Mendoza-Ong vs. Sandiganbayan 414 SCRA 181 23oct2003 PDF

9/2/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 414
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 23, 2003 181

Mendoza-Ong vs. Sandiganbayan
*
G.R. Nos. 146368-69. October 23, 2003.
MADELEINE MENDOZA-ONG, petitioner, vs. HON.

SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Motions to

Quash; The fundamental test of the viability of a motion to quash
on the ground that the facts averred in the information do not
amount to an offense is whether the facts alleged would establish
the essential elements of the crime as defined by law, and in this
examination, matters aliunde are not considered.—Petitioner
claims that in a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 3(c)
of R.A. 3019 as amended, the law requires that the gift received
should be “manifestly excessive” as defined by Section 2(c) of the
same Act. She adds that it is imperative to specify the exact value
of the five drums of diesel fuel allegedly received by Mayor Ong as
public officer to determine whether such is “manifestly excessive”
under the circumstances. The fundamental test of the viability of
a motion to quash on the ground that the facts averred in the
information do not amount to an offense is whether the facts
alleged would establish the essential elements of the crime as
defined by law. In this examination, matters aliunde are not
considered.
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
Elements of Violation of Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 3019.—Petitioner
is charged specifically with violation of Section 3(c) of Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended. The pertinent portions of said law
provide: SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: . . . (c) Di-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001744c99190399aeb922003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/11
182
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
rectly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or

other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another,
from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or
capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any
Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given
or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act. . .
. Based on the foregoing, the elements of the offense charged in
the assailed information are as follows: (1) the offender is a public
officer; (2) he has secured or obtained, or would secure or obtain,
for a person any government permit or license; (3) he directly or
indirectly requested or received from said person any gift, present
or other pecuniary or material benefit for himself or for another;
and (4) he requested or received the gift, present or other
pecuniary or material benefit in consideration for help given or to
be given.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Words and
Phrases; “Receiving Any Gift,” Explained; The value of the gift is
not mentioned at all as an essential element of the offense charged
under Section 3 (c), and there appears no need to require the
prosecution to specify such value in order to comply with the
requirements of showing a prima facie case; Evidently the
legislature is aware that in implementing R.A. 3019, it will be
precedents that will guide the court on the issue of what is or what
is not manifestly excessive.—SEC. 2. Definition of terms.—As used
in this Act, the term—. . . (c) “Receiving any gift” includes the act
of accepting directly or indirectly a gift from a person other than a
member of the public officer’s immediate family, in behalf of
himself or of any member of his family or relative within the
fourth civil degree, either by consanguinity or affinity, even on the
occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like
Christmas, if the value of the gift is under the circumstances
manifestly excessive. . . . Petitioner contends that pursuant to her
reading of the above provision, the value of the alleged gift must
be specified in the information. But note that Section 2(c)
abovecited mentions a situation where (1) the value of the gift is
manifestly excessive; (2) from a person who is not a member of the
public officer’s immediate family; and (3) even on the occasion of a
family celebration or national festivity. In contrast, Section 3 (c)
earlier quoted in the present case applies regardless of whether
the gift’s value is manifestly excessive or not, and regardless of
the occasion. What is important here, in our view, is whether the

gift is received in consideration for help given or to be given by the
public officer. The value of the gift is not mentioned at all as an
essential element of the offense charged under Section 3 (c), and
there appears no need to require the prosecution to specify such
value in order to comply with the requirements of showing a
prima facie case. Evidently the legislature is aware that in
implementing R.A. 3019, it will be precedents that will guide the
court on the issue of what is or what is not manifestly excessive.
183
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 23, 2003 183

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

Agabin, Verzola, Hermoso & Layaoen Law Offices for
petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action 1

for certiorari assails
Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 2
May 8, 2000, denying
petitioner’s Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal
Case 3No. 23848, for violation of Section 3(c) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended.
4
Petitioner also impugns said court’s
Resolution dated November 9, 2000, denying her Motion
for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as
follows:
Sometime in February 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of5
Laoang, Northern Samar, passed Resolution No. 93-132,
authorizing the
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 30-35.

2 Records, Vol. II, pp. 480-503.
3 The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
4 Rollo, pp. 36-37.
5 Id., at pp. 181-182.
RESPECTFULLY REQUESTING LT. COL. EDUARDO J. LENA, CSC (CE) PA

OF THE 53RD ENGINEERING BATTALION, PA, TO LEND ONE GRADER,
PAY LOADER AND A DUMP TRUCK TO THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF
LAOANG, NORTHERN SAMAR TO BE USED FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF
THE BUS TERMINAL IN BARANGAY RAWIS, LAOANG, THIS PROVINCE.
...
RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to respectfully request Lt. Col. Eduardo J.
Lena—CSC (CE) PA of the 53rd Engineering Battalion, PA, to lend one grader,
pay loader and a dump truck to the municipal government of Laoang, this
province to be used for the improvement of the bus terminal area in Barangay
Rawis, this municipality.
FURTHER RESOLVED, that the municipal government shall likewise shoulder
the expenses for fuel and oil and the subsistence of
184

municipality to borrow heavy equipment from the

Philippine Army’s 53rd Engineering Battalion, to be
utilized in the improvement of Laoang’s Bus Terminal.
Resolution No. 93-132 likewise mandated the municipal
government to shoulder the expenses for fuel, oil, and the
subsistence allowances of the heavy equipment operators
for the duration of the project.
Allegedly, however, the borrowed Army equipment was 6
diverted by the petitioner, who was then the town mayor of
Laoang, to develop some of her private properties in Rawis,
Laoang, Northern Samar. A concerned citizen and ex-
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Laoang, Juanito G.
Poso, Sr., filed a complaint
7
against petitioner and nine (9)
other municipal officers with the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB), Visayas, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
Acting on the complaint, Graft Investigation Officer
Alfonso S. Sarmiento of the OMB ordered herein petitioner
and her co-accused to submit their respective counter-
affidavits and8 other controverting evidence. Thereafter, in
a Resolution dated August 16, 1995, investigator
Sarmiento recommended the filing of the appropriate
criminal action against petitioner for violation
9
of Sections
3(c) and (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended. Despite strenuous
opposition and objections by the defense, on August 1,
1997, two informations were filed against her at the
Sandiganbayan docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23847
and 23848, to wit:
(1) Criminal Case No. 23847
“That on or about 15 February 1993, or sometime thereafter, in

the Municipality of Laoang, Northern Samar, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public officer, being then the
Municipal Mayor of Laoang, committing the crime herein charged
in relation to, while in the performance and taking
_______________
the heavy equipment operators while the improvement of said area is still in
operation.
...
6 Later, Governor of Northern Samar. See Records, Vol. II, p. 480.
7 Vice Mayor Remus S. Dulay and Municipal Councilors Diosdado D. Ong,
Democrito V. Aquino, Emilio T. Giray, Fred P. Deananeas, Francisco A. Tang, Jose
B. Bautista, Eddie Cerbito, Concepcion E. Lipata.
8 Rollo, pp. 40-44.
9 Id., at p. 44.
185
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 23, 2003 185

advantage of her official functions, did then and there willfully,

unlawfully and criminally, through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, cause undue injury to the Government and give
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to herself and
spouses Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao when she, in the discharge of
her official or administrative functions, caused the improvement
or development of her private land in Barangay Rawis through
the use of the equipment and resources of the Philippine Army, to
the damage and prejudice 10of the Government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
This, however, was amended on October 27, 1998, so that

Criminal Case No. 23847 would read as follows:

in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of
her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, through manifest partiality and evident bad faith,
cause undue injury to the Government and give unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to her husband, Hector Ong,

herself, and/or her family and to spouses Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao
when she, in the discharge of her official or administrative
functions, caused the improvement or development of a private
land owned by her husband. Hector Ong, herself and/or her
family in Barangay Rawis through the use of the equipment and
resources of the Philippine Army, to the damage and prejudice of
the Government. 11
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
(2) Criminal Case No, 23848

in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of
her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, request or receive, directly or indirectly, a gift, present
or other pecuniary or material benefit in the form of five (5)
drums of diesel fuel, for herself or for another from the spouses
Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao, persons for whom accused Mendoza-
Ong, in any manner or capacity, has
_______________
10 Records, Vol. I, p. 1.
11 Records, Vol. I, p. 372.
186

secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Municipal

Government permit or license anent the operation of the bus
company, JB Lines, owned by the aforenamed spouses, in
consideration for the help given
12
or to be given by the accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
On September 15, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash

with the Sandiganbayan alleging in the main that: (1) the
informations especially in Criminal Case No. 23848, failed
to allege facts constituting an offense; (2) that the officer
who filed the information has no authority to do so; and (3)
that the accused was deprived of her right to due process
and to the speedy disposition of cases against her.
On May 8, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s

Motion to Quash. Petitioner duly moved for reconsideration
but this was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
order dated November 9, 2000.
Hence, the instant petition with assigned errors faulting
respondent court as follows:
I. RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT FAILED TO
DISMISS THE INFORMATIONS FILED AGAINST
PETITIONER WHICH CLEARLY DO NOT
ALLEGE SUFFICIENT FACTS CONSTITUTING
THE OFFENSE HENCE FAILING TO ALLEGE A
PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST PETITIONER,
ACCUSED THEREIN.
II. RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
PETITIONER’S MOTION TO QUASH THE
INFORMATIONS FILED BY AN OFFICER WHO
HAS NO AUTHORITY TO DO SO AND DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE HEAD OF THE
PROSECUTION DIVISION OF RESPONDENT
COURT HAD RECOMMENDED THE DISMISSAL
OF SAID CASES.
III. RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED
TO DISMISS THE INFORMATIONS AGAINST
ACCUSED WHO HAD BEEN DEPRIVED OF DUE
PROCESS AND SPEEDY DETERMINATION OF
THE CASE IN CLEAR DISREGARD OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT’S RULINGS THAT
INORDINATE DELAY IN THE CONDUCT OF
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS 13 WOULD
WARRANT DISMISSAL OF THE CASE.
_______________
12 Records, Vol. II, p. 421.

13 Rollo, pp. 8-9.
187
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 23, 2003 187

Simply put, we find that the sole issue for resolution now is
whether the Sandiganbayan gravely erred or gravely
abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Quash filed
by petitioner, particularly on the ground that the
information in Criminal Case No. 23848 does not constitute
an offense. The other assigned errors are, in our view,
without sufficient merit and deserve no further
consideration.
Petitioner claims that in a criminal prosecution for
violation of Section 3(c) of R.A. 3019 as amended, the law
requires that the gift received should be “manifestly
excessive” as defined by Section 2(c) of the same Act. She
adds that it is imperative to specify the exact value of the
five drums of diesel fuel allegedly received by Mayor Ong
as public officer to determine whether
14
such is “manifestly
excessive” under the circumstances.
The fundamental test of the viability of a motion to
quash on the ground that the facts averred in the
information do not amount to an offense is whether the
facts alleged would establish the essential elements of the
crime as defined by law. In 15this examination, matters
aliunde are not considered. Petitioner is charged
specifically with violation of Section 3(c) of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended. The pertinent portions of said law
provide:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
...
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for
another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any
manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or
obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the
help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of
this Act.
...
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 11-12. See also Memorandum for the Petitioner, p. 9.

15 Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 109376, 20 January 2000, 322
SCRA 655, 664.
188

Based on the foregoing, the elements of the offense charged

in the assailed information are as follows: (1) the offender
is a public officer; (2) he has secured or obtained, or would
secure or obtain, for a person any government permit or
license; (3) he directly or indirectly requested or received
from said person any gift, present or other pecuniary or
material benefit for himself or for another; and (4) he
requested or received the gift, present or other pecuniary or
material
16
benefit in consideration for help given or to be
given.
In the instant case, we find that the information in
Crim. Case No. 23848 alleged that: (1) accused Madeleine
Mendoza-Ong, a public officer, being then the Municipal
Mayor of Laoang, (2) committed the crime charged in
relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage
of her official functions, (3) did request or receive directly or
indirectly, a gift, present or other pecuniary or material
benefit in the form of five drums of diesel fuel, for herself or
for another, from spouses Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao, persons
for whom accused Mendoza-Ong, (4) has secured or
obtained, or will secure or obtain, a Municipal Government
permit or license anent the operation of the bus company,
JB Lines, owned by said spouses, in consideration for help
given or to be given by the accused. After considering
thoroughly this averment as formulated by the prosecution,
we are not prepared to say that the impugned information
omitted an element needed to adequately charge a violation
of Section 3(c) of R.A. 3019.
Petitioner pleads that the pertinent statute must be
read in its entirety. She argues that a provision of R.A.
3019 such as Section 3(c) must be interpreted in light of all
other provisions, particularly the definition of “receiving
any gift,” under Section 2(a) thereof, which reads as
follows:
SEC. 2. Definition of terms.—As used in this Act, the term—

...
(c) “Receiving any gift” includes the act of accepting directly or
indirectly a gift from a person other than a member of the public
officer’s immediate family, in behalf of himself or of any member
of his family or relative within the fourth civil degree, either by
consanguinity or affinity, even on the occasion of a family
celebration or national festivity like
_______________
16 Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 123045, 16 November 1999, 318 SCRA

80, 90.
189
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 23, 2003 189

Christmas, if the value of the gift is under the circumstances

manifestly excessive.
...
Petitioner contends that pursuant to her reading of the

above provision, the value of the alleged gift must be
specified in the information. But note that Section 2(c)
abovecited mentions a situation where (1) the value of the
gift is manifestly excessive; (2) from a person who is not a
member of the public officer’s immediate family; and (3)
even on the occasion of a family celebration or national
festivity.
In contrast, Section 3 (c) earlier quoted in the present
case applies regardless of whether the gift’s value is
manifestly excessive or not, and regardless of the occasion.
What is important here, in our view, is whether the gift is
received in consideration for help given or to be given by
the public officer. The value of the gift is not mentioned at
all as an essential element of the offense charged under
Section 3 (c), and there appears no need to require the
prosecution to specify such value in order to comply with
the requirements of showing a prima facie case.
Evidently the legislature is aware that in implementing
R.A. 3019, it will be precedents that will guide the court17
on
the issue of what is or what is not manifestly excessive.
In sum, we are constrained to rule that respondent court
did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, much less did it gravely err, in
denying petitioner’s motion to quash the information filed
against her in Criminal Case
_______________
17 See Senate Proceedings in regard to R.A. 3019:
It is impossible to lay down a hard and fast rule on what value or amount will be
construed as manifestly excessive. Thus the judiciary will be guided by the
precedents established in bribery cases on amounts that are considered of such
insignificant and small value so that they may be considered as ordinary token of
gratitude and friendship. 3 SENATE RECORD 248 (1960).
What is excessive or manifestly excessive is relative. The circumstances of

person and of social position have to be taken into account in determining whether
the gift is actually excessive and also the fact of whether it might influence action
one way or another on the part of a public official. There is no definite amount. 3
SENATE RECORD 258-259 (1960).
190

Firme vs. Bukal Enterprises and Development Corporation
No. 23848. This ruling, however, is without prejudice to the

actual merits of this criminal case as may be shown during
trial before the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 23848 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo,

Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed, resolutions affirmed.
Notes.—Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a

motion to quash an information is denied. (Lalican vs.
Vergara, 276 SCRA 518 [1997])
The fundamental test on the viability of a motion to
quash on the ground that the facts averred in the
information do not amount to an offense is whether the
facts asseverated would establish the essential elements of
the crime defined in the law. (Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan,
322 SCRA 655 [2000])
——o0o——
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9/2/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 414

VOL. 414, OCTOBER 23, 2003 181

MADELEINE MENDOZA-ONG, petitioner, vs. HON.

Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Motions to

182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mendoza-Ong vs. Sandiganbayan

rectly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or

the occasion. What is important here, in our view, is whether the

VOL. 414, OCTOBER 23, 2003 183

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

This special civil action 1

1 Rollo, pp. 30-35.

RESPECTFULLY REQUESTING LT. COL. EDUARDO J. LENA, CSC (CE) PA

184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

municipality to borrow heavy equipment from the

(1) Criminal Case No. 23847

“That on or about 15 February 1993, or sometime thereafter, in

VOL. 414, OCTOBER 23, 2003 185

advantage of her official functions, did then and there willfully,

This, however, was amended on October 27, 1998, so that

“That on or about 15 February 1993, or sometime thereafter, in

benefits, advantage or preference to her husband, Hector Ong,

(2) Criminal Case No, 23848

“That on or about 15 February 1993, or sometime thereafter, in

186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Municipal

On September 15, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash

On May 8, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s

I. RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE

12 Records, Vol. II, p. 421.

VOL. 414, OCTOBER 23, 2003 187

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts or

14 Id., at pp. 11-12. See also Memorandum for the Petitioner, p. 9.

188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mendoza-Ong vs. Sandiganbayan

Based on the foregoing, the elements of the offense charged

SEC. 2. Definition of terms.—As used in this Act, the term—

16 Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 123045, 16 November 1999, 318 SCRA

VOL. 414, OCTOBER 23, 2003 189

Christmas, if the value of the gift is under the circumstances

Petitioner contends that pursuant to her reading of the

17 See Senate Proceedings in regard to R.A. 3019:

What is excessive or manifestly excessive is relative. The circumstances of

190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

No. 23848. This ruling, however, is without prejudice to the

Bellosillo (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo,

Petition dismissed, resolutions affirmed.

Notes.—Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a

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