Nigerian Studies in Economics

and Management Sciences 2018

ISSN: 2645-3061 Special Edition:45-55

Assessment of the Effect of Corporate

Governance on Performance of Deposit Money
Banks in Nigeria
Adesina Olufemi Dadepo

Abstract
Background: The board of directors and the management must be conscious of its
responsibilities to all stakeholders, the environment and the general society by complying
with the appropriate legal, economic and institutional rules, practices and processes. This is
the essence of corporate governance.
Research Objective(s)/Hypothesis(es): The study assessed the effect of corporate
governance on performance of deposit money banks in Nigeria.
Data and Methods: Secondary data were collected from the annual report and accounts
of the ten selected banks for a period of five years spanning from 2012 to 2016. Data
collected were analyzed using descriptive statistics, correlation and regression analyses.
Findings: The study revealed that board size (BZ) had positive and significant impact on
return on equity (ROE) but insignificant impact on return on assets (ROA) while
composition of independent and non-executive directors (BIND) exerted negative and
insignificant impact on ROA.
Concluding Remarks/Policy Recommendations: The study recommended that
government and regulatory authorities must play a very good role in ensuring the
compliance of banks to professional ethics and codes of Corporate governance.

Keywords: Accountability, Performance; Stakeholders; Regulatory Authorities.

Adesina Olufemi Dadepo is a Lecturer in the Department of Accountancy, The Federal

Polytechnic, Ile-Oluji, Ondo State, Nigeria. E-mail olufemiadesina5@gmail.com.

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INTRODUCTION

According to The Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators in the UK

“Corporate governance refers to the way in which companies are governed and to what
purpose. It is concerned with practices and procedures for trying to ensure that a company is
run in such a way that it achieves its objectives.” Corporate governance essentially involves
balancing the interests of all the stakeholders in the company among which are customers,
suppliers, shareholders, management, workers and the community at large by ensuring that
appropriate legal rules, practices and processes are in place.
The magnitude of accounting scandals experienced by WorldCom and Enron, have
great impact on the nation and global economies. These events prompted the urgent need for
implementing good corporate governance mechanisms for all business entities, banking sector
inclusive (James and Joseph, 2015). The implication is that a prudent financial system is a
necessary requirement for rapid growth and development of every of modern economy. In
essence, banking sector plays an important role in economy by ensuring that loans and
advances are made available to both corporate and individuals (Adesina and Olatise, 2017). It
is mandatory for the banks to comply with the code of corporate governance issued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for all public companies and the revised Code of
Corporate Governance issued in 2014 for Banks and Discount Houses in Nigeria issued by the
Central Bank of Nigeria.
Banks’ commitment to the highest standards of corporate governance must be the
responsibility of the board of directors and management who are accountable to shareholders
for creating and delivering sustainable value. Board size is expected to have a positive effect on
the performance of the organization according to resource-based hypothesis premised on the
fact that, the larger the board size, the more resources are available. This is because board of
directors have different education background and work experience which are expected to
assist the management in decision making to achieve corporate objective. The Board of
directors comprises non-executive directors, independent directors and executive directors. The
appointment of board of directors are subject to the approval of the central bank of Nigeria
(CBN). Therefore, composition of appropriate people with diverse skills, knowledge and
experience is an essential aspect of corporate governance.
Previous empirical studies on the relationship between corporate governance and
banks’ performance revealed mixed results. Board size was positive and statistically significant
in some studies and it was found not statistically significant other studies. For instance, in a
study carried out in U.S.A by Adams and Mehran (2012) using 35 bank holding companies
spanning from 1986-1999 revealed that board size was positively related to performance while
board independence was not statistically significant. Contrarily, the study carried out in Malaysia
by James and Joseph (2015) on the influence of corporate governance on banks’ performance
showed that board size and board independent had no significant influence on bank
performance while capital adequacy was found to have a significant influence on banks’
performance. In the same direction, a study of 25 Egyptian banks covering a period from 2006
to 2014 by Abobakr (2017) on the effect of corporate governance on banks’ performance using
Generalized Least Square (GLS) random effect model found that board independence had no
significant influence on banks’ performance while bank size positively affected the bank
performance
In Nigeria, Mohammed (2012) examined the impact of corporate governance on banks’
performance for a period of ten (10) years spanning from 2001- 2010 using secondary data
from annual report of nine (9) banks. Assets qualities and loan deposit ratios were used as
proxies for corporate governance while return on asset (ROA) was used as performance
indicator. According to the results, poor asset quality measured by ratio of non-performing
credit to total credit had negative effect on ROA. Unlike Mohammed (2012), Akingunola and
Adedipe (2013) studied the relationship between corporate governance and performance of

46
banks in Nigeria and found out that banks’ total credit had positive relationship with banks’
performance but it was not statistically significant.
As noted earlier, there are mixed results from empirical studies on the relationship
between corporate governance and banks’ performance. There is a strong need to conduct a
recent study to assess the effect of Corporate Governance on banks’ performance in Nigeria
using ten banks that are purposely selected based on the accessibility to their annual reports
and accounts. The selection covers both old generation and new generalization banks. These
banks are First Bank, Union bank, UBA, Wema bank, GT bank, Zenith Bank, Access bank,
Fidelity bank, Sterling bank and Diamond bank.
This study is motivated on full implementation of Treasury Single Account, now that
federal government deposits are no longer with the deposit banks, there is a need for
compliance with good corporate governance codes and adherence to professional ethics in
order to protect the depositors funds mostly from the private and corporate entities. In order
to achieve the objective of this study, the research work is structured into five parts. The first
section deals with introduction and reviews of relevant literature on the relationship between
corporate governance and the performance of deposit money banks in Nigeria. Section two
deals with research methods while section three deals with results, section four focus on
discussion and the last section is conclusion.

METHODS

The target population for this study consists of 25 commercial banks in Nigeria
representing both old and new generation banks. The sample study consisted of 10 banks
purposely selected based on accessibility to data. These banks are First Bank Nigeria Ltd, Union
Bank Nig. Plc, and United Bank for Africa (UBA), Wema Bank, Guaranty Trust Bank, Zenith
Bank, Access Bank, Fidelity Bank, Sterling Bank and Diamond Bank. The study made use of
data obtained from the audited financial reports of those banks for a period of five years (2012-
2016).
Model Specification
Appropriate indices that are quantitatively and qualitatively measure were adopted, this
include loan to deposit ratio, bank total deposit and bank total credit which implies that bank
performance to be function of corporate governance. It can be represented mathematically
thus;
BP = f (CG) ………………………….…………………………….…………………… (1)
BP = ROA; ROE ………………………….…………………………… ..... ………. (2)
CG = (BZ, BIND, CDR,) ……………….…………………………………….........(3)
ROA= f (BZ, BIND, CDR,) …………………………………………………….......(4)
ROE = f (BZ, BC, CDR,) ……………………………………………………………. (5)

Regression Model
ROA = bo + β1BZit + β2BINDit + β3CDRit +Uit…………………………… (6)
ROE = bo + β1BZit + β2BINDit + β3CDRit +Uit …………………………… (7)
Where:
BP= Bank Performance
CG= Corporate Governance
ROA= Returns on Assets
ROE= Returns on Equity

47
bo =Constant
BZ = Board Size
BIND = Independence and Non- Executive Board Composition
CDR= Total Credit to Total Deposit Ratio
TC = Total Credit
TD= Total Deposit
U= Error time
t= time
Measurements of Variables
Returns on Assets = Profit After interest and taxation/total assets
Returns on Equity= Profit After interest and taxation/shareholders’ funds
Board Size= No of Directors (Independent, Non-executive and Executive)
Board Independence and Non-Executive Director = (Independence director and Non-Executive
Directors)
Credit Deposit Ratio = Ratio of Total credit to total Deposit

RESULTS

Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics

Variables Mean Standard Minimum Maximum Observation
Deviation
ROA 1.828600 1.347945 2.050000 5.26000 50
ROE 12.95620 7.567122 0.00000 29.75000 50
BIND 8.060000 1.517382 5.00000 11.0000 50
BZ 14.46000 2.829942 8.00000 21.0000 50
CRD 65.48900 15.00950 28.21000 96.81000 50
Source: Data Analysis (2018)
Table 3.1 presents a summary of descriptive statistics of independent and dependent
variables used in the research. It indicates the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum
and observation. The average ROA 1.828600 is equivalent of 1.82% while the mean of ROE is
12.95620 representing 12.96%. The average number of Independent and Non-executive
directors is 8, the average number of board size is 15. Credit deposit ratio on the average is
65.48900 indicating that 65% of the deposit was granted as loans and advances to the
customers.
Table 3.2: Correlations analysis
ROA ROE BIND BZ CRD
ROA 1.00000
ROE 0.91981 1.00000
BIND -0.02699 -0.85436 1.00000
BZ 0.14349 0.17104 0.72534 1.00000
CDR 0.26458 0.21383 -0.25993 -0.24386 1.00000
Source: Data Analysis (2018)
The correlation matrix in the above table 3.2 revealed the relationship among the
variables used in the study. As a rule, the correlation coefficients between 0 and 0.30 marks a
weak correlation, from 0.30 to 0.60 a moderate correlation, and between 0.60-1.00 a strong
correlation. As can be seen from the above table, there is a weak negative correlation -
0.026998 between BIND and ROA. Also, there is a weak negative relation of-0.085436 between

48
BIND and ROE. There is weak positive relationship of 0.143499 and 0.17104 between board
size and ROA and ROE respectively. In the same direction, there is a positive relationship of
0.264584 and 0.213831 between CRD and ROA and ROE respectively.

Table 4.3 Fixed effect Panel Regression (Dependent Variable: ROA)

Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.

C 0.433057 1.095100 0.395449 0.6948

BIND -0.098143 0.122520 -0.801034 0.4282
BZ 0.113449 0.064392 1.761834 0.0864
CRD 0.008339 0.008262 1.009277 0.3194
Effects Specification

Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)

R-squared 0.809740 Mean dependent var 1.828600

Adjusted R-squared 0.748035 S.D. dependent var 1.347945
S.E. of regression 0.676616 Akaike info criterion 2.275470
Sum squared resid 16.93896 Schwarz criterion 2.772596
Log likelihood -43.88676 Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.464779
F-statistic 13.12260 Durbin-Watson stat 1.683025
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
From table 3.3 there is a positive coefficient of 0.434057 for the intercept. A negative
coefficient and probability value of -0.098143 (p=0.4282) for independent and non-executive
directors. There is a positive coefficient and probability value of 0.113449 (p=0.0864) for board
size. In the same direction, there is a positive coefficient and probability value of 0.008339
(p=0.3194) for credit deposit ratio. The R2 is 0.809740 and the adjusted is R 2 of 0.748035.

Dependent Variable: ROE

Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.

C 8.350753 6.992276 1.194282 0.2400

BIND -1.424131 0.782296 -1.820449 0.0768
BZ 0.998734 0.411149 2.429129 0.0201
CRD 0.025077 0.052755 0.475344 0.6373

Effects Specification

Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)

R-squared 0.753873 Mean dependent var 12.95620

Adjusted R-squared 0.674048 S.D. dependent var 7.567122
S.E. of regression 4.320235 Akaike info criterion 5.983391
Sum squared resid 690.5838 Schwarz criterion 6.480517
Log likelihood -136.5848 Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.172700
F-statistic 9.444089 Durbin-Watson stat 1.331408
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000

From table 3.4 there is a positive coefficient of 8.350753 for the intercept. A negative
coefficient and probability value of -1.424131(p=0.0768) for independent and non-executive

49
directors. There is a positive coefficient and probability value of 0.998734 (p=0.0201) for board
size. Also, there is a positive coefficient and probability value of 0.025077(0.6373) for credit
deposit ratio. The R2 of is 0.753873 and the adjusted R 2 is 0.674048 explain that 75% and 67%
of the variation in the ROE is explained by the independent variables.

DISCUSSION

From table 3.3 there is a positive coefficient of 0.434057 for the intercept. A negative
coefficient of -0.098143 for independent and non-executive directors indicates that if this
variable is increased by N1 it will lead to 0.098k loss in ROA. It is however, not statistically
significant as reflected in the p-value of 0.4282. There is a positive coefficient of 0.113449 for
board size which implied that for every increase in board size (composition of, independent and
non-executive and executive) it will lead to increase of 11k in the ROA. This is also not
statistically significant as shown in the p-value of 0.0864. In the same direction, there is a
positive coefficient of 0.008339 for credit deposit ratio, which signifies that N1 increase in CRD
will lead to 0.008k increase in ROA. The p-value of 0.3194 confirmed the insignificant of this
variable. The R2 of 0.809740 and the adjusted R2 of 0.748035 explain that 81% and 75% of the
variation in the ROA is explained by the independent variables. This result agrees with the
result of Abobakr (2017) who investigated the effect of corporate governance on banks
performance in Egypt that bank size positively affected the bank performance. Non-executive
directors had no significant effect.
From table 3.4 there is a positive coefficient of 8.350753 for the intercept. A negative
coefficient of -1.424131 for independent and non-executive directors indicates that if this
variable is increased by 1 it will lead to 1.42k loss in ROE. It is however, not statistically
significant as reflected in the p-value of 0.0768. There is a positive coefficient of 0.998734 for
board size which implied that for every increase in board size (composition of, independent and
non-executive and executive) it will lead to increase of 99k increase the ROE. It statistically
significant as shown in the p-value of 0.0201. In the same direction, there is a positive
coefficient of 0.025077 for credit deposit ratio, which signifies that an increase in CRD will lead
to 0.02k increase in ROE. The p-value of 0.6373 confirmed the insignificant of this variable. The
R2 of 0.753873 and the adjusted R 2 of 0.674048 explain that 75% and 67% of the variation in
the ROE is explained by the independent variables. This study confirmed the results of Adams
and Mehran (2012) which found that board independence is not related to performance.
However, board size is positively and significantly related to performance. The result of this
study is also in line with Akingunola, Adekunle and Adedipe (2013) who examined the
relationship between corporate Governance and Banks’ Performance in Nigeria. The estimation
of the developed model was found that banks total credit was positively related but not
significantly determinant factors of bank’s performance,

CONCLUSION

This study concluded that good Corporate Governance affects stakeholders positively as
indicated in the study that board size had positive and significant effect on return on equity
(ROE). In a nutshell, corporate governance affects the ability of the organization to fulfill its
objectives to its stakeholders and to the society at large. It is cleared from this study that
corporate governance is a catalyst that speed up the performance of banks in Nigeria.
To minimize financial and economic crimes in the system and to prevent eventual bank
failure, banks must embrace the professional ethics which include transparency, accountability,
honesty and fairness in dealing with all its stakeholders. Findings from this study would assist
the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Securities Commission to ensure continuous formation of
timely and appropriate policies and strategies for banking sector to fully comply with the
Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance. In addition, Banks in Nigeria would be able to identify
resources that need to be prioritized in attaining higher performance.

50
References
Abobakr, M. G. (2017). Corporate governance and banks performance: Evidence from Egypt.
Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, 7(12), 1326-
1343.
Adams, R. B. and Mehran, H. (2012). Bank board structure and performance: Evidence for large
bank holding companies. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 21, 243-367.
Adesina, O. D & Olatise F. A (2017). Financial ratios as a measure of performance of deposit
money banks in Nigeria in post 2015 consolidation. The Beam Journal of Arts and
Science, Vol 10, 1-15.
Akingunola, R.O, Adekunle, O & Adedipe, O. (2013). Corporate governance and banks’
performance in Nigeria (Post Bank Consolidation). European Journal of Business and
Social Sciences, 2(8), 89-111
James & Joseph (2015). Corporate governance mechanisms and bank performance: Resource
based view. Procedic Economics and Finance, vol. 31, 117-123.
Mohammed, F. (2012). Impact of corporate governance on banks’ performance in Nigeria.
Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences, 3(3), 257-260

51
 APPENDIX
BANKS
FIRST BANK 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
BOARD SIZE 18 19 17 13 15
BOARDNEX&INDP 10 10 10 7 10
N'Million
LOANS AND ADVANCES
BANKS 329,120 367,571 242,842 137,548 267,447
CUSTOMERS 1,316,407 1,473,840 1,794,037 1,457,285 1,693,377
TOTAL 1,645,527 1,841,411 2,036,879 1,594,833 1,960,824
DEPOSITS
BANKS 18,463 10,155 19,246 50,566 71,633
CUSTOMERS 2,171,807 2,570,719 2,551,022 2,399,822 2,528,576
TOTAL 2,190,270 2,580,874 2,570,268 2,540,388 2,600,209
PROFIT AFTER TAX 71,144 59,365 79,351 37,000 33,694
TOTAL ASSETS 2,770,675 3,244,355 3,490,871 3,332,376 3,700,373
EQUITY 372,176 350,709 423,047 459,696 464,512

UNION BANK
BOARD SIZE 13 16 15 17 14
BOARDNEX&INDP 9 10 9 11 8
N'Million
LOANS AND ADVANCES
BANKS 0 0 0 0 0
CUSTOMERS 136,982 210,118 302,372 348,984 489,890
TOTAL 136,982 210,118 302,372 348,984 489,890
DEPOSITS
BANKS 3,500 3,200 18,055 11,800 4,351
CUSTOMERS 482,005 479,956 507,431 569,116 633,827
TOTAL 485,505 483,156 525,486 580,916 638,178
PROFIT AFTER TAX 3,170 5,121 20,486 18,035 15,885
TOTAL ASSETS 886,468 881,391 922,755 1,000,976 1,123,483
EQUITY 171,671 187,078 207,793 233,507 251,339

UBA
BOARD SIZE 21 20 16 20 19
BOARDNEX&INDP 11 10 9 10 10
N'Million
LOANS AND ADVANCES
BANKS 27,878 26,251 48,991 14,591 23,850
CUSTOMERS 570,714 796,942 884,587 822,694 1,090,355
TOTAL 598,592 823,193 933,578 837,285 1,114,205

DEPOSITS
BANKS 22,875 0 1,526 350 30,484
CUSTOMERS 1,461,131 1,797,376 1,812,277 1,627,060 1,698,859

52
TOTAL 1,484,006 1,797,376 1,813,803 1,627,410 1,729,343
PROFIT AFTER TAX 47,375 46,483 40,083 47,642 47,541
TOTAL ASSETS 1,933,065 2,217,417 2,338,858 2,216,337 2,539,585
EQUITY 220,317 259,538 281,933 338,231 390,900

WEMA BANK
BOARD SIZE 10 11 11 12 12
BOARDNEX&INDP 5 6 6 7 7
N'Million
LOANS AND ADVANCES
BANKS 0 0 0 0 0
CUSTOMERS 73,746 98,632 149,294 185,596 227,009
TOTAL 73,746 98,632 149,294 185,596 227,009
DEPOSITS
BANKS 731 3,397 3,243 0 0
CUSTOMERS 174,302 217,734 258,956 284,978 283,303
TOTAL 175,033 221,131 262,199 284,978 283,303
PROFIT AFTER TAX -5,041 1,596 2,372 2,273 2,561
TOTAL ASSETS 245,704 330,872 382,562 396,743 424,043
EQUITY 1,273 41,395 43,768 46,064 48,471

GUARANTY TRUST BANK

BOARD SIZE 14 14 14 14 13
BOARDNEX&INDP 7 7 8 8 7
N'Million
LOANS AND ADVANCES
BANKS 177 16 30 639 29
CUSTOMERS 742,437 926,767 1,182,394 1,265,207 1,417,218
TOTAL 742,614 726,783 1,182,424 1,265,846 1,417,247
DEPOSITS
BANKS 7,170 88 143 40 40
CUSTOMERS 1,054,123 1,261,927 1,439,522 1,422,550 1,681,185
TOTAL 1,061,293 1,262,015 1,439,665 1,422,590 1,681,225
PROFIT AFTER TAX 85,264 85,545 89,171 94,308 126,837
TOTAL ASSETS 1,620,317 1,904,365 2,126,608 2,277,629 2,613,340
EQUITY 286,539 324,289 359,912 405,608 476,918
CREDIT/DEPOSIT RATIO 0.699725712 0.575890936 0.821318848 0.889817867 0.842984728
ROA 0.052621802 0.044920485 0.041931094 0.041406217 0.048534443
ROE 0.297565078 0.263792481 0.247757785 0.232510207 0.265951379

53
ZENITH BANK 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
BOARD SIZE 13 15 12 10 11
BOARDNEX&INDP 7 8 8 6 6
N'Million
LOANS AND ADVANCES
BANKS 0 0 0 0 0
CUSTOMERS 895,354 1,126,559 1,580,250 1,849,225 2,138,132
TOTAL 895,354 1,126,559 1,580,250 1,849,225 2,138,132
DEPOSITS
BANKS 0 0 0 0 0
CUSTOMERS 1,802,008 2,079,862 2,265,262 2,333,017 2,552,963
TOTAL 1,802,008 2,079,862 2,265,262 2,333,017 2,552,963
PROFIT AFTER TAX 95,803 83,414 92,479 98,784 119,285
TOTAL ASSETS 2,436,886 2,878,693 3,423,819 3,750,327 4,283,736
EQUITY 438,003 472,622 512,707 546,946 616,353

ACCESS BANK 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

BOARD SIZE 16 20 16 14 14
BOARDNEX&INDP 8 7 9 7 8
N'Million
LOANS AND ADVANCES
BANKS 3,055 13,049 55,777 60,415 104,006
CUSTOMERS 554,592 735,301 1,019,909 1,243,215 1,594,562
TOTAL 557,647 748,350 1,075,686 1,303,630 1,698,568
DEPOSITS
BANKS 16,313 61,295 134,510 63,344 95,122
CUSTOMERS 1,093,979 1,217,177 1,324,801 1,528,214 1,813,043
TOTAL 1,110,292 1,278,472 1,459,311 1,591,558 1,908,165
PROFIT AFTER TAX 35,816 26,212 39,941 65,869 71,439
TOTAL ASSETS 1,515,754 1,704,094 1,981,956 2,411,944 3,094,960
EQUITY 237,624 245,182 274,156 360,429 421,679

FIDELITY BANK 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

BOARD SIZE 17 17 14 14 14
BOARDNEX&INDP 10 9 8 8 8
N'Million
LOANS AND ADVANCES
BANKS 98,000 80,875 68,735 79,942 49,200
CUSTOMERS 345,500 426,076 541,686 578,203 718,401
TOTAL 443,500 506,951 610,421 658,145 767,601
DEPOSITS
BANKS 0 0 0 0 0
CUSTOMERS 716,749 806,320 820,034 769,636 792,971
TOTAL 716,749 806,320 820,034 769,636 792,971

54
PROFIT AFTER TAX 17,924 7,721 13,796 13,904 9,734
TOTAL ASSETS 914,360 1,081,217 1,187,025 1,231,722 1,298,141
EQUITY 161,455 163,455 173,111 183,516 185,402

STERLING BANK
BOARD SIZE 13 13 16 15 15
BOARDNEX&INDP 9 9 10 9 9
N'Million
LOANS AND ADVANCES
BANKS 0 0 0 0 0
CUSTOMERS 229,421 321,749 371,246 338,726 468,250
TOTAL 229,421 321,749 371,246 338,726 468,250
DEPOSITS
BANKS 3,119 0 0 0 0
CUSTOMERS 463,726 570,511 655,944 590,889 584,734
TOTAL 466,845 570,511 655,944 590,889 584,734
PROFIT AFTER TAX 6,953 8,275 9,005 10,292 5,180
TOTAL ASSETS 580,226 707,201 824,539 799,451 830,802
EQUITY 46,642 63,458 84,715 95,566 85,679

DIAMOND BANK 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

BOARD SIZE 16 16 13 13 11
BOARDNEX&INDP 6 6 8 9 7
N'Million
LOANS AND ADVANCES
BANKS 113,384 104,892 214,538 66,821 88,553
CUSTOMERS 523,375 585,953 712,065 648,971 804,636
TOTAL 636,759 690,845 926,603 715,792 893,189
DEPOSITS
BANKS 8,173 5,745 9,687 57,175 13,365
CUSTOMERS 823,091 1,093,784 1,354,815 1,075,622 1,134,861
TOTAL 831,264 1,099,529 1,364,502 1,132,797 1,148,226
PROFIT AFTER TAX 23,073 29,754 22,057 3,834 1,970
TOTAL ASSETS 1,059,137 1,354,931 1,750,270 1,555,183 1,662,509
EQUITY 107,316 138,303 205,661 208,076 211,337

55