Abduction and Kidnapping

Chapter - II
ABDUCTION AND KIDNAPPING

1. Abduction.—Whoever by force compels,
or by any deceitful means induces, any

person to go from any place, is said the
abduct that person.
[Vide Section 362, IPC, 1860].
2. Buying or disposing of any person as a
slave.—Whoever imports, exports, removes,

buys, sells or disposes of any person as a
slave, or accepts, receives or detains against
his will any person as a slave, or accepts,
receives or detains against his will any
person as a slave, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years, and
shall also be liable to fine.
3. Habitual dealing in slaves.—Whoever
habitually imports, exports, removes, buys,
sells, traffics or deals in slaves, shall be
punished with imprisonment for life, or with
imprisonment of either description for a term
not exceeding ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
4. Kidnapping.—Kidnapping is of two
kinds; kidnapping from India, and
kidnapping from Lawful guardianship.
5. Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman
to compel her marriage, etc.— Whoever

kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent
that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be
likely that she will be compelled, to marry any
person against her will, or in order that she
may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse,
or knowing it to be likely that she will be
forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to
ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, and
whoever, by means of criminal intimidation as
defined in this Code or of abuse of authority
or any other method of compulsion, induces
any woman to go from any place with intent
that she may be, or knowing that it is likely
that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit
intercourse with another person shall also be
punishable as aforesaid.
The essential ingredient of the offence
punishable under Section 366 of IPC is that
when a person has forcibly taken a minor
girl with the intention as specified in that
section, then the offence is clearly made out.
[Tarkeshwar Sahu v. State of Bihar, (Now
Jharkhand), 2006 (4) Crimes 171 : 2006 (3)
SCC (Cri) 556 : 2006 (4) Recent Cri 603 :
2006 (7) Supreme 741].
In the case of rape, the onus is always on the
prosecution to prove affirmatively each
ingredients of the offence and such onus
never shifts. The evidence of PWs cannot be
accepted merely because an accused fails to
say as to why they come forward to depose
against him. In this case, the evidence of the
prosecutrix does not appear to reliable and
trustworthy and the same is not supported by
an independent. Looking to the facts and
circumstances of the case, the only
irresistible conclusion can be drawn is that
the prosecutrix was a consenting party and
all the activities right from the beginning
were on with her fact consent.
[Chhoga v. State, (2004) 1 Crimes 444
(Raj)].
In order to constitute an offence of
‘abduction’ a person must be carried off
illegally by force or deception, that is, ‘to
compel a person by force or deceitful means to
induce to go from one place to another.”
[Rajendra v. State of Maharashtra, 2002 Cri
R LJ 4353 : AIR 2002 SC 3390 : 2002 SCC
(Cri) 1847 : 2002 (7) Supreme 68 : 2002 (7)
JT 514 : 2002 (10) SRJ 112].
So far as a charge under Section 366 of IPC
is concerned, mere finding that a woman was
abducted is not enough, it must further be
proved that the accused abducted the woman
with intent that she may be compelled, or
knowing it to be likely that she will be
compelled to marry any person or in order
that she may be forced or seduced to illicit
intercourse or knowing it to be likely that she
will be forced or seduced to illicit
intercourse.
[Gabbu v. State of H.P., (2006) 2 Crimes
270 : (2006) 5 SCC 740 : (2006) 3 SCC
(Cri) 71 : AIR 2006 SC 2461 : 2006 Cri LJ
3276 : 2006 AIR SCW 3212 : 2006 (6) SCJ
245 : 2006 (5) Scale 649 : 2006 (4) Supreme
439 : 2006 (11) JT 255 : 2006 (6) SCJD
496].
Accused was visiting the house of the
prosecutrix. Letter were exchanged.
Telephone calls were made. When the
telephone was got disconnected by the father
of the prosecutrix, accused gave her mobile
phone. She was not opposed to marry
accused. But it is only that her parents were
objecting to the same. She dressed like
a bride. Thus, possibility of her having
consented of having sexual intercourse with
accused cannot be ruled out. Testimony of
the prosecutrix and the Doctor, clearly
establishes that she was wearing as a bride.
In fact, MLC (Ext. PW-3/B) records “bearing
Sindoor”. In this backdrop it cannot be said
that the accused subjected the prosecutrix to
an offence of rape. As such, the present
appeals are allowed and the judgement of
conviction and sentence passed by the Trial
Court is set aside.
[Madan Lal v. State of H.P., 2014 Cri LJ 641
(HP)].
Dr. “T” P.W. 3 has deposed that no mark of
injury was found on the person of the
prosecutrix at the time of medical
examination. As per testimony of the
prosecutrix, she was caused burn injury (by
cigarette) by the accused on two places
whereas the prosecutrix did not mention this
fact either in her First Information Report or
in the statement given to the Investigating
Officer. The Investigating Officer has
denied this fact that the prosecutrix ever told
about any injury being caused to her by
cigarette burn. In this backdrop we may easily
infer that the accused had previously lodge
criminal case against the father and the two
others of the prosecutrix wherein they were
convicted and sentenced by the Trial Court
which fact may act as the motivating factor for
false implication of the accused. In this view
of the matter, the Trial Court was justified
in taking reasonable precaution by observing
that would be safer to really on some
independent corroboration apart from sole
testimony of the prosecutrix. In view of the
discussion made hereinabove, High Court see
no infirmity latent or patent in the
judgement of acquittal record by the Trial
Court. Allahabad High Court, accordingly, not
inclined to interfere with the judgement and
the order of acquittal recorded by the trial
Judge in respect of the accused respondent.
[State of U.P. v. Gulzar, 2014 (143) AIC 864
(All. ) (D.B.)].
In the case in hand there is no evidence
within the four corners of the record that
the appellant/accused either by applying
force, or by any deceitful means induced
victim to go from any place. If that be t he
position then there was no question of
abduction within the meaning of Section
362 of the Indian Panel Code. As such the
question of applying Section 366 does not
arise. It was held that there was no material
to prove the charge under Section 366 of the
Indian Penal Code against the appellant/
accused. Accordingly, the order of
conviction and sentence for commission of
offence under Section 366 of the Indian
Penal Code is hereby set aside.
[Swarup Prakash Dhara v. State of West
Bengal, 2014 (142) AIC 576 (Cal.) (DB)].
Radiological examination reports, voters
list, etc. proved that prosecutrix was major, it
cannot be ruled out that the major girl had
gone accused on her own volition and might
had undergone sexual intercourse with her
consent. There was no injury on person of
prosecutrix and no evidence of intercourse.
Trial Court has erred in law in convicting
accused.
[Neeraj Kadam Singh v. State of
Uttrakhand, 2013 Cri LJ 3066 (Uttra)].
The claim of the petitioner that he is
innocent and has been falsely implicated
cannot be accepted. There are material to
show his involvement in the incident. A deeper
probe into the veracity of the allegation is not
warranted at this point of time. The petitioner
has been in custody from 28.12.2012 onwards.
A good part of the investigation must have
been completed by now. Since no
apprehension is expressed by the Investigating
Agency that if the petitioner is released on bail,
he is likely to abscond, his continued custody
appears to be unnecessary and he can be
released on bail.
[Sanju v. State of Kerala, 2013 (1) Crimes
683 (Ker.)].
The conduct of prosecutrix during her
stay for about a month with accused
disclosed that no force or undue influence
was used by accused on her. The charge of
abduction was not established, hence,
conviction was liable to be set aside.
[Pooran v. State of Rajasthan, 2014 (3)
Crimes 413 (Raj.)].
The prosecution case appears to be highly
doubtful for the reason that it is not
probable that for 2-3 months, a person aged
about 32 years would not raise any protest
even while living with the Appellant. In
such circumstances High Court was not
convicted that it is a case of kidnapping or
sexual assault without consent. Hence,
order of conviction and sentence is, hereby
set aside.
[Raju Kumar Rai v. State of Bihar, 2014 Cri
LJ 1670 (Pat.)].
The prosecution has not able to establish
offence against the Appellant. Section 366
contemplates that “whoever kidnaps or
abducts any woman with intent that she
may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely
that she will be compelled, to marry any
person against her will, or in order that she
may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse,
or knowing it to illicit intercourse”. The
evidence that have come on record is clearly
deficient to bring home this charge. First of all,
the victim, P.W. 2, in her own statement had
stated that “On the relevant night accused did
not commit any offence against me”. Even the
evidence of P.W. 8 clearly reflects that the
victim girl was not in a compelling
circumstance either to marry the appellant or
to be sexually assaulted. In these
circumstances, the principle ingredients
necessary to constitute an offence under
Section 366, IPC are found wanting and,
therefore, no case under that provision can
be said to have been made out against the
Appellant. For these reasons, the conviction of
the appellant under Section 366, IPC stands
set aside.
[Md. Aktar Alam v. State of Sikkim, 2014
Cri LJ 4493].
The prosecutrix has deposed that she was
taken from one place to the other and
remained at various houses for almost two
months. The only explanation given by her
is that she was threatened by the accused
persons. It is not in her testimony that she
was confined to one place. In fact, it has been
borne out from the material on record that
she had travelled from place to place and she
was ravished number of times. Under these
circumstances, the medical evidence gains
significance, for the examining doctor has
categorically deposed that there are no
injuries on the private parts. The delay in FIR,
the non-examination of the witness, the
testimony of the prosecutrix, the associated
circumstances and the medical evidence,
leave a mark of doubt to treat the testimony
of the prosecutrix as so natural and truthful to
inspire confidence. It can be stated with
certitude that the evidence of the prosecutrix
is not of such quality which can be replaced
reliance upon. True it is, the grammar of law
permits the testimony of a prosecutrix can be
accepted without any corroboration without
material particulars, for she has to be placed
on a higher pedestal than an injured witness,
but, a pregnant one, when a Court, on studied
scrutiny of the evidence finds it difficult to
accept the version of the prosecutrix, because
it is not unreproachable, there is requirement
for search of such direct or circumstantial
evidence which would lend assurance to her
testimony. As the instant case would show,
her testimony does not inspire confidence,
and the circumstantial evidence remotely do
not lend any support to the same. In the
absence of both, High Court was compelled to
hold that the trial Judge has erroneously
convicted the accused appellants for the
alleged offence and the High Court has fallen
into error, without reappreciating the
material on record, by giving the stamps of
approval to the same.
[Md. Ali v. State of U.P., 2015 AIR SCW
1711].
Where a girl aged less than 18 years is taken

away or the girl has herself gone the accused
person taking the minor girl should be held
guilty of the offence under Section 366
notwithstanding the fact that she
accompanied the accused persons of her
own accord and not as a result of force or
misrepresentation.
[Rajan v. State of Rajasthan, 2002 Cri LJ
3152 (Raj)].
6. Kidnapping for India.—Whoever
conveys any person beyond the limits of
India without the consent of that person, or
of some person authorised to consent on
behalf of that person, is said to kidnap that
person from India.
7. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship.—
Whoever takes or entices any minor under

sixteen years of age if a male, or under
eighteen years of age if a female or any
person of unsound mind, out of the keeping
of the Lawful guardian of such minor or
person of unsound mind, without the
consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap
such minor or person from lawful
guardianship.
[See Section 361, IPC, 1860].
8. Kidnapping or abducting child under ten
years with intent to steal from its person.—
Whoever kidnaps or abducts any child
under the age of ten years with the intention
of taking dishonestly any movable property
from the person of such child, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either
seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
9. Kidnapping or abducting in order to subject
person to grievous hurt, slavery, etc.—Whoever

kidnaps or abducts any person in order that
such person may be subjected, or may be so
disposed off as to be put in danger of being
subjected to grievous hurt, or slavery, or to
the unnatural lust of any person, or knowing
it to be likely that such person will be so
subjected or disposed off, shall be punished
with imprisonment or either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, and
10. Kidnapping or abducting with intent
secretly and wrongfully to confine person.—
Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person
with intent to cause that person to be
secretly and wrongfully confined, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either
seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
11. Kidnapping or maiming a minor for
purposes of begging.—(1) Whoever kidnaps
any minor or, not being the lawful guardian of
a minor, obtains the custody of the minor,
in order that such minor may be employed or
used for the purposes of begging, shall be
punishable with imprisonment of either
ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) Whoever maims any minor in order that
such minor may be employed or used for the

purposes of begging shall be punishable with
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable
to fine.
(3) Where any person, not being the lawful
guardian of a minor, employs or used such

minor for the purposes of begging, it shall be
presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that
he kidnapped or otherwise obtained the
custody of that minor in order that the
minor might be employed or used for the
purposes of begging.
(4) In this section,—

(a) “begging” means—
(i) soliciting or receiving alms in a public
place, whether under the pretence of

singing, dancing, fortune-telling,
performing tricks or selling articles or
otherwise;
(ii) entering on any private premises for
the purpose of soliciting or receiving

alms;
(iii) exposing or exhibiting, with the object
of obtaining or extorting alms, any

sore, wound, injury, deformity or
disease, whether of himself of any
other person or of an animal;
(iv) using a minor as an exhibit for the
purpose of soliciting or receiving alms;

(b) “minor” means—
(i) in the case of a male, a person under
sixteen years of age;

(ii) in the case of a female, a person
under eighteen years of age. [Vide

Section 363-A, IPC, 1860].
Kidnapping or abducting in order to
12.
murder.—Whoever kidnaps or abducts any

person in order that such person may be
murdered or may be so disposed off as to be
put in danger of being murdered, shall be
punished with imprisonment for life or
rigorous imprisonment for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
In the facts of the instant case, there is
sufficient interval between the death of the
boy and the recovery of the body, which was
only a selection, the link in the chain of the
circumstantial evidence does not appear to
be complete. Hence, the conviction of the
appellants by the Trial Court is bad in the
eyes of law and is not sustainable.
[Tara Chand v. State of U.P., 2013(2)
Crimes 636 (All.) (DB) (SN)].
The Counsel appearing for the accused-
appellant would bring to the notice of
High Court the conduct of the accused-
appellant immediately after the
occurrence and submitted that no prudent
person who had intended to cause the
death of the victim would have behave in
such a manner. High Court find that there
is substance in the submission made by
appearing for the accused-appellant. Had
the accused- appellant intended to cause
the death of the victim, there was no
reason for him not to kill the victim at the
scene of crime itself. Even assuming for
the sake of arguments that the accused had
intended to immobilize the victim with his
attack, he would not have taken her to the
best hospital for treatment. It is the
admitted version of PW 1 the father of the
victim that not only the accused-
appellant, but also his parents were
present at PGI, Chandigarh when he
reached there to meet his injured
daughter. had the accused-appellant made
an attempt to kill the victim, he would not
have associated his parents in giving best of
treatment in the reputed hospital. For all
these reasons, the conduct of the accused-
appellant also belies the version of the
prosecution that the accused-appellant
authorised the crime charged as against
him. In view of the above the Trial Court
had fallen in error in convicting the
accused for the charges under Sections
302 and 364, IPC.
[Jatinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab, 2014
(2) Crimes 692 (P&H)].
The evidence tendered by the prosecution

raises a strong suspicion against the accused,
but then the law is well settled that the
suspicion, however, grave, cannot take the
place of proof. That being so, High Court
conclude that the prosecution has failed to
prove any of the offences with which the
accused was charged. The accused is
acquitted of the offence punishable under
Sections 364, 367, 377 and 302 of the Indian
Penal Code, for which he has been convicted.
[State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Shekar
Shriram Atram, 2013 (5) ABR 29 (Bom)
(DB)].
13. Kidnapping for ransom, etc.—Whoever
kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a
person in detention after such kidnapping or
abduction, and threatens to cause death or
hurt to such person, or by his conduct gives
rise to a reasonable apprehension that such
person may be put to death or hurt, or causes
hurt or death to such person in order to
compel the Government or any foreign State
or International Inter-Governmental
Organization or any other person to do or
abstrain from doing any act or to pay a
ransom, shall be punishable with death, or
imprisonment for life, and shall also be
liable to fine.
[Vide Section 364-A, IPC, 1860].
Section 364-A was introduced in the IPC by
the Criminal Amendment of Act of 42 of
1993 which came into effect with effect from
22.5.1993 because of the increasing number of
cases where the victim is abducted and a
demand for money is raised with a threat
perception or danger to the life on that person
and that person is ultimately put to death.
Such kind of offences are not covered under
sub-section (2) of Section 181 of Cr PC. It is
not simply abduction or kidnapping. It is
something more in ordinary case of abduction
or kidnapping as defined in Sections 359 and
362. They are offence simpliciter of
kidnapping and abduction.
[Vishwanath Gupta v. State of Uttaranchal,
2007 Cri LJ 2296 : 2007 (5) Scale 114
: 2007 (2) East Cri C 249 : 2007 (2) CCR 205 :
2007 (58) All Cri C 636].
To attract the provisions of Section 364-A of
IPC there has to be a demand by the
kidnapper on the complainant or any of his
relations asking for the payment of ransom.
Demand cannot be said to be made when the
accused has not communicated any letter
but has only kept it in his pocket.
[Netra Pal v. State, 2001 Cri LJ 1669 (Del) :
2001 (4) Crimes 387].
The presence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 at the place
where the victim boy was recovered has also
not been established by cogent and reliable
evidence. This important fact is not found
proved by the prosecution. Similarly , the
fact of having found the accused appellant
at the place of recovery of the victim boy
from the said jungle has not been proved.
when these two facts are not proved, it
would impel to infer that there existed a
possibility of false implication of the
accused appellant. For the same reason,
possibility of improvement of the
prosecution case with intention to implicate
the accused appellant cannot be ruled out.
[Rakesh Debnath v. State of Tripura, 2011
Cri LJ 1030 (Gau) (DB)].
The PW 2 has not stated a word about ‘A’.
PW 1 has not indicated anything, which
would show involvement of a with crime in
question. Similarly, neither PW 3, nor PW 4,
or PW 5, or PW 6, or PW 7, or PW 8, or PW 9
has stated anything, which would suggest that
‘A’ was even remotely connected with the
crime in question. It is Inspector (PW 10),
who has the Investigating Officer, who stated
in Court that ‘D’ disclose to him that it was ‘A’
who had made the plan for the crime and was
the main conspirator. This piece if evidence is
not acceptable in law. Therefore, the
conclusion would be that the prosecution
failed to bring on record any evidence
suggestion even a remote connection of ‘A’
has been convicted by the judgement under
Appeal without there being any evidence on
record against him. That part of the judgment,
by which, ‘A’ has been convicted for offence
punishable under Section 120-B of IPC is,
accordingly, interfered with and the same is
set aside.
[Auab v. State of Uttrakhand, 2013 Cri LJ
4310 (Uttra) (DB)].
The victim admitted that he roamed
around freely in village Barban, met the
people there, viewed television, went to
ease himself, but he did not try to flee away
to his own house. prosecution story
became doubtful on the basis of such
statements of PW 1. An adult person , who
was allegedly abducted, had opportunity
of fleeing away to his house, but PW 1 did
not free himself from the clutches of his
abductors for the reasons best known to
him. The said fact casts shadow of doubt
on the testimony of PW 1 (victim).
Otherwise also, no test identification
parade of the accused persons was
conducted to establish the fact that the
accused-respondents and respondents
alone, abducted PW 1. Labourers, were also
not examined no behalf of the prosecution.
[Saffan Kumar Goel v. State of Uttranchal,
2014 Cri LJ 1247 (Uttra)].
There is no evidence on record to establish
that infuriated by his removal from service
and non-payment of dues, the appellant
master-minded the lot to abduct the Children
or played any active role in abducting them. If
a telephone all was received making ransom
demand and making relevance about alleged
ill-treatment of the appellant, the police had
should have treated the calls and identified
the caller. The police have failed to do so.
Criminal Court recognize only legally
admissible evidence and not far-fetched
conjectures and surmises. The High Court
was carried away by the heinous nature of
the crime and, in that, it lost sight of the basic
principle underlying criminal jurisprudence
that suspicious, however, grave, cannot take
the place of proof. In the result, Supreme
Court allow the appeal and set aside the
impugned order. The appellant is ordered to
be released forthwith, if he is not required in
any other case.
[Md. Faizan Ahmed v. State of Bihar, 2013
All MR(Cri) 708 (SC) : 2013 (1) Crimes 21 :
2013 Cri LJ 1631].
14. Procuration of minor girl.—Whoever, by
any means whatsoever, induces any minor

girl under the age of eighteen years to go
from any place or to do any act with intent
that such girl may be, or knowing that it is
likely that shall will be, forced or seduced to
illicit intercourse with another person shall
be punishable with imprisonment which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
[Vide Section 366-A, IPC, 1860].
Section 366-A of IPC would come into play,
it is established by the prosecution that the
victim minor girl was taken away with intent
or knowledge that she would likely to be
forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with
“another person”. In the instant case, the
charge against A-1 was that he himself
committed forcible intercourse on the minor
girl. In such a case, Section 366-A will have
no application.
[Mohammed Nisar Riyaz Khan v. State, 2007
Cri LJ 562 (Bom) : 2006 (6) AIR Bom R 610].
Circumstances is speaking that nothing
adverse was existing for her disclosure if
she was kidnapped. More relevant is that
this accused respondent was in custody in
the instant case. From beginning till the end
her act does not justify to show that force
was ever used that is not necessary in
kidnapping of a girl who is minor but when
a created explanations is given away from the
reality that is not admissible which has been
taken into consideration by the Trial Court
including several facts and non-existing of
ingredients for constituting offence under
Section 366-A of the Indian Penal Code. Thus,
High Court find no mistake committed by the
trial Court in its judgement.
[State of Bihar v. Rakesh Kumar, 2013 Cri
LJ 1990 (Pat.)].
Here, in case, though the offence under
Sections 366 and 366-A are of more or less
similar in nature, still the punishment
provided for both the offence is
imprisonment for ten years and fine.
Therefore, the offence under Section 366-
A is not a minor offence to Section 366 of I.
P.C., so as to invoke Section 222(2) of Cr.
P. C. Thus, the conviction of these
appellants/accused 1 to 4 under Section
366-A of I.P.C., without there being a
charge, is illegal and therefore, the same is
liable to be set aside.
[Suramani v. State, 2011 Cri LJ 2871
(Mad)].
In the instant case, no such evidence is
available that the accused-appellant had
induced the victim to leave her parental
house with intent that she may be forced or
seduced to illicit intercourse with other
person that the accused and also it is not
conclusively proved that the victim was at
the time of alleged occurrence below the age
of 18 years. Thus, the impugned judgement
and order is set aside and consequent
thereto, the accused-appellant is acquitted
of the offence under Section 366-A of the
IPC.
[Babul Chandra Pal v. State of Tripura,
2014 Cri LJ 1415 (Tri.)].
There is no dispute that the petitioner is a
major and was at all relevant times a major.
Hence, she is free to marry anyone she likes
or live with anyone she likes. There is no bar
to an inter-caste marriage under the Hindu
Marriage Act or any other law. Hence, High
Court cannot see what offence was
committed by the petitioner, her husband or
her husband’s relatives. It was held that no
offence was committed by any of the
accused and the whole criminal case in
question is an abuse of the process of the
Court.
[Parvati Kumari v. State of Jharkhand, 2014
(2) Crimes 725 (Jhar.)].
15. Punishment for kidnapping.—Whoever
kidnaps any person from India or from
lawful guardianship, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years, and
By demonstrating inconsistencies and
infirmities in the statements of the
statements of the witnesses, their statements
have also been rendered suspicious and
accordingly unreliable. There is also a serious
impression of funding and padding at the
hands of the agencies involved. As a matter of
fact, the lack of truthfulness of the
statement of witness has been demonstrated
by means of simple logic emerging from the
factual position expressed through different
prosecution witnesses. The evidence
produced to prove the charge, has been
systematically shattered, thereby demolishing
the prosecution version. More than all that,
is the non-production of the evidence which
the prosecution has unjustifiably withheld,
resulting in slashing all the States efforts to
the ground. It is not necessary for Supreme
Court to record our detailed determination
on the submission advance at the hand of
the Counsel for the appellant, for such
reasons clearly emerge from the factual
position. Recording
of reason all over again, would just be a

matter of repetition. In view of the above,
Supreme Court find no merit in this appeal.
[State of Gujarat v. Kishanbhai, 2014 (5)
SCC 108 : 2014 AIR SCW 557 : JT 2014
(1) SC 508 : 2014 (1) SCR 197 : 2014 (1)
SCALE 177].
Discussion of issue of age at length, and in
addition to it medical opinion about age of
victim (16 to 18 year) with concession that
the actual age of victim may be 2 years more
or 2 years less than age found in medical
opinion are the material possible to read in
favour of accused in the circumstances of
the came. Thus, in the circumstances of the
case is an erroneous approach. Just because
victim had taken her friend ‘C’ with her and
had a sickle and iron basket with her, the
real reason for going to the boundary of the
village at that time cannot be ignored or
glossed over. The fact that the victim even
after her brother ‘R’ came at the scene at
that time and even though ‘R’ has alleged to
have instructed ‘C’ to bring victim with her-
She, the victim opts to go away with the
accused, cannot be brushed aside or
ignored by referring the favorites fact in the
manner that Court did. This appears to be
erroneous approach. The material aspect
missed by the Trial Court is absence of
‘mens rea’. It ought to have been brought on
record or culpable state of mind should be
possible for the Court to infer from the
circumstances of the case. The accused may
be unrefined and rustic, but the record does
not reveal anything that can be considered
as criminal design on the part of accused. In
that case, the victim had asked the accused
to see her at particular place. So also in the
present case, it is the victim who had stated
to the accused to meet her at the boundary
of the village. In the facts and circumstances
of the present case, it can be said that as in
Varadrajan case. “‘taking’ of Savitri...
(Sharda herein) out of keeping of her father
has not been established...” It may also be
noted that neither father nor the mother of
the victim are examined by the prosecution
in the instant case. In the instant case, the
victim and accused had gone by walking to
Barbara Bus Stands. In short, there is no
evidence worth the name of offence under
Section 366 of the IPC. In view of the above
discussion, the judgment of the Sessions
Judge and of Sessions Judge are
unsustainable.
[Amarshibhai v. State of Gujarat, 2013 Cri
LJ 2768 (Guj.)].
In cross-examination, the prosecutrix
stated that she started from village Fathepur
Billoch in an auto-rickshaw at about 9.00 or
10.00 a.m., and came at Ambedkar Chowk.
From there she was taken by all the three
accused in an auto-rickshaw to Railway
Station from where she was taken to Delhi.
There were many passengers at the Railway
Station and in the train. They reached Delhi
after about 1½ hours. From the Railway
Station she was taken to a bus stand but
stated that when she tried to speak to the
passengers, the accused threatened her with
dire consequences. The prosecutrix further
stated that after committing rape A1 stated
that he would not marry her. She rather
stated that she never wanted to marry with
A1 but accused war forcing her for that. The
prosecutrix admitted in cross-examination
that she knew A1 for the past 8/9 years
being her neighbour.
The other important aspect is that the
doctor recorded in the MLR of the
porsecutrix, that as per the information of the
girl, no sexual assault was done. This also
recorded at the top of the medico-legal report
Ex. PW6/A. PW/6 (Dr. N. Kaur) stated in the
affidavit Ex. PW6/A that there was no
external mark of injury found on the person
of the prosecutrix. The doctor also prepared a
vial containing two vaginal swab and a packet
of maroon colour underwear of prosecutrix
into a sealer parcel and handed over the
same to the police for chemical examination.
Ex. PA is the copy of report of Forensic
Science Laboratory, Madhuban, Kamal
(Haryana) where the sealed parcels were sent
for examination. Even the sealed parcel
containing underwear was sent to the said
laboratory. Vide report Ex. P.A. of FSL
semen could not be detected on any of the
exhibits sent for examination.
From the discussion made above, High
Court find that testimony of prosecutrix
when compared with the series of
contradictions and in-consistencies does
not inspire confidence. The charge against
both A1 and A2, therefore, is not proved
beyond suspicion.
[Sita Ram v. State of Haryana, 2015 (1)
Crimes 582 (P&H)].
In the instant case, ‘R’ is admitting in so
many words that she had accompanied the
application on her own free will and volition
and since she was in love the appellant and the
applicant also loved her, they decided to get
married and, accordingly, got married at the
Ajmer Sharif. It was held that no case is made
out to even prima facie show that ‘R’ had
received a promiser or assurance or any
tempting offer from the applicant by virtue of
which she was forced to leave her parental
home. There is, nothing to even prima facie
show to the Court the “taking” of the girl by
the accused, the evidence about his “enticing”
her away is equally absent. If this is so, there
is no kidnapping of the girl and hence the
question for application of Section 363 of the
Indian Penal Code does not arise. It was held
that when no offence is constituted, the
Police should not be allowed to continue with
the investigation.
[Mujamil Abdulsattar Mansuri v. State of
Gujarat, 2015 (3) Crimes 231 (Guj)].
In the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the case, it cannot be said that the
prosecutrix was taken away by the
appellants form the lawful guardianship of
her parents so as to attract the penal
provision of Sections 363 of I.P.C. against
them. therefore, High Court have no
hesitation in holding that the impugned
judgement of conviction and order on
sentence passed by the Trial Court against
the appellants cannot be sustained either on
facts or in law. In view of the foregoing, this
appeal is allowed. Impugned judgement of
conviction and order on sentence set aside.
[Ajab Singh v. State of M.P., 2011 Cri LJ
1718 (M.P.)].
It is significant to note that the statement of
two star witnesses PW-4 and PW-36 came to
be recorded after two month of the incident.
There is no whisper in the entire evidence of
the witnesses including the investigating
Officer to explain delay in recording
statements. Further admissions elicited in
cross-examination of PW-4 and PW-36,
clearly shows that last seen ceased to be a cir
circumstance against accused Nos. 1 and 3
as according to witness and complainant, ‘R’
had gone with his friend in a car and
accused No. 1 returned to the house. In this
background, theory of last seen is not
established by the prosecution against
accused Nos. 1 and 3. So far as other
accused are concerned, it is not the
prosecution case that deceased ‘R’ was last
seen in their company.
[Balasaheb Gurling Todkari v. State of
Maharashtra, 2015 All MR (Cri) 3464 (Bom)
(D.B.)].
P.W. 1 (Father of the girl) who is her
guardian has not supported the prosecution
story and he has turned hostile. He did not say
that accused had taken his daughter from his
lawful guardianship. He told that the girl was
aged eighteen years. Not only this, P.W.3
(real brother of the victim) has stated in his
cross-examination that his age was twenty
five years. He had two younger sister ‘S’ and
‘P’ (victim). ‘S’ was three years younger to him
and ‘P’ was two years younger to ‘S’. In other
words age of the victim was twenty years in
the year 2004 which means on the day of the
incident age of the
girl was eighteen years. On perusal of cross-

examination of P.W.2 ‘P’ also it is clear that
she has admitted that her elder brother was
aged thirty years who was a married man. She
further told that they are three siblings. She
further stated that her elder sister is three
years young to he elder brother and she (P.W.
2) is two years younger to her elder sister as
such the statement give by the girl in her
cross-examination further corroborates the
fact that on the day of the incident she was
aged eighteen years. As Such, High Court is of
the view that the allegation of kidnapping of
minor girl made by the prosecution does
not stand proved on the record.
[Bittu v. State of Uttarakhand, 2013 Cri LJ
4704 (Uttra)].
P.W. 2 nowhere alleged sexual intercourse
with her by the respondent No. 1 in her
statement. Although she said that the
respondent No. 1 forced upon her after the
marriage, but the same was not explained by
P.W. 2. In other words, it was not alleged by
P.W. 2 that the respondent No. 1 had sexual
intercourse with her. After having had
ossification test, the Medical Officer opined
that she was between 17-18 years of age. In
such view of the matter, neither the offence
of rape nor of deemed rape was made out
against the respondent No. 1. The allegation
of conspiracy was also not proved against
the respondent No. 2. Hence, it is held that
the prosecution was unable to prove the
offences punishable under Sections 363,
366, 376, IPC against the respondent No. 1
and Section 120-B, IPC against the
respondent No. 2.
[State of Uttarakhand v. Deepu Das, 2013
Cri LJ 746 (Uttra) (DB)].
P.W. 2 willingly went along with the first
accused to various places and therefore, no
offence under Section 363 of I.P.C. would be
attracted against the first accused. As a
corollary, appellant Nos. 2 to 4 also entitled
for acquittal. Thus, the appellant Nos. 1 to 4
are entitled for acquittal from the conviction
and sentence imposed against them under
Section 363, I.P.C.
[Suramani v. State, 2011 Cri LJ
2871(Mad)].
The case in so far as this appellant is
concerned becomes doubtful and no case
can be said to have been made out either
under Section 363 or under Section 366-
A of the Indian Penal Code. It is a clear case
that ‘S’ went on the call of ‘N’ and thereafter
she is said to have been taken away.
Therefore, a case of kidnapping from lawful
guardianship by ‘A’ is not made out. The
evidence of ‘S’, even if it is taken into
consideration, would only indicate that ‘N’
and another person had taken her away. Now
in the examination in chief she has clearly
stated that ‘N’ and ‘A’ brought her to Kolkata.
In other words she knew ‘A’ by name and yet
she states that 2 person brought her near a
hired taxi and that ‘N’ and another person put
a handkerchief on her mouth. if ‘S’ knew ‘A’
by name then there is no explanation as to
how and why she did not name ‘A’ as the
person who had put the handkerchief on her
mouth. From the evidences, therefore, on
record, High Court notice that the
involvement of the appellant has not been
specially attributed by any of the
prosecution witnesses. As a consequence let
the appellant who is in custody be released
forthwith.
[Atiar Rahman Mallick v. State of West
Bengal, 2014 Cri LJ 1268 (Cal.) (DB)].
The evidence of PW 17 did not inspire
confidence. The alleged incident had been
committed at night and there was darkness at
the scene of the incident. No reliance could
be placed on the Test Identification Parade
conducted by PW13— Tahasildar, there was
infirmity in the conduct of the Test
Identification Parade as all the 9 accused
were put up for identification and in the first
round 4 accused while in the second
round four other accused were parade and
thereafter one accused as
paraded for identification. It was held in the
absence of any other evidence which
would establish the complicity of the
accused acquitted the appellant.
[Pravin Rajendra Rathod v. State of
Maharashtra, 2014 (2) Crimes 339 (Bom.)
(DB)].
The offence under Section 363 of IPC is not
attracted if the prosecution has not
established that the prosecutrix is under 18
years of age and a minor at the relevant time.
[Mohan v. State of Rajasthan, 2003 Cri LJ
1891 (Raj)].
The prosecution has not been able to
prove that ingredients of both Sections 363
and 366, IPC are present in this case. There
is nothing on record to show that the
prosecutrix was either kidnapped from the
lawful guardianship of her parents or that
she was abducted with the intent to force or
seduce her to enter into illicit intercourse.
High Court find that the essential
ingredients for constituting the offence
punishable under Sections 363 and 366,
IPC are missing in this case and therefore,
the finding records by the Court below
regarding the same is erroneous and
conviction of the appellant under the said
two sections deserves to be quashed and set
aside.
[Thakur Narsangji Ablaiv v. State of
Gujarat, 2014 Cri LJ 1252 (Guj) (DB)].
The prosecutrix, as per medical opinion, is
aged about 19 years and in her statement
recorded under Section 164, Cr. P. C. she has
categorically stated that she voluntarily left
her parents house and had accompanied with
co-accused and traveled at several places
and enjoyed with company and further
married him at Aligarh and established,
sexual relationship with co-accused and
remained with him for about two months.
Admittedly, as per the statement of the
prosecutrix no offence under Sections 363 and
366 of IPC is made out against the applicant.
Moreover the academic record of the
applicant also shown that he is a brilliant
student and his implication by the
complainant mala fide manner cannot be
ruled out. In view of the above, the
prosecution of the application in the aforesaid
case is wholly unwarranted and is hereby
quashed.
[Chandan v. State of U.P., 2014 (2) Crimes
140 (All.)].
The prosecutrix left her parental house
willingly. On the date of incident, the age
of the prosecutrix was about 18 years. The
evidence on record indicates that the
prosecutrix was about 18 years. The evidence
on record indicates that the prosecutrix
willingly went away with the appellant. It
appears that the prosecutrix did not complain
to anybody while she was going with the
appellant. It indicates that she had gone
with the appellant willingly. In absence of any
threat, coercion or inducement having been
established by the prosecutrix High Court
think it not possible to rely on the prosecution
case to come to the conclusion that the
appellant is guilty of the charges framed
against him. The prosecutrix has sufficient
opportunities not only to run away Bilaspur
but also from the house at Pithampur where
she was kept by the appellant. The conduct
of prosecutrix clearly shows that she was
consenting party and she left her parental
house, willingly.
For the foregoing reasons, the conviction
and sentence awarded by the trial Judge to
the appellant under Sections 363 and 366,
IPC are not sustainable.
[Raj Kumar Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh,
2013 (1) Crimes 45 (Chhat)]. Undoubtedly,
the offences are registered under
Sections 363, 366 and 376 of
Indian Penal Code. However, post-
registration of the offences, the applicant No.
1 has married applicant No. 3 and is having a
happy married life and the applicant No. 1 is
also earning by working. High Court,
therefore, think that in the peculiar facts
and circumstances of the present case,
when the applicant No. 1 has married
applicant No. 3 and there are two small
children who are being looked after and
taken care, it would be appropriate to
exercise power under Section 482, Criminal
Procedure Code; lest the FIR as well as the
charge-sheet would obstruct matrimonial
life of applicant Nos. 1 and 3.
[Deepak v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 All MR
(Cri) 3614 (Bom) (DB)].
Where the prosecution has failed to prove
that the prosecutrix was below 18 years on the
relevant date of incident and the conduct of
the prosecutrix in visiting several places with
the accused permitting him to have sex with
her for considerable period, it can be held
that she was a consenting party and therefore,
the accused cannot be convicted under
Sections 363, 376 and 506 of I.P.C.
[Johat Ram v. State, (2010) 3 Crimes 410
(Chhat)].
The victim was 18 years on day of incident
and case was not of rape but of consensual
sex between victim and accused fully
established by FIR and evidence on record.
Accused entitled to acquittal.
[Bittu v. State of Uttarakhand, 2013 Cri LJ
4704 (Uttra)].
Where the victim stated that she had gone
and married accused of her own Will and
love and she was major and was not under
the guardianship of her father, no offence
under Section 363 of IPC was made out.
[Shamher Alam v. State of U.P., 2002 Cri
LJ 3588 (All)].
16. Selling minor for purposes of
prostitution, etc.—Whoever, sells, lets to
hire, or otherwise disposes of any person
under the age of eighteen years with intent
that such person shall at any age be employed
or used for the purposes of prostitution or
illicit intercourse with any person or for any
unlawful and immoral purpose, or knowing it
to be likely that such person will at any age be
employed or used for any such purpose, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either
ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Where neither witnesses deposed that the
victim was sold by A-1 to “R” for Rs. 8,000/-
for the purpose of prostitution or illicit
intercourse with the anyone or that even they
have stated in their evidence that the house of
“R” was used by “R” for carrying on
prostitution and the medical evidence shows
that the girls was used to sexual intercourse
and the medical evidence shows that she was
between 16 and 18 years on the date of
incident, the trial Court has committed
serious error in convicting A-1 and A-2 for
offence punishable under Sections 372/34 of
I.P.C. and therefore, they are entitled to be
acquitted.
[Thimmappa v. State, (2010) 4 Crimes 398
(Kant)].
17. Wrongfully concealing or keeping in
confinement, kidnapped or abducted
person.—Whoever, knowing that any
person has been kidnapped or has been
abducted, wrongfully conceals or confines
such person, shall be punished in the same
manner as if he had kidnapped or abducted
such person with the same intention or
knowledge, or for the same purpose as that
with or for which he conceals or detains
such person in confinement.
18. Kidnapping for murder and kidnapping

for ransom—Difference between.— The
ingredients of offence under Sections 364 and
364-A of IPC are different. Where as the
intention to kidnap in order that the victim
may be murdered or may be so disposed off as
to be put in danger as murder satisfies the
requirements of Section 364-A of IPC for
obtaining a conviction for offence under
Section 364-A of IPC it is necessary to prove
not only such prosecution or abetment had
taken place but thereafter the accused
threatened to cause death or hurt to such
person or by his conduct gave rise to a
reasonable apprehension that such a person
may be put to death or hurt or causes hurt
or death to such person in order to compel the
Government or any foreign State or
international inter-governmental
organization or any other person to do or
abstain from doing any act or to pay a
ransom.
[Anil v. Administration of Daman & Diu,
Daman, 2007 (2) Crimes 135 (SC)].
19. Connotation of words “takes” and
“entices”.—The two words “takes” and
“entices” as used in Section 361 of IPC are
intended to be read together so that each
takes to some extent its colour and content
from the other. If the minor leaves her
paternal home completely uninfluenced by
any promise, offer or inducement emanating
from the guilty party, then the latter cannot
be considered to have committed the offence
as defined in Section 361 of IPC.
[Parkash
595 : v. State
(2004) SCC of
339Haryana,
: 2004 2004
SCC Cr LJ
(Cri) 290 :
AIR 2004 SC 227].
20. Abduction not proved.—Where accused
allegedly abducted prosecutrix by use of
deceitful means, simply because it is alleged
that the accused committed rape that does
not mean that he abducted her and accused
could not be convicted on that ground.
[Maguni Ranjan Jyoti v. State of Orissa,
2003 Cir LJ 530 (Ori) : 2002 (4) Crimes 101].
21. Abduction with intention of forcible
intercourse not proved.—Where there was
existing enmity between the informant
brothers of the victim widow living with him
and the accused and the motorcycle on
which the accused was alleged to have taken
the victim was recovered from the house of
the accused by the police one day prior to
the date of the alleged occurrence and the
victim herself has deposed that she was not
abducted by the accused nor, was she kept
confined, contrary to her statement
recorded under Section 164 of Cr PC and the
FIR was lodged after a long delay—Held,
that since there is no legal evidence to show
that the victim was abducted with the
intention of forcible intercourse or to
compel her to marry the accused, the
ingredients of Section 366 could not be said
to have been made out and the finding of
guilt of the accused recorded by the Trial
Court was erroneous and set aside.
[Alam Ansari v. State, 2005 AIR Jhar HCR
790 : 2005 Cri LJ (NOC) 100 (Jhar)].
22. Absence of conclusive proof.—In
abduction and murder of jeweller, blood-
stain on motor cycle seized from accused
were found to be of the same group as that
of the accused, such circumstance was not
conclusive to prove the involvement of the
accused in the murder of the deceased.
[Manish
Cri LJ Dixit
133 : v. 2001
AIR State SC
of Rajasthan,
93 : 2000 2001
(4)
Crimes 171].
23. Absence of direct evidence.—There was
no direct evidence either of kidnapping of the
victim or committing his murder, there was
no recovery of the deadbody of the victim and
the alleged confessional statement of the co-
accused was exculpatory and the prosecution
evidence as to demand of ransom was not
consistent on the point of money demanded,
the conviction of the accused for the offences
charged could not be sustained.
[Rajesh Kumar Singh v. State, (2006) 1
Crimes 222 (Pat)].
Where accused allegedly kidnapped and

murdered a minor girl and there was no
direct or circumstantial evidence on record to
prove his involvement, accused cannot be
convicted solely on the basis of extrajudicial
confession without any corroboration.
[Raja Kumar Pandit v. State of Bihar, 2001
Cri LJ 3570 (Jhar) : 2001 (4) Crimes 296].
24. Absence of evidence.—A-2, known to the
family of the informant, told the prosecutrix

that A-1 was awaiting her and took her to meet
A-1 without any force or inducement. It was
held that since there was no clear evidence
that A-2 knew the intention of A-1 and he
knowingly misled the prosecutrix, A-2 could
not be convicted under Sections 366-A/34 of
IPC.
[Sharful Haque v. State, 2006 Cri LJ 3916
(Jhar)].
Where accused allegedly kidnapped a child
and pushed him into well but there was no
evidence to connect the accused with the
offences alleged, accused held entitled to be
acquitted.
[Satala v. State, 2003 Cri LJ 1195 (Mad)].
Where there is no evidence that the
accused who is an handicapped person and
unable to move freely that he had taken or
enticed away the victim-girl aged about 17
years who had herself came to the accused
whom she loved, the conviction of the
accused under Section 366 of IPC could not
be sustained.
[Upendra Rajak v. State, 2007 (2) Crimes
388 (Jhar)].
Where there is no evidence to show that
the accused had induced the victim minor
girl to leave her father’s custody with an
intent that she might be forced or seduced
to have illicit sexual intercourse with him,
the offence under Section 366- A of IPC
cannot be said to have been established.
[Mahendra Murtiyan Madrasi v. State,
2004 Cr LJ 539 (Guj)].
Where there was no material on record to
show that the handicapped victim was
kidnapped from her lawful guardian and there
was nothing on record to prove the
ingredients of the offence under Section 506
of IPC against the accused as such held that
the conviction of the accused under Sections
366 and 506 of IPC could not be sustained.
[Bhaskar Swain v. State, 2007 Cri LJ 4365
(Ori)].
25. Absence of eye-witness.—Where there is no
eye-witness and the victim or kidnappee

alleged to have been recovered from his own
house himself, who could be the best
witness, was murdered in some other incident
before being produced as a witness in the case,
original letters claiming ransom from the
son of kidnappe has not been produced, the
alleged recovery statement made by the
accused as to recovery of the kindnappee has
not been proved and there was no test
identification of the accused persons despite
their claim, the accused persons cannot be
convicted for offence under Section 364-A of
IPC.
[State v. Shashi Shekhar, 2004 Cri LJ 2961
(All)].
26. Absence of inducement.—The conduct of
the prosecutrix clearly revealed that she

voluntarily boarded the truck at her own
accord of which the accused was driver and
had also paid fare. It was held that the
prosecutrix planned her departure from her
place of residence and had willingly gone
away with the accused in his truck, which
further indicated that there was no threat or
inducement either in regard to her leaving
the place or in regard to accompanying the
accused and undertaking
long journey. Therefore, the conviction of

the accused under Section 366 of IPC
could not be sustained.
[Sukhwant Singh v. State, (2006) 2 Crimes
265 (Raj)].
Where there is no inducement on the part of
the accused persons to the victim girl from
her house to do the act as mentioned in
Section 366-A of IPC and since the
inducement is found to be absent on the basis
of the testimony of the witnesses, the accused
persons cannot be convicted under Section
366-A.
[Golapi Bibi v. State, 2004 Cr LJ 2209
(Gau)].
27. Absence of injuries.—Where from the
statement PW-3 and PW-4 who were
abductees and they were abducted by A-1
and other co-accused persons and they were
kept in the jungle for three days and the
accused persons were having double- barrel
gun, lathi, farsa and ballam. The accused
person carried these persons in the jungle
and they were beaten by the accused
persons and they received injuries and after
three days, on account of heavy showers in
the night they got chance to run away but in
the police statements made under Section
161 of Cr. P.C. these witnesses specifically
stated that the police party arrived at the
jungle and on seeing the police party the
accused persons ran away releasing the
abductees and apart from this, though they
stated that they were beaten by the accused
persons and they received injuries on their
person but the Doctor who examined these
abductees and found no injury on the
abductees. Therefore held that the accused
persons could not be convicted under
Section 364-A of IPC.
[Punttai v. State, 2007 Cri LJ 445 (MP)].
Where the prosecutrix stated that she had
been raped by all the six robust accused for
more than 18 time but medical evidence
shows that there was absolutely no injury on
her breast or private parts, the medical
evidence indicating that the prosecutrix
could be aged 19 years and not 14 years of
age, though she has named all the six
accused in her Section 161 of Cr. P.C.,
statement as if they were previously known
to her but during trial she admitted that
they were not previously known to her, in
the light of the infirmities and specially on
account of medical evidence, it does not
remain believable that the prosecutrix was
taken away against her wishes or was raped
18 times or more by the accused persons
and consequently the conviction of the
accused persons cannot be sustained.
[Roshan Khan v. State, (2004) 2 Crimes 51
(Raj)].
28. Absence of motive.—Since there was
nothing in evidence that the victim was
kidnapped for murdering him because there
was no motive with the accused to murder
the victim it was not a case under Section
364 of IPC.
[Sridhar Yeswant Bhosale v. State, 2007 Cri
LJ 1380 (Bom) : 2007 (1) AIR Bom R 528].
Where no motive has been shown by
prosecution at for commission of murder of
the boy aged 9 years and the prosecution
evidence suffers from such intrinsic
improbabilities and discrepancies which
render the prosecution case unbelievable
and unacceptable and investigation has been
perfunctory and the circumstances have
been brought on record in a very
unsatisfactory and exercisable manner falling
to inspire confidence, the conviction recorded
against the accused persons are liable to be
set aside.
[Kaptan v. State, 2004 Cr LJ 1556 (All)].
Where there was no evidence that the
deceased was forcefully taken or by deceitful
means or where he was taken or confined and
during the relevant period
when deceased was allegedly kidnapped and

murdered by the accused he was in jail and
there was no motive behind crime, conviction
of accused merely on the basis of evidence
‘last seen’ was not proper.
[Gulab Singh v. State, 2002 Cri LJ 1575
(All)].
29. Absence of positive evidence.—Where
there is no positive evidence to show that
kidnapping of the victim minor girl was in
order that she may be murdered or may be
so disposed as of be put in danger of being
murder, the conviction of the accused for
offence under Section 364 of IPC cannot be
sustained.
[Ghanshyam Panjiyar v. State, (2004) 2
Crimes 428 (Pat)].
30. Absence of sign of rape.—The doctor
found no sign of rape, nor any injury on the
external or internal parts of the body of the
victim. To prove the age of the victim girl the
parents had neither produced horoscope
nor birth certificate except the transfer
certificate issued by the Headmaster of the
school where the victim girl was studying
which cannot be accepted to be authentic
age proof certificate confirming about the
age of the victim girl as minor and that being
the position, the prosecution in the instant
case ought to have placed some more
acceptable evidence to prove the age of the
victim girl to be a minor. For the foregoing
reasons the conviction of the accused-
appellant as recorded by the Trial Court
held liable to be set aside.
[Diganta Mazumdar v. State of Assam,
2008 Cri LJ 2856 (Gau)].
31. Accused forcibly taken prosecutrix from
her parent’s house not proved.— Where

accused is alleged to have kidnapped
prosecutrix and committed rape on her and
there was no evidence to show that the
accused had forcibly taken her from her
parent’s house and no reliable evidence
produced to establish that at the relevant
time prosecutrix was under age of discretion,
conviction of accused under Sections 363
and 376 of IPC was set aside.
[Suresh Kumar v. State of H.P., 2002 Cri LJ
498 (HP)].
32. Accused had not used any force in taking
the minor victim girl out of her house.—

Where the evidence on record shows that
the accused had not used any force in
taking the minor victim girl out of her house
and that girl herself had taken money out of
her house as the accused had no money of
his own, her statement goes to show that her
father was going to betrothal her to another
boy against her wish and there is no
evidence to show that it was the accused
who took or induced her out of lawful
custody of her father, the conviction of the
accused under Sections 363/366 of IPC
cannot be said to be proper.
[Mahendra Murtiyan Madras v. State, 2004
Cr LJ 539 (Guj)].
33. Age of prosecutrix—Proof of.—In rape
case particularly offence under Section 366-A,
the age of the victim if not proved to be below
18 years the time of occurrence, no offence
under Section 366-A is made out.
[Dev Kishan v. State of Rajasthan, 2002 Cri
LJ 1118 (Raj)].
Where accused allegedly kidnapped a girl to
compel her to marry and to rape her and
prosecution failed to establish that
prosecutrix was less than 18 years age as on
the date of incidence, charge under Section
366-A would fail.
[Jinish Lal Sha v. State of Bihar, 2003 Cri
LJ 4914 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 395 : AIR 2003 SC
2081 : 2003 (1) Crimes 246].
Where accused allegedly kidnapped the
victim and committed rape on her and
prosecution could not prove that the
prosecutrix was below eighteen years of age,
accused could not be convicted.
[Makhan v. State of M.P., 2003 Cri LJ 2777
(MP) : 2003 (4) Crimes 396].
Where from the evidence on record it is
established that the victim-girl having love
affair with the accused and she had gone
here and there with him with her sweet will
and that she admits that while she was going
on the motorcycle with the accused she did
not raised alarm though the place
wherefrom she was alleged to have been
abducted was not a lonely place, no case
under Section 366 of IPC is made out, she
being aged above 18 years.
[Manoj Kumar Munda v. State, 2004 Cri LJ
3431 (Jhar)].
Where it is more than evident that the
prosecutrix has not shown to be aged less than
18 years during the relevant time, there is no
satisfactory evidence to suggest that she was
taken by the accused persons against her
wishes and even if there was any sexual
intercourse she was evidently a willing party
and also, there is no acceptable evidence to
conclude that she was put under wrongful
restraint or was put to a wrongful
confinement, the accused cannot be
convicted under Sections 366, 376 and 341
of IPC.
[Balwant Singh v. State, 2004 Cr LJ 3673
(Raj)].
Where the age of the prosecutrix has not
been proved that she was below 18 years and
her evidence shows that she was voluntarily
participated in act of kidnapping and sexual
intercourse with the accused, the acquittal of
the accused is, held, proper as the
prosecution has failed to the alleged acts of
kidnapping and sexual intercourse with the
consent of the prosecutrix and against her
will.
[Sau. Raubu Ismail Pathan v. Raju
Jayasingh Bhise, 2004 Cr LJ 7111 (Bom)].
Where the mark-sheet showing the age of
the prosecutrix below 18 years was never
filed along with the challan nor it was
exhibited or stressed by the prosecution the
reliance placed by the Trial Court on
untendered, non-exhibited and unproved
mark-sheet for holding that the age of the
prosecutrix is below 18 years is erroneous
and cannot sustained in the eyes of law. The
opinion of the Radiologist that the age of
the prosecutrix was 14 to 16 years and there
can be a variance of two years and this
benefit goes to the accused.
[Sita Ram v. State, 2004 Cr LJ 4320 (Raj)].
Where there is no evidence that the
prosecutrix, below 18 years of age was
enticed or taken away from the lawful
guardianship rather she went away with the
accused with her own will and had enjoyed
movie and sweets, conviction of the accused
cannot be sustained.
[Narinder v. State, (2004) 1 Crimes 140].
Where there was no evidence to establish
that victim who was not less then 18 years of
age was actually kidnapped or abducted
against her will and was subjected to rape
and she had given contradictory statement,
conviction of accused under Sections 363,
366 and 376 of IPC was not justified.
[Kasan v. State of Rajasthan, 2002 Cri LJ
1460 (Raj)].
Where, though the prosecutrix in her
evidence stated that in the night she had
gone to answer the call of nature and from
there at the point of Chhura the accused
took her in his house and she was kept for
one day and raped her and took her at
different places, although she had
opportunity to raise alarm that she has been
kidnapped and from the letters written by
the prosecutrix, it appears that she has
expressed her love to the accused. Held, that
the prosecutrix went with the accused with
her own desire but due to some
misunderstanding which later developed in
between the two the case has been lodged by

her father and it is clear that from the facts
that she had gone out of her free will and
since she is aged more than 18 years as
found by the doctor, no case under Sections
366 and 376 of IPC is made out.
[Noor Alam Momin v. State, 2005 Cri LJ
3065 (Jhar)].
Where though the Doctor opined that the
age of the prosecutrix is between 15 to 16
years in his report he has clearly mentioned
that the age of the victim is below 18 years and
admitted that in determination of age on basis
of ossification test variation of 2 years or
more is possible, and according to radiologist
report the age of the victim girl is above 18
years, it cannot be held, that the victim girl
was under the age of 18 years on the date of
incident.
[Lakhanlal v. State, 2004 Cr LJ 3962
(MP)].
34. Bad blood between accused and
witnesses.—Audio conversation recorded on
cassettes has not been proved. Even Maruti
Van has not been connected with the
appellants. The location of the house where
the boy was detained is not identified. There
was bad blood between the accused and
witnesses. The entire story of kidnapping for
ransom is unusual and does not inspire
confidence. The testimony of the boy
appears to be a must of tutoring only to nail
the appellant. It was held that appellants were
acquitted.
[Rajesh Dalal v. State (Government of
N.C.T. of Delhi), 2008 Cri LJ 937 (Del)].
35. Benefit of doubt.—Where accused
persons allegedly kidnapped and murdered
deceased-boy to offer human sacrifice to
appease deities but the investigation
conducted was tardy and not satisfactory and
prosecution rested its case entirely on a
witness without any corroboration of his
testimony or material aspects and there was
no evidence to connect accused with the
commission of the offence, accused would be
entitled to benefit of doubt.
[Kalpana Mazumdar v. State of Orissa,
2002 Cri LJ 3756 (SC) : AIR 2002 SC 2826
: 2002 (3) Crimes 114].
Where it was alleged that though the
accused took the victim son of the informant
after obtaining permission from the parents of
the informant he returned alone but the
evidence shows that there was enmity
between the both sides over land disputes
and there was no occasion go the informant
to send her son with the accused particularly
when the accused was always threatening the
informant that he would make her childless
and the informant and her husband went to
search for the victim instead of filing FIR, it
has been held that the accused is entitled to
benefit of doubt.
[Islam Mian v. State, 2004 Cr LJ (NOC) 27
(Jhar)].
Where the girl was minor but she stayed 20
days with the accused and was consenting
party to sexual intercourse and she was
habitual to sex and it was supported by
medical evidence and case of rape and
kidnapping was not proved beyond doubt,
therefore, accused was held entitled to
benefit of doubt.
[Tafiz Ali v. State of Assam, 2007 Cri LJ
(NOC) 665 (Gau)].
Where the testimony of the prosecutrix that
the accused gave her free lift in their taxi and
committed forcible rape is not conclusively
supported by the medical evidence and her
testimony in cross-examination is directly
contrary to what she has stated in her
examination-in-chief fund the circumstances
in which the police called her father of the
victim have not been brought on record, the
accused are entitled to the benefit of doubt.
[Puran Tirwal Bishwakarma v. State,
2004 Cr LJ 4416 (Sik)].
36.Beyond reasonable doubt.—Since the

allegation of PW-4 is that he received a
letter by which Rs. 4,00,000/- was demanded
as ransom and since that letter has not been
submitted to the police, it has not been
specifically proved that demand for any
money was beyond all reasonable doubt. The
prosecution, failed to prove the charge under
[Uttam Debbarama v. State of Tripura,
2008 Cri LJ 3730 (Gau)].
The seizure for ransom list witnesses had
not supported the recovery of the gold rings
belonging to the victim from the house of the
accused and the confession statement of the
accused was exculpatory by putting entire
burden of murder on the accused and
question of demanding a sum of two lacs by
the accused persons on phone did not
appear to be trustworthy as the evidence of
the prosecution was not consistent and
moreso, when victim father of the informant
had agreed for making payment of rupees four
lacs and admitted that there was no direct
evidence either of kidnapping the victim or
committing the murder and it was also not
established that victim, after his abduction,
was killed and was now no more. It was held
that the prosecution had failed to prove its
case beyond all reasonable doubt and as such,
the conviction of the accused persons could
not be upheld.
[Rajesh Kumar Singh v. State, 2006 Cri LJ
1855 (Pat) : 2006 (1) Crimes 222].
Where there is unexplained delay of lodging
FIR and there is no evidence showing that the
deceased alongwith the complainant and
other witnesses to had gone to the city to
attend the Court in connection with the case
allegedly pending there and there is a long
standing enmity between the parties, it was
been held that the prosecution has not able
to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt.
[Kaliyan Singh v. State, 2004 Cr LJ 4262
(All)].
Where there were material contradictions in
the prosecution version, the case was lodged
more than 40 days after the accused allegedly
took away the victim-girl to a distance
place and there was contradictory statement
regarding the alleged recovery of the victim-
girl from the house of a person who was not
examined and though he had stated different
timing that she was brought back from
Bhutan after 15/20 days whereas the
complainant mentioned 4-5 days, it could be
held that the prosecution had not been able
to prove the charges beyond reasonable
doubt.
[Shamin Ansari v. State, 2007 (2) Crimes
164 (Jhar)].
37. Burden of proof.—In the case of rape, the
onus is always on the prosecution to prove

affirmatively each ingredients of the offence
and such onus never shifts. The evidence of
PWs cannot be accepted merely because an
accused fails to say as to why they have
come forward to depose against him. In this
case, the evidence of the prosecutrix does not
appear to reliable and trustworthy and the
same is not supported by an independent.
Looking to the entire facts and
circumstances of the case, the only
irresistible conclusion can be drawn is that the
prosecutrix was a consenting party and all
the activities right from the beginning were
going on with her facit consent.
[Chhoga v. State, (2004) 1 Crimes 444
(Raj)].
38. Case of elopement of victim.—Where
accused allegedly abducted the victim girl
and raped her and there was no material to
show that she raised any voice or filed any
complainant and it was case elopement of
victim and voluntarily submitting her to
accused, accused was entitled to be
acquitted.
[Tara Devi v. State of Haryana, 2003 Cri LJ
725 (P&H)].
39. Chain of circumstantial evidence not

completed.—Where in a case accused
kidnapped 10 years boy and his dead body
was found in hillocks but there was no
reliable and truthful evidence to confirm
that appellant was involved in the murder
and finding was based on conjectures and
surmises and chain of circumstances was
not completed. Conviction was set aside.
[Sudama Singh v. State of Bihar, 2007 Cri
LJ (NOC) 765 (Jhar) : 2007 (2) AIR Jhar R
843].
Where in a case the accused persons
wanted to rob deceased of his newly brought
vehicle and sell it but the story was found
false and the vehicle was found in
abandoned condition after a month of the
occurrence and the chain was not
completed, conviction was set aside.
[Gajendra v. State of Rajasthan, 2007 Cri
LJ (NOC) 628 (Raj)].
40. Charge of kidnapping for ransom not
established.—Where there is nothing on
record to prove even prima facie that the
threatening was ever given to the victim to
caused his death by the accused in order to
compel the Government or any other person
to pay a ransom charge under Section 364-
A of IPC could not be said to have been
established.
[Satyendra Singh v. State, 2007 Cri LJ 3997
(Raj)].
41. Confession inconsistent with medical
evidence.—Where there is no evidence that
the victim boys were in the company of the
accused ; the recovery of silver chain of one
of the victims was recovered at the instance
of the accused but at the accused
; the recovery of the dead body was at the
instance of the co-accused and not the
accused; there is no corroboration of the
confession which was retracted and the extra-
judicial confession is found to be non-
voluntary and the alleged cause of death
mentioned in the confession statements,
confessions is clearly inconsistent with
medical evidence, it is not safe to convict the
accused solely on the basis of the alleged
confession which was retracted.
[Parmananda Pegu v. State of Assam, 2004
Cr LJ 4197 : (2004) 3 Crimes 337 (SC)
: (2004) 7 SCC 779 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2081 :
AIR 2004 SC 4197].
42. Consenting party.—Findings of Court,
that the prosecutrix was a consenting party
in rape case has to be to applied to the
offence of abduction as well.
3438 (Raj) : 2002 (2) Crimes 532].
In the instant case, the proved fact that has
emerged from the recorded evidence was that
the girl, aged more than 16 years, was in love
with A-1 and A-2 being a neighbour was
closely known to her and the evidence of an
independent witness indicated that she on her
own consent had travelled with A-2 knowing
fully well that she was going to meet her boy
friend, A-1 and in her statement the alleged
victim girl nowhere divulged that A-2 put
pressure on her to marry A-1 or he was
responsible for carrying her to different
places. On the contrary, she had stated that A-
1 had taken her to Bangladesh. Where she
stayed most of the period of about 20/22 days
and A-2 was not with them there. Simply
because A-2 being the close neighbour and a
friend of the absconding man accused A-1
and the victim accompanied A-2 in a vehicle
for meeting A-1 who might have secret design
to marry her by detaining her in certain places
for a considerable period. A-2 could not be
said to be guilty of kidnapping the victim.
[Mihir Das v. State, 2006, Cri LJ 1500 (Gau)].
The conduct of he prosecutrix voluminously
speaks for itself that she had been a
consenting party throughout. She had a
consensual intercourse with the accused.
When once, it has been proved that she was a

consenting party, question to bring home
the guilt against the accused under Section
376 (2) (g) of IPC does not arise. Indisputably,
prosecutrix was more than 18 years of age on
the day of alleged occurrence that is,
5.10.2001 so on offence under Section 366 of
IPC is made out against the accused.
Therefore, the appeal is accepted, the
impugned judgment of conviction and the
order of sentence held liable to be set aside.
[Om Prakash v. State of Haryana, 2008 Cri
LJ 1846 (P&H)].
The girl had left in the company of the
accused of her own will and that she was not
forced to sexual intercourse with any person
other than the accused. It was held that
Section 366-A had no application.
[Iqbal v. State of Kerala, 2008 Crl LJ 436
(SC)].
When prosecutrix who was below 18 years
of age and accused were having love affair and
prosecutrix herself accompanied accused and
went to different places with him, offence
under Section 366-A is not made out.
3152 (Raj)].
When the prosecutrix had voluntarily
accompanied accused out of her own free
Will it is not fair to convict the accused on
charge under Section 366 of IPC on the
basis of mere probabilities and possibilities.
[Keshav v. State, 2001 Cri LJ 1201 (Del)].
Where accused alleged to have kidnapped
and raped a minor girl but doctor opined
her age to be between 18 to 19 years and the
prosecutrix was found to be a consenting
party accused would be entitled to be
acquitted.
[Manna v. State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cri LJ
3496 (Raj)].
Where allegations were that prosecutrix was
induced to elope with accused and forced to
have illicit intercourse with him but evidence
on record showed that on the date of
occurrence she was major and she had left her
parent’s house voluntarily out of her free
Will and she moved from one place to another
without raising any alarm and she was a
consenting party, accused are entitled to be
exonerated of charges.
[Md. Khalil v. State of Bihar, 2002 Cri LJ
4235 (Jhar) : 2003 (1) Crimes 145].
Where conduct of the prosecutrix showing
that she had gone with the accused
voluntarily and had raised any alarm during
the time when she went alongwith accused,
conviction of accused under Sections 366
and 376 would be unjustified.
[Vishnu Kumar v. State of Rajasthan,
2002 Cri LJ 3346 (Raj)].
Where from the conduct of the prosecutrix
that she did not raise any alarm when the
accused took her alongwith her wearing
apparels, she lived with the relatives of the
accused without informing or complaining
to the inhabitants of the house nor did she
make any attempt to run away it appears
that she left the lawful guardianship wilfully
and went alongwith the accused of her own
accord and there is no promise or
persuation, inducement or allucement from
the accused and even if her age is accepted
to be below 18 years, she was at the age of
discretion it is sufficient to hold that the
accused is not guilty of kidnapping or
abduction.
[Lakhanlal v. State, 2004 Cr LJ 3962 (MP)].
Where from the oral testimony of the
parents of the prosecutrix it is corroborated
by the medical evidence that the prosecutrix
was above 16 years of age at the time of
occurrence and the conduct of the prosecutrix
showed that she and the accused was in
love and she joined the accused by her own
volition and stayed in the house of the
friend of accused and that she was a
consenting party in the act of sexual
intercourse, the conviction of the accused
under Sections 366 and 376 of IPC could not
be sustained.
[Panchopathi v. State, 2007 (4) Crimes 378
(Mad)].
Where girl aged about sixteen years left her
home on her own accord and lived with the
accused as his wife, the offence under Section
363 of IPC was not made out.
[Suresh Babu v. State of Kerala, 2001 Cri LJ
1483 (Ker) : 2001 (2) Crimes 313].
Where it has been established beyond doubt
that the prosecutrix was aged more than 16
years on the date of occurrence and the fact
that she went from place to place with the
accused in van, bus and train but she did not
protest to anybody that she was being
abducted and letters written by her and
photographs shows that the accused were
having a love affair and she was happily going
from place to place with the accused on her
own free will and the statement of the
prosecurtix made in the Court was not
corroborated by the evidence by her father
who admitted that his daughter mentioned in
a letter that she had gone with the accused of
her own and from the statement of the
prosecutrix recorded by the session Judge in
application of anticipatory bail filed by the
accused it was clear that for about 1-1/2
months the accused and the prosecutrix
stayed together. Held, that it is clear that the
prosecutrix willingly and on her own went
with the accused though she has stated that
she was threatened, there is no iota of
evidence to that effect. She was a consenting
party and, therefore, conviction and sentence
of the accused was set aside.
[Sukhbir v. State, (2005) 3 Crimes 280
(P&H)].
Where prosecutrix appeared to be
consenting party and complaint filed against
accused alleging her abduction and rape was
at behest of her sister and brother-in- law
and there was no evidence to prove abduction
threat, forcible marriage and sexual
intercourse against will of prosecutrix,
accused was entitled to be exonerated.
[Arjun Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cri
LJ 4621 (Raj)].
Where the prosecutrix a major girl had been
taken away from the house of her mother by
the accused and on the pretext of the promise
of marriage has ravished her on several
occasions and them has refused to marry her
and has solemnized his marriage with another
girl, the prosecutrix cannot be said to be
consenting party to the sexual intercourse
and as such the accused cannot convicted
under Sections 366-A and 376 of IPC.
[Kuber Chandra Das v. State, 2004 Cr LJ
4776 (Jhar)].
Where the prosecutrix left her parents’
house out of her own sweet will left behind
the letter showing the reason for her leaving
the house and went away with the accused
and she was found habituated to sexual
intercourse and also pregnant at the time of
her medical examination and the facts and
circumstances clearly show that she was a
willing and consenting party for the sexual
intercourse and from the evidence of her
mother it appears that she was 18 years of
age, the accused is entitled to acquittal.
[Sita Ram v. State, (2004) 3 Crimes 463
(Raj)].
Where the radiological reports shows that
the informant was not definitely not below
18 years at the time of incident and she
stated in her evidence that she had
remained in the company of the accused out
of her free will, volition and consent and
the FIR of the informant and her evidence
clearly shown that she was a willing and
consisting party to the sexual intercourse
with the accused on the assumption
based on assurance and promise that the

accused would marry her cannot amount to
lack of consent to the sexual intercourse and,
therefore, the accused cannot be convicted for
offence under Sections 366-A and 376, IPC.
[Kuber Chandra Das v. State, (2004) 2
Crimes 421 (Jhar)].
Where the statements of the victim-girls
that they were going with the accused persons
from the Bazar out of their own free Will and
the two witnesses have turned hostile to the
prosecution by not supporting its case and the
informant had not been examined, and the
story of rape stood only on the testimony of
two alleged victims. While one of the victims
had admitted that she knew the accused since
before, the other one denied any knowledge
about them thereby creating a reasonable
doubt in the prosecution case and these two
witnesses did not report the matter to their
parents and were moving different places. The
FIR lodged after three days of the incident and
the victims were sent for medical examination
thereafter held that the accused persons could
not be convicted for offences under Sections
366-A and 376 of IPC.
[Parsu Ram Hessa v. State, 2007 Cri LJ
1063 (Jhar) : 2007 (1) AIR Jhar R 130].
When the victim girl aged about 18 to 19
years left the house at her own Will on the
pretext that she has been going to her friend’s
house and she accompanied accused from one
place to another without any objection and
there was no evidence to show that she had
ever been induced to compel her marriage,
offence of abduction is not made out.
[Ranjeet Lohra v. State, 2002 Cri LJ 329
(Jhar)].
Where there is clear evidence that the
prosecutrix left her parents house out of her
own sweet-will leaving behind a letter
showing the reason for her leaving the
house; travelled alone to Railway Station
where the accused who was previously
known to prosecutrix and he had visiting
terms with her family ; she was found
habitual to sexual intercourse and also
pregnant at the time of her medical
examination, her mother’s evidence shows
that she was a major girl; no reliable
documentary evidence has been led to show
her below 18 years of age ; she never
complained against the accused despite so
may occasions available to her, the only
conclusion can be drawn that she was major
and a consenting party and none of the
offence is made out.
[Sita Ram v. State, 2004 Cr LJ 4320 (Raj)].
When there was no evidence led to show
that prosecutrix who had intimate relations
with accused and had married her was a
minor and there was consents on her part,
accused could not be convicted.
[Eta Singh v. State of Bihar, 2002 Cri LJ
4413 (Jhar)].
43. Contradiction in prosecution evidence.—
Where informant’s mother was allegedly

kidnapped by accused and no explanation
worth cognizable was given for not lodging
FIR promptly and there was much
contradiction in the evidence of
prosecution witness as regards the manner
of occurrence, the accused was entitled to
be exonerated.
[Deori Benkira v. State of Bihar, 2001 Cri LJ
3579 (Jhar)].
44. Contradictory statements.—Where there
was no evidence to establish that victim who
was not less than 18 years of age was actually
kidnapped or abducted against her Will and
was subjected to rape and she had given
contradictory statements, conviction of
accused under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of
IPC was not justified.
[Kasan v. State of Rajasthan, 2002 Cri LJ
1460 (Raj)].
Where there were contradiction in the

statement of the victim and her conduct in
not raising hue and cry indicated that she
accompanied accused at her own, the offence
under Section 366 of IPC is not attracted.
1891 (Raj)].
45. Criminal proceeding—Quashing of.—
There was no dispute that the alleged victim
was a major and was at all relevant times a
major, she was free to marry anyone she liked
or live with anyone she liked. There was no bar
to an inter-caste marriage under the Hindu
Marriage Act or any other law and, therefore,
there was nothing to show what offence was
committed by the petitioner-alleged victim,
her husband or her husband’s family and as
such, no offence was committed by any of the
accused and the whole criminal case in
question was an abuse of the process of the
Court as well as of the administrative
machinery at the instance of the petitioner’s
brothers who were only furious because the
petitioner married outside her caste. Hence,
the criminal proceeding in the sessions trial
for offences under Sections 366 and 368 of
IPC was quashed.
[Lata Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 3 Crimes
41 : 2006 (6) Scale 563 : 2006 (5)
Supreme 266 : 2006 AIR SCW 3499 : 2006 SCC
475 : 2006 (2) SCC (Cri) 478 : AIR
2006 SC 2522 : 2006 (7) SCJD 430].
Where the victim, a major girl and the
accused had entered into marriage with the
accused on her free will after running away
from the home of her father, there is no
reasonable likelihood of conviction of the
accused and, therefore, the criminal
proceedings initiated at the instance of the
father of the prosecutrix is liable to be
quashed.
[Brij Mohan Rana v. State, (2004) 2 Crimes
122 (J&K)].
46. Delay in lodging FIR.—It appeared from
the evidence of the prosecutrix that the

story of the prosecution as alleged in the FIR
that the prosecutrix was abducted when he
had gone to attend the call of nature was
given a complete go-bye by the prosecutrix
when she stated that the accused entered
her house where she was sleeping with her
husband and from there she was forcibly
taken away by the accused with the other
accused and that due to the commotion her
husband woke up, yet the accused forcibly
dragged her away from her house, it was
difficult to believe that the prosecutrix who
was a matured lady married for 10 years
would be made to walk from her place of
residence to the other village. The place
from where the prosecutrix was taken away,
as preferred in the FIR one hand and as
stated in the evidence of the prosecutrix on
the other hand, raised a groae doubt about
the happening of the incident as alleged by
the prosecution. Delay in lodging the FIR
was another factor which raised doubt in the
prosecution version. That the story of the
prosecutrix did not make out case of
abduction because mere abduction did not
bring the accused under the ambit of
Section 366 of IPC. Hence, the conviction
and sentence of the accused passed by the
Sessions Court was set aside.
[Gabbu v. State of M.P., (2006) 2 Crimes
270 : (2006) 5 SCC 740 : (2006) 3 SCC
(Cri) 71 : AIR 2006 SC 2461 : 2006 Cri LJ
3276 : 2006 (6) SCJ 245 : 2006 (9) Scale
649
: 2006 (4) Supreme 439 : 2006 AIR SCW 3212
: 2006 (11) JT 255 : 2006 (6) SCJD 496].
The testimony of the prosecutrix aged
more than 18 years on the date of occurrence
that the accused person forcibly seated her
on the motorcycle and took her in the forest
and A-1 committed rape on her appeared to be
highly exaggerated and her testimony that
she was repeatedly raped 9 times during 3
days under constant threat had not been
corroborated by the medical evidence, the
possibility that the
eloped with A-1 of her own volition and had

consented to sexual intercourse could not be
ruled out, there was a long delay of 6 days in
lodging the FIR the FSL report had not been
produced and absence of any blood-stain on
the underwear of the prosecutrix rendered her
testimony and that of her mother unworthy
of credence, the conviction of the accused
under Sections 363, 366, 376 and 342 of
IPC could not be sustained.
[Kishore Bahadur v. State, 2006 Cri LJ 2556
(Chhat) : 2006 (2) Crimes 330].
47. Demand for ransom not proved.—Where
in the deposition of the complainant, the

father of the minor victim there was no
demand for ransom by any of the accused
persons and there was no mention of
particulars of telephonic demand of ransom
through someone, or which accused
demanded the ransom, and the prosecution
has failed to prove that the letters
demanding payment of ransom emanated
from the accused or were sent at the behest
of the accused, it is held that the prosecution
has failed to satisfy the essential ingredients
of kidnapping being for payment of ransom
in absence of proving ransom notes or to
prove demand of ransom by any of the
accused for kidnapping.
[Pappu v. State, 2005 Cri LJ 3380 (Del)].
48. Evidence of eye-witnesses not reliable.—
Where accused allegedly kidnapped his two

step-brothers and committed their murder
for purpose of succeeding to his father’s
property and alleged eye-witnesses were
not named in the FIR and their evidence
was not convincing and reliable, accused
was entitled to be exonerated of charges.
[Murari Lal v. State of U.P., 2001 Cri 2831
(All)].
49. Evidence of prosecutrix not reliable.—
Where the evidence of the prosecutrix found

unreliable, the prosecution could not
establish that the age of the girl was below
18 years, no satisfactory evidence is
available as to the allegation of kidnapping
or abduction of the prosecutrix, the
conviction of the accused under Section 366
of IPC cannot be sustained.
[Lakhanlal v. State, 2004 Cri LJ 3962
(MP)].
50. Guilt of accused not established.—From
the evidence of doctor who held post-

mortem examination on the deadbody of
the minor deceased it was clear that the
injuries found on the deceased were after
death and there being no eye-witnesses to
the alleged killing, it was difficult to believe
that the accused persons after killing had
also cut hand and legs of the deceased, the
informant father was not an eye- witnesses
and the statements of mother and uncle of
the deceased and child witnesses go to show
that though they claimed to have seen the
accused persons along kidnapping, they
were not eye-witnesses on the point of
killing of the deceased in the manner as
alleged and since there was specific
allegation of enmity of the accused persons
with the informant before relating to
settlement of Jalkar, motive and enmity cut
both ends as if there was possibility of
accused persons committing the murder of
the deceased there was also no less
probability of false implication of the
accused by the informant. Hence,
circumstances that the accused persons had
dispute with the informant relating to
settlement of Jalkar in absence of eye-
witnesses on the paint of killing could not
be sufficient to establish the guilt of the
accused persons.
[Naresh Mandal v. State, (2006) 2 Crimes
131 (Pat)].
Since the statement of co-accused person
recorded under Section 164 of Cr.
P.C. do not refer to the name of opposite
party No. 2 at all. Such statements are totally
relevant and of no consequence against the

opposite party No. 2. Though informant and
his wife have referred to the name of opposite
party No. 2 but the evidence is highly
insufficient and inadequate and does not
prove guilt against opposite party No. 2 for
any offence beyond reasonable doubt.
[Samir Kumar Mukherjee v. State of
Jharkhand, 2008 Cri LJ 502 (Jhar)].
Where in a case accused persons took
victim to unknown place and kept him lawful
confinement and received amount of ransom
and confession of co-accused relied on but
only allegation that the appellant was within
the company of co- accused and there was no
independent witness to prove the guilt.
Conviction was set aside.
[Prakash Kumar v. State of Gujarat, 2007
Cri LJ 2731 (SC) : 2007 AIR SCW 2721
: 2007 (4) SCC 266 : 2007 (6) Scale 91 : 2007
(2) SCC (Cri) 285].
Where the evidence of the complainant,
father of the alleged abducted son to the effect
that the accused has taken away his 30 years’
old son on pretext of doing some work in his
house and has killed him and has concealed
his dead body, is not supported by any
independent witness of the village and there
is no evidence on record to give an inkling of
the fact that the accused had intention at the
time of taking for his house that he shall be
murdered or would be so disposed off, or to be
put in danger of being murdered since there
was no enmity existed and alive between the
parties prior to the occurrence and the dead
body of the ‘N’ has also not been recovered in
the course of investigation—Held, that there
did not appear any ring of truth in the
evidence of the father, mother and another
son namely ‘M’ the substantiate the
prosecution case as such the Trial Court has
committed a manifest error in coming to the
finding of the guilt of the accused under
Section 364 of IPC.
[Sepalu Munda v. State, 2005 Cri LJ 2834
(Jhar)].
51. Implication of accused persons was
afterthought.—From the deposition of the
9 PWs it appeared the they have supported
the occurrence of kidnapping of “V” (PW 5)
but they had not claimed to identify any of
the kidnapping and there was no
corroboration of the evidence of “V” to the
effect that A-1—A6 had any hand in the
kidnapping and the very conduct of “V”
seemed to be natural and non-disclosure of
the names of the six accused persons
immediately after his release created doubt
that the implication of the accused persons
was afterthought, and father there was
absolutely no evidence to prove the criminal
conspiracy and since one out of seven
accused persons was acquitted the charge
under Section 120-B of IPC automatically
failed, the conviction of the six accused
persons under Sections 364-A and 120-B of
IPC could not be upheld.
[Md. Mobin Ali v. State, (2006) 2 Crimes
278 (Pat)].
52. Kidnapping appeared to be doubtful.—
Where in a case accused persons forcibly
took victim in vehicle and there was no
evidence that she was forced to marry with
one of the accused and house owner was not
examined which created suspicion and the
kidnapping appeared to be doubtful.
Therefore, conviction could not be held as
justified.
[Gouranga Roy v. State of Tripura, 2007 Cri
LJ (NOC) 380 (Gau)].
53. Love affairs with accused.—Where
though in FIR it is mentioned that the
prosecutrix was 17 years of age at the time of
her enticing away by the accused but the
medical estimation of her age from the
number of teeth and their position and the
ossification test have shown that the is
above 18 years and circumstances show that
she had love affairs with the accused and has

voluntarily staged with the accused, no
offence under Section 366-A of IPC is made
out.
[Kuber Chandra Dal v. State, 2004 Cr LJ
4776 (Jhar)].
54. Medical evidence falsified the prosecution
case of rape.—Where in a case it was

alleged that accused took the victim of a girl
aged 14 years from one place to another and
medical evidence falsified the prosecution
case of rape and accused stated in her
statement that he was in love of victim and
she forced to accompany him to different
places, conviction under Section 363 was set
aside.
[Ajit Singh v. State of Haryana, 2007 Cri LJ
(NOC) 675 (P&H)].
55. Medical evidence not supported the
prosecution case.—The prosecutrix was not
found to be minor on the date of occurrence
and she was found in the house of the uncle
of the accused in another village and her story
of committing rape on her by the accused
was not supported by the medical evidence,
and there was delay of one day in lodging
FIR though her parents knew that she had
gone with the accused and the IO and the
doctor was not examined and there was
material contradiction as to commission of
rape on her by the accused under Section 161
of Cr. PC, the accused could not be convicted
under Sections 366-A and 376 of IPC.
[Sharful Haque v. State, 2006 Cri LJ 3916
(Jhar)].
Where accused allegedly took prosecutrix
from her parents house and then committed
rape on her and age of prosecutrix was 18-
19 years and there was no resistance or
alarm raised by her and medical evidence
did not support prosecutrix case, accused
entitled to be acquitted.
[Nand Kishore v. State of Rajasthan, 2002
Cri LJ 4157 (Raj.)].
56. Money paid as ransom not proved.—
Where in a case there was abduction and
extortion of money from victims and money
was recovered from the house of accused
but there was no proof as how the money
was paid as ransom to accused and co-
accused had not involved the accused in his
confessional statement. Acquittal was
justified.
[Abdulvahab Abdul Majid Shaikh v. State of
Gujarat, 2007 Cri LJ 3529 : AIR 2007 SC 2492
: 2007 AIR SCW 4436 : 2007 (3) SCC (Cri)
126].
57. No alarm raised by prosecutrix.—
Conviction of accused police personnel by
inference that the complainant must have
accompanied him under some mis-
representation or pretext was not justified
when there was no alarm raised by her while
he was taking her on scooter.
[Rajendra v. State of Maharashtra, 2002 Cri
LJ 4353 : AIR 2002 SC 3390].
58. No allegation of kidnapping.—Where in a
case the victim stated that accused persons

had forced some tablet in her mouth but
under the statement under Section 164 she
did not state this fact and did not stated that
she was kidnapped by any of the accused
persons. It was held that conviction under
Section 363 was not justified.
[Narayan Chandra v. State of Tripura, 2007
Cri LJ 2638 (Gau)].
59. No allegation of rape or sexual
intercourse alleged in FIR.—Where the
prosecutrix went with her own Will with the
accused but when she came to know that
accused was a Muslim boy, she ran away
and no allegation of rape of sexual
intercourse was alleged in the FIR but it was
subsequently improved at later stage. It was
held that acquittal was justified.
[Mobin Mian v. State of Jharkhand, 2007
Cri LJ (NOC) 596 (Jhar) : 2007 (2) AIR Jhar
R 325].
No threat or inducement.—Where
60.
accused allegedly kidnapped girl to compel

him to marry and to commit rape and there
was evidence of father of the prosecutrix
that she went away by taking clothes and
gold chain and some cash and this was an
indication that there was no threat or
inducement, accused could not be convicted
under Section 366 or Section 376 of IPC.
[Jinesh Lal Sha v. State of Bihar, 2003 Cri
LJ 4914 : AIR 2003 SC 2081 : 2003 SCC
(Cri) 395 : 2003 (1) Crimes 246].
61. Non-examination of informer.—Where the
evidence of the complainant stated that the

accused had kidnapped his minor son
appeared to be untrustworthy because of the
non-examination of the person who had
informed him and his wife as to the taking
away of the victim, the extrajudicial
confession and recovery of the victim from
possession of the accused on the bais of
disclosure statement made by the co- accused
and the said alleged disclosure statement was
not put to the accused under Section 313 of Cr.
P.C., the conviction of the accused under
Section 363 of IPC was not sustainable.
[Shabnam v. State, 2007 Cri LJ 1752 (Del)].
62. Non-examination of I.O.—Though the two
minor girls were recovered from another

village where the villagers allegedly kept
safely both the girls and confined the
accused neither the person who had allegedly
informed the informant about the girls
having been seen with the company of the
accused nor were the villagers who allegedly
kept the accused confined were examined nor
even the IO was examined, the accused
could not be convicted for the offences
levelled against him.
[Shidhant Mahto v. State, 2006 Cri LJ 3941
(Jhar)].
63. Non-identification of accused.—The
prosecution case not only on the ground of
non-identification of the accused by the victim
prior to the trial but where the victim did
not disclose the name of the accused at the
earliest opportunity to any of the witnesses
except the I.O. who recorded the statement
after three months, it was proper for the
Court to disbelieve the injured victim.
[Sanjit Debbarma v. State, 2007 Cri LJ
4627 (Gau)].
64. Non-mentioning of name in FIR.—In the
instant case, the owner of the vehicle lodged

the FIR, when the taxi hired by the accused
was returned. The evidence of PW 5 who
stated that the driver of the taxi lastly seen
alive in the company of the accused and he
was sitting in the back seat of the taxi driven
by the accused is highly improbable. The
evidence of two witnesses as to the factum
of recovery and arrest was not credible and
cogent. The accused was not named in the
FIR. There were glaring discrepancies in the
statement of the prosecution witnesses with
regard to the recovery of the taxi. Under
these circumstances, the evidence of
recovery and arrest of the accused did not
inspire confidence and he could not be
saddled with the liability of committing the
crime alleged and as such he deserved to be
acquitted of the charges levelled against
him.
[Kush Kumar v. State, 2005 Cri LJ 1639
(Uttr)].
65. Offence of kidnapping and rape not
established.—Where accused is said to have
kidnapped prosecutrix aged 22 years and
committed rape on her at various places but
there was no evidence to show that accused
did the act by threatening her and the
evidence could not establish offences of
kidnapping and rape, accused is entitled to
be acquitted.
[Mohd. Laddu v. State of H.P., 2002 Cri LJ
4178 (HP)].
66. Prosecution case doubtful.—Where in a
case of kidnapping and rape alleged by the
prosecution there was no medical evidence
supporting its case and there were no signs
of recent intercourse nor any injury on
private parts and the fact the mother of the
accused would allow him to keep her in their
house and commit rape on her was
improbable and veracity of whole
prosecution case was doubtful, accused
could not be convicted.
[Hemanta Kumar Sahu v. State of Orissa,
2001 Cri LJ 2799 (Ori)].
67. Prosecution failed to prove that the victim
girl was taken out of lawful guardianship.—

Where in alleged abduction case,
prosecution failed to prove that the victim
girl was taken out of lawful guardianship
and she had not deposed that she was
forcibly taken away, the accused could not
be convicted.
[Varda v. State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cri LJ
1283 (Raj)].
68. Prosecution failed to prove the
charge.—Extra-judicial confession
corroborated by the recovery of the victims
cloth is not sufficient enough to sustain the
conviction of the house in which the victim
boy was a tenant. It was held that
prosecution has not able to prove the
conviction of the landlord.
[Nandlal Prasad v. State of Bihar, 2008 Cri
LJ 579 (Pat)].
The confession by itself was not sufficient to
hold the other accused guilty. The prosecution
could not adduce any other supporting
evidence to prove the guilt of the appellant.
There was no any other independent
evidence. It was held that prosecution had
failed to prove the charge.
[Prakash Kumar v. State of Gujarat, 2007
Cri LJ 2731 (SC) : 2007 AIR SCW 2721
: 2007 (4) SCC 266 : 2007 (6) Scale 91 : 2007
(2) SCC (Cri) 285].
The statements of the prosecutrix do not
inspire confidence. There are material
contradictions emerging on material
particulars in the statement. The
prosecution has failed to fasten the guilt
upon the accused-respondents.
[State of Rajasthan v. Phool Chand, 2008
Cri LJ 4792 (Raj)].
The wife of the deceased only has stated that
the deceased left alongwith the three
accused and thereafter he did not return
home, there was no evidence to show that
the accused was compelled to go out by the
accused or was taken by deceitful means and
the prosecution has failed to prove the identity
of the some skeleton of a man aged below 25
years which the wife of the deceased identified
to be of her husband since deadbody could
not get skeletonized within a period 12 days
and since admittedly the deceased was in
between 35-40 years and the apparels
alleged to have been recovered was not
shown to the wife of the deceased and the
witnesses did not even identify the apparels
which were allegedly seen by her at the
place where the skeleton were seen by her
and the prosecution did not even examine the
I.O. It was held that the prosecution even
failed to establish that the husband of the
informant (PW 1) died and that he died on
account of homicide violence and, therefore,
conviction of the accused persons under
Section 364 of IPC could not be upheld.
[Lakhan Sah v. State, 2006 Cri LJ 2524
(Jhar) : 2006 (4) Crimes 252].
There was no ingredients of the offence
under Section 364 brought on record to prove
the charge under the said section, there were
material contradictions between the
evidence of the informant and the witnesses
that the victim alongwith accused had been to
the hotel of the informant and then left
together for “Jatra” performance regarding
the destination of the victim and the accused
after taking food and although some wearing
apparels were seized by the police, such
Alamats were not produced in Court during
the trial of the case for about 30 months from
the seizure of the these articles
were sent to FSL for chemical analyses and
nobody knew as to where such articles were
kept so long. Although the two persons who
had been cited as eye-witness to the incident
no attempt was made by the prosecution to
produce them before the Trial Court and the
Trial Court also did not make any attempt to
examination them under Section 311 of Cr PC
and there was no evidence to bring home the
charge under Section 364 of IPC that at the
time when the victim, was taken away the
accused had intention to cause him death. It
was held that the prosecution had failed to
prove the charge under Section 364 of IPC
against the accused.
[Uttam Kirtonia v. State, 2006 Cri LJ 2328
(Cal)].
Where the two witnesses to the recovery of
the boy from the house of the accused,
father of the main accused have been
declared hostile of the prosecution and the
mother of the boy simply has stated that her
son was missing on the day of occurrence,
and there is no evidence that demand for
ransom was made by the accused person,
the prosecution has miserably failed to
established its case for offence under
Section 364-A of IPC against the accused
persons.
[Mazhar Hussain v. State, (2004) 2 Crimes
432 (Pat)].
69. Prosecution story doubtful.—Not finding
any blood by the I.O. on the P.O., nor there

being a mark of any dragging a serious doubt
was entertained over the existence of location
of the P.O. as said by the prosecution and it
made prosecution story highly doubtful sofar
as the place of occurrence is concerned. It was
held that prosecution failed to prove the case.
[Ganesh Rai v. State of Bihar, 2007 Cri LJ
3691 (Pat)].
70. Prosecutrix was not a minor.—The
conviction of accused cannot be based solely
on the statement under Section 313
admitting that victim girl had gone with him
when she was not a minor on relevant date
and considering fact that she had
subsequently married him and leading
happy conjugal life with him.
[Binod Kumar Rajak v. State of Bihar, 2002
Cri LJ 4410 (Jhar)].
Where accused allegedly kidnapped victim
girl and evidence showed that she was
major and that she left her house with her own
consent and there was not evidence of her
being found in the house of material uncle of
the accused, accused was entitled to be
exonerated.
[Raju Nayak v. State, 2001 Cri LJ 4600
(Jhar)].
71. Ransom not proved.—Wife of the
accused was not a party to conspiracy in
kidnapping for ranson. No witness had
directly or even indirectly deposed about
ransom by her. It could not be said that she
had committed an offence punishable under
Section 364-A read with Section 120-B of
IPC.
[Suman Sood v. State of Rajasthan, 2007 Cri
LJ 4080 : AIR 2007 SC 2774 : 2007 AIR SCW
5013 : 2007 (5) SCC 634 : 2007 (7) Scale 312
: 2007 (2) SCC (Cri) 637].
72. Registration of offence—Quashing of.—
Where in a case Director of Gram Bal

Hostel was the guardian of the child and his
authority could be said to be valid authority
against all except his natural guardian,
therefore, the registration of offence under
Section 363 against his father was quashed.
[Bapi Kisan Lackat v. State of Maharashtra
2007 Cri LJ (NOC) 757 (Bom) : 2007 (4) AIR
Bom R 333].
73. Same persons cannot be convicted on
same facts.—Since Section 366 an
aggravated form of the offence under
Section 363, same person cannot be
convicted on the same facts under both the
sections.
3152 (Raj)].
74.Sexual exploitation of prosecutrix not

proved by medical evidence.—No
complaint was lodged immediately by the
mother of the prosecutrix that her daughter
was forcibly abducted from the house by A-
1 and A-2, to the police not did she narrate
the incident to the villagers and the
evidence of the villagers that they had seen
the accused person carrying the victim
was not found reliable and believeable and
the allegation of sexual exploitation of the
prosecutrix was disproved by the medical
evidence and was not supported by the
prosecutrix herself, the prosecution
version that that the victim was forcible
abducted and later on taken to different
places by A- 1 seems improbable and not
proved beyond reasonable doubt and the
possibility of registering a false case
against the A-1 on account of son of the
informant had kidnaped the sister of A-1
could not be ruled out and the
participation of A-2 was not proved the
conviction of the accused under Sections
366 and 364-A of IPC could not be
sustained.
[Swayambar Singh Munda v. State, 2006
Cri LJ 4199 (Jhar)].
75. Specific charge for a demand of ransom
not framed.—Where there is convincing

evidence of the witnesses that the accused
pointed out the police whereat the
deadbody of the victim child was burnt, and
the nalla wherefrom the bones were
recovered the place being isolated and
grassy area and the judicial confession
made by the accused was not retracted
during trial except in his statement under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C. but no specific charge
for a demand of ransom under Section 364-
A of IPC was framed, therefore held that the
accused could not be convicted under
[Anil v. Administration of Daman & Diu,
Daman, 2007 (2) Crimes 135 (SC)].
76. Testimony of prosecutrix not corroborated
by medical evidence.—The prosecutrix left the

school and voluntarily accompanied A-1 from
one place to another, there was material
omission in her statement under Section 161
as to rape having committed to her and her
testimony was not corroborated by the
medical evidence and the possibility of her
being of 18 years of age at the time of
occurrence could not be ruled and her
parents did not lodge any report of rape
against A-1 after she was recovered from the
house of A-2, merely because of the FSL
report as to the presence of semen and
human spermatozoa on the underwear of the
prosecutrix and her vaginal slides in absence
of any stains of semen on the underwear of A-
1, the conviction of the accused could not
be recorded.
[Bablu v. State, 2006 Cri LJ 3732 (Chhat)].
77. Testimony of prosecutrix not reliable.—
Where accused allegedly kidnapped and

raped the prosecutrix on the pretext of
taking her to the Employment Exchange,
however the testimony of the prosecutrix
was not reliable merely because accused in
his possession nude photographs would not
mean that accused committed rape and
taken her nude photograph and therefore,
he was entitled to be exonerated.
[Palaparthy Vijay Kumar v. State of A.P.,
2003 Cri LJ 1670 (AP) : 2003 (2) Crimes 132].
Where though offences of kidnapping and
rape were committed in the year 1987 but the
date of committing rape has been mentioned
in the charge 11/12.1.1986 thereby
prejudicing the defence and it is found from
the entire evidence that the victim girl is not
a truthful witness, the Trial Court has
committed an illegality in placing reliance on
the testimony of the victim girl and other
witnesses in convicting the accused.
[Dharm Pal v. State, (2004) 3 Crimes 220
(All)].
78.Tutored witness.—Where there was no
satisfactory evidence regarding the
prosecution allegation that the deceased was
last seen in the Company of the accused and
there was not satisfactory evidence regarding
recovery of the articles belonging to the
deceased from the accused or was there
evidence regarding the recovery of the bones
and human skeleton from the land over which
the accused and his family had exclusive
possession nor was there evidence that the
bones and skeleton were that of the
deceased and the evidence of the witness as to
the fact of arrival of the deceased at the house
of the accused and subsequently the
deceased disappeared was unacceptable in
the eye of law as the I.O. procured and
pressurized the said witness to give false
evidence and she was a tutored witness,
therefore, the conviction of the accused for
offence under Sections 364/34,302/34 and
201/34 of IPC could not be sustained.
[Bani Israil Zinnatunnessa Bibi v. State,
2007 Cri LJ 1859 (Cal)].

Abduction and Kidnapping

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Abduction and Kidnapping

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Chapter - II

ABDUCTION AND KIDNAPPING

or by any deceitful means induces, any

slave.—Whoever imports, exports, removes,

to compel her marriage, etc.— Whoever

Where a girl aged less than 18 years is taken

Whoever takes or entices any minor under

person to grievous hurt, slavery, etc.—Whoever

such minor may be employed or used for the

guardian of a minor, employs or used such

(4) In this section,—

place, whether under the pretence of

the purpose of soliciting or receiving

of obtaining or extorting alms, any

purpose of soliciting or receiving alms;

(i) in the case of a male, a person under

sixteen years of age;

under eighteen years of age. [Vide

murder.—Whoever kidnaps or abducts any

The evidence tendered by the prosecution

any means whatsoever, induces any minor

of reason all over again, would just be a

girl was eighteen years. On perusal of cross-

18. Kidnapping for murder and kidnapping

Where accused allegedly kidnapped and

family of the informant, told the prosecutrix

eye-witness and the victim or kidnappee

the prosecutrix clearly revealed that she

long journey. Therefore, the conviction of

when deceased was allegedly kidnapped and

her parent’s house not proved.— Where

the minor victim girl out of her house.—

between the two the case has been lodged by

36.Beyond reasonable doubt.—Since the

onus is always on the prosecution to prove

39. Chain of circumstantial evidence not

When once, it has been proved that she was a

based on assurance and promise that the

Where informant’s mother was allegedly

Where there were contradiction in the

the evidence of the prosecutrix that the

eloped with A-1 of her own volition and had

in the deposition of the complainant, the

Where accused allegedly kidnapped his two

Where the evidence of the prosecutrix found

the evidence of doctor who held post-

relevant and of no consequence against the

she had love affairs with the accused and has

case of rape.—Where in a case it was

case the victim stated that accused persons

accused allegedly kidnapped girl to compel

evidence of the complainant stated that the

minor girls were recovered from another

instant case, the owner of the vehicle lodged

girl was taken out of lawful guardianship.—

any blood by the I.O. on the P.O., nor there

Where in a case Director of Gram Bal

74.Sexual exploitation of prosecutrix not

not framed.—Where there is convincing

by medical evidence.—The prosecutrix left the

Where accused allegedly kidnapped and

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