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    Francisco Salto Alemany
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    teorías racionalidad en la antigüedad

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    teorías racionalidad en la antigüedad

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    8 views25 pages

    Sorabij Rationality (Antiguedad)

    Uploaded by

    Francisco Salto Alemany
    teorías racionalidad en la antigüedad

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
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    of 25
    310 Mario Mignucci because it gives a nice solution to our problem. But it would be unfair to adopt it simply because it offers an explanation of what we are looking for. I do not see any reason to prefer the first interpre tation to the second. In our passage it is not said to what dgoguanévns GAndés is opposed, and it might be contrasted either to what is indefinitely true or to what is not yet true. Consequently, the author of the Quaestio might equally be a forerunner of Ammonius or a follower of Nicostratus. Although we do not know where his view ultimately comes from, Ammonius’ doctrine is far from uninteresting in an historical and philosophical perspective. Its commitment to an atemporal theory of truth, on the one hand, and its exploiting of the notions of necessity and possibility, on the other, clearly show how ample the range of the problems involved is and how modern they are."* ® Icis impossible to express my gratitude to all colleagues and friends who have contributed with their observations and criticisms to give the final form to this chapter. However, I would like to thank at least Jonathan Barnes, who has not only given me useful suggestions, but also tried to make my English less Italian I2 Rationality RICHARD SORABII THE DENIAL OF RATIONALITY T want to tell the story of the crisis produced in philosophy by a single claim about rationality: Aristotle’s claim that animals lack it. And since belief (doxa) implies rationality, he denied them belief as well.' But how, then, do animals cope with the world? To explain this, Aristotle had to expand the content of sense perception, which in Theaetetus 185-7 Plato had contracted to the mere registering of whiteness, sweetness, and other sensible qualities. And he had to reclaim appearance (phantasia) as a perceptual faculty, where Plato had classified appearance and illusion as kinds of belief (doxa)? But in re-expanding the content of sense perception, which an- imals do possess, Aristotle had to avoid turning sense perception into belief, which they do not. Similarly for emotion, experience, memory, and foresight, if animals possess these, it must be shown why these capacities do not involve reason or belief. And these demarcations in turn throw light on the nature of rationality. Thus every part of the philosophy of mind was affected by Aristotle's claim. The important investigations of ancient scepticism in recent years, notably by Jonathan Barnes, Myles Burnyeat, Michael Frede, and Gisela Striker, have shown it to be a rich source of distinctions in the philosophy of mind. The denial of rationality to animals was another. The problem confronted not only Aristotle, but also the Stoics, who, like him, denied rationality to animals. It confronted some, * De An. 3. 3. 428'18-24, Sph. 2630-264d; Rep. 6030. 312 Richard Sorabji but not all, of the Epicureans, for they varied on whether to allow reason or intellect to animals.’ am not quite persuaded by Michael Frede’s suggestion‘ that they turned reasoning into a mere function of memory, although he has shown that others did, and that would have put reasoning within the compass of animals. Those philoso- phers who did grant reason and intellect to animals, typically the Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent mem- bers of Aristotle’s school, often exploited the difficulty of dis- entangling other mental powers from rationality. Not only in philosophy of mind, but also in ethics, the denial of rationality had repercussions for our treatment of animals, as we shall see. And these repercussions have lasted to this day. For Plato there was not yet a problem. In many works he im- plied, through his belief in transmigration of souls, that animals have a rational part of the soul.’ Why do foxes have clongated heads? To accommodate the movements of the rational part dis torted in a previous human incarnation. The rational part is not said to be missing, merely unused, and not even this is said of birds.* Even if reason (logismos, logos, logistikon) is sometimes denied to animals,’ this does not matter. For Plato believes that the non- rational parts of the soul are capable of beliefs. This is crucial, to take one example, to his analysis in the Republic of self-control as involving the rational and non-rational parts of the soul having the same beliefs (homodoxein) about which should rule.’ Only the Theaetetus evinces any other view, when it denies reasoning (analogismata) about what is the case (ousia), and by implication belief, to some animals.’ But it is not quite clear that it means all animals. And the Laws, written later than the Theaetetus, allows ® Deniat of reason (Jogos): Hermarchus ap. Porphsrium, Abs. 1. 12. Denia of thinking esis) and belie! (doxa, also pseudodoxia) Philodems, On the Gods 2 17:13. 67, 39; 14. 34 though animals have something analogous (analogon) to foresight (roorasts) and expectation (prosdokia) 13. 16-2126. for otner analogous States, 11+ ty 28, 34; 13. 30) 14. 29. But Lucretius grants animals mind (mens, tins), 3.265, 268: 299, *’ Michael Frede, “An Etopircist View of Knowledge: Memorism’, in Stephen Everson (ed), A Philosophical Introduction to Ancient Epistemology (Cambridge, 1990) Tim. 420-4, 91d-onc; Ph. 8rd-Baby Rep. 620a-d; Phar. 249 * Tins gid-o3e. For turther evidence, see Rep. 3760; Pe 2654 7 Smp. ro7a-c; Rep. stab; Laves fs; but contrast 964 * Rep. 4azb-

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