Case 7:

RODEL LUZ y ONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012
Sereno, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 2011 2 and Resolution
dated 8 July 2011.

PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, a traffic enforcer, flagged down the petitioner, who was coming down
from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, for driving a
motorcycle without a helmet on March 10, 2003 at 3 a.m. He then invited the petitioner to enter
their sub-station because it was almost in front of the said sub-station. While issuing a ticket
along with SPO1 Rayford Brilliante, he noticed unusual behavior from Luz and told him to
empty his pockets as the latter may have a weapon. A metal container about 2-3 inches in size, 2
cellphones, 1 pair of scissors, and 1 Swiss knife were found. Upon seeing the container, he asked
the petitioner to open it; Luz complied. He also instructed the petitioner to spill out the contents
which turned out to be 4 plastic sachets, 2 were empty while the other 2 contained suspected
shabu.

July 2, 2003, petitioner pleaded “not guilty” to the charge illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
PO3 Alteza and a forensic chemist testified while Luz testified himself and raised the defense of
planting evidence and extortion.

RTC: Convicted petitioner finding sufficient evidence to show that he had been lawfully arrested
for the traffic violation and subjected to a valid search. Petitioner’s defense was unsubstantiated.
CA: Affirmed RTC decision.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure because there
was no lawful arrest, claiming it as erroneous since he was not issued a ticket or charged with
violation of the ordinance. Thus, he claims to not consenting to the search conducted upon him.

ISSUE: (1) WON the arrest was valid.

(2) WON the search and seizure conducted unto the petitioner was legal.

RULING:
No, the arrest was not valid and the search and seizure was likewise illegal. Hence,
petition is granted, and petitioner Luz is acquitted.

First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not arrested solely for this reason. Arrest is the taking of a
person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person's
voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of
arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest
the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.
At the time that the petitioner was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket,
petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of
PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty or take him into custody. Prior to the
issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself
testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been
flagged down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that
they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty, the US Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside
questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered
custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial
interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning,
the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is
conducted. Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned
will be induced "to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." First, detention of a
motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. It is expected that vast
majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorist's expectations are that he will
be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer
checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he
most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. On the other hand, stationhouse interrogation
is prolonged and will continue until interrogators get the answer they seek (Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S.,at 467). Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that
the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. Thus, it is more similar to a “Terry Stop”
than a formal arrest.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance the petitioner violated is penalized by a
fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. This ruling does not imply that there can
be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police
officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be
deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officer's issuance (or intent to
issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested"
upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then
the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with. This Court has held that at the time a
person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for
the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of
their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make
could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional
requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. If it were true that petitioner was already deemed
"arrested" when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket,
then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second time — after the police
officers allegedly discovered the drugs — as he was already in their custody.
 Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was
likewise illegal. The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (1) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search of evidence in "plain view;" (3) search
of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) a "stop and frisk"
search; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
The evidence seized was not in “plain view” as it was concealed in a metal container
inside the petitioner’s pocket. Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. It must be
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While
the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged
accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that
petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents of his pocket.
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined
from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1)
the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3)
whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's
belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning;
(8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear
and positive testimony that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily
given. In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three
in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily
against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally
applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to
believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search
of outer clothing for weapons.
In Knowles v. Iowa, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a
person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this
procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein
held that there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the
motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the
motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown. There are two historical rationales for the
"search incident to arrest" exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into
custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. Neither of these underlying
rationales are applicable in the present case because a routine traffic stop is a relative brief
encounter than a formal arrest. Although to say that concern for officer safety is absent in the
case at bar, it still is, but the concern does not justify the considerably greater intrusion of
attending a full field type search.
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to
object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless
arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the
illegal warrantless arrest.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in
violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power
to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and
the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles
of government.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the
very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their
inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is
hereby ACQUITTED.