ROTE Project No. _1L162706A553-TA3-7 TECOM Project No. _3-00-513-FBT-023 OPG Oocument No. __OPG-5-4454 ec AN EVALUATION OF ENTOMOLOGICAL WARFARE - AS A POTENTIAL DANGER TO THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN NATO NATIONS (U) By William H. Rose March 1981 U.S. ARMY DUGWAY PROVING GROUND Dugway, Utah 84022 SS veo BY: Multiple Sources OPG 81-47 + 31 March 1997 Copy 6° of 69 CopiesTable 1. {U) Resource Cost Summary for an f. salarenais Aerosol Attack on a Battalion, term Cost (1976 5) Planning 8,750 Agent Productiaa 10,000 Hunftion Acquisition 9,897 Weapon Employment: 5,700 TOTAL: 4,367 1.5.1.2 (UP. Attack when Yellow Fever Inf toes. The cost of attacking a 7.5-ker grea (oattalion) with yellow fever-infected mosqut- tous was estimated. here possible, costs of equipment ware taken Fron 1976 catalogues to make the cost comparison with the aerosol pete ag valid as possible. The feasitdlity of area caverag rosquitoes was based an the Avon Park, Florida msauite teials deseripes fin Section 4 (11,12). Approximately 225,000 infected female a. aegupst are required for this hypothetical Gttaci. The mosquitoes would be released from a helicopter G10 m upwind af the targer area, Table ? contains the resource cost summary for this attack, See Table 6 page 46 for the astimated cost of munition items for the F. cutarunole ateack and Table F page 49 for the estimated cost of frems co raise 225.000 yellow fevar infected mosquitots. Table 2, (U} Resource Cost Summary for s Yellow Fever- Infected Mosquito Attack on a Gattatian. tem Gost (1978 $} Planning 8,750 Agent Production 9,066 Funttton Acquisition 2,150 Weapon Employment. 6,700 TOTAL: 26, 666 {U) Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate the probable cost differential for an aercsol vorsus EW attack when considering a given limited area such a8 that occupled by a mechanized batrelign in the fteld. in al pe on a cilitary unit would probably not be attempted because complete contro! of the Sirvays would be necessary and the attack would not be covert, The sane would be true for a pathogen aerosol attack atteepted this close to the target area. UNCLASSIFIED5.2 City Attack. 15.2.1 (U) Attack with Yeliow fever Infected Hosquitoes. The cost of akegeking an urban area covertly yeliew fever- in nosevitoes, ups estimated. [t was assumed the SOSS Of planning 2 city attack with yellow faver-infected rescuitees 1s comparable with the cost of planning an werasa) attack on Washington, OC (scenario 7 of reference 10}. [a the present hypothetical attack. 16 simultaneous attacks were planned ata total stanatag. cant of 8, The cost of one attack wauld be $547.00 ($6,750 + (U) Agent preductice would fnvalve preducing 225,000 yellow fever- infected fenale 4. This {5 the same nysber used in the hypo~ theticel bactalign ateack so the cost would be the sane ($9,066), (U) Munition acquisition was estimated to be $500.00 and weapan employment {truck rental and wages of tuo seni-gkitled people for eight aad was estimated te be $360.00. ‘These costs are gummgrized in Table Table 3. (U) Resource Cost Suemary for 4 Yellow Fever- Infected Mosquito Attack on a City. Ite Cost (1976 $) ——— Planning 547 Agant Production 9,066 Munition Acquisition $00 Weapon Employment 360 TOTAL: 10,473 THIS TABLE TS UNCLASSIFIED. .. {OPEL wee (U} The ceits of agent production, aunition acavisttion. and weapon employment were also taken from scengric 7 of reference 10. The one excepticn to this was for weapon employment, Scenario 7 included the travel and per diem costs of foreign agents traveling to the US to conduct the attack. weently described scenario. people to conduct the attack were considered to be already in the US. This makes the costs comparable to those for the yellow fever mosquito attack on acity where attack personnel were considered to be already in the US. The costs are summarized in Table 4. Table 4. (Ul) Resource Cost Summary for an F. twierensts Aarasal Attack on a City, Item Cost. (1976 §) Planning Say Agent Production 174,000 Munition Acquisition 1,435 Weapon Employment. 3,250 TOTAL: 179,232 THIS TABLE [$ UNCLASSTFIED 1.5.3 Cost Comparison Summary. — = (De i {U) The closeness of agent and agent weetor release in these two types of attacks (610 m upwind of the target ares) would preclude the advantage of covertness. Therefore, parsonnel having access to protective masks F. tularensis aerosol attack would probably have the opportun- vantage of this method of protection. | et i (OCR) sae {U) It has been estimated that between £0 and 90 percent of a foniemune population bitten by infected yellow fever mosquitoes will becone infected and 20 to 40 percent of the victims will die (12). Thus 250 percent of the perscane’ {n the battalion wauld Iikely becore tnca- pacttated and a large aunber would dig. m. rs Table §. (U) Various Estimates of Cost per Ceath for an F. sularensis Aerosol Attack on 4 City. Percent Number of Cost Fer Oeatns Geaths Death (1976 5) 5 62,500 2.86 10 125,000 1.43 20 260,000 0,72 ES] 375,000 0.48 a0 500,000 9.36 50 625,000 0.29 THIS TABLE [$ UNCLASSIFIED ‘Streptomycin, kanamycin, and chLOrAnphenicol are aleo effactivi £. tulareneda, alehough some sceains of F, cularentig are rea atrapcomycin.SEETION 3. TELL IGENCE ruroavartoN cu) {U) Since world Mar li several reports have indicated che Soviet Union nas an interest in EW. 3.1 HIRSCH REPORT ane tDt1) soe (U] The prisoners, reporiedly in chains, were placed in an efght- san tent which had a sumber of plague-infected rats and fleas under wire mets on the floor, Hast of the prisoners devalaged bubonic plague after being bitten by the fleas, Ground squirrels and other rodents uere reported t¢ save been used in similar experiments and proved to be efficient intermediary hosts. The escape of a prisoner infected with Subonte plaque started a great epidemic anang the Mongols in the sunner of Iga). Three co five thousand Mongols were reported to have died in this epidemic and were disposed of by burning or burying with disinfec- tants. (') Ticks ware also reported to have been used to transfer tick- borne encephalit1s co orisoners. In addition, fnfactad fleas and other ingect vectors were dropped fron aircraft im paper containers. (ord‘SECTION. 4.1 OPERATION BIG ITCH (8,12) (u) In 1954 4 series of trials was conducted using <7 givor's (fleas) in €-1d cunitions with cardboard and sponge inserzs. The insects were dropped from altitudes of 305 and 610 m over US Aray Dugway Proving Ground (OPG), Utah to: (1) investigate the suitability of the munition components for dissemination of these arthropod vectors; (2) determine survival and host acquisition ability of £. 3 disseninated from chese devices; (3) plot carrier patterns produced by E-ig munitions filled with the special carriers. (U} Tha fleas were successfully reared to the appropriate stage, ‘then dropped on the target with little or no dle-off. After release, the insects were successful if acquiring hosts but were sot active longer than 24 hours. [he sponge carriers were the most widely distri- buted, a indicated by cerrier patterns. (U) Mo calculations of effects were attempted in this report. 4,2 OPERATION BIG BUZZ (12,18) {U) In May 1955 a field test was conducted in Georgia to (1) demon strate the feasibility of mags-oroducing, storing, leading into munt- tions, and disseminating sosquitoas from aircraft. and fe fo determine ff the mosquitoes wuld survive the afrdrog and take blood seals fros humans. (u) More than one million uninfected i. ti were produced and stored for nearly two weeks. About one third of these sosquiltocs were placed in E-14 munitions (containing “alrconb waffles” and “loop tubes") and fn 0.76 m racket-shated ground release munitions, and dropped, with- ouk mortality, from alrersfi, The remaining mosduitocs were used in munition loading and storage tests. Mosquitoes were released from E-14 munitions when they were 91 @ above the ground. The mosquitoes vere dispersed by the wind and their own flight and were collected as far as 610m dowmvind from the target relegse site, The female mosquito were active in seeking blood meals from humans and guinea pigs. 4,3 OPERATION OROP KICK (12,15){DHL 4.5 OPERATION MAY DAY (12,17) (U) Operation MAY DAY consisted of studies o and atepersign in an urban area (Savanah, Gaergta) Kovember 1356. (U) The tests were designed to give information on the dispersal of 4, sapere from a greurd leval point-source release {n a short period of time. Results were based primarily on mosquito recovertes ‘obtained in dry-ice baited traps. In these tests a small fraction (0.5 percent to 7.75 percent} of the total number of mosquitoes eT betivity 16SEI iD RECOMMENDED DEFENSIVE MEASURES ON 7. CONCLUSIONS 7.1 CONCLUSIONS (U) Intelligence information gathered about the Karsaw Pact countries indicates that In the past, they have attemoted developeent of an EN capasitity, Indirect evidence, @.9., 9a33 rearing of potential insect vectors and working with microbiological agents compatible with EW that are not 4 problem in these countriés, comprises the evidence available to indicate present activity in thig area, The Warsaw Pact nations certainly have the capability to conduct EW, {U) The a. cemypti/yellow fever virus systen 1s estinated to be the most likely antioersonnel EH system that could be used by the Warsaw Pact countries against the United States or the European HATO nations. Foot. and mouth disease virus {3 4 likely animal EW agent that could be effec- tively seread by 4, demwerted, (U) In the magnituce of the city attack scenarios described in this report, i. ‘1 simultaneous attacks on urban aveas, the A. aegured/ yellow fever virus EW attack system was Qstimated to be less cost effec- tive than the F, fuiarenste aeroso] code of attack in casualties praduced, but ft may be more cost effective when considaring mortalities produced. The 4, cegyprt/yellow fever virws attack system becomes more cost offec- tive fn relation to the 7, culareneds seroso] attack moda if the magnitude ‘of the attack becomes smaller, and less affective when the magnitude becomes greater. The A. aegyptd/yellow fever virus EW attack systen also requires lets expertise to develop and employ than the °, telerenate aerosol system {u) EN systems are not likely to be enployed on military units because the agent vectors must be released tog clase to the target ares. This would make a covert attack on a military unit very difficult to achieve, EM could be very effectively used againse civilian urtan Dopulations or it could be used to cause great economic losses in the cattle and livestock industry. 7.2 RECOMMENDED DEFEHSIVE MEASURES (U) When en EM attack ona city 15 suspected or when a large popu- lation of mosquitoes or ober Insects unexpected! y appears in an abnor- mal way, reaction must be swift. Insecticide spray operations should be initiated as soon as possible. At the same time, the general popu- Tation must be warned by radio, television, and newspapers. If the ingects are emsquitees the warning should include advice to stay Indoors and the keeo unscreened doors and windows closed at all times. Those who aust venture outside should be protected as much a possible. Suggested protection should include wearing mosquito netting over face UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED and neck and the use of mosquito repellant. Long sleeve shirts with Gloves tightly fastened around the wrists should be worn, Panes should be fastened tightly around the ankles and two pairs of socks worn, Hats should be worn to protect the tops of heads. {U) Where possible, insecticide spraying should be started tn individual dwellings. In the event of an EW plague attack, welt should be assured that ft 15 treatable and in the event of plaque symp- toms, antibiotic treatment must not be delayed. Tf suffictent evidence ds available that a plague flea attack has occurred, and ff sufficient antibiotics are available, antibiotic treatment of flea-bitten individ- uals might even be given before the appearance of symptons. (U})_ Panic is one of tha most important things to prevent in the event of an EW attack on tha general population. People mst be assured that, ordinarily, the best procedure for them to follow is not to flee the area but to stay and receive proper treatment, or if mos- quitoes are the vector, to stay inside and stay protected, TNC) ASSIeIeN