Theory of Hegemonic War

Sources:-

- Antonio Gramsci, On the Prison Notebooks (Hegemony and the Production

of Consent)

- Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War”, Journal of

Interdisciplinary History, Vol 18, No 4, 1988

- Stefano Guzzini, “Realisms at War: Robert Gilpin’s political economy of

hegemonic was as a critique of Waltz’s Neorealism”, Working Papers
11/2002, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2002

- Stuart A. Bremer, “Dangerous Dyads: Conditions affecting the likelihood of

interstate war: 1816-1965”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36 (2), 1992

In international politics, a hegemon is the leading state within a collection of

states. Hegemonic status is based on possession of structural power, particularly
the control of economic and military resources, enabling the hegemon to shape the
preferences and actions of other states, typically by promoting willing consent,
rather than through force.

Following Antonio Gramsci, the term implies that international or global

leadership operates, in part, through ideational or ideological means.

The major powers are normally specified through one or more defining elements:-

[1]
  The Power Dimension reflecting the sheer size of a nation’s capabilities
 The spatial dimension that refer to geographic scope of interests,
actions, or projected power
 The status dimension indicating a formal or informal acknowledgement
of the major power status.

The idea of hegemonic wars/rivalry should be understood, conceptually in the

context of Realism (and Neo-realism), political realism, Realpolitik and power
politics. Read works by Niccolo Machiavelli, (The Prince); Thomas Hobbes
(Leviathan), E. H Carr (The Twenty Years’ Crisis); Hans J Morgenthau (Politics
among Nations); and Kenneth Waltz (1959 published PhD thesis on the Origins of
War). Like Waltz, Robert Gilpin (Theory of Hegemonic War) is considered a
neorealist. Morgenthau articulated the significance of national interest and
state power in modern international politics.

Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics, Cambridge: CUP, 1981
Gilpin develops a theory of hegemonic war, which is based on the idea that
behaviours be analysed according to marginal utility: a state will seek expansion as
long as the expected costs are lower than expected benefits. This is related to the
classical idea of a ‘power vacuum’ which will inevitably be filled by adjacent
powers.

Gilpin’s theory offered an understanding of epochal wars in terms of hegemonic

shifts:-

 The early modern wars for the shift from Dutch to British Hegemony (and
its defence against the French)

[2]
  The World Wars as corresponding to the shift from Pax Britannica to the
Pax Americana

Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic war challenges Walt’s attempt to put realism and
International Relations ant academic peace: the definition of politics, the role of
human nature for understanding conflict, the functional implications of (modern)
hegemonies.

Gilpin presents an implicitly rationalist, expected utility argument for international

relations: An international system is established because actors enter into social
relations and create structures to advance their interests. The structure and
distribution of benefits will therefore reflect the dominant interests within then the
system.
As the dominant interests change over time, actors who will benefit from a change
in the system will seek to change the system to get a more favourable distribution
of benefits.

 Equilibrium is achieved when one will gain from changing the system

 A state will attempt to change the system

In his article (The Theory of Hegemonic War), Robert Gilpin discusses the
dynamics of international relations, which Thucydides had discovered, notably,
states behave according to ‘differential growth of power among states’, or
‘identified as the theory of hegemonic war’.
Causes of Hegemonic War:-

[3]
  Geographical and Demographic Elements
 Economic and Technological- Naval power aiding the expansion of
commerce and the establishment of hegemony
 Domestic political developments
 Major determinant of foreign policies as differing character of their domestic
regimes
 Ideological dimension- Athens and Sparta sought to reorder other societies
in terms of their own political values and socio-economic systems
 Incompatibility between crucial elements of the existing international system
and the changing distribution of power among the states within the system-
Resolution of the disequilibrium between the superstructure of the system
and the underlying distribution of power would be by the outbreak and
intensification of conflict into a hegemonic war.

Hegemonic War in the Modern International System

 The Thirty Years War (1619-1648)

 WWI
 WWII

Great Power Rivalry and the Quest for Hegemony

[4]
 See Monday E. Dickson (Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony in the
Contemporary International System, Advances in Sciences Research Journal, Vol
6(6), 2019)

-the role as well as the rise and fall of Great powers, which often lead to structural
transformation in the international system, have been at the centre of of
international political discourse.

-After the Cold War, the international system witnessed a transition from bipolar to
unipolar system of hegemony, in which the US-led western coalition largely set
and enforced the rules of the international order.

-Later, the global system returned to a state of sharper and more explicit Great
Power competition

-A number of states, notably China, Russia, France, Germany and the UK (Plus
Japan) represent global economic powers.

However, American preponderance in each of the core components of state power

(remember the Elements and Instruments of National Power?), namely; Military,
Economic, Political and Technological, dwarfs those of the other nations. This has
had far reaching implications on the international system and the world at large.

-With the decline in the American hyper-supremacy, other nations should be able
to duplicate the overall reach and influence of the US- in terms of military,
economic, political and technological powers.

[5]
As such, the polycentric world with several power centres would ensure stability in
the contemporary world order.

Great Power Hegemony: Historical Perspective

Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, inter alia, legitimized a commonwealth of sovereign
states

Century between the Congress of Vienna and the outbreak of WWI,

international relations in Europe were largely dominated by five Great Powers;
Austria (Austria-Hungary after 1867), France, Britain, Prussia (Germany after
1871) and Russia. These great powers jealously guarded their status and were at all
times declined to admit new members into their ranks. They dominated the
diplomacy and warfare in Europe and engaged in a series of lengthy coalition wars
punctuated by swiftly changing alliances.

The dominance of the 5 or 6 powers over such a long period gave an underlying
stability to international relations.

At the outbreak of WWI, there were then 8 Great Powers, of which for the first
time, two were located totally outside Europe – Austria, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Italy, Japan and the US.

The end of WWI found Austria and Germany as well as Russia temporarily
removed from the list. Consequent of this development, the WWI and its attendant
political (re)alignments triggered a process that eventually culminated in the
integration of most of the world nations into a single balance of power system.

[6]
At the outbreak of WWII (1939), there were 7 Great Powers, Germany and the
Soviet Union having again became first-rate powers and others having retained
their status.

The War eliminated the Axis Powers (Germany, Italy and Japan) from major
power status and significantly diminished the relative power of Great Britain and
France, while China first appears on the list of major powers.

According to Morgenthau (1978:349), the end of WWII saw Great Britain, the
Soviet Union, and the US as Great Powers, while China and France, in view of
their potentials, were treated as in the negotiations and organisations as though
they were Great Powers.

British power, however, had declined to such an extent as to be distinctly inferior

to that of the US and the SU, which in view of their enormous superiority over the
power next in rank, deserved to be called Superpowers.

End of WWII, the major weight in the balance of power shifted from the
traditional players in the Western and Central Europe to just 2 non-European ones,
the US and the SU. This resulted in the emergence of a bipolar Cold War
international system.

End of Cold War, demise of bipolar world order heralded an era of transition for
global governance.

[7]
Immediate post-Cold War, dominance of the US and the transformation into a
unipolar system of hegemony, where America had the physical resources to
pursue its Unilateralist Foreign Policy around the world.

The era was marked by a fundamental shift in the Strategic Power Balances, and as
a result, a coalition of major powers under the leadership of the US emerged. The
US unilateral use of force during this era and other de facto foreign policy
endeavors had far-reaching implications on international system and the world at
large.

Recent years, US Great Power or Superpowers status has been increasingly

confronted with the growing influence of countries with potential as Great Powers
(China and Russia), resulting in a Polycentric Balance of Power, or
Multipolarity. India also on the rise, so is Indonesia.

Monday Dickson (2019): the contemporary international system can be best be

described as the Post-Cold War International System. It has had two phases:-

 31 December 1990 to 11 September 2001. US the dominant political and

military power

 11 September 2001 to Date. Revolves around three Great Powers, the US,
China and Europe. Russia, Germany and France are potential Great Powers.

The US

Popn of over 326 m (20180. GDP of US$18.6 trillion. Became a Great Power in
the early 20thc. Economic dynamism enabled it to become pivotal in both regional
[8]
and global politics. Application of soft and hard power. Hard power- Economic
and military might. Soft Power- cultural, historical and diplomatic influence.
America at some point attained Super Power Status/Hyper Power Status. US
military ranked 1st on the Global Fire Power Index (GFPI). Defence spending of
US$.......... yearly.

Russia

Largest country by land mass, nearly twice as big as Canada, the world’s second
largest nation. It covers all of northern Asia and much of Eastern Europe. Shares
land borders with more than a dozen countries and shares sea borders with Japan
and the US. Dissolution of the USSR, Russian turned into an aggrieved colossus-
anxious to restore its status as a world power. Russian foreign policy has been
shaped by a desire to reaffirm its Great Power Status and emergence as an Energy
Superpower, centred on the export of hydrocarbons (oil and gas). Popn, 144.3M;
GDP, US$1,3 trillion (cf US US$18.6 trillion!!); Military ranked 2 nd to the US;
Military spending, US$49 billion/year.

China

Popn, 1.4 billion. The country’s economic rise has been drastically changing the
world’s economic balance, and China’s Great Power Strategy is fundamentally
reshaping the world’s landscape. Geographically, China has actively promoted
development in both land and sea, based on its geopolitical strategy and geo-
economic environment.

[9]
On land, china has strengthened economic ties with Eurasia via the Belt and Road
Initiative; and while deepening cooperation with developed economies in Western
Europe, actively tap the potential of Central Asia, South Asia, East Asia and
Central and Eastern Europe. At sea, China should intensify economic connections
with Pacific Rim countries, especially the US and Japan, via the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership, Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific and
other bilateral and multilateral arrangements.

China’s economy is the world’s largest after the US. Over US$3 trillion in
reserves. Military ranked 3rd, after the US and Russia. GDP, US$10 trillion.

China a future Great Power.

NB: Since the 21st century, the US has remained a leading country in terms of
capabilities. In the early 2000s, the US spent US$295 billion on its military budget,
while Russia and China combined spent US$100 billion. The US remains the most
powerful country on earth. Dickson (2019): America’s dynamic economy, ever-
increasing population and its overwhelming military superiority, technological
development, all ensure that the US sits secure in its status on top of the greasy
pole of international power politics. However, China has cemented its status as the
world’s second greatest power, and the greatest long-term challenger to the US.
Beijing, in the face of American passivity, projected power in the South and East
China Seas, built up its artificial outposts and snatched a US military drone.

[10]
Russia and China are clearly the next two major powers and are among the world’s
top nations in terms of military capabilities and economic clouts. Following the top
three are Germany, the UK, France and Japan- countries that have large military
capability, technology, economies and give out high numbers of international aid.

Evidently, the international system is undergoing a fundamental transformation

with the emergence of more Great Powers. The emergence of multiple great
powers will ensure global stability, as international cooperation is more
conditioned by the relationships between the Great Powers. Indeed, distinctions
between states on the basis of their power act as an organizing principle within the
international state system.

Strategies used by a Hegemon in Dealing with a Proto-Peer

John Mearsheimer (2001) notes that Great Powers always seek to maximize their
share of world power, and all Great Powers seek hegemony in the international
system. This is based on a number of assumptions about the international system:-

 The international system is anarchic (remember political realism?) This does

not mean it is chaotic or riddled with disorder or a world characterized
security completion. It implies that the international system comprises
independent states that have no central authority above them. In an anarchic
international system, there exists a hierarchy of actors determined on the
basis of power. Since 1815, Great Powers have assumed a privileged status
that undermined the formal sovereign equality that had prevailed in the
previous century. Secondary States

[11]
 Great Powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, which
gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other. States
are potentially dangerous to each other, although some states have more
military might than others and are therefore more dangerous. A state’s
military power is usually identified with particular weaponry at its disposal,
although even if there were no weapons, the individuals in those states could
still use their feet and hand to attack the population of another state. This
implies that material inequality reduces the number of effective players in
the international system. Great power- states with the capacity to inflict
punishing damage, even the threat of death, on any other power in the
system, are equals. This suggests realism is a theory of Great Power
Politics, rather than a general theory of international relations.

 States can never be certain about other states’ intentions. No state can be
sure that another state will not use its offensive military capability to attack
the first state. However, uncertainty about intentions is unavoidable, which
means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive
intensions to go along with their offensive capabilities.

 Survival is the primary goal of great powers. States seek to maintain their
territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order.
Survival dominates other motives because once conquered, a state is
unlikely to be in a position to pursue other aims. Of course, states can only
pursue other goals, but security is the most important objective.

[12]
  Great Powers are rational actors. They are aware of their external
environment and they think strategically about how to survive in it. They do
some cost benefit analysis.

NB: An attempt to change the basic rules of the international system without the
hegemon’s permission (ie an effort that is non-cooperative vis-à-vis the hegemon
and threatens the hegemon’s position) contains the potential to evolve into military
conflict.

Any state contemplating such a challenge must consider it carefully. If the

challenge evolves into a crisis in which the challenger backs down, that challenger
will lose power, having been shown unable to follow through with a threat. Also,
the hegemon is likely to remain wary of future challenges and adjust its policy
toward such a dissatisfied state accordingly. If the challenge escalates to a military
conflict, then the challenger has to consider the possibility of catastrophic defeat.

Challenges to the hegemon generally occur when the challenger has about as much
power as the hegemon. At parity (power parity), the challenger may believe that it
stands to make a net gain even if a military conflict ensues. At parity, the danger of
a military conflict between the principals is the greatest, since both think that they
can win.

The challenger must calculate an expected gain before challenging the hegemon.

[13]
It is also important to note that power distribution within the international system is
always changing. The power of some states may grow faster or slower rate relative
to the hegemon.

The hegemon relies on the submission to its rules by the other main actors to
sustain its hegemonic role. Using coercion may uphold hegemonic rule, but also
alienate and intimidate. The hegemon must therefore steer carefully, employing
positive incentives toward those states that are willing to behave in accordance
with the rules, even adjusting them at times to deflect potential challenges, and
using forces (eg sanctions or military force) only toward those states clearly
unwilling to abide by the rules.

The hegemon can deploy the following strategies when dealing with proto-pers:-

 The Conciliate Strategy. Aims at increasing common interests between the

proto-peer and the hegemon, thus giving the former incentives not to
challenge the rules established by the hegemon as well as a greater stake in
the system. The strategy has a minimal amount of conflict-imposition
elements. The hegemon’s goal is limit friction with the proto-peer, and the
strategy predicated on allowing the proto-peer’s rapid growth. The
hegemon’s desired result is a peer that is a potential ally, rather than a
competitor. To pursue this strategy, the hegemon must assess the threat of
the proto-peer as low, based on a calculation that the proto-per has low
revisionist tendencies and that such tendencies, even with a leap to parity,
will remain low. By choosing the strategy that is low in conflict imposition,
the hegemon is betting on the preservation of the main element of the rules
even if the proto-peer were to overtake the hegemon.

[14]
 Example: The British policy toward the US beginning in the mid-1890s
and the early 20th C. Faced with a US that was gaining power rapidly,
confronted simultaneously with competition from France and Russia (later
Germany), and realizing the vulnerability of British holdings in the Western
Hemisphere (Canada) to the US, Britain concluded that its interests would
not be threatened by allowing America to assert regional hegemony over the
Western Hemisphere and that such a move would gain it a potential ally
against continental proto-peers and competitors. Britain chose to avoid
conflict with the US and to nurture it as a potential ally. This led to a
friendly power transition and retained for Britain many benefits of its earlier
hegemony. Today’s ‘Special US-UK relations’ reflects this choice. A
contemporary example is the US policy towards the EU, which has largely
been upholding existing (US) rules.

 The Co-Opt Strategy. Is a hedging strategy designed to lower the potential

for the proto-peer to compete with the hegemon. The strategy has a fair
amount of conflict-imposition elements and the hegemon does not shy away
from disputes with the proto-peer, though cooperative aspects form the
majority of the hegemon’s policies. This is largely a ‘carrots’ hedging
strategy, wherein the hegemon remains cautious about allowing a rapid rise
of the proto-peer and uses the interim period to strengthen the proto-peer’s
tendencies in favour of the existing rules, while avoiding overt conflict. The
hegemon’s desired result is to allow the rise of the proto-peer but with a
sustained change in behaviour.

[15]
 The hegemon must assess the specific proto-peer as a moderate threat, based
on a calculation that it has some revisionist tendencies but also that these
tendencies could change in response to threats and blandishments. The
expectation is that by the time the proto-peer attains parity with the
hegemon, it will subscribe to most of the rules. By choosing this strategy,
the hegemon is betting that the proto-peer’s revisionist tendencies are not
fundamental.

However, a rapid rise of the proto-peer along its current path would be
detrimental to the hegemon. Example: British policy toward Germany in the
early 1890s. As long as Germany remained outwardly muted in exhibiting
revisionist tendencies toward the rules upheld by Britain, the British did not
see a rapid rise of German power as problematic. Only with the rise of a
more assertive German policy that directly challenged Britain (build up of a
navy and colonial ambitions) did the hedging strategy escalate toward more
punitive elements and direct competition. A contemporary example of the
co-opt strategy is US policy toward China, basing on goals of increasing the
Chinese stake in the existing rules but also drawing clear lines on any use of
force

 The Constrain Strategy. Is also a hedging strategy. However, it is designed

to display the hegemon’s ability to punish the proto-peer for flouting the
existing rules. Most of the strategy’s elements consist of conflict imposition,
and the hegemon accepts a high level of disputes with the proto-peer.
However, cooperative elements still play a substantial role, and the hegemon
hopes to prevent a militarized completion with the proto-peer. Yet, this is a
predominantly ‘sticks’, rather than ‘carrots’, hedging strategy, whereby the

[16]
hegemon is pessimistic about the chances of the proto-peer not turning into a
competitor and uses the interim period to delay the proto-peer’s leap to peer
status and strengthen its antirevisionist tendencies in the meantime. Under
this strategy, the hegemon wants to slow the rate of power growth and effect
a sustained change in the proto-peer’s aspirations and behaviour.

For the strategy to be pursued, the hegemon must assess the threat of a
specific proto-peer as high, based on a calculation that the proto-peer has
strong revisionist tendencies and that they cannot be altered easily. The
strategy focuses on constraining the proto-peer, so that, finding its power
aggregation rate decreased over a prolonged period because of hegemon
actions, it will shed some revisionist aspirations (because they will seem
distant or unachievable) and reconcile itself to working within the
hegemon’s rules.

The strategy entails mostly negatives because the hegemon wants to throw
up as many obstacles as possible to the proto-peer’s power aggregation,
since it sees the leap to peer status as leading to a full challenge. By
choosing this strategy, the hegemon is betting that the proto-peer potentially
represents a fundamental threat and therefore wants to halt or at least slow
its power growth. Because of the proto-peer’s strong revisionist tendencies,
positive incentives are not a wise choice for the hegemon, because they will
only quicken the proto-peer’s growth and emergence as a full-blown
competitor. The dominant aspect of the constrain strategy is the hegemon’s
attempt to use conflict imposition to slow the pace of the emerging threat,
decrease the proto-peer’s revisionist tendencies and buy time.

[17]
 Example: The British policy toward Russia in the 1890s and into the early
20th C (until 1905). Russian challenges to British colonial possessions, its
alliance with France and the potential for its power to grow rapidly because
of industrialization made it Britain’s primary opponent. Only Russia’s much
lower overall power level led Britain to choose a constrain, rather than a
compete strategy, in which the British focused on blockading further
Russian inroads. Depending on China’s potential further evolution, a US
shift to a constrain strategy toward Beijing is possible.

 The Compete Strategy. It attempts to decrease the proto-peer’s power,

relative to the hegemon, by imposing conflict to punish the proto-peer. The
strategy is highly conflictual. The hegemon’s goal is to curtail the further
growth of the proto-peer’s power, and the strategy rests upon the hegemon’s
willingness to risk repeated militarized crises to effect change in the proto-
peer. The hegemon already views the proto-peer as a competitor and wants
to keep it from becoming a peer.

To pursue the strategy, the hegemon must assess the threat posed by a
specific proto-peer as high, based on a calculation that the proto-peer has
fundamental revisionist tendencies that are unlikely to be moderated by
measures short of threat of force. By choosing the strategy high in conflict
imposition, the hegemon is betting that the proto-peer represents a
fundamental challenge to the rules and is willing to risk war to prevent it.
The hegemon’s assessment is that, if the proto-peer overtakes it, then the
hegemon’s current form of existence would be threatened. The decision to
embark on a compete strategy has long-term consequences.

[18]
Example: US policy toward the USSR between late 1940s and late 1980s.
The most conflictual period was 1950s -1960s. There is no contemporary
example of the compete strategy. Will the shift to that strategy in future in
view of increasing Chinese and Russian assertiveness?

NB: Even if the hegemon tries to prevent the emergence of a peer by using
highly conflictual strategies, a peer may emerge anyway. Alternatively, an
exogenous shock might turn a benign and cooperative peer into a
competitor. A competitor might equally morph into an ally peer.

[19]