
for measurement. The values R of the attributes of Fig. 13 designate that
measurement is based on ratio scales in contrast to the qualitative measurement
in VPT and PDT. In structuralism, this distinction would be determined by the set
theoretic predicate defining the potential models of a theory, i.e. those models that
satisfy the conditions of the conceptual framework of a theory.
To sum up: So far, by means of three case studies, it has been shown that the
notion of theory frames is an expedient tool to analyze scientific theories. The
functional structure of a theory frame is ideally suited for the representation of
scientific laws and concepts. Further, we indicated that theory frames developed so
far can express important aspects of the highly detailed structuralist view of
theories.
22
Similarly, our notions empirically progressive and applicationally progressive correspond to the
notion of Lakatosian progress (Moulines 2000, p. 189 f.). Moulines (2000) provides a general analysis of
scientific progress also including progress with (partial) incommensurability. Incommensurability not
being the topic of this article, we did not develop a frame-based model for incommensurable theory shifts
here. However, Andersen et al. (2006) have shown that the frame model is an appropriate tool to represent
semantic concept shifts between incommensurable theories. Therefore, we are confident that future work
will show that scientific progress between incommensurable theories is analyzable by means of theory
frames.
123
However, comparing theory frames to the structuralist view of theories the

following question arises: What is the benefit of a frame-based theory representation
if the tools of the frame model’s theory analysis correspond to those of the
structuralist model? That is, why do we need a further model of philosophical theory
representation? There are three answers to this question:
First, in contrast to the rather complicated structuralist model presupposing an
extensive formal apparatus, the graphical character of the frame model provides a
clear and intuitive representation of the structure of a theory.23 The restricted
practicability of the structuralist model due to its elaborate set theoretical foundations
might be one of the reasons why in spite of its richness of detail, the structuralist
model has never really been established as a standard model for philosophical theory
reconstruction. As opposed to structuralism, the frame-model is easy to understand
and highly practicable due to its graphical representation of theories. That is not to say
that we claim that the frame model could replace structuralism as a tool for analyzing
theories. The advantage of intuitive visualizations and practicability depends on the
representations being equivalently detailed and precise. Based on plenty of theory
reconstructions, structuralism does provide many such detailed explications of
elements of scientific theories, like intertheoretical reduction, the empirical claim of a
theory, approximation and many more, which are not part of the frame model at its
current level of development. Future work on the frame model will show whether it
can provide equally detailed and precise theory representations and could thus be
suggested as a full alternative to structuralism.
Second, theory frames allow for analyses of the structure of the theoretical laws of
a theory and, additionally, of the empirical laws that are entailed by the theoretical
laws, as exemplified by the frames of VPT and PDT. That is not to say that it is
impossible to define a theory containing theoretical and non-theoretical (empirical)
laws in structuralism. According to PDT, the subsequent definition follows:
S*(PDT): x is a model* of PDT (x 2 M*(PDT)) if and only if there exist L, {on,

off}, {grammatical, ungrammatical}, PDL, NPDL, NTS, NNTS, SSE and PD, such
that
SSE, PD[
(2) x 2 M(PDT)
(3) 8yðððNTSðyÞ ¼ grammaticalÞ $ ðNNTSðyÞ ¼ grammaticalÞÞ
(4) 8yðððNTSðyÞ ¼ ungrammaticalÞ $ ðNNTSðyÞ ¼ ungrammaticalÞÞ
(5) 8yðððNTSðyÞ ¼ grammaticalÞ $ ðSSEðyÞ ¼ grammaticalÞÞ
(6) 8yðððNTSðyÞ ¼ ungrammaticalÞ $ ðSSEðyÞ ¼ ungrammaticalÞÞ
(7) 8yðððNNTSðyÞ ¼ grammaticalÞ $ ðSSEðyÞ ¼ grammaticalÞÞ
(8) 8yðððNNTSðyÞ ¼ ungrammaticalÞ $ ðSSEðyÞ ¼ ungrammaticalÞÞ
23
For a direct comparison between the structuralist model and the frame model, see Kornmesser (2012),
which contains a structuralist reconstruction of PDT including the diachronic theory evolution from 1980
to 1987 set out in this article within the frame model.
123
The laws S*(PDT)-(3–8) being derived from the laws of S(PDT), the sets of
models determined by S(PDT) and S*(PDT) are equivalent (M(PDT) = M*(PDT)).
However, S*(PDT) does not show that the non-theoretical (empirical) laws are
entailed by the theoretical laws of S(PDT). In contrast, following the double arrows
of the frame of Fig. 9 directly shows the logical relation between the theoretical
laws (given by the vertical edges) and the empirical generalizations (given by the
constraints).
Third, structuralism is not designed to exclusively represent the whole empirical
level of a theory. The set theoretical predicate Spp(T) defining the empirical
concepts of a theory does not contain any laws, i.e. it does not contain any empirical
laws either. Hence, the empirical level of PDT in Fig. 8 could not be represented by
Spp(PDT) because Spp(PDT) does not contain any laws. Further, it could not be
represented by S(PDT) either because S(PDT) contains theoretical concepts that are
not part of the empirical level as given by the theory frame of Fig. 8.
It could be argued that the theory of Fig. 8 is some kind of pre-theory (call it
PDT‘) whose models can be defined by a separate predicate S(PDT‘). S(PDT‘) does
not contain any theoretical concepts because the functions NTS, NNTS, and SSE are
given independently of PDT‘. In structuralism, the relation between PDT‘ and PDT
can be described as a theoretization (Balzer et al. 1987, p. 251). A theoretization is a
relation between a predecessor theory T‘ and a successor theory T in which the non-
theoretical concepts of T are determined by the predecessor theory T‘. In the
successor theory T, new theoretical concepts and laws containing these concepts are
introduced. For example, Newtonian mechanics introducing the new theoretical
concepts force and mass can be reconstructed as a theoretization of kinematics
determining the non-theoretical concepts of Newtonian mechanics, i.e. the position
function. However, with respect to PDT this point of view is historically inadequate.
In physics, there was a historical developmental step from kinematics to Newtonian
mechanics. For PDT, in contrast, the empirical correlations of Fig. 8 and the theory
of Fig. 9 were developed simultaneously. Perlmutter (1971) assumed a common
cause for the correlations of Fig. 8 that later was called pro drop parameter. Hence
it would be misleading to call the theory frame of Fig. 8 a predecessor theory of the
successor theory of Fig. 9. Theoretization as a relation between two separate
theories would thus not be an adequate tool to reconstruct the relation between the
theory frames of Figs. 8 and 9. Introducing the new theoretical concepts pro drop
parameter and pro drop language is an abductional process of finding the best
explanation for the empirically explored correlations. The theory frames of Figs. 8
and 9 explicate this abductional process, which is a certain kind of scientific process
that up to now has not been explored in structuralism.24
We do not think that it would be impossible for structuralism to meet the three
challenges mentioned above, but we do think that currently, with regards to these
points, the frame model has an advantage over structuralism.
To sum up, the frame model is a promising alternative to common approaches to
theory analysis in the philosophy of science. It provides tools for investigating a
24
For this point we are indebted to an anonymous reviewer.
123
considerable amount of aspects of scientific theories in an intuitively accessible

way.
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Analyzing Theories in The Frame Model

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Analyzing Theories in the Frame Model

Stephan Kornmesser1 • Gerhard Schurz2

Received: 28 August 2017 / Accepted: 15 October 2018

Keywords Frame Theory Theoretical concept Qualitative and quantitative

& Stephan Kornmesser

In Sect. 3, we will apply theory frames to two qualitative theories, providing a

2 The Frame Model: Taxonomy Frames and Theory Frames

2.1 Taxonomy Frames

In the following, we will introduce taxonomy frames by means of a standard

orbit center planet star

orbit shape parabolic planet

2.2 Theory Frames

We call a frame representing a scientific theory a theory frame. A theory frame

(a) theory applications

(b) theory applications Law

For example, the charge of an object is a theoretical attribute of electrostatics

Non-theoretical constrains express empirical correlations that can be determined

3 Analyzing Qualitative Theories by Frames

In this section, we will provide frame-based analyses of two qualitative theories

3.1 A Synchronic Analysis of the Vertical Prototype Theory

In the following, we will provide a frame-based analysis of VPT of Rosch et al.

The combination of the frames of Figs. 3, 4, and 5 in the frame of Fig. 6

high level of inclusion with few

common high level of inclusion with many superordinate

low level of inclusion with many

high level of inclusion with few

high level of inclusion with low

similarity high level of inclusion with high subordinate

low level of inclusion with high

constraints between values. Each pair of arrows connected by a dashed line is a

high level of inclusion with few

common high level of inclusion with many

low level of inclusion with many

high level of inclusion with few

theory low level of inclusion with many

similarity high level of inclusion with high

low level of inclusion with high

high level of inclusion with primed

low level of inclusion with primed

3.2 A Diachronic Analysis of the Pro Drop Theory

Subordinate subject extraction (SSE)13: In English it is possible to question the

grammatical pro drop

independently of PDT. One does not need to presuppose PDT in order to

3.2.1 Operationally Progressive and Applicationally Regressive Development of PDT

3.2.2 Operationally Regressive and Applicationally Progressive Development of PDT

grammatical pro drop

Fig. 10 Theory-frame of PDTKayne. The development of PDT is operationally progressive and

3.2.3 Radical Operationally Regressive and Applicationally Progressive

grammatical pro drop

Fig. 11 Theory-frame of PDTRizzi. The development of PDT is operationally regressive and

Fig. 12 Theory-frame of PDTAuwera/Gilligan. The development of PDT is operationally regressive and

4 Analyzing Quantitative Theories: A Theory Frame of Electrostatics

In this section, we will provide a frame-based analysis of a quantitative theory. This

In the literature on frames, so far there is only one attempt to represent

Q(x) electric field of a

(x) electric field of a

(x) electric field of a

(x) electric field of a

Likewise, the electric field of a line charge is given by

Eðx; pÞ ¼ rðx) ð2e0 Þ1 ; ð5Þ

Eðx; pÞ ¼ rðx) e1

S(PDT): x is a model of PDT (x 2 M*(PDT)) if and only if there exist L, {on,