Aldaba v.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 188078. January 25, 2010
CARPIO, J.:

Facts: On May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law wherein the city of Malolos was separated from
its original legislative district. As a result of which, the city was entitled to its own separate
legislative district, however petitioners, in their capacity as taxpayers, registered voters and
residents of the city, raised the issue of the constitutionality of the law for failing to meet the
minimum population requirement of 250,000 as provided under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution because the city only has a population of 223,069 when the law was proposed in
Congress in 2007.

Issue: Is the city of Malolos entitled to a separate Legislative District under RA 9591?

Ruling: The court ruled in the negative.

Under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, shall have at least one representative. In construing the provision, the
Court stated that the Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, a city must
have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand. Moreover, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution states that “any city whose population may hereinafter
increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one member…”.
Thus, in the case, the actual population of Malolos was less than the minimum population
requirement of 250,000 and therefore cannot be entitled to a legislative district.
 Representative Teddy Brawner Baguilat v. Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez
GR No. 227757. Jul 25, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Facts: The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17th Congress on July 25, 2016,
several news articles surfaced about Rep. Suarez's announcement that he sought the adoption or
anointment of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte's Administration as the "Minority Leader" to lead a
"cooperative minority" in the House of Representatives (or the House), and even purportedly
encamped himself in Davao shortly after the May 2016 Elections to get the endorsement of
President Duterte and the majority partisans. The petition further claims that to ensure Rep.
Suarez's election as the Minority Leader, the supermajority coalition in the House allegedly
"lent" Rep. Suarez some of its members to feign membership in the Minority, and thereafter,
vote for him as the Minority Leader.
On July 25, 2016, which was prior to the election of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, then-Acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas and Rep. Jose Atienza had an
interchange before the Plenary, wherein the latter elicited the following from the former: (a) all
those who vote for the winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for the
other candidates shall belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be
considered part of the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of
the Minority. Thereafter, the Elections for the Speakership were held, "with 252 Members voting
for Speaker Alvarez, eight voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining
and one [(l)] registering a no vote," thus, resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the duly elected
Speaker of the House of Representatives of the 17th Congress.
On August 1, 2016, one of the "abstentionists," Representative Harlin Neil Abayon, III (Rep.
Abayon), manifested before the Plenary that on July 27, 2016, those who did not vote for
Speaker Alvarez (including the 21 "abstentionists") convened and elected Rep. Suarez as the
Minority Leader.6 Thereafter, on August 15, 2016, Rep. (now, Majority Leader) Farinas moved
for the recognition of Rep. Suarez as the Minority Leader. This was opposed by Rep. Lagman
essentially on the ground that various "irregularities" attended Rep. Suarez's election as Minority
Leader, particularly: (a) that Rep. Suarez was a member of the Majority as he voted for Speaker
Alvarez, and that his "transfer" to the Minority was irregular; and (b) that the "abstentionists"
who constituted the bulk of votes in favor of Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader are
supposed to be considered independent members of the House, and thus, irregularly deemed as
part of the Minority.7 However, Rep. Lagman's opposition was overruled, and consequently,
Rep. Suarez was officially recognized as the House Minority Leader.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat should be
recognized as the Minority Leader in light of: (a)  the "long-standing tradition" in the House
where the candidate who garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership
automatically becomes the Minority Leader; and (b) the irregularities attending Rep. Suarez's
election to said Minority Leader position.

Issues: whether or not respondents may be compelled via a writ of mandamus to

recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives; and
(b)  petitioners as the only legitimate members of the House Minority.

Ruling: The petition is without merit.

"Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the
act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there
being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In Special
People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, the Court explained that the peremptory writ of mandamus  is
an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of
procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right
to the performance of the act to be compelled.
After a judicious study of this case, the Court finds that petitioners have no clear legal right to
the reliefs sought. Records disclose that prior to the Speakership Election held on July 25, 2016,
then-Acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas responded to a parliamentary inquiry from Rep. Atienza
as to who would elect the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives. Rep. Farinas then
articulated that: (a) all those who vote for the winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and
those who vote for other candidates shall belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from
voting shall likewise be considered part of the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall be
elected by the members of the Minority. Thereafter, the election of the Speaker of the House
proceeded without any objection from any member of Congress, including herein petitioners.
Notably, the election of the Speaker of the House is the essential and formative step conducted at
the first regular session of the 17th Congress to determine the constituency of the Majority and
Minority (and later on, their respective leaders), considering that the Majority would be
comprised of those who voted for the winning Speaker and the Minority of those who did not.
 AtongPaglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC
GR No. 203766. April 2, 2013
CARPIO, J.:

Facts: The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition
filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political
party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections
because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC,
on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in
the printing of the official.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations
of intent to participate in the elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for
the elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. 
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking
in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
Issues:
1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.
2. Can the petitioners register themselves as a party-list?
3. What are the New Parameters of the qualifications of a party-list?

Ruling:
1. No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since
the Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning
the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to
the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to
register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new
parameters prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision
clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two
obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system
is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the
first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-
list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after
this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the
three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral
parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under
the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and
exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system.
How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district
elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To
exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary
struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list
system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express
wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941

2. Yes, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may
now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new
parameters prescribed by this Court.

3. Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall
adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking
in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
 Lico v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 205505. September 29, 2015
SERENO, C.J.

Facts: Adhikaing Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating Koop) is a multi-sectoral party-list

organization which was registered under Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act.
Under its constitution and by-laws, its highest policy-making body is the National Convention.
The Central Committee, however, takes over when the National Convention is not in session.

In the 2010 Elections, Commission on Elections (COMELEC) proclaimed Ating Koop as one of
the winning party-lists. Petitioner, Atty. Isidro Lico, as the first nominee, took his oath of office
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives and assumed office.

Several months prior to its proclamation, Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution
2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its nominees. Lico was to serve
the first year of the three-year term.

In 2011, Ating Koop held its second National Convention, during which it introduced
amendment to its constitution and by-laws. Among the salient changes was the composition of
the Central Committee, which would still be composed of 15 representatives but with five each
coming from Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. The amendments likewise mandated the holding of
an election of central committee members within six months after the second National
Convention.

In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members (Interim
Central Committee) which was dominated by the members of the Rimas (Amparo Rimas) Group.
The Interim Central Committee expelled Lico from Ating Koop for disloyalty. Aside from the
allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, he allegedly refused to honor the term-
sharing agreement. Rimas Group filed with the COMELEC a petition against Lico to order him
to vacate the office. COMELEC upheld the expulsion of Lico.

Issue: Does COMELEC have a jurisdiction over the expulsion of a member of the House of
Representatives from his party-list organization?

Ruling: No. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has the jurisdiction to
resolve questions on the qualifications of members of the Congress. In accordance with Section
17 Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a
disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and
assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives.

Benigno Simeon Aquino III v. Commission On Elections

G.R. No. 189793. April 7, 2010
PEREZ, J.:

Facts: Republic Act no. 9716 was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on
October 12, 2009. By reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative of the province, the
said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur. To create a
new second legislative district, it combined the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabas, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando with the second district municipalities of
Milaor and Gainza. The petitioner contends that RA 6716 is unconstitutional because the
reapportionment by the said law will leave the proposed first district with a population of less
than 250,000 which violates the constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of
250,000 to create a new legislative district.

Issue: Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for

the creation of a new legislative district in a province
Ruling: No. Second sentence of Article VI, Sec 5(3) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution only
provides the population requirement for a city to be entitled to a district representative. However,
it does not mention a requirement as to how many inhabitants should a legislative province must
have in order to be entitled to a district representative.
Therefore, the petition is dismissed and Republic Act No. 6716 is declared a valid law.
 Aldaba v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 188078. January 25, 2010
CARPIO, J.:

Facts: The population of Malolos City on May 1, 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute
that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the
National Statistics Office that “the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be
254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000. House
Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region
III of the National Statistics Office as authority that the population of the City of Malolos “will
be 254,030 by the year 2010.” The Certification states that the population of “Malolos, Bulacan
as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291.” The Certification further states that it was “issued upon the
request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed
creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.”

Issue: Is RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional?

Ruling: Yes. The City of Malolos does not have at least a population of 250,000 for the purpose
of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the May 10, 2010 elections.
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is
without legal effect because she has no basis and authority to issue the Certification. The
Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the
population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010.
 Navarro v. Ermita
G.R. No. 180050. April 12, 2011
NACHURA, J.:

Facts: On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act No.
9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). On December 3, 2006, the Commision
on Elections conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the
province under the Local Government Code. The plebiscite yielded 69, 943 affirmative votes and
63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao
del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands, the President appointed the interim set of
provincial officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14,
2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who
assumed office on July 1, 2007.
On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene Medina,
former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. They used as
an argument LGC, Title IV, Chapter 1 Section 461, Requisites of Creation- (a) A province may
be created if it has an average annual income as certified by the Department of Finance, of not
less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) and that when the law was passed, Dinagat had
a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106, 951, failing to comply
with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the LGC, Title IV, Chapter 1 Section 461
which states that:
A province may be created provided that
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
In addition, the Supreme Court has decided that there is an exception which states that a district
should have a contiguous and compact territory and that is if the district is an island.

Issue: Is R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional?

Ruling: No, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government
unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province because the Supreme
Court has decided that there is an exception which states that a district should have a contiguous
and compact territory and that is if the district is an island. Also, its average annual income of
P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance, which is four time more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the
creation of a province.

Jalosjos v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 191970. April 24, 2012
ABAD, J.:

Facts: Quezon City was Jalosjos’ place of birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively
changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight,
acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. He came to the
Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay. In addition, he
reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
Bureau of Immigration. He then applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but
respondent Dan Erasmo, the Barangay Captain of Barangay Veteran’s Village, opposed the
same. Acting on the application, the Election Registration Board approved it and included
Jalosjos’ name in the Commission on Elections voters list for Precinct 0051F of Barangay
Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. He then filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections.
Undaunted, Erasmo filed before the Municipal Curcuit Trial Court of Ipil-Tungawan- R.T. Lim
in Ipil a petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos’ name from the official voters list on the ground
that the latter made material misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply with the
requirements of RA 9225 (An Act Making The Citizenship Of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire
Foreign Citizenship Permanent) and the one year-residency requirement of the Local
Government Code.
On motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the Second Division’s
decision, ruling that Jalosjos had been a mere guest or transient visitor in his brother’s house and,
for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile. Meanwhile, Jolosjos won the election and
was proclaimed winner of the 2010 gubernatorial race in the Province of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Issue: Did the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to
establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay?

Ruling: Yes. Still Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a
domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he
acquires a new one; and(c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
The COMELEC appears hasty in concluding that Jalosjos failed to prove that he successfully
changed his domicile to Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC points out that, since he was
unable to discharge the burden of proving Zamboanga Sibugay to be his rightful domicile, it
must be assumed that this domicile is either Quezon City or Australia. But it is clear from the
facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. In addition, he
reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly
proving that he gave up his domicile there and he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibuga since November 2008. He then thus have been living in Ipil Zamboanga for a
year before he filed for his certificate of Candidacy on May 10, 2010 elections.

Mitra v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 191938. October 19, 2010
BRION, J.:

Facts: In this case, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) oversteps the limits of its
discretion wherein a situation where resulting errors, arising from the grave abuse committed by
the respondent. Mitra the petitioner, was alleged by the COMELEC to have misrepresented his
Aborlan, Palawan residence to deceive and mislead the people of Province of Palawan. The
Supreme Court (Court) needed to intervene in this matter despite its limited certiorari
jurisdiction in election cases because they are obliged and are constitutionally bound by it.
The Court found out that the COMELEC failed to consider if the petitioner deliberately
attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible for the
position of Governor of Palawan but Mitra did not commit any deliberate material
misrepresentation in his COC. Thus, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its
appreciation of the evidence, leading it to conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan,
Palawan. According to the Court, the petitioner did all incremental moves to establish his new
domicile and in sum, the evidence in the present case was carefully reviewed which showed that
Mitra indeed transferred his residence from Puerto Prinsesa City to Aborlan within the period
required by law. On 19 July 2010, the Motion for reconsideration through the Office of the
Solicitor General, asks the Court to reconsider the 2 July 2010 decision due to overstepping the
review power over its factual findings as a specialized constitutional body, its findings and
conclusions of the COMELEC are respected and even given the status of finality. The
COMELEC now argues that Mitra’s purported dwelling lacks the determining the fact of
residency even though Mitra intended to transfer his domicile but it was still denied due to lack
of merit.
Issue: Is the Court qualified to intervene in regards to solving factual issues vested by the
Constitution to specialized agencies such as the COMELEC?
Ruling: Yes, the general rule is that the Court ordinarily does not review in a certiorari case, the
COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence but due to the presence of grave abuse of
discretion, the Court’s constitutional duty is to intervene and not to shy away from intervention
simply because a specialized agency has been given the authority to resolve the factual issues.
One exception is when the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence go beyond the
limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable. It is also stated in Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution which provides that "Unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." For this reason, the Rules of Court provide for a
separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a
petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause. In this circumstance, the Court is duty
bound under the Constitution to intervene and correct COMELEC errors that, because of the
attendant’s grave abuse of discretion, have mutated into errors of jurisdiction.
Furthermore, it is said that Mitra’s petition argued that the COMELEC’s grave abuse of
discretion was patent when it failed to consider that the ground to deny a COC is deliberate false
representation. However, COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion at every step in the
appreciation of the evidence according to the Court. Thus, the Court even with limited certiorari
jurisdiction to all factual issues, as long as there is a presence of grave abuse of discretion, the
Court is duty-bound to intervene in the name of justice.

Tagolino v. HRET
G.R. No. 202202. March 19, 2013
 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts: On November 2009, Richard Gomez filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeking congressional office as Representative of the
Forth Congressional District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. However, he was
disqualified for failing to comply with the residency requirement under the 1987 Constitution. As
a result of which, he was substituted by his wife, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez which was approved
by the COMELEC since the disqualification is not due to Richard Gomez’ CoC cancellation.
Subsequently, Gomez won the congressional race crediting his votes to Torres-Gomez with
respondent Tagolino placing second. Aggrieved, the latter filed a petition for quo warranto
before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to oust Lucy Marie Torres-
Gomez. The HRET ruled in favor of Torres-Gomez adopting the COMELEC’s resolution that
Richard Gomez’ disqualification was not due to the cancellation of his CoC and thus the
substitution is valid and that she is domiciled in Ormoc City thus the residency requirement is
complied with. Tagolino then appealed with the Supreme Court claiming that the HRET
committed grave abuse of discretion.

Issues: Is the substitution of Lucy Maria Torres-Gomez valid?

Is Lucy Maria Torres-Gomez qualified?

Ruling: The Court ruled that the substitution is invalid. And that her residency qualification need
not to be dealt with because there was lack of proper substitution making her a non bona fide
candidate for the position.

The Court distinguished a petition for disqualification between a petition to dent due course to
and/or cancel a CoC . Disqualification under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, are those
who: a) are in possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; or b) commits
certain acts of disqualification which includes among others, corruption, terrorism and
overspending. On the other hand, cancellation of CoC is based on the findings that a candidate
made material misrepresentations on his CoC. As to its effects, in the former petition, the
candidate is still considered to be a candidate while in the latter petition, the candidate is deemed
to have not been a candidate at all. Further, Sec. 77 of the same law requires that a person to be
substituted must be an official candidate.

Thus, in the case since Richard Gomez’ disqualification was based on a misrepresentation on his
CoC thus he is deemed to have not been a candidate at all or he is not considered to be an official
candidate. Hence, the substitution of Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez is invalid.
 Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC GR 119976
248 SCRA 300. Sept 18, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.

Facts: Petitioner Imelda Marcos, whose alleged legal residence is in Tacloban, Leyte, ran for
Congress representing the 1st district of Leyte. Her adversary, Montejo, sought to disqualify her
candidacy on the ground that, among others, she is not a resident of at least 1 year of Tacloban
and therefore she did not satisfy the residency requirement mandated by Art VI, Sec 6 of the
Constitution as she in fact wrote in her Certificate of Candidacy that she resided “in the
constituency where” she sought “to be elected” for only “seven months”. She later claimed it to
be an honest mistake brought about by confusion and asserted that it is in fact her domicile
“since childhood”. However, COMELEC resolved in favor of Montejo and contended that
Imelda’s domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban.
In its resolution, COMELEC cited San Juan, Metro Manila and San Miguel, Manila as places
where she resided and served certain positions. Mention was even made of her residence in
Malacañang and Honolulu, Hawaii.

Issue: Is Tacloban, Leyte the legal residence of Imelda thereby satisfying the residence
requirement mandated by Art VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution?

Ruling: Yes. The honest mistake in the Certificate of Candidacy regarding the period of
residency does not negate the fact of residence if such fact is established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper. It is settled that when the Constitution speaks
of “residence” in election law, it actually means only “domicile.” It was held that Tacloban,
Leyte was in fact the domicile of origin of Imelda by operation of law for a minor follows the
domicile of her parents (which was the same). In its Resolution, COMELEC was obviously
referring to Imelda’s various places of actual residence, not her domicile (legal residence). An
individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in different
places. Successfully changing residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, 80 and
Imelda has clearly always chosen to return to her domicile of origin. Even at the height of the
Marcos Regime’s powers, she kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating important personal milestones there, instituting well-
publicized projects for its benefit and establishing a political power base where her siblings and
close relatives held positions of power always with either her influence or consent.
 Aquino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120265. September 18, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.:

Facts: On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. Among
others, Aquino provided the following information in his certificate of candidacy, viz :
(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR. ADALLA STS., PALM
VILLAGE, MAKATI. (8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:__Years and 10 Months.
On his Certificate of Candidacy, it indicated that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion,
Tarlac in 1992 and was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election.
At the time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His
birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and
Aurora and there was no indication therein of a change in domicile.
On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman
of the LAKAS -NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify
Agapito A. Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate
for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a
period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections.
The day after said petition for disqualification was filed, Agapito filed another certificate of
candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. Stating under item 8 of his certificate
that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for 1 year and 13 days.
On May 6, 1995, COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the instant petition for
Disqualification against respondent AGAPITO AQUINO and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for
the Office of Representative in the Second Legislative District of Makati City.
On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May
6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where 3 candidates vied for the
ongressional seat in the Second District, Agapito garnered the highest votes as against the other
candidates.
On June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the
Second Division dated May 6, 1995 and declaring him ineligible and thus disqualified as a
candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City in
the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence.

Issues:
1. Whether or not COMELEC is correct to disqualify Agapito Aquino as candidate for the Office
of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City for lack of the constitutional
qualification of residence.
2. Whether or not the candidate receiving the next higher number of votes be proclaimed as
winner.

Ruling:
1. SC affirms the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein petitioner ineligible for the elective
position of Representative of Makati City's Second District on the basis of respondent
commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one year residence in the district mandated by the
1987 Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a
republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their
representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government positions.
And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in
the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the
Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental
law itself.
*Note that the term "residence" has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not
only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.

2. The candidate receiving the next higher number of votes is not proclaimed the winner.
SC made a turnabout from our previous ruling in latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos
v. Commission on Election, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who
placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified
as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second
placer won by default.
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of
the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435), which represents the more logical and
democratic rule. Geronimo v Ramos pronounced that "votes cast for a disqualified candidate fall
within the category of invalid or nonexistent votes because a disqualified candidate is no
candidate at all in the eyes of the law,".
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority, votes does not entitle
the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be installed, under no
circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be deemed elected to the office.

Coquilla v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 151914. July 31, 2002
MENDOZA, J.
Facts: Teodulo Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He
joined the US Navy and was subsequently naturalized as a US citizen. In 1998, he came to the
Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the
United States. He applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. 8171 which was approved. In
2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

In 2000, he registered as a voter in Oras, Eastern Samar. In 2001, he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of mayor pf Oras, Eastern Samar. He wrote in his certificate of
candidacy that he has been a resident of the said place for two years.
Incumbent mayor Neil Alvarez sought the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on
the ground that Coquilla had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in fact he has resided therein for
only about six months.

Issue: Is Coquilla qualified to be proclaimed as a mayor of Oras?

Ruling: No. Under the Local Government Code (RA 7160):

Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus
rendering such certificate liable to cancellation.
 Abundo v. Commission On Elections
G.R. No. 201716. January 8, 2013
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts: The petitioner, Abundo, vied for the petition of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes
for 4 successive regular elections namely the 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010 national and local
elections. He was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate in both the 2001 and 2007
elections and served as the mayor in the corresponding terms. However, in the 2004 elections,
the Viga municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Jose Torres as mayor who, in due time,
performed his functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested the election and proclamation
of Torres and was eventually declared as the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest and
assumed the office of the mayor starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the term which is on June
30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
During the 2010 elections, Abundo and Torres opposed each other again. Torres sought the
disqualification to run of Abundo by asserting the three-consecutive term limit rule.

Issue: Whether or not the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official
arising from his being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered
as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive term limit for
elective local officials

Ruling: No. The term of Abundo was effectively broken when he was initially deprived of title
to serve and occupy an office to which he, after due proceedings or the electoral protest, was
eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate. Thus, there was no
consecutiveness of three successive terms. Also, Abundo only assumed the position of mayoralty
for a period of a little over one year and one month and was not able to serve fully the entire term
to which he was entitled.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted
constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
 Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez
G.R. No. L-23326. December 18, 1965
REGALA, J.:

Facts: Article VI, of the Constitution, reads as follows: The senators and the Members of the
House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual
compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other
emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective
districts in the case of Members of the House of Representative and to and from their places of
residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided
by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each
receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos. However, the original strict
prohibition was modified by the subsequent provision when the Constitutional amendments were
approved in 1940.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term
compensation “other emoluments.” RA No. 3836 was then enacted which reads: AN ACT
AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT
NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT
NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX.
Subsection (c) of RA no. 186 reads: “Retirement is likewise allowed to a member, regardless of
age, who has rendered at least twenty years of service. “
RA No. 3836 currently reads “Retirement is also allowed to a senator or a member of the House
of Representatives and to an elective officer of either House of the Congress, regardless of age,
provided that in the case of a Senator or Member, he must have served at least twelve years as a
Senator and/or as a member of the House of Representatives, and, in the case of an elective
officer of either House, he must have served the government for at least twelve years, not less
than four years of which must have been rendered as such elective officer: Provided, That the
gratuity payable to a retiring senator, member of the House of Representatives, or elective
officer, of either House, shall be equivalent to one year’s salary for every four year of service in
the government and the same shall be exempt from any tax whatsoever and shall be neither liable
to attachment or execution nor refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.
The petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the law based on the reason that the provision
on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries
of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution.

Issues:
1. What does “emolument” mean?
2. Is RA 3836 constitutional?

Ruling:
1. Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded “emolument” as “the profit arising
from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is
annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.”
2. No, it is not constitutional the court declared R.A. No. 3836 unconstitutional for it allows the
retirement benefits immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article 6, Section 14 of the Constitution.

Pobre v. Defensor Santiago

597 SCRA 1. August 25, 2009
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts: Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege

cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however,
powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."
Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be
held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof."
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites
the Court’s attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech
delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards
then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct
contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary
actions be taken against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does
not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were
covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she
delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.
The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies
in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose
what she believed "to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending
out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would
eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify
for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-
sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

Issues:
1. What is Parliamentary Immunity?
2. What is Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution?
3. Is her speech covered under the doctrine of Parliamentary Immunity?

Ruling:
1. Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however,
powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."
2. Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the
House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof."
3. No. The Supreme Court has decided that Parliamentary immunity is not an individual
privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for the individual
members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the
benefit of the people and the institution that represents them
 People v. Jalosjos
G.R. No. 132875. February 3, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is

now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts
and acts of lasciviousness based on Art. 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code which punishes him
for reclusion perpetua or at least 30 years in prison.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the
sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their
representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to
perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made
possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable
procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases. The immunity from arrest or detention
of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as
Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows
that privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It
may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department states that
Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the same, . . .

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to
civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the
Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the
same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending
appeal.

The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:

Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions
and in going to and returning from the same.

For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from
arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and intent to confine it within carefully defined
parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved the custody of the law
within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such
privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.

The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to
surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be
attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses,
it is enough that Congress is in session.

Accused-appellant's relied on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that —

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office.
To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a
people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of
his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been
guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule
the will of the people.

Issues:
1. Is Parliamentary Immunity applicable in the present case?
2. Did the accused-appellant correctly relied in Aguinaldo v. Santos in the present case?

Ruling:
1. No, according to Art. VIII, Sec. 9 of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, A Member of the
Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the
same. For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity
from arrest. In the present case, since the accused-appellant was convicted for the crime of rape
which is punishable for at least 30 years and a member of the Batasang Pambansa also known as
the Philippine Parliament, parliamentary cannot be given to him.
2. No, the accused-appellant did not correctly relied in Aguinaldo v. Santos. It can be readily
seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a
public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment
arising from the enforcement of criminal law which is the issue in the present case. Moreover, in
the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not
removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
 Trillanes IV v. Judge Pimentel
G.R. NO. 179817. June 27, 2008
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts: On 27 July 2003, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No.4
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion due to
the marching of a group of more than 300 armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Later on in that day, the impasse was resolved through a series
of negotiations with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening. Trillanes IV the petitioner
along with his comrades, were charged with coup d etat defined under Article 134-A of the
Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
But when Trillanes IV entered into politics and won the Senatorial Elections, he filed a petition
with RTC Makati for an “Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate
Sessions and Related Requests” (Omnibus Motion). It was denied by the trial court on 25 July
2007 and the denial was also reinstituted in petitioner’s motion for reconsideration which
excluded some parts of his requests on the order dated 18 September 2007. Hence, the present
petition for Certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court and, for prohibition and
mandamus.
Issue: Is the petitioner, as elected by the people in their sovereign capacity to the position of
Senator of the Republic provides the Proper Legal Justification to allow him to work and serve
his mandate as a Senator?

Ruling: No, in the Doctrine of Condonation, the Court held that election or re-election does not
apply to criminal cases and does not obliterate a criminal charge. In this case, petitioner is known
to be detained by the public, thus, the voters elected him as a senator with awareness that there
are limitations on his freedom of action which he could only achieve legislative results within the
confines of prison. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by the public officers
has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. A mere absence of a member of the
Congress is said to be not affecting the legislation. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
The Parliamentary Immunities differ in types of gravity of the offense committed by government
officials, the greater the offense, chances of bail be granted by a court is dubious due to the fact
of human inclination of escaping the punishment which could possibly limit his locomotion in
perpetuity, the gravity must be analyzed by the courts before granting bails to detainees. Hence,
parliamentary immunities of members of the Congress differs depending to the profundity of the
crime committed, the lesser sanction decreases the chance for the grant of bail. Thus, the petition
is dismissed due virtually making the petitioner a free man if allowed to participate in his
juridical capacity as a Senator elected by the Sovereign Power of the People, renders such
purposes of the correctional system as a mockery.

Trillanes IV v. Judge Castillo-Marigomen

G.R. No. 223451. March 14, 2018
TIJAM, J.:

Facts: On October 2014 the Senate Blue Ribbon Sub-Committee held its hearing on the alleged
350-hectar estate owned by the Binay family. In his testimony, former Makati Vice Mayor
Ernesto Mercado stated that since the developer of the land, Hillmares’ Construction
Corporation, refused to charge its development on the Binays’ 13% “kickback” on all of the
Makati infrastructure projects, the company instead overpriced its bid on the Makati City Hall
Parking Building construction project to come up with the funds for the development of the 350-
hectar estate. Thereafter, herein private respondent Antonio Tiu claimed ownership of the estate
and that the allegations was not true; that his company was responsible for its development; and
that he has the financial means of owning that land.

Certain about such allegations, Senator Antonio Trillanes IV made statement on the media
accusing Tiu of being a “front” or “nominee” or an acting “dummy” of Vice President Binay.
Thus, Tiu filed a civil complaint for damages against Trillanes IV for his comments against him
in the media. In his defense Trillanes IV contended that, among others, he was immune from
such since his statements were made in the performance of his duties as a Senator under Sec. 11,
Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Are the remarks of Trillanes IV in the media accusing Tiu as the Vice President’s “front”
or “nominee” or “dummy” covered by the privilege of speech and debate clause under the 1987
Constitution?

Ruling: The court ruled in the negative.

Under Sec. 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution: “No member of Congress shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in Congress or in any committee
thereof”. The court opined that the Speech or Debate Clause under Sec. 11, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution which grants immunity to the members of Congress for their statements is only
limited to legislative acts which, as defined by US jurisprudence as an act generally done in
Congress in relation to the business before it. Further, the court ruled that to participate in or
respond to media interviews in not an official function of any lawmaker; that it falls outside the
privilege speech or debate under the Constitution; that it is not a legislative act, but is political in
nature which is outside the ambit of the immunity conferred under such Clause.

In the case, since Senator Trillanes IV gave his statements in the media which the Court does not
recognize as a legislative act, he cannot therefore invoke his parliamentary immunity.
 Liban v. Sen. Gordon
G.R. No. 175352. January 18, 2011
CARPIO, J.

Facts: Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City
Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare
Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who
was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during
his incumbency as Senator. Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC
Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec.
13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that No Senator may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was
elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.

Issue: Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

Ruling: NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because
it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a
GOCC nor a private corporation. The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by
the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the
very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the
issue of constitutionality. The Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the
very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the
parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the
court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be
left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable. The Court should not have
declared void certain sections of the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised
judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the
Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected
by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was
being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate
under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.

Garcia v. Executive Secretary

677 SCRA 750
 Padilla v. Alvarez
G. R. No. 231671. July 25, 2017
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Facts: President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law
and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Mindanao group of islands on
the grounds of rebellion and necessity of public safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution.

According to President Duterte’s Proclamation No. 216 and his Report to the Congress, the
declaration of a state pf martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole Mindanao ensued from the series of armed attacks, violent acts, and
atrocities directed against civilians and government authorities, institutions, and establishments
perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf and Maute terrorist groups.

Representatives from the Executive Department, the military, and other security officials of the
government were invited, on separate occasions, by the Senate and the House of Representatives
for a conference briefing regarding the circumstances, details, and updates surrounding the
President’s proclamation and report.

The Senate deliberated on these proposed resolutions: a) Proposed Senate (P. S.) Resolution No.
388, which expressed support for the President’s Proclamation No. 216; b) P. S. Resolution No.
390, which called for the convening in joint session of the Senate and the House of
Representatives to deliberate Proclamation No. 216.

P. S. No. 390 was opposed by the majority of the Senate. The proposal was also rejected by the
House of Representatives.

Issue: Does the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene jointly upon the President’s
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus under Article VII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling: No. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to
vote jointly to revoke the President’s declaration or suspension.

By the language of Article VII, Section 18

of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress is
only required to vote jointly to revoke the
President's proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution fully reads:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of alarmed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires
it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

Paredes v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 118364. August 10, 1995
 Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001
VITUG, J.:

Facts: The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in
ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in
connection with pending in criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took over the
case from investigator Gualberto dela Llana after having been constituted by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioner's request, came up with a resolution which it referred, for
approval, to the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his
Memorandum, dated 26 April 1991, the Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate
informations against petitioner. On 13 May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the
informations for clearance; approved, forthwith, three informations were filed on even date.

On or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official
functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for
legalization for the stay of several aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in
violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of
said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified thereby giving
unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by
said accused."

The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioner's case before the
Sandiganbayan has been brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been called
upon to resolve several other matters on the subject.
Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez,  petitioner sought to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019;
(2) in Santiago vs. Vasquez,  petitioner sought the nullification of the hold departure order issued
by the Sandiganbayan via a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold
Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident for Hearing;
(3) in Santiago vs. Garchitorena,  petitioner sought the nullification of the resolution, dated 03
March 1993, in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare
Presiding Justice Garchitorena disqualified from acting in said criminal case, and the resolution,
dated 14 March 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 amended informations against her; and
(4) in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, petitioner assailed the denial by the
Sandiganbayan of her motion for reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order allowing the
testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these cases, the Court declared:
"We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case
No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she
failed to raise the issue of the delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the
information against her in those petitions. A piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting
of causes of action, is self-defeating.
"Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any offense punishable
under Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts complained therein were
authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of
Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and
unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines
after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion
to quash the informations
"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the
information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted
hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer,
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official
functions.'
"The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e)
of R.A. No. 3019." 

Issues:
1. What is the difference between the order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019
from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution?
2. Is the order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 applicable in the present case?

Ruling:
1. The suspension contemplated in the constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
upon an erring member while in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner
for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.
2. Yes. The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively
excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim
simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the
government — the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary — has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly
intruding into the internal affairs of either branch. unless an infringement of any specific
Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not deign substitute its own
judgment over that of any of the other two branches of government. It is an impairment or a clear
disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for
Judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to
contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the manner
prescribed by the Charter itself. Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the
members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the
assailed preventive suspension order.
 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
235 SCRA 630. October 30, 1995
MENDOZA, J.:

Facts: Some of the petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco,
and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)) reiterate previous claims made
by them that R.A. No. 7716 (Expanded Value-Added Tax Law) did not "originate exclusively"
in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI of the Constitution. Although they admit
that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives where it passed three readings and
that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was referred to the Senate
Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third
readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it
approved on May 24, 1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should
have done was to amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with
the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House bill and the Senate version
just becomes the text (only the text) of the House bill."

The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an
amendment to a House revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill. On at least two
occasions during the Eighth Congress, the Senate passed its own version of revenue bills, which,
in consolidation with House bills earlier passed, became the enrolled bills. It is noteworthy that,
in the particular case of S. No. 1630, petitioners Tolentino and Roco, as members of the Senate,
voted to approve it on second and third readings.

S. No. 1630 a mere amendment of H. No. 11197. Petitioners' basic error is that they assume that
S. No. 1630 is an independent and distinct bill. Hence their repeated references to its certification
that it was passed by the Senate "in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S.
Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197," implying that there is something substantially different
between the reference to S. No. 1129 and the reference to H. No. 11197. From this premise, they
conclude that R.A. No. 7716 originated both in the House and in the Senate and that it is the
product of two "half-baked bills because neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 was passed by
both houses of Congress."
In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to be mere
amendments of the corresponding provisions of H. No. 11197. The very tabular comparison of
the provisions of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 attached as Supplement A to the basic petition of
petitioner Tolentino, while showing differences between the two bills, at the same time indicates
that the provisions of the Senate bill were precisely intended to be amendments to the House bill.
Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630. Because the Senate bill
was a mere amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197 in its original form did not have to pass
the Senate on second and three readings. It was enough that after it was passed on first reading it
was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. Neither was it required that S. No.
1630 be passed by the House of Representatives before the two bills could be referred to the
Conference Committee.

According to our courts, while Art. VI provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must
"originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an
entirely new bill as a substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a
committee to which a bill is referred may do any of the following:
(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill omitting or adding
sections or altering its language; (3) to make and endorse an entirely new bill as a
substitute, in which case it will be known as a committee bill; or (4) to make no report at
all.

To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are required to originate in the
House by prescribing that the number of the House bill and its other parts up to the enacting
clause must be preserved although the text of the Senate amendment may be incorporated in
place of the original body of the bill is to insist on a mere technicality. At any rate there is no rule
prescribing this form. S. No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is therefore as much an amendment
of H. No. 11197 as any which the Senate could have made.

Issue: Are petitioners argument have merit?

Ruling: No, the petitioners argument have no merit. While Art. VI provides that all
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills must "originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also
adds, "but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." In the present case, the
arguments of the petitioners saying that the bill should originate from the House of
Representatives instead of from the house of Senate does not have any merit because the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments as provided in Art VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.

In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to be mere
amendments of the corresponding provisions of H. No. 11197. The very tabular comparison of
the provisions of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 attached as Supplement A to the basic petition of
petitioner Tolentino, while showing differences between the two bills, at the same time indicates
that the provisions of the Senate bill were precisely intended to be amendments to the House bill.
Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630. Because the Senate bill
was a mere amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197 in its original form did not have to pass
the Senate on second and three readings. It was enough that after it was passed on first reading it
was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. Neither was it required that S. No.
1630 be passed by the House of Representatives before the two bills could be referred to the
Conference Committee.

Brillantes v. COMELEC
432 SCRA 269. June 15, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts: On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of
votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also
mandated the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer
equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.
The COMELEC initially intended to implement the automation during the May 11, 1998
presidential elections, particularly in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
The failure of the machines to read correctly some automated ballots, however, deferred its
implementation.
In the May 2001 elections, the counting and canvassing of votes for both national and local
positions were also done manually, as no additional ACMs had been acquired for that electoral
exercise because of time constraints.
On October 29, 2002, the COMELEC adopted, in its Resolution No. 02-0170, a modernization
program for the 2004 elections consisting of three (3) phases, to wit:
(1) PHASE I – Computerized system of registration and voters validation or the so-called
"biometrics" system of registration;
(2) PHASE II – Computerized voting and counting of votes; and
(3) PHASE III – Electronic transmission of results.
It resolved to conduct biddings for the three phases.

On the other hand, the validation scheme under Phase I of the AES apparently encountered
problems in its implementation, as evinced by the COMELEC’s pronouncements prior to the
elections that it was reverting to the old listing of voters. Despite the scrapping of Phase II of the
AES, the COMELEC nevertheless ventured to implement Phase III of the AES through an
electronic transmission of advanced "unofficial" results of the 2004 elections for national,
provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."
Senate President Franklin Drilon had misgivings and misapprehensions about the
constitutionality of the proposed electronic transmission of results for the positions of President
and Vice-President, and apprised COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos of his position during
their meeting on January 28, 2004. He also wrote Chairman Abalos on February 2, 2004. The
letter reads:
Dear Chairman Abalos,
This is to confirm my opinion which I relayed to you during our meeting on January 28th that the
Commission on Elections cannot and should not conduct a "quick count" on the results of the
elections for the positions of President and Vice-President.
Under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, it is the Congress that has the sole and
exclusive authority to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President. Thus, any quick count
to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the
votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority
of the Congress, but also would be lacking of any Constitutional authority. You conceded the
validity of the position we have taken on this point.
In view of the foregoing, we asked the COMELEC during that meeting to reconsider its plan to
include the votes for President and Vice-President in the "quick count", to which you graciously
consented. Thank you very much.
On April 27, 2004, the COMELEC met en banc to update itself on and resolve whether to
proceed with its implementation of Phase III of the AES. During the said meeting, COMELEC
Commissioner Florentino Tuason, Jr. requested his fellow Commissioners that "whatever is said
here should be confined within the four walls of this room and the minutes so that  walang
masyadong problema. Commissioner Tuason, Jr. stated that he had no objection as to the Phase
III of the modernization project itself, but had concerns about the budget. He opined that other
funds of the COMELEC may not be proper for realignment. Commissioners.
Despite the dire and serious reservations of most of its members, the COMELEC, the next day,
April 28, 2004, barely two weeks before the national and local elections, approved the assailed
resolution 6712 declaring that it "adopts the policy that the precinct election results of each city
and municipality shall be immediately transmitted electronically in advance to the COMELEC,
Manila." For the purpose, respondent COMELEC established a National Consolidation Center
(NCC), Electronic Transmission Centers (ETCs) for every city and municipality, and a special
ETC at the COMELEC, Manila, for the Overseas Absentee Voting.

Briefly, the procedure for this electronic transmission of precinct results is outlined as follows:
I. The NCC shall receive and consolidate all precinct results based on the data transmitted to it
by each ETC;
II. Each city and municipality shall have an ETC "where votes obtained by each candidate for all
positions shall be encoded, and shall consequently be transmitted electronically to the NCC,
through Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) facilities." For this purpose, personal computers
shall be allocated for all cities and municipalities at the rate of one set for every one hundred
seventy-five (175) precincts;
III. A Department of Education (DepEd) Supervisor shall be designated in the area who will be
assigned in each polling center for the purpose of gathering from all Board of Election Inspectors
(BEI) therein the envelopes containing the Copy 3 of the Election Returns (ER) for national
positions and Copy 2 of the ER for local positions, both intended for the COMELEC, which shall
be used as basis for the encoding and transmission of advanced precinct results.
The assailed resolution further provides that written notices of the date, time and place of the
electronic transmission of advanced precinct results shall be given not later than May 5, 2004 to
candidates running for local positions, and not later than May 7, 2004 to candidates running for
national positions, as well as to political parties fielding candidates, and parties,
organizations/coalitions participating under the party-list system.

In relation to this, Section 13 of the assailed resolution provides that the encoding proceedings
were ministerial and the tabulations were "advanced unofficial results." The entirety of Section
13, reads:
Sec. 13. Right to observe the ETC proceedings. – Every registered political party or coalition of
parties, accredited political party, sectoral party/organization or coalition thereof under the party-
list, through its representative, and every candidate for national positions has the right to
observe/witness the encoding and electronic transmission of the ERs within the authorized
perimeter.
Provided, That candidates for the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panglungsod or sangguniang bayan belonging to the same slate or ticket shall collectively be
entitled to only one common observer at the ETC.
The citizens’ arm of the Commission, and civic, religious, professional, business, service, youth
and other similar organizations collectively, with prior authority of the Commission, shall each
be entitled to one (1) observer. Such fact shall be recorded in the Minutes.
The observer shall have the right to observe, take note of and make observations on the
proceedings of the team. Observations shall be in writing and, when submitted, shall be attached
to the Minutes.
The encoding proceedings being ministerial in nature, and the tabulations being advanced
unofficial results, no objections or protests shall be allowed or entertained by the ETC.
In keeping with the "unofficial" character of the electronically transmitted precinct results, the
assailed resolution expressly provides that "no print-outs shall be released at the ETC and at the
NCC." Instead, consolidated and per-precinct results shall be made available via the Internet, text
messaging, and electronic billboards in designated locations. Interested parties may print the
result published in the COMELEC web site.

NAMFREL and political parties have the following concerns about Resolution 6712 which arose
during consultation over the past week[:]
a) The Resolution disregards RA 8173, 8436, and 7166 which authorize only the citizen’s arm to
use an election return for an unofficial count; other unofficial counts may not be based on an
election return; Indeed, it may be fairly inferred from the law that except for the copy of the
citizen’s arm, election returns may only be used for canvassing or for receiving dispute
resolutions.
b) The Commission’s copy, the second or third copy of the election return, as the case may be,
has always been intended to be an archived copy and its integrity preserved until required by the
Commission to resolve election disputes. Only the Board of Election Inspectors is authorized to
have been in contact with the return before the Commission unseals it.
c) The instruction contained in Resolution 6712, to break the seal of the envelope containing
copies Nos. 2 and 3 will introduce a break in the chain of custody prior to its opening by the
Commission on Election[s]. In the process of prematurely breaking the seal of the Board of
Election Inspectors, the integrity of the Commission’s copy is breached, thereby rendering it
void of any probative value.
To us, it does appear that the use of election returns as prescribed in Resolution 6712 departs
from the letters and spirit of the law, as well as previous practice. More importantly, questions of
legalities aside, the conduct of an advanced count by the COMELEC may affect the credibility of
the elections because it will differ from the results obtained from canvassing. Needless to say, it
does not help either that Resolution 6712 was promulgated only recently, and perceivably, on the
eve of the elections.

Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC as the statutory
basis for the assailed resolution, does not cover the use of the latest technological and election
devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover, the COMELEC failed to notify the
authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all candidates in areas affected by
the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the
effectivity of the use of such devices. Section 52(i) reads:
SEC. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. – In addition to the powers and
functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of
the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose
of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall :
…
(i) Prescribe the use or adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, taking into
account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds available for the purpose: Provided,
That the Commission shall notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties
and candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices
not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.
Issues:
Assuming the issues are not political, whether Resolution No. 6712 is void:
(a) for preempting the sole and exclusive authority of Congress under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the
1987 Constitution to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President;

(b) for violating Art. VI, Sec. 29 (par. 1) of the 1987 Constitution that "no money shall be paid
out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law;"

(c) for disregarding Rep. Acts Nos. 8173, 8436 and 7166 which authorize only the citizens’ arm
to use an election return for an "unofficial" count;

(d) for violation of Sec. 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, requiring not less than thirty (30)
days notice of the use of new technological and electronic devices; and,

(e) for lack of constitutional or statutory basis

Ruling:
(a) Yes, Resolution 6712 is void. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution provides in part:
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate
shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
As early as January 28, 2004, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon already conveyed to
Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. his deep-seated concern that the respondent COMELEC
could not and should not conduct any "quick count" of the votes cast for the positions of
President and Vice-President. In his Letter dated February 2, 2004 addressed to Chairman
Abalos, Senate President Drilon reiterated his position emphasizing that "any quick count to be
conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes
of the President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of
Congress, but would also be lacking of any constitutional authority."

Nonetheless, in disregard of the valid objection of the Senate President, the COMELEC
proceeded to promulgate the assailed resolution. Such resolution directly infringes the authority
of Congress, considering that Section 4 thereof allows the use of the third copy of the Election
Returns (ERs) for the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives, intended for the COMELEC, as basis for the encoding and transmission of
advanced precinct results, and in the process, canvass the votes for the President and Vice-
President, ahead of the canvassing of the same votes by Congress.

(b) Yes, Resolution No. 6712 is void. The assailed COMELEC resolution contravenes the
constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law."
By its very terms, the electronic transmission and tabulation of the election results projected
under Resolution No. 6712 is "unofficial" in character, meaning "not emanating from or
sanctioned or acknowledged by the government or government body. Any disbursement of
public funds to implement this project is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep.
Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act. The use of the COMELEC of its
funds appropriated for the AES for the "unofficial" quick count project may even be considered
as a felony under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Irrefragably, the implementation of the assailed resolution would entail, in due course, the hiring
of additional manpower, technical services and acquisition of equipment, including computers
and software, among others. According to the COMELEC, it needed ₱55,000,000 to
operationalize the project, including the encoding process. Hence, it would necessarily involve
the disbursement of public funds for which there must be the corresponding appropriation.
The COMELEC posited during the hearing that the 2003 General Appropriations Act has
appropriated the amount needed for its "unofficial" tabulation.

(c) Yes, Resolution No. 6712 is void he assailed resolution disregards existing laws which
authorize solely the duly-accredited citizens’ arm to conduct the "unofficial" counting of votes.
Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in
Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, the accredited citizen’s arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is
exclusively authorized to use a copy of the election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial"
counting of the votes, whether for the national or the local elections. No other entity, including
the respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy of the election returns for purposes
of conducting an "unofficial" count. In addition, the second or third copy of the election returns,
while required to be delivered to the COMELEC under the aforementioned laws, are not
intended for undertaking an "unofficial" count. The aforesaid COMELEC copies are archived
and unsealed only when needed by the respondent COMELEC to verify election results in
connection with resolving election disputes that may be imminent. However, in contravention of
the law, the assailed Resolution authorizes the so-called Reception Officers (RO), to open the
second or third copy intended for the respondent COMELEC as basis for the encoding and
transmission of advanced "unofficial" precinct results. This not only violates the exclusive
prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an "unofficial" count, but also taints the integrity of the
envelopes containing the election returns, as well as the returns themselves, by creating a gap in
its chain of custody from the Board of Election Inspectors to the COMELEC.

(d) Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC as the
statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does not cover the use of the latest technological and
election devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover, the COMELEC failed to notify
the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all candidates in areas affected
by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to
the effectivity of the use of such devices. Section 52(i) reads:
SEC. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. – In addition to the powers and
functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of
the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose
of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall :
…
(i) Prescribe the use or adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, taking into
account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds available for the purpose: Provided,
That the Commission shall notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties
and candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices
not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.
From the clear terms of the above provision, before the COMELEC may resort to and adopt the
latest technological and electronic devices for electoral purposes, it must act in accordance with
the following conditions:
(a) Take into account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds available for the purpose;
and,
(b) Notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and candidates in areas
affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days
prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.
It is quite obvious that the purpose of this provision is to accord to all political parties and all
candidates the opportunity to object to the effectiveness of the proposed technology and devices,
and, if they are so minded not to object, to allow them ample time to field their own trusted
personnel especially in far flung areas and to take other necessary measures to ensure the
reliability of the proposed electoral technology or device.
As earlier pointed out, the assailed resolution was issued by the COMELEC despite most of the
Commissioners’ apprehensions regarding the legal, operational and financial impediments
thereto. More significantly, since Resolution No. 6712 was made effective immediately a day
after its issuance on April 28, 2004, the respondent COMELEC could not have possibly
complied with the thirty-day notice requirement provided under Section 52(i) of the Omnibus
Election Code. This indubitably violates the constitutional right to due process of the political
parties and candidates.

Drilon v. De Venecia
594 SCRA 749

Arroyo v. De Venecia
G.R. No. 127255. June 26, 1998

People v. Silton
600 SCRA 476

Sabio v. Gordon
504 SCRA 704. 2006

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES v EDUARDO ERMITA

488 SCRA 1. April 20, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Facts: In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter
alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to
various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation and others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections,
wiretapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”. The public hearing
was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate
the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail
Project.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights
of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and For Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect
immediately. Due to this, the invited officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from
the president as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all public officials enumerated
therein to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the resolution of the
issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it has
already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and
impedes the valid exercise of the Senate’s powers and functions and conceals information of
great public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R.
No. 169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or not E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires public officials, enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before the Congress valid and
constitutional

Ruling: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain
information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest.
The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in
this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public
interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought
in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
 Gudani v. Senga
495 SCRA 671 & 498 SCRA 671
TINGA, J.:

Facts: Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani
and Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense
and Security to shed light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed
by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said
Committee. On the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. However, the two
testified before the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue an order directing Gudani and Balutan
to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for
investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military
service. After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be charged with violation of
Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared
unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their
successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently
enjoined from proceeding against them, as a consequence of their having testified before the
Senate. 

Issues:
1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative
inquiry? 
2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the
President desires otherwise?
3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last 4 October
2005?

Ruling: 

1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-
in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under
military justice. Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to
seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that
a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief.
Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget
appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the
Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions
appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of
command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed
forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the
President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to
choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear
before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-
advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct
legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified
anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement
today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces,
the clash may soon loom or actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which
members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President
desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as
commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.

The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative
creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so.
There is considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due
deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes
this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a
particular mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not
enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness
inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is
balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to
its rulings by the other branches of government.

3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be
outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated
against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the
officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen.
Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him
occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005. 

Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers

564 SCRA 152. September 4, 2008
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Facts: The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even
prior to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best
understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United
States. Schwart defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the
right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from
Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public." x x x In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of
executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez. Almonte used the term
in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon
decision which explains the basis for the privilege:
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences,
like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, he has all the values to
which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the
necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh
opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to
explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a
way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying
a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution x x x "

On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for
about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN
Project"), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications
("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that
then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and
petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or
not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by
requiring him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007,
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to
dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege.

The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic
of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the
President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without
disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.

Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to

his request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order
dated January 30, 2008; In Re: P.S. Res. Nos. 127,129,136 & 144; and privilege speeches of
Senator Lacson and Santiago (all on the ZTE-NBN Project), citing petitioner in contempt of
respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of
the presidential communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system.

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to
the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive
Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state
that the authority is "By order of the President", which means that he personally consulted with
her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official
in the executive hierarchy.

In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked
executive privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement between the
Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3) questions propounded to petitioner
Neri in the course of the Senate Committees’ investigation.

Issues:
1. What is executive privilege?
2. What is the meaning of presidential communications privilege?
3. Can the petitioner invoke executive privilege?

Ruling:
1. Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used in
the legal literature of the United States. Schwart defines executive privilege as "the power of the
Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. Similarly,
Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to
withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public."

2. Yes, petitioner can invoke executive privilege. In light of this highly exceptional nature of the
privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege.
She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in
which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President",
which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power,
it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy.
In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked
executive privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement between the
Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3) questions propounded to petitioner
Neri in the course of the Senate Committees’ investigation.
Balag v. Senate of the Philippines
 G.R. No. 234608. July 3, 2018
GESMUNDO, J.:

Facts: RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION

SECTION 1. Power to Conduct Formal Inquiries or Investigations:
The Senate or any of its Committees may conduct formal inquiries or investigations in aid of
legislation in accordance with these Rules.
Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or appropriation, or
in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of, or in connection with future
legislation, or will aid in the review or formulation of a new legislative policy or enactment.
They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the
Senate alone.
On September 17, 2017, Horacio Tomas T. Castillo III (Horacio III), a first year law student of
the University of Sto. Tomas (UST), died allegedly due to hazing conducted by the Aegis Juris
Fraternity (AJ Fraternity) of the same university.
Petitioner was first asked on October 18, 2017, around 11:29 in the morning, whether he was the
president of the AJ Fraternity, based on school records, and he denied it; he was asked again at
12:09 in the afternoon whether he was the president of the AJ Fraternity but he still refused to
answer the question; at 1:19 in the afternoon, he admitted that he was a member of the fraternity
but still he refused to say whether or not he was the president, only saying that he is already
studying in another school. On November 6, 2017, at the resumption of the hearing, petitioner
was still unresponsive. According to respondents, these acts were contemptuous and were valid
reasons to cite petitioner in contempt.
Petitioner chiefly argues that the legislative inquiry conducted by respondent committees was not
in aid of legislation; rather, it was in aid of prosecution. He posits that the purpose of SR No. 504
was to hold accountable those responsible for the senseless act of killing Horacio III, and not to
aid legislation. Petitioner underscores that the transcripts during the September 25, 2017
committee hearing were used in the criminal complaint filed against him, which bolsters that the
said hearings were in aid of prosecution. He insists that the senate hearings would violate his
right to due process and would pre-empt the findings of the DOJ with respect to the criminal
complaint filed against him.
In their Comment, respondents, through the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel, countered that
the purpose of the hearing was to re-examine R.A. No. 8049; that several documents showed that
the legislative hearing referred to Senate Bill Nos. 27, 199, 223, 1161, and 1591; that the
statement of the senators during the hearing demonstrated that the legislative inquiry was
conducted in aid of legislation; and that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation (Senate Rules) were duly published.
Further, respondents underscored that the question propounded to petitioner was not
incriminating because an admission that he was an officer of the AJ Fraternity would not
automatically make him liable under R.A. No. 8049. They emphasized that the Senate respected
petitioner's right to due process because the hearing was conducted in aid of legislation; that the
senators explained why he would be cited in contempt; that he was given several chances to
properly purge himself from contempt; and that no incriminating question was asked.
Then, on January 23, 2018, the Committees on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs and Justice
and Human Rights jointly adopted Committee Report Nos. 232 and 233 and submitted the same
to the Senate. Committee Report No. 232 referred to the findings of respondent committees in
the inquiry conducted in aid of legislation; while Committee Report No. 233 referred to the
recommendation that Senate Bill No. 1662 be approved in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 27,
199, 223, 1161, 1591, and 1609. On February 12, 2018, the Senate passed on the reading Senate
Bill No. 1662.
During the trial the Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of
contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination
of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked. Further, the Court rules that the
legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances:
First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Sections 22 and 23 of Senate
Rules state:
Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of the inquiry, the
Committee shall meet to begin the consideration of its Report.
The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions, shall be filed with the
Secretary of the Senate, who shall include the same in the next Order of Business.
Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of Business, shall be referred
to the Committee on Rules for assignment in the Calendar.
Evidently, respondent committees have terminated their legislative inquiry upon the approval of
Committee Report Nos. 232 and 233 by the majority of its members. The Senate even went
further by approving on its 3rd reading the proposed bill, Senate Bill No. 1662, the result of the
inquiry in aid of legislation. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of
petitioner likewise ends.

Issues:
1. What is a legislative Inquiry?
2. What is the duration of the detention for a contempt ordered by the Senate?
3. Is the present case considered as moot and academic?

Ruling:
1. According to the RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING INQUIRIES IN AID OF
LEGISLATION SECTION 1. Power to Conduct Formal Inquiries or Investigations
The Senate or any of its Committees may conduct formal inquiries or investigations in aid of
legislation in accordance with these Rules.
Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or appropriation, or
in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of, or in connection with future
legislation, or will aid in the review or formulation of a new legislative policy or enactment.
They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the
Senate alone.

2. The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the
Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the
legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked. Further, the Court rules that the
legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances:
First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Sections 22 and 23 of Senate
Rules state:
Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of the inquiry, the
Committee shall meet to begin the consideration of its Report.
The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions, shall be filed with the
Secretary of the Senate, who shall include the same in the next Order of Business.
Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of Business, shall be referred
to the Committee on Rules for assignment in the Calendar.

3. Yes, the present case is already considered as moot and academic. In this case, the Court finds
that there is no more justiciable controversy. Petitioner essentially alleges that respondents
unlawfully exercised their power of contempt and that his detention was invalid. As discussed
earlier, in its resolution dated December 12, 2017, the Court ordered in the interim the immediate
release of petitioner pending resolution of the instant petition. Thus, petitioner was no longer
detained under the Senate's authority.
Then, on January 23, 2018, the Committees on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs and Justice
and Human Rights jointly adopted Committee Report Nos. 232 and 233 and submitted the same
to the Senate. Committee Report No. 232 referred to the findings of respondent committees in
the inquiry conducted in aid of legislation; while Committee Report No. 233 referred to the
recommendation that Senate Bill No. 1662 be approved in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 27,
199, 223, 1161, 1591, and 1609. On February 12, 2018, the Senate passed on the reading Senate
Bill No. 1662.
Evidently, respondent committees have terminated their legislative inquiry upon the approval of
Committee Report Nos. 232 and 233 by the majority of its members. The Senate even went
further by approving on its 3rd reading the proposed bill, Senate Bill No. 1662, the result of the
inquiry in aid of legislation. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of
petitioner likewise ends.
Accordingly, there is no more justiciable controversy regarding respondents' exercise of their
constitutional power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, their power of contempt, and the
validity of petitioner's detention. Indeed, the petition has become moot and academic.

Belgica et al. v. Honorable Executive Secretary Ochoa et al

G.R. No. 208566. November 19, 2013
PERLAS–BERNABE, J.

Facts: On August 28, 2013, petitioner (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a
Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition),
seeking that the “Pork Barrel System” be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be
issued permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in
their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of
Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the
“Pork Barrel System,” in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from
approving further releases pursuant thereto.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners (Belgica, et al.), and (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition
For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual “Pork Barrel System,”
presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF,
and the Executive’s lump–sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion
Petitioners question the phrases of PD 910 especially (a) “and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910, relating to the Malampaya
Funds, and (b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund.

Issue: Is the pork barrel system unconstitutional?

Ruling: Yes, the pork barrel system is unconstitutional for it violates the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non–delegability of legislative
power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; and (e) local autonomy.
First, the court said that because of the principle of separation of powers, legislators, as soon as
they pass the annual budget law, should no longer have any participation in the implementation
of the law. Second, the court said that the power to provide the annual appropriations law cannot
be delegated to the individual members of Congress. Third, the court said that the pork barrel
violates the system of check and balances since it deprives the president the power to veto line
items in the annual appropriation law. Fourth, the court said that public office is public trust
however the public trust was violated when the pork barrel system was implemented. Fifth, the
court has ruled that instead of allowing local officials to identify projects in their local
government units, members of Congress, simply because of their title, are granted also the power
to identify infrastructure projects for their district.

Araullo et al v. Aquino III et al

G.R. No. 209135. July 1, 2014

TESDA v. COA
G.R. No. 196418. February 10, 2015

COMELEC v. Judge Quijano-Padilla et al

Sept. 8, 2002

Mandanas v. Ochoa
January 23,2018

Dela Cruz v. Ochoa

January 23, 2018

Tan v. Del Rosario

237 SCRA 324

Planters Products, Inc v. Fertiphil Corp.

 548 SCRA 485. March 14, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.:

Facts: Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated
under Philippine laws. They are both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers,
pesticides and agricultural chemicals.
On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI
No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component
(CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines. The LOI provides:
The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing formula
a capital contribution component of not less than ₱10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be
collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such capital contribution shall be
applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the Philippines. Pursuant to the LOI,
Fertiphil paid ₱10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted the amount collected to the Far East Bank and
Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid ₱6,689,144 to FPA from July 8, 1985
to January 24, 1986.
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the ₱10 levy. With
the return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI
No. 1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand.
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC in
Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable,
oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of
law. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used
the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.

Issue: Do the petitioners have locus standi to ask for the return or reimbursement of all the levies
it had paid for each bag of fertilizer it sold under the Letter of Instruction No. 1465?

Ruling: Yes. Fertiphil has locus standi to file it. Fertiphil suffered a direct injury from the
enforcement of LOI No. 1465. It was required, and it did pay, the P10 levy imposed for every
bag of fertilizer sold on the domestic market. It may be true that Fertiphil has passed some or all
of the levy to the ultimate consumer, but that does not disqualify it from attacking the
constitutionality of the LOI or from seeking a refund. As a seller, it bore the ultimate burden of
paying the levy. It faced the possibility of severe sanctions for failure to pay the levy. The fact of
payment is sufficient injury to Fertiphil.

Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos
253 SCRA 559. February 13, 1996
Per Curiam
Facts: The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992
election. In her Motion on the 16th day of August in the year 1995, reiterated in her comment of
the 29th of August of the same year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the
remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot
areas be deemed computed. The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the
protestant and protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by
her election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on the
30th of June in the year 1995.

Ruling: Yes. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or
considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and
her discharge of the duties and functions thereof.
The protestant abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue the public interest involved in
the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest
would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the
1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation
during this period of national recovery.
Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if
after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still wishes to present
evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal of any such intention, such is a manifest
indication that she no longer intends to do so.
 Macalintal v. PET
G.R. No. 191618. November 23, 2010
NACHURA, J.:

Facts: Confronting us is an undesignated petition filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty.

Macalintal), that questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an
illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose.

Issue: Is the creation of the PET constitutional?

Ruling: Yes it is constitutional. It is significant that the Supreme Court has characterized the
resolution of by the Electoral Tribunals of electoral contests as “essentially an exercise of
judicial power”, although “subject to judicial review via a petition for certiorari filed by the
proper party if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”

Pimentel Jr v. Committee of Congress to canvass votes for President and Vice President
G.R. No. 163783. June 22, 2004

Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 146738. March 2,2001

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary

194 SCRA 317

Funa v. Acting Secretary Alberto Agra

G.R. No. 191644. February 19, 2013

Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 152154. July 15. 2003

Senate v. Ermita
488 SCRA 1
 Estrada v. Desierto
G.R. No. 146710-15. March 2, 2001
PUNO, J.:

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President
while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million
Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from life's adversity. Both
petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.

From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that
slowly but surely eroded his popularity. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in
character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. Petitioner invokes Executive
Privilege on his defense.

Issue: Can the petitioner invoke Executive Privilege as his defense?

Ruling: No, he cannot. The Supreme Court has ruled that petitioner cannot cite the Executive
Privilege which will not make him liable. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity as an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any other trespassers.
 Gloria v. CA
G.R. No. 119903. August 15, 2000
PURISIMA, J.:

Facts: Respondent Secretary Gloria recommended to the President of the Philippines that the
petitioner be reassigned as Superintendent of the MIST [Marikina Institute ofience and
Technology], to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag
F. Lauro, on June 17, 1994.
On October 12, 1994, the President approved the recommendation of Secretary Gloria.
After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment
of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the
Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the
reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience" being "an
expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is
more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned)b,
being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the
reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent
replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the
part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. 

Issue: Is the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the
private respondent?

Ruling: Yes. As held in Bentain "Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally

guaranteed feature of our civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to
employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are
tantamount to illegal removals (Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of
Appeals, 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27
SCRA 138).

While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the

employees prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his
removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly
terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the
provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria
vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116).

Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his security
of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced.

Lagman v. Pimentel
G.R. No. 235935. February 6, 2018.
TIJAM, J.
Facts: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring
a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion mounted by
members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). On May 25, 2017, within the 48-
hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to the
Senate and the House of Representatives his written Report, citing the events and reasons that
impelled him to issue Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S. Resolution No.
388 while the House of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050, both expressing full
support to the Proclamation and finding no cause to revoke the same.

The President, in a letter dated December 8, 2017, asked both the Senate and the House of
Representatives to further extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018
to December 31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress may determine.

Issue: Do the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend Proclamation No.
216?

Ruling: Yes. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases for the
extension of the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and (b) public safety requires the extension.

Rebellion thus exists when "(1) there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the
Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the
allegiance to the Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or
Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives."116

The President issued Proclamation No. 216 in response to the series of attacks launched by the
Maute Group and other rebel groups in Marawi City. The President reported to the Congress that
these groups had publicly taken up arms for the purpose of removing Mindanao from its
allegiance to the Government and its laws and establishing a DAESH/ISIS wilayat or province in
Mindanao.

Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law, "involves
the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the general
public from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters."

The rising number of these rebel groups, their training in and predilection to terrorism, and their
resoluteness in wresting control of Mindanao from the government, pose a serious danger to
Mindanao. The country had been witness to these groups' capacity and resolve to engage in
combat with the government forces, resulting in severe casualties among both soldiers and
civilians, the displacement of thousands of Marawi residents, and considerable damage to their
City. In a short period after the Marawi crisis was put under control, said rebel groups have
managed to increase their number by 400, almost the same strength as the group that initially
stormed Marawi. Their current number is now more than half the 1,010 rebels in Marawi which
had taken the AFP five months to neutralize. To wait until a new battleground is chosen by these
rebel groups before.We consider them a significant threat to public safety is neither sound nor
prudent.

Zabal vs Duterte
G.R. No. 238467. February 12, 2019
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts: Claiming that Boracay has become a cesspool, President Duterte first made public his
plan to shut it down during a business forum held in Davao sometime February2018. This was
followed by several speeches and news releases stating that he would place Boracay under a state
of calamity. True to his words, President Duterte ordered the shutting down of the island in a
cabinet meeting held on April 4, 2018. This was confirmed by then Presidential Spokesperson
Harry L. Roque, Jr. in a press briefing the following day wherein he formally announced that the
total closure of Boracay would be for a maximum period of six months starting April 26, 2018.

 Following this pronouncement, petitioners contend that around 630 police and military
personnel were readily deployed to Boracay including personnel for crowd dispersal
management. They also allege that the DILG had already released guidelines for the closure.
Petitioners claim that ever since the news of Boracay's closure came about, fewer tourists had
been engaging the services of Zabal and Jacosalem such that their earnings were barely enough
to feed their families. They fear that if the closure pushes through, they would suffer grave and
irreparable damage. Hence, despite the fact that the government was then yet to release a formal
issuance on the matter, petitioners filed the petition on April 25, 2018praying that:(a) Upon
the filing of [the] petition, a TEMPORARYRESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) and/or a WRIT
OFPRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION be immediately issued RESTRAINING
and/or ENJOINING the respondents, and all persons acting under their command, order, and
responsibility from enforcing a closure of Boracay Island or from banning the petitioners,
tourists, and non-residents therefrom, and a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY
INJUNCTION directing the respondents, and all persons acting undertheir command, order, and
responsibility to ALLOW all of the said persons to enter and/or leave Boracay Island unimpeded;
(b) In the alternative, if the respondents enforce the closure after the instant petition is filed, that
a STATUSQUO ANTE Order be issued restoring and maintaining the condition prior to such
closure;(c) After proper proceedings, a judgment be rendered PERMANENTLY
RESTRAINING and/or ENJOINING the respondents, and all persons acting under their
command, order, and responsibility from enforcing a closure of Boracay Island or from banning
the petitioners, tourists, and non-residents therefrom, and further DECLARING the closure of
Boracay Island or the ban against petitioners, tourists, and non-residents therefrom to
be UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are similarly prayed for. On May 18, 2018,
petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition stating that the day following the filing of their original
petition or on April 26, 2018, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 475 formally declaring
a state of calamity in Boracay and ordering its closure for six months from April 26, 2018 to
October 25, 2018. The closure was implemented on even date. Thus, in addition to what they
prayed for in their original petition, petitioners implore the Court to declare as unconstitutional
Proclamation No. 475insofar as it orders the closure of Boracay and ban of tourists and
nonresidents therefrom.

 In the Resolutions dated April 26, 2018 and June 5,2018, the Court required respondents to file
their Comment on the Petition and the Supplemental Petition, respectively. Respondents filed
their Consolidated Comment on July30, 2018 while petitioners filed their Reply thereto on
October 12, 2018.On October 26, 2018, Boracay was reopened to tourism.

Issue: Is President Duterte immune from suit?

Ruling: Yes, the incumbent President Duterte is immune from suit due to the ruling of the case
in Professor David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo. Settled is the doctrine that the President,
during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case,
and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the
high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and
functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch
and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important
duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the
Government. Thus, the Court dropped President Duterte as a respondent in this case.

National Artist for Literature Virgilio Almario v. The Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 189028. July 16, 2013

Banda v. Ermita
618 SCRA 488

In re: Appointment of Hon. M. Valenzuela

AM No. 98-5-01-SC. November 9, 1998

Pimentel v. Ermita
G.R. No. 164978. October 13, 2005

De Castro v. JBC
G.R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010

Domingo v. Rayala
G.R. No. 155831. February 18, 2008
NACHURA, J.:

Facts: On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic
Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before
Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
Domingo assails the CA’s resolution modifying the penalty imposed by the Office of the
President.

She raises this issue: The Court of Appeals erred in modifying the penalty for the respondent
from dismissal to suspension from service for the maximum period of one year. The President
has the prerogative to determine the proper penalty to be imposed on an erring Presidential
appointee. The President was well within his power when he fittingly used that prerogative in
deciding to dismiss the respondent from the service.

She argues that the power to remove Rayala, a presidential appointee, is lodged with the
President who has control of the entire Executive Department, its bureaus and offices. The OP’s
decision was arrived at after affording Rayala due process. Hence, his dismissal from the service
is a prerogative that is entirely with the President.

Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense of a disgraceful and immoral conduct is
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, while the penalty for the second
offense is dismissal. On the other hand, Section 22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 198753 and Section 52 A(15) of the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service54 both provide that the first
offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and
one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable by dismissal.

Issue: Is the president the proper disciplining authority in the present case?

Ruling: Yes. In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining
authority, who would determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as
NLRC Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided by
law." Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral
conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than
the penalty provided by law for such offense. As cited above, the imposable penalty for the first
offense of either the administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral
conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error
for the Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a
penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.

Drilon v. Lim
235 SCRA 135. August 4, 1994
CRUZ, J.:

Facts: Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or
legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds.
When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his
own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure.
In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local Government
Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances
and, inferentially, to annul them. He cited the familiar distinction between control and
supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that
lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law." His conclusion was that the
challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of control and not of supervision only as
vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation
not only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of
local governments, and the policy of local autonomy in general.

Issue: Is Section 187 unconstitutional for it gave the Secretary the power of control and not of
supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines?

Ruling: No. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it
with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or
unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law.
What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was
determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with
the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of
mere supervision.

Banda v. Executive Secretary Ermita

GR No. 166620. April 20, 2010
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Facts: The NPO was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term of former President Corazon C.
Aquino (President Aquino), by virtue of Executive Order No. 285. On October 25, 2004,
President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the
printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. Pursuant to
Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their
printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition
that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared
to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO's appropriation in
the General Appropriations Act to its income.

Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the
NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that it is beyond the executive
powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former
President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers.

Issue: Can a president amend or repeal an executive order which was issued by a former
president when the latter still exercised legislative powers?

Ruling: Yes. According to our courts, it is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the
President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line
with the President's constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by
virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under
existing statutes.
 Pichay vs. Office of the deputy executive secretary
G.R. No. 196425. July 24, 2012
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts: On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No.
12 (E.O. 12) creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the
power to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption,
among others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to
the President.
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13
(E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary
Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit[2] for grave misconduct
against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water
Utilities
Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees,
namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel
Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand
Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order[3] signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations
under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad
Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct
entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-
0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. Now alleging that no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the ordinary course of law, petitioner
has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition

Issue: Is E.O. 13 unconstitutional for usurping the power of the legislature to create a public
office?

Ruling: No, in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, the Court ruled that we must not lose sight
of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section
31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987),
"the President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. The distinction between the allowable
organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the
other is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches
upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall
within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it
was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential
Assistant II and I, respectively,  and was placed directly "under the Office of the President."  On
the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is
an office within the Office of the President Proper. 11 Since both of these offices belong to the
Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
In accordance to Article VII Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “The
President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.” Thus, the President exercise his power of control in
the Executive Department, in creating the ODESLA by virtue given by the constitutional
mandate and the E.O No. 292 is constitutional because the changes made by the President is
within the Executive Proper.
DENR v. DENR region XII Employees
G.R. No. 149724. August 19, 2003

Hontiveros- Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board

G.R. No. 181293. February 23, 2015

DatuZaldyAmpatuan v. Hon. Puno

G.R. no. 190259. June 7, 2011

Biraogo v. The Phil. Truth Commission of 2010

637 SCRA 78

Kulayan v. Governor Abdusakar Tan

675 scra 482. 2012

Gonzales v. Abaya
498 SCRA 445. August 10, 2006
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts: On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that
some members of the AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated places
of assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the government. The President then directed the AFP
and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted
men of the AFP – mostly from the elite units of the Army’s Scout Rangers and the Navy’s
Special Warfare Group – entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on
Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices
around the building.
Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with
the emblem of the "Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan. 1 The troops then, through broadcast
media, announced their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo, such as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition
to the "enemies" of the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military
assistance from the US government. They declared their withdrawal of support from their
Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. They also
called for the resignation of her cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP.
About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state
of rebellion, followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary
measures to suppress the rebellion then taking place in Makati City.

Issue: Can the president effectively command, control, and discipline the armed forces of the
Philippines?

Ruling: Yes. Our court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive
to enable the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and discipline
the armed forces (see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrop’s Military
Law and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form part of the disciplinary
system that ensures the President’s control, and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the
apex of this disciplinary system is the President who exercises review powers over decisions of
courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted)

Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary

421 SCRA 656. February 3, 2004
TINGA, J.:

Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted
men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders
have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the
AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of
the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the
officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the
Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation
of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO
NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18
Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out
the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation.

Issue: Can the president require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP?

Ruling: Yes. It has been ruled that the President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs
in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her
Commander-in-Chief powers as vested by the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

David v. Arroyo
GR No. 171396. May 3, 2006
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Facts: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President.
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. .
.rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed
narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part
of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of
the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the
reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence
Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the
NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any
contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
calling for military aid. Petitioners argue that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out
power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis.

Issue: Does the calling-out power of the president have actual basis?

Ruling: Yes. The case of Barcelon and Montenegro were in unison in declaring that the
authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the President and his decision is
final and conclusive on the courts. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora -- a recent
case most pertinent to these cases at bar -- echoed a principle similar to Lansang. While the
Court considered the President’s "calling-out" power as a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom, it stressed that "this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion."

This Court further ruled that "it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s
decision is totally bereft of factual basis" and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his
assertion, then "this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing
PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated
Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of
PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records.
 Lagman v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
July 4, 2017. G.R. No. 231658
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts: Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the
factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has
been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the
passing of time.

The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to capture the
high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf IP (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted. These
groups, which have been unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however, confronted the government
operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not only against the government
authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians and their properties. In particular, the
President chronicled in his Report the events which took place on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City
which impelled him to declare a state of martial law and suspend the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus

The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role
it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the
possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups.
President Duterte concluded, "While the government is presently conducting legitimate
operations to address the on-going rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety
necessitates the continued implementation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is
completely quelled."

After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 390
expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be
satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate
declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the same". The Lagman Group, the
Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group petitioned (Petitions) the Supreme Court, questioning
the factual basis of President Duterte's Proclamation of martial law. The OSG sided with
President Duterte.

Issue: Is the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; nullification of Proclamation No.
216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55?
Ruling: Yes, it is different because in Article VII Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that:
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress,
if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The President is granted by virtue of the said provision of calling out military forces as the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary
such as in situations of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In Kulayan v. Tan, the Court ruled
that the President's calling out power is in a different category from the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus  and the power to declare martial law:
Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency
of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President's action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places
the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution
would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and
review without any qualification. Thus, the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect
Proclamation No. 55 as ruled by the Supreme Court.

IBP v. Zamora
August 15, 2000

Lacson v. Perez
G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001.

Lagman v. Pimentel
February 6, 2018

Lagman v. Madialde
February 19, 2019

Gonzales v. Narvosa
177 SCRA 668

Marcos v. Manglapus
177 SCRA 668. October 27, 1989
 EN BANC:

Facts: Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her)
oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people.

In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed
the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present
time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died
in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said:

In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and
passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the
remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time
as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide.
[Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]

On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners stating that the
President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it
arbitrarily.

Issue: Does the president have the power to bar a Filipino from his own country?

Ruling: Yes. According to the Supreme Court, among the duties of the President under the
Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest
and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the
remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with
this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with
grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the
implementation of this decision.
 Borja v. COMELEC
295 SCRA 157. September 3, 1998
MENDOZA, J.

Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18,
1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of
law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected
mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was
reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998.1
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a
candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would have
already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be
ineligible to serve for another term after that.

Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

This provision is restated in 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160):

Sec. 43. Term of Office - . . .

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned
was elected.

Issue: Does a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves
the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the
three-term limit?

Ruling: No. According to the court, to recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials
must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in
an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number
of times before the disqualification can apply. In the present case, the respondent has not been
reelected three consecutive times and has not served in the same elective position and thus he
must not be disqualified for running a third time as a vice mayor.
 Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary
669 SCRA 49. October 6, 2017
ABAD, J.:

Facts:  In 1976 President Marcos enacted P.D. 961, the Coconut Industry Code, which
consolidated and codified existing laws relating to the coconut industry. The Code provided that
surpluses from the CCS Fund and the CID Fund collections, not used for replanting and other
authorized purposes, were to be invested by acquiring shares of stock of corporations, including
the San Miguel Corporation (SMC), engaged in undertakings related to the coconut and palm oil
industries. UCPB was to make such investments and equitably distribute these for free to
coconut farmers. These investments constituted the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF).
P.D. 961 also provided that the coconut levy funds (coco-levy funds) shall be owned by the
coconut farmers in their private capacities. The COA reviewed the use of the funds. The Bureau
of Internal Revenue treated them as public funds and the very laws governing coconut levies
recognize their public character.

Issues:
1. Are the Coconut levy funds considered as public funds?
2. Did appropriating public funds violate substantive due process?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The court explained that the coconut levy fund was imposed in the exercise of the State’s
inherent power of taxation. It was raised pursuant to law to support a proper governmental
purpose. “They were raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State for the
benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers in general. As stressed by the Court in Republic v.
COCOFED, the coconut levy funds were sourced from forced exactions decreed under P.D. Nos.
232, 276 and 582, among others, with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry.
2. Yes. Clearly, to hold therefore, even by law, that the revenues received from the imposition of
the coconut levies be used purely for private purposes to be owned by private individuals in their
private capacity and for their benefit, would contravene the rationale behind the imposition of
taxes or levies.
 Villavert v. Desierto
G.R. No. 133715. February 23, 2000
BELLOSILLO, J.:

Facts: An administrative charge for grave misconduct was filed against Villavert, Sales &
Promotion Supervisor of PCSO Cebu Branch. The Graft Investigation Officer recommended the
dismissal of the case. However, Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas issued a Memorandum finding
Villavert guilty of the charge. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 27 of RA 6770.

Issue: Is the Supreme Court allowed to review the decision of the Ombudsman in pursuant to
Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770 in regards to this case?

Ruling: No, in Namuhe v. Ombudsman, under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure,
appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the
Court of Appeals not to be reviewed by the Supreme Court because it violates Article VI Section
30 of the Constitution which provides that “No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence.”
Furthermore, in Fabian v. Desierto, any appeal by way of petition for review from a decision or
final resolution or order of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, or special civil action
relative to such decision, resolution or order filed with the Court after 15 March 1999 shall no
longer be referred to the Court of Appeals, but must be forthwith denied or dismissed,
respectively. Since the petition was filed prior to 15 March 1999, decisions of the Ombudsman
regarding administrative cases shall be referred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition and
not to this Court.

Ifurung v. Ombudsman
April 24, 2018

Genuino v. De Lima
April 17, 2018

PHAPI v. Medialde
Novermber 6, 2018

Chavez v. JBC
679 SCRA 579

De Castro v. JBC
G.R. no. 191002. March 17, 2010

Bengson v. Drilon
208 SCRA 133. April 15, 1992
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Facts: On June 20, 1953, Republic Act No, 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions
of Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who have rendered at least twenty
(20) years of service either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both,
having attained the age of seventy (70) years or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge
the duties of the office. The retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the
salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation.

On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower
Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court
providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for
the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of
Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission.

Issue: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill
is constitutional.

Ruling: As a general rule, the veto power of the president on a particular item or items in a bill is
unconstitutional. However, there is an exception. The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of
Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the President power to veto any particular item or items in
an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object. In the present case, the veto power of the president was constitutional
because it was valid in consonance with Section 27, Art. 6 of the Constitution

In re Appointment of Mateo Valenzuela

298 SCRA 408. November 9, 1998
NARVASA, C.J.:

Facts: Referred to the Court En Banc by the Chief Justice are the appointments signed by His
Excellency the President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Baguio City and of
Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively. The appointments were received at the Chief Justice's
chambers on May 12, 1998. The referral was made in view of the serious constitutional issue
concerning said appointments arising from the pertinent antecedents.
The issue was first ventilated at the meeting of the Judicial and Bar Council on March 9, 1998.
The meeting had been called, according to the Chief Justice as Ex Officio Chairman, to discuss
the question raised by some sectors about the "constitutionality of ** appointments" to the Court
of Appeals, specifically, in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. Attention was drawn
to Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution reading as follows:
Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his,
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.

According to the Supreme Court Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of
appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations.
The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential
election and are similar to those which are declared elections offenses in the Omnibus Election
Code. The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consist of the so-
called "midnight" appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of
Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in
his bid for reelection, became no more than a "caretaker" administrator whose duty was to
"prepare for the transfer of authority to the incoming President."

Issue: Is the appointment made by the President in the present case considered to as
constitutional?

Ruling: Yes, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII — allowing appointments to be
made during the period of the ban therein provided — is much narrower than that recognized in
Aytona. The exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the
article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban. In the
present case, the appointment which was made by the President was constitutional because it was
a temporary appointment made to the judiciary position.
 In re: Request for Creation of a Special Division
A.M. No. 02-1-09-SC. January 21, 2002
BELLOSILLO, J.

Facts: Resolution No. 01-2002 recommends that "the cases against former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada and those accused with him be referred to a special division created by
constitutional authority of the Supreme Court composed of three justices with two alternates in
case of temporary absence of any of the three to be chosen from among the present composition
of this Court who will be able to participate therein until the termination of said cases."

On 10 January 2002 the Special Prosecution Panel filed its comment/suggestion maintaining that
the Third Division should continue hearing the Plunder Case, and to achieve constancy in the
membership of that division it recommended the creation of Special Third Division to be
composed of the remaining permanent member of the Third Division, Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-De Castro, and two (2) other justices who have heretofore at one time or another taken
part in hearing the Plunder Case, who are not retirable within the next three (3) years, and who
are not appointees of the principal accused.

The Defense Panel on the other hand, in its letter of 11 January 2002, argues that the creation of
an Ad Hoc Special Division "may create serious equal protection concerns and set a dangerous
precedent that may come back to haunt us." The Defense also manifests its "deep reservations"
against the participation of Justice Leonardo-De Castro "Being an object of an unresolved
petition to recuse as well as an administrative complaint." Consequently, it recommended the
transfer of the "Estrada Cases" to the Fifth Division composed of Acting Presiding Justice Minita
V. Chico-Nazario and Associate Justices Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada and Francisco H.
Villaruz, Jr., "a tribunal with a predictable, stable, regular, permanent membership."

Issue: Does the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights and procedure in all courts, including the Sandiganbayan?

Ruling: Yes. Under Sec. 5, par. [5], Art. VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has
the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
and procedure in all courts, including the Sandiganbayan. Accordingly, given the nature of the
Plunder Case and cases related thereto, the prominence of the principal accused and the
importance of the immediate resolution of the cases to the Filipino people and the Philippine
Government, this Court, in the interest of justice and the speedy disposition of cases, with due
regard to the procedural and substantive rights of the accused, deems it best to create a Special
Division of the Sandiganbayan to be composed of members mentioned in the immediately
preceding paragraph. This Special Division shall hear, try and decide with dispatch the Plunder
Case and all related cases filed or which may hereafter be filed against former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada and those accused with him, until they are resolved, decided and terminated.
The designation of temporary alternate members may be properly addressed later. Meanwhile,
until otherwise revoked, the Acting Presiding Justice is authorized to designate from time to
time, an alternate member to be drawn from the remaining members of the Sandiganbayan as the
exigencies of the service may require.
 Vivares v. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE
G.R. No. 202666 . September 29, 2014
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts: Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s
College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a
beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital
pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by
Angela on her Facebook profile.
At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from
her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the
waist up, dressed only in brassieres.  Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls
in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne, among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook
accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne
drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the
streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black
brassieres.
Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the
identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact,
viewable by any Facebook user.
Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved were barred from joining
the commencement exercises.
Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data on the following grounds:
1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’
right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view
them, lost their privacy in some way.
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
Issue: Is the writ of Habeas Data developed by the Supreme Court?
Ruling: Yes, in accordance to Article VII Section 5 (5) of the 1987 Constitution which provides
the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, to wit:
Section 5 (5): Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.

The Court aimed to protect individual’s right to informational privacy which is defined by
Andres Gamuz, a comparative law scholar that habeas data is a “procedure designed to safeguard
individual freedom from abuse in the information age.” The writ of habeas datais a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information
of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly
in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends. This rule is within the rule-making power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights such as the
right to privacy.
In this case, the petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the
minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without
restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted,
STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline. The Supreme Court denied the
petition due to finding that the respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors’
privacy rights.

Infant Julian Yusay Caram v. Segui

G.R. No, 193652. August 5, 2014

Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo Jr., requesting exemption from payment of IBP Dues
B.M. No. 1370. Mary 9, 2005

Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp

605 SCRA 100

CJ Renato Corona v. Senate of the Philippines

G.R. no. 200242. July 17, 2012

Araullo v. Benigno Aquino III

G.R. No. 209287. July 1, 2014
 CSC v. Moralde
G.R. No. 211077. August 15, 2018
LEONEN, J.

Facts: Moralde's services were engaged as a Dental Aide in the Province's Provincial Health
Office.14 He was assigned to the municipalities of Villanueva and Claveria. According to the
Province, he had a history of falsifying public documents by forging his immediate supervisor's
signature onto his Daily Time Record. The Province also noted that he had a track record of
"frequent absences without leave, and . . . habitual tardiness."

Eventually, Moralde was formally charged with falsifying his Daily Time Records for March and
April 1998. Dr. Diana Marie L. Casiño, Municipal Health Officer of Villanueva, noted that his
Daily Time Records were altered to conceal how he did not report for work in those months. In
his written explanation, Moralde admitted that he did not render service from March 16 to 30,
1998. After conducting an investigation, Atty. Danilo P. Rubio (Atty. Rubio), the Provincial
Attorney, noted that Moralde had previously committed the very same infraction. Thus, he
recommended that Moralde be dismissed from service.

Unknown to the Province's officials, Moralde went to the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) while the administrative case against him was pending. There, on November 8, 1998, he
filed an "application for retirement" under Republic Act No. 8291, otherwise known as the
"Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977."

Issue: Did the Civil Service Commission erred in setting aside its ruling to reinstate respondent
Gabriel Moralde on the ground that the same ruling has become impracticable or unviable,
hence, moot and academic?

Ruling: Yes. This voluntary termination of employment was made before the administrative
complaint against Moralde could be resolved by the Province, at the first instance, and then
referred to the Commission, on appeal. It was also successfully concealed for almost nine (9)
years. Its discovery was made only long after the Commission ruled on his appeal. The Civil
Service Commission's willingness to rule on his appeal reveals that it was under the mistaken
impression that Moralde's continuance in office was still an unresolved, justiciable matter.
Evidently, however, the Civil Service Commission's ruling on Moralde's appeal was a pointless
superfluity. Any pronouncement on his continuance in office was reduced to a purely academic
exercise as Moralde had already put himself out of office.

The subsequent unraveling of the pointlessness and utter absurdity of reinstating an employee
who voluntarily left employment changed the entire complexion of Moralde's case. Confronted
with the basic and pressing demands of "practicality, logic, fairness and substantial justice," the
Civil Service Commission was correct in realizing that forcing the reinstatement of a voluntarily
deserting employee was impractical, illogical, unfair, and unjust.

Pagdanganan v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 202678, September 05, 2018
 LEONEN, J.

Facts: This is a Petition for Mandamus seeking to compel the Court of Appeals to resolve the
Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 104291, alleging that the Court of Appeals committed inordinate
delay in violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases of Ernestina A. Pagdanganan,
Roderick Apacible Pagdanganan, Maria Rosario Lota, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,
Ernestina A. Pagdanganan, Ernest Jerome Pagdanganan and Sandra Apacible Pagdanganan, as
the heirs and substitutes of deceased Isauro J. Pagdanganan (Pagdanganan), Alfonso Ortigas
Olondriz (Alfonso), and Citibank N.A. Hongkong (collectively, petitioners).
Solid Guaranty, Inc. (Solid Guaranty) is a domestic corporation engaged in the insurance
business. On November 23, 2007, Solid Guaranty, through Pagdanganan, a minority stockholder,
filed a complaint for interpleader before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The complaint was
filed because of the alleged conflicting claims between Ma. Susana A.S. Madrigal, Ma. Ana A.S.
Madrigal, and Ma. Rosa A.S. Madrigal (collectively, the Madrigals), and Citibank N.A.
Hongkong (Citibank) over the shares of stock previously held by the late Antonio P.
Madrigal. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 07-118329.
Petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus before the Court of
Appeals on July 11, 2008. On July 15, 2008, the Court of Appeals required respondents to
submit their comment on this Petition. On July 28, 2008, however, petitioners filed a Motion for
Leave to File Supplemental Petition.
Meanwhile, respondents filed their Comment on August 5, 2008, while petitioners filed their
Reply on August 15, 2008. On September 17, 2008, the Court of Appeals directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. On September 30, 2008, however, petitioners filed a Motion
to Admit Second Supplemental Petition. Thus, on October 13, 2008, the Court of Appeals
directed the submission of comments on the Second Supplemental Petition. Nonetheless, all the
parties had already submitted their respective memoranda by October 17, 2008.
On December 12, 2008, petitioners again filed a Motion for Leave to File a Third Supplemental
Petition. In its frustration, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dated October 22, 2009,
stating:
From the records, it appears that the herein parties have already submitted their respective
memoranda, thus this Court could have very well considered this case submitted for decision.
Owing to the requirements of due process, the Court of Appeals, however, directed respondents
to file their comments on the Third Supplemental Petition, after which, the case would be
deemed submitted for decision. Thus, respondents submitted a Comment dated November 12,
2009. After assessing the merits of the Second and Third Supplemental Petitions, the Court of
Appeals expunged them both and deemed the case submitted for decision in its October 6, 2010
Resolution. The Court of Appeals reiterated:
This case is already ripe for determination had it not been for the filing of the instant Motions
and the consequent filing of pleadings. For in fact, the parties had already submitted their
respective Memoranda.

Issue: Were the petitioners given the right to a speedy disposition of cases?

Ruling: Yes. The Constitution specifies specific time periods when courts may resolve cases:
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided
or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three
months for all other lower courts.
Under this provision, the Court of Appeals is given a 12-month period to resolve any case that
has already been submitted for decision. Any case still pending 12 months after submission for
decision may be considered as delay. The parties may file the necessary action, such as a petition
for mandamus, to protect their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
In this case, however, petitioners' invocation of the right to speedy disposition of cases is
misplaced since the Court of Appeals has resolved the petition in a timely manner within the
period provided by law.
Labay v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 235937-40. July 23, 2018
VELASCO JR., J.

Facts: The case arose from the complaint dated May 11, 2015 filed by the Field Investigation
Office I (FIO I) of the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner Johanne Edward B. Labay
(Petitioner Labay) for his participation in the alleged anomalous utilization of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of former Representative of the 1st District of Davao del
Sur, Marc Douglas C. Cagas IV (Rep. Cagas IV). The complaint was for violation of Article 217
(Malversation of Public Funds or Property), Article 171 (Falsification of Public Documents),
paragraphs (1), (2), (4), and (7), Article 217 in relation to Article 171 (Malversation thru
Falsification of Public Documents), all of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as well as Section 3,
paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended. The case was docketed as
OMB-C-C-15-0152.3

The complaint alleged that Rep. Cagas IV, in conspiracy with other public officials and private
individuals such as petitioner Labay, through the Technology Resource Center (TRC), sought the
release and transfer of his PDAF in the total amount of Php6,000,000.00 to Farmer-business
Development Corporation (FDC), which was led by its then president, herein petitioner Labay.
However, upon field verification conducted by the FIO I, it appears that the livelihood projects
funded by Rep. Cagas IV's PDAF were never implemented and were considered to be "ghost
projects."

In a Joint Order dated September 1, 2015, the Ombudsman directed respondents to file their
respective counter-affidavits. Several respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits.
However, copies of this Order could not be served on petitioner Labay.

According to the Ombudsman, it exerted diligent efforts to serve copies of the September 1,
2015 Joint Order on petitioner Labay through his office and at his last known address. However,
the copies were returned unserved because he was no longer employed in that office and he was
unknown at the given residential address. As such, the Ombudsman proceeded with the
preliminary investigation without any counter-affidavit or participation from petitioner Labay.

In a Resolution dated May 10, 2016, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Rep. Cagas
IV and his co-respondents, including petitioner Labay, for conspiracy in the commission of two
counts of Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, one count of Malversation of Public Funds, and
one count of Malversation thru Falsification
Issue: Should there be a remand of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for a
reinvestigation of petitioner?

Ruling: Yes. As pointed out by petitioner, the Ombudsman only tried to effect service of the
order to file his counter affidavit on petitioner on one instance, albeit to two different addresses.
However, this service failed since petitioner was no longer employed at his former office at
NAPC, as confirmed by the letter sent by the NAPC Secretary and Lead Convenor, and since he
was no longer residing at the residential address where the order was sent.

In its Comment, the OSP seeks refuge in paragraph (e), Section 4 of the Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure which provides that in cases where the respondents cannot be served with the order to
file their counter-affidavit, or having been served but does not comply therewith, the complaint
shall be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on the record.

While the Ombudsman was correct in resolving the complaint based on the evidence presented in
accordance with Paragraph (e), Section 4 of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, the situation,
however, effectively changed when petitioner made himself available to the Ombudsman when
he requested access to the case records. The Ombudsman had a clear opportunity to furnish
petitioner with copies of the complaint affidavit and its supporting documents. Instead, it merely
decided to furnish petitioner with a copy of its May 10, 2016 Resolution.

Even assuming that the Ombudsman was merely complying with Atty. Labay's request for
information when it responded with the case titles and docket numbers of the cases pending
against petitioner Labay, it should have exercised its duty to inform petitioner of the charges
filed against him by furnishing him copies of the complaint affidavit and its supporting
documents. Or at the very least, it should have directed and allowed petitioner to access these
records at its office. This, however, was not done by the Ombudsman.
 Tan v. BARRIOS
G.R. No. 85481-82 October 18, 1990
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

Facts: On the basis of Proclamation 1081 dated 21 September 1972, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, thru General Order 8 dated 27 September 1972, authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to
create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as
may be referred to them." In General Order 21 dated 30 September 1972, the military tribunals,
"exclusive of the civil courts," were vested with jurisdiction among others, over violations of the
law on firearms, and other crimes which were directly related to the quelling of rebellion and the
preservation of the safety and security of the Republic. In General Order 12-b dated 7 November
1972, "crimes against persons as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code" were added
to the jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions. Subsequently, General Order 49, dated 11
October 1974, redefined the jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals.
The enumeration of offenses cognizable by such tribunals excluded crimes against persons as
defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. However, although civil courts should have
exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses not mentioned in Section 1 of GO 49, Section 2 of the
same general order provided that "the President may, in the public interest, refer to a Military
Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts" and vice versa. On 17
April 1975, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan, with 12 others Ang Tiat Chuan,
Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Occaciones, Leopoldo Nicolas, Enrique Labita, Oscar Yaun,
Eusebio Tan, Alfonso Tan, Go E Kuan, Marciano Benemerito, Manuel Beleta, and John Doe,
were arrested and charged in Criminal Case MC-1-67 before the Military Commission 1, for the
crimes of: (1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally-possessed firearm, penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 1, par. 6 of General Order 49,
for the killing on 25 August 1973 of Florentino Lim of the wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of
Cagayan de Oro City; and (2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol, caliber .45
SN-1283521 with ammunition, in violation of General Orders 6 and 7 in relation to Presidential
Decree 9. Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City, President Marcos,
pursuant to the recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, withdrew his earlier
order to transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case was retained in the military court.
All the accused were detained without bail in the PC Stockade in Camp Crame.
Upon arraignment on 6 May 1975, all the accused pleaded "not guilty." Manuel Beleta was
discharged to be used as a state witness. He was released from detention on 5 May 1975. Almost
daily trials were held for more than 13 months. The testimonies of 45 prosecution witnesses and
35 defense witnesses filled up 21 volumes of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages. On 10
June 1976, a decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was promulgated by the Military
Commission finding 5 of the accused namely: Luis Tan, Ang Tiat Chuan, Mariano Velez, Jr.,
Antonio Occaciones, and Leopoldo Nicolas guilty of murder, where each of them was sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from 17 years, 4 months, and 21 days, to 20 years. A
sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both murder and illegal possession of
firearm, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by electrocution. 8 of the accused,
namely: Oscar Yaun, Enrique Labita, Eusebio Tan, Alfonso Tan, Go E Kuan, William Tan,
Joaquin Tan Leh, and Vicente Tan were acquitted of the charges, and released on 11 June 1976.
On 17 January 1981, Proclamation 2045 ended martial rule and abolished the military tribunals
and commissions. On 22 May 1987, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs.
Military Commission 34, et al. (150 SCRA 144), vacating the sentence rendered on 4 December
1984 by Military Commission 34 against Olaguer, et al. and declaring that military commissions
and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians charged
with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts are open and
functioning as they did during the period of martial law.
In October 1986, 6 habeas corpus petitions were filed in the Supreme Court by some 217
prisoners in the national penitentiary, who had been tried for common crimes and convicted by
the military commissions during the 9-year span of official martial rule (G.R. Nos. 75983,
79077,79599-79600, 79862 and 80565 consolidated and entitled Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs.
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700). Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, the
Supreme Court in Cruz vs. Enrile (160 SCRA 700), nullified the proceedings leading to the
conviction of non-political detainees who should have been brought before the courts of justice
as their offenses were totally unrelated to the insurgency sought to be controlled by martial rule.
On 15 September 1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez issued Department Order 226
designating State Prosecutor Hernani Barrios "to collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de
Oro City in the investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case MC-1-67 and, if the evidence
warrants, to prosecute the case in the court of competent jurisdiction." On 15 November 1988,
State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios was designated Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City
in lieu of the regular fiscal who inhibited himself.
Without conducting an investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on 9 December 1988, in
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City two (2) informations for (1) Illegal Possession
of Firearm [Criminal Case 88-824]; and (2) Murder [Criminal Case 88-825] against all the 15
original defendants in Criminal Case MC1-67 including those who had already died. Criminal
Cases 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, were assigned by raffle to the sala
of RTC Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo. Before issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused,
Judge Demecillo issued an order on 26 October 1988, requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to
submit certified copies of "the supporting affidavits of the previous cases wherever they are
now," and of the Supreme Court order "which is the basis of filing the cases, within 5 days from
receipt" of his said order. The State Prosecutor has not complied with that order. On 7 November
1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition praying that the informations in Criminal Cases 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of
Judge dated 26 October 1988 be annulled, among others.

Issue: Did the respondent judge of Cagayan De Oro, Barrios the State Prosecutor of Department
of Justice and City Fiscal of Cagayan De Oro gravely abused their discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction which violates res judicata in prison grey of the petitioners?

Ruling: Yes, in Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546, the doctrine of
"operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the petitioners and their co-accused before
Military Commission No. 1. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military
courts over civilians should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular
case of the petitioners, the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious violations of their
constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military commission that heard
and decided the charges against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by this
Court years before the Olaguer case arose and came before us.
The trials that achieved finality during the Marcos Regime which were ruled by the Military
Tribunal will violate the doctrine of double jeopardy which protects the accused from harassment
by the strong arm of the State : "The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality. A single
prosecution for any offense is all the law allows. It protects an accused from harassment, enables
him to treat what had transpired as a closed chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom or to
be resigned to whatever penalty is imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself time-
consuming and expense-producing for the state as well. It has been referred to as 'res judicata in
prison grey.' The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is inflicted only once, not whenever it pleases
the state to do so." Thus, the Court granted the pleadings of the petitioners.

Gayo v. Verceles
452 SCRA 504

Re: 1989 Election of the IBP

178 SCRA 398

Republic of the Phils v. Maria Lourdes Sereno

G.R. No. 237428. May 11, 2018

Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao

368 SCRA 36

People v. Gacott
246 SCRA 52

City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero

600 SCRA 33. September 17, 2009
NACHURA, J.:

Facts: Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner of two
parcels of land. It incurred real estate tax liabilities on the said properties for the tax years 1976
to 1983. For failure of TTTDC to settle its delinquent real estate tax obligations, the City
Government of Tagaytay offered the properties for sale at a public auction. Being the
only bidder, a certificate of sale was executed in favor of the City of Tagaytay and was
correspondingly inscribed on the titles of the properties . The City of Tagaytay filed an
unnumbered petition for entry of new certificates of title in its favor before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cavite. RTC granted the petition. The TTTDC appealed to the CA. The subject
properties were later purchased by Amuerfina Melencio-Herrera and Emiliana Melencio-
Fernando (Melencios) for the amount equivalent to the taxes and penalties due to the same.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case before the CA, TTTDC filed a petition for
nullification of the public auction involving the disputed properties on the ground that the
properties were not within the jurisdiction of the City of Tagaytay and thus, beyond its taxing
authority. On the other hand, the City of Tagaytay averred that based on its Charter, said
properties are within its territorial jurisdiction. The RTC denied this motion.

Issue: Is the City of Tagaytay is liable for damages when it levied real estate taxes on the subject
properties?

Ruling: Yes. It is basic that before the City of Tagaytay may levy a certain property for sale due
to tax delinquency, the subject property should be under its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the failure
of the city officials in this case to verify if the property is within its jurisdiction before levying
taxes on the same constitutes gross negligence. The negligence of its officers in the performance
of their official functions gives rise to an action ex contractu and quasi ex-delictu. Under
the doctrine of respondeat superior, the City of Tagaytay is liable for all the necessary and
natural consequences of the negligent acts of its city officials. It is liable for the tortious
acts committed by its agents who sold the properties to the Melencios despite the clear mandate
of RA No 1418, separating Barrio Birinayan from its jurisdiction and transferring the same to the
Province of Batangas. Decision affirmed with modification.
 Limkaichong v. COMELEC
594 SCRA 434. April 1, 2009.
PERALTA, J.

Facts: On April 4, 2007, Napoleon Camero, a registered voter of La Libertad, Negros Oriental,
filed the petition for her disqualification on the ground that she lacked the citizenship
requirement of a Member of the House of Representatives. The petition, which was docketed as
SPA No. (PES) A07-006, alleged that she is not a natural-born Filipino because her parents were
Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. On April 11, 2007, Renald F. Villando, also a registered
voter of the same locality, filed the second petition on the same ground of citizenship, docketed
as SPA (PES) No. A07-007. He claimed that when Limkaichong was born, her parents were still
Chinese citizens as the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never
attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects. Both petitions prayed for the
cancellation of Limkaichong's COC and for the COMELEC to strike out her name from the list
of qualified candidates for the Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.
After the casting, counting and canvassing of votes in the said elections, Limkaichong emerged
as the winner with 65,708 votes or by a margin of 7,746 votes over another congressional
candidate, Olivia Paras (Paras), who obtained 57,962.
On May 15, 2007, Paras filed with the COMELEC a Very Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene
and to Suspend the Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong as Winning Candidate of the First
District of Negros Oriental.
In a Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007, the COMELEC Second Division granted the petitions
in the disqualification cases, disqualified Limkaichong as a candidate for Representative of the
First District of Negros Oriental, directed the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC to strike
out her name from the list of eligible candidates, and for the Provincial Board of Canvassers
(PBOC) to suspend her proclamation. In disposing the cases, the COMELEC Second Division
made the following ratiocination:
On the substantial issue of whether respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong is disqualified to run for
the congressional seat of the First District of Negros Oriental on the ground that she is not a
natural-born Filipino, we hold that she is so disqualified.
Petitioners have successfully discharged their burden of proof and has convincingly shown with
pieces of documentary evidence that Julio Ong Sy, father of herein respondent Jocelyn Sy-
Limkaichong, failed to acquire Filipino citizenship in the naturalization proceedings which he
underwent for the said purpose.
An examination of the records of Special Case No. 1043 would reveal that the Office of the
Solicitor General was deprived of its participation in all the stages of the proceedings therein, as
required under Commonwealth Act No. 473 or the Revised Naturalization Law and Republic Act
No. 530, An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization.
The documents presented by petitioners showed that the OSG was not furnished copies of two
material orders of the trial court in the said proceedings. One was the July 9, 1957 Order granting
his petition for naturalization and the other was the September 21, 1959 Order declaring Julio
Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen. Moreover, from a perusal of the same page 171 of the OSG
logbook, we have determined that the OSG did not receive a notice for the hearing conducted by
the trial court on July 9, 1959, prior to its issuance of the September 12, 1959 Order declaring
Julio Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen.
Another glaring defect in the said proceedings was the fact that Julio Ong Sy took his Oath of
Allegiance on October 21, 1959, which was exactly thirty (30) days after his declaration as a
naturalized Filipino. The respondent insists that naturalization proceedings are in rem and are
binding on the whole world.

Issue: Is the respondent’s argument tenable?

Ruling: No. According to the Supreme Court, the respondent’s argument would have been
correct had all the necessary parties to the case been informed of the same. The OSG, being the
counsel for the government, has to participate in all the proceedings so that it could be bound by
what has transpired therein. Lacking the participation of this indispensable party to the same, the
proceedings are null and void and, hence, no rights could arise therefrom.

Malacora v. CA
G.R. No. L-51042. September 30, 1982
DE CASTRO, J.

Facts: On April 14, 1971, the respondent court rendered a decision in CAR Case No. 6, entitled
"Dionisio Malacora and Lucia Marabulas vs. Rodrigo Libarnes and Consuelo Libarnes", the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the herein
defendants RODRIGO LIBARNES and CONSUELO LIBARNES to pay the herein plaintiffs
DIONISIO MALACORA and LUCIA MARABULAS the total amount of TWO THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY FIVE (P2,595.00) PESOS for onehalf of all the coconut trees
and of TEN (P10.00) PESOS for one-half of the banana plants said plaintiffs planted on the
defendants' land and after payment of said amounts their tenancy relation will be considered as
terminated and the said plaintiffs will be allowed to surrender and leave their tenanted holding.
Both parties in this case are hereby ordered to pay fifty-fifty the court fees, the plaintiffs to pay
their one-half share upon receipt of the payments for one-half of the improvements as herein
above ordered.
Defendants, petitioners herein, appealed to this Court (CA-G.R. No. 00658-R) which modified
the judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the modification that the
petitioners are ordered to pay P8.00 per coconut trees for one- half of all the coconut trees which
the private respondents had planted on the land in question, without pronouncement as to costs.
After Our decision became final and the case had been returned to the respondent court,
plaintiffs, private respondents herein, filed a motion for execution. Acting on the motion, the
respondent court, on September 20, 1974, entered an order of execution; and on October 4, 1974,
the Clerk of Court issued a writ of execution which commanded petitioners 'to pay plaintiffs
Dionisio Malacora and Lucia Marabulas the total amount of P2,184.00 for the 273 coconut trees
planted by the plaintiffs.

Issue: Did the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the writ of execution, the sheriff's certificate
of sale and the sheriff's final deed of sale, and the orders of June 27 and August 1, 1978 in CAR
Case No. 6 Agrarian '68 as annulled and set aside?

Ruling: No. The writ of execution is supposed to be to enforce the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from, is hereby affirmed, with the modification that the
petitioners are ordered to pay P8.00 per coconut tree for one-half of all the coconut trees which
the private respondents had planted on the land in question, without pronouncement as to cost. 3
The variance between the writ of execution and the final judgment of the court of Appeals sought
to be enforced is at once noticeable. On the basis of the judgment to be executed, the amount to
be paid by the private respondents to petitioners should be only P1,100.00, the value of 1/2 of the
275 coconut trees planted, at the rate of P8.00 a tree already fruit bearing or not. The writ of
execution fixed the value at P2,184.00. Not being in accordance with the judgment to be
enforced, in a very substantial manner, the writ of execution was correctly set aside as a nullity
by the respondent Court of Appeals, properly acting on the authority of the Collector of Internal
Revenue vs. Gutierrez, et al. 

In re: Problems of Delays in cases before the Sandiganbayan

A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC. November 8, 2001

Spouses Marcelo v. Judge Pichay

AM No. MTJ-13-1838. March 12, 2014

Brillantes v. Yorac
192 SCRA 358

Funa v. The Chairman, COA

670 SCRA 579

Gaminde v. COA
G.R. No. 140335. December 13, 2000

PAGCOR v. CA
202 SCRA 191. August 20, 2018
GESMUNDO, J

Facts: Respondent was an employee of PAGCOR with a position of Dealer stationed at Casino
Filipino-Waterfront Hotel, Lahug, Cebu City. In a random drug testing conducted by PAGCOR
to all its employees, respondent allegedly tested positive for methamphetamine. Thus, in its
March 30, 2006 Letter, respondent was informed that she was dismissed from the service for
gross misconduct and violation of company rules and regulations. Respondent moved for
reconsideration which PAGCOR denied in its May 11, 2006 letter.
On May 19, 2006, respondent appealed her dismissal with the CSC.
The CSC, in its March 24, 2008 resolution, dismissed the appeal and affirmed her dismissal.
When respondent moved for reconsideration of this resolution, the CSC, in its January 24, 2012
resolution, reversed itself and reinstated respondent into service.
PAGCOR received the January 3, 2017 resolution of the CA denying its motion for
reconsideration on January 11, 2017. Hence, PAGCOR had fifteen (15) days, or until January 26,
2017, to file its appeal. It let this period lapse and, instead, filed herein petition for certiorari on
March 13, 2017. Evidently, the present petition is a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
The CSC exonerated respondent from the administrative charges on account of PAGCOR's
failure to comply with the requirements of Section 38 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. It found that respondent was not notified of
the positive screening result, which should have given her a window of opportunity to impugn
the result through a confirmatory testing. It held that notice of the screening test is part of her
substantive rights and the absence thereof is tantamount to denial of the due process granted to
her by law. Thus, it exonerated her of the administrative charges.
PAGCOR argues that the negligence of its former counsel was so gross that it effectively
deprived it of due process

Issue: Is the petitioner’s argument meritous?

Ruling: No. The Court finds in the instant case that PAGCOR failed to prove that the negligence
of its former counsel was so gross that it effectively deprived it of due process.
PAGCOR argues in its petition that its failure to comply with the CA's October 22, 2015
resolution was unintentional. It contends that its failure was merely due to the heavy workload of
its former counsel and an effect of the recurring water intrusion/leakage in its offices. The Court
fails to see how these excuses could amount to gross negligence on the part of its former counsel.
In fact, they themselves characterized it as a mere, unintentional lapse. This is simple negligence.
There is simply no gross negligence to speak of in the instant case.
Further, PAGCOR was not deprived of due process. On the contrary, it was given every
opportunity to be heard, which is the very essence of due process. The merits of its case were
heard by the CSC. It appealed the decision of the CSC to the CA. The CA initially dismissed the
case for failure to acquire jurisdiction over respondent due to PAGCOR's failure to comply with
its orders regarding service of a copy of the petition to respondent and/or her counsel. When the
CA reinstated the case in view of respondent's voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, PAGCOR
squandered the second chance given to it by failing to comply with the CA's directive to furnish
respondent with a copy of the petition. This is despite respondent volunteering the current
address of her counsel through the manifestations she filed. To add salt to injury, PAGCOR let
the period to appeal the January 3, 2017 resolution of the CA before this Court lapse. Instead, it
filed the present petition for certiorari as a substitute for its lost appeal.

Casino Labor Association v. CA

554 SCRA 323. June 12, 2008
PUNO, C.J.

Facts: The present Constitution specifically provides in Article IX B, Section 2(1) that "the civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters." (Emphasis
supplied)
There appears to be no question from the petition and its annexes that the respondent
corporations were created by an original charter, P.D. No. 1869 in relation to P.D. Nos. 1067-A,
1067-C, 1399 and 1632.
Moreover, P.D. 1869, Section 18, specifically prohibits formation of unions among casino
employees and exempts them from the coverage of Labor Code provisions. Under the new
Constitution, they may now form unions but subject to the laws passed to regulate unions in
offices and corporations governed by the Civil Service Law.

Issue: Does the Civil Service Commission instead of the NLRC have jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling: Yes. In resolving the issue of whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over employer-
employee relations in PAGCOR, PCOC and PSSC, the Third Division made the definitive ruling
that "there appears to be no question from the petition and its annexes that the respondent
corporations were created by an original charter." The Court collectively referred to all
respondent corporations, including PCOC and PSSC, and held that in accordance with the
Constitution and jurisprudence, corporations with original charter "fall under the jurisdiction of
the Civil Service Commission and not the Labor Department." The Court stated further that P.D.
1869 exempts casino employees from the coverage of Labor Code provisions and although the
employees are empowered by the Constitution to form unions, these are "subject to the laws
passed to regulate unions in offices and corporations governed by the Civil Service Law." Thus,
in dismissing the petition, the ruling of the Third Division was clear - - - it is the Civil Service
Commission, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the employer-employee problems in
PAGCOR, PCOC and PSSC.
 UP v. Regino
221 SCRA 598. May 3, 1993
CRUZ, J.

Facts: Private respondent Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the University of the
Philippines was dismissed after being found guilty of causing the leakage of final examination
questions. After seeking relief from Merit Systems Board (MSB), MSB ruled in favor of
respondent. Thus, UP appealed to the Civil Service Commission which sustained the MSB and
ordered respondent’s reinstatement. On RTC, respondent’s immediate reinstatement was also
ordered. However, UP contends that under Section 6(e) of its charter, Act 1870, UP Board of
Regents has the power “to appoint, on recommendation of the president of the university,
professors, instructors, lecturers, and other employees of the university, to fix their compensation
and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had.”

Issue: Whether or not the administrative cases involving the discipline of petitioner’s employees
come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Held: Yes. As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the
Civil Service under the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a
special law and has an original charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore
governed by PD 807 and administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees come
under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Under the 1973 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations, regardless of the
manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil Service. Under the 1987 Constitution
only government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters fall within the scope of
the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), which states: “The Civil Service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.”
DOH v. NLRC
251 SCRA 700

CSC v. CA
G.R. No. 185766. November 23, 2010

Geronimo v. Ramos
135 SCRA 435

BANAT Partylist v. COMELEC

595 SCRA 477

GMA v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 205357. September 2, 2014

SWS v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147571. May 5, 2001

DelaLlana v. The Chairperson, COA

665 SCRA 176. February 7, 2012
SERENO, J.

Facts: On 26 October 1982, the COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-audit
of government financial transactions, albeit with certain exceptions. The circular affirmed the
state policy that all resources of the government shall be managed, expended or utilized in
accordance with law and regulations, and safeguarded against loss or wastage through illegal or
improper disposition, with a view to ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the
operations of government. Further, the circular emphasized that the responsibility to ensure
faithful adherence to the policy rested directly with the chief or head of the government agency
concerned. The circular was also designed to further facilitate or expedite government
transactions without impairing their integrity.
After the change in administration due to the February 1986 revolution, grave irregularities and
anomalies in the government’s financial transactions were uncovered. Hence, on 31 March 1986,
the COA issued Circular No. 86-257, which reinstated the pre-audit of selected government
transactions. The selective pre-audit was perceived to be an effective, although temporary,
remedy against the said anomalies.
With the normalization of the political system and the stabilization of government operations, the
COA saw it fit to issue Circular No. 89-299, which again lifted the pre-audit of government
transactions of national government agencies (NGAs) and government-owned or -controlled
corporations (GOCCs)

In the interregnum, on 3 May 2006, petitioner dela Llana wrote to the COA regarding the
recommendation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food that the Department of
Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service. On 18 July 2006, the COA replied to petitioner,
informing him of the prior issuance of Circular No. 89-299.  The 18 July 2006 reply of the COA
further emphasized the required observance of Administrative Order No. 278 dated 8 June 1992,
which directed the strengthening of internal control systems of government offices through the
installation of an internal audit service (IAS).
On 15 January 2008, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges that the
pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-
audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution. He further claims that, because of the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious
irregularities in government transactions have been committed, such as the ₱728-million
fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the ₱550-million call center laboratory project of the
Commission on Higher Education, and many others.

Issue: Is the task of conducting a pre-audit a mandated task as a part of the task of COA?

Ruling: There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all
government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit
requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is mandated for
certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal
control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt
measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.
Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA
to perform.

Yap v. COA
619 SCRA 154. April 23, 2010
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Facts: Ramon R. Yap is holder of a regular position of Department Manager of the National
Development Company (NDC), a government-owned and controlled corporation with original
charter. He was appointed by the Board of Directors, Manila Gas Corporation (MGC), a
subsidiary of NDC as Vice-President for Finance effective June 14, 1991while remaining as a
regular employee of NDC. The additional employment entitled him to honoraria equivalent to
fifty percent (50%) of his basic salary at NDC and various allowances attached to the office. In
the course of the regular audit, the Corporate Auditor, MGC issued notices of disallowances
against Mr. Ramon R. Yap which were predicated on the ground that appellants appointment to
MGC in addition to his regular position as Department Manager III of NDC and the subsequent
receipt of the questioned allowances and reimbursements from the former directly contravened
the proscription contained in Section 7 (2) and Section 8, Article IX-b of the Constitution. Mr.
Yap appealed the Auditors disallowances primarily contending that the questioned benefits were
all approved by the MGC Board of Directors.

Petitioners appeal was denied by the CAO II, which affirmed the MGC Corporate Auditors
findings. Unperturbed, petitioner sought a reconsideration of the CAO II ruling from respondent
COA arguing that his assignment to MGC was required by the primary functions of his office
and was also authorized by law, namely Executive Order No. 284 issued on July 25, 1987. In
turn, respondent COA denied petitioners appeal in herein assailed COA Decision No. 2002-
213.It upheld the CAO IIs ruling that characterized the disallowed allowances and
reimbursements as prohibited by the Constitution.Furthermore, it also ruled that the said
allowances and reimbursements claimed by petitioner failed to pass the test of public purpose
requirement of the law and further emphasized that it is not enough that payments made to
petitioner be authorized by the Board of Directors of the MGC but it is likewise necessary that
said payments do not contravene the principles provided for under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1445 on the use of government funds, more specifically on the public purpose
requirement that is provided in Section 4(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known
as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. A Motion for Reconsideration was
subsequently filed by petitioner, but this was likewise denied by respondent COA in COA
Decision No. 2003-087.

Issue: Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
used as a basis the public purpose requirement in affirming the questioned disallowances?

Ruling: No. Any disbursement of public funds, which includes payment of salaries and benefits
to government employees and officials, must (a) be authorized by law, and (b) serve a public
purpose. Public purpose in relation to disbursement of public funds means any purpose or use
directly available to the general public as a matter of right. Thus, it has also been defined as an
activity as will serve as benefit to the community as a body and which at the same time is
directly related function of government. However, the concept of public use is not limited to
traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere, the idea that public use is strictly limited to clear cases
of use by the public has been discarded. In fact, this Court has already categorically stated that
the term public purpose is not defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit
modern standards. It should be given a broad interpretation; therefore, it does not only pertain to
those purposes that which are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as
building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to
promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers,
low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform. In short, public use is now equated with public
interest, and that it is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited
number of persons.

In view of the public purpose requirement, the disbursement of public funds, salaries and
benefits of government officers and employees should be granted to compensate them for
valuable public services rendered, and the salaries or benefits paid to such officers or employees
must be commensurate with services rendered. In the same vein, additional allowances and
benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the official duties and
functions of the government officers and employees. Petitioners theory that the compensation
and benefits of public officers are intended purely for the personal benefit of such officers, or
that the mere payment of salaries and benefits to a public officer satisfies the public purpose
requirement is wrong. That theory would lead to the anomalous conclusion that government
officers and employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or without any justification
necessary other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the government.
Public funds are the property of the people and must be used prudently at all times with a view to
prevent dissipation and waste.
 Pacete v. Acting Chairman of the COA
185 SCRA 1. May 07, 1990
CORTES, J.

Facts: On July 22, 1968, petitioner Elias V. Pacete was appointed by the then Mayor Antonio
C. Acharon of General Santos City as City Attorney of the said city.  On June 24, 1971,
Mayor Acharon was charged with murder in the Court of First Instance of General Santos City
and was detained without bail.  A few months later, on November 8, 1971, Mayor Acharon ran
for and was reelected as City Mayor of General Santos City pending the criminal case against
him and even while he was in jail.  On January 1, 1972, Mayor Acharon issued Administrative
Order No. 1 designating Vice Mayor Erlindo R. Grafilo as Acting Mayor.  On June 29,
1972, Acharon, while still in prison, issued another memorandum which had the effect of
revoking the aforementioned January 1, 1972 memorandum.
Subsequently, Acharon filed two cases with the Supreme Court challenging the authority of
Acting Mayor Grafilo to act as such, claiming that notwithstanding the fact that he was confined
as a detention prisoner due to the murder charge against him, Acharon may lawfully discharge
the duties and functions of the Office of the Mayor of General Santos City.  Both
petitions, City of General Santos and Hon. Antonio Acharon v. Atty. Erlindo Grafilo, et al., G.R.
No. 35303 and Antonio C. Acharon v. Pedro Samson C. Anomas, et al., G.R. No. L-33835, were
dismissed by the Court.  The Court, in a Resolution dated October 20, 1972 stated that "the
continued detention of . . . Antonio Acharon in jail, pending hearing and determination of his
case of murder, for which he has been denied bail, constitutes temporary incapacity to discharge
the duties of his Office of Mayor of General Santos City, under Section 17 of Republic Act No.
6388 which incapacity justifies the assumption of the Office of Mayor by respondent Vice-
Mayor Erlindo Grafilo . . ." [City of General Santos and Hon. Antonio C. Acharon v.
Atty. Erlindo Grafilo, et al., G.R. No. L-35303, October 20, 1972.]
In the meantime, acting Mayor Erlindo Grafilo suspended petitioner Elias V. Pacete as City
Attorney for a period of ten (10) days effective July 11, 1972.  Finally, on July 20, 1972, notice
was served on petitioner that he had been removed as the City Attorney of General Santos City
on the ground of loss of confidence.  Ostensibly, the Acting Mayor's loss of confidence in
petitioner was the result of the legal opinion of the latter impugning the authority of Acting
Mayor Grafilo to act as such and upholding the authority of Mayor Acharon to discharge the
functions of the Office of the Mayor even while the latter was in prison.
Petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission the termination of his services as City
Attorney.  The Acting Commissioner on Civil Service in an indorsement dated October 13, 1972
directed Acting Mayor Grafilo to allow Atty. Pacete to continue in service as City Attorney
pending resolution of the merits of his appeal.  Acting Mayor Grafilo disregarded the directive of
the Civil Service Commissioner branding the same as an illegal order and contrary to the
Supreme Court decisions in Claudio vs. Subido, 40 SCRA 481 and Besa vs. PNB, 33 SCRA
330.  On September 14, 1972, Acting Mayor Grafilo appointed Atty. Hilarion Polistico as City
Attorney of General Santos City.
On October 12, 1972, petitioner filed with the City Treasurer of General Santos City a claim for
the payment of his back salaries in the amount of P2,275.00 corresponding to the period from
July 11 to October 15, 1972 invoking in support of his claim the aforementioned directive of the
Commission on Civil Service.

Issue: Is the position of Legal Counsel or City Attorney is confidential in nature, for which loss
of confidence is a valid ground for termination?

Ruling: Yes. In the case of Cadiente v. Santos, the Supreme Court has stated that the tenure of
officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their
term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves
no removal (Corpus vs. Cuaderno, L-23721, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 591-596).  When such
confidence is lost and the officer holding such position is separated from the service, such
cessation entails no removal but an expiration of his term.  In the case of Hernandez vs. Villegas,
L-17287, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 548, it was held -
It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding primarily confidential
positions continue only for so long as confidence in them endures.  The termination of their
official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their
cessation from office involved no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office - two
different causes for the termination of official relations recognized in the Law of Public Officers.
The Court, after a careful consideration of the instant case, finds no cogent reason to depart from
the ruling of the aforecited cases that the position of Legal Counsel or City Attorney is
confidential in nature, for which loss of confidence is a valid ground for termination.  Hence, the
Court must rule that petitioner is not entitled to the backwages claimed.  Moreover, having
determined the legality of petitioner's termination from service as City Attorney, the Court must
likewise hold that respondent City Auditor Miguel Penalosa, Jr. cannot be held liable for
damages since his refusal to pass in audit petitioner's claim for backwages was pursuant to a
lawful order made by the respondent Acting Commissioner on Audit.

Albon v. Fernando
494 SCRA 141
Funa v. MECO
G.R. No. 193462. February 4, 2014

Nacion v. COA
G.R. No. 204757. March 17, 2015

PhilHealth v. COA
August 4, 2018

Bayani v. COA
December 4, 2018

Geronimo v. COA
G.R. No. 2224163.December 4, 2018
REYES, J. JR.,J.
 
Facts: Petitioner alleged that the DPWH, through the officials and then Secretary Florante
Soriquez,asked him to do several landscaping projects along Ayala Boulevard, Padre Burgos St.,
RoxasBoulevard, Osmeña Highway and other major thoroughfares within Metro Manila in
connection with the 112th Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) Summit in Manila.The parties
involved did not execute any written contract due to time constraint. Upon completion, Petitioner
alleged that he incurred a total amount of ₱14,245,994.20. Despite such completion and several
demands, DPWH failed to pay Petitioner compensation for the services rendered. Hence,
Petitioner filed a Petition for Money claim before the Commission. He attached in his Petition
several letters and memoranda signed by the officials of DPWH, as well as photographs of the
completed projects to support his claims. DPWH, on the other hand, denied the liability arguing
that there was no written contract between him and the department. It further argued that
Petitioner cannot claim compensation based on Quantum meruit  as there was no proof that the
landscaping projects have been completed in accordance with the approved plans and
specifications by the DPWH, and that the public benefited there from. The Commission ruled
that the principle of quantum meruit is applicable. However, it still denied the Petition and ruled
that the Petition lacks supporting documents that would substantiate the project accomplishment
and the reasonableness of the cost thereof, pursuant to PD No. 1445 which requires the
submission of complete documents in claims against the government funds.

Issues:
1. What does the principle of Quantum meruit means?
2. Is the principle of Quantum meruit applicable in the present case?
3. Was the liability of DPWH sufficiently established?

Ruling:
1. It is a reasonable sum of money to be paid for services rendered or work done when the
amount due is not stipulated in a legally enforceable contract.
2. Yes. Jurisprudence dictates that absence of written contracts would not necessarily preclude
that contractor from receiving payment for the services he or she has rendered for the
government. The Court further explained that denial of the contractor’s claim would result in the
government unjustly enriching itself. Justice and equity demand compensation on the basis of
quantum meruit. Recovery on the basis of Quantum meruit was also allowed despite invalidity or
absence of a written contract between the contractor and the government agency.
3. Yes. The Commission’s findings that DPWH acknowledged the existence of its obligation for
the landscaping and beautification project should be treated with utmost respect. The letters and
memoranda presented by the Petitioner unmistakably established DPWH’s recognition of the
completion of the projects and its liability therefor. These projects obviously redounded to the
benefit of the public in the form of uplifting the image of the country albeit superficially  to the
foreign dignitaries who passed through these thoroughfares during the IPU Summit. It would be
unjust and inequitable if there is no compensation for the actual work performed and services
rendered by Petitioner. However, without any reasonable computation and supporting document,
such as receipts of materials procured for the projects, to justify the figures contained therein,
these summaries could only be considered s self-serving statements which the Commission
properly disregarded. According to the SC, the most judicious action that the Commission should
have taken is to require Petitioner to submit additional supporting evidence and/or employ
whatever auditing technique is necessary to determine the reasonable value of the services he
rendered, and the market value of the materials used in the subject landscaping projects.
 Fernando v. COA
GR No. 214910. Feb 13, 2018
JARDELEZA, J.

Facts: On March 22, 2004, the MMDA conducted a public bidding for the Design and
Construction of Steel Pedestrian Bridges in various parts of Metro Manila, with William L. Tan
Construction (WLTC) emerging as the winning bidder. Thus, on March 24, 2004, the
MMDA and WLTC executed a Contract where the latter agreed to design and construct 14 steel
pedestrian bridges for a price of P196,291,834.71 to be completed within 120 calendar days from
receipt of the Notice to Proceed (NTP). The MMDA also issued the NTP on March 24, 2004 and
WLTC received it on the same day.

During the construction, WLTC executed Deeds of Assignment for parts of the project to third-
party contractors. The MMDA also issued three suspension orders (SOs) to WLTC on various
dates, as well as the corresponding resume orders subsequently. Based on WLTC's claimed work
accomplishment, the MMDA paid WLTC a total of P161,903,009.85 net of taxes, and withheld
P9,052,570.48 as retention fee. The MMDA also did not pay WLTC the difference of
P5,861,078.43 since it was the computed liquidated damages for the 120-calendar day delay in
the completion of the project.

On post-audit, the Supervising Auditor of COA-MMDA issued Notice of Suspension (NS) No.
08-23-TF-(2004-2007) on all payments pending the MMDA's submission of required documents
within 90 days from notice, and by reason of the Technical Evaluation Reports (TERs) dated
March 9, 2007 and June 18, 2007 of COA engineers assigned at COA-MMDA. The TERs
concluded that the contract cost of P199,801,671.91 was excessive for being 29.63% above the
COA Estimated Cost of P151,409,330.45 due to high percentage mark-up and erroneous
computation of site works. The TERs also showed that the liquidated damages to be imposed
should be P18,153,348.63, instead of P5,861 ,078.43, due to the delay in the construction for 344
days.

Issue: Is within the scope of the COA's authority to evaluate and determine whether the SOs or
the extension of the contract time, which necessarily includes the waiver of any penalty or
liquidated damages to be imposed considered as valid?

Ruling: No it is not. According to the court, the COA is endowed with enough latitude to
determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds. As specifically applied here, it is well within the scope of the
COA's authority to evaluate and determine whether the SOs or the extension of the contract time,
which necessarily includes the waiver of any penalty or liquidated damages to be imposed, is
valid. The plain reason is that government funds are involved. Hence, even if the MMDA,
through Ona, favorably granted the requests for suspension of work and the extension of contract
time, this cannot bind or preclude the COA from exercising its constitutionally mandated
 function in reviewing the same and to ensure its conformity with the law. It has the power to
ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purpose for which they had been intended.
Thus, the COA is traditionally given free rein in the exercise of its constitutional duty to examine
and audit expenditures of public funds especially those which are palpably beyond what is
allowed by law. It is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a
petition questioning its rulings.
Bearing all the foregoing in mind, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in
issuing its assailed Decision. Glaringly, petitioners do not deny the fact of delay in the project
and actually state in their petition that it is undisputed. Indeed, records show that petitioners
counted a 120-day delay reckoned from March 2, 2005 until June 30, 2005. In contrast, the COA
counted a 344-day delay reckoned from July 21, 2004 until June 30, 2005. The point of
difference in their respective computations was in how the SOs, ROs, and extension of contract
time were considered. For petitioners, these were valid; while for the COA, they were not. We
agree with the COA.

Corona v. Senate of the Philippines

G.R. No. 200242. July 17, 2012
VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Facts: On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which
a verified complaint for impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the
Committee on Justice. After a brief presentation, on the same day, the complaint was voted in
session and 188 Members signed and endorsed it, way above the one third vote required by the
Constitution. On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which
convened as an impeachment court the following day.

On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and Corruption, which alleged
that:

I. He betrayed the public trust through his track record marked by partiality and subservience in
cases involving the Arroyo Administration from the time of his appointment As Supreme
Court justice and until his dubious appointment as a midnight chief justice to the present;
II. Respondent committed culpable violation of the Constitution and/or betrayed the public trust
when he failed to disclose to the public his SALN as required under sec. 17, art. XI of the
1987 Constitution;
III. Respondent committed culpable violations of the constitution and/or betrayed the public trust by
failing to meet and observe the stringent standards under the constitution that provides that
“[a] Member of the judiciary must be a person of Proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence” in allowing the supreme court to act on mere letters filed by a counsel which
Caused the issuance of flip-flopping Decisions in Final and executory cases; in creating an
excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to office; and in
discussing with litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme Court.
IV. Respondent betrayed the public trust and/or committed culpable violation of the Constitution
when he blatantly disregarded the principle of separation of powers by issuing a “status quo
ante” order against the House of Representatives in the case concerning the Impeachment of
then Ombudsman Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez.

And such other allegations of arbitrariness in relation to his office and his relationship with
former Pres. Arroyo and her husband, as well, failure to account for collections of the JDF.

Petitioner filed his answer and assailed the swift manner by which the impeachment complaint as
initiated and transferred from the HOR to the Senate.

Petitioner argued at length that the acts, misdeeds or offenses imputed to him were either false or
baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed for the outright dismissal of the
complaint for failing to meet the requirements of the Constitution or that the Impeachment Court
enter a judgment of acquittal for all the articles of impeachment.

Meanwhile, the prosecution panel composed of respondent Representatives held a press

conference revealing evidence which supposedly support their accusations against petitioner,
which was carried on front page newspaper reports, the following day.

On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court,
commenced trial proceedings against the petitioner. Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary hearing
was denied. On January 18, 2012, Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk of Court of this Court, in
compliance with a subpoena issued by the Impeachment Court, took the witness stand and
submitted the SALNs of petitioner for the years 2002 to 2010.

Other prosecution witnesses also testified regarding petitioner’s SALNs and other properties. In
a subsequent Resolution dated February 6, 2012, the Impeachment Court granted the
prosecution’s request for subpoena directed to the officers of two private banks where petitioner
allegedly deposited millions in peso and dollar currencies.

On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238)
seeking to enjoin the Impeachment Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing the
aforesaid subpoena requiring PSBank thru its authorized representative to testify and to bring the
original and certified true copies of the opening documents for petitioner’s alleged foreign
currency accounts, and thereafter to render judgment nullifying the subpoenas including the bank
statements showing the yearend balances for the said accounts.

On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On February 13, 2012,
petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition claiming that his right to due process is being violated in
the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator Judges have lost the cold
neutrality of impartial judges by acting as prosecutors.

The Petitioner was eventually impeached based on evidence presented to the Senate sitting as
impeachment court.
Issue: Did the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion in
ruling for the former Chief Justice’s impeachment.

Ruling: No. Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious
crimes or misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of
power, impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through
the influence of English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.
By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator
Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel
during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the part of any
Senator Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a political
question that is not within this Court’s power of expanded judicial review.

An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In such
cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which
would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice

G.R. no, 193459. February 15, 2011

Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman

248 SCRA 566

Lastimosa v. Vasquez
243 SCRA 497

Disini v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 180564. June 22, 2010

University of San Agustin, Inc. v. CA

230 SCRA 761

Ateneo De Manila v. Capulong

222 SCRA 644

University of San Carlos v. CA

166 SCRA 570. October 18, 1988
GANCAYCO, J.

Facts: Private respondent enrolled in the College of Architecture, University of San Carlos
(USC), during the first semester of school year 1978-79. At the end of the second semester of
that school year, she obtained a grade of "I.C." (Incomplete) in Architecture 121, and grades of
"5's" (failures) in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123.
The following school year, 1979-1980, she shifted to the College of Commerce of the USC.
Some of the units she had completed when she was still an architecture student were then carried
over and credited in her new course. As a commerce student, she obtained good grades.
However, she was aware of her earlier failing grades in the College of Architecture and that the
same would be taken into consideration in the evaluation of her overall academic performance to
determine if she could graduate with honors.
So, on December 10, 1981, she wrote the Council of Deans of the USC, requesting that her
grades of 5s in Architecture 121 and Architecture 122 be disregarded in the computation of her
grade average. She wrote a similar letter to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports MECS
in Region VII on January 5, 1982 and this letter was referred to the President of the USC for
comment and return to the MECS.
In the 3rd Indorsement dated February 4, 1982, the President of the USC informed the MECS
that the university policy was that any failing grade obtained by a student in any course would
disqualify the student for honors; that to deviate from that policy would mean injustice to
students similarly situated before who were not allowed to graduate with honors; that the bad
grades given to her were justified and could not be deleted or removed because her subjects were
not "dropped" as required; that she had two failures and one incomplete grade which became a
failure upon her inaction to attend to the incomplete grade within one year; and that while her
three failures did not affect her graduation from the College of Commerce, they nonetheless
caused her disqualification from graduating with honors. She was furnished a copy of said
indorsement but she did not ask for a reconsideration.
On March 17, 1982, when the USC President was out of town, private respondent wrote to the
USC Registrar' requesting that her failing grades be changed. The USC Registrar  referred her
letter to the MECS and the request for change of grades was approved in a 4th indorsement of
March 22, 1982.  Thus, her grade of IC in Architecture 121 was changed to "1.9" by Professor
Victor Leves Jr. and the grades of "5" in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 were changed to
"W" (Withdrawn).
On March 24, 1982, Mr. Marcelo Bacalso of MECS' Higher Education Division discovered that
the change of the grade of private respondent from "IC" to "1.9" did not have the supporting
class record required, so he wrote to MECS Supervisor Mr. Ortiz requesting the submission of
the class record. 
On March 28, 1982, the USC held its graduation exercises, and the private respondent graduated
with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in Accounting, without honors.
Private respondent Jennifer C. Lee filed an action for mandamus with damages against
petitioners University of San Carlos and Victoria A. Satorre, docketed as Civil Case No. R22022
in the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVIII, Cebu, asking that petitioners be compelled to confer
upon her the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in Accounting, cum laude,
retroactive to March 28, 1982, to execute and deliver to her all necessary credentials evidencing
her graduation with honors, and to pay her moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00.

Issue: Can a university may not be compelled by mandamus to grant graduation honors to any
student who, according to the university's standards, rules and regulations, does not qualify for
such honors.
Ruling: Yes. It is an accepted principle that schools of teaming are given ample discretion to
formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part
of academic freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of
universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the
graduating students. Its discretion on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less
controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.
In this case, the petitioner's bulletin of information provides all students and all other interested
parties advise on the University policies and rules on enrollment and academic achievements.
Therein it is provided, among others, that a student may not officially withdraw from subjects in
the curriculum if he does not have the written permission of his parents or guardian. For an
incomplete grade, there must be an application for completion or removal within the period
announced by the school calendar and when not removed within one (1) year, it automatically
becomes final.  A "DR" (Dropped) subject which is in the same category, as a "5" disqualifies a
student from receiving honors.  A candidate for honors should have earned no less than 18 units
per semester but a working student should earn no less that 12 units. A failure in any subject
disqualifies a student from honors. Good moral character and exemplary conduct are as
important criteria for honors as academic achievements. 
Private respondent should know and is presumed to know those University policies and is bound
to comply therewith.
 UP Board of Regents v. CA
G.R. No. 134625. August 31, 1999
MENDOZA, J.

Facts: Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program in

Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already completed the units of course work required
and finished her dissertation and was ready for oral defense. After going over her dissertation,
Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she committed plagiarism. However, respondent was
allowed to defend her dissertation. Four out of the five panelists gave a passing mark except Dr.
Medina.

UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated disapproval. Hence, she
expressed her disappointments over the CSSP administration and warned Dean Paz. However,
Dean Paz request the exclusion of Celine’s name from the list of candidates for graduation but it
did not reach the Board of Regents on time, hence Celine graduated. Dr. Medina formally
charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her
be withdrawn. Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her.

CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private

respondent's doctorate degree. The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to
withdraw her Doctorate Degree recommended by the University Council. She sought an
audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by
President

Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her
degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process.

Issue: Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived of her right to
substantive due process.
Ruling: No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed heard several
times. Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge that private
respondent had committed plagiarism and she was heard in her defense.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain
one's side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to
have been denied due process.

In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against her and given
opportunities to answer them. She was asked to submit her written explanation which she
submiited. She, as well, met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla
committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities
explaining her position.

It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before
the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not
require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board
of Regents.

Cudia v. PMA
G.R No. 211362. February 24, 2015
PERALTA, J.:

Facts: Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, the country's
premiere military academy located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio City. He belonged to the
"A" Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class. On November 14, 2013, the combined
classes of the Navy and Air Force 1 CL cadets had a lesson examination (LE) on Operations
Research (OR432) under Dr. Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr. Costales) at the PMAFI Room.

Per published schedule from the Headquarters Academic Group, the 4th period class in OR432
was from 1 :30-3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H), while the 5th period class in ENG412 was from 3:05-
4:05 p.m. (1505H-1605H). Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5th
period class issued a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1 CL Cudia because he was "[/]ate
for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412 class x x x. " Cadets 1 CL Narciso, Arcangel, Miranda,
Pontillas, Diaz, Otila, and Dela Cruz were also reported late for five minutes.

On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers. They were logged
and transmitted to the Company Tactical Officers ( CTO) for explanation of the concerned
cadets. Two days later, Cadet lCL Cudia received his DR. In his Explanation of Report dated
December 8, 2013, Cadet lCL Cudia reasoned out that: "I came directly from OR432 Class. We
were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir."

On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis Hindang (Maj. Hindang), the CTO of Cadet 1
CL Cudia, meted out to him the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Immediately, Cadet
lCL Cudia clarified with Maj. Hindang his alleged violation. The latter told him that the basis of
the punishment was the result of his conversation with Dr. Costales, who responded that she
never dismissed her class late, and the protocol to dismiss the class 10-15 minutes earlier than
scheduled.

During the hearing, it was showed that the investigation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s Honor Code
violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified
of the Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He was then given the opportunity to explain the report
against him. He was informed about his options and the entire process that the case would
undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a
written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted a written report
together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings
and recommendations. When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team
was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed
of the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his
side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough
discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the ' Honor Code.
Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at the Academy level - from the OIC
of the HC, to the SJA, to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate
investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to
reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was
constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to
appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings.

Issues:
1. What is the meaning of “academic freedom”?
2. How was the doctrine of academic freedom applicable in the present case?

Ruling:
1. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution likewise provided for the academic
freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions
of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher
learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the
choice of students." If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who
cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and
distinction of being its graduates.
2. In the present case, using the doctrine of Academic Freedom which can also be found in
Art. XIV, Sec. 5, par. 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution the PMA has the jurisdiction
to issue the dismissal of Cadet Cudia on the ground that he violated the honor code of a
cadet which is sets the standard of norms that was set to be followed by a cadet.
Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of
the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.”
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. March 8, 2011.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Facts: On 28 April 2010, the decision of the case Vinuya v Executive Secretary was
promulgated with Justice Mariano del Castillo as its ponente.  Motion for reconsideration was
filed by the petitioner’s counsel on various grounds but most notably on the ground that not only
did the ponente of the case plagiarised at least 3 books and articles in discussing the principles
of jus cogens and erga omnes, but have also twisted such quotations making it appear contrary to
the intent of the original works.  The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: 1)
Evan J Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens published in 2009 in
the Yale Journal of International Law; 2) Christian J. Tams’ Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations
in Internation Law published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and 3) Mark
Ellis’ Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime  published in the Case Western
Reserve Journal of Internation Law in 2006.  Thereafter, news regarding the plagiarism by the
Supreme Court spread over the media and the original authors wrote letters to the Chief Justice
expressing discontent by the questioned act of Justice del Castillo.
On 27 July 2010, the UP College of Law faculty members gave their opinion on the matter of
plagiarism by issuing an article titled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” signed overall 37 faculty members.   In said article, the
faculty expressly gave their dismay saying that the court had the hopes of relief from those
“comfort women” during the war “crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the Land.” 
In the article, it was stated that plagiarism, as appropriation and misrepresentation of another
person’s work as one’s own, is considered as “dishonesty, pure and simple.”  Hence, it was
argued that since the decision in the Vinuya case form part of the Philippine judicial system, the
Court, in fine, is allowing dishonesty to be promulgated.  Furthermore, the plagiarism and
misrepresentation in the Vinuya case undermines the judicial system of our country and is a dirt
on the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court, the article sought for the resignation of Associate
Justice Mariano del Castillo.
In response to the said article, the Court issued a resolution stating that the remarks and choice of
words used were such a great insult to the members of the Court and a threat to the independence
of the judiciary, a clear violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and the Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.  Thereafter, the Court ordered the signatories to show cause
on why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for such alleged violations.
In fulfillment of the directive by the Court, the signatories passed a Common Compliance stating
therein that their intention in issuing the article in question “was not to malign the Court but
rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure continued confidence in the legal
system” by the words used therein as “focusing on constructive action.”  Also, it was alleged that
the respondents are correct in seeking responsibility from Justice del Castillo for he, indeed,
committed plagiarism thus, rectifying their issuance of the article.  Furthermore, the respondents
argued that the article in question is a valid exercise of the freedom of expression as citizens of a
democracy, and an exercise of academic freedom.

Issue: Whether or not the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violation of various Canons and
Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling: Yes.  The Court ruled that the Common Compliance given by the respondent-signatories
in the questioned article is not sufficient in reasoning why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar.
“…the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
“However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating
but not offensive.
“On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
“Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the
limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech.”
“In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views
on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and
vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal
profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the
Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under
established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors
or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an
indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity
towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of
their status in the academic community or the law school to which they belong.”
The Court further reminded the respondent law professors “of their lawyerly duty, under Canons
1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to
refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending
matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.”
DISSENTING OPINION
Sereno, J.
The Court’s act in directing the law professors to furnish the Show Cause Resolution is like the
little boy who exclaimed that the emperor has no clothes in the Danish story be made to explain
why he should not be punished for his keen observation which is an act of prematurely judging
them guilty.  The Court’s act of labelling Justice del Castillo’s act as not plagiarism is what
makes this contempt case grave.  It should not be the place of the Court to seek revenge against
those who have the courage to say what is wrong with it. 
The Resolution requiring the Show Cause Resolution demonstrates nothing but an abrasive
flexing of the judicial muscle that could hardly be characterized as judicious.  This knee-jerk
response from the Court stares back at its own face, since this judicial act is the one that is totally
unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance.
 
Carpio, J.:
The Show Cause Resolution by the respondents is sufficient and there is no need to admonish or
warn them of the use of disrespectful language.  The Court adheres to the clear and present
danger test and it appears that the evil consequences of the statements are absent and it does not
exhibit that irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy the courts and
their members.  There is only contempt when the article is taken apart, contrary to the practice of
the Court which is to read with contextual care making sure that disparaging statements are not
taken out of context.