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BERNARDA CH. FACTS:

Petition on the certriorari resolution of the CA, petioner (daughter), Respondents are the
OSMEÑA, granddaughter.
PETITIONER, VS. The dispute revolves around two parcels of land, Lots 4[3] and 5[4], and the ancestral
house standing on Lot 4.
NICASIO CH. OSMEÑA,
JOSE CH. OSMEÑA,
TOMAS CH. OSMEÑA,
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO
CH. OSMEÑA AND
SIXTA CH. OSMEÑA,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 171911 : January 26, 2010
Facts:
Lupo Atienza vs. Lupo Almodiel Atienza filed an administrative case against Judge Brillantes for Gross
Judge Brillantes, Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety. Complainant alleges that he has two children with
Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at a subdivision in Makati, which he purchased in
(243 SCRA 32) 1p987. One day, he caught the respondent asleep in his bedroom. He asked the houseboy
about him and the latter said that the judge had been cohabiting with De Castro. Atienza did not
bother to wake up the respondent instead asked the houseboy to take care of his two children.
After that, the respondent prevented him from visiting his child and has alienated the affection of
his children. The Complainant also claims that the respondent is married to Zenaida Ongkiko.
The judge denies having been married to Ongkiko because their marriage was celebrated twice
without marriage license, therefore, his marriage to De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,
California was because he believed in good faith and for all legal purposes, that his first
marriage was solemnized without marriage license.
He further argues that Article 40 of the Family Code is not applicable in his case because his
first marriage in 1965 was governed by the Civil Code and the 2nd relationship was 1991 under
the Family Code. No retroactive Effect.

Issue:
Whether or not the absence of marriage license of his previous marriage justifi3es his act
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to cohabit with De Castro

Held:
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law
in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was
already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that
a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an
opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the
second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays
his sinister motives and bad faith. 
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right
that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.

Facts:
Bernabe vs. Alejo The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina Alejo. The son was born
on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13,
(374 SCRA 180) 1993 leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. Therafter, Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed
the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared as acknowledged illegitimate son of
Fiscal Bernabe. The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that under the provision of the Family
Code, the death of the putative father had barred the action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate
son of Fiscal Bernabe since the boy was born in 1981; his rights are governed by Article 283 of
the Civil Code. Hence, appeal was interposed in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Family Code shall have retroactive effect.

HELD: Applying recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code
is a substantive law as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within 4 years
from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to
file an action for recognition because that right had already vested prior to its enactment. The
right of children to seek recognition granted by the NCC to illegitimate children who were still
minors at the time the FC took effect cannot be impaired. NCC185 allows an illegitimate child to
file for recognition within 4 years of attaining age of majority, thus gave child a vested right
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which the FC cannot impair.
FACTS:
Philippine
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman
Telegraph and specifically as “Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until
April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave.  She was again invited
Telephone for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June
10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991. 
Company vs.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee
NLRC (272 SCRA where probationary period will cover 150 days.  She indicated in the portion of the job
application form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a
596) few months earlier.  When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor,
Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. 
Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the company’s policy of not accepting
married women for employment.  She was dismissed from the company effective January 29,
1992.  Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner
illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. 
Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company policies.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the
services of an employee.

HELD:

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee.  It is recognized that
company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their
discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or
those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor
laws and by our Constitution.  The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T
were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not
qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
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dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T.  As stated in
the labor code: 

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or
to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of marriage.”

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the
right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her
employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of
her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible
and inalienable right.  The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals
and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the
foundation of the nation.  Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or
dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order
but also imperatively required.

G.R. No. L-13274           See paper

January 30, 1960

REMEDIOS SACLOLO
and ERNESTO
PASCUAL, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF AGRARIAN
RELATIONS and
SANTIAGO
MADLANGSAKAY, res
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pondents.
Ernesto M. Tomaneng
for petitioners.
Nora G. Nostratis and
Fausto T. Allado for
respondent Court.
Facts. 
SKINNER VS. Oklahoma defined a “habitual criminal” as a person who, “having been convicted two or more
times for crimes ‘amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude’ either in Oklahoma or another
STATE OF State, is thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and is sentenced to a term of
imprisonment in a Oklahoma penal institution.” Such habitual criminals could be subject to
OKLAHOMA forced sterilization. The Petitioner had been twice arrested for theft offenses before being
arrested and confined for armed robbery. During his third incarceration, the Act was passed and
proceedings were instituted against him.

Issue. May the State sterilize an individual against his will for being convicted of three felonies
involving moral turpitude?

Held. No. Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruling reversed.

Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) notes that sterilization of habitual offenders in no way
guarantees that new offenders will not be born. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that habitual
offenders would spawn offenders themselves.
J. Douglas cannot justify the distinction between larceny (involving moral turpitude) and
embezzlement (not involving moral turpitude) in the eyes of the statute. This is clear
discrimination in J. Douglas’s view. In terms of fines and imprisonment the crimes are identical
to the State. Only when it comes to sterilization do the crimes differ. As such, equal protection is
violated.
Concurrence. Chief Justice Harlan Stone (J. Stone) concurs in the judgment, but rests his
decision on due process grounds, arguing that the invasion of personal liberty is too great.

Discussion. Skinner represents the Supreme Court of the United States’ growing awareness of
the right to reproductive autonomy. Unlike later cases that focus on due process and a right to
privacy, the majority in Skinner holds that sterilization in the present situation violates equal
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protection principles.
FACTS:
Loving v. Virginia In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white
man, were married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly
thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the state’s antimiscegenation statute,
which banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in
jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not
return for 25 years).

ISSUE:
Did Virginia’s antimiscegenation law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?

RULING:
Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that distinctions drawn according to race were
generally “odious to a free people” and were subject to “the most rigid scrutiny” under the Equal
Protection Clause. The Virginia law, the Court found, had no legitimate purpose “independent of
invidious racial discrimination.” The Court rejected the state’s argument that the statute was
legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and whites and found that racial
classifications were not subject to a “rational purpose” test under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court also held that the Virginia law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. “Under our Constitution,” wrote Chief Justice Earl Warren, “the freedom to marry,
or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by
the State.”
FACTS:
Reynolds vs. Us George Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, was charged with
bigamy under the federal Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act after marrying a woman while still married to his
previous wife. Reynolds argued that the law was unconstitutional. He reasoned that his religion required
him to marry multiple women and the law therefore violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion. 

ISSUE:
Is religious duty or belief a defense to a criminal charge?  

RULING:
The Court upheld Reynolds's conviction and Congress’s power to prohibit polygamy. The Court held that
while Congress could not outlaw a belief in the correctness of polygamy, it could outlaw the practice
thereof. The majority reasoned that while marriage is a “sacred obligation,” it is nevertheless “usually
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regulated by law” in “most civilized nations.” Finally, the Court held that people cannot avoid a law due to
their religion. 

FACTS:

In 1828, David S. Maynard and Lydia A. Maynard intermarried in the State of Vermont, and lived
together as husband and wife until David left his family in Ohio and started overland for
California in 1850. On April 3, 1852, while still being married to his wife, David settled upon and
claimed a tract of land of 640 acres. Thereafter, on December 22, 1852, David obtained a
legislative divorce, after which, he married Catherine T. Brashears. After some time, the
Commissioner of the General Land Office awarded one half of the land to David and the other
half to Lydia. However, the award to Lydia was cancelled on the ground that at the time of the
divorce, David possessed only an inchoate interest in the land. The land was treated as public
land, and the patent holders, Hill and Lewis, obtained the right to it. Plaintiff heirs, who were the
children of David and Lydia, filed a complaint in  territorial court to compel a conveyance of the
land to them, claiming that they were the equitable owners of the land. The territory courts
dismissed the complaint on the ground that it did not state a sufficient cause of action.

ISSUE:

Did the territory courts err in dismissing the heirs' action in equity to charge the patent holders
as trustees of certain lands and to compel a conveyance of those lands?

RULE:

Marriage is something more than a mere contract. The consent of the parties is of course
essential to its existence, but when the contract to marry is executed by the marriage, a relation
between the parties is created which they cannot change. Other contracts may be modified,
restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the parties. Not so with
marriage. The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to various obligations
and liabilities. It is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
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interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be
neither civilization nor progress.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the judgment of the territory court. According
to the Court, at the time of the divorce, David only had a possessory right to the land because he
had not yet occupied it for the statutory period of time. Because David had no vested interest in
the land, Lydia could have no interest greater than that of David. The wife was not entitled to
the east half of the donation claim. To entitle her to that half she must have continued as his
wife during his residence and cultivation of the land.

Manuel vs. FACTS:

people This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting the petitioner of bigamy.

The petitioner married Rubylus Gaña on July 28, 1975 in Makati. On the same year, Gaña was charged
with estafa. The petitioner visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. 

In January 1996, petitioner, then 39 years old met complainant Tina B. Gandalera, 21 years old, in
Dagupan City. Petitioner visited her several times in Baguio City, at one time he brought his parents
whom assured the complainant and her parents that the petitioner is single. On April 22, 1996, they
had a civil marriage in Baguio, settling at Irisan, Baguio. In their marriage contract, petitioner wrote
that he was "single".

After three years of marriage, complainant allege that petitioner was home only twice or thrice a year
and that whenever complainant asks for sustenance, the petitioner would slap her. On January 2001,
the petitioner finally left and did not return. Petitioner allege that the reason he left was that her
wife has a lover evidenced by the "love-bite" he saw on her neck.
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The RTC of  Baguio ruled against the petitioner, sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty from six
years to ten month as minimum and ten years as maximum, and indemnity in the amount of Php
200,000.00 by way of moral damages. After appealing with the Court of Appeals, the sentence was
reduced to two years, four months and one day minimum and ten years maximum. 

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioner's first wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there
was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code.

2.  Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award
of Php 200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.

Ruling:

1. No, the Court of Appeals did not commit an error of law. The Family Code, having a retroactive
effect, amended Article 390 of the Civil Code, wherefore adding the third rule in the requirements for
a subsequent bigamous marriage to be considered valid, which are: (1) the prior spouse have been
absent for four consecutive years, (2) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already dead, and (3) a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse
(Armas vs Calisterio 330 SCRA 201), the third rule of which is designed to harmonize with Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code which defines and penalizes bigamy.

2. No, there is no error of law committed by the Court of Appeals. The petitioner is liable for moral
damages in accordance to Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. Article 19 contends that a person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duty, act with justice, give everyone
his due and observe honesty and good faith; Article 20: every person who, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter the same; and Article 21:  any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another, in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The petitioner's collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage, by his and
his parents' assurance that he is single, were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to
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the complainant. Also, the petitioner's acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert
the family as a social institution,and against good morals, and the interest and general welfare of
society. Therefore, the award of Php 200,000. 00 cost for moral damages is just and reasonable.

ZULUETA VS. Facts: 

Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband Dr. Alfredo Martin. Dr. Martin is a

CA doctor of medicine while he is not in his house His wife took the 157 documents consisting of diaries, cancelled
check, greeting cards, passport and photograph, private respondents between her Wife and his alleged paramours,
by means of forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta filed the papers for the evidence of her case
of legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta, with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin’s Complaint or those further described
in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately
return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages
and attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible as
evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice. 

Ruling/Held:
The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of
communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity, who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. 
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify
any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence
of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of
communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without
the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion
for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.

DUNCAN VS. FACTS:

Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of employment signed by
Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by the existing company rules; to disclose
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GLAXO to management any existing future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees with competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a
prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.

Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may transfer
the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for employment
outside of the company after 6 months. Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee of
Astra, Glaxo's competition.

Before getting married, Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but
marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of conflict of intrest.
Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy resign from their respective
positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan
del Sur sales area.

After his request against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee
and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was
valid...

ISSUE: Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying
employees of any competitor company is valid

RULING: On Equal Protection Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies, and other confidential programs and information from competitors. The prohibition against
pesonal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of
the company.

That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied. It is the settled principle
that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color
of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of US Supreme Court decisions that the equal
protection clause erects to shield against merely privately conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.
The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy.
Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for
the lot of the employee.

On Constructive Dismissal
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Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued
employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is demotion in rank, or diminution
in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the
employee. None of these conditions are present in the instant case.

STAR PAPER FACTS:

CORP. VS. Simbol was employed by the company and met a co-employee and they eventually had a relatio

nship and got married. Prior to the marriage, the manager advise the couple that should they de
SIMBOL cide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy: 1) new applicant w
ill not be allowed to be hired if he/she has a relative, up to 3rd degree of consanguinity, already 
employed by the company. 2) if the two employees got married, one of them should resign to pr
eserve the policy  stated first. Simbol resigned.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the policy of the employer banning spouse from working in the same company, 
a valid exercise of management prerogative.

RULING:

No, it is not a valid exercise of management prerogative and violates the rights of employees un
der the constitution. The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides “it sh
all be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of empl
oyment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that up
on getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated , or to actually dis
miss, discharge , discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of he
r marriage.” The company policy of Star Paper, to be upheld, must clearly establish the require
ment of reasonableness. In the case at bar, there was no reasonable business necessity. Petitione
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rs failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit
, then an employee of the Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Th
e questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disprop
ortionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scruti
ny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. L
astly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction ca
nnot benefit the petitioners.

FACTS:
ONG VS. ONG
William Ong and Lucita Ong were married on July 13, 1975. Union was blessed with 3 children.
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation under Art 55 (1) of FC on
grounds of physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct of petitioner.
RTC granted appeal for legal separation. CA upheld RTC’s decision when herein petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The highlight was on December 14, 1995 when the
respondent asked petitioner to bring Kingston, their son, back from Bacolod which turned into a
violent quarrel with the petitioner hitting the respondent on the head, left cheek, eye, stomach,
arms, and ultimately pointing a gun at respondent’s head asking her to leave the conjugal
house.

ISSUES:

Whether or not CA erred in upholding the RTC’s decision granting legal separation to Lucita
when she herself has given ground for legal separation when abandoned her family.

HELD:No, It is true that a decree of legal separation should not be granted when both parties
have given ground for legal separation (Art 56 (4) FC). However, the abandonment referred to
in the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. Also, it
was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct which does not constitute the
abandonment contemplated in the said provision. The petition was denied for lack of merit.
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SSS VS. DE BAILON Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage. More than 15 years later, a Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death has been filed before the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon,
which has been granted. Bailon, subsequently, contracted marriage with respondent Teresita
Jarque and designated her the Social Security System (SSS) beneficiary of the former.

SSS cancelled the claim of respondent Teresita Jarque of her monthly pension for death benefits on
the basis of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was void as
it was contracted during the subsistence of Bailon’s marriage with Alice.

Teresita protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits asserting that her
marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful.
Hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Clemente Bailon and respondent Teresita Jarque
may terminate by mere reappearance of the absent spouse of Bailon

HELD:

The second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is
only the competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of
the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may
be filed.

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3,
1988 of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of their celebration.

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by final judgment

of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses
in the subsequent marriage.

Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus
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Article 42 thereof provides the subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated by the
recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either

by affidavit or by court action, such absentee‘s mere reappearance, even if made known to the
spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Since the second marriage
has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
continues inspite of the spouse‘s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still
be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.

In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon‘s and Teresita‘s
marriage prior to the former‘s death in 1998, Teresita is rightfully the dependent spouse-
beneficiary of Bailon.

GOMEZ VS. Facts:

Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two marriages:  the first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the
LIPANA second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935.  At the time of the... second marriage the first was still
subsisting, which fact, however, Lipana concealed from the second wife.
spouses of the second marriage acquired by purchase a piece of land... in the name of "Joaquin
Lipana married to Isidra Gomez."
1958 Isidra Gomez died intestate and childless
Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of her estate, commenced the present suit, praying for... the
forfeiture of the husband's share in the Cubao property in favor of the said estate.
The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and that the husband was the one
who gave cause for its nullity, applied the aforequoted provision and declared his interest in the
disputed property... forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.
Issues:
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two errors to the trial court
(1) in allowing a collateral attack on the validity of the second marriage and in holding it to be
bigamous and void ab... initio; and (2) in holding that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is
applicable in this case.
Ruling:
The first error has not been committed
The controlling statute is Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law which became
effective on December 4, 1929 and was in force when the two marriages were celebrated.

YAP VS. CA
FACTS : For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa by the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City1 and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correctional, as minimum to eight
years of prision mayor as maximum, "in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00
but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years."2 He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional
liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial court in an order
dated February 17,1999 The CA granted the Bail. A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the
amount of bail fixed by respondent court, but was denied in a resolution issued on November 25, 1999 Thus the
petition. 

ISSUE : WON there is an grave abuse of disretion

 HELD : There is no question that in the present case the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of allowing
bail to petitioner on appeal. Respondent court stated that it was doing so for "humanitarian reasons", and despite a
perceived high risk of flight, as by petitioner's admission he went out of the country several times during the pendency
of the case, for which reason the court deemed it necessary to peg the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00. The SC Finds
that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of
petitioner's right to bail the Court is not precluded from imposing in petitioner's case an amount higher than
P40,000.00 (based on the Bail Bond Guide) where it perceives that an appropriate increase is dictated by the
circumstances Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Under the
circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against
the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform
the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case
is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive,
and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner’s right to bail.

BALOGBOG VS. Facts:

Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva
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CA Arnibal who died inestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but
he died predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents brought an action for partition
and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino
by Catalina Ubas and that they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their
grandparents. In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that
their brother Gavino died single and without issue in their parents’ residence at Tag-amakan,
Asturias, Cebu.

Respondents presented witnesses. One testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband
and wife and Ramonito to be their first child because they performed at his campaign rallies. The
witness also contended that he attended their wedding in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as
officiated and Egmidio Manuel, then a councilor, acted as one of the witnesses. The second witness
testified that private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina. He likewise attended the
wedding and was in fact accompanied Catalina and carry her wedding dress. He also said that he
was a carpenter and he was the one who had made the coffin of Gavino. He also made the coffin of
the couple’s son, Petronilo, who died when he was six. Catalina Ubas likewise testified that after the
wedding, she was handed a “receipt,” presumably a wedding certificate by Fr. Jomao-as and was
burned during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three
children. She stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a man for
a year and then they separated. Private respondents presented certificates from the Local Civil
Registrar and by the Parish Priest of Asturias.

On the other hand, petitioner testified that Gavino died single. She denied that her brother had any
legitimate children and stated that she did not know private respondents. The petitioner likewise
presented a witness stating that Gavino died single and that Catalina lived with a certain Eleuterio
Keriado after the war. He added that Catalina had children by a man she married before the war.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased Gavino Balogbog.

Held:

Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as
husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to
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the contrary. In this case, petitioners claim that the certification presented by private respondents
was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of
Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain an entry pertaining to
the alleged marriage of private respondents’ parents. This contention has no merit. Private
respondents proved, through testimonial evidence. The law favors the validity of marriage, because
the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family s a matter of
constitutional concern. What is in issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino and Catalina but the
filiations of private respondents as their children. Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that
petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog admitted that Ramonito is his nephew. This admission of
relationship is admissible against Gaudioso although made in another case. It is considered as a
reliable declaration against interest.

ARTICLE 2

Silverio v.
FACTS:

Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically

Republic
G.R. No. 174689, 22 October 2007
male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast augmentation and sex
reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact engaged to be married. He
then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from
male to female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru
the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth certificate.

RULING:

Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change of first
name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must
present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must
show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. Article 412 of
the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
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The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his
first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides
that all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. Under
the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.
Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error
is immutable.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.

FACTS:
REPUBLIC OF THE
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna
PHILIPPINES vs. a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer
JENNIFER Cagandahan is sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical
condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer
CAGANDAHAN Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan
GR No. 166676,       September 12, 2008 presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition,
explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones,
her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The
lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the
Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE:
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Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the
case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme
Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the fact that private
respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that
Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult
for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will
follow.

GOSHEM V. STONONGTON
FACTS:

Goshen v. This was an action of assumpsit, to recover the sum of 380 dollars, expended, by the plaintiffs, at

Stonington - 4 the special instance and request of the defendants, for the support of Betsey Cooke, the wife of
Joseph Cooke, and their five children, from the 8th of October, 1818, to the 9th of September,
Conn. 209 (1822) 1820, alleged to be paupers, having their legal settlement in the town of Stonington, and residing
in the town of Goshen, at the time the support was furnished.

ISSUE:

Was the marriage between the alleged paupers valid?

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ANSWER:

Yes

RULE:

A clergyman in the administration of marriage, is a public civil officer, and in relation to this
subject, is not at all distinguished from a judge of the superior or county court, or a justice of the
peace, in the performance of the same duty.

CONCLUSION:

An objection was also made to the validity of the marriage between the alleged paupers, upon
which the claim of plaintiffs was founded. Whether the alleged paupers were legally settled in
the Town of Stonington depended upon the validity of their marriage. The court found that
marriage was authorized and was not susceptible of dispute. The court pointed out that the
legislature passed an act, rendering valid all marriages performed by an ordained minister,
qualified and empowered to celebrate them, according to the forms and usages of any religious
society or denomination. The court found that law applied in the instant situation. Further, the
court disagreed with defendants that the law was unconstitutional and/or void. The court
declined the request for a new trial.

FACTS:

PEOPLE V. On December 26, 1928, Pedro N. Cerdeñ a and Juana S. del Rosario appeared before Reverend Father H.
Janssen, a Catholic parish priest of the municipality of San Jose, Antique, to have their names inscribed in the
marriage registry, which was done. On

JANSSEN December 30, 1928, the banns were published in his parish in San Jose, Antique.

As the classes opened on January 7, 1929, the contracting parties asked the defendant-appellant to marry
them before that date. Upon petition of the defendant-appellant, the Bishop of Jaro issued the following
dispensation on December 29, 1928 authorizing the solemnization of the marriage as long as there are no
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legal impediments to the marriage. On January 4, 1929, the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, gave
the authority to solemnize marriage. By virtue of the above-quoted dispensation, and in view of said
authority of the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, the defendant-appellant on January 6, 1929,
solemnized the marriage of Pedro N. Cerdeñ a to Juana S. del Rosario

ISSUE
Whether or not appellant violated violated section 2 of Act No. 3412,

HELD
The law does not impose upon priests or ministers of religion the duty In holding that it is the duty of the
accused to inquiring into and determining the residence of the contracting parties before solemnizing
marriage. It is sufficient to know that the license has been issued by a competent official, and it may be
presumed from the issuance of said license that said official has complied with his duty of ascertaining
whether the woman who desires to get married resides habitually in his municipality.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that when a marriage is solemnized by a church, sect, or religion
whose rules and practices require proclamation or publicity, it is not necessary that said proclamation be
made during ten days, unless said rules or practices so require.

PAYNE V. PAYNE FACTS

The father was British, the mother came from New Zealand. They met, married and had a child in
London in 1996/1997. The family then left the United Kingdom temporarily with the father going to
Malaysia on a short-term contract and mother and child going to New Zealand.

However, after 5 months the marriage began to fail and the mother instituted custody proceedings
in New Zealand. The father in turn petitioned for the return of the child under the Hague Convention.
His application was granted and the child and mother returned to England in May 1999.

Initially there was a consent order whereby the mother was to have residence and the father
extensive contact. This lasted only a short time for in 2000 the father issued a residence application
and the mother an application for leave to remove the child to New Zealand.

On 20 October 200 the mother's application was granted and the father appealed to the Court of
Appeal.

Ruling
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Appeal dismissed and leave to remove the child out of the jurisdiction granted.

Grounds
Non-Convention Issues
The appeal was dismissed. It was accepted that the trial judge had not misdirected himself or made
an error of law, while his exercise of discretion in choosing the option least damaging to the child
was not open to challenge. That being so, the lengthy judgment still raised many points of note in
this difficult area of law. In the lead judgment Thorpe LJ conducted a detailed review of the English
case law on the issue. He noted that previously in MH v GP [1995] 2 FLR 106, he stated that the
case law had created a ‘presumption’ in favour of the reasonable application of the custodial parent.
Now however he stated that it was not appropriate to use the word ‘presumption’, even in a non-
legal sense. He held that concepts of presumption and burden of proof have no place in any
Children Act litigation given that the judge exercises a function that is partly inquisitorial.

Certainly the absent parent has the right to participation to the extent and in what manner the
complex circumstances of the individual case dictate.’ It was added that the court’s focus on
supporting the reasonable proposal of the primary carer is merely an important factor in upholding
the paramountcy of the welfare of the child.

Nevertheless, returning to his earlier comments, Thorpe LJ did concede that if the regard a court
plays to the reasonable proposals of the primary carer were elevated into a legal presumption there
would be a risk of breach of the respondent’s rights under Article 8 and Article 6, (right to a fair trial).
He then went on to set down several guidelines to be applied in such cases. 1. The first issue to
ascertain is whether the application is genuine, i.e. not merely motivated by the desire to exclude
the other parent from the child’s life.

If the applicant cannot satisfy both of these tests leave should be refused. 2. If the applicant does
satisfy these tests, a list of further issues must be considered: What is the basis of the other
parent’s objection? What effect would relocation have on him and his future relationship with the
child? To what extent would any negative effects be offset by the new relationships the child would
develop in the new state of residence? What would be the impact on the applicant if leave were not
granted? 3. The answers to these questions must then be considered in the light of the child’s
welfare being the paramount consideration, directed by the statutory checklist so far as is
appropriate.
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