[G.R. No. 110249.
August 21, 1997] Petitioners
ALFREDO TANO, BALDOMERO TANO, DANILO
TANO, ROMUALDO TANO, TEOCENES MIDELLO,
ANGEL DE MESA, EULOGIO TREMOCHA, FELIPE
ONGONION, JR., ANDRES LINIJAN, ROBERT LIM,
VIRGINIA LIM, FELIMON DE MESA, GENEROSO
ARAGON, TEODORICO ANDRE, ROMULO DEL
ROSARIO, CHOLITO ANDRE, ERICK MONTANO,
ANDRES OLIVA, VITTORIO SALVADOR,
LEOPOLDO ARAGON, RAFAEL RIBA,
ALEJANDRO LEONILA, JOSE DAMACINTO,
RAMIRO MANAEG, RUBEN MARGATE,
ROBERTO REYES, DANILO PANGARUTAN, NOE
GOLPAN,ESTANISLAO ROMERO, NICANOR
DOMINGO, ROLDAN TABANG, PANGANIBAN,
ADRIANO TABANG, FREDDIE SACAMAY,
MIGUEL TRIMOCHA, PACENCIO LABABIT,
PABLO H. OMPAD, CELESTINO A. ABANO,
ALLAN ALMODAL, BILLY D. BARTOLAY,
ALBINO D. LIQUE, MELCHOR J. LAYSON,
MELANI AMANTE, CLARO E. YATOC,
MERGELDO B. BALDEO, EDGAR M. ALMASET A.,
JOSELITO MANAEG, LIBERATO ANDRADA, JR.,
ROBERTO BERRY, RONALD VILLANUEVA,
EDUARDO VALMORIA, WILDREDO MENDOZA,
NAPOLEON BABANGA, ROBERTO TADEPA,
RUBEN ASINGUA, SILVERIO GABO, JERRY
ROMERO, DAVID PANGAGARUTAN, DANIEL
PANGGARUTAN, ROMEO AGAWIN, FERNANDO
EQUIZ, DITO LEQUIZ, RONILO ODERABLE,
BENEDICTO TORRES, ROSITO A. VALDEZ,
CRESENCIO A. SAYANG, NICOMEDES S.
ACOSTA, ERENEO A. SEGARINO, JR., WILDREDO
A. RAUTO, DIOSDADO A. ACOSTA, BONIFACIO G.
SISMO, TACIO ALUBA, DANIEL B. BATERZAL,
ELISEO YBAEZ, DIOSDADO E. HANCHIC, EDDIE
ESCALICAS, ELEAZAR B. BATERZAL,
DOMINADOR HALICHIC, ROOSEVELT RISMO-
AN, ROBERT C. MERCADER, TIRSO ARESGADO,
DANIEL CHAVEZ, DANILO CHAVEZ, VICTOR
VILLAROEL, ERNESTO C. YABANEZ, ARMANDO
T. SANTILLAN, RUDY S. SANTILLAN, JODJEN
ILUSTRISIMO, NESTOR SALANGRON, ALBERTO
SALANGRON, ROGER L. ROXAS, FRANCISCO T.
ANTICANO, PASTOR SALANGRON, BIENVENIDO
SANTILLAN, GILBUENA LADDY, FIDEL
BENJAMIN JOVELITO BELGANO, HONEY
PARIOL, ANTONIO SALANGRON, NICASIO
SALANGRON, & AIRLINE SHIPPERS
ASSOCIATION OF PALAWAN, Petitioners, vs. GOV.
SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, MEMBERS OF
SANGGUNIAN PANLALAWIGAN OF PALAWAN,
namely, VICE-GOVERNOR JOEL T. REYES, JOSE
D. ZABALA, ROSALINO R. ACOSTA, JOSELITO A.
CADLAON, ANDRES R. BAACO, NELSON P.
PENEYRA, CIPRIANO C. BARROMA, CLARO E.
ORDINARIO, ERNESTO A. LLACUN, RODOLFO C.
FLORDELIZA, GILBERT S. BAACO, WINSTON G.
ARZAGA, NAPOLEON F. ORDONEZ and GIL P.
ACOSTA, CITY MAYOR EDWARD HAGEDORN,
MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG
PUERTO PRINCESA, ALL MEMBERS OF BANTAY
DAGAT, MEMBERS OF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE OF PALAWAN, PROVINCIAL AND CITY
PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN and PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY, and ALL JUDGES OF PALAWAN,
REGIONAL, MUNICIPAL AND
METROPOLITAN, Respondents.
. breathing not necessarily moving.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
caption their petition as one
for Certiorari, Injunction With Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction,with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and pray that this Court: (1) declare as unconstitutional: (a)
Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992, of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b) Office
Order No. 23, Series of 1993, dated 22 January 1993,
issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto
Princesa City; and (c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2,
Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993, of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; (2) enjoin the
enforcement thereof; and (3) restrain respondents
Provincial and City Prosecutors of Palawan and Puerto
Princesa City and Judges of Regional Trial Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts1 and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and
hearing cases concerning the violation of the Ordinances
and of the Office Order.
More appropriately, the petition is, and shall be treated as, a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.
The following is petitioners summary of the factual
antecedents giving rise to the petition:
1. On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng
Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which
took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: AN ORDINANCE
BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND
LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM
JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND
PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF, the full text of which
reads as follows:
Section 1. Title of the Ordinance. - This Ordinance is
entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT
OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE
PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993
TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING
EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES THEREOF.
Section 2. Purpose, Scope and Coverage. - To effectively
free our City Sea Waters from Cyanide and other
Obnoxious substance, and shall cover all persons and/or
entities operating within and outside the City of Puerto
Princesa who is are [sic] directly or indirectly in the
business or shipment of live fish and lobster outside the
City.
Section 3. Definition of terms. - For purpose of this
Ordinance the following are hereby defined:
A. SEA BASS - A kind of fish under the family of
Centropomidae, better known as APAHAP;
B. CATFISH - A kind of fish under the family of
Plotosidae, better known as HITO-HITO;
C. MUDFISH - A kind of fish under the family of
Orphicaphalisae better known as DALAG
D. ALL LIVE FISH - All alive, breathing not necessarily
moving of all specie[s] use for food and for aquarium
purposes.
E. LIVE LOBSTER - Several relatively, large marine
crustaceans of the genus Homarus that are alive and
1
Section 4. It shall be unlawful [for] any person or any
Page
business enterprise or company to ship out from Puerto
Princesa City to any point of destination either via aircraft
or seacraft of any live fish and lobster except SEA BASS,
CATFISH, MUDFISH, AND MILKFISH FRIES.
Section 5. Penalty Clause. - Any person/s and or business
entity violating this Ordinance shall be penalized with a
fine of not more than P5,000.00 or imprisonment of not
more than twelve (12) months, cancellation of their permit
to do business in the City of Puerto Princesa or all of the
herein stated penalties, upon the discretion of the court.
Section 6. If the owner and/or operator of the establishment
found vilating the provisions of this ordinance is a
corporation or a partnership, the penalty prescribed in
Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon its president and/or
General Manager or Managing Partner and/or Manager, as
the case maybe [sic].
Section 7. Any existing ordinance or any provision of any
ordinance inconsistent to [sic] this ordinance is deemed
repealed.
Section 8. This Ordinance shall take effect on January 1,
1993.
SO ORDAINED.
xxx
2. To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City
Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23,
Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as
follows:
In the interest of public service and for purposes of City
Ordinance No. PD426-14-74, otherwise known as AN
ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED
OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS,
TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION
OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY OF THE
ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO
BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYORS PERMIT and
City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING
THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER
OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM
JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998, you are
hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct
necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and
lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport,
Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction
of the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via
aircraft or seacraft.
The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the
shipper possessed the required Mayors Permit issued by
this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or
clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as to compliance with
all other existing rules and regulations on the matter.
Any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the
required documents as stated herein must be held for proper
disposition.
In the pursuit of this Order, you are hereby authorized to
coordinate with the PAL Manager, the PPA Manager, the
local PNP Station and other offices concerned for the
needed support and cooperation. Further, that the usual
courtesy and diplomacy must be observed at all times in the
conduct of the inspection.
Please be guided accordingly.
xxx
3. On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No.
33 entitled: A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE
CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING,
SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL
DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT:
FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS
FASCIATUS (SUNO). CROMILEPTES
ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER
BELOW 200 GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRADACNA
GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA
MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS,
GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS
MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR
MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR
GREEN GROUPER) AND
FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM
FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND
COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS, the full text of
which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, scientific and factual researches [sic] and
studies disclose that only five (5) percent of the corals of
our province remain to be in excellent condition as [a]
habitat of marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms;
WHEREAS, it cannot be gainsaid that the destruction and
devastation of the corals of our province were principally
due to illegal fishing activities like dynamite fishing,
sodium cyanide fishing, use of other obnoxious substances
and other related activities;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative and urgent need to
protect and preserve the existence of the remaining
excellent corals and allow the devastated ones to
reinvigorate and regenerate themselves into vitality within
the span of five (5) years;
WHEREAS, Sec. 468, Par. 1, Sub-Par. VI of the [sic] R.A.
7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991 empowers the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to protect
the environment and impose appropriate penalties [upon]
acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, among
others.
NOW, THEREFORE, on motion by Kagawad Nelson P.
Peneyra and upon unanimous decision of all the members
present;
Be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to approve
Resolution No. 33, Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and to enact Ordinance No. 2 for the purpose,
to wit:
ORDINANCE NO. 2
Series of 1993
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN IN SESSION ASSEMBLED:
Section 1. TITLE - This Ordinance shall be known as an
Ordinance Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing,
buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms, to wit: 1. Family: Scaridae (Mameng),
2. Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno), 3. Cromileptes altivelis
(Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and
spawning), 4. Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada
Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and
other species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder
size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green
Grouper) and 8. Family: Balistidae (Topical Aquarium
2
Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and coming from
Page
Palawan Waters.
Section II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
1. Sec. 2-A (Rep. Act 7160). It is hereby declared, the
policy of the state that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the attainment of national
goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for [a] more
responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby
local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources.
2. Sec. 5-A (R.A. 7160). Any provision on a power of [a]
local Government Unit shall be liberaly interpreted in its
favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower
government units. Any fair and reasonable doubts as to the
existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the
Local Government Unit concerned.
3. Sec. 5-C (R.A. 7160). The general welfare provisions in
this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers
to local government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the
people in the community.
4. Sec. 16 (R.A. 7160). General Welfare. - Every local
government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance; and those which are essential to
the promotion of the general welfare.
Section III. DECLARATION OF POLICY. - It is hereby
declared to be the policy of the Province of Palawan to
protect and conserve the marine resources of Palawan not
only for the greatest good of the majority of the present
generation but with [the] proper perspective and
consideration of [sic] their prosperity, and to attain this end,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan henceforth declares that is
[sic] shall be unlawful for any person or any business entity
to engage in catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling
and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms as enumerated in Section 1 hereof in and coming
out of Palawan Waters for a period of five (5) years;
Section IV. PENALTY CLAUSE. - Any person and/or
business entity violating this Ordinance shall be penalized
with a fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, and/or imprisonment of
six (6) months to twelve (12) months and confiscation and
forfeiture of paraphernalias [sic] and equipment in favor of
the government at the discretion of the Court;
Section V. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE. - If for any reason,
a Section or provision of this Ordinance shall be held as
unconditional [sic] or invalid, it shall not affect the other
provisions hereof.
Section VI. REPEALING CLAUSE. - Any existing
Ordinance or a provision of any ordinance inconsistent
herewith is deemed modified, amended or repealed.
Section VII. EFFECTIVITY. - This Ordinance shall take
effect ten (10) days after its publication.
SO ORDAINED.
xxx
4. The respondents implemented the said ordinances,
Annexes A and C hereof thereby depriving all the
fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of
Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the
petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and
other marine merchants from performing their lawful
occupation and trade;
5. Petitioners Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Teocenes
Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, and Felipe
Ongonion, Jr. were even charged criminally under criminal
case no. 93-05-C in the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Cuyo-Agutaya-Magsaysay, an original carbon copy of the
criminal complaint dated April 12, 1993 is hereto attached
as Annex D; while xerox copies are attached as Annex D to
the copies of the petition;
6. Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, o n the other
hand, were charged by the respondent PNP with the
respondent City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City, a xerox
copy of the complaint is hereto attached as Annex E;
Without seeking redress from the concerned local
government units, prosecutors office and courts, petitioners
directly invoked our original jurisdiction by filing this
petition on 4 June 1993. In sum, petitioners contend that:
First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law,
their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII
and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.
Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor
condition under which the Mayors permit could be granted
or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute
authority to determine whether or not to issue permit.
Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan
altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession,
buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling
organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or
gathered through lawful fishing method, the Ordinance
took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their
livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-
members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned,
they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation
and entering into contracts which are proper, necessary, and
essential to carry out their business endeavors to a
successful conclusion.
Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal cases based
thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to be
dismissed.
In the Resolution of 15 June 1993 we required respondents
to comment on the petition, and furnished the Office of the
Solicitor General with a copy thereof.
In their comment filed on 13 August 1993, public
respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the
validity of Ordinance No.2, Series of 1993, as a valid
exercise of the Provincial Governments power under the
general welfare clause (Section 16 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 [hereafter, LGC]), and its
specific power to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section
458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC.
They claimed that in the exercise of such powers, the
Province of Palawan had the right and responsibilty to
3
insure that the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells
Page
[sic], within its territory remain healthy for the future
generation. The Ordinance, they further asserted, covered
only live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms which
were enumerated in the ordinance and excluded other kinds
of live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral
reefs; besides the prohibition was for only five (5) years to
protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow those
damaged to regenerate.
Aforementioned respondents likewise maintained that there
was no violation of due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. As to the former, public
hearings were conducted before the enactment of the
Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and
employed reasonable means; while as to the latter, a
substantial distinction existed between a fisherman who
catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a
fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of
selling it live, i.e., the former uses sodium cyanide while
the latter does not. Further, the Ordinance applied equally
to all those belonging to one class.
On 25 October 1993 petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the
Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
claiming that despite the pendency of this case, Branch 50
of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan was bent on
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 11223 against
petitioners Danilo Tano, Alfredo Tano, Eulogio Tremocha,
Romualdo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Andres Lemihan and
Angel de Mesa for violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan. Acting on said
plea, we issued on 11 November 1993 a temporary
restraining order directing Judge Angel Miclat of said court
to cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment
and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 11223.
On 12 July 1994, we excused the Office of the Solicitor
General from filing a comment, considering that as claimed
by said office in its Manifestation of 28 June 1994,
respondents were already represented by counsel.
The rest of the respondents did not file any comment on the
petition.
In the resolution of 15 September 1994, we resolved to
consider the comment on the petition as the Answer, gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 22 April 1997 we ordered impleaded as party
respondents the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau
of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and required the Office
of the Solicitor General to comment on their behalf. But in
light of the latters motion of 9 July 1997 for an extension of
time to file the comment which would only result in further
delay, we dispensed with said comment.
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolved
to dismiss this petition for want of merit, on 22 July 1997,
and assigned it to the ponente for the writing of the opinion
of the Court.
I likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of original
There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case. The
first is composed of Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano,
Danilo Tano, Romualdo Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de
Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Andres
Linijan, and Felimon de Mesa, who were criminally
charged with violating Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Resolution No. 33 and Ordinance No. 2,
Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan, in Criminal
Case No. 93-05-C of the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Palawan;3 and Robert Lim and Virginia Lim
who were charged with violating City Ordinance No. 15-92
of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1993, of the Province of Palawan before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa.4 All of them, with the
exception of Teocenes Midello, Felipe Ongonion, Jr.,
Felimon de Mesa, Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, are
likewise the accused in Criminal Case No. 11223 for the
violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan, pending before Branch 50 of the
Regional Trial Court of
Palawan.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the
petitioners numbering seventy-seven (77), all of whom,
except the Airline Shippers Association of Palawan -- an
alleged private association of several marine merchants --
are natural persons who claim to be fishermen.
The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of
course, to prevent the prosecution, trial and determination
of the criminal cases until the constitutionality or legality of
the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been
resolved. The second set of petitioners merely claim that
they being fishermen or marine merchants, they would be
adversely affected by the ordinances.
As to the first set of petitioners, this special civil
for certiorari must fail on the ground of prematurity
amounting to a lack of cause of action. There is no showing
that the said petitioners, as the accused in the criminal
cases, have filed motions to quash the informations therein
and that the same were denied. The ground available for
such motions is that the facts charged therein do not
constitute an offense because the ordinances in question are
unconstitutional.6 It cannot then be said that the lower
courts acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion to justify recourse to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition. It must
further be stressed that even if the petitioners did file
motions to quash, the denial thereof would not forthwith
give rise to a cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The general rule is that where a motion to quash is
denied, the remedy therefrom is not certiorari, but for the
party aggrieved thereby to go to trial without prejudice to
reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and if,
after trial on the merits of adverse decision is rendered, to
appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.7 And,
even where in an exceptional circumstance such denial may
be the subject of a special civil action for certiorari,  a
motion for reconsideration must have to be filed to allow
the court concerned an opportunity to correct its errors,
unless such motion may be dispensed with because of
existing exceptional circumstances.8 Finally, even if a
motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied, the
remedy under Rule 65 is still unavailable absent any
showing of the grounds provided for in Section 1
thereof.9 For obvious reasons, the petition at bar does not,
and could not have, alleged any of such grounds.
As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is
obviously one for DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for a
declaration that the Ordinances in question are a nullity...
for being unconstitutional.10 As such, their petition must
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only
questions of law are involved,11 it being settled that the
Court merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such
petitions.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
II
Even granting arguendo  that the first set of petitioners have
a cause of action ripe for the extraordinary writ
4
of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy
Page
of courts, and no special and important reason or
exceptional or compelling circumstance has been adduced
why direct recourse to us should be allowed. While we
have concurrent jurisdiction with Regional Trial courts and
with the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, so we held
in People v. Cuaresma:13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior)
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established
policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Courts time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the
Courts docket.
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time,
and to enjoin strict adherence thereto in the light of what it
perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants
and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called
extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals,
passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by
the highest tribunal of the land.
In Santiago v. Vasquez,14 this Court forcefully expressed
that the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the
hierarchy of courts must be put to a halt, not only because
of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court, but
also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended
or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has
to be remanded or referred to the lower court, the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We
reiterated the judicial policy that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot
be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of [its] primary
jurisdiction.
III
Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles against
the first set of petitioners, we opt to resolve this case on its
merits considering that the lifetime of the challenged
Ordinances is about to end. Ordinance No. 15-92 of the
City of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1 January
1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan,
enacted on 19 February 1993, is effective for only five (5)
years. Besides, these Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted
in the exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the
protection and preservation of the environment and are thus
novel and of paramount importance. No further delay then
may be allowed in the resolution of the issues raised.
It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances
enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption
of constitutionality.15 To overthrow this presumption, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In
short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt.16 Where doubt exists, even if well
founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To
doubt is to sustain.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the
provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to have
been violated, we find petitioners contentions baseless and
so hold that the former do not suffer from any infirmity,
both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
Petitioners specifically point to Section 2, Article XII and
Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution as having
been transgressed by the Ordinances.
The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article XII reads:
SEC. 2. x x x
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide:
Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the
commitment to create economic opportunities based on
freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
xxx
SEC. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence
fishermen, especially of local communities, to the
preferential use of the communal marine and fishing
resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support
to such fishermen through appropriate technology and
research, adequate financial, production, and marketing
assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect,
develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall
extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen
against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just
share from their labor in the utilization of marine and
fishing resources.
There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners
qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. In their
petition, petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan
is described as a private association composed of Marine
Merchants; petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as
merchants; while the rest of the petitioners claim to be
fishermen, without any qualification, however, as to their
status.
Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a
definition of the terms subsistence or marginal
fishermen,18 they should be construed in their general and
ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an individual
engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his
harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is
barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of
gathering the fish,19 while a subsistence fisherman is one
whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his
livelihood.20 Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160)
defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as an individual
engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be
5
limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or
Page
marine products produced by himself and his immediate
family. It bears repeating that nothing in the record
supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these
definitions.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to
bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress
on the duty of the State to protect the nations marine
wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that the
State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with
priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers,
lakes, bays, and lagoons. Our survey of the statute books
reveals that the only provision of law which speaks of the
preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section 149 of
the LGC of 1991 which pertinently provides:
SEC. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. -- x x x
(b) The sangguniang bayan may:
(1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster,
mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a
definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by
it: Provided, however, That duly registered organizations
and cooperatives of marginal fishermen shall have
preferential right to such fishery privileges....
In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3, dated 25 April 1996,
the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and the
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government prescribed the guidelines on the preferential
treatment of small fisherfolk relative to the fishery right
mentioned in Section 149. This case, however, does not
involve such fishery right.
Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the
use of communal marine and fishing resources, but of their
protection, development, and conservation. As hereafter
shown, the ordinances in question are meant precisely to
protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that
their enjoyment by the people may be guaranteed not only
for the present generation, but also for the generations to
come.
The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal
fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all
absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine
resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,
their exploration, development and utilization... shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State.
Moreover, their mandated protection, development, and
conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of
the Constitution, imply certain restrictions on whatever
right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone. Thus,
as to the curtailment of the preferential treatment of
marginal fisherman, the following exchange between
Commissioner Francisco Rodrigo and Commissioner Jose
F.S. Bengzon, Jr., took place at the plenary session of the
Constitutional Commission:
MR. RODRIGO:
Let us discuss the implementation of this because I would
not raise the hopes of our people, and afterwards fail in the
implementation. How will this be implemented? Will there
be a licensing or giving of permits so that government
officials will know that one is really a marginal fisherman?
Or if policeman say that a person is not a marginal
fisherman, he can show his permit, to prove that indeed he
is one.
MR. BENGZON:
Certainly, there will be some mode of licensing insofar as
this is concerned and this particular question could be
tackled when we discuss the Article on Local Governments
-- whether we will leave to the local governments or to
Congress on how these things will be implemented. But
certainly, I think our Congressmen and our local officials
will not be bereft of ideas on how to implement this
mandate.
xxx
MR. RODRIGO:
So, once one is licensed as a marginal fisherman,
he can go anywhere in the Philippines and fish in
any fishing grounds.
MR. BENGZON:
Subject to whatever rules and regulations and local laws
that may be passed, may be existing or will be
passed.21 (underscoring supplied for emphasis).
What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy
enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of the State
to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.22 On this score, in Oposa v.
Factoran,23 this Court declared:
While the right to balanced and healthful ecology is to be
found under the Declaration of Principles the State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is
less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less
than self-preservation and self-perpetuation - aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners - the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need
not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed
to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless
the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health
are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the
first and protect and advance the second, the day would not
be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come - generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable
of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it
a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment...
The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely
seek to give flesh and blood to the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, the General
Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right:
SEC. 16. General Welfare.-- Every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion
of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage
and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
6
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
Page
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain
peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience
of their inhabitants. (underscoring supplied).
Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that
the general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to the local government
units in accelerating economic development and upgrading
the quality of life for the people of the community.
The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant
fishery privileges in municipal waters and to impose
rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate
ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous
substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious
methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the
provisions of applicable fishery laws.24 Further,
the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and
the sangguniang panlalawigan  are directed to enact
ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and
its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances
that [p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as
dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing...
and such other activities which result in pollution,
acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of
ecological imbalance.25chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of
decentralization26 as expressly mandated by the
Constitution.27 Indispensable thereto is devolution and the
LGC expressly provides that [a]ny provision on a power of
a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its
favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower
local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to
the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of
the local government unit concerned,28 Devolution refers to
the act by which the National Government confers power
and authority upon the various local government units to
perform specific functions and
responsibilities.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of
the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws
in municipal waters including the conservation of
mangroves.30 This necessarily includes enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within
the municipal waters.
The term municipal waters, in turn, include not only
streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, not
being the subject of private ownership and not comprised
within the national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest
reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine waters
included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the
general coastline from points where the boundary lines of
the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third
line parallel with the general coastline and fifteen
kilometers from it.31 Under P.D. No. 704, the marine waters
included in municipal waters is limited to three nautical
miles from the general coastline using the above
perpendicular lines and a third parallel line.
These fishery laws which local government units may
enforce under Section 17(b), (2), (i) in municipal waters
include: (1) P.D. No. 704; (2) P.D. No. 1015 which, inter
alia, authorizes the establishment of a closed season in any
Philippine water if necessary for conservation or ecological
purposes; (3) P.D. No. 1219 which provides for the
exploration, exploitation, utilization, and conservation of
coral resources; (4) R.A. No. 5474, as amended by B.P.
Blg. 58, which makes it unlawful for any person,
association, or corporation to catch or cause to be caught,
sell, offer to sell, purchase, or have in possession any of the
fish specie called gobiidae or ipon during closed season;
and (5) R.A. No. 6451 which prohibits and punishes
electrofishing, as well as various issuances of the BFAR.
To those specifically devolved insofar as the control and
regulation of fishing in municipal waters and the protection
of its marine environment are concerned, must be added the
following:
1. Issuance of permits to construct fish cages within
municipal waters;
2. Issuance of permits to gather aquarium
fishes within municipal waters;
3. Issuance of permits to gather kapis shells
within municipal waters;
4. Issuance of permits to gather/culture
shelled mollusks within municipal waters;
5. Issuance of licenses to establish seaweed
farms within municipal waters;
6. Issuance of licenses to establish culture
pearls within municipal waters;
7. Issuance of auxiliary invoice to transport
fish and fishery products; and
8. Establishment of closed season in municipal waters.
These functions are covered in the Memorandum of
Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local
Government.
In light then of the principles of decentralization and
devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to
local government units under Section 16 (the General
Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi),
458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably
involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the
questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
Parenthetically, we wish to add that these Ordinances find
full support under R.A. No. 7611, otherwise known as the
Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act,
approved on 19 July 1992. This statute adopts a
comprehensive framework for the sustainable development
of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the
natural resources and endangered environment of the
province, which shall serve to guide the local government
of Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the
formulation and implementation of plans, programs and
projects affecting said
province.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At this time then, it would be appropriate to determine the
relation between the assailed Ordinances and the aforesaid
powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Puerto Princesa and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Palawan to protect the environment. To begin,
we ascertain the purpose of the Ordinances as set forth in
the statement of purposes or declaration of policies quoted
earlier.
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two
principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a closed
season for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered
therein for a period of five years, and (2) to protect the
corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa
and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to
illegal fishing activities.
The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the
devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal
waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the
establishment of closed seasons. The devolution of such
7
power has been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum
Page
of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local
Government.
The realization of the second objective falls within both the
general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate
thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts
which endanger the
environment.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The destruction of the coral reefs results in serious, if not
irreparable, ecological imbalance, for coral reefs are among
the natures life-support systems.34 They collect, retain, and
recycle nutrients for adjacent nearshore areas such as
mangroves, seagrass beds, and reef flats; provide food for
marine plants and animals; and serve as a protective shelter
for aquatic organisms.35 It is said that [e]cologically, the
reefs are to the oceans what forests are to continents: they
are shelter and breeding grounds for fish and plant species
that will disappear without
them.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The prohibition against catching live fish stems, in part,
from the modern phenomenon of live-fish trade which
entails the catching of so-called exotic tropical species of
fish not only for aquarium use in the West, but also for the
market for live banquet fish [which] is virtually insatiable
in ever more affluent Asia.37 These exotic species are coral-
dwellers, and fishermen catch them by diving in shallow
water with corraline habitats and squirting sodium cyanide
poison at passing fish directly or onto coral crevices; once
affected the fish are immobilized [merely stunned] and then
scooped by hand.38 The diver then surfaces and dumps his
catch into a submerged net attached to the skiff. Twenty
minutes later, the fish can swim normally. Back on shore,
they are placed in holding pens, and within a few weeks,
they expel the cyanide from their system and are ready to
be hauled. Then they are placed in saltwater tanks or
packaged in plastic bags filled with seawater for shipment
by air freight to major markets for live food fish.39 While
the fish are meant to survive, the opposite holds true for
their former home as [a]fter the fisherman squirts the
cyanide, the first thing to perish is the reef algae, on which
fish feed. Days later, the living coral starts to expire. Soon
the reef loses its function as habitat for the fish, which eat
both the algae and invertebrates that cling to the coral. The
reef becomes an underwater graveyard, its skeletal remains
brittle, bleached of all color and vulnerable to erosion from
the pounding of the waves.40 It has been found that cyanide
fishing kills most hard and soft corals within three months
of repeated application.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance
No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa and the prohibited
acts provided in Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 of the
Province of Palawan, on one hand, and the use of sodium
cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious. In sum, the
public purpose and reasonableness of the Ordinances may
not then be controverted.
As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting
City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of the City of Puerto
Princesa, we find nothing therein violative of any
constitutional or statutory provision. The Order refers to the
implementation of the challenged ordinance and is not the
Mayors Permit.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
relies upon the lack of authority on the part of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact
Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1992, on the theory that the
subject thereof is within the jurisdiction and responsibility
of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR)
under P.D. No. 704, otherwise known as the Fisheries
Decree of 1975; and that, in any event, the Ordinance is
unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of the
Department of Natural Resources (DNR), likewise in
accordance with P.D. No. 704.
The majority is unable to accommodate this view. The
jurisdiction and responsibility of the BFAR under P. D. no.
704, over the management, conservation, development,
protection, utilization and disposition of all fishery and
aquatic resources of the country is not all-encompassing.
First, Section 4 thereof excludes from such jurisdiction and
responsibility municipal waters, which shall be under the
municipal or city government concerned, except insofar as
fishpens and seaweed culture in municipal in municipal
centers are concerned. This section provides, however, that
all municipal or city ordinances and resolutions affecting
fishing and fisheries and any disposition thereunder shall be
submitted to the Secretary of the Department of Natural
Resources for appropriate action and shall have full force
and effect only upon his
approval.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Second, it must at once be pointed out that the BFAR is no
longer under the Department of Natural Resources (now
Department of Environment and Natural Resources).
Executive Order No. 967 of 30 June 1984 transferred the
BFAR from the control and supervision of the Minister
(formerly Secretary) of Natural Resources to the Ministry
of Agriculture and Food (MAF) and converted it into a
mere staff agency thereof, integrating its functions with the
regional offices of the MAF.
In Executive Order No. 116 of 30 January 1987, which
reorganized the MAF, the BFAR was retained as an
attached agency of the MAF. And under the Administrative
Code of 1987,43 the BFAR is placed under the Title
concerning the Department of
44
Agriculture. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged
Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is invalid or
unenforceable because it was not approved by the Secretary
of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be sought
would be that of the Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting
fishing and fisheries in municipal waters has been
dispensed with in view of the following reasons:
(1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly
repeals or amends Section 16 and 29 of P.D. No.
70445 insofar that they are inconsistent with the provisions
of the LGC.
(2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of
the LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia,
to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests
municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in
municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges
therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of
explosives, noxious or poisonous substances,
electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of
fishing; and to prosecute other methods of fishing; and to
prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable
fishing laws.46 Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang
bayan,  the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang
panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to [p]rotect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts
which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing
and other forms of destructive fishing and such other
activities which result in pollution, acceleration of
eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological
imbalance.47chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
8
Page
In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod  of
the City of Puerto Princesa and Sangguniang
Panlalawigan  of the Province of Palawan for exercising
the requisite political will to enact urgently needed [G.R. No. 120871. December 7, 1995.]
legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment,
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v.
thereby sharing in the herculean task of arresting the tide of COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S.
ecological destruction. We hope that other local LABITORIA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 161, REGIONAL
government units shall now be roused from their lethargy TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; SEA MAR
and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the TRADING CO. INC.; EASTERN LAGOON FISHING CORP.;
decimation of our legacy to future generations. At this time, MINAMAR FISHING CORP.; MUNICIPALITY OF
BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B.
the repercussions of any further delay in their response may
PACIS, Respondents.
prove disastrous, if not, irreversible.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for DECISION

lack of merit and the temporary restraining order issued on
11 November 1993 is LIFTED.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump

created by affluence and profligate consumption and
extravagance of the rich or fishing in the murky waters of
the Pasig River and the Laguna Lake or making a clearing
in the forest so that he can produce food for his family, to
[G.R. No. 120865-71. December 7, 1995.]
understand why protecting birds, fish, and trees is more
important than protecting him and keeping his family
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. alive.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL How do we strike a balance between environmental
COURT OF BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET protection, on the one hand, and the individual personal
DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO ARROYO; THE
MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO
interests of people, on the other?
B. PACIS, Respondents.
Towards environmental protection and ecology,
[G.R. No. 120866. December 7, 1995.] navigational safety, and sustainable development, Republic
Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. Authority." This Government Agency is supposed to carry
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C. TRAMPE,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 163, REGIONAL TRIAL
out and effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to
COURT OF PASIG; MANILA MARINE LIFE BUSINESS accelerate the development and balanced growth of the
RESOURCES, INC. represented by, MR. TOBIAS REYNALD Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and
M. TIANGCO; MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, METRO towns, in the act clearly named, within the context of the
MANILA and/or MAYOR RICARDO D. PAPA, national and regional plans and policies for social and
JR., Respondents. economic development.
[G.R. No. 120867. December 7, 1995.]
Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. E. Marcos amended certain sections of Republic Act No.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO A. 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of
MARQUEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 79, REGIONAL Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns
TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; GREENFIELD of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective
VENTURES INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
and R. J. ORION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION;
uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply,
MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of the
WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, Respondents. Government and the general public over: — the
environment impact of development on the water quality
[G.R. No. 120868. December 7, 1995.] and ecology of the lake and its related river Systems; the
inflow of polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial,
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S. domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas
PADOLINA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 162, REGIONAL around the lake; the increasing urbanization which induced
TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; IRMA the deterioration of the lake, since water quality studies
FISHING & TRADING CORP.; ARTM FISHING CORP.; BDR have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are
CORPORATION, MIRT CORPORATION and TRIM not taken to check the same; and the floods in Metropolitan
CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or Manila area and the lakeshore towns which will influence
MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, Respondents.
the hydraulic system of Laguna de Bay, since any scheme
[G.R. No. 120869. December 7, 1995.] of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the lake
and its river systems, — likewise gave impetus to the
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. creation of the Authority.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read
COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; BLUE LAGOON FISHlNG
CORP. and ALCRIS CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.; as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR
WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, Respondents. "SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby
declared to be the national policy to promote, and
[G.R. No. 120870. December 7, 1995.] accelerate the development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, towns hereinafter referred to as the region, within the
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL context of the national and regional plans and policies for
COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; AGP FISH VENTURES, INC., social and economic development and to carry out the
9

represented by its PRESIDENT ALFONSO PUYAT; development of the Laguna Lake region with due regard
Page

MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR and adequate provisions for environmental management
WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, Respondents.
and control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution." 1 quality standard to be enforced such conflict shall be
Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in
this case, include:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further
amended by adding thereto seven new paragraphs to be
known as paragraphs (j), (k), (1), (m), (n), (o), and (p)
which shall read as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x          x          x
‘(j) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, to engage in fish production and other
aqua-culture projects in Laguna de Bay and other bodies of
water within its jurisdiction and in pursuance thereof to
conduct studies and make experiments, whenever
necessary, with the collaboration and assistance of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, with the end in
view of improving present techniques and practices.
Provided, that until modified, altered or amended by the
procedure provided in the following sub-paragraph, the
present laws, rules and permits or authorizations remain in
force;
(k) For the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring
activities in Laguna de Bay, the Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to issue new permit for the use of the
lake waters for any projects or activities in or affecting the
said lake including navigation. construction, and operation
of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like, and to
impose necessary safeguards for lake quality control and
management and to collect necessary fees for said activities
and projects: Provided, That the fees collected for fisheries
may be shared between the Authority and other government
agencies and political sub-divisions in such proportion as
may be determined by the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Authority’s Board: Provided,
further, That the Authority’s Board may determine new
areas of fishery development or activities which it may
place under the supervision of the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources taking into account the overall
development plans and programs for Laguna de Bay and
related bodies of water: Provided, finally, That the
Authority shall subject to the approval of the President of
the Philippines promulgate such rules and regulations
which shall govern fisheries development activities in
Laguna de Bay which shall take into consideration among
others the following: socio-economic amelioration of
bonafide resident fishermen whether individually or
collectively in the form of cooperatives, lakeshore town
development, a master plan for fishpen construction and
operation, communal fishing ground for lake shore town
residents, and preference to lake shore town residents in
hiring laborers for fishery projects;
(l) To require the cities and municipalities embraced within
the region to pass appropriate zoning ordinances and other
regulatory measures necessary to carry out the objectives of
the Authority and enforce the same with the assistance of
the Authority;
(m) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, to exercise water rights over public waters
within the Laguna de Bay region whenever necessary to
carry out the Authority’s projects;
(n) To act in coordination with existing governmental
agencies in establishing water quality standards for
industrial, agricultural and municipal waste discharges into
the lake and to cooperate with said existing agencies of the
government of the Philippines in enforcing such standards,
or to separately pursue enforcement and penalty actions as
provided for in Section 4 (d) and Section 39-A of this Act:
Provided, That in case of conflict on the appropriate water
resolved thru the NEDA Board;’" 2
To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under
Republic Act No. 4850, as though Presidential Decree No.
813 were not thought to be completely effective, the Chief
Executive, feeling that the land and waters of the Laguna
Lake Region are limited natural resources requiring
judicious management to their optimal utilization to insure
renewability and to preserve the ecological balance, the
competing options for the use of such resources and
conflicting jurisdictions over such uses having created
undue constraints on the institutional capabilities of the
Authority in the light of the limited powers vested in it by
its charter, Order No. 927 further defined and enlarged the
functions and powers of the Authority and named and
enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed
by the term "Laguna de Bay Region" .
Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following
provisions of Executive Order No. 927 which include in
particular the sharing of fees:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and Other
Bodies of Water within the Lake Region: To effectively
regulate and monitor activities in the Laguna de Bay
region, the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects
or activities in or affecting the said region including
navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term ‘Laguna
de Bay Region’ shall refer to the Provinces of Rizal and
Laguna; the Cities of San Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon,
Manila and Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas
and Malvar in Batangas Province; the towns of Silang and
Carmona in Cavite Province; the town of Lucban in
Quezon Province; and the towns of Marikina, Pasig,
Taguig, Muntinlupa, and Pateros in Metro Manila.
SEC. 3. Collection of Fees. — The Authority is hereby
empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water and
its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not
limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial,
agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste disposal
purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collected,
and the sharing with other government agencies and
political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to the
approval of the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Authority’s Board, except fishpen
fee, which will be shared in the following manner: 20
percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local
governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development
Fund which shall be administered by a Council and the
remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of LLDA.
However, after the implementation within the three-year
period of the Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning and
Management Plan the sharing will be modified as follows:
35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local
governments, 5 percent goes to the Project Development
Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall be retained by
LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA shall
form part of its corporate funds and shall not be remitted to
the National Treasury as an exception to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1234." (Emphasis supplied)
It is important to note that Section 29 the term "Laguna
Lake" in this manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
10
"SECTION 41. Definition of Terms.
Page
(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna Lake or lake
is used in this Act Laguna de Bay which is that a water
when it is at the average level of elevation 12.50 meters,
10.00 meters below mean lower low Lands located at and
below such elevation are public lands which form part of
the bed of said lake."cralaw virtua1aw library
Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government
Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake
Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that
the newly passed law gave municipal governments the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their
municipal waters because R.A. 7160
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals; Fees and Charges. (a)
Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant
fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental
fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions
of this Section.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
(1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals oyster,
mussel or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas within a
definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by
it; . . . Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment
(2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry,
prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of other species and fish
from the municipal waters by nets, traps or other fishing
gears to marginal fishermen free from any rental fee,
charges or any other imposition whatsoever.
x          x          x
Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and Compensation. . . .,
(1) . .
(2) . .
(XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant
exclusive privileges of constructing fish corrals or fishpens,
or the taking or catching of bangus fry, prawn fry or
kawag-kawag or fry of any species or fish within the
municipal waters.
x       x       x"
Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to
issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen
operators took advantage of the occasion to establish
fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the
Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July,
1995, occupied almost one-third the entire lake water
surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from
7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995.
The Mayor’s permit to construct fishpens and fishcages
were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by
the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake
carrying capacity.
To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore
municipalities of separate independent policies in the
operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed
territorial municipal waters in the lake and their
indiscriminate grant of fishpens permits have already
saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating
the current environmental problems and ecological stress of
Laguna Lake.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority
served notice to the general public
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency
PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS given on June 23, 1993 at
Pila, Laguna, pursuant to Republic Act 4850 as amended by
Presidential Decree 813 and Executive Order 927 series of
1983 and in line with the policies and programs of the
Presidential Task Force on Illegal Fishpens and Illegal
Fishing, the general public is hereby notified
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
in the Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or
to which no application for registration and/or permit has
been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of
March 31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.
2. All fishpens; fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
so declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition which
shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for
illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing.
3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures declared as illegal shall, without prejudice to
demolition of their structures be criminally charged in
accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as
amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws.
of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five
Thousand Pesos or both at the discretion of the court.
All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures declared as illegal in accordance with the
foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27
October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their
said fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
should not be demolished/dismantled." chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the
. concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to
. dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from
receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected.
Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed
injunction cases against the Authority before various
regional trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil Case No. 759-B, for
Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal, filed by Fleet Development,
Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; (b) Civil Case No. 64049, for
Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig, filed
by IRMA Fishing and Trading Corp., ARTM Fishing
Corp., BDR Corp., MIRT Corp. and TRIM Corp.; (c) Civil
Case No. 566, for Declaratory Relief and Injunction,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig, filed by Manila
Marine Life Business Resources, Inc. and Tobias Reynaldo
M. Tianco; (d) Civil Case No. 556-M, for Prohibition,
Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Morong, Rizal, filed by AGP Fishing Ventures, Inc.; (e)
Civil Case No. 522-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and
Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal,
filed by Blue Lagoon and Alcris Chicken Growers, Inc.; (f)
Civil Case No. 554-, for Certiorari and Prohibition,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Morong, Rizal, filed by
Greenfields Ventures Industrial Corp. and R.J. Orion
Development Corp.; and (g) Civil Case No. 64124, for
Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Pasig, filed by
SEA-MAR Trading Co., Inc. and Eastern Lagoon Fishing
Corp. and Minamar Fishing Corporation.
The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it
on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were
11
invariably denied. Meanwhile, temporary restraining
order/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were
Page
issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining
the Authority from demolishing the fishpens and similar
structures in question.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction, G.R Nos. 120865-71, were filed by the
Authority with this court. Impleaded as parties-respondents
are concerned regional trial courts and respective private
parties, and the municipalities and/or respective Mayors of
Binangonan, Taguig and Jala-jala, who issued permits for
the construction and operation of fishpens in Laguna de
Bay. The Authority sought the following reliefs,
viz.:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(A) Nullification of the temporary restraining order/writs
of preliminary injunction issued in civil Cases Nos. 64125,
759 and 566;
(B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial courts
from exercising jurisdiction over cases involving the
Authority which is a co-equal body;
(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local
Government Code of 1991) did not repeal, after or modify
the provisions of R.A. 4850, as amended, empowering the
Authority to issue permits for fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay and that, the
Authority the government agency vested with exclusive
authority to issue said permits."cralaw virtua1aw library
By this Court’s resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority’s
consolidated petitions were referred to the Court of
Appeals.
In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the Authority’s consolidated petitions, the Court
of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those
quasi-judicial agencies of government appealable only to
the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest
LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are
concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar
as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had
been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D)
in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits
devolved to respective local government units concerned.
Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision to this
Court charging the following errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
PROBABLY COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY IS NOT A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED
THAT R.A. 4850 AS AMENDED BY P.D. 813 AND E.O.
927 SERIES OF 1983 HAS BEEN REPEALED BY
REPUBLIC ACT 7160. THE SAID RULING IS
CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES AND
JURISPRUDENCE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED
THAT THE POWER TO ISSUE FISHPEN PERMITS IN
LAGUNA DE BAY HAS BEEN DEVOLVED TO
CONCERNED (LAKESHORE) LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS."cralaw virtua1aw library
We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the
main and only use posed is: Which agency of the
Government - the Laguna Lake Development Authority or
the towns and municipalities comprising the region —
should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery
privileges is concerned?
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of
Executive Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide
that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use or all
surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting
the said region, including navigation, construction, and
operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the
like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code of 1991, has granted to the
municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan
may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster,
mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a
definite zone of the municipal
waters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do
not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the
Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the
latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the
lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any
express provision which categorically expressly repeal the
charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there
was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of
laws should be made clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic
Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a
general law. It is basic is basic in statutory construction that
the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law
cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a
well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute,
provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not
repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms,
provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or
alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are
broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special
law." 3
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a
special statute, the special statute should prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly that the general
statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the
general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing
a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are
not favored and as much as possible, given to all
enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be
repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law
by mere implication. 4
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the
Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code
of 1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the
Authority, which are environmental protection,
navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is
every indication that the legislative intent is for the
Authority to proceed with its mission.
We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner
Laguna Lake Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay,
like any other single body of water has its own unique
natural ecosystem. The 900 km2 lake surface water, the
eight (8) major river tributaries and several other smaller
rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km2 basin or
watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal
12
provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural
ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of
Page
policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining
sustainable development. This is an exhaustible natural
resource — a very limited one — which requires judicious
management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability
and preserve its ecological integrity and balance."cralaw
virtua1aw library
"Managing the lake resources would mean the
implementation of a national policy geared towards the
protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable
development of the region with due regard to the inter-
generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this
part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have
foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law — the
special law designed to govern the management of our
Laguna de Bay lake resources."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to
fragmented concepts of management policies where
lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive
dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The
garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the lake,
abstraction of water therefrom or construction of fishpens
by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that specific
portion but the entire 900 km2 of lake water. The
implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water
resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to
conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay."
5 the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise,
The power of the local government units to issue fishing
privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is
evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local
Government Code empowering local governments to issue
fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of
Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific
Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising
Power of Local Government Units."cralaw virtua1aw
library
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant
permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and
monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section
2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control
and management. 6 It does partake of the nature of police
power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and
the most demanding of all State powers including the
power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority
which embodies a valid exercise of police power should
prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on
matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna
de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927
provides for the proper sharing of fees collected.
In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a
quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding that,
considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake
Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA
304, 306, which we quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x          x          x
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases
generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAR), except in cases where the special law provides for
another forum It must be recognized in this regard that the
LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is
specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the
declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area
and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the
cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan
with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the
LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the
responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake
region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating
from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In
carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA
is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or
disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by
local government offices/agencies within the region, public
corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such
plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the
LLDA for the development of the region.
x          x          x
. . . While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative
agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it
by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative
agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in
therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution
cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA
to issue a ‘cease and desist order’ is, perforce, implied
Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a ‘toothless’ paper
agency." chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
there is no question that the Authority has express powers
as a regulatory a quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution
cases with authority to issue a "cease a desist order" and on
matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de
Bay. The Authority’s pretense, however, that it is co-equal
to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it
may only be instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot
be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of
legal questions affecting the powers of the Authority as
provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have
jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149
of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions
of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority,
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority
has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the
exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the
authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter
vested on it.
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing
authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region.
Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power would render
useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if
not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This,
the Local Government Code of 1991 had never intended to
do.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and
injunction are hereby granted, insofar as they relate to the
authority of the Laguna Lake Development Authority to
grant fishing privileges within the Laguna Lake Region.
13
The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by
Judge Arturo Marave, RTC, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal;
Page
Judge Herculano Tech, RTC, Branch 70, Binangonan,
Rizal; and Judge Aurelio Trampe, RTC, Branch 163, Pasig,
Metro Manila, are hereby declared null and void and
ordered set aside for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion.

The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are

hereby prohibited from issuing permits to construct and
operate fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures within the Laguna Lake Region, their previous
issuances being declared null and void. Thus, the fishing
permits issued by Mayors Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of
Binangonan; Ricardo D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and
Walfredo M. de Ia Vega, Municipality of Jala-jala,
specifically, are likewise declared null and void and
ordered cancelled.

The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures

put up by operators by virtue of permits issued by
Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region,
specifically, permits issued to Fleet Development, Inc. and
Carlito Arroyo; Manila Marine Life Business Resources,
Inc., represented by, Mr. Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco;
Greenfield Ventures Industrial Development Corporation
and R.J. Orion Development Corporation; IRMA Fishing
And Trading Corporation, ARTM Fishing Corporation,
BDR Corporation, Mirt Corporation and Trim Corporation;
Blue Lagoon Fishing Corporation and ALCRIS Chicken
Growers, Inc.; AGP Fish Ventures, Inc., represented by its
President Alfonso Puyat; SEA MAR Trading Co., Inc.,
Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corporation, and MINAMAR
Fishing Corporation, are hereby declared illegal structures
subject to demolition by the Laguna Lake Development
Authority.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

14
Page

G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191             April 30, 1957
SALVADOR A. ARANETA, ETC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, ETC., ET
AL., respondents.
EXEQUIEL SORIANO, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
SALVADOR ARANETA, ETC., ET AL., respondents-
appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant
Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor Troadio T.
Quiazon for petitioners.
San Juan, Africa and Benedicto for respondents.
FELIX, J.:
San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of
Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, a part of the National
waters of the Philippines with an extension of about 250
square miles and an average depth of approximately 6
fathoms (Otter trawl explorations in Philippine waters p.
21, Exh. B), is considered as the most important fishing
area in the Pacific side of the Bicol region. Sometime in
1950, trawl1 operators from Malabon, Navotas and other
places migrated to this region most of them settling at
Sabang, Calabanga, Camarines Sur, for the purpose of
using this particular method of fishing in said bay. On
account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that the
operation of this kind of gear caused the depletion of the
marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor
among the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to
prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay. This
move was manifested in the resolution of December 18,
1953 (Exh. F), passed by the Municipal Mayors' League
condemning the operation of trawls as the cause of the
wanton destruction of the shrimp specie and resolving to
petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing
in San Miguel Bay by declaring it closed for trawl fishing
at a certain period of the year. In another resolution dated
March 27, 1954, the same League of Municipal Mayor,
prayed the President to protect them and the fish resources
of San Miguel Bay by banning the operation of trawls
therein (Exh. 4). The Provincial Governor also made proper
presentations to this effect and petitions in behalf of the
non-trawl fishermen were likewise presented to the
President by social and civic organizations as the
NAMFREL (National Movement for Free Elections) and
the COMPADRE (Committee for Philippine Action in
Development, Reconstruction and Education),
recommending the cancellation of the licenses of trawl
operators after investigation, if such inquiry would
substantiate the charges that the operation of said fishing
method was detrimental to the welfare of the majority of
the inhabitants (Exh. 2).
In response to these pleas, the President issued on April 5,
1954, Executive Order No. 22 (50 Off. Gaz., 1421)
prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, but said
executive order was amended by Executive Order No. 66,
issued on September 23, 1954 (50 Off. Gaz., 4037),
apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board
of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl
fishing during the typhoon season only. On November 2,
1954, however, Executive Order No. 80 (50 Off. Gaz.,
5198) was issued reviving Executive Order No. 22, to take
effect after December 31, 1954.
A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the
court by filing a complaint for injunction and/or declaratory
relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of First
Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 24867,
praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to
restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Director of Fisheries from enforcing said executive
order; to declare the same null and void, and for such other
relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Director of Fisheries, represented by the Legal Adviser of
said Department and a Special Attorney of the Office of the
Solicitor General, answered the complaint alleging, among
other things, that of the 18 plaintiff (Exequiel Soriano,
Teodora Donato, Felipe Concepcion, Venancio Correa,
Santo Gaviana, Alfredo General, Constancio Gutierrez,
Arsenio de Guzman, Pedro Lazaro, Porfirio Lazaro, Deljie
de Leon, Jose Nepomuceno, Bayani Pingol, Claudio
Salgado, Porfirio, San Juan, Luis Sioco, Casimiro Villar
and Enrique Voluntad), only 11 were issued license to
operate fishing boats for the year 1954 (Annex B, petition
— L-8895); that the executive orders in question were
issued accordance with law; that the encouragement by the
Bureau of Fisheries of the use of Otter trawls should not be
construed to mean that the general welfare of the public
could be disregarded, and set up the defenses that since
plaintiffs question the validity of the executive orders
issued by the President, then the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries were
not the real parties in interest; that said executive orders do
not constitute a deprivation of property without due process
of law, and therefore prayed that the complaint be
dismissed (Exh. B, petition, L-8895).
15
During the trial of the case, the Governor of Camarines Sur
Page
appearing for the municipalities of Siruma, Tinambac,
Calabanga, Cabusao and Sipocot, in said province, called
the attention of the Court that the Solicitor General had not
been notified of the proceeding. To this manifestation, the
Court ruled that in view of the circumstances of the case,
and as the Solicitor General would only be interested in
maintaining the legality of the executive orders sought to be
impugned, section 4 of Rule 66 could be interpreted to
mean that the trial could go on and the Solicitor General
could be notified before judgement is entered.
After the evidence for both parties was submitted and the
Solicitor General was allowed to file his memorandum, the
Court rendered decision on February 2, 1955, the last part
of which reads as follows:
The power to close any definite area of the
Philippine waters, from the fact that Congress has
seen fit to define under what conditions it may be
done by the enactment of the sections cited, in the
mind of Congress must be of transcendental
significance. It is primarily within the fields of
legislation not of execution: for it goes far and says
who can and who can not fish in definite territorial
waters. The court can not accept that Congress had
intended to abdicate its inherent right to legislate
on this matter of national importance. To accept
respondents' view would be to sanction the
exercise of legislative power by executive decrees.
If it is San Miguel Bay now, it may be Davao Gulf
tomorrow, and so on. That may be done only by
Congress. This being the conclusion, there is
hardly need to go any further. Until the trawler is
outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be
banned from San Miguel Bay by executive
proclamation. The remedy for respondents and
population of the coastal towns of Camarines Sur
is to go to the Legislature. The result will be to
issue the writ prayed for, even though this be to
strike at public clamor and to annul the orders of
the President issued in response therefor. This is a
task unwelcome and unpleasant; unfortunately,
courts of justice use only one measure for both the
rich and poor, and are not bound by the more
popular cause when they give judgments.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, granted; Executive Order
Nos. 22, 66 and 80 are declared invalid; the
injunction prayed for is ordered to issue; no
pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioners immediately filed an ex-parte motion for the
issuance of a writ of injunction which was opposed by the
Solicitor General and after the parties had filed their
respective memoranda, the Court issued an order dated
February 19, 1955, denying respondents' motion to set
aside judgement and ordering them to file a bond in the
sum of P30,000 on or before March 1, 1955, as a condition
for the non-issuance of the injunction prayed for by
petitioners pending appeal. The Solicitor General filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of
merit, and the Court, acting upon the motion for new trial
filed by respondents, issued another order on March 3,
1965, denying said motion and granting the injunction
prayed for by petitioners upon the latter's filing a bond for
P30,000 unless respondents could secure a writ of
preliminary injunction from the Supreme Court on or
before March 15, 1955. Respondents, therefore, brought the
matter to this Court in a petition for prohibition
and certiorari with preliminary injunction, docketed as
G.R. No. L-8895, and on the same day filed a notice to
appeal from the order of the lower court dated February 2,
1955, which appeal was docketed in this Court as G.R. No.
L-9191.
In the petition for prohibition and certiorari, petitioners
(respondents therein) contended among other things, that
the order of, the respondent Judge requiring petitioners
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Director of Fisheries to post a bond in the sum of P30,000
on or before March 1, 1955, had been issued without
jurisdiction or in excess thereof, or at the very least with
grave abuse of discretion, because by requiring the bond,
the Republic of the Philippines was in effect made a party
defendant and therefore transformed the suit into one
against the Government which is beyond the jurisdiction of
the respondent Judge to entertain; that the failure to give
the Solicitor General the opportunity to defend the validity
of the challenged executive orders resulted in the receipt of
objectionable matters at the hearing; that Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court does not empower a court of law to pass
upon the validity of an executive order in a declaratory
relief proceeding; that the respondent Judge did not have
the power to grant the injunction as Section 4 of Rule 39
does not apply to declaratory relief proceedings but only to
injunction, receivership and patent accounting proceedings;
and prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to
enjoin the respondent Judge from enforcing its order of
March 3, 1955, and for such other relief as may be deem
just and equitable in the premises. This petition was given
due course and the hearing on the merits was set by this
Court for April 12, 1955, but no writ of preliminary
injunction was issued.
Meanwhile, the appeal (G.R. No. L-9191) was heard on
October 3, 1956, wherein respondents-appellants ascribed
to the lower court the commission of the following errors:
1. In ruling that the President has no authority to
issue Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 banning
the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay;
2. In holding that the power to declare a closed
area for fishing purposes has not been delegated to
the President of the Philippines under the Fisheries
Act;
3. In not considering Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66
and 80 as declaring a closed season pursuant to
Section 7, Act 4003, as amended, otherwise known
as the Fisheries Act;
4. In holding that to uphold the validity of
Executive Orders Nos. 22 and 80 would be to
sanction the exercise of legislative power by
executive decrees;
5. In its suggestion that the only remedy for
respondents and the people of the coastal towns of
Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte is to go to the
Legislature; and
6. In declaring Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and
80 invalid and in ordering the injunction prayed for
to issue.
As Our decision in the prohibition and certiorari case (G.R.
No. L-8895) would depend, in the last analysis, on Our
ruling in the appeal of the respondents in case G.R. No. L-
9191, We shall first proceed to dispose of the latter case.
It is indisputable that the President issued Executive Orders
Nos. 22, 66 and 80 in response to the clamor of the
inhabitants of the municipalities along the coastline of San
Miguel Bay. They read as follows:
16
EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 22
Page
PROHIBITING THE USE OF TRAWLS IN SAN
MIGUEL BAY
In order to effectively protect the municipal
fisheries of San Miguel Bay, Camarines Norte and
Camarines Sur, and to conserve fish and other
aquatic resources of the area, I, RAMON
MAGSAYSAY, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order that:
1. Fishing by means of trawls (utase, otter and/or
perenzella) of any kind, in the waters comprised
within San Miguel Bay, is hereby prohibited.
2. Trawl shall mean, for the purpose of this Order,
a fishing net made in the form of a bag with the
mouth kept open by a device, the whole affair
being towed, dragged, trailed or trawled on the
bottom of the sea to capture demersal, ground or
bottom species.
3. Violation of the provisions of this Order shall
subject the offender to the penalty provided under
Section 83 of Act 4993, or more than six months,
or both, in the discretion of the Court.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of April,
nineteen hundred and fifty-four and of the
Independence of the Philippines, the eighth. (50
Off. Gaz. 1421)
EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 66
AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 22,
DATED APRIL 5, 1954, ENTITLED
"PROHIBITING THE USE OF TRAWLS IN SAN
MIGUEL BAY"
By virtue of the powers voted in me by law, I,
RAMON MAGSAYSAY, President of the
Philippines, do hereby amend Executive Order No.
22, dated April 5, 1954, so as to allow fishing by
means of trawls, as defined in said Executive
Order, within that portion of San Miguel Bay north
of a straight line drawn from Tacubtacuban Hill in
the Municipality of Tinambac, Province of
Camarines Sur. Fishing by means of trawls south
of said line shall still be absolutely prohibited.
Done in the City of Manila, this 23rd day of
September, in the year of our Lord, nineteen
hundred and fifty-four, and of the Independence of
the Philippines, the ninth." (50 Off. Gaz. 4037).
EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 80.
FURTHER AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER
No. 22, DATED APRIL 5, 1954, AS AMENDED
BY EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 66, DATED
SEPTEMBER 23, 1954.
By virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I,
RAMON MAGSAYSAY, President of the
Philippines, do hereby amend Executive Order No.
66 dated September 23, 1954, so as to allow
fishing by means of trawls, as defined in Executive
Order No. 22, dated April 5, 1954, within the
portion of San Miguel Bay North of a straight line
drawn from Tacubtacuban Hill in the Municipality
of Mercedes, Province of Camarines Norte to
Balocbaloc Point in the Municipality of Tinambac,
Province of Camarines Sur, until December 31,
1954, only.
Thereafter, the provisions of said Executive Order
No. 22 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of
trawls in all the waters comprised within the San
Miguel Bay shall be revived and given full force
and effect as originally provided therein.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of
November, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and fifty-four and of the Independence of
the Philippines, the ninth. (50 Off. Gaz. 5198)
It is likewise admitted that petitioners assailed the validity
of said executive orders in their petition for a writ of
injunction and/or declaratory relief filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila, and that the lower court, upon
declaring Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 invalid,
issued an order requiring the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries to post a
bond for P30,000 if the writ of injunction restraining them
from enforcing the executive orders in question must be
stayed.
The Solicitor General avers that the constitutionality of an
executive order cannot be ventilated in a declaratory relief
proceeding. We find this untenable, for this Court taking
cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the lower
court in the case of Hilado vs. De la Costa, et al., 83 Phil.,
471, which involves the constitutionality of another
executive order presented in an action for declaratory relief,
in effect accepted the propriety of such action.
This question being eliminated, the main issues left for Our
determination with respect to defendants' appeal (G.R. No.
L-9191), are:
(1) Whether the Secretary of an Executive Department and
the Director of a Bureau, acting in their capacities as such
Government officials, could lawfully be required to post a
bond in an action against them;
(2) Whether the President of the Philippines has authority
to issue Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, banning the
operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay, or, said in other
words, whether said Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80
were issued in accordance with law; and.
(3) Whether Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were
valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of
legislative powers unduly delegated to the President.
Counsel for both parties presented commendable
exhaustive defenses in support of their respective stands.
Certainly, these cases deserve such efforts, not only
because the constitutionality of an act of a coordinate
branch in our tripartite system of Government is in issue,
but also because of the number of inhabitants, admittedly
classified as "subsistence fishermen", that may be affected
by any ruling that We may promulgate herein.
I. As to the first proposition, it is an elementary rule of
procedure that an appeal stays the execution of a judgment.
An exception is offered by section 4 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides that:
SEC. 4. INJUNCTION, RECEIVERSHIP AND
PATENT ACCOUNTING, NOT STAYED. —
Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment
in an action for injunction or in a receivership
action, or a judgment or order directing an
accounting in an action for infringement of letter
patent, shall not be stayed after its rendition and
17
before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of
an appeal. The trial court, however, in its
Page
discretion, when an appeal is taken from a
 judgement granting, dissolving or denying an
injunction, may make an order suspending,
modifying, restoring, or granting such injunction
during the pendency of an appeal, upon such terms
as to bond or otherwise as it may consider proper
for the security of the rights of the adverse party.
This provision was the basis of the order of the lower court
dated February 19, 1955, requiring the filing by the
respondents of a bond for P30,000 as a condition for the
non-issuance of the injunction prayed for by plaintiffs
therein, and which the Solicitor General charged to have
been issued in excess of jurisdiction. The State's counsel,
however, alleges that while judgment could be stayed in
injunction, receivership and patent accounting cases and
although the complaint was styled "Injunction, and/or
Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Injunction", the case is
necessarily one for declaratory relief, there being no
allegation sufficient to convince the Court that the plaintiffs
intended it to be one for injunction. But aside from the title
of the complaint, We find that plaintiffs pray for the
declaration of the nullity of Executive Order Nos. 22, 66
and 80; the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and
for such other relief as may be deemed just and equitable.
This Court has already held that there are only two
requisites to be satisfied if an injunction is to issue, namely,
the existence of the right sought to be protected, and that
the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are
violative of said right (North Negros Sugar Co.,
Inc. vs. Serafin Hidalgo, 63 Phil., 664). There is no
question that at least 11 of the complaining trawl operators
were duly licensed to operate in any of the national waters
of the Philippines, and it is undeniable that the executive
enactment's sought to be annulled are detrimental to their
interests. And considering further that the granting or
refusal of an injunction, whether temporary or permanent,
rests in the sound discretion of the Court, taking into
account the circumstances and the facts of the particular
case (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil,, 225, 42 Off. Gaz.,
2439), We find no abuse of discretion when the trial Court
treated the complaint as one for injunction and declaratory
relief and executed the judgment pursuant to the provisions
of section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, it shall be remembered that the party
defendants in Civil Case No. 24867 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila are Salvador Araneta, as Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, and, Deogracias
Villadolid, as Director of Fisheries, and were sued in such
capacities because they were the officers charged with duty
of carrying out the statutes, orders and regulations on
fishing and fisheries. In its order of February 19, 1955, the
trial court denied defendants' motion to set aside judgment
and they were required to file a bond for P30,000 to answer
for damages that plaintiffs were allegedly suffering at that
time, as otherwise the injunction prayed for by the latter
would be issued.
Because of these facts, We agree with the Solicitor General
when he says that the action, being one against herein
petitioners as such Government officials, is essentially one
against the Government, and to require these officials to
file a bond would be indirectly a requirement against the
Government for as regards bonds or damages that may be
proved, if any, the real party in interest would be the
Republic of the Philippines (L. S. Moon and
Co. vs. Harrison, 43 Phi., 39; Salgado vs. Ramos, 64 Phil.,
724-727, and others). The reason for this pronouncement is
understandable; the State undoubtedly is always solvent
(Tolentino vs. Carlos 66 Phil., 140; Government of the P.
I. vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, 34 Phil.,
167, cited in Joaquin Gutierrez et al. vs. Camus et al. * G.R.
No. L-6725, promulgated October 30, 1954). However, as
the records show that herein petitioners failed to put up the
bond required by the lower court, allegedly due to
difficulties encountered with the Auditor General's Office
(giving the impression that they were willing to put up said
bond but failed to do so for reasons beyond their control),
and that the orders subjects of the prohibition
and certiorari proceedings in G.R. No. L-8895, were
enforced, if at all,2 in accordance with section 4 of Rule 39,
which We hold to be applicable to the case at bar, the issue
as to the regularity or adequacy of requiring herein
petitioners to post a bond, becomes moot and academic.
II. Passing upon the question involved in the second
proposition, the trial judge extending the controversy to the
determination of which between the Legislative, and
Executive Departments of the Government had "the power
to close any definite area of the Philippine waters" instead
of limiting the same to the real issue raised by the
enactment of Executive Orders No. 22, 26 and 80,
especially the first and the last "absolutely prohibiting
fishing by means trawls in all the waters comprised within
the San Miguel Bay", ruled in favor of Congress had not
intended to abdicate its power to legislate on the matter, he
maintained as stated before, that "until the trawler is
outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned
from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation", and that
"the remedy for respondents and population of the coastal
towns of Camarines Sur is to go to Legislature," and thus
declared said Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 invalid".
The Solicitor General, on the contrary, asserts that the
President is empowered by law to issue the executive
enactment's in question.
Sections 6, 13 and 75 of Act No. 4003, known as the
Fisheries Law, the latter two sections as amended by
section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 471, read as follows:
SEC. 6. WORDS AND PHRASES DEFINED. —
Words and terms used in this Act shall be
construed as follows:
xxx     xxx     xxx
TAKE or TAKING includes pursuing, shooting,
killing, capturing, trapping, snaring, and netting
fish and other aquatic animals, and all lesser acts,
such as disturbing, wounding, stupefying; or
placing, setting, drawing, or using any net or other
device commonly used to take or collect fish and
other aquatic animals, whether they result in taking
or not, and includes every attempt to take and
every act of assistance to every other person in
taking or attempting to take or collect fish and
other aquatic animals: PROVIDED, That
whenever taking is allowed by law, reference is
had to taking by lawful means and in lawful
manner.
xxx     xxx     xxx
SEC. 13. PROTECTION OF FRY OR FISH
EGGS. — Except for scientific or educational
purpose or for propagation, it shall be unlawful to
take or catch fry or fish eggs and the small fish, not
more than three (3) centimeters long, known
as siliniasi, in the territorial waters of the
Philippines. Towards this end, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce shall be authorized to
provide by regulations such restrictions as may be
deemed necessary to be imposed on THE USE OF
ANY FISHING NET OR FISHING DEVICE FOR
THE PROTECTION OF FRY OR FISH EGGS;
18
Provided, however, That the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce shall permit the taking
Page
of young of certain species of fish known as hipon
 under such restrictions as may be deemed
necessary.
SEC. 75. FISH REFUGEES AND
SANCTUARIES. — Upon the recommendation of
the officer or chief of the bureau, office or service
concerned, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce may set aside and establish fishery
reservation or fish refuges and sanctuaries to be
administered in the manner to be prescribed by
him. All streams, ponds and waters within the
game refuge, birds, sanctuaries, national parks,
botanical gardens, communal forest and communal
pastures are hereby declared fishing refuges and
sanctuaries. It shall be unlawful for any person, to
take, destroy or kill in any of the places
aforementioned, or in any manner disturb or drive
away or take therefrom, any fish fry or fish eggs.
Act No. 4003 further provides as follows:
SEC. 83. OTHER VIOLATIONS. — Any other
violation of the provisions of this Act or any rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder shall
subject the offender to a fine of not more than two
hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than
six months, or both, in the discretion of the Court.
As may be seen from the just quoted provisions, the law
declares unlawful and fixes the penalty for the taking
(except for scientific or educational purposes or for
propagation), destroying or killing of any fish fry or fish
eggs, and the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) is
authorized to promulgate regulations restricting the use of
any fish net or fishing device (which includes the net used
by trawl fishermen) for the protection of fry or fish eggs, as
well as to set aside and establish fishery reservations or fish
refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the manner
prescribed by him, from which no person could lawfully
take, destroy or kill in any of the places aforementioned, or
in any manner disturb or drive away or take therefrom any
small or immature fish, fry or fish eggs. It is true that said
section 75 mentions certain streams, ponds and
waters within  the game refuges, . . . communal forest, etc.,
which the law itself declares fish refuges and sanctuaries,
but this enumeration of places does not curtail the general
and unlimited power of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources in the first part of section 75, to set aside
and establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and
sanctuaries, which naturally include seas or bays, like the
San Miguel Bay in Camarines.
From the resolution passed at the Conference of Municipal
Mayors held at Tinambac, Camarines Sur, on December 18,
1953 (Exh. F), the following manifestation is made:
WHEREAS, the continuous operation of said
trawls even during the close season as specified in
said Executive Order No. 20 caused the wanton
destruction of the mother shrimps laying their eggs
and the millions of eggs laid and the inevitable
extermination of the shrimps specie; in order to
save the shrimps specie from eventual
extermination and in order to conserve the shrimps
specie for posterity;
In the brief submitted by the NAMFREL and addressed to
the President of the Philippines (Exh. 2), in support of the
petition of San Miguel Bay fishermen (allegedly 6, 175 in
number), praying that trawlers be banned from operating in
San Miguel Bay, it is stated that:
The trawls ram and destroy the fish corrals. The
heavy trawl nets dig deep into the ocean bed. They
destroy the fish foods which lies below the ocean
floor. Their daytime catches net millions of
shrimps scooped up from the mud. In their nets
they bring up the life of the sea: algea, shell fish
and star fish . . .
The absence of some species or the apparent
decline in the catch of some fishermen operating in
the bay may be due to several factors, namely:
the indiscriminate catching of fry and immature
sizes of fishes, the wide-spread use of explosives
inside as well as at the mouth and approaches of
the bay, and the extensive operation of  the trawls.
(p.9, Report of Santos B. Rasalan, Exh. A)
Extensive Operation of Trawls: — The strenuous
effect of the operations of the 17 TRAWLS of the
demersal fisheries of San Miguel Bay is better
appreciated when we consider the fact that out of
its about 850 square kilometers area, only about
350 square kilometers of 5 fathoms up could be
trawled. With their continuous operation, is greatly
strained. This is shown by the fact that in view of
the non-observance of the close season from May
to October, each year, majority of their catch are
immature. If their operation would continue
unrestricted, the supply would be greatly depleted.
(p. 11), Report of Santos B. Rasalan, Exh. A)
San Miguel Bay — can sustain 3 to 4 small
trawlers  (Otter Trawl Explorations in Philippine
Waters, Research Report 25 of the Fish and
Wildlife Service, United States Department of the
Interior, p. 9 Exhibit B).
According to Annex A of the complaint filed in the lower
court in Civil Case No. 24867 — G.R. No. L-9191 (Exh. D,
p. 53 of the folder of Exhibits), the 18 plaintiffs-appellees
operate 29 trawling boats, and their operation must be in a
big scale considering the investments plaintiffs have made
therefore, amounting to P387,000 (Record on Appeal, p.
16-17).
In virtue of the aforementioned provisions of law and the
manifestation just copied, We are of the opinion that with
or without said Executive Orders, the restriction and
banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come,
under the law, within the powers of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, who in compliance
with his duties may even cause the criminal prosecution of
those who in violation of his instructions, regulations or
orders are caught fishing with trawls in the Philippine
waters.
Now, if under the law the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources has authority to regulate or ban the
fishing by trawl which, it is claimed, obnoxious for it
carries away fish eggs and fry's which should be preserved,
can the President of the Philippines exercise that same
power and authority? Section 10(1), Article VII of the
Constitution of the Philippines prescribes:
SEC. 10 (1). The President shall have control of
all the executive departments, bureaus or offices,
exercises general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.
Section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as
follows:
19
SEC. 63. EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND
EXECUTIVE PROCLAMATION. —
Page
Administrative acts and commands of the
 President of the Philippines touching the
organization or mode of operation of the
Government or rearranging or readjusting any of
the district, divisions, parts or ports of the
Philippines, and all acts and commands governing
the general performance of duties by public
employees or disposing of issues of general
concern shall be made in executive orders.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Regarding department organization Section 74 of the
Revised Administrative Code also provides that:
All executive functions of the government of the
Republic of the Philippines shall be directly under
the Executive Departments subject to the
supervision and control of the President of the
Philippines in matters of general policy. The
Departments are established for the proper
distribution of the work of the Executive, for the
performance of the functions expressly assigned to
them by law, and in order that each branch of the
administration may have a chief responsible for its
direction and policy. Each Department Secretary
shall assume the burden of, and responsibility for,
all activities of the Government under his control
and supervision.
For administrative purposes the President of the
Philippines shall be considered the Department
Head of the Executive Office.
One of the executive departments is that of Agriculture and
Natural Resources which by law is placed under the
direction and control of the Secretary, who exercises its
functions subject to the general supervision and control of
the President of the Philippines (Sec. 75, R. A. C.).
Moreover, "executive orders, regulations, decrees and
proclamations relative to matters under the supervision or
jurisdiction of a Department, the promulgation whereof is
expressly assigned by law to the President of the
Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued upon
proposition and recommendation of the respective
Department" (Sec. 79-A, R.A.C.), and there can be no
doubt that the promulgation of the questioned Executive
Orders was upon the proposition and recommendation of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and that
is why said Secretary, who was and is called upon to
enforce said executive Orders, was made a party defendant
in one of the cases at bar (G.R. No. L-9191).
For the foregoing reasons We do hesitate to declare that
Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series of 1954, of the
President, are valid and issued by authority of law.
III. But does the exercise of such authority by the President
constitute and undue delegation of the powers of Congress?
As already held by this Court, the true distinction between
delegation of the power to legislate and the conferring of
authority or discretion as to the execution of law consists in
that the former necessary involves a discretion as to what
the law shall be, wile in the latter the authority or discretion
as to its execution has to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter
no valid objection can be made (Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56
Phil., 234, 239. See also Rubi, et al. vs. The Provincial
Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660).
In the case of U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1, We also
held:
THE POWER TO DELEGATE. — The
Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to
enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself,
and it does nothing more than to authorize the
Governor-General to make rules and regulations to
carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the
law. There is no delegation of power and it is
valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself
does not define a crime and is not complete, and
some legislative act remains to be done to make it
a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in
the Governor-General, the act is delegation of
legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
From the provisions of Act No. 4003 of the Legislature, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 471, which have been
aforequoted, We find that Congress (a) declared it unlawful
"to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the territorial waters of
the Philippines; (b) towards this end, it authorized the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide
by the regulations such restrictions as may be deemed
necessary to be imposed on the use of any fishing net or
fishing device for the protection of fish fry or fish
eggs (Sec. 13); (c) it authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to set aside and
establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries
to be administered in the manner to be prescribed by him
and declared it unlawful for any person to take, destroy or
kill in any of said places, or, in any manner disturb or
drive away or take therefrom, any fish fry or fish eggs (See.
75); and (d) it penalizes the execution of such acts declared
unlawful and in violation of this Act (No. 4003) or of any
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, making the
offender subject to a fine of not more than P200, or
imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both, in the
discretion of the court (Sec. 83).
From the foregoing it may be seen that in so far as the
protection of fish fry or fish egg is concerned, the Fisheries
Act is complete in itself, leaving to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources the promulgation of
rules and regulations to carry into effect the legislative
intent. It also appears from the exhibits on record in these
cases that fishing with trawls causes "a wanton destruction
of the mother shrimps laying their eggs and the millions of
eggs laid and the inevitable extermination of the shrimps
specie" (Exh. F), and that, "the trawls ram and destroy the
fish corrals. The heavy trawl nets dig deep into the ocean
bed. They destroy the fish food which lies below the ocean
floor. Their daytime catches net millions of shrimps
scooped up from the mud. In their nets they bring up the
life of the sea" (Exh- 2).
In the light of these facts it is clear to Our mind that for the
protection of fry or fish eggs and small and immature
fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of Act No.
4003, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing device
like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply
of sea food, and to that end authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by
regulations such restrictions as he deemed necessary in
order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land.
Consequently, when the President, in response to the
clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur
issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting
fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within
the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious
regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal
province and dispose of issues of general concern (Sec. 63,
R.A.C.) which were in consonance and strict conformity
with the law.
20
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing
considerations We render judgement, as follows:
Page
(a) Declaring that the issues involved in case G.R. No. L-
8895 have become moot, as no writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued by this Court the respondent
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila Branch XIV,
from enforcing his order of March 3, 1955; and

(b) Reversing the decision appealed from in case G. R. No.

L-9191; dissolving the writ of injunction prayed for in the
lower court by plaintiffs, if any has been actually issued by
the court a quo; and declaring Executive Orders Nos. 22,
66 and 80, series of 1954, valid for having been issued by
authority of the Constitution, the Revised Administrative
Code and the Fisheries Act.

Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo,

Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia,
JJ., concur.

21
Page