CANDIDACY

A.DEFINITION OF TERMS

37. De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, G.R. No. L-24721. Nov. 3, 1925

Doctrine: after the people have expressed their will honestly, the result of the election cannot be
defeated by the fact that the respondent has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy.

Facts: Provincial board of canvassers counted the votes, Juan T. Lucero (respondent) obtained
8,771 votes while Tomas De Guzman (petitioner) obtained 7,662 votes. The board saw that the
original certificate of candidacy of respondent was not duly sworn to, as required by law, while
the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner was prepared and filed in accordance with the
requirements of the law.

The respondent provincial board of canvassers then willfully and illegally adjudicated the 8,771
votes to the respondent, and afterwards illegally proclaimed and certified him as governor-elect
of the Province of La Union

Issue:

1. whether or not the respondent has filed a certificate of candidacy in accordance with the law,

2. and in case he has not, whether the writ applied for should be issued. (Mandamus – to reject
and annul the votes adjudicated to Lucero)

Held:

1. Yes, it was filed in accordance with law, however, the certificate of candidacy must be sworn
to.

2. No, the writ should be denied, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality
consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to.

Only those who filed a verified certificate of candidacy shall be proclaimed and certified by the
provincial board of canvassers.

Section 404 of the Election Law provides that no person shall be eligible for the office of
senator, representative or any provincial office, unless within the time fixed by the law, he shall
file a certificate of candidacy duly verified.

Duly verified means that a receipt has been issued and the certificate filed can the CoC be
presumed that it has been duly verified and filed.
Respondent filed his certificate of candidacy in the office of the secretary of the provincial board
of La Union on April 15, 1925, the provincial secretary having issued the proper receipt for the
filing of said certificate.

Petitioner argues that the certificate of candidacy must be sworn to. The certificate of the
respondent Juan T. Lucero was defective, lacking the formality of the oath. This irregularity
might have justified the elimination of the name of Juan T. Lucero as a legal candidate for the
office of provincial governor, if an objection on the part of the petitioner Tomas de Guzman had
been made in due time. However, this irregularity does not invalidate the election for the
fundamental reason that after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had
obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a
technicality consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to.

The Supreme Court held that the legal provision here in question is mandatory and
non-compliance therewith before the election would have been fatal to the recognition of the
status of Juan T. Lucero as candidate. But after the people have expressed their will honestly,
the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the respondent has not sworn to his
certificate of candidacy.
38. Jurilla vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 105435. June 2, 1994

Doctrine: Statement of candidate’s precinct number and barangay where he is registered is not
required in the Certificate of Candidacy.

Facts:

Petitioners were among the candidates in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections for the six
(6) positions of councilor for the Second District of Quezon City.

On 23 March 1992, respondent Antonio V. Hernandez filed with the Commission on Elections
his certificate of candidacy for one of the contested seats. He stated in his COC that his address
is "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates, Quezon City." His biodata indicated that his address is
"Acacia Street, Mariana, Quezon City," which is part of the Fourth District of Quezon City.

Petitioners filed a petition for disqualification. They claimed that respondent’s certificate of
candidacy and his biodata filed with COMELEC did not expressly state that he was a registered
voter of Quezon City or that he was a resident of the Second District in violation of of Sec. 39,
par. (a), of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides:

Sec. 39. Qualifications — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines;
a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panglunsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
any other local language or dialect.

COMELEC denied the petition for being filed outside the reglementary period of RA 6646 which
pertains to nuisance candidates.

Issue: Whether or not respondent can be disqualified for failing to state in his COC his precinct
number and barangay where he is registered

Held: No. Statement of candidate’s precinct number and barangay where he is registered is not
required in the Certificate of Candidacy.

It may be gleaned from the provisions of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government
Code of 1991, earlier quoted, that the law does not specifically require that the candidate must
state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number and the Barangay where he is
registered. Apparently, it is enough that he is actually registered as a voter in the precinct where
he intends to vote, which should be within the district where he is running for office.
 In the case at bench, his failure to so state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct
Number is satisfactorily explained by him in that at the time he filed his certificate he was not yet
assigned a particular Precinct Number in the Second District of Quezon City. He was formerly a
registered voter of Manila, although for the past two (2) years prior to the elections he was
already a resident of "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates," admittedly within the Second District of
Quezon City.
39. Amora vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 192280. Jan. 25, 2011

Doctrine: C​ompetent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is personally
known to the Notary Public.

FACTS: Petitioner Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. At that
time, Amora was the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and had been twice elected to the post in
2007 and in 2007. Olandria, one of the candidates for councilor in the same municipality, filed
before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged that
Amoras COC was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC) and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in executing his
COC, Amora merely presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty.
Oriculo Granada (Atty. Granada), instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity.
Consequently, Amoras COC had no force and effect and should be considered as not filed.

Amora countered that:

1. The Petition for Disqualification is actually a Petition to Deny Due Course or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. Effectively, the petition of Olandria is filed out of time;

2. Olandrias claim does not constitute a proper ground for the cancellation of the COC;

3. The COC is valid and effective because he (Amora) is personally known to the notary public,
Atty. Granada, before whom he took his oath in filing the document;

4. Atty. Granada is, in fact, a close acquaintance since they have been members of the League
of Muncipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several years; and

5. Ultimately, he (Amora) sufficiently complied with the requirement that the COC be under oath.

The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Amora from running
for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding Olandria's claim
that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification.

HELD: Yes.

In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias claim that an improperly sworn
COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification. Not by any stretch of the
imagination can we infer this as an additional ground for disqualification from the specific
wording of the Omnibus Eleciton Code in Section 68, which reads:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right
to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this
Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the grounds for
disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory provisions. Nowhere therein does it
specify that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the
COMELEC would uphold that petition upon the outlandish claim that it is a petition to disqualify
a candidate "for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification."

Another red flag for the COMELEC to dismiss Olandrias petition is the fact that Amora claims to
personally know the notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom his COC was sworn. In this
regard, the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Larrazabal aptly disposes of the core issue. He
said that accordind to the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice:

Section 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act in

which an individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument
or document.
Therefore, competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is personally
known to the Notary Public, which is the case herein.

In this case, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora complied with the
requirement of a sworn COC. He readily explained that he and Atty. Granada personally knew
each other; they were not just colleagues at the League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter,
but they consider each other as distant relatives. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath was not
proven by Olandria since the presentation of a CTC turned out to be sufficient in this instance.

GRANTED.
B. FILING FOR CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY

1. Person Holding Public Appointive Position - (Sec. 66, B.P. 881)

40. PNOC-EDC vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 100947. May 31, 1993

Doctrine: Candidates holding appointive office or position are considered ipso facto resigned
upon filing of certificate of candidacy. This rule applies to officers and employees in
government-owned and controlled corporations with or without original charters.

Facts:

Manuel S. Pineda was employed with the Philippine National Oil Co. - Energy
Development Corp. (PNOC-EDC), a subsidiary of the Philippine National Oil Co. In November,
1987, while holding the position of Geothermal Construction Secretary, Engineering and
Construction Department, at Tongonan Geothermal Project, Ormoc City, Pineda decided to run
for councilor of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte, in the local elections scheduled in January,
1988. He was eventually proclaimed elected to the office of councilor. Despite so qualifying as
councilor, and assuming his duties as such, he continued working for PNOC-EDC as the latter’s
Geothermal Construction Secretary, Engineering and Construction Department, at Tongonan
Geothermal Project, Ormoc City.

The Legal Department of PNOC-EDC rendered an opinion to the effect that

Manuel S. Pineda should be considered ipso facto resigned upon the filing of his Certificate of
Candidacy in November, 1987, in accordance with Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
"SECTION 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. — Any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy."

Pineda appealed and invoked a "court ruling in the case of Caagusan and
Donato v. PNOC-Exploration Corp. . . . (to the effect that) while the government-owned or
controlled corporations are covered by the Civil Service Law (as is taken to mean in Sec. 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code of 1985) (sic), the subsidiaries or corporate offsprings are not." In
the same letter he declared his wish to continue working with PNOC-EDC and his willingness to
voluntarily resign from his position as councilor/member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

PNOC-EDC, through Marcelino Tongco (Manager, Engineering and Construction

Department), notified Manuel S. Pineda in writing that after having given him "ample time" to
make some major adjustments before . . . separation from the company," his employment was
being terminated pursuant to Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, effective upon receipt of
notice.
 The Labor Arbiter declared the dismissal of Pineda as illegal. The Arbiter pointed out that
the ruling relied upon by PNOC-EDC to justify Pineda’s dismissal from the service, i.e., NHA v.
Juco, 12 had already been abandoned; and that "as early as November 29, 1988," the
governing principle laid down by case law — in light of Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution 13 — has been that government-owned or controlled corporations incorporated
under the Corporation Code, the general law — as distinguished from those created by special
charter — are not deemed to be within the coverage of the Civil Service Law, and consequently
their employees, like those of the PNOC-EDC, are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code
rather than the Civil Service Law.

Issue: whether an employee in a government-owned or controlled corporation without an

original charter (and therefore not covered by Civil Service Law) nevertheless falls within the
scope of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code

Held: Yes. When the Congress of the Philippines reviewed the Omnibus Election Code of 1985,
it was no doubt aware that in light of Section 2(1), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution: (a)
government-owned or controlled corporations were of two (2) categories — those with original
charters, and those organized under the general law — and (b) employees of these
corporations were of two (2) kinds — those covered by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations because employed in corporations having original charters, and those not subject to
Civil Service Law but to the Labor Code because employed in said corporations organized
under the general law, or the Corporation Code. Yet Congress made no effort to distinguish
between these two classes of government-owned or controlled corporations or their employees
in the Omnibus Election Code or subsequent related statutes, particularly as regards the rule
that an any employee "in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy." What all this
imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, even those organized under the general laws on
incorporation and therefore not having an original or legislative charter, and even if they do not
fall under the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code.

In other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in

addition to those set forth in the Labor Code, as amended. The decision of the NLRC is nullified
and set aside and the complaint of Manuel Pineda is dismissed.
2. Person Holding Public Elective Position - (Sec. 67, B.P. 881)

41. Quinto vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 189698. Feb. 22, 2010

Doctrines: The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane
to the purposes of the law, because an election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps
the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. In contrast, there is no such
expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.

Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”

Facts:

Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:

SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a

public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.

Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file
their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive
positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant
petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369,
the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must
be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not
ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.

Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause

Held: Yes. (2009 Decision – See Motion For Reconsideration below)

In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon
the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the
elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying
elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may
pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of
valid classification be complied with, namely:

(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of
persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to
the purposes of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental
position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the
electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of
the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be
motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also
justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in
office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be
attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.

If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be
constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite
that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds
an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain.
For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield
the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post
(in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing,
social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that
they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both
file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the
example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire
election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.

As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his
appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files
his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to
show his fitness for the position aspired for.

There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones.
The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the
law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

_____

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Held: No

To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws
to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and
yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the
first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion
that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to
the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the
evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain."

In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the
operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is.

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the
sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office
by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a
definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed
resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words,
complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials
until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation
insofar as appointed officials are concerned.

The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the
purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and
discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial
scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest
of deferring to the sovereign will.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the intervenors’
Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s December 1, 2009
Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as CONSTITUTIONAL (1)
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.

_____

Notes: The 2009 ruling basically paves the way for justices, judges, election officials, military
and police officers, members of the cabinet and all appointed civil servants to continue
exercising the functions of, and holding on to, their appointive office while campaigning to get
elected for an elective position.

The legal ramifications are of great significance. As Justice Carpio pointed out in his dissenting
opinion, imagine if the Provincial Commander of the AFP files his COC for governor on 1
December 2009 for the 10 May 2010 elections. If he is not considered automatically resigned
from office, he has until the start of the campaign period on 26 March 2010 to remain in his post,
in command of hundreds, if not thousands, of fully-armed personnel. The same is true for
judges, cabinet secretaries, and other heads of offices who have some kind of influence and
control over certain personnel and government resources. There are even reports that some
Comelec officials themselves have filed their COCs for certain elective positions.

Next elections, it would then be possible that the Chief Justice, the Comelec Chairperson or the
AFP Chief of Staff become a candidate for President, Vice-President or Senator while serving
the office to which they were appointed.

The decision does not seem to prevent the evil that the Constitution, in so many words, seeks to
prevent. In fact, Article IX(B), Section 2(4) of the Constitution expressly provides that “No officer
or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or
partisan political campaign.”

Furthermore, if they lose, they just continue occupying their appointive posts. This is illogical
because Section 6, Art. IX(B) of the Constitution provides that “No candidate who has lost in any
election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government
of any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of its subsidiaries.”
3. Effect of Filing of Certificate of Candidacy Re Partisan Political Activity

42. Lanot vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 164858. Nov. 16, 2006

Doctrine: The essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are:
(1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is
done outside the campaign period.

Facts:

Henry Lanot et al filed a petition for disqualification under Sections 68 and 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code against Vicente Eusebio before the COMELEC stating that the latter
engaged in an election campaign in various forms on various occasions outside of the
designated campaign period, such as (1) addressing a large group of people during a medical
mission sponsored by the Pasig City government; (2) uttering defamatory statements against
Lanot; (3) causing the publication of a press release predicting his victory; (4) installing
billboards, streamers, posters, and stickers printed with his surname across Pasig City; and (5)
distributing shoes to schoolchildren in Pasig public schools to induce their parents to vote for
him. Lanot and Eusebio were both candidates for Pasig City Mayor in the May 2004 elections.

Eusebio won the election and any other complaints was dismissed by the COMELEC.

SECTION 80.Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. —

It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any
party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan
political activity except during the campaign period:​ Provided, That political parties
may hold political conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates within
thirty days before the commencement of the campaign period and forty-five days for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential election.

Issue: Whether or not there is a pre-campaign offense committed by Eusebio

Held: No, there is none.

The essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a
person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done
outside the campaign period.

The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate
is one who "has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed
his certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The third element requires that the
campaign period has not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is
committed.
 Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day,
which under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the
campaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior
to such last day. Before such last day, there is no "particular candidate or candidates" to
campaign for or against. On the day immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign period
starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80 covers only acts done "outside" the
campaign period.

Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may only
apply to acts done on such last day, which is before the start of the campaign period and after at
least one candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those
running for elective public office usually file their certificates of candidacy on the last day or
close to the last day.

There is no dispute that Eusebio’s acts of election campaigning or partisan political activities
were committed outside of the campaign period.

The only question is whether Eusebio, who filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December
2003, was a "candidate" when he committed those acts before the start of the campaign period
on 24 March 2004. When the Congress enacted RA 8436, particularly Section 11, which
changed the deadline of filing of the COC 120 days before election day and moved the original
deadline from 23 March 2004 to 2 January 2004, or 81 days earlier, the intention of this
provision is to afford the COMELEC enough time to print the ballots. One who filed his COC will
still not be considered as a candidate. Under Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio became a
"candidate," for purposes of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, only on 23 March 2004,
the last day for filing certificates of candidacy.

Applying the facts - as found by Director Ladra and affirmed by the COMELEC First Division - to
Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio clearly did not violate Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
which requires the existence of a "candidate," one who has filed his certificate of candidacy,
during the commission of the questioned acts.
43. Penera vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 181613. Nov. 25, 2009

Doctrine: that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the
campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may be
committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the
campaign period

Facts: COMELEC disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica,
Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera, In September
2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELEC.

Penera argues that she was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident (premature
campaigning) and that she never admitted the allegations of the petition for disqualification and
has consistently disputed the charge of premature campaigning.

Under the September 2009 decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature
campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the
campaign period. From the filing of the certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the
campaign period, the Decision considers the partisan political acts of a person so filing a
certificate of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate." Thus, such person
can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign
period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a
"candidate" even before the start of the campaign period.

Issue: whether or not petitioner Penera’s act of campaigning for votes immediately preceding
the filing of her certificate of candidacy on March 29, 2007 violates the prohibition in Section 80
of the Omnibus Election Code against premature campaigning, with the result that she is
disqualified from holding office in accordance with Section 68 of the Code.

Held: No.

The September 2009 decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC, which held that a person who files
a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.

Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are:
(1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity;
(2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates;
(3) the act is done outside the campaign period.

When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot
doctrine into law. Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy
under the early deadline required by the automated election system would be disqualified or
penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the campaign period. Thus, in
enacting RA 9369, Congress expressly wrote the Lanot doctrine into the second sentence, third
paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436:
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who
files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the
start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That,
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office
or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in
government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of
candidacy.

In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts
done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election
offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed
before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature
campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision
ignores the clear and express provision of the law.

Penera’s motion for reconsideration is granted. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of
Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.
C. Filing of Two Certificates of Candidacy
1. General Rule - (Sec. 73, B.P. 881)
2. Exception - (Sec. 73, B.P. 881)

44. Loreto-Go vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 147741. May 10, 2001

Doctrine: Filing certificates of candidacy for more than one office shall not make a person
eligible for any of them unless he declares under oath the office for which he desires to be
eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices before the expiration
of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy.

Facts: In her petition for certiorari, petitioner seeks to nullify the resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc declaring her disqualified to run for the office of governor of
Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte, because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions
and the withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor was filed late by twenty eight
minutes from the deadline.

Forthwith, the SC issued an order to maintain the status quo ante, in effect allowing petitioners
certificate of candidacy for governor in the meantime.

In its Comment, the COMELEC justified its resolution on the ground that petitioner’s affidavit of
withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was ineffectual because it
was submitted twenty-eight (28) minutes late at the office of the municipal election officer at
Baybay. The facsimile copy thereof was filed with said office at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001, and
the original copy thereof was actually received by the office of the municipal election officer of
Baybay at 1:15 p.m., the same day. The provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at
Tacloban City, to whom petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for governor at 11:47 p.m.,
28 February 2001, refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal tendered simultaneously
therewith because, as he claimed, the affidavit must be filed with the office of the municipal
election officer of Baybay, Leyte where petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified for both positions for filing two certificates of
candidacy for both positions

Held: No, she is not disqualified. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer
of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the
requirement of the law.

The SC held that petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay,
Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her certificate of candidacy for
governor.

Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code,
provides that:
"SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy.- No person shall be eligible for any elective public office
unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

"A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, ​prior to the election​, withdraw the
same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.

"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he
files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them.
However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the
person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the
office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the
other office or offices.​"

There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed
with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be
filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director
concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the
municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said
municipality.

While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20
November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place
where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such requirement is merely directory, and is
intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution
cannot contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law. Hence,
the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the
provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy. The
COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declared petitioner ineligible for
both positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy.