NFL v.

Eisma

G.R. No. L-61236

January 31, 1984

Facts:

On 1982, the National Federation of Labor, certified by the Ministry of Labor as the sole exclusive
collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of the respondent Zamboanga
Wood Products, Inc., charged the respondent firm before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for
underpayment. Petitioners declared a strike against the respondent, after the latter terminated the
president of the union. Respondent firm filed a complaint before the respondent Judge against the
members and officers of the union for obstruction and prayed for preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order. The petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Court, pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, as amended, and filed a motion for dismissal of the complaint.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent Judge has jurisdiction on Labor related cases.

Held:

The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130,
made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor
arbiters. Hence, the respondent Judge is devoid of jurisdiction.

Paat v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 111107

10 January 1997

Facts:

On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by DENR because
the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the
truck. Four days later, Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO, issued an order of confiscation and asked the
owners to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited within fifteen days. Private
respondent, however, failed to do so. R.E.D. Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained Layugan's action of
confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. de Guzman filed a letter of reconsideration but was
subsequently denied. The letter was forwarded to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to the respondent’s
wishes. During the pendency of the resolution, however, the respondent filed a suit for replevin. The
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss but was later denied by the RTC. Their motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied and the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the confiscation of the truck was valid.

Held:

Yes. The suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation
and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. The
provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of
E.O. No. 277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 could never be clearer.

Daoang v Municipal Judge

G.R. No. L-34568

28 March 1988

Facts:

On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos. On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and
guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for
adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named
Estrella Agonoy, oppositors’ mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were
disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to
adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:

Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction;

HELD:

The words in the paragraph (1) of the Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who
cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word
“descendant”, found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to “children”.
The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren.
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on
its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning
may be subjects of interpretation. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang , the grandchildren
of Antero and Amanda Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the
Agonoys. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the judgement of the Municipal Court of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte,declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all
legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and
Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be freed from legal obedience and maintenance by their
respective parents, Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and
Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family names ‘Bonilla’ and ‘Marcos’ be changed with
“Agonoy”, which is the family name of the petitioners, without pronouncements as to costs

PARAS v COMELEC

G.R. No. 123169

Facts:

Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994. Sometime in October 1995,
A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents. Public respondent COMELEC
resolved to approve the petition and set the recall election on November 13. In view of the petitioner’s
opposition, COMELEC deferred the election and rescheduled it on December 16, 1995. To prevent the
recall election from taking place, the petitioner filed a petition for injunction before the RTC. The trial
court issued a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the court dismissed the petition and lifted the
restraining order. The public respondent on a resolution date January 5, 1996, rescheduled the recall
election to be held January 13, 1996. Hence, this petition for certiorari. The petitioner argues the
pursuant to Section 74b of the Local Government code: “no recall shall take place within one (1) year
from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred (SK)
election was set on the first Monday of May 1996.

Issue:

Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of Section 74b of the Local
Government Code.

Held:

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context, that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Paras’ interpretation of the law is too literal
that it does not accord with the intentions of the authors of the law. The spirit rather that the letters of
a law determines its construction. Hence, it was held that the “regular local election” refers to an
election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled.
 Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% of the special allowance for judges be included
in the computation of his retirement benefits; Callejo Sr., J., AM No. RTJ-04-1868

I. The Facts:

In his letter dated May 26, 2004 addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Judge Tito G. Gustilo
requested that, considering his retirement is “barely one month from November 2004,” the second
tranche of the Special Allowance granted to judges under the Republic Act No. 9227 included in the
computation of his retirement benefits. In support thereof, Judge Gustilo points out that “in the past,
Judges who retire in October are included in the grant of the December 13th month pay, invoking the
“liberal policy” of the Court in granting benefits to the underpaid Trial Court Judges.” To recall, Rep. Act
No. 9227 granting additional compensation in the form of Special Allowance to judges took effect in
November 11, 2003. The special allowances shall be equivalent to 100% of the basic monthly salary
specified for their respective salary grades to be implemented uniformly in 4 years in such sums or
amounts equivalent to 25% of the basic salaries of the positions covered thereof. Subsequent
implementation shall be in such sums and amounts and up to the extent only that can be supported by
the funding source specified in Section 3 thereof. It is likewise reiterated that for purposes of computing
the retirement benefits, only the special allowance actually received and that which accrued at the time
of retirement shall be included.

II. The Issue:

Whether or not the Court can adopt a liberal stance in interpreting the retirement laws in favor of
retiree Judge Gustilo.

III. The Ruling:

No. The court denied Judge Gustilo's request for the inclusion of the second 25% of the special
allowance in the computation of his retirement benefits because Sec 5 of Rep. Act No. 9227 is quite
clear and unambiguous which, in plain reading, shows that only the allowances “actually received” and
the tranche or tranches “already received and implemented,” upon date of retirement, shall be included
in the computation of the retirement benefits. As such, there is no room for interpretation but only
simple application of the law.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN v. CA, GR No. 125183, 1997-09-29

Facts:

On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for
Municipal Government Center Site Purposes certain parcels of land of the public domain located in the
Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Considering that the land covered by the above-mentioned proclamation was occupied by squatters, the
Municipality of San Juan purchased an 18-hectare land in Taytay, Rizal as resettlement center for the
said squatters.
After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the Municipality of San Juan started to develop its
government center

On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July 26, 1987, former President Corazon
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716. Said amendatory proclamation
pertinently reads as follows:... together with other parcels of land not covered by Proclamation No. 1716
but nevertheless occupied for residential purposes, open to disposition under the provisions of the
Public Land Act,... On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association, Inc., one of herein
private respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Pasig,
Branch 159) a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for restraining order against... the Municipal
Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin them from either
removing or demolishing the houses of the association members who were claiming that the lots they
occupied have been awarded to them by Proclamation No. 164.

the regional trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that the property in question is being utilized by the
Municipality of San Juan for government purposes and thus, the condition set forth in Proclamation No.
164 is absent.

The appeal before the Court of Appeals was dismissed

This decision became final and the said judgment was duly entered

Disregarding the ruling of the court in this final judgment, private respondents hired a private surveyor
to make consolidation-subdivision plans of the land in question

To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private respondents, petitioner municipality filed a petition
for prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
against respondent DENR and private respondent Corazon de Jesus

Homeowners Association.

The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality, enjoining the DENR from disposing and
awarding the parcels of land covered by Proclamation No. 164.

The Court of Appeals reversed, Petitioner municipality assails the decision of the Court of Appeals by
hammering on the issue of res judicata in view of the fact that an earlier judgment, which had become
final and executory, had already settled the respective rights of the parties under

Proclamation No. 164.

Issues:

issue of res judicata insofar as the particular area covered by Proclamation No. 164, which was the
subject matter of the earlier case, Proclamation No. 1716 was... a valid act of legislation

Proclamation No. 164 is... a valid act of legislation.

Ruling:

The existence of the first three elements cannot be disputed. As to identity of parties, we have ruled
that only substantial identity is required and not absolute identity of parties

The addition of public... respondent DENR in the second case will thus be of no moment.

Likewise, there is identity of cause of action... all remain to be the same in both the first and the second
actions despite the fact that in the first action, private respondents were the plaintiff while in the second
action, they were the respondents.

reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals would be justified

Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos on February 17, 1978 in
the due exercise of legislative power vested upon him by Amendment No. 6 introduced in 1976. Being a
valid act of legislation, said Proclamation may only be amended by an... equally valid act of legislation

Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation.

President Corazon Aquino took the reigns of power under a revolutionary government. On March 24,
1986, she issued her... historic Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the Provisional Constitution, or more
popularly referred to as the Freedom Constitution

Under Article II, Section 1 of the Freedom Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise
legislative power until a legislature is elected... and convened under a new constitution.

Then came the ratification of the draft constitution

When Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this legislative power under the
Freedom Constitution

Proclamation No.

164, amending Proclamation No. 1716 was issued on October 6, 1987 when legislative power was
already solely on Congress.

this unauthorized act by... the then president constitutes a direct derogation of the most basic principle
in the separation of powers... we cannot simply close our eyes and rely upon the principle of the
presumption of validity of a... law. We, therefore, hold that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 was an
invalid exercise of legislative power. Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby declared NULL and VOID.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. Public respondent
Department of Environment and Natural Resources is hereby permanently ENJOINED from enforcing
Proclamation No. 164.

Principles:

The basic elements of res judicata are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court which
rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the
merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions... identity of parties, subject matter,
and cause of action
There is a long standing principle that every statute is presumed to be valid

However, this rests upon the premise that the statute was duly enacted by legislature. This...
presumption cannot apply when there is clear usurpation of legislative power by the executive branch.

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRIAGO

vs.

THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

Facts:

Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC).

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President, which is tasked to investigate
reports of graft and corruption and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman.

Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners filed a case alleging the constitutionality of E.O. No. 1 for it violates the equal protection
clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. It does not apply equally to all members of
the same class such that the intent of singling out the “previous administration” as its sole object makes
the PTC an “adventure in partisan hostility.

They argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass
acts committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior
administrations where the “same magnitude of controversies and anomalies” were reported to have
been committed against the Filipino people.

They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized
exceptions because first, “there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for
investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their public office for
personal gain; and second, the selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order
No. 1 to end corruption.”

Issue:

WON E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.

Held:
Yes, E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.

The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
“concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not
a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which
the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being
unconstitutional.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent (DIGEST)

G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997

TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional Provisions

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts,
the MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS
has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).

ISSUE:

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

Chinabank v Ortega

GR. L-34964

Facts:

On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against Bautista Logging Co.,
Inc., B & B Forest Development Corporation and Marino Bautista for the collection of a sum of money.
Upon motion of the plaintiff, the court declared the defendants in default for not answering within the
prescribe period. To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought for the garnishment of the bank deposits
of the defendants with the China Banking Corporation. Consequently, a notice of garnishment was
issued by the deputy sheriff of the trial court and served on the bank’s cashier. The bank cashier, replied
in the negative. In the reply, he invited the attention of the sheriff to RA 1405. The plaintiff then filed a
motion to cite the cashier for contempt of court. The trial court, despite having denied the motion,
ordered that the cashier confirm whether or not the defendants have existing deposit in their bank. The
cashier moved to reconsider but was denied and, subsequently, he was ordered to comply with the
order of the court within 10 days, otherwise, he would be arrested. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not china bank may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank
deposit of the debtor by invoking the provisions of RA 1405.

Held:

The prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not
preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. In the present case, there was no
inquiry as to how much the actual deposits are, the only inquiry that the court had was whether or not
there are deposits of the then defendants in China bank
 BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS OF PVA V BAUTISTA

G.R. No. L-37867

Facts:

In 1955, private respondent Gasilao, a war veteran during the World War II, filed a claim for disability
before the public petitioners under Section 9 of RA 65. The claim was denied. Meanwhile, the said act
was amended by RA 1362, including now benefits for the pensioner’s unmarried children below 18
years. Another amendment was made in 1957, increasing the life pension of the veteran but retaining
the same benefits for his children.

In 1968, after 12 years following the disapproved claim, it was reconsidered and the claim was finally
approved. The respondent, thereafter, requested from the petitioners that his claim be made
retroactive from the time his original claim was disapproved. The petitioners did not act on his request.
Private respondent claims that he was deprived of his right to the pension from the time his claim was
disapproved until the time of reconsideration. He filed a petition before the lower court and was
granted.

The petitioners through the Solicitor General challenged the decision of the lower court. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the claim for pension works in the retroactive.

Held:

Yes. Taking September 25, 1946 as the point of reference, the original claim of the respondent was
within 10 years, as prescribed by law. It would be more in consonance with the spirit and intention of
the law that the benefits therein granted be received and enjoyed at the earliest possible time by
according retroactive effect to the grant of the pension award. If the pension awards are made effective
only upon approval of the corresponding application which would be dependent on the discretion of the
Board of Administrators which as noted above had been abused through inaction extending to nine
years, even to twelve years, the noble and humanitarian purposes for which the law had enacted could
easily be thwarted or defeated.
 LORENZO T. TANGGAAN vs. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., UNIVERSE TANKSHIP
DELAWARE LLC, and CARLOS C. SALINAS G.R. No. 180636, 13 March 2013

FACTS:

Under the employment contract entered by Tanggaan with Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC)
for and in behalf of its foreign employer, Universe Tankship Delaware, LLC., he was to be employed for a
period of six months as chief engineer of the vessel the S.S. “Kure”. He was to be paid a basic salary of
US$5,000.00; vacation leave pay equivalent to 15 days a month or US$2,500.00 per month and tonnage
bonus in the amount of US$700.00 a month. On February 2002, Tanggaan was deployed but was
dismissed on April 2002. Tanggaan filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for payment of
salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract, leave pay, exemplary and moral damages, attorney’s
fees and interest.

The Labor Arbiter found petitioner to be illegally dismissed. As regards petitioner’s claim for back
salaries, LA said he is entitled not to four months which is equivalent to the unexpired portion of his
contract, but only to three months, inclusive of vacation leave pay and tonnage bonus (or US$8,200 x 3
months = US$24,600) pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 or The Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 2005.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an illegally dismissed overseas employee is only entitled to 3months back salaries.

RULING:

No. As held in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, involving Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,
that an illegally dismissed overseas employee is not entitled to three (3) month’s salary only. A plain
reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed
overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or three (3) month’s salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into
play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more. This is
evident from the wording “for every year of the unexpired term” which follows the wording “salaries x x
x for three months.” To follow the thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3) month’s
salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words
used in the statute while giving effect to some. Petitioner must be awarded his salaries corresponding to
the unexpired portion of his six-month employment contract, or equivalent to four months. This
includes all his corresponding monthly vacation leave pay and tonnage bonuses which are expressly
provided and guaranteed in his employment contract as part of his monthly salary and benefit package.
Thus, petitioner is entitled to back salaries of US$32,800 (or US$5,000 + US$2,500 + US$700 = US$8,200
x 4 months). “Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that an employee’s full back wages shall be
inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.” As we have time and again
held, “it is the obligation of the employer to pay an illegally dismissed employee or worker the whole
amount of the salaries or wages, plus all other benefits and bonuses and general increases, to which he
would have been normally entitled had he not been dismissed and had not stopped working.”