Continental Micronesia v.

Basso

Respondent then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner corporation. Alleging the
presence of foreign elements, CMI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of CMI and the subject matter of the controversy.

The Labor Arbiter agreed with CMI that the employment contract was executed in the US “since the
letter-offer was under the Texas letterhead and the acceptance of Complainant was returned there.”
Thus, applying the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis, US laws apply. Also, applying lex loci contractus,
the Labor Arbiter ruled that the parties did not intend to apply Philippine laws.

The NLRC ruled that the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the case when CMI voluntarily
submitted to his office’s jurisdiction by presenting evidence, advancing arguments in support of the
legality of its acts, and praying for reliefs on the merits of the case.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case and over the parties.

Issue:

Whether labor tribunals have jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

Yes. The Court ruled that the labor tribunals had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of
the case. The employment contract of Basso was replete with references to US laws, and that it
originated from and was returned to the US, do not automatically preclude our labor tribunals from
exercising jurisdiction to hear and try this case.

On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of CMI was acquired through the coercive process of
service of summons. CMI never denied that it was served with summons. CMI has, in fact, voluntarily
appeared and participated in the proceedings before the courts. Though a foreign corporation, CMI is
licensed to do business in the Philippines and has a local business address here. The purpose of the law
in requiring that foreign corporations doing business in the country be licensed to do so, is to subject
the foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of our courts.

Where the facts establish the existence of foreign elements, the case presents a conflicts-of-laws
issue. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a conflict-of-laws case may
assume jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the
Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is
in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine
Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. All these requisites are present here

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS BERHAD,

Facts:
This case stemmed from an action for recovery of sum of money filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig by respondent Malaysian corporation against petitioner Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC)
PNCC and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings) caused the incorporation of an associate
company known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered into contracts
to construct rural roads and bridges for the State of Pahang,... Malaysia.[9]
In connection with this construction contract, PNCC obtained various guarantees and bonds from
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to guarantee the due performance of its obligations.[10] The
four contracts of guaranty stipulate that Asiavest Merchant
Bankers (M) Berhad shall guarantee to the State of Pahang "the due performance by PNCC of its
construction contracts . . . and the repayment of the temporary advances given to PNCC[.]"[11] These
contracts were understood to be governed by the laws of Malaysia.[12]
There was failure to perform the obligations under the construction contract, prompting the State of
Pahang to demand payment against Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad's performance bonds.[13] It
"entered into a compromise agreement with the State of Pahang by paying the reduced amount of
[Malaysian Ringgit (MYR)] 3,915,053.54[.]"[14] Consequently, the corporation demanded indemnity
from PNCC by demanding the amount it paid to the State of Pahang.[15]
On April 12, 1994, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a Complaint[16] for recovery of sum of
money against PNCC before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.[17] It based its action on Malaysian laws.
Specifically, it invoked
Section 98[18] of the Malaysian Contracts Act of 1950 and Section 11[19] of the Malaysian Civil Law Act
of 1956.[20
PNCC filed Motions for extension of time to file its Answer on May 18, 1994, June 2, 1994, and June 17,
1994. The trial court granted these motions, with the last one set to expire on July 3, 1994. On July 4,
1994, PNCC filed a Motion for another five-day extension. The trial... court denied this Motion on July
13, 1994.
On July 27, 1994, the trial court declared PNCC in default for failure to file any responsive pleading,
and allowed Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to present its evidence ex parte.
The Regional Trial Court, in its Decision dated November 29, 1994, rendered judgment in favor of
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad
The trial court found that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad complied with the requisites for proof
of written foreign laws.[24] The Malaysian laws invoked were found to be similar with Articles 2066 and
2067 of the Civil Code... the trial court denied PNCC's Motion to Lift Order of Default... it also denied
PNCC's Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam
PNCC brought its case before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals... dismissed PNCC's appeal for raising pure questions of law exclusively cognizable
by this court.[31] It likewise denied reconsideration.[32
Hence, PNCC filed this Petition.
Issues:
Whether our courts have subject matter jurisdiction over an action for recovery of sum of money filed
by a Malaysian corporation against a Philippine corporation involving a contract executed and
performed in Malaysia, and the applicability of the forum non... conveniens principle.
Ruling:
On the jurisdiction issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.[92] Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is one such law that provides
for the jurisdiction of our courts. A plain reading... of Section 19[93] shows that civil actions for
payment of sum of money are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of trial courts:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.-Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
....
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where... the demand, exclusive of
the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000).
These jurisdictional amounts were adjusted to P300,000.00, and P400,000.00 in the case of Metro
Manila.[94] Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig has jurisdiction over respondent's complaint for
recovery of the sum of Malaysian Ringgit (MYR)
3,915,053.54.
"Forum non conveniens literally translates to 'the forum is inconvenient.'"[96] This doctrine applies in
conflicts of law cases. It gives courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it appears that it is
not the most convenient forum and the... parties may seek redress in another one.[97] It is a device
"designed to frustrate illicit means for securing advantages and vexing litigants that would otherwise be
possible if the venue of litigation (or dispute resolution) were left entirely to the whim... of either
party."[98]
On the other hand, courts may choose to assume jurisdiction subject to the following requisites: "(1)
that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine
Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law... and the facts; and (3) that the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision."[
The determination of whether to entertain a case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
which must carefully consider the facts of the particular case.[102] A mere invocation of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens or an easy averment... that foreign elements exist cannot operate to
automatically divest a court of its jurisdiction. It is crucial for courts to determine first if facts were
established such that special circumstances exist to warrant its desistance from assuming jurisdiction.[
The trial court assumed jurisdiction and explained in its Order dated August 11, 1995 that "[o]n the
contrary[,] to try the case in the Philippines, it is believed, would be more convenient to defendant
corporation as its principal office is located in the Philippines, its... records will be more accessible,
witnesses would be readily available and entail less expenses in terms of legal services.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation with its main office in the Philippines. It is safe to assume that all
of its pertinent documents in relation to its business would be available in its main office. Most of
petitioner's officers and employees who were involved in the... construction contract in Malaysia could
most likely also be found in the Philippines. Thus, it is unexpected that a Philippine corporation would
rather engage this civil suit before Malaysian courts. Our courts would be "better positioned to enforce
[the] judgment and,... ultimately, to dispense"[110] in this case against petitioner.
Also, petitioner failed to plead and show real and present danger that another jurisdiction commenced
litigation and the foreign tribunal chose to exercise jurisdiction

PIONEER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES v. TODARO

FACTS
Antonio D. Todaro (Todaro) filed with the RTC of Makati City, a complaint for Sum of Money and
Damages with Preliminary Attachment against Pioneer International Limited (PIL), Pioneer Concrete
Philippines, Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI), John G. McDonald (McDonald) and
Philip J. Klepzig (Klepzig).

Todaro alleged that PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Australia and is
principally engaged in the ready-mix concrete and concrete aggregates business; PPHI is the company
established by PIL to own and hold the stocks of its operating company in the Philippines; PCPI is the
company established by PIL to undertake its business of ready-mix concrete, concrete aggregates and
quarrying operations in the Philippines; McDonald is the Chief Executive of the Hongkong office of PIL;
and, Klepzig is the President and Managing Director of PPHI and PCPI; Todaro has been the managing
director of Betonval Readyconcrete, Inc. (Betonval), a company engaged in pre-mixed concrete and
concrete aggregate production; he resigned from Betonval in February 1996; in May 1996, PIL
contacted Todaro and asked him if he was available to join them in connection with their intention to
establish a ready-mix concrete plant and other related operations in the Philippines; Todaro informed
PIL of his availability and interest to join them; subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement
wherein the former consented to engage the services of the latter as a consultant for two to three
months, after which, he would be employed as the manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete operations
should the company decide to invest in the Philippines; subsequently, PIL started its operations in the
Philippines; however, it refused to comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent
basis. Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint, as the same is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that the
complaint should be dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. RTC dismissed the
MTD which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE
W/N the RTC should have dismissed the case on the basis of forum non conveniens due to a presence of
a foreign element

RULING
NO. Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely
upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the
case of Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that "xxx [a]
Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the
following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently
resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and
the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision."

The doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because
Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a ground. This Court further
ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on
this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the court’s desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a case based on this
principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly
considered a matter of defense.

Note: the case was also being dismissed on the ground that there was no cause of action but SC held
that there was cause of action, to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint
must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively
stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. And it was also argued in this case that jurisdiction is
with the NLRC and not with the RTC. SC held it was with RTC, SC has consistently held that where no
employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be
resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement,
it is the RTC that has jurisdiction.

DAVID A. NOVERAS v. LETICIA T. NOVERAS

Facts:
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24
June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.[6] The California court granted to Leticia
the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple's properties in the USA.[7]
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC
of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David's failure to comply with
his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer... all conjugal properties in
the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject conjugal
properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David
to remit half of the purchase price as share of
Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of P50,000.00 and P100,000.00
litigation expenses.[8]
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29
June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal
partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated and... that all expenses of
liquidation, including attorney's fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership.
David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained
a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all
the properties in the USA to
Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial
separation of conjugal properties.
Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses
had been living separately... since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his
own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita
Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital...
where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David
in the Consent for Operation form.[20] Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it
was granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for
judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
Issues:
Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital infidelity
which can result into the forfeiture of the parties' properties in favor of the petitioner and their two
(2) children.
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the same can be
included in the judicial separation prayed for.
Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and respondent
David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter's property rights over their conjugal
properties.
Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras is entitled to reimbursement of one-half of the P2.2 [M]illion sales
proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the P1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the
property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and... charges.
How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
Whether or not the attorney's fees and litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable against their
conjugal properties.
Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses
had been living separately... since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his
own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita
Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital...
where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David
in the Consent for Operation form.[20] Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it
was granted by the California court in June

2005.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for
judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
Ruling:
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the
California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country... where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in
the absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children's
presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property. While
both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing
where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have... come from the community
property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the
benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00
incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses... in the amount of
P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at
least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No.
7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise,... expenses incurred to settle the
criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum,
Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of P120,000.00 or in
the respective amounts of
P1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The
children are therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net... assets of the absolute
community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their
respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the receivables
from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00.
Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive
legitimes therefrom.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
88686 is AFFIRMED.
At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt
the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court's Decision with respect to liquidation.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the
California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country... where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in
the absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children's
presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property. While
both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing
where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have... come from the community
property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the
benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00
incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses... in the amount of
P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at
least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No.
7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise,... expenses incurred to settle the
criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum,
Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of P120,000.00 or in
the respective amounts of
P1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The
children are therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net... assets of the absolute
community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their
respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the receivables
from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00.
Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive
legitimes therefrom.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
88686 is AFFIRMED

Llorente vs. CA

FACTS:
Alicia( 2nd wife) ß Lorenzo N. Llorente --- Paula (1ST wife) --- Ceferino Llorente (brother)
Crisologo Llorente(son)
  Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927
to September 30, 1957
 February 22, 1937: Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were married before a parish priest, Roman
Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur
 Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula
stayed in the conjugal home
 November 30, 1943: Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of
Naturalization
 1945: When Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave to visit his wife and he visited the
Philippines, He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was “living in” and having an
adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente
 December 4, 1945: Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua
as Crisologo Llorente with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line
for the father’s name was left blank
 Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her
 February 2, 1946: the couple drew and signed a written agreement which was witnessed by
Paula’s father and stepmother to the effect that
1.    all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other
obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended
2.    they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings
3.    they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital
life; and
4.    Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and
agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. 
 November 16, 1951: Lorenzo returned and filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State
of California in and for the County of San Diego
 December 4, 1952: the divorce decree became final
 January 16, 1958: Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila and lived together as husband
and wife and bore 3 children: Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente
 March 13, 1981: Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament where he bequeathed all his
property to Alicia and their three children
 December 14, 1983: Lorenzo filed with the RTC, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the
probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be
appointed Special Administratrix of his estate
 January 18, 1984: RTC denied the motion for the reason that the Lorenzo was still alive
 January 24, 1984: RTC admitted finding that the will was duly executedthe will to probate
 June 11, 1985: before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died
 RTC on the petition for letters of administration filed by Paula over Lorenzo’s estate
contending that she was the surviving spouse and WITHOUT terminating the testate
proceedings filed by Alicia, gave due course to Paula’s petition
 divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the
Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato at Manila is void
 Paula T. Llorente: 1/3 estate and ½ conjugal estate
 illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly: 1/3 estate
 RTC denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified that Raul and Luz Llorente are not
children “legitimate or otherwise” of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him thus,
Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitles her to 1/3 of the estate and
one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate
 CA: Affirmed with modification

ISSUE: W/N the divorce is valid and proven

HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED. REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as
VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court
of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
 REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N.
Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with
instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the
deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.:

o    nationality principle in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality
o    Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national
law
 Quita v. Court of Appeals:
o    once proven that NO longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce, the ruling in Van Dorn
would become applicable
 Divorce of Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity.  Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the
estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
 The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed.  We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity.
 Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved
by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. 
 Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by
referring to Philippine law.  In fact, the will was duly probated.

RAYTHEON INTL vs. ROUZZIE

FACTS

Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized & existing under the laws of
Connecticut, &Stockton Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract

BMSI hired Rouzie as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects
in thePhilippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts.

Rouzie secured a service contract w/ the Rep. of Phil. on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers
affected by the Mt.Pinatubo eruption & mudflows.

Rouzie filed before the NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust International (Rust) for alleged nonpayment
of commissions, illegal termination, & breach of employment contract.

The Labor Arbiter order 

ed BMSI & Rust to pay Rouzie’s money claims.

Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed & dismissed Rouzie’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Rouzie filed an action for damages before the RTC of La Union (where he was a resident) against
Raytheon International. He reiterated that he was not paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo
dredging project w/c hesecured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI, RUST and
Raytheon had combined & functioned as 1 company.

RAYTHEON SOUGHT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS OF FAILURE TO STATE ACAUSE
OF ACTION & FORUM NON CONVENIENS & PRAYED FOR DAMAGES BY WAY OF COMPULSORY
COUNTERCLAIM. THE RTC DENIED RAYTHEON’S MOTION. THE CA AFFIRMED.

Raytheon’s contention: The written contract between Rouzie & BMSI included a valid choice of law
clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also
mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute, namely that the parties & witnesses involved
are American corporations & citizens & the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines,
that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. The foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the
immediate application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

ISSUES(a) W/N the RTC had jurisdiction.(b) W/N the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of
forum non conveniens.

RULING

(a) YES.

On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine
court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or
can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point
to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the
law & by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of w/n the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. The case file was an action for damages
arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of
damages prayed are w/in the jurisdiction of the RTC.

 As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Rouzi upon the filing of the

complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of Raytheon was acquired by its voluntary
appearance in court.

That THE SUBJECT CONTRACT INCLUDED A STIPULATION THAT THE SAME SHALL BE GOVERNED BYTHE
LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT THE PHILIPPINE COURTS,
OR ANY OTHER FOREIGN TRIBUNAL FOR THAT MATTER, ARE PRECLUDED FROM HEARING THE CIVIL ACTIO
N.

JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW ARE 2 DISTINCT CONCEPTS. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to
cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the
application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The
choice of law stipulation will be come relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case
develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

(b) NO.

UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS, A COURT, IN CONFLICTS-OF-LAWS CASES, MAY
REFUSE IMPOSITIONS ON ITS JURISDICTION WHERE IT IS NOT THE MOST “CONVENIENT” OR
 AVAILABLE FORUM AND THE PARTIES ARE NOT PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING REMEDIES ELSEWHERE.
Raytheon’s averments of the foreign elements are not sufficient to oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over
the case and the parties involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a
factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is w/c
the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so
only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s
desistance.

LWV CONSTRUCTION V. DUPO (2009)

 As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural
matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so
forth, are governed by the laws of the forum.
 A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be
viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a
law. However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes
irrelevant when the country of the forum has a “borrowing statute”. Said statute has the
practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A borrowing
statute directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending
claims based on a foreign law.
 Respondent’s complaint was well within the three-year prescriptive period under Art. 291 of
our Labor Code. This point, however, has already been mooted by the Court’s finding that
respondent’s service award had been paid, albeit the payroll termed such payment as
severance pay.

Haumschildv.Continental Casualty Co.

Action by the plaintiff Jacquelyn Haumschild against the defendants Le Roy Gleason, Continental
Casualty Company, and others to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of a motor
vehicle accident.

The plaintiff and Gleason were married in Lincoln county, Wisconsin, on November 17, 1956, and lived
together as wife and husband until some time in March, 1957. During all of such time Gleason assumed
in good faith that the marriage was valid. On March 10, 1958, such marriage was annulled by decree of
the circuit court for Milwaukee county. At all times material to the instant action for personal injuries
both the plaintiff and Gleason have had their domicile in Wisconsin.

On December 19, 1956, the plaintiff was injured while riding in a motor truck being driven by Gleason,
her then supposed husband. Such accident occurred in California, and the instant action is the
outgrowth of such accident. In addition to Gleason and the insurer of the vehicle, the two owners of
the truck were also joined as defendants. 

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the action on the grounds that under
California law one spouse is immune from suit in tort by the other spouse, and that the plaintiff by her
conduct is estopped to assert the invalidity of her marriage to Gleason. The circuit court granted
defendants' motion and judgment was entered on August 26, 1958, dismissing the action. The plaintiff
has appealed therefrom.

CURRIE, J.

This appeal presents a conflict-of-laws problem with respect to interspousal liability for tort growing
out of an automobile accident. Which law controls, that of the state of the forum, the state of the
place of wrong, or the state of domicile? Wisconsin is both the state of the forum and of the domicile
while California is the state where the alleged wrong was committed. Under Wisconsin law a wife may
sue her husband in tort. Under California law she cannot. Peters v. Peters (1909), 156 Cal. 32, 103 P.
219; Cubbison v. Cubbison (1946), 73 Cal.App.2d 437, 166 P.2d 387; and Paulus v. Bauder (1951), 106
Cal.App.2d 589, 235 P.2d 422.

This court was first faced with this question in Buckeye v. Buckeye (1931), 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342.
In that case Wisconsin was the state of the forum and domicile, while Illinois was the state of the place
of wrong. It was there held that the law governing the creation and extent of tort liability is that of the
place where the tort was committed, citing Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1st ed.), p. 188, sec. 92. From
this premise it was further held that interspousal immunity from tort liability necessarily is
governed  by the law of the place of injury. This principle of conflict of laws has been consistently
applied in all subsequent interspousal actions in automobile accident cases except the recent case
of Bodenhagen v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. (1958), 5 Wis.2d 306, 92 N.W.2d 759, 95 N.W.2d 822,
hereinafter discussed.

The case of Jaeger v. Jaeger (1952), 262 Wis. 14, 53 N.W.2d 740, sometimes has been mistakenly
interpreted as holding that the law of the domicile applied. However, as explained in Hansen v.
Hansen (1956), 274 Wis. 262, 264, 80 N.W.2d 230, the law of Arizona, the place of wrong, was actually
applied, but because the Arizona Married Women's Act was similar to that of Wisconsin and the Arizona
courts had not construed the same with reference to tort liability, we presumed the Arizona judicial
interpretation of such act would be the same as that of Wisconsin. The discussion in the Jaeger
Case with reference to the law of domicile was confined to the community-property issue and must be
so interpreted.

The principle enunciated in the Buckeye Case and followed in subsequent Wisconsin cases, that the law
of the place of wrong controls as to whether one spouse is immune from suit in tort by the other, is the
prevailing view in the majority of jurisdictions in this country. Anno. 22 A.L.R.2d 1248, 1251-1253,
entitled, "Conflict of laws as to right of action between husband and wife or parent and child." It is also
the rule adopted in Restatement, Conflict of Laws, p. 457, sec. 378, and p. 470, sec. 384 (2). However,
criticism of the rule of the Buckeye Case, by legal writers, some of them recognized authorities in the
field of conflict of laws, and recent decisions by the courts of California, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania, have caused us to re-examine the question afresh.

In 1942, Prof. Walter Wheeler Cook of the Northwestern University Law School faculty published his
book entitled, "The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws." It was his conclusion that the law
of the domicile, and not the place of wrong, should be applied in determining whether  a wife had
capacity to sue her husband in tort. Pages 248 to 250 and 345 to 346 of text. Also, in 1942, Max
Rheinstein in an article in 41 Michigan Law Review, 83, 97, advocated that the law of domicile should
be applied in conflict-of-laws situations to determine whether there is an immunity for tort grounded
on family relationship. Ernst Rabel, in his "The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study" (1945), pp. 322,
323, pointed out that in the civil-law countries of western Europe prohibitions, which exclude lawsuits
in tort between husband and wife, are considered part of family law and, therefore, the law of the
domicile governs and not the law of the place of wrong.

The most-comprehensive treatment of the problem that we have discovered is the excellent 30-page
article in 15 University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 397, entitled, "Interspousal Liability for Automobile
Accidents in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason versus the Restatement," by Alan W. Ford, published
in 1954. The article contains a careful analysis of the American cases on the subject commencing with
our own Buckeye Case. The author's conclusion is stated as follows (p. 423):

"The lex fori and the lex loci delicti rules have already been criticized as inadequate. Between them,
these two rules encompass all of the American cases. To find a more-desirable alternative we must,
therefore, go beyond those cases. The foreign experience, briefly discussed above, is a useful starting
point. As that experience suggests, there is some logic in separating questions of status and tort, in
determining the incidents of the marital relationship by the family law, and the problems of tort by the
law of torts. If a conflicts problem is involved, there is no reason why both questions should be
determined by the law of torts. Instead, the two questions should remain separate, and problems of
status or capacity could be referred, by an appropriate conflicts rule, to the law of the place of the
domicile." 

Ford, in his article, cited four cases of interspousal immunity in which American courts have refused to
apply the law of the place of wrong to an automobile accident situation but instead applied their own
law of the forum: Poling v. Poling (1935), 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604; Mertz v. Mertz (1936), 271
N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597, 108 A.L.R. 1120; Kircher v. Kircher (1939), 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120;
and Kyle v. Kyle (1941), 210 Minn. 204, 297 N.W. 744. In all four cases one spouse sued the other in the
state of domicile where there existed the immunity from suit in tort in a situation where the accident
had occurred in a state which had abolished the immunity. The decisions were based on the ground
that the public policy of the forum state forbade one spouse suing the other in tort. The holdings in
these four cases are highly significant because they are inconsistent in result with the theory that the
injured spouse possessed a vested right in the cause of action which had accrued in the state where the
alleged negligence occurred. Furthermore these cases are authority for the principle that public policy
may be a controlling factor to be considered by the court of the forum state in determining which law
it will apply in resolving a conflict-of-laws problem. This factor of public policy is also acknowledged in
Restatement, Conflict of Laws, pp. 9, 10, sec. 5, comment b.

Conversely, after New York had abolished the immunity, it refused to hold that it offended the public
policy of the forum state to apply the law of the state of wrong and deny recovery where the state in
which the accident occurred still preserved the immunity. Coster v. Coster (1943), 289 N.Y. 438, 46
N.E.2d 509, 146 A.L.R. 702, rehearing denied, 290 N.Y. 662, 49 N.E.2d 621.

The first case to break the ice and flatly hold that the law of domicile should be applied in determining
whether there existed an immunity from suit for tort based upon family relationship is Emery v.
Emery (1955), 45 Cal.2d 421,  289 P.2d 218. In that case two unemancipated minor sisters sued their
unemancipated minor brother and their father to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile
accident that occurred in the state of Idaho, the complaint alleging wilful misconduct in order to come
within the provisions of the Idaho "guest" statute. All parties were domiciled in California. The opinion
by Mr. Justice TRAYNOR recognized that the California court, in passing on the question of whether an
unemancipated minor child may sue the parent or an unemancipated brother, had a choice to apply
the law of the place of wrong, of the forum, or of the domicile. It was held that the immunity issue
was not a question of tort but one of capacity to sue and be sued, and rejected the law of the place of
injury as "both fortuitous and irrelevant." In deciding whether to apply the law of the forum, or the law
of the domicile, the opinion stated this conclusion ( 45 Cal.2d 428, 289 P.2d 222):

"Although tort actions between members of the same family will ordinarily be brought in the state of
the family domicile, the courts of another state will in some cases be a more convenient forum, and
thus the question arises whether the choice-of-law rule should be expressed in terms of the law of the
forum or that of the domicile. We think that disabilities to sue and immunities from suit because of a
family relationship are more properly determined by reference to the law of the state of the family
domicile. That state has the primary responsibility for establishing and regulating the incidents of the
family relationship and it is the only state in which the parties can, by participation in the legislative
processes, effect a change in those incidents. Moreover, it is undesirable that the rights, duties,
disabilities, and immunities conferred or imposed by the family relationship should constantly change
as members of the family cross state boundaries during temporary absences from their home."

Since the decision in Emery v. Emery, supra, two other courts have held that, when a court is
confronted with a  conflict-of-laws problem in order to resolve an issue of whether there is an
immunity from suit for tort based upon a family relationship, the law to be applied is that of the
domicile state. Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp. (1958), 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34; and Pittman v. Deiter
(1957), 10 Pa. D. C. 2d 360. The conclusion reached by the New Jersey supreme court in the  Koplik
Case, after first having rejected the law of the place of injury as applicable to the immunity question,
is stated succinctly as follows ( 27 N.J. 11, 141 A.2d 40):

"As a final word on the subject, we hold the view that even where an actual conflict-of-laws problem is
directly presented, it is sensible and logical to have disabilities to sue and immunities from suit arising
from the family relationship determined by reference to the law of the state of the family domicile
when the suit is brought in that state. Otherwise, the lex loci will be permitted to interfere seriously
with a status and a policy which the state of residence is primarily interested in maintaining."
(Citing Emery v. Emery, supra, and Ford's article in 15 University of Pittsburgh Law Review.)

Among recent law-review articles and notes approving the holding of one or more of the afore-cited
three cases, which have held that immunity from suit based on family relationship is a matter of family
law rather than tort law and should be governed by the law of the domicile, are: 31 Temple Law
Quarterly, 117, 4 Wayne Law Review, 79, and 33 Indiana Law Journal, 297. All were published in 1958.

The two reasons most often advanced for the common-law rule, that one spouse may not sue the
other, are the ancient concept that husband and wife constitute in law but one person., and that to
permit such suits will be to foment family discord and strife. The Married Women's Acts of the various
states have effectively destroyed the "one person"  concept thereby leaving as the other remaining
reason for the immunity the objective of preventing family discord. This is also the justification usually
advanced for denying an unemancipated child the capacity to sue a parent, brother, or sister. Clearly
this policy reason for denying the capacity to sue more properly lies within the sphere of family law,
where domicile usually controls the law to be applied, than it does tort law, where the place of injury
generally determines the substantive law which will govern. In making a choice between the law of the
domicile and the law of the forum, in those situations where the action is not brought in the state of
the domicile, the afore-quoted persuasive arguments advanced by the California and New Jersey courts
in Emery v. Emery, supra, and Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., supra, in favor of applying the law of
domicile to decide any issue of incapacity to sue based upon family relationship, seem unanswerable.

Rather persuasive arguments were advanced before this court in the recent case of Schwenkhoff v.
Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. (1959), 6 Wis.2d 44, 93 N.W.2d 867, that other policy considerations
require that such immunity be abolished. However, in the opinion it was pointed out that the 1957
legislature had rejected a bill which would have abolished the immunity, and that the problem was one
for the legislature rather than the court.

We are convinced that, from both the standpoint of public policy and logic, the proper solution of the
conflict-of-laws problem, in cases similar to the instant action, is to hold that the law of the domicile
is the one that ought to be applied in determining any issue of incapacity to sue based upon family
relationship.

However, in order to adopt such a conflict-of-laws rule it will be necessary to overrule at least six prior
decisions of this court, and to partially overrule two others. If it ever is proper for a court to depart
from stare decisis, we scarcely can perceive of a more-justifiable situation in which to do so. In the
first place, the rule being discarded is one lying  in the field of conflict of laws as applied to torts so
that there can hardly have been any action taken by the parties in reliance upon it. Secondly, strong
reasons of public policy exist for supplanting such rule by a better one which does not unnecessarily
discriminate against the citizens of our own state.

The most-compelling argument against taking such step is that it departs from the rule of the
Restatement, and disturbs the sought-after ideal of establishing some uniformity in the conflict-of-laws
field. However, as well appears from the cases hereinbefore cited, there is a clearly discernible trend
away from the rule of the Restatement in so far as it requires that the law of the place of wrong is to
be applied in determining questions of incapacity to sue based on family status. Furthermore, it must
be recognized that, in the field of the conflict of laws, absolutes should not be made the goal at the
sacrifice of progress in furtherance of sound public policy. The American Law Institute is now engaged
in redrafting a revised Restatement of Conflict of Laws. In such work of revision the question of
whether the law of the domicile, rather than the law of the place of wrong, should be applied, in
resolving an issue of interfamily immunity from suit in tort, will undoubtedly receive consideration.

After most careful deliberation, it is our considered judgment that this court should adopt the rule
that, whenever the courts of this state are confronted with a conflict-of-laws problem as to which law
governs the capacity of one spouse to sue the other in tort, the law to be applied is that of the state of
domicile. We, therefore, expressly overrule the cases of Buckeye v. Buckeye, supra; Forbes v.
Forbes (1938), 226 Wis. 477, 277 N.W. 112; Bourestom v. Bourestom (1939), 231 Wis. 666, 285 N.W.
426; Garlin v. Garlin (1951), 260 Wis. 187, 50 N.W.2d 373;  Scholle v. Home Mut. Casualty
Co. (1956), 273 Wis. 387, 78 N.W.2d 902; and Hansen v. Hansen (1956), 274 Wis. 262, 80 N.W.2d 230.
We do not overrule the result in the cases of Nelson v. American Employers' Ins. Co. (1951), 258 Wis.
252, 45 N.W.2d 681, and 22 A.L.R.2d 1244, and Jaeger v. Jaeger (1952), 262 Wis. 14, 53 N.W.2d 740,
but we disapprove of the holding therein that the law of place of injury controlled the issue of
interspousal immunity.

It is interesting to note that, if the rule now adopted had been applied in the first six cited overruled
automobile accident cases, the result in four of such cases would have been to hold that there was no
interspousal immunity from suit, because the parties were domiciled in Wisconsin. Only in Forbes v.
Forbes, supra, and Bourestom v. Bourestom, supra, would immunity from suit have been found to exist
if the law of the domicile, as interpreted by this court, had been applied to such issue.

The Forbes Case is the only one of the eight where the place of wrong was Wisconsin. The parties were
nonresidents domiciled in Illinois. For the reasons hereinbefore set forth, it is apparent that Illinois
rather than Wisconsin was the state most concerned with the policy considerations of whether the
plaintiff wife had capacity to sue her husband. Furthermore, the plaintiff in the Forbes Case would not
have fared worse in Wisconsin than she would have in the state of domicile.

The Bourestom Case involved "forum shopping" which ought to be discouraged rather than tolerated.
There Oklahoma was the state of injury, Minnesota the state of domicile, and Wisconsin the state of
forum. The adoption of the new rule would not in theory close the doors of our courts to a nonresident
spouse in such a situation instituting suit in Wisconsin. However, the defendant spouse might have   a
good defense in bar if he pleaded, and proved, the true state of domicile, and took the proper steps to
bring before the trial court the law of such state granting the immunity.

Perhaps a word of caution should be sounded to the effect that the instant decision should not be
interpreted as a rejection by this court of the general rule that ordinarily the substantive rights of
parties to an action in tort are to be determined in the light of the law of the place of wrong. This
decision merely holds that incapacity to sue because of marital status presents a question of family law
rather than tort law.

Earlier in this opinion we made a brief reference to our recent decision in  Bodenhagen v. Farmers Mut.
Ins. Co. In that case a wife domiciled in Wisconsin instituted suit against the insurer of her husband's
automobile to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile accident occurring in Illinois as a result of
the alleged negligence of the husband. We first looked to Illinois law to determine whether a cause of
action existed in favor of the plaintiff wife. The Illinois law was interpreted by us as holding that its
interspousal immunity against suit in tort barred only the remedy and not the cause of action, and,
therefore, Wisconsin, as the forum state, would not apply such law. A motion for rehearing was filed
subsequent to our original decision and the brief filed in support thereof caused this court to grant a
rehearing. The reason for so doing was that we entertained grave doubt as to whether we had reached
the right conclusion in holding that under Illinois law the interspousal immunity to suit in tort was
procedural and not substantive. Because of the result reached in the instant appeal we now find it
unnecessary to pass on such last-mentioned point. In an opinion this day handed down in such rehearing
in the Bodenhagen Case we have affirmed the original result, but have grounded the same upon the
principle  herein adopted, i.e., that the law of domicile controls the issue of interspousal immunity.

The concurring opinion by Mr. Justice FAIRCHILD protests that we should not adopt the conflict-of-laws
rule, that interspousal immunity to suit in tort should be determined by the law of the domicile,
because this was not urged in the briefs or arguments of counsel. However, appellant's brief did cite
and summarize Emery v. Emery, supra, and on the oral argument appellant's counsel also cited Koplik
v. C. P. Trucking Corp., supra, in which two cases such rule was adopted by the California and New
Jersey courts. While the appellant's counsel did not request that we overrule Buckeye v. Buckeye,
supra, and the subsequent Wisconsin cases dealing with this particular conflict-of-laws problem, he did
specifically seek to have this court apply California's conflict-of-laws principle, that the law of the
domicile is determinative of interspousal capacity to sue, to this particular case. However, to do so
would violate the well-recognized principle of conflict of laws that, where the substantive law of
another state is applied, there necessarily must be excluded such foreign state's law of conflict of laws.
Restatement, Conflict of Laws, p. 11, sec. 7 (b); 11 Am.Jur., Conflict of Laws, p. 296, sec. 3; 15 C.J.S.,
Conflict of Laws, p. 872, sec. 7; Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harvard Law Review, 1165, 1170,
1173; and note in 18 George Washington Law Review, 559.

While Griswold in such article written in 1938 himself advocates the application of the renvoi doctrine
in a case like the instant one, he concedes that the overwhelming weight of authority is contra. Cook,
in his "The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws," pp. 248-250, expressly rejects Griswold's
proposed solution and recommends instead the adoption of the conflict-of-laws principle that the law
of the domicile should be applied in the first instance to a question of interspousal immunity to suit in
tort.

The reason why the authorities on conflict of laws almost universally reject the renvoi doctrine
(permitting a court  of the forum state to apply the conflict-of-laws principle of a foreign state) is that
it is likely to result in the court pursuing a course equivalent to a never-ending circle. For example, in
the instant case, if the Buckeye v. Buckeye line of Wisconsin cases is to be followed, the Wisconsin
court first looks to the law of California to see whether a wife can sue her husband in tort. California
substantive law holds that she cannot. However, California has adopted a conflict-of-laws principle
that holds that the law of the domicile determines such question. Applying such principle the court is
referred back to Wisconsin law because Wisconsin is the state of domicile. Again the court applies
Wisconsin law and, under the prior holdings of the Buckeye v. Buckeye line of authorities, would have
to again refer to California law because such line of cases does not recognize that the law of domicile
has anything to do with interspousal immunity, but holds that the law of the state of injury controls.

Wisconsin certainly should not adopt the much-criticized renvoi principle in order not to overrule
the Buckeye v. Buckeye line of cases, and still permit the plaintiff to recover. Such a result we believe
would contribute far more to produce chaos in the field of conflict of laws than to overrule the
Buckeye v. Buckeye line of cases and adopt a principle the soundness of which has been commended by
so many reputable authorities.

By the Court. — Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.

Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin

FACTS:

Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas, made a will in 1952.
Unfortunately, she passed away in 1957 while she was domiciled in Iloilo City.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie, however,
also stated in her will that should her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother
and sister.

In 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled in the Philippines).
While the probate proceeding on the will of Linnie was pending, Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of
Charles, filed a motion before the probate court so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as
the administratrix of the estate. The latter was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they were
alive.

Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’
office. Hence, in the meantime, he would like to have Magno appointed as administratrix. The said
motion was approved by Judge Venicio Escolin.

Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since said
will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said
petition.

Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother
and sister and since that is her will, the same must be respected.

Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that under
Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas
law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes (Charles’ share in the
estate).

PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was
domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death (applying the renvoi doctrine).

ISSUE:

WON Texas Law should apply.

HELD:

The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court since both parties failed to adduce
proof as to the law of Texas.

The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be
resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court further
emphasized that Texas law is the applicable law at the time of Linnie’s death.